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1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28#include <linux/errno.h>
29#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30#include <linux/sched/task.h>
31#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40#include <linux/swap.h>
41#include <linux/spinlock.h>
42#include <linux/syscalls.h>
43#include <linux/dcache.h>
44#include <linux/file.h>
45#include <linux/fdtable.h>
46#include <linux/namei.h>
47#include <linux/mount.h>
48#include <linux/fs_context.h>
49#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57#include <net/net_namespace.h>
58#include <net/netlabel.h>
59#include <linux/uaccess.h>
60#include <asm/ioctls.h>
61#include <linux/atomic.h>
62#include <linux/bitops.h>
63#include <linux/interrupt.h>
64#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65#include <net/netlink.h>
66#include <linux/tcp.h>
67#include <linux/udp.h>
68#include <linux/dccp.h>
69#include <linux/sctp.h>
70#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71#include <linux/quota.h>
72#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <linux/parser.h>
75#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
76#include <net/ipv6.h>
77#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78#include <linux/personality.h>
79#include <linux/audit.h>
80#include <linux/string.h>
81#include <linux/mutex.h>
82#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83#include <linux/syslog.h>
84#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85#include <linux/export.h>
86#include <linux/msg.h>
87#include <linux/shm.h>
88#include <linux/bpf.h>
89#include <linux/kernfs.h>
90#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
91#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
92#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
93#include <linux/fanotify.h>
94#include <linux/io_uring.h>
95
96#include "avc.h"
97#include "objsec.h"
98#include "netif.h"
99#include "netnode.h"
100#include "netport.h"
101#include "ibpkey.h"
102#include "xfrm.h"
103#include "netlabel.h"
104#include "audit.h"
105#include "avc_ss.h"
106
107struct selinux_state selinux_state;
108
109/* SECMARK reference count */
110static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
111
112#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
114
115static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
116{
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
120 return 1;
121}
122__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
123#else
124#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
125#endif
126
127int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
130{
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
134 return 1;
135}
136__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
137#endif
138
139static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
141
142static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143{
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
148 if (checkreqprot)
149 pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
150 }
151 return 1;
152}
153__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
154
155/**
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
157 *
158 * Description:
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
164 *
165 */
166static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167{
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
170}
171
172/**
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
174 *
175 * Description:
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
180 *
181 */
182static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183{
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
186}
187
188static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189{
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
191 sel_netif_flush();
192 sel_netnode_flush();
193 sel_netport_flush();
194 synchronize_net();
195 }
196 return 0;
197}
198
199static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200{
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
204 }
205
206 return 0;
207}
208
209/*
210 * initialise the security for the init task
211 */
212static void cred_init_security(void)
213{
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
215
216 tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
217 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
218}
219
220/*
221 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
222 */
223static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
224{
225 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
226
227 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
228 return tsec->sid;
229}
230
231/*
232 * get the objective security ID of a task
233 */
234static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
235{
236 u32 sid;
237
238 rcu_read_lock();
239 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
240 rcu_read_unlock();
241 return sid;
242}
243
244static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
245
246/*
247 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
248 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
249 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
250 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
251 */
252static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
253 struct dentry *dentry,
254 bool may_sleep)
255{
256 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
257
258 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
259
260 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
261 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
262 if (!may_sleep)
263 return -ECHILD;
264
265 /*
266 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
267 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
268 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
269 */
270 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
271 }
272 return 0;
273}
274
275static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
276{
277 return selinux_inode(inode);
278}
279
280static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
281{
282 int error;
283
284 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
285 if (error)
286 return ERR_PTR(error);
287 return selinux_inode(inode);
288}
289
290/*
291 * Get the security label of an inode.
292 */
293static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
294{
295 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
296 return selinux_inode(inode);
297}
298
299static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
300{
301 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
302
303 return selinux_inode(inode);
304}
305
306/*
307 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
308 */
309static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
310{
311 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
312
313 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
314 return selinux_inode(inode);
315}
316
317static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
318{
319 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
320 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
321
322 if (!isec)
323 return;
324 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
325 /*
326 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
327 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
328 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
329 *
330 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
331 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
332 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
333 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
334 */
335 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
336 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
337 list_del_init(&isec->list);
338 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
339 }
340}
341
342struct selinux_mnt_opts {
343 u32 fscontext_sid;
344 u32 context_sid;
345 u32 rootcontext_sid;
346 u32 defcontext_sid;
347};
348
349static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
350{
351 kfree(mnt_opts);
352}
353
354enum {
355 Opt_error = -1,
356 Opt_context = 0,
357 Opt_defcontext = 1,
358 Opt_fscontext = 2,
359 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
360 Opt_seclabel = 4,
361};
362
363#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
364static struct {
365 const char *name;
366 int len;
367 int opt;
368 bool has_arg;
369} tokens[] = {
370 A(context, true),
371 A(fscontext, true),
372 A(defcontext, true),
373 A(rootcontext, true),
374 A(seclabel, false),
375};
376#undef A
377
378static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
379{
380 int i;
381
382 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
383 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
384 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
385 continue;
386 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
387 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
388 continue;
389 *arg = s + len + 1;
390 } else if (len != l)
391 continue;
392 return tokens[i].opt;
393 }
394 return Opt_error;
395}
396
397#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
398
399static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
400 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
401 const struct cred *cred)
402{
403 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
404 int rc;
405
406 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
407 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
408 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
409 if (rc)
410 return rc;
411
412 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
413 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
414 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
415 return rc;
416}
417
418static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
419 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
420 const struct cred *cred)
421{
422 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
423 int rc;
424 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
425 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
426 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
427 if (rc)
428 return rc;
429
430 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
431 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
432 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
433 return rc;
434}
435
436static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
437{
438 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
439 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
440 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
441 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
442 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
443 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
444 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
445 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
446 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
447}
448
449static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
450{
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
452
453 /*
454 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
455 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
456 */
457 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
458
459 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
460 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
461 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
463 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
464 return 1;
465
466 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
467 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
468
469 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
472 default:
473 return 0;
474 }
475}
476
477static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
478{
479 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
480 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
481 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
482 u32 sid;
483 int rc;
484
485 /*
486 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
487 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
488 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
489 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
490 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
491 */
492 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
493 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
494 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
495 goto fallback;
496 }
497
498 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
499 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
500 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
501 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
502 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
503 goto fallback;
504 } else {
505 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
506 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
507 return rc;
508 }
509 }
510 return 0;
511
512fallback:
513 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
514 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, "/",
515 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
516 if (rc)
517 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
518
519 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
520 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
521 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
522 sbsec->sid = sid;
523 return 0;
524}
525
526static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
527{
528 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
529 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
530 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
531 int rc = 0;
532
533 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
534 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
535 if (rc)
536 return rc;
537 }
538
539 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
540
541 /*
542 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
543 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
544 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
545 */
546 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
547 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
548 else
549 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
550
551 /* Initialize the root inode. */
552 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
553
554 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
555 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
556 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
557 populates itself. */
558 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
559 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
560 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
561 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
562 struct inode_security_struct, list);
563 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
564 list_del_init(&isec->list);
565 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
566 inode = igrab(inode);
567 if (inode) {
568 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
569 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
570 iput(inode);
571 }
572 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
573 }
574 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
575 return rc;
576}
577
578static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
579 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
580{
581 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
582
583 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
584 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
585 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
586 (old_sid != new_sid))
587 return 1;
588
589 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
590 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
591 */
592 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
593 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 return 1;
595 return 0;
596}
597
598/*
599 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
600 * labeling information.
601 */
602static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
603 void *mnt_opts,
604 unsigned long kern_flags,
605 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
606{
607 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
608 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
609 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
610 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
611 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
612 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
613 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
614 int rc = 0;
615
616 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
617
618 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
619 if (!opts) {
620 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
621 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
622 server is ready to handle calls. */
623 goto out;
624 }
625 rc = -EINVAL;
626 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
628 goto out;
629 }
630 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
631 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
632 * place the results is not allowed */
633 rc = -EINVAL;
634 goto out;
635 }
636
637 /*
638 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
639 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
640 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
641 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
642 *
643 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
644 * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
645 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
646 * will be used for both mounts)
647 */
648 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
649 && !opts)
650 goto out;
651
652 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
653
654 /*
655 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
656 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
657 * than once with different security options.
658 */
659 if (opts) {
660 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
661 fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
662 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
663 fscontext_sid))
664 goto out_double_mount;
665 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
666 }
667 if (opts->context_sid) {
668 context_sid = opts->context_sid;
669 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
670 context_sid))
671 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
673 }
674 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
675 rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
677 rootcontext_sid))
678 goto out_double_mount;
679 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
680 }
681 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
682 defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
683 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
684 defcontext_sid))
685 goto out_double_mount;
686 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
687 }
688 }
689
690 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
691 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
692 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
693 goto out_double_mount;
694 rc = 0;
695 goto out;
696 }
697
698 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
699 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
700
701 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
702 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
703 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
704 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
705 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
706 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
707 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
708
709 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
710 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
711 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
712 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
713
714 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
715 /*
716 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
717 * filesystem type.
718 */
719 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
720 if (rc) {
721 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
722 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
723 goto out;
724 }
725 }
726
727 /*
728 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
729 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
730 * line and security labels must be ignored.
731 */
732 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
733 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
734 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
736 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
737 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
738 defcontext_sid) {
739 rc = -EACCES;
740 goto out;
741 }
742 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
744 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
745 current_sid(),
746 current_sid(),
747 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
748 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
749 if (rc)
750 goto out;
751 }
752 goto out_set_opts;
753 }
754
755 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
756 if (fscontext_sid) {
757 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
758 if (rc)
759 goto out;
760
761 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
762 }
763
764 /*
765 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
766 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
767 * the superblock context if not already set.
768 */
769 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
770 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
771 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
772 }
773
774 if (context_sid) {
775 if (!fscontext_sid) {
776 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
777 cred);
778 if (rc)
779 goto out;
780 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
781 } else {
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
783 cred);
784 if (rc)
785 goto out;
786 }
787 if (!rootcontext_sid)
788 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
789
790 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
792 }
793
794 if (rootcontext_sid) {
795 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
796 cred);
797 if (rc)
798 goto out;
799
800 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
801 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
802 }
803
804 if (defcontext_sid) {
805 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
806 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
807 rc = -EINVAL;
808 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
809 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
810 goto out;
811 }
812
813 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
815 sbsec, cred);
816 if (rc)
817 goto out;
818 }
819
820 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
821 }
822
823out_set_opts:
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
825out:
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
827 return rc;
828out_double_mount:
829 rc = -EINVAL;
830 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
832 sb->s_type->name);
833 goto out;
834}
835
836static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
837 const struct super_block *newsb)
838{
839 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
840 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
841 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
842 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
843
844 if (oldflags != newflags)
845 goto mismatch;
846 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
847 goto mismatch;
848 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
849 goto mismatch;
850 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
851 goto mismatch;
852 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
853 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
854 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
855 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
856 goto mismatch;
857 }
858 return 0;
859mismatch:
860 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
861 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
862 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
863 return -EBUSY;
864}
865
866static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
867 struct super_block *newsb,
868 unsigned long kern_flags,
869 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
870{
871 int rc = 0;
872 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
873 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
874 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
875
876 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
877 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
878 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
879
880 /*
881 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
882 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
883 */
884 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
885 return 0;
886
887 /*
888 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
889 * place the results is not allowed.
890 */
891 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
892 return -EINVAL;
893
894 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
895 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
896
897 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
898 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
899 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
900 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
901 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
902 }
903
904 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
905
906 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
907
908 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
909 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
910 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
911
912 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
913 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
914 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
915 if (rc)
916 goto out;
917 }
918
919 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
920 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
921 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
922 }
923
924 if (set_context) {
925 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
926
927 if (!set_fscontext)
928 newsbsec->sid = sid;
929 if (!set_rootcontext) {
930 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
931 newisec->sid = sid;
932 }
933 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
934 }
935 if (set_rootcontext) {
936 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
937 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
938
939 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
940 }
941
942 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
943out:
944 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
945 return rc;
946}
947
948/*
949 * NOTE: the caller is resposible for freeing the memory even if on error.
950 */
951static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
952{
953 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
954 u32 *dst_sid;
955 int rc;
956
957 if (token == Opt_seclabel)
958 /* eaten and completely ignored */
959 return 0;
960 if (!s)
961 return -EINVAL;
962
963 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
964 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
965 return -EINVAL;
966 }
967
968 if (!opts) {
969 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
970 if (!opts)
971 return -ENOMEM;
972 *mnt_opts = opts;
973 }
974
975 switch (token) {
976 case Opt_context:
977 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
978 goto err;
979 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
980 break;
981 case Opt_fscontext:
982 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
983 goto err;
984 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
985 break;
986 case Opt_rootcontext:
987 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
988 goto err;
989 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
990 break;
991 case Opt_defcontext:
992 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
993 goto err;
994 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
995 break;
996 default:
997 WARN_ON(1);
998 return -EINVAL;
999 }
1000 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1001 if (rc)
1002 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1003 s, rc);
1004 return rc;
1005
1006err:
1007 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1008 return -EINVAL;
1009}
1010
1011static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1012{
1013 char *context = NULL;
1014 u32 len;
1015 int rc;
1016
1017 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1018 &context, &len);
1019 if (!rc) {
1020 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1021
1022 seq_putc(m, '=');
1023 if (has_comma)
1024 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1025 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1026 if (has_comma)
1027 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1028 }
1029 kfree(context);
1030 return rc;
1031}
1032
1033static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1034{
1035 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1036 int rc;
1037
1038 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1039 return 0;
1040
1041 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1042 return 0;
1043
1044 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1045 seq_putc(m, ',');
1046 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1047 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1048 if (rc)
1049 return rc;
1050 }
1051 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1052 seq_putc(m, ',');
1053 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1054 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1055 if (rc)
1056 return rc;
1057 }
1058 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1059 seq_putc(m, ',');
1060 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1061 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1062 if (rc)
1063 return rc;
1064 }
1065 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1066 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1067 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1068 seq_putc(m, ',');
1069 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1070 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1071 if (rc)
1072 return rc;
1073 }
1074 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1075 seq_putc(m, ',');
1076 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1077 }
1078 return 0;
1079}
1080
1081static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1082{
1083 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1084 case S_IFSOCK:
1085 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1086 case S_IFLNK:
1087 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1088 case S_IFREG:
1089 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1090 case S_IFBLK:
1091 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1092 case S_IFDIR:
1093 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1094 case S_IFCHR:
1095 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1096 case S_IFIFO:
1097 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1098
1099 }
1100
1101 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1102}
1103
1104static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1105{
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1107 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1108}
1109
1110static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1111{
1112 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1113}
1114
1115static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116{
1117 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1118
1119 switch (family) {
1120 case PF_UNIX:
1121 switch (type) {
1122 case SOCK_STREAM:
1123 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1124 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1125 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1126 case SOCK_RAW:
1127 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1128 }
1129 break;
1130 case PF_INET:
1131 case PF_INET6:
1132 switch (type) {
1133 case SOCK_STREAM:
1134 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1135 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1136 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1137 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1138 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1139 else
1140 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1141 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1142 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1143 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1144 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1145 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1146 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1147 else
1148 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1149 case SOCK_DCCP:
1150 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1151 default:
1152 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1153 }
1154 break;
1155 case PF_NETLINK:
1156 switch (protocol) {
1157 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1163 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1165 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1166 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1167 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1168 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1169 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1170 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1171 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1172 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1173 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1174 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1175 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1176 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1177 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1178 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1179 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1180 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1181 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1182 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1183 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1184 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1185 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1186 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1187 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1188 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1189 default:
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1191 }
1192 case PF_PACKET:
1193 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1194 case PF_KEY:
1195 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1196 case PF_APPLETALK:
1197 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1198 }
1199
1200 if (extsockclass) {
1201 switch (family) {
1202 case PF_AX25:
1203 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1204 case PF_IPX:
1205 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1206 case PF_NETROM:
1207 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1208 case PF_ATMPVC:
1209 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1210 case PF_X25:
1211 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1212 case PF_ROSE:
1213 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1214 case PF_DECnet:
1215 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1216 case PF_ATMSVC:
1217 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1218 case PF_RDS:
1219 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1220 case PF_IRDA:
1221 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1222 case PF_PPPOX:
1223 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1224 case PF_LLC:
1225 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1226 case PF_CAN:
1227 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1228 case PF_TIPC:
1229 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1230 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1231 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1232 case PF_IUCV:
1233 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1234 case PF_RXRPC:
1235 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1236 case PF_ISDN:
1237 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1238 case PF_PHONET:
1239 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1240 case PF_IEEE802154:
1241 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1242 case PF_CAIF:
1243 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1244 case PF_ALG:
1245 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1246 case PF_NFC:
1247 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1248 case PF_VSOCK:
1249 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1250 case PF_KCM:
1251 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1252 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1253 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1254 case PF_SMC:
1255 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1256 case PF_XDP:
1257 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1258 case PF_MCTP:
1259 return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1260#if PF_MAX > 46
1261#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1262#endif
1263 }
1264 }
1265
1266 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1267}
1268
1269static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1270 u16 tclass,
1271 u16 flags,
1272 u32 *sid)
1273{
1274 int rc;
1275 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1276 char *buffer, *path;
1277
1278 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1279 if (!buffer)
1280 return -ENOMEM;
1281
1282 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1283 if (IS_ERR(path))
1284 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1285 else {
1286 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1287 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1288 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1289 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1290 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1291 path[1] = '/';
1292 path++;
1293 }
1294 }
1295 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1296 path, tclass, sid);
1297 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1298 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1299 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1300 rc = 0;
1301 }
1302 }
1303 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1304 return rc;
1305}
1306
1307static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1308 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1309{
1310#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1311 char *context;
1312 unsigned int len;
1313 int rc;
1314
1315 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1316 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1317 if (!context)
1318 return -ENOMEM;
1319
1320 context[len] = '\0';
1321 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1322 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1323 kfree(context);
1324
1325 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1326 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1327 if (rc < 0)
1328 return rc;
1329
1330 len = rc;
1331 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1332 if (!context)
1333 return -ENOMEM;
1334
1335 context[len] = '\0';
1336 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1337 context, len);
1338 }
1339 if (rc < 0) {
1340 kfree(context);
1341 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1342 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1343 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1344 return rc;
1345 }
1346 *sid = def_sid;
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349
1350 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1351 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1352 if (rc) {
1353 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1354 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1355
1356 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1357 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1358 ino, dev, context);
1359 } else {
1360 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1361 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1362 }
1363 }
1364 kfree(context);
1365 return 0;
1366}
1367
1368/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1369static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1370{
1371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1372 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1373 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1374 u16 sclass;
1375 struct dentry *dentry;
1376 int rc = 0;
1377
1378 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1379 return 0;
1380
1381 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1382 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1383 goto out_unlock;
1384
1385 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1386 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1387
1388 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1389 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1390 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1391 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1392 server is ready to handle calls. */
1393 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1394 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1395 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1396 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1397 goto out_unlock;
1398 }
1399
1400 sclass = isec->sclass;
1401 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1402 sid = isec->sid;
1403 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1404 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1405
1406 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1407 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1408 break;
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1410 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1411 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1412 break;
1413 }
1414 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1415 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1416 if (opt_dentry) {
1417 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1418 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1419 } else {
1420 /*
1421 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1422 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1423 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1424 * two, depending upon that...
1425 */
1426 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1427 if (!dentry)
1428 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1429 }
1430 if (!dentry) {
1431 /*
1432 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1433 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1434 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1435 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1436 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1437 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1438 * be used again by userspace.
1439 */
1440 goto out_invalid;
1441 }
1442
1443 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1444 &sid);
1445 dput(dentry);
1446 if (rc)
1447 goto out;
1448 break;
1449 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1450 sid = task_sid;
1451 break;
1452 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1453 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1454 sid = sbsec->sid;
1455
1456 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1457 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1458 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1459 if (rc)
1460 goto out;
1461 break;
1462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1463 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1464 break;
1465 default:
1466 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1467 sid = sbsec->sid;
1468
1469 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1470 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1471 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1472 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1473 * procfs inodes */
1474 if (opt_dentry) {
1475 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1476 * d_splice_alias. */
1477 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1478 } else {
1479 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1480 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1481 * a connected one, so try that first.
1482 */
1483 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1484 if (!dentry)
1485 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1486 }
1487 /*
1488 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1489 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1490 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1491 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1492 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1493 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1494 * could be used again by userspace.
1495 */
1496 if (!dentry)
1497 goto out_invalid;
1498 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1499 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1500 if (rc) {
1501 dput(dentry);
1502 goto out;
1503 }
1504
1505 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1506 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1507 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1508 sid, &sid);
1509 if (rc) {
1510 dput(dentry);
1511 goto out;
1512 }
1513 }
1514 dput(dentry);
1515 }
1516 break;
1517 }
1518
1519out:
1520 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1521 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1522 if (rc) {
1523 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1524 goto out_unlock;
1525 }
1526 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1527 isec->sid = sid;
1528 }
1529
1530out_unlock:
1531 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1532 return rc;
1533
1534out_invalid:
1535 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1536 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1537 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1538 isec->sid = sid;
1539 }
1540 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1541 return 0;
1542}
1543
1544/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1545static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1546{
1547 u32 perm = 0;
1548
1549 switch (sig) {
1550 case SIGCHLD:
1551 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1552 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1553 break;
1554 case SIGKILL:
1555 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1556 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1557 break;
1558 case SIGSTOP:
1559 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1560 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1561 break;
1562 default:
1563 /* All other signals. */
1564 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1565 break;
1566 }
1567
1568 return perm;
1569}
1570
1571#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1572#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1573#endif
1574
1575/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1576static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1577 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1578{
1579 struct common_audit_data ad;
1580 struct av_decision avd;
1581 u16 sclass;
1582 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1583 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1584 int rc;
1585
1586 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1587 ad.u.cap = cap;
1588
1589 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1590 case 0:
1591 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1592 break;
1593 case 1:
1594 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1595 break;
1596 default:
1597 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1598 BUG();
1599 return -EINVAL;
1600 }
1601
1602 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1603 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1604 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1605 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1606 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1607 if (rc2)
1608 return rc2;
1609 }
1610 return rc;
1611}
1612
1613/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1614 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1615 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1616static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1617 struct inode *inode,
1618 u32 perms,
1619 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1620{
1621 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1622 u32 sid;
1623
1624 validate_creds(cred);
1625
1626 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1627 return 0;
1628
1629 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1630 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1631
1632 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1633 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1634}
1635
1636/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1637 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1638 pathname if needed. */
1639static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1640 struct dentry *dentry,
1641 u32 av)
1642{
1643 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1644 struct common_audit_data ad;
1645
1646 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1647 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1648 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1649 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1650}
1651
1652/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1653 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1654 pathname if needed. */
1655static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1656 const struct path *path,
1657 u32 av)
1658{
1659 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1660 struct common_audit_data ad;
1661
1662 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1663 ad.u.path = *path;
1664 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1665 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1666}
1667
1668/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1669static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1670 struct file *file,
1671 u32 av)
1672{
1673 struct common_audit_data ad;
1674
1675 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1676 ad.u.file = file;
1677 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1678}
1679
1680#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1681static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1682#endif
1683
1684/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1685 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1686 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1687 check a particular permission to the file.
