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1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28#include <linux/errno.h>
29#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30#include <linux/sched/task.h>
31#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40#include <linux/swap.h>
41#include <linux/spinlock.h>
42#include <linux/syscalls.h>
43#include <linux/dcache.h>
44#include <linux/file.h>
45#include <linux/fdtable.h>
46#include <linux/namei.h>
47#include <linux/mount.h>
48#include <linux/fs_context.h>
49#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57#include <net/net_namespace.h>
58#include <net/netlabel.h>
59#include <linux/uaccess.h>
60#include <asm/ioctls.h>
61#include <linux/atomic.h>
62#include <linux/bitops.h>
63#include <linux/interrupt.h>
64#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65#include <net/netlink.h>
66#include <linux/tcp.h>
67#include <linux/udp.h>
68#include <linux/dccp.h>
69#include <linux/sctp.h>
70#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71#include <linux/quota.h>
72#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <linux/parser.h>
75#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
76#include <net/ipv6.h>
77#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78#include <linux/personality.h>
79#include <linux/audit.h>
80#include <linux/string.h>
81#include <linux/mutex.h>
82#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83#include <linux/syslog.h>
84#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85#include <linux/export.h>
86#include <linux/msg.h>
87#include <linux/shm.h>
88#include <linux/bpf.h>
89#include <linux/kernfs.h>
90#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
91#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
92#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
93#include <linux/fanotify.h>
94#include <linux/io_uring.h>
95
96#include "avc.h"
97#include "objsec.h"
98#include "netif.h"
99#include "netnode.h"
100#include "netport.h"
101#include "ibpkey.h"
102#include "xfrm.h"
103#include "netlabel.h"
104#include "audit.h"
105#include "avc_ss.h"
106
107struct selinux_state selinux_state;
108
109/* SECMARK reference count */
110static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
111
112#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
114
115static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
116{
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
120 return 1;
121}
122__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
123#else
124#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
125#endif
126
127int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
130{
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
134 return 1;
135}
136__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
137#endif
138
139static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
141
142static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143{
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
148 if (checkreqprot)
149 pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
150 }
151 return 1;
152}
153__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
154
155/**
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
157 *
158 * Description:
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
164 *
165 */
166static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167{
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
170}
171
172/**
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
174 *
175 * Description:
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
180 *
181 */
182static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183{
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
186}
187
188static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189{
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
191 sel_netif_flush();
192 sel_netnode_flush();
193 sel_netport_flush();
194 synchronize_net();
195 }
196 return 0;
197}
198
199static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200{
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
204 }
205
206 return 0;
207}
208
209/*
210 * initialise the security for the init task
211 */
212static void cred_init_security(void)
213{
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
215
216 tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
217 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
218}
219
220/*
221 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
222 */
223static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
224{
225 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
226
227 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
228 return tsec->sid;
229}
230
231/*
232 * get the objective security ID of a task
233 */
234static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
235{
236 u32 sid;
237
238 rcu_read_lock();
239 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
240 rcu_read_unlock();
241 return sid;
242}
243
244static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
245
246/*
247 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
248 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
249 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
250 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
251 */
252static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
253 struct dentry *dentry,
254 bool may_sleep)
255{
256 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
257
258 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
259
260 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
261 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
262 if (!may_sleep)
263 return -ECHILD;
264
265 /*
266 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
267 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
268 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
269 */
270 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
271 }
272 return 0;
273}
274
275static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
276{
277 return selinux_inode(inode);
278}
279
280static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
281{
282 int error;
283
284 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
285 if (error)
286 return ERR_PTR(error);
287 return selinux_inode(inode);
288}
289
290/*
291 * Get the security label of an inode.