1688 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1689 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1690 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1691 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1692static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1693 struct file *file,
1694 u32 av)
1695{
1696 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1697 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1698 struct common_audit_data ad;
1699 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1700 int rc;
1701
1702 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1703 ad.u.file = file;
1704
1705 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1706 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1707 sid, fsec->sid,
1708 SECCLASS_FD,
1709 FD__USE,
1710 &ad);
1711 if (rc)
1712 goto out;
1713 }
1714
1715#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1716 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1717 if (rc)
1718 return rc;
1719#endif
1720
1721 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1722 rc = 0;
1723 if (av)
1724 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1725
1726out:
1727 return rc;
1728}
1729
1730/*
1731 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1732 */
1733static int
1734selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1735 struct inode *dir,
1736 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1737 u32 *_new_isid)
1738{
1739 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1740 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1741
1742 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1743 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1744 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1745 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1746 tsec->create_sid) {
1747 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1748 } else {
1749 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1750 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1751 dsec->sid, tclass,
1752 name, _new_isid);
1753 }
1754
1755 return 0;
1756}
1757
1758/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1759static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1760 struct dentry *dentry,
1761 u16 tclass)
1762{
1763 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1764 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1766 u32 sid, newsid;
1767 struct common_audit_data ad;
1768 int rc;
1769
1770 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1771 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1772
1773 sid = tsec->sid;
1774
1775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1776 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1777
1778 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1779 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1780 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1781 &ad);
1782 if (rc)
1783 return rc;
1784
1785 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1786 &newsid);
1787 if (rc)
1788 return rc;
1789
1790 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1791 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1792 if (rc)
1793 return rc;
1794
1795 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1796 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1797 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1798 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1799}
1800
1801#define MAY_LINK 0
1802#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1803#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1804
1805/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1806static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1807 struct dentry *dentry,
1808 int kind)
1809
1810{
1811 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1812 struct common_audit_data ad;
1813 u32 sid = current_sid();
1814 u32 av;
1815 int rc;
1816
1817 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1818 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1819
1820 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1821 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1822
1823 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1824 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1825 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1826 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1827 if (rc)
1828 return rc;
1829
1830 switch (kind) {
1831 case MAY_LINK:
1832 av = FILE__LINK;
1833 break;
1834 case MAY_UNLINK:
1835 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1836 break;
1837 case MAY_RMDIR:
1838 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1839 break;
1840 default:
1841 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1842 __func__, kind);
1843 return 0;
1844 }
1845
1846 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1847 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1848 return rc;
1849}
1850
1851static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1852 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1853 struct inode *new_dir,
1854 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1855{
1856 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1857 struct common_audit_data ad;
1858 u32 sid = current_sid();
1859 u32 av;
1860 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1861 int rc;
1862
1863 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1864 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1865 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1866 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1867
1868 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1869
1870 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1871 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1872 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1873 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1874 if (rc)
1875 return rc;
1876 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1877 sid, old_isec->sid,
1878 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1879 if (rc)
1880 return rc;
1881 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1882 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1883 sid, old_isec->sid,
1884 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1885 if (rc)
1886 return rc;
1887 }
1888
1889 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1890 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1891 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1892 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1893 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1894 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1895 if (rc)
1896 return rc;
1897 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1898 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1899 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1900 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1901 sid, new_isec->sid,
1902 new_isec->sclass,
1903 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1904 if (rc)
1905 return rc;
1906 }
1907
1908 return 0;
1909}
1910
1911/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1912static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1913 struct super_block *sb,
1914 u32 perms,
1915 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1916{
1917 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1918 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1919
1920 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1921 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1922 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1923}
1924
1925/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1926static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1927{
1928 u32 av = 0;
1929
1930 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1931 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1932 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1933 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1934 av |= FILE__READ;
1935
1936 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1937 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1938 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1939 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1940
1941 } else {
1942 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1943 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1944 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1945 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1946 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1947 av |= DIR__READ;
1948 }
1949
1950 return av;
1951}
1952
1953/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1954static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1955{
1956 u32 av = 0;
1957
1958 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1959 av |= FILE__READ;
1960 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1961 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1962 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1963 else
1964 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1965 }
1966 if (!av) {
1967 /*
1968 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1969 */
1970 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1971 }
1972
1973 return av;
1974}
1975
1976/*
1977 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
1978 * open permission.
1979 */
1980static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1981{
1982 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1983 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1984
1985 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1986 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1987 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1988
1989 return av;
1990}
1991
1992/* Hook functions begin here. */
1993
1994static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
1995{
1996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1997 current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
1998 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1999}
2000
2001static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2002 const struct cred *to)
2003{
2004 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2005 u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2006 u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2007 int rc;
2008
2009 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2010 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2011 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2012 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2013 if (rc)
2014 return rc;
2015 }
2016
2017 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,
2018 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2019}
2020
2021static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2022 const struct cred *to)
2023{
2024 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2025 cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2026 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2027 NULL);
2028}
2029
2030static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2031 const struct cred *to,
2032 struct file *file)
2033{
2034 u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2035 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2036 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2037 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2038 struct common_audit_data ad;
2039 int rc;
2040
2041 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2042 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2043
2044 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2045 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2046 sid, fsec->sid,
2047 SECCLASS_FD,
2048 FD__USE,
2049 &ad);
2050 if (rc)
2051 return rc;
2052 }
2053
2054#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2055 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2056 if (rc)
2057 return rc;
2058#endif
2059
2060 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2061 return 0;
2062
2063 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2064 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2065 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2066 &ad);
2067}
2068
2069static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2070 unsigned int mode)
2071{
2072 u32 sid = current_sid();
2073 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2074
2075 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2076 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2077 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2078
2079 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2080 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2081}
2082
2083static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2084{
2085 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2086 task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2087 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2088}
2089
2090static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2091 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2092{
2093 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2094 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2095 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2096}
2097
2098static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2099 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2100 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2101 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2102{
2103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2104 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2105 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2106}
2107
2108/*
2109 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2110 * which was removed).
2111 *
2112 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2113 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2114 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2115 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2116 */
2117
2118static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2119 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2120{
2121 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2122}
2123
2124static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2125{
2126 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2127 int rc = 0;
2128
2129 if (!sb)
2130 return 0;
2131
2132 switch (cmds) {
2133 case Q_SYNC:
2134 case Q_QUOTAON:
2135 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2136 case Q_SETINFO:
2137 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2138 case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2139 case Q_XQUOTAON:
2140 case Q_XSETQLIM:
2141 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2142 break;
2143 case Q_GETFMT:
2144 case Q_GETINFO:
2145 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2146 case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2147 case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2148 case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2149 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2150 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2151 break;
2152 default:
2153 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2154 break;
2155 }
2156 return rc;
2157}
2158
2159static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2160{
2161 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2162
2163 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2164}
2165
2166static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2167{
2168 switch (type) {
2169 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2170 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2171 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2172 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2173 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2174 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2175 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2176 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2177 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2178 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2179 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2180 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2181 NULL);
2182 }
2183 /* All other syslog types */
2184 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2185 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2186 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2187}
2188
2189/*
2190 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2191 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2192 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2193 *
2194 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2195 * processes that allocate mappings.
2196 */
2197static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2198{
2199 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2200
2201 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2202 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2203 if (rc == 0)
2204 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2205
2206 return cap_sys_admin;
2207}
2208
2209/* binprm security operations */
2210
2211static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2212{
2213 u32 sid = 0;
2214 struct task_struct *tracer;
2215
2216 rcu_read_lock();
2217 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2218 if (tracer)
2219 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2220 rcu_read_unlock();
2221
2222 return sid;
2223}
2224
2225static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2226 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2227 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2228{
2229 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2230 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2231 int rc;
2232 u32 av;
2233
2234 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2235 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2236
2237 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2238 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2239
2240 /*
2241 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2242 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2243 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2244 * the old and new contexts.
2245 */
2246 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2247 av = 0;
2248 if (nnp)
2249 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2250 if (nosuid)
2251 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2252 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2253 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2254 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2255 if (!rc)
2256 return 0;
2257 }
2258
2259 /*
2260 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2261 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2262 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2263 */
2264 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2265 new_tsec->sid);
2266 if (!rc)
2267 return 0;
2268
2269 /*
2270 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2271 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2272 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2273 */
2274 if (nnp)
2275 return -EPERM;
2276 return -EACCES;
2277}
2278
2279static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2280{
2281 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2282 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2283 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2284 struct common_audit_data ad;
2285 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2286 int rc;
2287
2288 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2289 * the script interpreter */
2290
2291 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2292 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2293 isec = inode_security(inode);
2294
2295 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2296 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2297 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2298
2299 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2300 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2301 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2302 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2303
2304 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2305 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2306 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2307 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2308
2309 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2310 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2311 if (rc)
2312 return rc;
2313 } else {
2314 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2315 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2316 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2317 &new_tsec->sid);
2318 if (rc)
2319 return rc;
2320
2321 /*
2322 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2323 * transition.
2324 */
2325 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2326 if (rc)
2327 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2328 }
2329
2330 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2331 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2332
2333 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2335 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2336 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2337 if (rc)
2338 return rc;
2339 } else {
2340 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2341 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2342 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2343 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2344 if (rc)
2345 return rc;
2346
2347 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2348 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2349 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2350 if (rc)
2351 return rc;
2352
2353 /* Check for shared state */
2354 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2356 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2358 NULL);
2359 if (rc)
2360 return -EPERM;
2361 }
2362
2363 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2364 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2365 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2366 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2367 if (ptsid != 0) {
2368 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2369 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2370 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2371 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2372 if (rc)
2373 return -EPERM;
2374 }
2375 }
2376
2377 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2378 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2379
2380 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2381 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2382 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2383 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2384 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2385 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2386 NULL);
2387 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2388 }
2389
2390 return 0;
2391}
2392
2393static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2394{
2395 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2396}
2397
2398/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2399static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2400 struct files_struct *files)
2401{
2402 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2403 struct tty_struct *tty;
2404 int drop_tty = 0;
2405 unsigned n;
2406
2407 tty = get_current_tty();
2408 if (tty) {
2409 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2410 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2411 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2412
2413 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2414 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2415 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2416 open file may belong to another process and we are
2417 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2418 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2419 struct tty_file_private, list);
2420 file = file_priv->file;
2421 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2422 drop_tty = 1;
2423 }
2424 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2425 tty_kref_put(tty);
2426 }
2427 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2428 if (drop_tty)
2429 no_tty();
2430
2431 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2432 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2433 if (!n) /* none found? */
2434 return;
2435
2436 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2437 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2438 devnull = NULL;
2439 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2440 do {
2441 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2442 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2443 if (devnull)
2444 fput(devnull);
2445}
2446
2447/*
2448 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2449 */
2450static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2451{
2452 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2453 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2454 int rc, i;
2455
2456 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2457 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2458 return;
2459
2460 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2461 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2462
2463 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2464 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2465
2466 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2467 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2468 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2469 *
2470 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2471 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2472 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2473 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2474 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2475 */
2476 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2477 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2478 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2479 if (rc) {
2480 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2481 task_lock(current);
2482 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2483 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2484 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2485 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2486 }
2487 task_unlock(current);
2488 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2489 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2490 }
2491}
2492
2493/*
2494 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2495 * due to exec
2496 */
2497static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2498{
2499 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2500 u32 osid, sid;
2501 int rc;
2502
2503 osid = tsec->osid;
2504 sid = tsec->sid;
2505
2506 if (sid == osid)
2507 return;
2508
2509 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2510 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2511 * flush and unblock signals.
2512 *
2513 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2514 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2515 */
2516 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2517 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2518 if (rc) {
2519 clear_itimer();
2520
2521 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2522 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2523 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2524 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2525 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2526 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2527 recalc_sigpending();
2528 }
2529 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2530 }
2531
2532 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2533 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2534 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2535 __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2536 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2537}
2538
2539/* superblock security operations */
2540
2541static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2542{
2543 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2544
2545 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2546 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2547 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2548 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2549 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2550 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2551
2552 return 0;
2553}
2554
2555static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2556{
2557 bool open_quote = false;
2558 int len;
2559 char c;
2560
2561 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2562 if (c == '"')
2563 open_quote = !open_quote;
2564 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2565 break;
2566 }
2567 return len;
2568}
2569
2570static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2571{
2572 char *from = options;
2573 char *to = options;
2574 bool first = true;
2575 int rc;
2576
2577 while (1) {
2578 int len = opt_len(from);
2579 int token;
2580 char *arg = NULL;
2581
2582 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2583
2584 if (token != Opt_error) {
2585 char *p, *q;
2586
2587 /* strip quotes */
2588 if (arg) {
2589 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2590 char c = *p;
2591 if (c != '"')
2592 *q++ = c;
2593 }
2594 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2595 if (!arg) {
2596 rc = -ENOMEM;
2597 goto free_opt;
2598 }
2599 }
2600 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2601 kfree(arg);
2602 arg = NULL;
2603 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2604 goto free_opt;
2605 }
2606 } else {
2607 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2608 from--;
2609 len++;
2610 }
2611 if (to != from)
2612 memmove(to, from, len);
2613 to += len;
2614 first = false;
2615 }
2616 if (!from[len])
2617 break;
2618 from += len + 1;
2619 }
2620 *to = '\0';
2621 return 0;
2622
2623free_opt:
2624 if (*mnt_opts) {
2625 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2626 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2627 }
2628 return rc;
2629}
2630
2631static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2632{
2633 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2634 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2635
2636 /*
2637 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2638 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2639 */
2640 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2641 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2642
2643 /*
2644 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2645 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2646 */
2647 if (!opts)
2648 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2649
2650 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2651 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2652 opts->fscontext_sid))
2653 return 1;
2654 }
2655 if (opts->context_sid) {
2656 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2657 opts->context_sid))
2658 return 1;
2659 }
2660 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2661 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2662
2663 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2664 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2665 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2666 return 1;
2667 }
2668 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2669 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2670 opts->defcontext_sid))
2671 return 1;
2672 }
2673 return 0;
2674}
2675
2676static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2677{
2678 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2679 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2680
2681 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2682 return 0;
2683
2684 if (!opts)
2685 return 0;
2686
2687 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2688 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2689 opts->fscontext_sid))
2690 goto out_bad_option;
2691 }
2692 if (opts->context_sid) {
2693 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2694 opts->context_sid))
2695 goto out_bad_option;
2696 }
2697 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2698 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2699 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2700 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2701 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2702 goto out_bad_option;
2703 }
2704 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2705 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2706 opts->defcontext_sid))
2707 goto out_bad_option;
2708 }
2709 return 0;
2710
2711out_bad_option:
2712 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2713 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2714 sb->s_type->name);
2715 return -EINVAL;
2716}
2717
2718static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2719{
2720 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2721 struct common_audit_data ad;
2722
2723 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2724 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2725 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2726}
2727
2728static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2729{
2730 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2731 struct common_audit_data ad;
2732
2733 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2734 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2735 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2736}
2737
2738static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2739 const struct path *path,
2740 const char *type,
2741 unsigned long flags,
2742 void *data)
2743{
2744 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2745
2746 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2747 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2748 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2749 else
2750 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2751}
2752
2753static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2754 const struct path *to_path)
2755{
2756 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2757
2758 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2759}
2760
2761static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2762{
2763 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2764
2765 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2766 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2767}
2768
2769static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2770 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2771{
2772 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2773
2774 if (!src)
2775 return 0;
2776
2777 fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2778 return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2779}
2780
2781static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2782 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2783 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2784 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2785 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2786 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2787 {}
2788};
2789
2790static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2791 struct fs_parameter *param)
2792{
2793 struct fs_parse_result result;
2794 int opt;
2795
2796 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2797 if (opt < 0)
2798 return opt;
2799
2800 return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2801}
2802
2803/* inode security operations */
2804
2805static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2806{
2807 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2808 u32 sid = current_sid();
2809
2810 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2811 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2812 isec->inode = inode;
2813 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2814 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2815 isec->task_sid = sid;
2816 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2817
2818 return 0;
2819}
2820
2821static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2822{
2823 inode_free_security(inode);
2824}
2825
2826static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2827 const struct qstr *name,
2828 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2829 u32 *ctxlen)
2830{
2831 u32 newsid;
2832 int rc;
2833
2834 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2835 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2836 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2837 &newsid);
2838 if (rc)
2839 return rc;
2840
2841 if (xattr_name)
2842 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2843
2844 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2845 ctxlen);
2846}
2847
2848static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2849 struct qstr *name,
2850 const struct cred *old,
2851 struct cred *new)
2852{
2853 u32 newsid;
2854 int rc;
2855 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2856
2857 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2858 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2859 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2860 &newsid);
2861 if (rc)
2862 return rc;
2863
2864 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2865 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2866 return 0;
2867}
2868
2869static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2870 const struct qstr *qstr,
2871 const char **name,
2872 void **value, size_t *len)
2873{
2874 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2875 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2876 u32 newsid, clen;
2877 int rc;
2878 char *context;
2879
2880 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2881
2882 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2883
2884 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2885 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2886 &newsid);
2887 if (rc)
2888 return rc;
2889
2890 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2891 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2892 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2893 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2894 isec->sid = newsid;
2895 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2896 }
2897
2898 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
2899 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2900 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2901
2902 if (name)
2903 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2904
2905 if (value && len) {
2906 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2907 &context, &clen);
2908 if (rc)
2909 return rc;
2910 *value = context;
2911 *len = clen;
2912 }
2913
2914 return 0;
2915}
2916
2917static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2918 const struct qstr *name,
2919 const struct inode *context_inode)
2920{
2921 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2922 struct common_audit_data ad;
2923 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2924 int rc;
2925
2926 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
2927 return 0;
2928
2929 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2930
2931 /*
2932 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
2933 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2934 * untouched.
2935 */
2936
2937 if (context_inode) {
2938 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2939 selinux_inode(context_inode);
2940 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2941 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized");
2942 return -EACCES;
2943 }
2944
2945 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2946 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2947 } else {
2948 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2949 rc = security_transition_sid(
2950 &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2951 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2952 if (rc)
2953 return rc;
2954 }
2955
2956 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2957 /*
2958 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
2959 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
2960 */
2961
2962 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
2963 ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
2964
2965 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2966 tsec->sid,
2967 isec->sid,
2968 isec->sclass,
2969 FILE__CREATE,
2970 &ad);
2971}
2972
2973static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2974{
2975 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2976}
2977
2978static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2979{
2980 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2981}
2982
2983static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2984{
2985 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2986}
2987
2988static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2989{
2990 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2991}
2992
2993static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2994{
2995 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2996}
2997
2998static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2999{
3000 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3001}
3002
3003static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3004{
3005 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3006}
3007
3008static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3009 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3010{
3011 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3012}
3013
3014static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3015{
3016 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3017
3018 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3019}
3020
3021static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3022 bool rcu)
3023{
3024 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3025 struct common_audit_data ad;
3026 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3027 u32 sid;
3028
3029 validate_creds(cred);
3030
3031 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3032 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3033 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3034 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3035 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3036 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3037
3038 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3039 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3040}
3041
3042static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3043 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3044 int result)
3045{
3046 struct common_audit_data ad;
3047 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3048
3049 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3050 ad.u.inode = inode;
3051
3052 return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3053 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3054 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3055}
3056
3057static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3058{
3059 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3060 u32 perms;
3061 bool from_access;
3062 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3063 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3064 u32 sid;
3065 struct av_decision avd;
3066 int rc, rc2;
3067 u32 audited, denied;
3068
3069 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3070 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3071
3072 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3073 if (!mask)
3074 return 0;
3075
3076 validate_creds(cred);
3077
3078 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3079 return 0;
3080
3081 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3082
3083 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3084 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3085 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3086 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3087
3088 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3089 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3090 &avd);
3091 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3092 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3093 &denied);
3094 if (likely(!audited))
3095 return rc;
3096
3097 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3098 if (rc2)
3099 return rc2;
3100 return rc;
3101}
3102
3103static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3104{
3105 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3106 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3107 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3108 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3109
3110 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3111 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3112 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3113 ATTR_FORCE);
3114 if (!ia_valid)
3115 return 0;
3116 }
3117
3118 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3119 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3120 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3121
3122 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3123 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3124 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3125 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3126 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3127
3128 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3129}
3130
3131static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3132{
3133 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3134}
3135
3136static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3137{
3138 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3139 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3140
3141 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3142 return false;
3143 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3144 return false;
3145 return true;
3146}
3147
3148static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3149 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3150 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3151{
3152 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3153 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3154 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3155 struct common_audit_data ad;
3156 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3157 int rc = 0;
3158
3159 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3160 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3161 if (rc)
3162 return rc;
3163
3164 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3165 ordinary setattr permission. */
3166 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3167 }
3168
3169 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3170 return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3171
3172 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3173 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3174 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3175
3176 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
3177 return -EPERM;
3178
3179 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3180 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3181
3182 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3183 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3184 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3185 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3186 if (rc)
3187 return rc;
3188
3189 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3190 GFP_KERNEL);
3191 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3192 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3193 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3194 size_t audit_size;
3195
3196 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3197 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3198 if (value) {
3199 const char *str = value;
3200
3201 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3202 audit_size = size - 1;
3203 else
3204 audit_size = size;
3205 } else {
3206 audit_size = 0;
3207 }
3208 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3209 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3210 if (!ab)
3211 return rc;
3212 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3213 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3214 audit_log_end(ab);
3215
3216 return rc;
3217 }
3218 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3219 size, &newsid);
3220 }
3221 if (rc)
3222 return rc;
3223
3224 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3225 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3226 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3227 if (rc)
3228 return rc;
3229
3230 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3231 sid, isec->sclass);
3232 if (rc)
3233 return rc;
3234
3235 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3236 newsid,
3237 sbsec->sid,
3238 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3239 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3240 &ad);
3241}
3242
3243static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3244 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3245 struct posix_acl *kacl)
3246{
3247 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3248}
3249
3250static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3251 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3252{
3253 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3254}
3255
3256static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3257 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3258{
3259 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3260}
3261
3262static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3263 const void *value, size_t size,
3264 int flags)
3265{
3266 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3267 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3268 u32 newsid;
3269 int rc;
3270
3271 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3272 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3273 return;
3274 }
3275
3276 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3277 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3278 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3279 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3280 * we've since initialized.
3281 */
3282 return;
3283 }
3284
3285 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3286 &newsid);
3287 if (rc) {
3288 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3289 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3290 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3291 return;
3292 }
3293
3294 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3295 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3296 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3297 isec->sid = newsid;
3298 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3299 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3300}
3301
3302static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3303{
3304 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3305
3306 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3307}
3308
3309static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3310{
3311 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3312
3313 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3314}
3315
3316static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3317 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3318{
3319 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3320 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
3321 if (rc)
3322 return rc;
3323
3324 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3325 ordinary setattr permission. */
3326 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3327 }
3328
3329 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3330 return 0;
3331
3332 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3333 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3334 return -EACCES;
3335}
3336
3337static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3338 unsigned int obj_type)
3339{
3340 int ret;
3341 u32 perm;
3342
3343 struct common_audit_data ad;
3344
3345 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3346 ad.u.path = *path;
3347
3348 /*
3349 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3350 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3351 */
3352 switch (obj_type) {
3353 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3354 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3355 break;
3356 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3357 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3358 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3359 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3360 if (ret)
3361 return ret;
3362 break;
3363 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3364 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3365 break;
3366 default:
3367 return -EINVAL;
3368 }
3369
3370 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3371 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3372 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3373
3374 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3375 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3376 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3377
3378 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3379}
3380
3381/*
3382 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3383 *
3384 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3385 */
3386static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3387 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3388 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3389{
3390 u32 size;
3391 int error;
3392 char *context = NULL;
3393 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3394
3395 /*
3396 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3397 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3398 */
3399 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3400 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3401 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3402
3403 /*
3404 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3405 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3406 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3407 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3408 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3409 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3410 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3411 */
3412 isec = inode_security(inode);
3413 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3414 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3415 isec->sid, &context,
3416 &size);
3417 else
3418 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3419 &context, &size);
3420 if (error)
3421 return error;
3422 error = size;
3423 if (alloc) {
3424 *buffer = context;
3425 goto out_nofree;
3426 }
3427 kfree(context);
3428out_nofree:
3429 return error;
3430}
3431
3432static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3433 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3434{
3435 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3436 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3437 u32 newsid;
3438 int rc;
3439
3440 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3441 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3442
3443 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3444 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3445 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3446
3447 if (!value || !size)
3448 return -EACCES;
3449
3450 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3451 GFP_KERNEL);
3452 if (rc)
3453 return rc;
3454
3455 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3456 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3457 isec->sid = newsid;
3458 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3459 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3460 return 0;
3461}
3462
3463static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3464{
3465 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3466
3467 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3468 return 0;
3469
3470 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3471 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3472 return len;
3473}
3474
3475static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3476{
3477 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3478 *secid = isec->sid;
3479}
3480
3481static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3482{
3483 u32 sid;
3484 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3485 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3486
3487 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3488 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3489 if (!new_creds)
3490 return -ENOMEM;
3491 }
3492
3493 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3494 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3495 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3496 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3497 *new = new_creds;
3498 return 0;
3499}
3500
3501static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3502{
3503 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3504 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3505 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3506 */
3507 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3508 return 1; /* Discard */
3509 /*
3510 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3511 * by selinux.
3512 */
3513 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3514}
3515
3516/* kernfs node operations */
3517
3518static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3519 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3520{
3521 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3522 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3523 int rc;
3524 char *context;
3525
3526 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3527 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3528 return 0;
3529 else if (rc < 0)
3530 return rc;
3531
3532 clen = (u32)rc;
3533 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3534 if (!context)
3535 return -ENOMEM;
3536
3537 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3538 if (rc < 0) {
3539 kfree(context);
3540 return rc;
3541 }
3542
3543 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3544 GFP_KERNEL);
3545 kfree(context);
3546 if (rc)
3547 return rc;
3548
3549 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3550 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3551 } else {
3552 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3553 struct qstr q;
3554
3555 q.name = kn->name;
3556 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3557
3558 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3559 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3560 &newsid);
3561 if (rc)
3562 return rc;
3563 }
3564
3565 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3566 &context, &clen);
3567 if (rc)
3568 return rc;
3569
3570 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3571 XATTR_CREATE);
3572 kfree(context);
3573 return rc;
3574}
3575
3576
3577/* file security operations */
3578
3579static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3580{
3581 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3582 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3583
3584 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3585 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3586 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3587
3588 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3589 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3590}
3591
3592static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3593{
3594 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3595 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3596 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3597 u32 sid = current_sid();
3598
3599 if (!mask)
3600 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3601 return 0;
3602
3603 isec = inode_security(inode);
3604 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3605 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3606 /* No change since file_open check. */
3607 return 0;
3608
3609 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3610}
3611
3612static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3613{
3614 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3615 u32 sid = current_sid();
3616
3617 fsec->sid = sid;
3618 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3619
3620 return 0;
3621}
3622
3623/*
3624 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3625 * operation to an inode.
3626 */
3627static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3628 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3629{
3630 struct common_audit_data ad;
3631 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3632 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3633 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3634 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3635 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3636 int rc;
3637 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3638 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3639
3640 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3641 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3642 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3643 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3644
3645 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3646 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3647 ssid, fsec->sid,
3648 SECCLASS_FD,
3649 FD__USE,
3650 &ad);
3651 if (rc)
3652 goto out;
3653 }
3654
3655 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3656 return 0;
3657
3658 isec = inode_security(inode);
3659 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3660 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3661 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3662out:
3663 return rc;
3664}
3665
3666static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3667 unsigned long arg)
3668{
3669 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3670 int error = 0;
3671
3672 switch (cmd) {
3673 case FIONREAD:
3674 case FIBMAP:
3675 case FIGETBSZ:
3676 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3677 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3678 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3679 break;
3680
3681 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3682 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3683 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3684 break;
3685
3686 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3687 case FIONBIO:
3688 case FIOASYNC:
3689 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3690 break;
3691
3692 case KDSKBENT:
3693 case KDSKBSENT:
3694 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3695 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3696 break;
3697
3698 case FIOCLEX:
3699 case FIONCLEX:
3700 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3701 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3702 break;
3703
3704 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3705 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3706 */
3707 default:
3708 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3709 }
3710 return error;
3711}
3712
3713static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3714
3715static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3716{
3717 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3718 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3719 int rc = 0;
3720
3721 if (default_noexec &&
3722 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3723 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3724 /*
3725 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3726 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3727 * This has an additional check.
3728 */
3729 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3730 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3731 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3732 if (rc)
3733 goto error;
3734 }
3735
3736 if (file) {
3737 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3738 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3739
3740 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3741 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3742 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3743
3744 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3745 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3746
3747 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3748 }
3749
3750error:
3751 return rc;
3752}
3753
3754static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3755{
3756 int rc = 0;
3757
3758 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3759 u32 sid = current_sid();
3760 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3761 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3762 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3763 }
3764
3765 return rc;
3766}
3767
3768static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3769 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3770{
3771 struct common_audit_data ad;
3772 int rc;
3773
3774 if (file) {
3775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3776 ad.u.file = file;
3777 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3778 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3779 if (rc)
3780 return rc;
3781 }
3782
3783 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3784 prot = reqprot;
3785
3786 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3787 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3788}
3789
3790static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3791 unsigned long reqprot,
3792 unsigned long prot)
3793{
3794 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3795 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3796
3797 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3798 prot = reqprot;
3799
3800 if (default_noexec &&
3801 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3802 int rc = 0;
3803 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3804 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3805 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3806 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3807 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3808 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3809 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3810 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3811 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3812 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3813 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3814 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3815 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3816 /*
3817 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3818 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3819 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3820 * modified content. This typically should only
3821 * occur for text relocations.
3822 */
3823 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3824 }
3825 if (rc)
3826 return rc;
3827 }
3828
3829 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3830}
3831
3832static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3833{
3834 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3835
3836 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3837}
3838
3839static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3840 unsigned long arg)
3841{
3842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3843 int err = 0;
3844
3845 switch (cmd) {
3846 case F_SETFL:
3847 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3848 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3849 break;
3850 }
3851 fallthrough;
3852 case F_SETOWN:
3853 case F_SETSIG:
3854 case F_GETFL:
3855 case F_GETOWN:
3856 case F_GETSIG:
3857 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3858 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3859 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3860 break;
3861 case F_GETLK:
3862 case F_SETLK:
3863 case F_SETLKW:
3864 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3865 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3866 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3867#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3868 case F_GETLK64:
3869 case F_SETLK64:
3870 case F_SETLKW64:
3871#endif
3872 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3873 break;
3874 }
3875
3876 return err;
3877}
3878
3879static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3880{
3881 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3882
3883 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3884 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3885}
3886
3887static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3888 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3889{
3890 struct file *file;
3891 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3892 u32 perm;
3893 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3894
3895 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3896 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3897
3898 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3899
3900 if (!signum)
3901 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3902 else
3903 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3904
3905 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3906 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3907 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3908}
3909
3910static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3911{
3912 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3913
3914 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3915}
3916
3917static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3918{
3919 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3920 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3921
3922 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3923 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3924 /*
3925 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3926 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3927 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3928 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3929 * struct as its SID.
3930 */
3931 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3932 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3933 /*
3934 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3935 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3936 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3937 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3938 * new inode label or new policy.
3939 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3940 */
3941 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3942}
3943
3944/* task security operations */
3945
3946static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3947 unsigned long clone_flags)
3948{
3949 u32 sid = current_sid();
3950
3951 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3952 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3953}
3954
3955/*
3956 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3957 */
3958static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3959 gfp_t gfp)
3960{
3961 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3962 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3963
3964 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3965 return 0;
3966}
3967
3968/*
3969 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3970 */
3971static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3972{
3973 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3974 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3975
3976 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3977}
3978
3979static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3980{
3981 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3982}
3983
3984/*
3985 * set the security data for a kernel service
3986 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3987 */
3988static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3989{
3990 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3991 u32 sid = current_sid();
3992 int ret;
3993
3994 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3995 sid, secid,
3996 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3997 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3998 NULL);
3999 if (ret == 0) {
4000 tsec->sid = secid;
4001 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4002 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4003 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4004 }
4005 return ret;
4006}
4007
4008/*
4009 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4010 * objective context of the specified inode
4011 */
4012static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4013{
4014 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4015 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4016 u32 sid = current_sid();
4017 int ret;
4018
4019 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4020 sid, isec->sid,
4021 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4022 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4023 NULL);
4024
4025 if (ret == 0)
4026 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4027 return ret;
4028}
4029
4030static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4031{
4032 struct common_audit_data ad;
4033
4034 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4035 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4036
4037 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4038 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4039 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4040}
4041
4042static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4043{
4044 struct common_audit_data ad;
4045 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4046 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4047 u32 sid = current_sid();
4048 int rc;
4049
4050 /* init_module */
4051 if (file == NULL)
4052 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4053 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4054 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4055
4056 /* finit_module */
4057
4058 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4059 ad.u.file = file;
4060
4061 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4062 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4063 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4064 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4065 if (rc)
4066 return rc;
4067 }
4068
4069 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4070 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4071 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4072 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4073}
4074
4075static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4076 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4077 bool contents)
4078{
4079 int rc = 0;
4080
4081 switch (id) {
4082 case READING_MODULE:
4083 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4084 break;
4085 default:
4086 break;
4087 }
4088
4089 return rc;
4090}
4091
4092static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4093{
4094 int rc = 0;
4095
4096 switch (id) {
4097 case LOADING_MODULE:
4098 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4099 break;
4100 default:
4101 break;
4102 }
4103
4104 return rc;
4105}
4106
4107static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4108{
4109 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4110 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4111 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4112}
4113
4114static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4115{
4116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4117 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4118 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4119}
4120
4121static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4122{
4123 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4124 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4125 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4126}
4127
4128static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
4129{
4130 *secid = current_sid();
4131}
4132
4133static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4134{
4135 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4136}
4137
4138static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4139{
4140 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4141 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4142 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4143}
4144
4145static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4146{
4147 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4148 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4149 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4150}
4151
4152static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4153{
4154 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4155 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4156 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4157}
4158
4159static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4160 unsigned int flags)
4161{
4162 u32 av = 0;
4163
4164 if (!flags)
4165 return 0;
4166 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4167 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4168 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4169 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4170 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4171 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4172 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4173}
4174
4175static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4176 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4177{
4178 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4179
4180 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4181 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4182 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4183 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4184 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4185 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4186 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4187 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4188
4189 return 0;
4190}
4191
4192static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4193{
4194 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4195 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4196 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4197}
4198
4199static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4200{
4201 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4202 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4203 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4204}
4205
4206static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4207{
4208 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4209 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4210 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4211}
4212
4213static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4214 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4215{
4216 u32 secid;
4217 u32 perm;
4218
4219 if (!sig)
4220 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4221 else
4222 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4223 if (!cred)
4224 secid = current_sid();
4225 else
4226 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4227 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4228 secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4229}
4230
4231static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4232 struct inode *inode)
4233{
4234 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4235 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4236
4237 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4238 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4239 isec->sid = sid;
4240 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4241 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4242}
4243
4244static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4245{
4246 u32 sid = current_sid();
4247
4248 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4249 USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4250}
4251
4252/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4253static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4254 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4255{
4256 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4257 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4258
4259 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4260 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4261 if (ih == NULL)
4262 goto out;
4263
4264 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4265 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4266 goto out;
4267
4268 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4269 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4270 ret = 0;
4271
4272 if (proto)
4273 *proto = ih->protocol;
4274
4275 switch (ih->protocol) {
4276 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4277 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4278
4279 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4280 break;
4281
4282 offset += ihlen;
4283 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4284 if (th == NULL)
4285 break;
4286
4287 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4288 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4289 break;
4290 }
4291
4292 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4293 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4294
4295 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4296 break;
4297
4298 offset += ihlen;
4299 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4300 if (uh == NULL)
4301 break;
4302
4303 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4304 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4305 break;
4306 }
4307
4308 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4309 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4310
4311 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4312 break;
4313
4314 offset += ihlen;
4315 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4316 if (dh == NULL)
4317 break;
4318
4319 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4320 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4321 break;
4322 }
4323
4324#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4325 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4326 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4327
4328 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4329 break;
4330
4331 offset += ihlen;
4332 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4333 if (sh == NULL)
4334 break;
4335
4336 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4337 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4338 break;
4339 }
4340#endif
4341 default:
4342 break;
4343 }
4344out:
4345 return ret;
4346}
4347
4348#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4349
4350/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4351static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4352 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4353{
4354 u8 nexthdr;
4355 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4356 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4357 __be16 frag_off;
4358
4359 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4360 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4361 if (ip6 == NULL)
4362 goto out;
4363
4364 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4365 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4366 ret = 0;
4367
4368 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4369 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4370 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4371 if (offset < 0)
4372 goto out;
4373
4374 if (proto)
4375 *proto = nexthdr;
4376
4377 switch (nexthdr) {
4378 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4379 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4380
4381 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4382 if (th == NULL)
4383 break;
4384
4385 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4386 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4387 break;
4388 }
4389
4390 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4391 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4392
4393 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4394 if (uh == NULL)
4395 break;
4396
4397 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4398 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4399 break;
4400 }
4401
4402 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4403 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4404
4405 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4406 if (dh == NULL)
4407 break;
4408
4409 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4410 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4411 break;
4412 }
4413
4414#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4415 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4416 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4417
4418 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4419 if (sh == NULL)
4420 break;
4421
4422 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4423 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4424 break;
4425 }
4426#endif
4427 /* includes fragments */
4428 default:
4429 break;
4430 }
4431out:
4432 return ret;
4433}
4434
4435#endif /* IPV6 */
4436
4437static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4438 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4439{
4440 char *addrp;
4441 int ret;
4442
4443 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4444 case PF_INET:
4445 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4446 if (ret)
4447 goto parse_error;
4448 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4449 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4450 goto okay;
4451
4452#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4453 case PF_INET6:
4454 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4455 if (ret)
4456 goto parse_error;
4457 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4458 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4459 goto okay;
4460#endif /* IPV6 */
4461 default:
4462 addrp = NULL;
4463 goto okay;
4464 }
4465
4466parse_error:
4467 pr_warn(
4468 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4469 " unable to parse packet\n");
4470 return ret;
4471
4472okay:
4473 if (_addrp)
4474 *_addrp = addrp;
4475 return 0;
4476}
4477
4478/**
4479 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4480 * @skb: the packet
4481 * @family: protocol family
4482 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4483 *
4484 * Description:
4485 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4486 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4487 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4488 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4489 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4490 * peer labels.
4491 *
4492 */
4493static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4494{
4495 int err;
4496 u32 xfrm_sid;
4497 u32 nlbl_sid;
4498 u32 nlbl_type;
4499
4500 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4501 if (unlikely(err))
4502 return -EACCES;
4503 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4504 if (unlikely(err))
4505 return -EACCES;
4506
4507 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4508 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4509 if (unlikely(err)) {
4510 pr_warn(
4511 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4512 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4513 return -EACCES;
4514 }
4515
4516 return 0;
4517}
4518
4519/**
4520 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4521 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4522 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4523 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4524 *
4525 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4526 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4527 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4528 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4529 *
4530 */
4531static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4532{
4533 int err = 0;
4534
4535 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4536 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4537 conn_sid);
4538 else
4539 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4540
4541 return err;
4542}
4543
4544/* socket security operations */
4545
4546static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4547 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4548{
4549 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4550 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4551 return 0;
4552 }
4553
4554 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4555 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4556}
4557
4558static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4559{
4560 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4561 struct common_audit_data ad;
4562 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4563
4564 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4565 return 0;
4566
4567 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4568 ad.u.net = &net;
4569 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4570
4571 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4572 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4573 &ad);
4574}
4575
4576static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4577 int protocol, int kern)
4578{
4579 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4580 u32 newsid;
4581 u16 secclass;
4582 int rc;
4583
4584 if (kern)
4585 return 0;
4586
4587 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4588 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4589 if (rc)
4590 return rc;
4591
4592 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4593 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4594}
4595
4596static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4597 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4598{
4599 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4600 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4601 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4602 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4603 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4604 int err = 0;
4605
4606 if (!kern) {
4607 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4608 if (err)
4609 return err;
4610 }
4611
4612 isec->sclass = sclass;
4613 isec->sid = sid;
4614 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4615
4616 if (sock->sk) {
4617 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4618 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4619 sksec->sid = sid;
4620 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4621 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4622 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4623
4624 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4625 }
4626
4627 return err;
4628}
4629
4630static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4631 struct socket *sockb)
4632{
4633 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4634 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4635
4636 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4637 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4638
4639 return 0;
4640}
4641
4642/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4643 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4644 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4645
4646static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4647{
4648 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4649 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4650 u16 family;
4651 int err;
4652
4653 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4654 if (err)
4655 goto out;
4656
4657 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4658 family = sk->sk_family;
4659 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4660 char *addrp;
4661 struct common_audit_data ad;
4662 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4663 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4664 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4665 u16 family_sa;
4666 unsigned short snum;
4667 u32 sid, node_perm;
4668
4669 /*
4670 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4671 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4672 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4673 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4674 */
4675 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4676 return -EINVAL;
4677 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4678 switch (family_sa) {
4679 case AF_UNSPEC:
4680 case AF_INET:
4681 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4682 return -EINVAL;
4683 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4684 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4685 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4686 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4687 */
4688 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4689 goto err_af;
4690 family_sa = AF_INET;
4691 }
4692 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4693 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4694 break;
4695 case AF_INET6:
4696 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4697 return -EINVAL;
4698 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4699 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4700 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4701 break;
4702 default:
4703 goto err_af;
4704 }
4705
4706 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4707 ad.u.net = &net;
4708 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4709 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4710
4711 if (snum) {
4712 int low, high;
4713
4714 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4715
4716 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4717 snum < low || snum > high) {
4718 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4719 snum, &sid);
4720 if (err)
4721 goto out;
4722 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4723 sksec->sid, sid,
4724 sksec->sclass,
4725 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4726 if (err)
4727 goto out;
4728 }
4729 }
4730
4731 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4732 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4733 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4734 break;
4735
4736 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4737 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4738 break;
4739
4740 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4741 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4742 break;
4743
4744 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4745 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4746 break;
4747
4748 default:
4749 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4750 break;
4751 }
4752
4753 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4754 if (err)
4755 goto out;
4756
4757 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4758 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4759 else
4760 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4761
4762 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4763 sksec->sid, sid,
4764 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4765 if (err)
4766 goto out;
4767 }
4768out:
4769 return err;
4770err_af:
4771 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4772 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4773 return -EINVAL;
4774 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4775}
4776
4777/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4778 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4779 */
4780static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4781 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4782{
4783 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4784 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4785 int err;
4786
4787 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4788 if (err)
4789 return err;
4790 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4791 return -EINVAL;
4792
4793 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4794 * way to disconnect the socket
4795 */
4796 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4797 return 0;
4798
4799 /*
4800 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4801 * for the port.