292 */
293static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
294{
295 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
296 return selinux_inode(inode);
297}
298
299static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
300{
301 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
302
303 return selinux_inode(inode);
304}
305
306/*
307 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
308 */
309static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
310{
311 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
312
313 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
314 return selinux_inode(inode);
315}
316
317static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
318{
319 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
320 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
321
322 if (!isec)
323 return;
324 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
325 /*
326 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
327 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
328 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
329 *
330 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
331 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
332 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
333 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
334 */
335 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
336 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
337 list_del_init(&isec->list);
338 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
339 }
340}
341
342struct selinux_mnt_opts {
343 u32 fscontext_sid;
344 u32 context_sid;
345 u32 rootcontext_sid;
346 u32 defcontext_sid;
347};
348
349static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
350{
351 kfree(mnt_opts);
352}
353
354enum {
355 Opt_error = -1,
356 Opt_context = 0,
357 Opt_defcontext = 1,
358 Opt_fscontext = 2,
359 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
360 Opt_seclabel = 4,
361};
362
363#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
364static struct {
365 const char *name;
366 int len;
367 int opt;
368 bool has_arg;
369} tokens[] = {
370 A(context, true),
371 A(fscontext, true),
372 A(defcontext, true),
373 A(rootcontext, true),
374 A(seclabel, false),
375};
376#undef A
377
378static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
379{
380 int i;
381
382 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
383 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
384 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
385 continue;
386 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
387 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
388 continue;
389 *arg = s + len + 1;
390 } else if (len != l)
391 continue;
392 return tokens[i].opt;
393 }
394 return Opt_error;
395}
396
397#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
398
399static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
400 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
401 const struct cred *cred)
402{
403 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
404 int rc;
405
406 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
407 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
408 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
409 if (rc)
410 return rc;
411
412 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
413 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
414 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
415 return rc;
416}
417
418static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
419 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
420 const struct cred *cred)
421{
422 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
423 int rc;
424 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
425 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
426 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
427 if (rc)
428 return rc;
429
430 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
431 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
432 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
433 return rc;
434}
435
436static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
437{
438 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
439 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
440 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
441 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
442 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
443 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
444 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
445 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
446 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
447}
448
449static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
450{
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
452
453 /*
454 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
455 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
456 */
457 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
458
459 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
460 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
461 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
463 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
464 return 1;
465
466 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
467 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
468
469 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
472 default:
473 return 0;
474 }
475}
476
477static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
478{
479 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
480 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
481 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
482 u32 sid;
483 int rc;
484
485 /*
486 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
487 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
488 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
489 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
490 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
491 */
492 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
493 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
494 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
495 goto fallback;
496 }
497
498 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
499 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
500 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
501 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
502 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
503 goto fallback;
504 } else {
505 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
506 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
507 return rc;
508 }
509 }
510 return 0;
511
512fallback:
513 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
514 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, "/",
515 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
516 if (rc)
517 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
518
519 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
520 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
521 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
522 sbsec->sid = sid;
523 return 0;
524}
525
526static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
527{
528 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
529 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
530 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
531 int rc = 0;
532
533 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
534 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
535 if (rc)
536 return rc;
537 }
538
539 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
540
541 /*
542 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
543 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
544 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
545 */
546 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
547 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
548 else
549 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
550
551 /* Initialize the root inode. */
552 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
553
554 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
555 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
556 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
557 populates itself. */
558 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
559 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
560 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
561 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
562 struct inode_security_struct, list);
563 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
564 list_del_init(&isec->list);
565 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
566 inode = igrab(inode);
567 if (inode) {
568 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
569 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
570 iput(inode);
571 }
572 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
573 }
574 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
575 return rc;
576}
577
578static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
579 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
580{
581 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
582
583 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
584 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
585 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
586 (old_sid != new_sid))
587 return 1;
588
589 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
590 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
591 */
592 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
593 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 return 1;
595 return 0;
596}
597
598/*
599 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
600 * labeling information.
601 */
602static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
603 void *mnt_opts,
604 unsigned long kern_flags,
605 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
606{
607 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
608 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
609 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
610 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
611 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
612 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
613 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
614 int rc = 0;
615
616 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
617
618 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
619 if (!opts) {
620 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
621 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
622 server is ready to handle calls. */
623 goto out;
624 }
625 rc = -EINVAL;
626 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
628 goto out;
629 }
630 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
631 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
632 * place the results is not allowed */
633 rc = -EINVAL;
634 goto out;
635 }
636
637 /*
638 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
639 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
640 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
641 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
642 *
643 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
644 * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
645 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
646 * will be used for both mounts)
647 */
648 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
649 && !opts)
650 goto out;
651
652 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
653
654 /*
655 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
656 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
657 * than once with different security options.