4802 */
4803 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4804 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4805 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4806 struct common_audit_data ad;
4807 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4808 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4809 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4810 unsigned short snum;
4811 u32 sid, perm;
4812
4813 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4814 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4815 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4816 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4817 */
4818 switch (address->sa_family) {
4819 case AF_INET:
4820 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4821 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4822 return -EINVAL;
4823 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4824 break;
4825 case AF_INET6:
4826 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4827 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4828 return -EINVAL;
4829 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4830 break;
4831 default:
4832 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4833 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4834 */
4835 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4836 return -EINVAL;
4837 else
4838 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4839 }
4840
4841 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4842 if (err)
4843 return err;
4844
4845 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4846 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4847 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4848 break;
4849 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4850 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4851 break;
4852 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4853 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4854 break;
4855 }
4856
4857 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4858 ad.u.net = &net;
4859 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4860 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4861 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4862 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4863 if (err)
4864 return err;
4865 }
4866
4867 return 0;
4868}
4869
4870/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4871static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4872 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4873{
4874 int err;
4875 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4876
4877 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4878 if (err)
4879 return err;
4880
4881 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4882}
4883
4884static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4885{
4886 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4887}
4888
4889static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4890{
4891 int err;
4892 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4893 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4894 u16 sclass;
4895 u32 sid;
4896
4897 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4898 if (err)
4899 return err;
4900
4901 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4902 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4903 sclass = isec->sclass;
4904 sid = isec->sid;
4905 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4906
4907 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4908 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4909 newisec->sid = sid;
4910 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4911
4912 return 0;
4913}
4914
4915static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4916 int size)
4917{
4918 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4919}
4920
4921static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4922 int size, int flags)
4923{
4924 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4925}
4926
4927static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4928{
4929 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4930}
4931
4932static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4933{
4934 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4935}
4936
4937static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4938{
4939 int err;
4940
4941 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4942 if (err)
4943 return err;
4944
4945 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4946}
4947
4948static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4949 int optname)
4950{
4951 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4952}
4953
4954static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4955{
4956 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4957}
4958
4959static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4960 struct sock *other,
4961 struct sock *newsk)
4962{
4963 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4964 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4965 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4966 struct common_audit_data ad;
4967 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4968 int err;
4969
4970 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4971 ad.u.net = &net;
4972 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4973
4974 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4975 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4976 sksec_other->sclass,
4977 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4978 if (err)
4979 return err;
4980
4981 /* server child socket */
4982 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4983 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4984 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4985 if (err)
4986 return err;
4987
4988 /* connecting socket */
4989 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4990
4991 return 0;
4992}
4993
4994static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4995 struct socket *other)
4996{
4997 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4998 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4999 struct common_audit_data ad;
5000 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5001
5002 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5003 ad.u.net = &net;
5004 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
5005
5006 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5007 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5008 &ad);
5009}
5010
5011static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5012 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5013 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5014{
5015 int err;
5016 u32 if_sid;
5017 u32 node_sid;
5018
5019 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5020 if (err)
5021 return err;
5022 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5023 peer_sid, if_sid,
5024 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5025 if (err)
5026 return err;
5027
5028 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5029 if (err)
5030 return err;
5031 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5032 peer_sid, node_sid,
5033 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5034}
5035
5036static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5037 u16 family)
5038{
5039 int err = 0;
5040 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5041 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5042 struct common_audit_data ad;
5043 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5044 char *addrp;
5045
5046 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5047 ad.u.net = &net;
5048 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5049 ad.u.net->family = family;
5050 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5051 if (err)
5052 return err;
5053
5054 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5055 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5056 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5057 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5058 if (err)
5059 return err;
5060 }
5061
5062 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5063 if (err)
5064 return err;
5065 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5066
5067 return err;
5068}
5069
5070static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5071{
5072 int err;
5073 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5074 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5075 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5076 struct common_audit_data ad;
5077 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5078 char *addrp;
5079 u8 secmark_active;
5080 u8 peerlbl_active;
5081
5082 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5083 return 0;
5084
5085 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5086 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5087 family = PF_INET;
5088
5089 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5090 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5091 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5092 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5093 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5094 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5095
5096 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5097 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5098 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5099 return 0;
5100
5101 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5102 ad.u.net = &net;
5103 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5104 ad.u.net->family = family;
5105 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5106 if (err)
5107 return err;
5108
5109 if (peerlbl_active) {
5110 u32 peer_sid;
5111
5112 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5113 if (err)
5114 return err;
5115 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5116 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5117 if (err) {
5118 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5119 return err;
5120 }
5121 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5122 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5123 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5124 if (err) {
5125 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5126 return err;
5127 }
5128 }
5129
5130 if (secmark_active) {
5131 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5132 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5133 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5134 if (err)
5135 return err;
5136 }
5137
5138 return err;
5139}
5140
5141static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5142 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5143 unsigned int len)
5144{
5145 int err = 0;
5146 char *scontext = NULL;
5147 u32 scontext_len;
5148 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5149 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5150
5151 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5152 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5153 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5154 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5155 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5156 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5157
5158 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5159 &scontext_len);
5160 if (err)
5161 return err;
5162 if (scontext_len > len) {
5163 err = -ERANGE;
5164 goto out_len;
5165 }
5166
5167 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5168 err = -EFAULT;
5169out_len:
5170 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5171 err = -EFAULT;
5172 kfree(scontext);
5173 return err;
5174}
5175
5176static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5177{
5178 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5179 u16 family;
5180 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5181
5182 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5183 family = PF_INET;
5184 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5185 family = PF_INET6;
5186 else if (sock)
5187 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5188 else
5189 goto out;
5190
5191 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5192 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5193 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5194 } else if (skb)
5195 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5196
5197out:
5198 *secid = peer_secid;
5199 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5200 return -EINVAL;
5201 return 0;
5202}
5203
5204static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5205{
5206 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5207
5208 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5209 if (!sksec)
5210 return -ENOMEM;
5211
5212 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5213 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5214 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5215 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5216 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5217
5218 return 0;
5219}
5220
5221static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5222{
5223 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5224
5225 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5226 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5227 kfree(sksec);
5228}
5229
5230static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5231{
5232 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5233 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5234
5235 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5236 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5237 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5238
5239 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5240}
5241
5242static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5243{
5244 if (!sk)
5245 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5246 else {
5247 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5248
5249 *secid = sksec->sid;
5250 }
5251}
5252
5253static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5254{
5255 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5256 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5257 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5258
5259 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5260 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5261 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5262 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5263}
5264
5265/*
5266 * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5267 * if it's the first association on the socket.
5268 */
5269static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5270 struct sk_buff *skb)
5271{
5272 struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5273 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5274 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5275 struct common_audit_data ad;
5276 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5277 int err;
5278
5279 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5280 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5281 family = PF_INET;
5282
5283 if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5284 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5285
5286 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5287 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5288 */
5289 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5290 if (err)
5291 return err;
5292
5293 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5294 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5295 } else {
5296 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5297 }
5298
5299 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5300 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5301
5302 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5303 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5304 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5305 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5306 */
5307 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5308 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5309 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5310 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5311 */
5312 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5313 ad.u.net = &net;
5314 ad.u.net->sk = asoc->base.sk;
5315 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5316 sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5317 sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5318 &ad);
5319 if (err)
5320 return err;
5321 }
5322 return 0;
5323}
5324
5325/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5326 * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5327 * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5328 */
5329static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5330 struct sk_buff *skb)
5331{
5332 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5333 u32 conn_sid;
5334 int err;
5335
5336 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5337 return 0;
5338
5339 err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5340 if (err)
5341 return err;
5342
5343 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5344 * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5345 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5346 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5347 * plug this into the new socket.
5348 */
5349 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5350 if (err)
5351 return err;
5352
5353 asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5354
5355 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5356 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5357}
5358
5359/* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5360 * response to an association request (initited by us).
5361 */
5362static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5363 struct sk_buff *skb)
5364{
5365 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5366
5367 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5368 return 0;
5369
5370 /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5371 * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5372 * into a new socket.
5373 */
5374 asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5375
5376 return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5377}
5378
5379/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5380 * based on their @optname.
5381 */
5382static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5383 struct sockaddr *address,
5384 int addrlen)
5385{
5386 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5387 void *addr_buf;
5388 struct sockaddr *addr;
5389 struct socket *sock;
5390
5391 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5392 return 0;
5393
5394 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5395 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5396 addr_buf = address;
5397
5398 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5399 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5400 return -EINVAL;
5401
5402 addr = addr_buf;
5403 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5404 case AF_UNSPEC:
5405 case AF_INET:
5406 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5407 break;
5408 case AF_INET6:
5409 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5410 break;
5411 default:
5412 return -EINVAL;
5413 }
5414
5415 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5416 return -EINVAL;
5417
5418 err = -EINVAL;
5419 switch (optname) {
5420 /* Bind checks */
5421 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5422 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5423 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5424 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5425 break;
5426 /* Connect checks */
5427 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5428 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5429 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5430 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5431 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5432 if (err)
5433 return err;
5434
5435 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5436 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5437 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5438 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5439 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5440 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5441 * primary address is selected.
5442 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5443 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5444 * selinux_socket_connect().
5445 */
5446 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5447 break;
5448 }
5449
5450 if (err)
5451 return err;
5452
5453 addr_buf += len;
5454 walk_size += len;
5455 }
5456
5457 return 0;
5458}
5459
5460/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5461static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5462 struct sock *newsk)
5463{
5464 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5465 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5466
5467 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5468 * the non-sctp clone version.
5469 */
5470 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5471 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5472
5473 newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5474 newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5475 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5476 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5477}
5478
5479static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5480 struct request_sock *req)
5481{
5482 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5483 int err;
5484 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5485 u32 connsid;
5486 u32 peersid;
5487
5488 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5489 if (err)
5490 return err;
5491 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5492 if (err)
5493 return err;
5494 req->secid = connsid;
5495 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5496
5497 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5498}
5499
5500static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5501 const struct request_sock *req)
5502{
5503 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5504
5505 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5506 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5507 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5508 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5509 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5510 time it will have been created and available. */
5511
5512 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5513 * thread with access to newsksec */
5514 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5515}
5516
5517static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5518{
5519 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5521
5522 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5523 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5524 family = PF_INET;
5525
5526 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5527}
5528
5529static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5530{
5531 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5532 u32 tsid;
5533
5534 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5535 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5536
5537 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5538 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5539 NULL);
5540}
5541
5542static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5543{
5544 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5545}
5546
5547static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5548{
5549 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5550}
5551
5552static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5553 struct flowi_common *flic)
5554{
5555 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5556}
5557
5558static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5559{
5560 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5561
5562 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5563 if (!tunsec)
5564 return -ENOMEM;
5565 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5566
5567 *security = tunsec;
5568 return 0;
5569}
5570
5571static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5572{
5573 kfree(security);
5574}
5575
5576static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5577{
5578 u32 sid = current_sid();
5579
5580 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5581 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5582 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5583 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5584 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5585 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5586
5587 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5588 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5589 NULL);
5590}
5591
5592static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5593{
5594 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5595
5596 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5597 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5598 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5599}
5600
5601static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5602{
5603 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5604 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5605
5606 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5607 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5608 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5609 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5610 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5611 * protocols were being used */
5612
5613 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5614 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5615
5616 return 0;
5617}
5618
5619static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5620{
5621 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5622 u32 sid = current_sid();
5623 int err;
5624
5625 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5626 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5627 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5628 if (err)
5629 return err;
5630 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5631 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5632 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5633 if (err)
5634 return err;
5635 tunsec->sid = sid;
5636
5637 return 0;
5638}
5639
5640#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5641
5642static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5643 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5644{
5645 int ifindex;
5646 u16 family;
5647 char *addrp;
5648 u32 peer_sid;
5649 struct common_audit_data ad;
5650 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5651 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5652
5653 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5654 return NF_ACCEPT;
5655
5656 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5657 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5658 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5659 return NF_ACCEPT;
5660
5661 family = state->pf;
5662 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5663 return NF_DROP;
5664
5665 ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5666 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5667 ad.u.net = &net;
5668 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5669 ad.u.net->family = family;
5670 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5671 return NF_DROP;
5672
5673 if (peerlbl_active) {
5674 int err;
5675
5676 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5677 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5678 if (err) {
5679 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5680 return NF_DROP;
5681 }
5682 }
5683
5684 if (secmark_active)
5685 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5686 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5687 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5688 return NF_DROP;
5689
5690 if (netlbl_enabled())
5691 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5692 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5693 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5694 * protection */
5695 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5696 return NF_DROP;
5697
5698 return NF_ACCEPT;
5699}
5700
5701static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5702 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5703{
5704 struct sock *sk;
5705 u32 sid;
5706
5707 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5708 return NF_ACCEPT;
5709
5710 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5711 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5712 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5713 sk = skb->sk;
5714 if (sk) {
5715 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5716
5717 if (sk_listener(sk))
5718 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5719 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5720 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5721 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5722 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5723 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5724 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5725 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5726 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5727 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5728 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5729 * best we can do. */
5730 return NF_ACCEPT;
5731
5732 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5733 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5734 sid = sksec->sid;
5735 } else
5736 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5737 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5738 return NF_DROP;
5739
5740 return NF_ACCEPT;
5741}
5742
5743
5744static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5745 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5746{
5747 struct sock *sk;
5748 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5749 struct common_audit_data ad;
5750 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5751 u8 proto = 0;
5752
5753 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5754 if (sk == NULL)
5755 return NF_ACCEPT;
5756 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5757
5758 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5759 ad.u.net = &net;
5760 ad.u.net->netif = state->out->ifindex;
5761 ad.u.net->family = state->pf;
5762 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5763 return NF_DROP;
5764
5765 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5766 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5767 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5768 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5769 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5770
5771 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5772 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5773
5774 return NF_ACCEPT;
5775}
5776
5777static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5778 struct sk_buff *skb,
5779 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5780{
5781 u16 family;
5782 u32 secmark_perm;
5783 u32 peer_sid;
5784 int ifindex;
5785 struct sock *sk;
5786 struct common_audit_data ad;
5787 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5788 char *addrp;
5789 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5790
5791 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5792 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5793 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5794 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5795 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5796 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5797
5798 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5799 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5800 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5801 return NF_ACCEPT;
5802
5803 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5804
5805#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5806 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5807 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5808 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5809 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5810 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5811 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5812 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5813 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5814 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5815 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5816 * connection. */
5817 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5818 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5819 return NF_ACCEPT;
5820#endif
5821
5822 family = state->pf;
5823 if (sk == NULL) {
5824 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5825 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5826 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5827 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5828 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5829 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5830 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5831 return NF_DROP;
5832 } else {
5833 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5834 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5835 }
5836 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5837 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5838 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5839 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5840 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5841 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5842 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5843 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5844 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5845 * for similar problems. */
5846 u32 skb_sid;
5847 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5848
5849 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5850 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5851 return NF_DROP;
5852 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5853 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5854 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5855 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5856 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5857 * pass the packet. */
5858 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5859 switch (family) {
5860 case PF_INET:
5861 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5862 return NF_ACCEPT;
5863 break;
5864 case PF_INET6:
5865 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5866 return NF_ACCEPT;
5867 break;
5868 default:
5869 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5870 }
5871 }
5872 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5873 return NF_DROP;
5874 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5875 } else {
5876 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5877 * associated socket. */
5878 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5879 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5880 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5881 }
5882
5883 ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5884 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5885 ad.u.net = &net;
5886 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5887 ad.u.net->family = family;
5888 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5889 return NF_DROP;
5890
5891 if (secmark_active)
5892 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5893 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5894 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5895 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5896
5897 if (peerlbl_active) {
5898 u32 if_sid;
5899 u32 node_sid;
5900
5901 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5902 return NF_DROP;
5903 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5904 peer_sid, if_sid,
5905 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5906 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5907
5908 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5909 return NF_DROP;
5910 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5911 peer_sid, node_sid,
5912 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5913 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5914 }
5915
5916 return NF_ACCEPT;
5917}
5918#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5919
5920static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5921{
5922 int rc = 0;
5923 unsigned int msg_len;
5924 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5925 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5926 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5927 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5928 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5929 u32 perm;
5930
5931 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5932 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5933
5934 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5935 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5936 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5937 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5938 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5939 */
5940 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5941 return 0;
5942
5943 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5944 if (rc == 0) {
5945 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5946 if (rc)
5947 return rc;
5948 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5949 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5950 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5951 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5952 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5953 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5954 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5955 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5956 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
5957 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5958 return rc;
5959 rc = 0;
5960 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5961 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5962 rc = 0;
5963 } else {
5964 return rc;
5965 }
5966
5967 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5968 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5969 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5970 return 0;
5971 data_len -= msg_len;
5972 data += msg_len;
5973 }
5974
5975 return rc;
5976}
5977
5978static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5979{
5980 isec->sclass = sclass;
5981 isec->sid = current_sid();
5982}
5983
5984static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5985 u32 perms)
5986{
5987 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5988 struct common_audit_data ad;
5989 u32 sid = current_sid();
5990
5991 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5992
5993 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5994 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5995
5996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5997 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5998}
5999
6000static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6001{
6002 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6003
6004 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6005 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6006
6007 return 0;
6008}
6009
6010/* message queue security operations */
6011static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6012{
6013 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6014 struct common_audit_data ad;
6015 u32 sid = current_sid();
6016
6017 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6018 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6019
6020 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6021 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6022
6023 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6024 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6025 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
6026}
6027
6028static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6029{
6030 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6031 struct common_audit_data ad;
6032 u32 sid = current_sid();
6033
6034 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6035
6036 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6037 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6038
6039 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6040 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6041 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6042}
6043
6044static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6045{
6046 int err;
6047 int perms;
6048
6049 switch (cmd) {
6050 case IPC_INFO:
6051 case MSG_INFO:
6052 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6053 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6054 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6055 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6056 case IPC_STAT:
6057 case MSG_STAT:
6058 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6059 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6060 break;
6061 case IPC_SET:
6062 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6063 break;
6064 case IPC_RMID:
6065 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6066 break;
6067 default:
6068 return 0;
6069 }
6070
6071 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6072 return err;
6073}
6074
6075static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6076{
6077 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6078 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6079 struct common_audit_data ad;
6080 u32 sid = current_sid();
6081 int rc;
6082
6083 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6084 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6085
6086 /*
6087 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6088 */
6089 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6090 /*
6091 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6092 * message queue this message will be stored in
6093 */
6094 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6095 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6096 if (rc)
6097 return rc;
6098 }
6099
6100 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6101 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6102
6103 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6104 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6105 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6106 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6107 if (!rc)
6108 /* Can this process send the message */
6109 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6110 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6111 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6112 if (!rc)
6113 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6114 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6115 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6116 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6117
6118 return rc;
6119}
6120
6121static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6122 struct task_struct *target,
6123 long type, int mode)
6124{
6125 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6126 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6127 struct common_audit_data ad;
6128 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6129 int rc;
6130
6131 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6132 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6133
6134 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6135 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6136
6137 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6138 sid, isec->sid,
6139 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6140 if (!rc)
6141 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6142 sid, msec->sid,
6143 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6144 return rc;
6145}
6146
6147/* Shared Memory security operations */
6148static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6149{
6150 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6151 struct common_audit_data ad;
6152 u32 sid = current_sid();
6153
6154 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6155 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6156
6157 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6158 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6159
6160 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6161 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6162 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6163}
6164
6165static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6166{
6167 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6168 struct common_audit_data ad;
6169 u32 sid = current_sid();
6170
6171 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6172
6173 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6174 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6175
6176 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6177 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6178 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6179}
6180
6181/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6182static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6183{
6184 int perms;
6185 int err;
6186
6187 switch (cmd) {
6188 case IPC_INFO:
6189 case SHM_INFO:
6190 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6191 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6192 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6193 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6194 case IPC_STAT:
6195 case SHM_STAT:
6196 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6197 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6198 break;
6199 case IPC_SET:
6200 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6201 break;
6202 case SHM_LOCK:
6203 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6204 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6205 break;
6206 case IPC_RMID:
6207 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6208 break;
6209 default:
6210 return 0;
6211 }
6212
6213 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6214 return err;
6215}
6216
6217static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6218 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6219{
6220 u32 perms;
6221
6222 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6223 perms = SHM__READ;
6224 else
6225 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6226
6227 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6228}
6229
6230/* Semaphore security operations */
6231static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6232{
6233 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6234 struct common_audit_data ad;
6235 u32 sid = current_sid();
6236
6237 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6238 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6239
6240 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6241 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6242
6243 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6244 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6245 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6246}
6247
6248static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6249{
6250 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6251 struct common_audit_data ad;
6252 u32 sid = current_sid();
6253
6254 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6255
6256 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6257 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6258
6259 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6260 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6261 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6262}
6263
6264/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6265static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6266{
6267 int err;
6268 u32 perms;
6269
6270 switch (cmd) {
6271 case IPC_INFO:
6272 case SEM_INFO:
6273 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6274 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6275 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6276 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6277 case GETPID:
6278 case GETNCNT:
6279 case GETZCNT:
6280 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6281 break;
6282 case GETVAL:
6283 case GETALL:
6284 perms = SEM__READ;
6285 break;
6286 case SETVAL:
6287 case SETALL:
6288 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6289 break;
6290 case IPC_RMID:
6291 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6292 break;
6293 case IPC_SET:
6294 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6295 break;
6296 case IPC_STAT:
6297 case SEM_STAT:
6298 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6299 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6300 break;
6301 default:
6302 return 0;
6303 }
6304
6305 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6306 return err;
6307}
6308
6309static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6310 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6311{
6312 u32 perms;
6313
6314 if (alter)
6315 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6316 else
6317 perms = SEM__READ;
6318
6319 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6320}
6321
6322static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6323{
6324 u32 av = 0;
6325
6326 av = 0;
6327 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6328 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6329 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6330 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6331
6332 if (av == 0)
6333 return 0;
6334
6335 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6336}
6337
6338static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6339{
6340 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6341 *secid = isec->sid;
6342}
6343
6344static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6345{
6346 if (inode)
6347 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6348}
6349
6350static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6351 const char *name, char **value)
6352{
6353 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6354 u32 sid;
6355 int error;
6356 unsigned len;
6357
6358 rcu_read_lock();
6359 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6360
6361 if (current != p) {
6362 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6363 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6364 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6365 if (error)
6366 goto bad;
6367 }
6368
6369 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6370 sid = __tsec->sid;
6371 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6372 sid = __tsec->osid;
6373 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6374 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6375 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6376 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6377 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6378 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6379 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6380 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6381 else {
6382 error = -EINVAL;
6383 goto bad;
6384 }
6385 rcu_read_unlock();
6386
6387 if (!sid)
6388 return 0;
6389
6390 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6391 if (error)
6392 return error;
6393 return len;
6394
6395bad:
6396 rcu_read_unlock();
6397 return error;
6398}
6399
6400static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6401{
6402 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6403 struct cred *new;
6404 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6405 int error;
6406 char *str = value;
6407
6408 /*
6409 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6410 */
6411 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6412 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6413 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6414 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6415 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6416 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6417 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6418 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6419 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6420 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6421 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6422 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6423 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6424 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6425 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6426 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6427 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6428 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6429 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6430 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6431 else
6432 error = -EINVAL;
6433 if (error)
6434 return error;
6435
6436 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6437 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6438 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6439 str[size-1] = 0;
6440 size--;
6441 }
6442 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6443 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6444 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6445 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6446 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6447 size_t audit_size;
6448
6449 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6450 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6451 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6452 audit_size = size - 1;
6453 else
6454 audit_size = size;
6455 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6456 GFP_ATOMIC,
6457 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6458 if (!ab)
6459 return error;
6460 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6461 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6462 audit_log_end(ab);
6463
6464 return error;
6465 }
6466 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6467 &selinux_state,
6468 value, size, &sid);
6469 }
6470 if (error)
6471 return error;
6472 }
6473
6474 new = prepare_creds();
6475 if (!new)
6476 return -ENOMEM;
6477
6478 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6479 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6480 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6481 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6482 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6483 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6484 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6485 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6486 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6487 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6488 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6489 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6490 if (sid) {
6491 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6492 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6493 if (error)
6494 goto abort_change;
6495 }
6496 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6497 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6498 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6499 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6500 error = -EINVAL;
6501 if (sid == 0)
6502 goto abort_change;
6503
6504 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6505 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6506 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6507 tsec->sid, sid);
6508 if (error)
6509 goto abort_change;
6510 }
6511
6512 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6513 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6514 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6516 if (error)
6517 goto abort_change;
6518
6519 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6520 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6521 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6522 if (ptsid != 0) {
6523 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6524 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6525 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6526 if (error)
6527 goto abort_change;
6528 }
6529
6530 tsec->sid = sid;
6531 } else {
6532 error = -EINVAL;
6533 goto abort_change;
6534 }
6535
6536 commit_creds(new);
6537 return size;
6538
6539abort_change:
6540 abort_creds(new);
6541 return error;
6542}
6543
6544static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6545{
6546 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6547}
6548
6549static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6550{
6551 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6552 secdata, seclen);
6553}
6554
6555static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6556{
6557 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6558 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6559}
6560
6561static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6562{
6563 kfree(secdata);
6564}
6565
6566static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6567{
6568 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6569
6570 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6571 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6572 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6573}
6574
6575/*
6576 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6577 */
6578static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6579{
6580 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6581 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6582 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6583 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6584}
6585
6586/*
6587 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6588 */
6589static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6590{
6591 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6592 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6593}
6594
6595static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6596{
6597 int len = 0;
6598 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&init_user_ns, inode,
6599 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6600 if (len < 0)
6601 return len;
6602 *ctxlen = len;
6603 return 0;
6604}
6605#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6606
6607static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6608 unsigned long flags)
6609{
6610 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6611 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6612
6613 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6614 if (!ksec)
6615 return -ENOMEM;
6616
6617 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6618 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6619 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6620 else
6621 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6622
6623 k->security = ksec;
6624 return 0;
6625}
6626
6627static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6628{
6629 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6630
6631 k->security = NULL;
6632 kfree(ksec);
6633}
6634
6635static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6636 const struct cred *cred,
6637 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6638{
6639 struct key *key;
6640 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6641 u32 perm, sid;
6642
6643 switch (need_perm) {
6644 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6645 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6646 break;
6647 case KEY_NEED_READ:
6648 perm = KEY__READ;
6649 break;
6650 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6651 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6652 break;
6653 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6654 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6655 break;
6656 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6657 perm = KEY__LINK;
6658 break;
6659 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6660 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6661 break;
6662 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6663 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6664 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6665 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6666 return 0;
6667 default:
6668 WARN_ON(1);
6669 return -EPERM;
6670
6671 }
6672
6673 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6674 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6675 ksec = key->security;
6676
6677 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6678 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6679}
6680
6681static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6682{
6683 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6684 char *context = NULL;
6685 unsigned len;
6686 int rc;
6687
6688 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6689 &context, &len);
6690 if (!rc)
6691 rc = len;
6692 *_buffer = context;
6693 return rc;
6694}
6695
6696#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6697static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6698{
6699 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6700 u32 sid = current_sid();
6701
6702 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6703 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6704}
6705#endif
6706#endif
6707
6708#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6709static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6710{
6711 struct common_audit_data ad;
6712 int err;
6713 u32 sid = 0;
6714 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6715 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6716
6717 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6718 if (err)
6719 return err;
6720
6721 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6722 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6723 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6724 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6725 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6726 sec->sid, sid,
6727 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6728 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6729}
6730
6731static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6732 u8 port_num)
6733{
6734 struct common_audit_data ad;
6735 int err;
6736 u32 sid = 0;
6737 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6738 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6739
6740 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6741 &sid);
6742
6743 if (err)
6744 return err;
6745
6746 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6747 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6748 ibendport.port = port_num;
6749 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6750 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6751 sec->sid, sid,
6752 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6753 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6754}
6755
6756static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6757{
6758 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6759
6760 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6761 if (!sec)
6762 return -ENOMEM;
6763 sec->sid = current_sid();
6764
6765 *ib_sec = sec;
6766 return 0;
6767}
6768
6769static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6770{
6771 kfree(ib_sec);
6772}
6773#endif
6774
6775#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6776static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6777 unsigned int size)
6778{
6779 u32 sid = current_sid();
6780 int ret;
6781
6782 switch (cmd) {
6783 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6784 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6785 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6786 NULL);
6787 break;
6788 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6789 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6790 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6791 NULL);
6792 break;
6793 default:
6794 ret = 0;
6795 break;
6796 }
6797
6798 return ret;
6799}
6800
6801static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6802{
6803 u32 av = 0;
6804
6805 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6806 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6807 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6808 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6809 return av;
6810}
6811
6812/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6813 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6814 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6815 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6816 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6817 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6818 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6819 */
6820static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6821{
6822 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6823 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6824 struct bpf_map *map;
6825 int ret;
6826
6827 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6828 map = file->private_data;
6829 bpfsec = map->security;
6830 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6831 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6832 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6833 if (ret)
6834 return ret;
6835 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6836 prog = file->private_data;
6837 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6838 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6839 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6840 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6841 if (ret)
6842 return ret;
6843 }
6844 return 0;
6845}
6846
6847static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6848{
6849 u32 sid = current_sid();
6850 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6851
6852 bpfsec = map->security;
6853 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6854 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6855 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6856}
6857
6858static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6859{
6860 u32 sid = current_sid();
6861 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6862
6863 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6864 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6865 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6866 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6867}
6868
6869static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6870{
6871 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6872
6873 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6874 if (!bpfsec)
6875 return -ENOMEM;
6876
6877 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6878 map->security = bpfsec;
6879
6880 return 0;
6881}
6882
6883static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6884{
6885 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6886
6887 map->security = NULL;
6888 kfree(bpfsec);
6889}
6890
6891static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6892{
6893 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6894
6895 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6896 if (!bpfsec)
6897 return -ENOMEM;
6898
6899 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6900 aux->security = bpfsec;
6901
6902 return 0;
6903}
6904
6905static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6906{
6907 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6908
6909 aux->security = NULL;
6910 kfree(bpfsec);
6911}
6912#endif
6913
6914struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6915 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6916 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6917 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6918 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6919 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6920 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
6921};
6922
6923#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6924static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6925{
6926 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6927
6928 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6929 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6930 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6931 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6932 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6933 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6934 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6935 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6936 else
6937 return -EINVAL;
6938
6939 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6940 requested, NULL);
6941}
6942
6943static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6944{
6945 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6946
6947 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6948 if (!perfsec)
6949 return -ENOMEM;
6950
6951 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6952 event->security = perfsec;
6953
6954 return 0;
6955}
6956
6957static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6958{
6959 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6960
6961 event->security = NULL;
6962 kfree(perfsec);
6963}
6964
6965static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6966{
6967 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6968 u32 sid = current_sid();
6969
6970 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6971 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6972}
6973
6974static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6975{
6976 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6977 u32 sid = current_sid();
6978
6979 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6980 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6981}
6982#endif
6983
6984#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
6985/**
6986 * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
6987 * @new: the target creds
6988 *
6989 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
6990 * to service an io_uring operation.
6991 */
6992static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
6993{
6994 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
6995 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
6996}
6997
6998/**
6999 * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
7000 *
7001 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
7002 * kernel polling thread.
7003 */
7004static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
7005{
7006 int sid = current_sid();
7007
7008 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
7009 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
7010}
7011
7012/**
7013 * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
7014 * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
7015 *
7016 * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
7017 * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
7018 *
7019 */
7020static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
7021{
7022 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
7023 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
7024 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
7025 struct common_audit_data ad;
7026
7027 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
7028 ad.u.file = file;
7029
7030 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
7031 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
7032}
7033#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
7034
7035/*
7036 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7037 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7038 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7039 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7040 * hooks),
7041 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7042 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7043 *
7044 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7045 *
7046 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
7047 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
7048 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
7049 */
7050static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7055
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7065
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7067
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7071
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7082
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7084
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7087
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7119
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7121
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7133
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7135
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7161
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7164
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7169
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7173
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7177
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7179
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7182
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7189
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7192
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7209 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7230 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7231#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7233 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7234 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7235 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7236#endif
7237#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7238 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7239 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7242 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7244 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7246#endif
7247
7248#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7252#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7254#endif
7255#endif
7256
7257#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7261#endif
7262
7263#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7264 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7269#endif
7270
7271#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7276#endif
7277
7278#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7282#endif
7283
7284 /*
7285 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7286 */
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7290#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7292#endif
7293
7294 /*
7295 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7296 */
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7299 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7302 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7304 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7305 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7308#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7310#endif
7311#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7312 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7314 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7315 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7316#endif
7317#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7319#endif
7320#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7321 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7322#endif
7323#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7324 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7325 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7326#endif
7327#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7328 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7329#endif
7330};
7331
7332static __init int selinux_init(void)
7333{
7334 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7335
7336 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7337 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7338 if (CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE)
7339 pr_err("SELinux: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is non-zero. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
7340 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7341 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7342 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7343 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7344
7345 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7346 cred_init_security();
7347
7348 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7349
7350 avc_init();
7351
7352 avtab_cache_init();
7353
7354 ebitmap_cache_init();
7355
7356 hashtab_cache_init();
7357
7358 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7359
7360 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7361 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7362
7363 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7364 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7365
7366 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7367 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7368 else
7369 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7370
7371 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7372
7373 return 0;
7374}
7375
7376static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7377{
7378 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7379}
7380
7381void selinux_complete_init(void)
7382{
7383 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7384
7385 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7386 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7387 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7388}
7389
7390/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7391 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7392DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7393 .name = "selinux",
7394 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7395 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7396 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7397 .init = selinux_init,
7398};
7399
7400#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7401
7402static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7403 {
7404 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7405 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7406 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7407 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7408 },
7409 {
7410 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7411 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7412 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7413 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7414 },
7415 {
7416 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7417 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7418 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7419 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7420 },
7421#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7422 {
7423 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7424 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7425 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7426 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7427 },
7428 {
7429 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7430 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7431 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7432 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7433 },
7434 {
7435 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7436 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7437 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7438 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7439 },
7440#endif /* IPV6 */
7441};
7442
7443static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7444{
7445 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7446 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7447}
7448
7449static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7450{
7451 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7452 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7453}
7454
7455static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7456 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7457 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7458};
7459
7460static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7461{
7462 int err;
7463
7464 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7465 return 0;
7466
7467 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7468
7469 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7470 if (err)
7471 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7472
7473 return 0;
7474}
7475__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7476
7477#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7478static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7479{
7480 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7481
7482 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7483}
7484#endif
7485
7486#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7487
7488#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7489#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7490#endif
7491
7492#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7493
7494#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7495int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7496{
7497 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7498 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7499 return -EINVAL;
7500 }
7501
7502 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7503 /* Only do this once. */
7504 return -EINVAL;
7505 }
7506
7507 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7508
7509 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7510
7511 /*
7512 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7513 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7514 * runtime disable.
7515 */
7516 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7517
7518 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7519
7520 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7521 avc_disable();
7522
7523 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7524 exit_sel_fs();
7525
7526 return 0;
7527}
7528#endif
1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26#include <linux/init.h>
27#include <linux/kd.h>
28#include <linux/kernel.h>
29#include <linux/tracehook.h>
30#include <linux/errno.h>
31#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
32#include <linux/sched.h>
33#include <linux/security.h>
34#include <linux/xattr.h>
35#include <linux/capability.h>
36#include <linux/unistd.h>
37#include <linux/mm.h>
38#include <linux/mman.h>
39#include <linux/slab.h>
40#include <linux/pagemap.h>
41#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
42#include <linux/swap.h>
43#include <linux/spinlock.h>
44#include <linux/syscalls.h>
45#include <linux/dcache.h>
46#include <linux/file.h>
47#include <linux/fdtable.h>
48#include <linux/namei.h>
49#include <linux/mount.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/net_namespace.h>
57#include <net/netlabel.h>
58#include <linux/uaccess.h>
59#include <asm/ioctls.h>
60#include <linux/atomic.h>
61#include <linux/bitops.h>
62#include <linux/interrupt.h>
63#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64#include <linux/netlink.h>
65#include <linux/tcp.h>
66#include <linux/udp.h>
67#include <linux/dccp.h>
68#include <linux/quota.h>
69#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71#include <linux/parser.h>
72#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73#include <net/ipv6.h>
74#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75#include <linux/personality.h>
76#include <linux/audit.h>
77#include <linux/string.h>
78#include <linux/selinux.h>
79#include <linux/mutex.h>
80#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81#include <linux/syslog.h>
82#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83
84#include "avc.h"
85#include "objsec.h"
86#include "netif.h"
87#include "netnode.h"
88#include "netport.h"
89#include "xfrm.h"
90#include "netlabel.h"
91#include "audit.h"
92
93#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94
95extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97
98/* SECMARK reference count */
99atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
101#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102int selinux_enforcing;
103
104static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105{
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
109 return 1;
110}
111__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
112#endif
113
114#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116
117static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118{
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
122 return 1;
123}
124__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125#else
126int selinux_enabled = 1;
127#endif
128
129static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
130
131/**
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
133 *
134 * Description:
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
139 *
140 */
141static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
142{
143 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
144}
145
146/*
147 * initialise the security for the init task
148 */
149static void cred_init_security(void)
150{
151 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
152 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
153
154 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
155 if (!tsec)
156 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
157
158 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
159 cred->security = tsec;
160}
161
162/*
163 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
164 */
165static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
166{
167 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
168
169 tsec = cred->security;
170 return tsec->sid;
171}
172
173/*
174 * get the objective security ID of a task
175 */
176static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
177{
178 u32 sid;
179
180 rcu_read_lock();
181 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
182 rcu_read_unlock();
183 return sid;
184}
185
186/*
187 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
188 */
189static inline u32 current_sid(void)
190{
191 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
192
193 return tsec->sid;
194}
195
196/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
197
198static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
199{
200 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
201 u32 sid = current_sid();
202
203 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
204 if (!isec)
205 return -ENOMEM;
206
207 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
208 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
209 isec->inode = inode;
210 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
211 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
212 isec->task_sid = sid;
213 inode->i_security = isec;
214
215 return 0;
216}
217
218static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
219{
220 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
222
223 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
224 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
225 list_del_init(&isec->list);
226 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
227
228 inode->i_security = NULL;
229 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
230}
231
232static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
233{
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
235 u32 sid = current_sid();
236
237 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
238 if (!fsec)
239 return -ENOMEM;
240
241 fsec->sid = sid;
242 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
243 file->f_security = fsec;
244
245 return 0;
246}
247
248static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
249{
250 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
251 file->f_security = NULL;
252 kfree(fsec);
253}
254
255static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
256{
257 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
258
259 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
260 if (!sbsec)
261 return -ENOMEM;
262
263 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
264 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
265 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
266 sbsec->sb = sb;
267 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
268 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
269 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sb->s_security = sbsec;
271
272 return 0;
273}
274
275static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
276{
277 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
278 sb->s_security = NULL;
279 kfree(sbsec);
280}
281
282/* The security server must be initialized before
283 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
284extern int ss_initialized;
285
286/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
287
288static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
289 "uses xattr",
290 "uses transition SIDs",
291 "uses task SIDs",
292 "uses genfs_contexts",
293 "not configured for labeling",
294 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295};
296
297static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
298
299static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
300{
301 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
302}
303
304enum {
305 Opt_error = -1,
306 Opt_context = 1,
307 Opt_fscontext = 2,
308 Opt_defcontext = 3,
309 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
310 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311};
312
313static const match_table_t tokens = {
314 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
317 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
318 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
319 {Opt_error, NULL},
320};
321
322#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
323
324static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
325 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
326 const struct cred *cred)
327{
328 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 int rc;
330
331 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
332 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
333 if (rc)
334 return rc;
335
336 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
337 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
338 return rc;
339}
340
341static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
342 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
343 const struct cred *cred)
344{
345 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
346 int rc;
347 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 if (rc)
350 return rc;
351
352 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
353 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
354 return rc;
355}
356
357static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
358{
359 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
360 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
361 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 int rc = 0;
363
364 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
365 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
366 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
367 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
368 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
369 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
370 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
371 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
372 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
373 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
374 goto out;
375 }
376 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
377 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
378 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
379 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
380 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
381 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
382 else
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
384 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
385 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
386 goto out;
387 }
388 }
389
390 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
391
392 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
393 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 else
396 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
397 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
398 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
399
400 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
401 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
402 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
403 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
405
406 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
407 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
408 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
409
410 /* Initialize the root inode. */
411 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
412
413 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
414 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
415 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
416 populates itself. */
417 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
418next_inode:
419 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
420 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
421 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
422 struct inode_security_struct, list);
423 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
424 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
425 inode = igrab(inode);
426 if (inode) {
427 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
428 inode_doinit(inode);
429 iput(inode);
430 }
431 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
432 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 goto next_inode;
434 }
435 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
436out:
437 return rc;
438}
439
440/*
441 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
442 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
443 * mount options, or whatever.
444 */
445static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
446 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447{
448 int rc = 0, i;
449 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
450 char *context = NULL;
451 u32 len;
452 char tmp;
453
454 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
455
456 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
457 return -EINVAL;
458
459 if (!ss_initialized)
460 return -EINVAL;
461
462 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
463 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
464 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
465 if (tmp & 0x01)
466 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 tmp >>= 1;
468 }
469 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
470 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
472
473 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
474 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
475 rc = -ENOMEM;
476 goto out_free;
477 }
478
479 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
480 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
481 rc = -ENOMEM;
482 goto out_free;
483 }
484
485 i = 0;
486 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
487 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 if (rc)
489 goto out_free;
490 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
491 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
492 }
493 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
494 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 if (rc)
496 goto out_free;
497 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
498 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
499 }
500 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
501 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 if (rc)
503 goto out_free;
504 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
505 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
506 }
507 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
508 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
509 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
510
511 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 if (rc)
513 goto out_free;
514 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
515 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
516 }
517 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
518 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
519 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 }
521
522 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
523
524 return 0;
525
526out_free:
527 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
528 return rc;
529}
530
531static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
532 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533{
534 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
535
536 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
537 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
538 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
539 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 return 1;
541
542 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
543 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
544 */
545 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
546 if (mnt_flags & flag)
547 return 1;
548 return 0;
549}
550
551/*
552 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
553 * labeling information.
554 */
555static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
556 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
557{
558 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
559 int rc = 0, i;
560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
561 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
562 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
563 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
564 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
565 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
566 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
567 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
568 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
569
570 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
571
572 if (!ss_initialized) {
573 if (!num_opts) {
574 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
575 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
576 server is ready to handle calls. */
577 goto out;
578 }
579 rc = -EINVAL;
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
582 goto out;
583 }
584
585 /*
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
590 *
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
595 */
596 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
597 && (num_opts == 0))
598 goto out;
599
600 /*
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
604 */
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 u32 sid;
607
608 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
609 continue;
610 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
611 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
612 if (rc) {
613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
614 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
615 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
616 goto out;
617 }
618 switch (flags[i]) {
619 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
620 fscontext_sid = sid;
621
622 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
623 fscontext_sid))
624 goto out_double_mount;
625
626 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
627 break;
628 case CONTEXT_MNT:
629 context_sid = sid;
630
631 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
632 context_sid))
633 goto out_double_mount;
634
635 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
636 break;
637 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
638 rootcontext_sid = sid;
639
640 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
641 rootcontext_sid))
642 goto out_double_mount;
643
644 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645
646 break;
647 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
648 defcontext_sid = sid;
649
650 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
651 defcontext_sid))
652 goto out_double_mount;
653
654 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
655
656 break;
657 default:
658 rc = -EINVAL;
659 goto out;
660 }
661 }
662
663 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
664 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
665 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
666 goto out_double_mount;
667 rc = 0;
668 goto out;
669 }
670
671 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
673
674 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
675 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
676 if (rc) {
677 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
678 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 goto out;
680 }
681
682 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 if (fscontext_sid) {
684 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
685 if (rc)
686 goto out;
687
688 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
689 }
690
691 /*
692 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
693 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
694 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 */
696 if (context_sid) {
697 if (!fscontext_sid) {
698 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
699 cred);
700 if (rc)
701 goto out;
702 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
703 } else {
704 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
705 cred);
706 if (rc)
707 goto out;
708 }
709 if (!rootcontext_sid)
710 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
711
712 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
713 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 }
715
716 if (rootcontext_sid) {
717 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
718 cred);
719 if (rc)
720 goto out;
721
722 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
723 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 }
725
726 if (defcontext_sid) {
727 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
728 rc = -EINVAL;
729 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
730 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
731 goto out;
732 }
733
734 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
735 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
736 sbsec, cred);
737 if (rc)
738 goto out;
739 }
740
741 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 }
743
744 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
745out:
746 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
747 return rc;
748out_double_mount:
749 rc = -EINVAL;
750 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
751 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
752 goto out;
753}
754
755static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
756 struct super_block *newsb)
757{
758 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
759 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
760
761 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
762 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
763 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764
765 /*
766 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
767 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
768 */
769 if (!ss_initialized)
770 return;
771
772 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
773 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
774
775 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
776 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 return;
778
779 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
780
781 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
782
783 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
784 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
785 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786
787 if (set_context) {
788 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
789
790 if (!set_fscontext)
791 newsbsec->sid = sid;
792 if (!set_rootcontext) {
793 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
794 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newisec->sid = sid;
796 }
797 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
798 }
799 if (set_rootcontext) {
800 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
802 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
804
805 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 }
807
808 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
809 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810}
811
812static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
813 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814{
815 char *p;
816 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
817 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
818 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
819
820 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
821
822 /* Standard string-based options. */
823 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
824 int token;
825 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
826
827 if (!*p)
828 continue;
829
830 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
831
832 switch (token) {
833 case Opt_context:
834 if (context || defcontext) {
835 rc = -EINVAL;
836 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 goto out_err;
838 }
839 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
840 if (!context) {
841 rc = -ENOMEM;
842 goto out_err;
843 }
844 break;
845
846 case Opt_fscontext:
847 if (fscontext) {
848 rc = -EINVAL;
849 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 goto out_err;
851 }
852 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
853 if (!fscontext) {
854 rc = -ENOMEM;
855 goto out_err;
856 }
857 break;
858
859 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 if (rootcontext) {
861 rc = -EINVAL;
862 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 goto out_err;
864 }
865 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
866 if (!rootcontext) {
867 rc = -ENOMEM;
868 goto out_err;
869 }
870 break;
871
872 case Opt_defcontext:
873 if (context || defcontext) {
874 rc = -EINVAL;
875 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 goto out_err;
877 }
878 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
879 if (!defcontext) {
880 rc = -ENOMEM;
881 goto out_err;
882 }
883 break;
884 case Opt_labelsupport:
885 break;
886 default:
887 rc = -EINVAL;
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
889 goto out_err;
890
891 }
892 }
893
894 rc = -ENOMEM;
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
896 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
897 goto out_err;
898
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
902 goto out_err;
903 }
904
905 if (fscontext) {
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 }
909 if (context) {
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 }
913 if (rootcontext) {
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 }
917 if (defcontext) {
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 }
921
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
923 return 0;
924
925out_err:
926 kfree(context);
927 kfree(defcontext);
928 kfree(fscontext);
929 kfree(rootcontext);
930 return rc;
931}
932/*
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
934 */
935static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936{
937 int rc = 0;
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
940
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
942
943 if (!data)
944 goto out;
945
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
947
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
949 if (rc)
950 goto out_err;
951
952out:
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954
955out_err:
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
957 return rc;
958}
959
960static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
961 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
962{
963 int i;
964 char *prefix;
965
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 char *has_comma;
968
969 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
970 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
971 else
972 has_comma = NULL;
973
974 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
975 case CONTEXT_MNT:
976 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 break;
978 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
980 break;
981 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
982 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 break;
984 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
985 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
986 break;
987 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
988 seq_putc(m, ',');
989 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
990 continue;
991 default:
992 BUG();
993 return;
994 };
995 /* we need a comma before each option */
996 seq_putc(m, ',');
997 seq_puts(m, prefix);
998 if (has_comma)
999 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1000 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1001 if (has_comma)
1002 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1003 }
1004}
1005
1006static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1007{
1008 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 int rc;
1010
1011 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1012 if (rc) {
1013 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1014 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1015 rc = 0;
1016 return rc;
1017 }
1018
1019 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1020
1021 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1022
1023 return rc;
1024}
1025
1026static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1027{
1028 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1029 case S_IFSOCK:
1030 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1031 case S_IFLNK:
1032 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1033 case S_IFREG:
1034 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1035 case S_IFBLK:
1036 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1037 case S_IFDIR:
1038 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1039 case S_IFCHR:
1040 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1041 case S_IFIFO:
1042 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1043
1044 }
1045
1046 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047}
1048
1049static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1050{
1051 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052}
1053
1054static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1055{
1056 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057}
1058
1059static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1060{
1061 switch (family) {
1062 case PF_UNIX:
1063 switch (type) {
1064 case SOCK_STREAM:
1065 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1067 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1068 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1069 }
1070 break;
1071 case PF_INET:
1072 case PF_INET6:
1073 switch (type) {
1074 case SOCK_STREAM:
1075 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1076 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1077 else
1078 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1079 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1080 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1081 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1082 else
1083 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1084 case SOCK_DCCP:
1085 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1086 default:
1087 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1088 }
1089 break;
1090 case PF_NETLINK:
1091 switch (protocol) {
1092 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1102 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1110 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1112 default:
1113 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 }
1115 case PF_PACKET:
1116 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1117 case PF_KEY:
1118 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1119 case PF_APPLETALK:
1120 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 }
1122
1123 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124}
1125
1126#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1127static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1128 u16 tclass,
1129 u32 *sid)
1130{
1131 int rc;
1132 char *buffer, *path;
1133
1134 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1135 if (!buffer)
1136 return -ENOMEM;
1137
1138 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1139 if (IS_ERR(path))
1140 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1141 else {
1142 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1143 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1144 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1145 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1146 path[1] = '/';
1147 path++;
1148 }
1149 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1150 }
1151 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1152 return rc;
1153}
1154#else
1155static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1156 u16 tclass,
1157 u32 *sid)
1158{
1159 return -EINVAL;
1160}
1161#endif
1162
1163/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1164static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1165{
1166 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1168 u32 sid;
1169 struct dentry *dentry;
1170#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1171 char *context = NULL;
1172 unsigned len = 0;
1173 int rc = 0;
1174
1175 if (isec->initialized)
1176 goto out;
1177
1178 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1179 if (isec->initialized)
1180 goto out_unlock;
1181
1182 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1183 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1184 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1185 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1186 server is ready to handle calls. */
1187 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1189 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1190 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1191 goto out_unlock;
1192 }
1193
1194 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1195 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1196 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1197 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1198 break;
1199 }
1200
1201 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1202 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1203 if (opt_dentry) {
1204 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1205 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1206 } else {
1207 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1208 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1209 }
1210 if (!dentry) {
1211 /*
1212 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1213 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1214 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1215 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1216 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1217 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1218 * be used again by userspace.