658 */
659 if (opts) {
660 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
661 fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
662 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
663 fscontext_sid))
664 goto out_double_mount;
665 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
666 }
667 if (opts->context_sid) {
668 context_sid = opts->context_sid;
669 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
670 context_sid))
671 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
673 }
674 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
675 rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
677 rootcontext_sid))
678 goto out_double_mount;
679 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
680 }
681 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
682 defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
683 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
684 defcontext_sid))
685 goto out_double_mount;
686 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
687 }
688 }
689
690 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
691 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
692 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
693 goto out_double_mount;
694 rc = 0;
695 goto out;
696 }
697
698 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
699 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
700
701 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
702 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
703 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
704 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
705 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
706 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
707 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
708
709 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
710 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
711 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
712 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
713
714 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
715 /*
716 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
717 * filesystem type.
718 */
719 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
720 if (rc) {
721 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
722 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
723 goto out;
724 }
725 }
726
727 /*
728 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
729 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
730 * line and security labels must be ignored.
731 */
732 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
733 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
734 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
736 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
737 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
738 defcontext_sid) {
739 rc = -EACCES;
740 goto out;
741 }
742 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
744 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
745 current_sid(),
746 current_sid(),
747 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
748 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
749 if (rc)
750 goto out;
751 }
752 goto out_set_opts;
753 }
754
755 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
756 if (fscontext_sid) {
757 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
758 if (rc)
759 goto out;
760
761 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
762 }
763
764 /*
765 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
766 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
767 * the superblock context if not already set.
768 */
769 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
770 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
771 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
772 }
773
774 if (context_sid) {
775 if (!fscontext_sid) {
776 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
777 cred);
778 if (rc)
779 goto out;
780 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
781 } else {
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
783 cred);
784 if (rc)
785 goto out;
786 }
787 if (!rootcontext_sid)
788 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
789
790 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
792 }
793
794 if (rootcontext_sid) {
795 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
796 cred);
797 if (rc)
798 goto out;
799
800 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
801 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
802 }
803
804 if (defcontext_sid) {
805 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
806 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
807 rc = -EINVAL;
808 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
809 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
810 goto out;
811 }
812
813 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
815 sbsec, cred);
816 if (rc)
817 goto out;
818 }
819
820 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
821 }
822
823out_set_opts:
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
825out:
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
827 return rc;
828out_double_mount:
829 rc = -EINVAL;
830 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
832 sb->s_type->name);
833 goto out;
834}
835
836static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
837 const struct super_block *newsb)
838{
839 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
840 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
841 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
842 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
843
844 if (oldflags != newflags)
845 goto mismatch;
846 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
847 goto mismatch;
848 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
849 goto mismatch;
850 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
851 goto mismatch;
852 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
853 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
854 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
855 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
856 goto mismatch;
857 }
858 return 0;
859mismatch:
860 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
861 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
862 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
863 return -EBUSY;
864}
865
866static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
867 struct super_block *newsb,
868 unsigned long kern_flags,
869 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
870{
871 int rc = 0;
872 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
873 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
874 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
875
876 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
877 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
878 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
879
880 /*
881 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
882 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
883 */
884 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
885 return 0;
886
887 /*
888 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
889 * place the results is not allowed.
890 */
891 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
892 return -EINVAL;
893
894 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
895 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
896
897 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
898 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
899 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
900 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
901 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
902 }
903
904 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
905
906 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
907
908 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
909 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
910 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
911
912 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
913 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
914 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
915 if (rc)
916 goto out;
917 }
918
919 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
920 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
921 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
922 }
923
924 if (set_context) {
925 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
926
927 if (!set_fscontext)
928 newsbsec->sid = sid;
929 if (!set_rootcontext) {
930 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
931 newisec->sid = sid;
932 }
933 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
934 }
935 if (set_rootcontext) {
936 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
937 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
938
939 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
940 }
941
942 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
943out:
944 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
945 return rc;
946}
947
948/*
949 * NOTE: the caller is resposible for freeing the memory even if on error.
950 */
951static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
952{
953 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
954 u32 *dst_sid;
955 int rc;
956
957 if (token == Opt_seclabel)
958 /* eaten and completely ignored */
959 return 0;
960 if (!s)
961 return -EINVAL;
962
963 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
964 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
965 return -EINVAL;
966 }
967
968 if (!opts) {
969 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
970 if (!opts)
971 return -ENOMEM;
972 *mnt_opts = opts;
973 }
974
975 switch (token) {
976 case Opt_context:
977 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
978 goto err;
979 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
980 break;
981 case Opt_fscontext:
982 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
983 goto err;
984 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
985 break;
986 case Opt_rootcontext:
987 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
988 goto err;
989 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
990 break;
991 case Opt_defcontext:
992 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
993 goto err;
994 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
995 break;
996 default:
997 WARN_ON(1);
998 return -EINVAL;
999 }
1000 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1001 if (rc)
1002 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1003 s, rc);
1004 return rc;
1005
1006err:
1007 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1008 return -EINVAL;
1009}
1010
1011static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1012{
1013 char *context = NULL;
1014 u32 len;
1015 int rc;
1016
1017 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1018 &context, &len);
1019 if (!rc) {
1020 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1021
1022 seq_putc(m, '=');
1023 if (has_comma)
1024 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1025 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1026 if (has_comma)
1027 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1028 }
1029 kfree(context);
1030 return rc;
1031}
1032
1033static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1034{
1035 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1036 int rc;
1037
1038 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1039 return 0;
1040
1041 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1042 return 0;
1043
1044 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1045 seq_putc(m, ',');
1046 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1047 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1048 if (rc)
1049 return rc;
1050 }
1051 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1052 seq_putc(m, ',');
1053 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1054 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1055 if (rc)
1056 return rc;
1057 }
1058 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1059 seq_putc(m, ',');
1060 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1061 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1062 if (rc)
1063 return rc;
1064 }
1065 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1066 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1067 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1068 seq_putc(m, ',');
1069 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1070 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1071 if (rc)
1072 return rc;
1073 }
1074 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1075 seq_putc(m, ',');
1076 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1077 }
1078 return 0;
1079}
1080
1081static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1082{
1083 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1084 case S_IFSOCK:
1085 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1086 case S_IFLNK:
1087 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1088 case S_IFREG:
1089 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1090 case S_IFBLK:
1091 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1092 case S_IFDIR:
1093 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1094 case S_IFCHR:
1095 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1096 case S_IFIFO:
1097 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1098
1099 }
1100
1101 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1102}
1103
1104static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1105{
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1107 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1108}
1109
1110static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1111{
1112 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1113}
1114
1115static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116{
1117 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1118
1119 switch (family) {
1120 case PF_UNIX:
1121 switch (type) {
1122 case SOCK_STREAM:
1123 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1124 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1125 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1126 case SOCK_RAW:
1127 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1128 }
1129 break;
1130 case PF_INET:
1131 case PF_INET6:
1132 switch (type) {
1133 case SOCK_STREAM:
1134 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1135 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1136 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1137 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1138 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1139 else
1140 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1141 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1142 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1143 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1144 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1145 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1146 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1147 else
1148 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1149 case SOCK_DCCP:
1150 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1151 default:
1152 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1153 }
1154 break;
1155 case PF_NETLINK:
1156 switch (protocol) {
1157 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1163 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1165 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1166 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1167 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1168 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1169 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1170 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1171 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1172 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1173 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1174 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1175 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1176 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1177 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1178 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1179 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1180 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1181 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1182 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1183 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1184 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1185 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1186 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1187 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1188 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1189 default:
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1191 }
1192 case PF_PACKET:
1193 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1194 case PF_KEY:
1195 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1196 case PF_APPLETALK:
1197 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1198 }
1199
1200 if (extsockclass) {
1201 switch (family) {
1202 case PF_AX25:
1203 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1204 case PF_IPX:
1205 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1206 case PF_NETROM:
1207 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1208 case PF_ATMPVC:
1209 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1210 case PF_X25:
1211 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1212 case PF_ROSE:
1213 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1214 case PF_DECnet:
1215 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1216 case PF_ATMSVC:
1217 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1218 case PF_RDS:
1219 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1220 case PF_IRDA:
1221 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1222 case PF_PPPOX:
1223 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1224 case PF_LLC:
1225 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1226 case PF_CAN:
1227 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1228 case PF_TIPC:
1229 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1230 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1231 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1232 case PF_IUCV:
1233 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1234 case PF_RXRPC:
1235 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1236 case PF_ISDN:
1237 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1238 case PF_PHONET:
1239 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1240 case PF_IEEE802154:
1241 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1242 case PF_CAIF:
1243 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1244 case PF_ALG:
1245 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1246 case PF_NFC:
1247 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1248 case PF_VSOCK:
1249 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1250 case PF_KCM:
1251 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1252 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1253 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1254 case PF_SMC:
1255 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1256 case PF_XDP:
1257 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1258 case PF_MCTP:
1259 return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1260#if PF_MAX > 46
1261#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1262#endif
1263 }
1264 }
1265
1266 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1267}
1268
1269static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1270 u16 tclass,
1271 u16 flags,
1272 u32 *sid)
1273{
1274 int rc;
1275 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1276 char *buffer, *path;
1277
1278 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1279 if (!buffer)
1280 return -ENOMEM;
1281
1282 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1283 if (IS_ERR(path))
1284 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1285 else {
1286 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1287 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1288 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1289 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1290 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1291 path[1] = '/';
1292 path++;
1293 }
1294 }
1295 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1296 path, tclass, sid);
1297 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1298 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1299 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1300 rc = 0;
1301 }
1302 }
1303 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1304 return rc;
1305}
1306
1307static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1308 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1309{
1310#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1311 char *context;
1312 unsigned int len;
1313 int rc;
1314
1315 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1316 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1317 if (!context)
1318 return -ENOMEM;
1319
1320 context[len] = '\0';
1321 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1322 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1323 kfree(context);
1324
1325 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1326 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1327 if (rc < 0)
1328 return rc;
1329
1330 len = rc;
1331 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1332 if (!context)
1333 return -ENOMEM;
1334
1335 context[len] = '\0';
1336 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1337 context, len);
1338 }
1339 if (rc < 0) {
1340 kfree(context);
1341 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1342 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1343 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1344 return rc;
1345 }
1346 *sid = def_sid;
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349
1350 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1351 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1352 if (rc) {
1353 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1354 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1355
1356 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1357 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1358 ino, dev, context);
1359 } else {
1360 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1361 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1362 }
1363 }
1364 kfree(context);
1365 return 0;
1366}
1367
1368/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1369static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1370{
1371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1372 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1373 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1374 u16 sclass;
1375 struct dentry *dentry;
1376 int rc = 0;
1377
1378 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1379 return 0;
1380
1381 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1382 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1383 goto out_unlock;
1384
1385 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1386 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1387
1388 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1389 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1390 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1391 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1392 server is ready to handle calls. */
1393 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1394 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1395 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1396 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1397 goto out_unlock;
1398 }
1399
1400 sclass = isec->sclass;
1401 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1402 sid = isec->sid;
1403 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1404 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1405
1406 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1407 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1408 break;
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1410 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1411 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1412 break;
1413 }
1414 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1415 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1416 if (opt_dentry) {
1417 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1418 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1419 } else {
1420 /*
1421 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1422 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1423 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1424 * two, depending upon that...
1425 */
1426 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1427 if (!dentry)
1428 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1429 }
1430 if (!dentry) {
1431 /*
1432 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1433 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1434 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1435 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1436 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1437 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1438 * be used again by userspace.