1219 */
1220 goto out_unlock;
1221 }
1222
1223 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1224 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1225 if (!context) {
1226 rc = -ENOMEM;
1227 dput(dentry);
1228 goto out_unlock;
1229 }
1230 context[len] = '\0';
1231 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1232 context, len);
1233 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 kfree(context);
1235
1236 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1237 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1238 NULL, 0);
1239 if (rc < 0) {
1240 dput(dentry);
1241 goto out_unlock;
1242 }
1243 len = rc;
1244 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1245 if (!context) {
1246 rc = -ENOMEM;
1247 dput(dentry);
1248 goto out_unlock;
1249 }
1250 context[len] = '\0';
1251 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1252 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1253 context, len);
1254 }
1255 dput(dentry);
1256 if (rc < 0) {
1257 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1258 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1259 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1260 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1261 kfree(context);
1262 goto out_unlock;
1263 }
1264 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1265 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = 0;
1267 } else {
1268 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1269 sbsec->def_sid,
1270 GFP_NOFS);
1271 if (rc) {
1272 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1273 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1274
1275 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1276 if (printk_ratelimit())
1277 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1278 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1279 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1280 } else {
1281 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1282 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1283 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 }
1285 kfree(context);
1286 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1287 rc = 0;
1288 break;
1289 }
1290 }
1291 kfree(context);
1292 isec->sid = sid;
1293 break;
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1295 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1296 break;
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1298 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1299 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1300
1301 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1302 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1303 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1304 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1305 if (rc)
1306 goto out_unlock;
1307 isec->sid = sid;
1308 break;
1309 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1310 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 break;
1312 default:
1313 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1314 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1315
1316 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1317 if (opt_dentry) {
1318 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1319 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1320 isec->sclass,
1321 &sid);
1322 if (rc)
1323 goto out_unlock;
1324 isec->sid = sid;
1325 }
1326 }
1327 break;
1328 }
1329
1330 isec->initialized = 1;
1331
1332out_unlock:
1333 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1334out:
1335 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1336 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1337 return rc;
1338}
1339
1340/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1341static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1342{
1343 u32 perm = 0;
1344
1345 switch (sig) {
1346 case SIGCHLD:
1347 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1348 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 break;
1350 case SIGKILL:
1351 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1352 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 break;
1354 case SIGSTOP:
1355 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1356 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 break;
1358 default:
1359 /* All other signals. */
1360 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1361 break;
1362 }
1363
1364 return perm;
1365}
1366
1367/*
1368 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1369 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1370 */
1371static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1372 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 perms)
1374{
1375 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1376
1377 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1378}
1379
1380/*
1381 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1382 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1383 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1384 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1385 */
1386static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1387 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 u32 perms)
1389{
1390 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1391 u32 sid1, sid2;
1392
1393 rcu_read_lock();
1394 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1395 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1396 rcu_read_unlock();
1397 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1398}
1399
1400/*
1401 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1402 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1403 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1404 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1405 */
1406static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1407 u32 perms)
1408{
1409 u32 sid, tsid;
1410
1411 sid = current_sid();
1412 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1413 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414}
1415
1416#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1417#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418#endif
1419
1420/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1421static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1422 const struct cred *cred,
1423 int cap, int audit)
1424{
1425 struct common_audit_data ad;
1426 struct av_decision avd;
1427 u16 sclass;
1428 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1429 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1430 int rc;
1431
1432 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1433 ad.tsk = tsk;
1434 ad.u.cap = cap;
1435
1436 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1437 case 0:
1438 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1439 break;
1440 case 1:
1441 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1442 break;
1443 default:
1444 printk(KERN_ERR
1445 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1446 BUG();
1447 return -EINVAL;
1448 }
1449
1450 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1451 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1452 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1453 if (rc2)
1454 return rc2;
1455 }
1456 return rc;
1457}
1458
1459/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1460static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 u32 perms)
1462{
1463 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1464
1465 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1466 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1467}
1468
1469/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1470 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1471 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1472static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1473 struct inode *inode,
1474 u32 perms,
1475 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1476 unsigned flags)
1477{
1478 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1479 u32 sid;
1480
1481 validate_creds(cred);
1482
1483 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1484 return 0;
1485
1486 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1487 isec = inode->i_security;
1488
1489 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1490}
1491
1492static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
1493 struct inode *inode,
1494 u32 perms,
1495 unsigned flags)
1496{
1497 struct common_audit_data ad;
1498
1499 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
1500 ad.u.inode = inode;
1501 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
1502}
1503
1504/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1505 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1506 pathname if needed. */
1507static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1508 struct dentry *dentry,
1509 u32 av)
1510{
1511 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1512 struct common_audit_data ad;
1513
1514 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1515 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1516 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1517}
1518
1519/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1520 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1521 pathname if needed. */
1522static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1523 struct path *path,
1524 u32 av)
1525{
1526 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1527 struct common_audit_data ad;
1528
1529 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1530 ad.u.path = *path;
1531 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1532}
1533
1534/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1535 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1536 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1537 check a particular permission to the file.
1538 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1539 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1540 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1541 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1542static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1543 struct file *file,
1544 u32 av)
1545{
1546 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1547 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1548 struct common_audit_data ad;
1549 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1550 int rc;
1551
1552 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1553 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1554
1555 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1556 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1557 SECCLASS_FD,
1558 FD__USE,
1559 &ad);
1560 if (rc)
1561 goto out;
1562 }
1563
1564 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1565 rc = 0;
1566 if (av)
1567 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1568
1569out:
1570 return rc;
1571}
1572
1573/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1574static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1575 struct dentry *dentry,
1576 u16 tclass)
1577{
1578 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1579 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1580 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1581 u32 sid, newsid;
1582 struct common_audit_data ad;
1583 int rc;
1584
1585 dsec = dir->i_security;
1586 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1587
1588 sid = tsec->sid;
1589 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1590
1591 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1592 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1593
1594 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1595 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1596 &ad);
1597 if (rc)
1598 return rc;
1599
1600 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1601 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1602 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1603 if (rc)
1604 return rc;
1605 }
1606
1607 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1608 if (rc)
1609 return rc;
1610
1611 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1612 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1613 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1614}
1615
1616/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1617static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1618 struct task_struct *ctx)
1619{
1620 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1621
1622 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1623}
1624
1625#define MAY_LINK 0
1626#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1627#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1628
1629/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1630static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1631 struct dentry *dentry,
1632 int kind)
1633
1634{
1635 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1636 struct common_audit_data ad;
1637 u32 sid = current_sid();
1638 u32 av;
1639 int rc;
1640
1641 dsec = dir->i_security;
1642 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1643
1644 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1645 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1646
1647 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1648 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1649 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1650 if (rc)
1651 return rc;
1652
1653 switch (kind) {
1654 case MAY_LINK:
1655 av = FILE__LINK;
1656 break;
1657 case MAY_UNLINK:
1658 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1659 break;
1660 case MAY_RMDIR:
1661 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1662 break;
1663 default:
1664 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1665 __func__, kind);
1666 return 0;
1667 }
1668
1669 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1670 return rc;
1671}
1672
1673static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1674 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1675 struct inode *new_dir,
1676 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1677{
1678 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1679 struct common_audit_data ad;
1680 u32 sid = current_sid();
1681 u32 av;
1682 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1683 int rc;
1684
1685 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1686 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1687 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1688 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1689
1690 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1691
1692 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1693 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1694 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1695 if (rc)
1696 return rc;
1697 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1698 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1699 if (rc)
1700 return rc;
1701 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1702 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1703 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1704 if (rc)
1705 return rc;
1706 }
1707
1708 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1709 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1710 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1711 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1713 if (rc)
1714 return rc;
1715 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1716 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1717 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1718 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1719 new_isec->sclass,
1720 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1721 if (rc)
1722 return rc;
1723 }
1724
1725 return 0;
1726}
1727
1728/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1729static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1730 struct super_block *sb,
1731 u32 perms,
1732 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1733{
1734 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1735 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1736
1737 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1738 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1739}
1740
1741/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1742static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1743{
1744 u32 av = 0;
1745
1746 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1747 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1748 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1749 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1750 av |= FILE__READ;
1751
1752 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1753 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1754 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1755 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1756
1757 } else {
1758 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1759 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1760 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1761 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1762 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1763 av |= DIR__READ;
1764 }
1765
1766 return av;
1767}
1768
1769/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1770static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1771{
1772 u32 av = 0;
1773
1774 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1775 av |= FILE__READ;
1776 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1777 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1778 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1779 else
1780 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1781 }
1782 if (!av) {
1783 /*
1784 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1785 */
1786 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1787 }
1788
1789 return av;
1790}
1791
1792/*
1793 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1794 * open permission.
1795 */
1796static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1797{
1798 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1799
1800 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1801 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1802
1803 return av;
1804}
1805
1806/* Hook functions begin here. */
1807
1808static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1809 unsigned int mode)
1810{
1811 int rc;
1812
1813 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1814 if (rc)
1815 return rc;
1816
1817 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1818 u32 sid = current_sid();
1819 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1820 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1821 }
1822
1823 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1824}
1825
1826static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1827{
1828 int rc;
1829
1830 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1831 if (rc)
1832 return rc;
1833
1834 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1835}
1836
1837static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1838 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1839{
1840 int error;
1841
1842 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1843 if (error)
1844 return error;
1845
1846 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1847}
1848
1849static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1850 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1851 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1852 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1853{
1854 int error;
1855
1856 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1857 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1858 if (error)
1859 return error;
1860
1861 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1862}
1863
1864/*
1865 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1866 * which was removed).
1867 *
1868 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1869 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1870 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1871 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1872 */
1873
1874static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1875 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
1876{
1877 int rc;
1878
1879 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
1880 if (rc)
1881 return rc;
1882
1883 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1884}
1885
1886static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1887{
1888 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1889 int rc = 0;
1890
1891 if (!sb)
1892 return 0;
1893
1894 switch (cmds) {
1895 case Q_SYNC:
1896 case Q_QUOTAON:
1897 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1898 case Q_SETINFO:
1899 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1900 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1901 break;
1902 case Q_GETFMT:
1903 case Q_GETINFO:
1904 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1905 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1906 break;
1907 default:
1908 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1909 break;
1910 }
1911 return rc;
1912}
1913
1914static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1915{
1916 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1917
1918 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1919}
1920
1921static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1922{
1923 int rc;
1924
1925 switch (type) {
1926 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1927 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1928 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1929 break;
1930 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1931 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1932 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1933 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1934 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1935 break;
1936 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1937 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1938 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1939 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1940 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1941 default:
1942 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1943 break;
1944 }
1945 return rc;
1946}
1947
1948/*
1949 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1950 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1951 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1952 *
1953 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1954 * processes that allocate mappings.
1955 */
1956static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1957{
1958 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1959
1960 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
1961 &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1962 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1963 if (rc == 0)
1964 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1965
1966 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1967}
1968
1969/* binprm security operations */
1970
1971static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1972{
1973 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1974 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1975 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1976 struct common_audit_data ad;
1977 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1978 int rc;
1979
1980 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1981 if (rc)
1982 return rc;
1983
1984 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1985 * the script interpreter */
1986 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1987 return 0;
1988
1989 old_tsec = current_security();
1990 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1991 isec = inode->i_security;
1992
1993 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1994 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1995 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1996
1997 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1998 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1999 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2000 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2001
2002 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2003 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2004 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2005 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2006 } else {
2007 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2008 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2009 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2010 &new_tsec->sid);
2011 if (rc)
2012 return rc;
2013 }
2014
2015 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
2016 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2017
2018 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2019 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2020
2021 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2022 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2023 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2024 if (rc)
2025 return rc;
2026 } else {
2027 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2028 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2029 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2030 if (rc)
2031 return rc;
2032
2033 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2034 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2035 if (rc)
2036 return rc;
2037
2038 /* Check for shared state */
2039 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2040 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2041 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2042 NULL);
2043 if (rc)
2044 return -EPERM;
2045 }
2046
2047 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2048 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2049 if (bprm->unsafe &
2050 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2051 struct task_struct *tracer;
2052 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2053 u32 ptsid = 0;
2054
2055 rcu_read_lock();
2056 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2057 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2058 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2059 ptsid = sec->sid;
2060 }
2061 rcu_read_unlock();
2062
2063 if (ptsid != 0) {
2064 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2065 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2066 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2067 if (rc)
2068 return -EPERM;
2069 }
2070 }
2071
2072 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2073 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2074 }
2075
2076 return 0;
2077}
2078
2079static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080{
2081 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2082 u32 sid, osid;
2083 int atsecure = 0;
2084
2085 sid = tsec->sid;
2086 osid = tsec->osid;
2087
2088 if (osid != sid) {
2089 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2090 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2091 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2092 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2093 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2094 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2095 }
2096
2097 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2098}
2099
2100extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2101extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2102
2103/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2104static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2105 struct files_struct *files)
2106{
2107 struct common_audit_data ad;
2108 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2109 struct tty_struct *tty;
2110 struct fdtable *fdt;
2111 long j = -1;
2112 int drop_tty = 0;
2113
2114 tty = get_current_tty();
2115 if (tty) {
2116 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2117 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2118 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2119 struct inode *inode;
2120
2121 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2122 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2123 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2124 file may belong to another process and we are only
2125 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2126 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2127 struct tty_file_private, list);
2128 file = file_priv->file;
2129 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2130 if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
2131 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
2132 drop_tty = 1;
2133 }
2134 }
2135 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2136 tty_kref_put(tty);
2137 }
2138 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2139 if (drop_tty)
2140 no_tty();
2141
2142 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2143
2144 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2145
2146 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2147 for (;;) {
2148 unsigned long set, i;
2149 int fd;
2150
2151 j++;
2152 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2153 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2154 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2155 break;
2156 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2157 if (!set)
2158 continue;
2159 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2160 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2161 if (set & 1) {
2162 file = fget(i);
2163 if (!file)
2164 continue;
2165 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2166 file,
2167 file_to_av(file))) {
2168 sys_close(i);
2169 fd = get_unused_fd();
2170 if (fd != i) {
2171 if (fd >= 0)
2172 put_unused_fd(fd);
2173 fput(file);
2174 continue;
2175 }
2176 if (devnull) {
2177 get_file(devnull);
2178 } else {
2179 devnull = dentry_open(
2180 dget(selinux_null),
2181 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2182 O_RDWR, cred);
2183 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2184 devnull = NULL;
2185 put_unused_fd(fd);
2186 fput(file);
2187 continue;
2188 }
2189 }
2190 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2191 }
2192 fput(file);
2193 }
2194 }
2195 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2196
2197 }
2198 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2199}
2200
2201/*
2202 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2203 */
2204static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2205{
2206 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2207 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2208 int rc, i;
2209
2210 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2211 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2212 return;
2213
2214 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2215 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2216
2217 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2218 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2219
2220 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2221 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2222 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2223 *
2224 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2225 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2226 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2227 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2228 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2229 */
2230 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2231 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2232 if (rc) {
2233 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2234 task_lock(current);
2235 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2236 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2237 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2238 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2239 }
2240 task_unlock(current);
2241 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2242 }
2243}
2244
2245/*
2246 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2247 * due to exec
2248 */
2249static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2250{
2251 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2252 struct itimerval itimer;
2253 u32 osid, sid;
2254 int rc, i;
2255
2256 osid = tsec->osid;
2257 sid = tsec->sid;
2258
2259 if (sid == osid)
2260 return;
2261
2262 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2263 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2264 * flush and unblock signals.
2265 *
2266 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2267 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2268 */
2269 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2270 if (rc) {
2271 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2272 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2273 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2274 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2275 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2276 __flush_signals(current);
2277 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2278 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2279 }
2280 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2281 }
2282
2283 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2284 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2285 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2286 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2287 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2288}
2289
2290/* superblock security operations */
2291
2292static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2293{
2294 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2295}
2296
2297static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2298{
2299 superblock_free_security(sb);
2300}
2301
2302static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2303{
2304 if (plen > olen)
2305 return 0;
2306
2307 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2308}
2309
2310static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2311{
2312 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2313 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2314 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2315 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2316 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2317}
2318
2319static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2320{
2321 if (!*first) {
2322 **to = ',';
2323 *to += 1;
2324 } else
2325 *first = 0;
2326 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2327 *to += len;
2328}
2329
2330static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2331 int len)
2332{
2333 int current_size = 0;
2334
2335 if (!*first) {
2336 **to = '|';
2337 *to += 1;
2338 } else
2339 *first = 0;
2340
2341 while (current_size < len) {
2342 if (*from != '"') {
2343 **to = *from;
2344 *to += 1;
2345 }
2346 from += 1;
2347 current_size += 1;
2348 }
2349}
2350
2351static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2352{
2353 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2354 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2355 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2356 int open_quote = 0;
2357
2358 in_curr = orig;
2359 sec_curr = copy;
2360
2361 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2362 if (!nosec) {
2363 rc = -ENOMEM;
2364 goto out;
2365 }
2366
2367 nosec_save = nosec;
2368 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2369 in_save = in_end = orig;
2370
2371 do {
2372 if (*in_end == '"')
2373 open_quote = !open_quote;
2374 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2375 *in_end == '\0') {
2376 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2377
2378 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2379 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2380 else
2381 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2382
2383 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2384 }
2385 } while (*in_end++);
2386
2387 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2388 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2389out:
2390 return rc;
2391}
2392
2393static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2394{
2395 int rc, i, *flags;
2396 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2397 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2398 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2399
2400 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2401 return 0;
2402
2403 if (!data)
2404 return 0;
2405
2406 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2407 return 0;
2408
2409 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2410 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2411 if (!secdata)
2412 return -ENOMEM;
2413 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2414 if (rc)
2415 goto out_free_secdata;
2416
2417 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2418 if (rc)
2419 goto out_free_secdata;
2420
2421 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2422 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2423
2424 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2425 u32 sid;
2426 size_t len;
2427
2428 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2429 continue;
2430 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2431 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2432 if (rc) {
2433 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2434 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2435 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2436 goto out_free_opts;
2437 }
2438 rc = -EINVAL;
2439 switch (flags[i]) {
2440 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2441 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2442 goto out_bad_option;
2443 break;
2444 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2445 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2446 goto out_bad_option;
2447 break;
2448 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2449 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2450 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2451
2452 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2453 goto out_bad_option;
2454 break;
2455 }
2456 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2457 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2458 goto out_bad_option;
2459 break;
2460 default:
2461 goto out_free_opts;
2462 }
2463 }
2464
2465 rc = 0;
2466out_free_opts:
2467 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2468out_free_secdata:
2469 free_secdata(secdata);
2470 return rc;
2471out_bad_option:
2472 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2473 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2474 sb->s_type->name);
2475 goto out_free_opts;
2476}
2477
2478static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2479{
2480 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2481 struct common_audit_data ad;
2482 int rc;
2483
2484 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2485 if (rc)
2486 return rc;
2487
2488 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2489 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2490 return 0;
2491
2492 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2493 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2494 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2495}
2496
2497static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2498{
2499 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2500 struct common_audit_data ad;
2501
2502 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2503 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2504 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2505}
2506
2507static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2508 struct path *path,
2509 char *type,
2510 unsigned long flags,
2511 void *data)
2512{
2513 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2514
2515 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2516 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2517 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2518 else
2519 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2520}
2521
2522static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2523{
2524 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2525
2526 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2527 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2528}
2529
2530/* inode security operations */
2531
2532static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2533{
2534 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2535}
2536
2537static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2538{
2539 inode_free_security(inode);
2540}
2541
2542static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2543 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2544 void **value, size_t *len)
2545{
2546 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2547 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2548 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2549 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2550 int rc;
2551 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2552
2553 dsec = dir->i_security;
2554 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2555
2556 sid = tsec->sid;
2557 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2558
2559 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2560 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2561 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2562 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2563 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2564 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2565 qstr, &newsid);
2566 if (rc) {
2567 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2568 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2569 "ino=%ld)\n",
2570 __func__,
2571 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2572 return rc;
2573 }
2574 }
2575
2576 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2577 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2578 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2579 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2580 isec->sid = newsid;
2581 isec->initialized = 1;
2582 }
2583
2584 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2585 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2586
2587 if (name) {
2588 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2589 if (!namep)
2590 return -ENOMEM;
2591 *name = namep;
2592 }
2593
2594 if (value && len) {
2595 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2596 if (rc) {
2597 kfree(namep);
2598 return rc;
2599 }
2600 *value = context;
2601 *len = clen;
2602 }
2603
2604 return 0;
2605}
2606
2607static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2608{
2609 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2610}
2611
2612static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2613{
2614 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2615}
2616
2617static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2618{
2619 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2620}
2621
2622static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2623{
2624 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2625}
2626
2627static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2628{
2629 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2630}
2631
2632static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2633{
2634 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2635}
2636
2637static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2638{
2639 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2640}
2641
2642static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2643 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2644{
2645 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2646}
2647
2648static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2649{
2650 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2651
2652 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2653}
2654
2655static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2656{
2657 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2658
2659 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2660}
2661
2662static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2663{
2664 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2665 struct common_audit_data ad;
2666 u32 perms;
2667 bool from_access;
2668 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2669
2670 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2671 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2672
2673 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2674 if (!mask)
2675 return 0;
2676
2677 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2678 ad.u.inode = inode;
2679
2680 if (from_access)
2681 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2682
2683 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2684
2685 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
2686}
2687
2688static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2689{
2690 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2691 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2692
2693 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2694 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2695 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2696 ATTR_FORCE);
2697 if (!ia_valid)
2698 return 0;
2699 }
2700
2701 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2702 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2703 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2704
2705 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2706}
2707
2708static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2709{
2710 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2711 struct path path;
2712
2713 path.dentry = dentry;
2714 path.mnt = mnt;
2715
2716 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2717}
2718
2719static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2720{
2721 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2722
2723 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2724 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2725 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2726 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2727 return -EPERM;
2728 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2729 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2730 Restrict to administrator. */
2731 return -EPERM;
2732 }
2733 }
2734
2735 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2736 ordinary setattr permission. */
2737 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2738}
2739
2740static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2741 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2742{
2743 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2744 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2745 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2746 struct common_audit_data ad;
2747 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2748 int rc = 0;
2749
2750 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2751 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2752
2753 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2754 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2755 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2756
2757 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2758 return -EPERM;
2759
2760 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2761 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2762
2763 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2764 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2765 if (rc)
2766 return rc;
2767
2768 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2769 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2770 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2771 return rc;
2772 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2773 }
2774 if (rc)
2775 return rc;
2776
2777 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2778 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2779 if (rc)
2780 return rc;
2781
2782 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2783 isec->sclass);
2784 if (rc)
2785 return rc;
2786
2787 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2788 sbsec->sid,
2789 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2790 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2791 &ad);
2792}
2793
2794static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2795 const void *value, size_t size,
2796 int flags)
2797{
2798 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2799 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2800 u32 newsid;
2801 int rc;
2802
2803 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2804 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2805 return;
2806 }
2807
2808 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2809 if (rc) {
2810 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2811 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2812 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2813 return;
2814 }
2815
2816 isec->sid = newsid;
2817 return;
2818}
2819
2820static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2821{
2822 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2823
2824 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2825}
2826
2827static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2828{
2829 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2830
2831 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2832}
2833
2834static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2835{
2836 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2837 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2838
2839 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2840 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2841 return -EACCES;
2842}
2843
2844/*
2845 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2846 *
2847 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2848 */
2849static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2850{
2851 u32 size;
2852 int error;
2853 char *context = NULL;
2854 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2855
2856 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2857 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2858
2859 /*
2860 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2861 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2862 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2863 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2864 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2865 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2866 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2867 */
2868 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
2869 &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2870 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2871 if (!error)
2872 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2873 &size);
2874 else
2875 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2876 if (error)
2877 return error;
2878 error = size;
2879 if (alloc) {
2880 *buffer = context;
2881 goto out_nofree;
2882 }
2883 kfree(context);
2884out_nofree:
2885 return error;
2886}
2887
2888static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2889 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2890{
2891 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2892 u32 newsid;
2893 int rc;
2894
2895 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2896 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2897
2898 if (!value || !size)
2899 return -EACCES;
2900
2901 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2902 if (rc)
2903 return rc;
2904
2905 isec->sid = newsid;
2906 isec->initialized = 1;
2907 return 0;
2908}
2909
2910static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2911{
2912 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2913 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2914 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2915 return len;
2916}
2917
2918static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2919{
2920 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2921 *secid = isec->sid;
2922}
2923
2924/* file security operations */
2925
2926static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2927{
2928 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2929 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2930
2931 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2932 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2933 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2934
2935 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2936 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2937}
2938
2939static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2940{
2941 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2942 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2943 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2944 u32 sid = current_sid();
2945
2946 if (!mask)
2947 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2948 return 0;
2949
2950 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2951 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2952 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2953 return 0;
2954
2955 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2956}
2957
2958static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2959{
2960 return file_alloc_security(file);
2961}
2962
2963static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2964{
2965 file_free_security(file);
2966}
2967
2968static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2969 unsigned long arg)
2970{
2971 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2972 int error = 0;
2973
2974 switch (cmd) {
2975 case FIONREAD:
2976 /* fall through */
2977 case FIBMAP:
2978 /* fall through */
2979 case FIGETBSZ:
2980 /* fall through */
2981 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2982 /* fall through */
2983 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2984 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2985 break;
2986
2987 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2988 /* fall through */
2989 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2990 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2991 break;
2992
2993 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2994 case FIONBIO:
2995 /* fall through */
2996 case FIOASYNC:
2997 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
2998 break;
2999
3000 case KDSKBENT:
3001 case KDSKBSENT:
3002 error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3003 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3004 break;
3005
3006 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3007 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3008 */
3009 default:
3010 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3011 }
3012 return error;
3013}
3014
3015static int default_noexec;
3016
3017static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3018{
3019 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3020 int rc = 0;
3021
3022 if (default_noexec &&
3023 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3024 /*
3025 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3026 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3027 * This has an additional check.
3028 */
3029 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3030 if (rc)
3031 goto error;
3032 }
3033
3034 if (file) {
3035 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3036 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3037
3038 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3039 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3040 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3041
3042 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3043 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3044
3045 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3046 }
3047
3048error:
3049 return rc;
3050}
3051
3052static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3053 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3054 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3055{
3056 int rc = 0;
3057 u32 sid = current_sid();
3058
3059 /*
3060 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3061 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3062 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3063 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3064 */
3065 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3066 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3067 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3068 if (rc)
3069 return rc;
3070 }
3071
3072 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3073 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3074 if (rc || addr_only)
3075 return rc;
3076
3077 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3078 prot = reqprot;
3079
3080 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3081 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3082}
3083
3084static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3085 unsigned long reqprot,
3086 unsigned long prot)
3087{
3088 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3089
3090 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3091 prot = reqprot;
3092
3093 if (default_noexec &&
3094 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3095 int rc = 0;
3096 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3097 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3098 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3099 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3100 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3101 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3102 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3103 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3104 /*
3105 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3106 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3107 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3108 * modified content. This typically should only
3109 * occur for text relocations.
3110 */
3111 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3112 }
3113 if (rc)
3114 return rc;
3115 }
3116
3117 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3118}
3119
3120static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3121{
3122 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3123
3124 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3125}
3126
3127static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3128 unsigned long arg)
3129{
3130 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3131 int err = 0;
3132
3133 switch (cmd) {
3134 case F_SETFL:
3135 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3136 err = -EINVAL;
3137 break;
3138 }
3139
3140 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3141 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3142 break;
3143 }
3144 /* fall through */
3145 case F_SETOWN:
3146 case F_SETSIG:
3147 case F_GETFL:
3148 case F_GETOWN:
3149 case F_GETSIG:
3150 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3151 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3152 break;
3153 case F_GETLK:
3154 case F_SETLK:
3155 case F_SETLKW:
3156#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3157 case F_GETLK64:
3158 case F_SETLK64:
3159 case F_SETLKW64:
3160#endif
3161 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3162 err = -EINVAL;
3163 break;
3164 }
3165 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3166 break;
3167 }
3168
3169 return err;
3170}
3171
3172static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3173{
3174 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3175
3176 fsec = file->f_security;
3177 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3178
3179 return 0;
3180}
3181
3182static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3183 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3184{
3185 struct file *file;
3186 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3187 u32 perm;
3188 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3189
3190 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3191 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3192
3193 fsec = file->f_security;
3194
3195 if (!signum)
3196 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3197 else
3198 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3199
3200 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3201 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3202}
3203
3204static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3205{
3206 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3207
3208 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3209}
3210
3211static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3212{
3213 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3214 struct inode *inode;
3215 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3216
3217 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3218 fsec = file->f_security;
3219 isec = inode->i_security;
3220 /*
3221 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3222 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3223 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3224 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3225 * struct as its SID.
3226 */
3227 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3228 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3229 /*
3230 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3231 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3232 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3233 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3234 * new inode label or new policy.
3235 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3236 */
3237 return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
3238}
3239
3240/* task security operations */
3241
3242static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3243{
3244 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3245}
3246
3247/*
3248 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3249 */
3250static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3251{
3252 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3253
3254 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3255 if (!tsec)
3256 return -ENOMEM;
3257
3258 cred->security = tsec;
3259 return 0;
3260}
3261
3262/*
3263 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3264 */
3265static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3266{
3267 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3268
3269 /*
3270 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3271 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3272 */
3273 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3274 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3275 kfree(tsec);
3276}
3277
3278/*
3279 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3280 */
3281static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3282 gfp_t gfp)
3283{
3284 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3285 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3286
3287 old_tsec = old->security;
3288
3289 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3290 if (!tsec)
3291 return -ENOMEM;
3292
3293 new->security = tsec;
3294 return 0;
3295}
3296
3297/*
3298 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3299 */
3300static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3301{
3302 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3303 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3304
3305 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3306}
3307
3308/*
3309 * set the security data for a kernel service
3310 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3311 */
3312static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3313{
3314 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3315 u32 sid = current_sid();
3316 int ret;
3317
3318 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3319 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3320 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3321 NULL);
3322 if (ret == 0) {
3323 tsec->sid = secid;
3324 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3325 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3326 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3327 }
3328 return ret;
3329}
3330
3331/*
3332 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3333 * objective context of the specified inode
3334 */
3335static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3336{
3337 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3338 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3339 u32 sid = current_sid();
3340 int ret;
3341
3342 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3343 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3344 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3345 NULL);
3346
3347 if (ret == 0)
3348 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3349 return ret;
3350}
3351
3352static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3353{
3354 u32 sid;
3355 struct common_audit_data ad;
3356
3357 sid = task_sid(current);
3358
3359 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3360 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3361
3362 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3363 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3364}
3365
3366static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3367{
3368 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3369}
3370
3371static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3372{
3373 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3374}
3375
3376static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3377{
3378 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3379}
3380
3381static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3382{
3383 *secid = task_sid(p);
3384}
3385
3386static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3387{
3388 int rc;
3389
3390 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3391 if (rc)
3392 return rc;
3393
3394 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3395}
3396
3397static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3398{
3399 int rc;
3400
3401 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3402 if (rc)
3403 return rc;
3404
3405 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3406}
3407
3408static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3409{
3410 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3411}
3412
3413static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3414 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3415{
3416 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3417
3418 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3419 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3420 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3421 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3422 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3423 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3424
3425 return 0;
3426}
3427
3428static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3429{
3430 int rc;
3431
3432 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3433 if (rc)
3434 return rc;
3435
3436 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3437}
3438
3439static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3440{
3441 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3442}
3443
3444static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3445{
3446 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3447}
3448
3449static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3450 int sig, u32 secid)
3451{
3452 u32 perm;
3453 int rc;
3454
3455 if (!sig)
3456 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3457 else
3458 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3459 if (secid)
3460 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3461 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3462 else
3463 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3464 return rc;
3465}
3466
3467static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3468{
3469 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3470}
3471
3472static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3473 struct inode *inode)
3474{
3475 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3476 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3477
3478 isec->sid = sid;
3479 isec->initialized = 1;
3480}
3481
3482/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3483static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3484 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3485{
3486 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3487 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3488
3489 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3490 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3491 if (ih == NULL)
3492 goto out;
3493
3494 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3495 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3496 goto out;
3497
3498 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3499 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3500 ret = 0;
3501
3502 if (proto)
3503 *proto = ih->protocol;
3504
3505 switch (ih->protocol) {
3506 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3507 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3508
3509 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3510 break;
3511
3512 offset += ihlen;
3513 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3514 if (th == NULL)
3515 break;
3516
3517 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3518 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3519 break;
3520 }
3521
3522 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3523 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3524
3525 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3526 break;
3527
3528 offset += ihlen;
3529 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3530 if (uh == NULL)
3531 break;
3532
3533 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3534 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3535 break;
3536 }
3537
3538 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3539 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3540
3541 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3542 break;
3543
3544 offset += ihlen;
3545 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3546 if (dh == NULL)
3547 break;
3548
3549 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3550 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3551 break;
3552 }
3553
3554 default:
3555 break;
3556 }
3557out:
3558 return ret;
3559}
3560
3561#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3562
3563/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3564static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3565 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3566{
3567 u8 nexthdr;
3568 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3569 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3570
3571 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3572 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3573 if (ip6 == NULL)
3574 goto out;
3575
3576 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3577 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3578 ret = 0;
3579
3580 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3581 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3582 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3583 if (offset < 0)
3584 goto out;
3585
3586 if (proto)
3587 *proto = nexthdr;
3588
3589 switch (nexthdr) {
3590 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3591 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3592
3593 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3594 if (th == NULL)
3595 break;
3596
3597 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3598 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3599 break;
3600 }
3601
3602 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3603 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3604
3605 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3606 if (uh == NULL)
3607 break;
3608
3609 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3610 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3611 break;
3612 }
3613
3614 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3615 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3616
3617 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3618 if (dh == NULL)
3619 break;
3620
3621 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3622 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3623 break;
3624 }
3625
3626 /* includes fragments */
3627 default:
3628 break;
3629 }
3630out:
3631 return ret;
3632}
3633
3634#endif /* IPV6 */
3635
3636static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3637 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3638{
3639 char *addrp;
3640 int ret;
3641
3642 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3643 case PF_INET:
3644 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3645 if (ret)
3646 goto parse_error;
3647 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3648 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3649 goto okay;
3650
3651#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3652 case PF_INET6:
3653 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3654 if (ret)
3655 goto parse_error;
3656 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3657 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3658 goto okay;
3659#endif /* IPV6 */
3660 default:
3661 addrp = NULL;
3662 goto okay;
3663 }
3664
3665parse_error:
3666 printk(KERN_WARNING
3667 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3668 " unable to parse packet\n");
3669 return ret;
3670
3671okay:
3672 if (_addrp)
3673 *_addrp = addrp;
3674 return 0;
3675}
3676
3677/**
3678 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3679 * @skb: the packet
3680 * @family: protocol family
3681 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3682 *
3683 * Description:
3684 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3685 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3686 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3687 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3688 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3689 * peer labels.
3690 *
3691 */
3692static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3693{
3694 int err;
3695 u32 xfrm_sid;
3696 u32 nlbl_sid;
3697 u32 nlbl_type;
3698
3699 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3700 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3701
3702 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3703 if (unlikely(err)) {
3704 printk(KERN_WARNING
3705 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3706 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3707 return -EACCES;
3708 }
3709
3710 return 0;
3711}
3712
3713/* socket security operations */
3714
3715static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3716 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3717{
3718 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3719 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3720 return 0;
3721 }
3722
3723 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3724 socksid);
3725}
3726
3727static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3728{
3729 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3730 struct common_audit_data ad;
3731 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3732
3733 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3734 return 0;
3735
3736 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3737 ad.u.net.sk = sk;
3738
3739 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3740}
3741
3742static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3743 int protocol, int kern)
3744{
3745 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3746 u32 newsid;
3747 u16 secclass;
3748 int rc;
3749
3750 if (kern)
3751 return 0;
3752
3753 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3754 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3755 if (rc)
3756 return rc;
3757
3758 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3759}
3760
3761static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3762 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3763{
3764 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3765 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3766 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3767 int err = 0;
3768
3769 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3770
3771 if (kern)
3772 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3773 else {
3774 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3775 if (err)
3776 return err;
3777 }
3778
3779 isec->initialized = 1;
3780
3781 if (sock->sk) {
3782 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3783 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3784 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3785 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3786 }
3787
3788 return err;
3789}
3790
3791/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3792 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3793 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3794
3795static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3796{
3797 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3798 u16 family;
3799 int err;
3800
3801 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3802 if (err)
3803 goto out;
3804
3805 /*
3806 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3807 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3808 * check the first address now.