1439 */
1440 goto out_invalid;
1441 }
1442
1443 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1444 &sid);
1445 dput(dentry);
1446 if (rc)
1447 goto out;
1448 break;
1449 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1450 sid = task_sid;
1451 break;
1452 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1453 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1454 sid = sbsec->sid;
1455
1456 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1457 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1458 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1459 if (rc)
1460 goto out;
1461 break;
1462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1463 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1464 break;
1465 default:
1466 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1467 sid = sbsec->sid;
1468
1469 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1470 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1471 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1472 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1473 * procfs inodes */
1474 if (opt_dentry) {
1475 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1476 * d_splice_alias. */
1477 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1478 } else {
1479 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1480 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1481 * a connected one, so try that first.
1482 */
1483 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1484 if (!dentry)
1485 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1486 }
1487 /*
1488 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1489 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1490 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1491 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1492 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1493 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1494 * could be used again by userspace.
1495 */
1496 if (!dentry)
1497 goto out_invalid;
1498 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1499 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1500 if (rc) {
1501 dput(dentry);
1502 goto out;
1503 }
1504
1505 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1506 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1507 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1508 sid, &sid);
1509 if (rc) {
1510 dput(dentry);
1511 goto out;
1512 }
1513 }
1514 dput(dentry);
1515 }
1516 break;
1517 }
1518
1519out:
1520 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1521 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1522 if (rc) {
1523 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1524 goto out_unlock;
1525 }
1526 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1527 isec->sid = sid;
1528 }
1529
1530out_unlock:
1531 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1532 return rc;
1533
1534out_invalid:
1535 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1536 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1537 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1538 isec->sid = sid;
1539 }
1540 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1541 return 0;
1542}
1543
1544/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1545static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1546{
1547 u32 perm = 0;
1548
1549 switch (sig) {
1550 case SIGCHLD:
1551 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1552 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1553 break;
1554 case SIGKILL:
1555 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1556 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1557 break;
1558 case SIGSTOP:
1559 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1560 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1561 break;
1562 default:
1563 /* All other signals. */
1564 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1565 break;
1566 }
1567
1568 return perm;
1569}
1570
1571#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1572#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1573#endif
1574
1575/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1576static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1577 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1578{
1579 struct common_audit_data ad;
1580 struct av_decision avd;
1581 u16 sclass;
1582 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1583 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1584 int rc;
1585
1586 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1587 ad.u.cap = cap;
1588
1589 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1590 case 0:
1591 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1592 break;
1593 case 1:
1594 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1595 break;
1596 default:
1597 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1598 BUG();
1599 return -EINVAL;
1600 }
1601
1602 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1603 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1604 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1605 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1606 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1607 if (rc2)
1608 return rc2;
1609 }
1610 return rc;
1611}
1612
1613/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1614 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1615 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1616static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1617 struct inode *inode,
1618 u32 perms,
1619 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1620{
1621 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1622 u32 sid;
1623
1624 validate_creds(cred);
1625
1626 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1627 return 0;
1628
1629 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1630 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1631
1632 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1633 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1634}
1635
1636/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1637 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1638 pathname if needed. */
1639static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1640 struct dentry *dentry,
1641 u32 av)
1642{
1643 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1644 struct common_audit_data ad;
1645
1646 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1647 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1648 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1649 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1650}
1651
1652/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1653 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1654 pathname if needed. */
1655static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1656 const struct path *path,
1657 u32 av)
1658{
1659 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1660 struct common_audit_data ad;
1661
1662 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1663 ad.u.path = *path;
1664 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1665 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1666}
1667
1668/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1669static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1670 struct file *file,
1671 u32 av)
1672{
1673 struct common_audit_data ad;
1674
1675 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1676 ad.u.file = file;
1677 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1678}
1679
1680#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1681static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1682#endif
1683
1684/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1685 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1686 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1687 check a particular permission to the file.