3809 */
3810 family = sk->sk_family;
3811 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3812 char *addrp;
3813 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3814 struct common_audit_data ad;
3815 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3816 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3817 unsigned short snum;
3818 u32 sid, node_perm;
3819
3820 if (family == PF_INET) {
3821 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3822 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3823 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3824 } else {
3825 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3826 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3827 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3828 }
3829
3830 if (snum) {
3831 int low, high;
3832
3833 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3834
3835 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3836 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3837 snum, &sid);
3838 if (err)
3839 goto out;
3840 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3841 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3842 ad.u.net.family = family;
3843 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3844 sksec->sclass,
3845 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3846 if (err)
3847 goto out;
3848 }
3849 }
3850
3851 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3852 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3853 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3854 break;
3855
3856 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3857 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3858 break;
3859
3860 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3861 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3862 break;
3863
3864 default:
3865 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3866 break;
3867 }
3868
3869 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3870 if (err)
3871 goto out;
3872
3873 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3874 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3875 ad.u.net.family = family;
3876
3877 if (family == PF_INET)
3878 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3879 else
3880 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3881
3882 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3883 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3884 if (err)
3885 goto out;
3886 }
3887out:
3888 return err;
3889}
3890
3891static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3892{
3893 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3894 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3895 int err;
3896
3897 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3898 if (err)
3899 return err;
3900
3901 /*
3902 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3903 */
3904 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3905 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3906 struct common_audit_data ad;
3907 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3908 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3909 unsigned short snum;
3910 u32 sid, perm;
3911
3912 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3913 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3914 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3915 return -EINVAL;
3916 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3917 } else {
3918 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3919 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3920 return -EINVAL;
3921 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3922 }
3923
3924 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3925 if (err)
3926 goto out;
3927
3928 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3929 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3930
3931 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3932 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3933 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3934 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3935 if (err)
3936 goto out;
3937 }
3938
3939 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3940
3941out:
3942 return err;
3943}
3944
3945static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3946{
3947 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3948}
3949
3950static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3951{
3952 int err;
3953 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3954 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3955
3956 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3957 if (err)
3958 return err;
3959
3960 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3961
3962 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3963 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3964 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3965 newisec->initialized = 1;
3966
3967 return 0;
3968}
3969
3970static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3971 int size)
3972{
3973 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3974}
3975
3976static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3977 int size, int flags)
3978{
3979 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3980}
3981
3982static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3983{
3984 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3985}
3986
3987static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3988{
3989 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3990}
3991
3992static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3993{
3994 int err;
3995
3996 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3997 if (err)
3998 return err;
3999
4000 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4001}
4002
4003static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4004 int optname)
4005{
4006 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4007}
4008
4009static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4010{
4011 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4012}
4013
4014static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4015 struct sock *other,
4016 struct sock *newsk)
4017{
4018 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4019 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4020 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4021 struct common_audit_data ad;
4022 int err;
4023
4024 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4025 ad.u.net.sk = other;
4026
4027 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4028 sksec_other->sclass,
4029 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4030 if (err)
4031 return err;
4032
4033 /* server child socket */
4034 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4035 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4036 &sksec_new->sid);
4037 if (err)
4038 return err;
4039
4040 /* connecting socket */
4041 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4042
4043 return 0;
4044}
4045
4046static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4047 struct socket *other)
4048{
4049 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4050 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4051 struct common_audit_data ad;
4052
4053 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4054 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4055
4056 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4057 &ad);
4058}
4059
4060static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4061 u32 peer_sid,
4062 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4063{
4064 int err;
4065 u32 if_sid;
4066 u32 node_sid;
4067
4068 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4069 if (err)
4070 return err;
4071 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4072 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4073 if (err)
4074 return err;
4075
4076 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4077 if (err)
4078 return err;
4079 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4080 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4081}
4082
4083static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4084 u16 family)
4085{
4086 int err = 0;
4087 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4088 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4089 struct common_audit_data ad;
4090 char *addrp;
4091
4092 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4093 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4094 ad.u.net.family = family;
4095 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4096 if (err)
4097 return err;
4098
4099 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4100 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4101 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4102 if (err)
4103 return err;
4104 }
4105
4106 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4107 if (err)
4108 return err;
4109 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4110
4111 return err;
4112}
4113
4114static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4115{
4116 int err;
4117 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4118 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4119 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4120 struct common_audit_data ad;
4121 char *addrp;
4122 u8 secmark_active;
4123 u8 peerlbl_active;
4124
4125 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4126 return 0;
4127
4128 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4129 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4130 family = PF_INET;
4131
4132 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4133 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4134 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4135 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4136 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4137 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4138
4139 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4140 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4141 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4142 return 0;
4143
4144 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4145 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4146 ad.u.net.family = family;
4147 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4148 if (err)
4149 return err;
4150
4151 if (peerlbl_active) {
4152 u32 peer_sid;
4153
4154 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4155 if (err)
4156 return err;
4157 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4158 peer_sid, &ad);
4159 if (err) {
4160 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4161 return err;
4162 }
4163 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4164 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4165 if (err)
4166 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4167 }
4168
4169 if (secmark_active) {
4170 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4171 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4172 if (err)
4173 return err;
4174 }
4175
4176 return err;
4177}
4178
4179static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4180 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4181{
4182 int err = 0;
4183 char *scontext;
4184 u32 scontext_len;
4185 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4186 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4187
4188 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4189 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4190 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4191 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4192 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4193
4194 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4195 if (err)
4196 return err;
4197
4198 if (scontext_len > len) {
4199 err = -ERANGE;
4200 goto out_len;
4201 }
4202
4203 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4204 err = -EFAULT;
4205
4206out_len:
4207 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4208 err = -EFAULT;
4209 kfree(scontext);
4210 return err;
4211}
4212
4213static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4214{
4215 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4216 u16 family;
4217
4218 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4219 family = PF_INET;
4220 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4221 family = PF_INET6;
4222 else if (sock)
4223 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4224 else
4225 goto out;
4226
4227 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4228 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4229 else if (skb)
4230 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4231
4232out:
4233 *secid = peer_secid;
4234 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4235 return -EINVAL;
4236 return 0;
4237}
4238
4239static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4240{
4241 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4242
4243 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4244 if (!sksec)
4245 return -ENOMEM;
4246
4247 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4248 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4249 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4250 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4251
4252 return 0;
4253}
4254
4255static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4256{
4257 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4258
4259 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4260 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4261 kfree(sksec);
4262}
4263
4264static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4265{
4266 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4267 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4268
4269 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4270 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4271 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4272
4273 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4274}
4275
4276static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4277{
4278 if (!sk)
4279 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4280 else {
4281 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4282
4283 *secid = sksec->sid;
4284 }
4285}
4286
4287static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4288{
4289 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4290 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4291
4292 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4293 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4294 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4295 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4296}
4297
4298static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4299 struct request_sock *req)
4300{
4301 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4302 int err;
4303 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4304 u32 newsid;
4305 u32 peersid;
4306
4307 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4308 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4309 family = PF_INET;
4310
4311 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4312 if (err)
4313 return err;
4314 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4315 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4316 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4317 } else {
4318 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4319 if (err)
4320 return err;
4321 req->secid = newsid;
4322 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4323 }
4324
4325 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4326}
4327
4328static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4329 const struct request_sock *req)
4330{
4331 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4332
4333 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4334 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4335 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4336 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4337 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4338 time it will have been created and available. */
4339
4340 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4341 * thread with access to newsksec */
4342 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4343}
4344
4345static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4346{
4347 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4348 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4349
4350 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4351 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4352 family = PF_INET;
4353
4354 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4355}
4356
4357static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4358{
4359 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4360 u32 tsid;
4361
4362 __tsec = current_security();
4363 tsid = __tsec->sid;
4364
4365 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4366}
4367
4368static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4369{
4370 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4371}
4372
4373static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4374{
4375 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4376}
4377
4378static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4379 struct flowi *fl)
4380{
4381 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4382}
4383
4384static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4385{
4386 u32 sid = current_sid();
4387
4388 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4389 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4390 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4391 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4392 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4393 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4394
4395 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4396 NULL);
4397}
4398
4399static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4400{
4401 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4402
4403 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4404 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4405 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4406 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4407 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4408 * protocols were being used */
4409
4410 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4411 * the sockcreate SID here */
4412
4413 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4414 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4415}
4416
4417static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4418{
4419 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4420 u32 sid = current_sid();
4421 int err;
4422
4423 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4424 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4425 if (err)
4426 return err;
4427 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4428 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4429 if (err)
4430 return err;
4431
4432 sksec->sid = sid;
4433
4434 return 0;
4435}
4436
4437static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4438{
4439 int err = 0;
4440 u32 perm;
4441 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4442 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4443
4444 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4445 err = -EINVAL;
4446 goto out;
4447 }
4448 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4449
4450 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4451 if (err) {
4452 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4453 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4454 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4455 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4456 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4457 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4458 err = 0;
4459 }
4460
4461 /* Ignore */
4462 if (err == -ENOENT)
4463 err = 0;
4464 goto out;
4465 }
4466
4467 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4468out:
4469 return err;
4470}
4471
4472#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4473
4474static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4475 u16 family)
4476{
4477 int err;
4478 char *addrp;
4479 u32 peer_sid;
4480 struct common_audit_data ad;
4481 u8 secmark_active;
4482 u8 netlbl_active;
4483 u8 peerlbl_active;
4484
4485 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4486 return NF_ACCEPT;
4487
4488 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4489 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4490 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4491 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4492 return NF_ACCEPT;
4493
4494 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4495 return NF_DROP;
4496
4497 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4498 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4499 ad.u.net.family = family;
4500 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4501 return NF_DROP;
4502
4503 if (peerlbl_active) {
4504 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4505 peer_sid, &ad);
4506 if (err) {
4507 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4508 return NF_DROP;
4509 }
4510 }
4511
4512 if (secmark_active)
4513 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4514 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4515 return NF_DROP;
4516
4517 if (netlbl_active)
4518 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4519 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4520 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4521 * protection */
4522 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4523 return NF_DROP;
4524
4525 return NF_ACCEPT;
4526}
4527
4528static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4529 struct sk_buff *skb,
4530 const struct net_device *in,
4531 const struct net_device *out,
4532 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4533{
4534 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4535}
4536
4537#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4538static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4539 struct sk_buff *skb,
4540 const struct net_device *in,
4541 const struct net_device *out,
4542 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4543{
4544 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4545}
4546#endif /* IPV6 */
4547
4548static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4549 u16 family)
4550{
4551 u32 sid;
4552
4553 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4554 return NF_ACCEPT;
4555
4556 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4557 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4558 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4559 if (skb->sk) {
4560 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4561 sid = sksec->sid;
4562 } else
4563 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4564 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4565 return NF_DROP;
4566
4567 return NF_ACCEPT;
4568}
4569
4570static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4571 struct sk_buff *skb,
4572 const struct net_device *in,
4573 const struct net_device *out,
4574 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4575{
4576 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4577}
4578
4579static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4580 int ifindex,
4581 u16 family)
4582{
4583 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4584 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4585 struct common_audit_data ad;
4586 char *addrp;
4587 u8 proto;
4588
4589 if (sk == NULL)
4590 return NF_ACCEPT;
4591 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4592
4593 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4594 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4595 ad.u.net.family = family;
4596 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4597 return NF_DROP;
4598
4599 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4600 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4601 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4602 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4603
4604 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4605 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4606
4607 return NF_ACCEPT;
4608}
4609
4610static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4611 u16 family)
4612{
4613 u32 secmark_perm;
4614 u32 peer_sid;
4615 struct sock *sk;
4616 struct common_audit_data ad;
4617 char *addrp;
4618 u8 secmark_active;
4619 u8 peerlbl_active;
4620
4621 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4622 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4623 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4624 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4625 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4626 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4627#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4628 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4629 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4630 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4631 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4632 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4633 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4634 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4635 return NF_ACCEPT;
4636#endif
4637 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4638 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4639 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4640 return NF_ACCEPT;
4641
4642 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4643 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4644 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4645 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4646 sk = skb->sk;
4647 if (sk == NULL) {
4648 if (skb->skb_iif) {
4649 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4650 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4651 return NF_DROP;
4652 } else {
4653 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4654 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4655 }
4656 } else {
4657 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4658 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4659 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4660 }
4661
4662 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4663 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4664 ad.u.net.family = family;
4665 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4666 return NF_DROP;
4667
4668 if (secmark_active)
4669 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4670 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4671 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4672
4673 if (peerlbl_active) {
4674 u32 if_sid;
4675 u32 node_sid;
4676
4677 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4678 return NF_DROP;
4679 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4680 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4681 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4682
4683 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4684 return NF_DROP;
4685 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4686 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4687 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4688 }
4689
4690 return NF_ACCEPT;
4691}
4692
4693static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4694 struct sk_buff *skb,
4695 const struct net_device *in,
4696 const struct net_device *out,
4697 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4698{
4699 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4700}
4701
4702#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4703static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4704 struct sk_buff *skb,
4705 const struct net_device *in,
4706 const struct net_device *out,
4707 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4708{
4709 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4710}
4711#endif /* IPV6 */
4712
4713#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4714
4715static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4716{
4717 int err;
4718
4719 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4720 if (err)
4721 return err;
4722
4723 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4724}
4725
4726static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4727{
4728 int err;
4729 struct common_audit_data ad;
4730 u32 sid;
4731
4732 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4733 if (err)
4734 return err;
4735
4736 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4737 ad.u.cap = capability;
4738
4739 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
4740 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
4741 CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4742}
4743
4744static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4745 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4746 u16 sclass)
4747{
4748 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4749 u32 sid;
4750
4751 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4752 if (!isec)
4753 return -ENOMEM;
4754
4755 sid = task_sid(task);
4756 isec->sclass = sclass;
4757 isec->sid = sid;
4758 perm->security = isec;
4759
4760 return 0;
4761}
4762
4763static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4764{
4765 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4766 perm->security = NULL;
4767 kfree(isec);
4768}
4769
4770static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4771{
4772 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4773
4774 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4775 if (!msec)
4776 return -ENOMEM;
4777
4778 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4779 msg->security = msec;
4780
4781 return 0;
4782}
4783
4784static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4785{
4786 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4787
4788 msg->security = NULL;
4789 kfree(msec);
4790}
4791
4792static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4793 u32 perms)
4794{
4795 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4796 struct common_audit_data ad;
4797 u32 sid = current_sid();
4798
4799 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4800
4801 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4802 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4803
4804 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4805}
4806
4807static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4808{
4809 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4810}
4811
4812static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4813{
4814 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4815}
4816
4817/* message queue security operations */
4818static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4819{
4820 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4821 struct common_audit_data ad;
4822 u32 sid = current_sid();
4823 int rc;
4824
4825 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4826 if (rc)
4827 return rc;
4828
4829 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4830
4831 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4832 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4833
4834 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4835 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4836 if (rc) {
4837 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4838 return rc;
4839 }
4840 return 0;
4841}
4842
4843static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4844{
4845 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4846}
4847
4848static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4849{
4850 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4851 struct common_audit_data ad;
4852 u32 sid = current_sid();
4853
4854 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4855
4856 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4857 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4858
4859 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4860 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4861}
4862
4863static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4864{
4865 int err;
4866 int perms;
4867
4868 switch (cmd) {
4869 case IPC_INFO:
4870 case MSG_INFO:
4871 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4872 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4873 case IPC_STAT:
4874 case MSG_STAT:
4875 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4876 break;
4877 case IPC_SET:
4878 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4879 break;
4880 case IPC_RMID:
4881 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4882 break;
4883 default:
4884 return 0;
4885 }
4886
4887 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4888 return err;
4889}
4890
4891static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4892{
4893 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4894 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4895 struct common_audit_data ad;
4896 u32 sid = current_sid();
4897 int rc;
4898
4899 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4900 msec = msg->security;
4901
4902 /*
4903 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4904 */
4905 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4906 /*
4907 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4908 * message queue this message will be stored in
4909 */
4910 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4911 NULL, &msec->sid);
4912 if (rc)
4913 return rc;
4914 }
4915
4916 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4917 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4918
4919 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4920 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4921 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4922 if (!rc)
4923 /* Can this process send the message */
4924 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4925 MSG__SEND, &ad);
4926 if (!rc)
4927 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4928 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4929 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4930
4931 return rc;
4932}
4933
4934static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4935 struct task_struct *target,
4936 long type, int mode)
4937{
4938 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4939 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4940 struct common_audit_data ad;
4941 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4942 int rc;
4943
4944 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4945 msec = msg->security;
4946
4947 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4948 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4949
4950 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4951 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4952 if (!rc)
4953 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4954 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4955 return rc;
4956}
4957
4958/* Shared Memory security operations */
4959static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4960{
4961 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4962 struct common_audit_data ad;
4963 u32 sid = current_sid();
4964 int rc;
4965
4966 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4967 if (rc)
4968 return rc;
4969
4970 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4971
4972 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4973 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4974
4975 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4976 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4977 if (rc) {
4978 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4979 return rc;
4980 }
4981 return 0;
4982}
4983
4984static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4985{
4986 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4987}
4988
4989static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4990{
4991 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4992 struct common_audit_data ad;
4993 u32 sid = current_sid();
4994
4995 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4996
4997 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4998 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4999
5000 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5001 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5002}
5003
5004/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5005static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5006{
5007 int perms;
5008 int err;
5009
5010 switch (cmd) {
5011 case IPC_INFO:
5012 case SHM_INFO:
5013 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5014 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5015 case IPC_STAT:
5016 case SHM_STAT:
5017 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5018 break;
5019 case IPC_SET:
5020 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5021 break;
5022 case SHM_LOCK:
5023 case SHM_UNLOCK:
5024 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5025 break;
5026 case IPC_RMID:
5027 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5028 break;
5029 default:
5030 return 0;
5031 }
5032
5033 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5034 return err;
5035}
5036
5037static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5038 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5039{
5040 u32 perms;
5041
5042 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5043 perms = SHM__READ;
5044 else
5045 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5046
5047 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5048}
5049
5050/* Semaphore security operations */
5051static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5052{
5053 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5054 struct common_audit_data ad;
5055 u32 sid = current_sid();
5056 int rc;
5057
5058 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5059 if (rc)
5060 return rc;
5061
5062 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5063
5064 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5065 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5066
5067 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5068 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5069 if (rc) {
5070 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5071 return rc;
5072 }
5073 return 0;
5074}
5075
5076static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5077{
5078 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5079}
5080
5081static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5082{
5083 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5084 struct common_audit_data ad;
5085 u32 sid = current_sid();
5086
5087 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5088
5089 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5090 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5091
5092 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5093 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5094}
5095
5096/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5097static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5098{
5099 int err;
5100 u32 perms;
5101
5102 switch (cmd) {
5103 case IPC_INFO:
5104 case SEM_INFO:
5105 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5106 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5107 case GETPID:
5108 case GETNCNT:
5109 case GETZCNT:
5110 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5111 break;
5112 case GETVAL:
5113 case GETALL:
5114 perms = SEM__READ;
5115 break;
5116 case SETVAL:
5117 case SETALL:
5118 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5119 break;
5120 case IPC_RMID:
5121 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5122 break;
5123 case IPC_SET:
5124 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5125 break;
5126 case IPC_STAT:
5127 case SEM_STAT:
5128 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5129 break;
5130 default:
5131 return 0;
5132 }
5133
5134 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5135 return err;
5136}
5137
5138static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5139 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5140{
5141 u32 perms;
5142
5143 if (alter)
5144 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5145 else
5146 perms = SEM__READ;
5147
5148 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5149}
5150
5151static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5152{
5153 u32 av = 0;
5154
5155 av = 0;
5156 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5157 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5158 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5159 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5160
5161 if (av == 0)
5162 return 0;
5163
5164 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5165}
5166
5167static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5168{
5169 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5170 *secid = isec->sid;
5171}
5172
5173static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5174{
5175 if (inode)
5176 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5177}
5178
5179static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5180 char *name, char **value)
5181{
5182 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5183 u32 sid;
5184 int error;
5185 unsigned len;
5186
5187 if (current != p) {
5188 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5189 if (error)
5190 return error;
5191 }
5192
5193 rcu_read_lock();
5194 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5195
5196 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5197 sid = __tsec->sid;
5198 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5199 sid = __tsec->osid;
5200 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5201 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5202 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5203 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5204 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5205 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5206 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5207 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5208 else
5209 goto invalid;
5210 rcu_read_unlock();
5211
5212 if (!sid)
5213 return 0;
5214
5215 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5216 if (error)
5217 return error;
5218 return len;
5219
5220invalid:
5221 rcu_read_unlock();
5222 return -EINVAL;
5223}
5224
5225static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5226 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5227{
5228 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5229 struct task_struct *tracer;
5230 struct cred *new;
5231 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5232 int error;
5233 char *str = value;
5234
5235 if (current != p) {
5236 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5237 security attributes. */
5238 return -EACCES;
5239 }
5240
5241 /*
5242 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5243 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5244 * above restriction is ever removed.
5245 */
5246 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5247 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5248 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5249 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5250 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5251 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5252 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5253 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5254 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5255 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5256 else
5257 error = -EINVAL;
5258 if (error)
5259 return error;
5260
5261 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5262 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5263 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5264 str[size-1] = 0;
5265 size--;
5266 }
5267 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5268 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5269 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5270 return error;
5271 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5272 &sid);
5273 }
5274 if (error)
5275 return error;
5276 }
5277
5278 new = prepare_creds();
5279 if (!new)
5280 return -ENOMEM;
5281
5282 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5283 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5284 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5285 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5286 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5287 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5288 tsec = new->security;
5289 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5290 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5291 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5292 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5293 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5294 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5295 if (error)
5296 goto abort_change;
5297 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5298 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5299 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5300 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5301 error = -EINVAL;
5302 if (sid == 0)
5303 goto abort_change;
5304
5305 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5306 error = -EPERM;
5307 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5308 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5309 if (error)
5310 goto abort_change;
5311 }
5312
5313 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5314 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5315 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5316 if (error)
5317 goto abort_change;
5318
5319 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5320 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5321 ptsid = 0;
5322 task_lock(p);
5323 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5324 if (tracer)
5325 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5326 task_unlock(p);
5327
5328 if (tracer) {
5329 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5330 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5331 if (error)
5332 goto abort_change;
5333 }
5334
5335 tsec->sid = sid;
5336 } else {
5337 error = -EINVAL;
5338 goto abort_change;
5339 }
5340
5341 commit_creds(new);
5342 return size;
5343
5344abort_change:
5345 abort_creds(new);
5346 return error;
5347}
5348
5349static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5350{
5351 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5352}
5353
5354static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5355{
5356 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5357}
5358
5359static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5360{
5361 kfree(secdata);
5362}
5363
5364/*
5365 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5366 */
5367static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5368{
5369 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5370}
5371
5372/*
5373 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5374 */
5375static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5376{
5377 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5378}
5379
5380static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5381{
5382 int len = 0;
5383 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5384 ctx, true);
5385 if (len < 0)
5386 return len;
5387 *ctxlen = len;
5388 return 0;
5389}
5390#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5391
5392static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5393 unsigned long flags)
5394{
5395 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5396 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5397
5398 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5399 if (!ksec)
5400 return -ENOMEM;
5401
5402 tsec = cred->security;
5403 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5404 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5405 else
5406 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5407
5408 k->security = ksec;
5409 return 0;
5410}
5411
5412static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5413{
5414 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5415
5416 k->security = NULL;
5417 kfree(ksec);
5418}
5419
5420static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5421 const struct cred *cred,
5422 key_perm_t perm)
5423{
5424 struct key *key;
5425 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5426 u32 sid;
5427
5428 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5429 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5430 appear to be created. */
5431 if (perm == 0)
5432 return 0;
5433
5434 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5435
5436 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5437 ksec = key->security;
5438
5439 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5440}
5441
5442static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5443{
5444 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5445 char *context = NULL;
5446 unsigned len;
5447 int rc;
5448
5449 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5450 if (!rc)
5451 rc = len;
5452 *_buffer = context;
5453 return rc;
5454}
5455
5456#endif
5457
5458static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5459 .name = "selinux",
5460
5461 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5462 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5463 .capget = selinux_capget,
5464 .capset = selinux_capset,
5465 .capable = selinux_capable,
5466 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5467 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5468 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5469 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5470
5471 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5472 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5473
5474 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5475 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5476 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5477 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5478
5479 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5480 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5481 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5482 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5483 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5484 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5485 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5486 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5487 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5488 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5489 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5490 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5491
5492
5493 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5494 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5495 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5496 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5497 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5498 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5499 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5500 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5501 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5502 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5503 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5504 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5505 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5506 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5507 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5508 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5509 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5510 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5511 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5512 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5513 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5514 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5515 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5516 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5517 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5518
5519 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5520 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5521 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5522 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5523 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5524 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5525 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5526 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5527 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5528 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5529 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5530
5531 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5532
5533 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5534 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5535 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5536 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5537 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5538 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5539 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5540 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5541 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5542 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5543 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5544 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5545 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5546 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5547 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5548 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5549 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5550 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5551 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5552 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5553 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5554 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5555
5556 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5557 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5558
5559 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5560 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5561
5562 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5563 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5564 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5565 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5566 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5567 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5568
5569 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5570 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5571 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5572 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5573 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5574
5575 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5576 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5577 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5578 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5579 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5580
5581 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5582
5583 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5584 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5585
5586 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5587 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5588 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5589 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5590 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5591 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5592
5593 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5594 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5595
5596 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5597 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5598 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5599 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5600 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5601 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5602 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5603 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5604 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5605 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5606 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5607 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5608 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5609 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5610 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5611 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5612 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5613 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5614 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5615 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5616 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5617 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5618 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5619 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5620 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5621 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5622 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5623 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5624 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5625 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5626 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5627
5628#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5629 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5630 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5631 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5632 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5633 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5634 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5635 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5636 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5637 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5638 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5639#endif
5640
5641#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5642 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5643 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5644 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5645 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5646#endif
5647
5648#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5649 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5650 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5651 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5652 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5653#endif
5654};
5655
5656static __init int selinux_init(void)
5657{
5658 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5659 selinux_enabled = 0;
5660 return 0;
5661 }
5662
5663 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5664 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5665 return 0;
5666 }
5667
5668 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5669
5670 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5671 cred_init_security();
5672
5673 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5674
5675 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5676 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5677 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5678 avc_init();
5679
5680 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5681 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5682
5683 if (selinux_enforcing)
5684 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5685 else
5686 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5687
5688 return 0;
5689}
5690
5691static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5692{
5693 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5694}
5695
5696void selinux_complete_init(void)
5697{
5698 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5699
5700 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5701 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5702 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5703}
5704
5705/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5706 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5707security_initcall(selinux_init);
5708
5709#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5710
5711static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5712 {
5713 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5714 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5715 .pf = PF_INET,
5716 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5717 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5718 },
5719 {
5720 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5721 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5722 .pf = PF_INET,
5723 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5724 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5725 },
5726 {
5727 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5728 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5729 .pf = PF_INET,
5730 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5731 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5732 }
5733};
5734
5735#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5736
5737static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5738 {
5739 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5740 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5741 .pf = PF_INET6,
5742 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5743 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5744 },
5745 {
5746 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5747 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5748 .pf = PF_INET6,
5749 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5750 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5751 }
5752};
5753
5754#endif /* IPV6 */
5755
5756static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5757{
5758 int err = 0;
5759
5760 if (!selinux_enabled)
5761 goto out;
5762
5763 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5764
5765 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5766 if (err)
5767 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5768
5769#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5770 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5771 if (err)
5772 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5773#endif /* IPV6 */
5774
5775out:
5776 return err;
5777}
5778
5779__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5780
5781#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5782static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5783{
5784 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5785
5786 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5787#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5788 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5789#endif /* IPV6 */
5790}
5791#endif
5792
5793#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5794
5795#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5796#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5797#endif
5798
5799#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5800
5801#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5802static int selinux_disabled;
5803
5804int selinux_disable(void)
5805{
5806 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5807
5808 if (ss_initialized) {
5809 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5810 return -EINVAL;
5811 }
5812
5813 if (selinux_disabled) {
5814 /* Only do this once. */
5815 return -EINVAL;
5816 }
5817
5818 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5819
5820 selinux_disabled = 1;
5821 selinux_enabled = 0;
5822
5823 reset_security_ops();
5824
5825 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5826 avc_disable();
5827
5828 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5829 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5830
5831 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5832 exit_sel_fs();
5833
5834 return 0;
5835}
5836#endif