1688 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1689 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1690 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1691 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1692static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1693 struct file *file,
1694 u32 av)
1695{
1696 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1697 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1698 struct common_audit_data ad;
1699 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1700 int rc;
1701
1702 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1703 ad.u.file = file;
1704
1705 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1706 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1707 sid, fsec->sid,
1708 SECCLASS_FD,
1709 FD__USE,
1710 &ad);
1711 if (rc)
1712 goto out;
1713 }
1714
1715#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1716 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1717 if (rc)
1718 return rc;
1719#endif
1720
1721 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1722 rc = 0;
1723 if (av)
1724 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1725
1726out:
1727 return rc;
1728}
1729
1730/*
1731 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1732 */
1733static int
1734selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1735 struct inode *dir,
1736 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1737 u32 *_new_isid)
1738{
1739 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1740 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1741
1742 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1743 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1744 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1745 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1746 tsec->create_sid) {
1747 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1748 } else {
1749 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1750 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1751 dsec->sid, tclass,
1752 name, _new_isid);
1753 }
1754
1755 return 0;
1756}
1757
1758/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1759static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1760 struct dentry *dentry,
1761 u16 tclass)
1762{
1763 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1764 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1766 u32 sid, newsid;
1767 struct common_audit_data ad;
1768 int rc;
1769
1770 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1771 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1772
1773 sid = tsec->sid;
1774
1775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1776 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1777
1778 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1779 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1780 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1781 &ad);
1782 if (rc)
1783 return rc;
1784
1785 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1786 &newsid);
1787 if (rc)
1788 return rc;
1789
1790 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1791 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1792 if (rc)
1793 return rc;
1794
1795 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1796 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1797 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1798 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1799}
1800
1801#define MAY_LINK 0
1802#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1803#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1804
1805/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1806static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1807 struct dentry *dentry,
1808 int kind)
1809
1810{
1811 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1812 struct common_audit_data ad;
1813 u32 sid = current_sid();
1814 u32 av;
1815 int rc;
1816
1817 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1818 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1819
1820 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1821 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1822
1823 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1824 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1825 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1826 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1827 if (rc)
1828 return rc;
1829
1830 switch (kind) {
1831 case MAY_LINK:
1832 av = FILE__LINK;
1833 break;
1834 case MAY_UNLINK:
1835 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1836 break;
1837 case MAY_RMDIR:
1838 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1839 break;
1840 default:
1841 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1842 __func__, kind);
1843 return 0;
1844 }
1845
1846 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1847 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1848 return rc;
1849}
1850
1851static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1852 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1853 struct inode *new_dir,
1854 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1855{
1856 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1857 struct common_audit_data ad;
1858 u32 sid = current_sid();
1859 u32 av;
1860 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1861 int rc;
1862
1863 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1864 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1865 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1866 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1867
1868 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1869
1870 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1871 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1872 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1873 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1874 if (rc)
1875 return rc;
1876 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1877 sid, old_isec->sid,
1878 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1879 if (rc)
1880 return rc;
1881 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1882 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1883 sid, old_isec->sid,
1884 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1885 if (rc)
1886 return rc;
1887 }
1888
1889 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1890 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1891 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1892 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1893 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1894 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1895 if (rc)
1896 return rc;
1897 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1898 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1899 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1900 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1901 sid, new_isec->sid,
1902 new_isec->sclass,
1903 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1904 if (rc)
1905 return rc;
1906 }
1907
1908 return 0;
1909}
1910
1911/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1912static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1913 struct super_block *sb,
1914 u32 perms,
1915 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1916{
1917 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1918 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1919
1920 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1921 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1922 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1923}
1924
1925/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1926static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1927{
1928 u32 av = 0;
1929
1930 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1931 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1932 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1933 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1934 av |= FILE__READ;
1935
1936 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1937 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1938 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1939 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1940
1941 } else {
1942 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1943 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1944 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1945 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1946 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1947 av |= DIR__READ;
1948 }
1949
1950 return av;
1951}
1952
1953/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1954static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1955{
1956 u32 av = 0;
1957
1958 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1959 av |= FILE__READ;
1960 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1961 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1962 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1963 else
1964 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1965 }
1966 if (!av) {
1967 /*
1968 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1969 */
1970 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1971 }
1972
1973 return av;
1974}
1975
1976/*
1977 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
1978 * open permission.
1979 */
1980static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1981{
1982 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1983 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1984
1985 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1986 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1987 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1988
1989 return av;
1990}
1991
1992/* Hook functions begin here. */
1993
1994static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
1995{
1996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1997 current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
1998 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1999}
2000
2001static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2002 const struct cred *to)
2003{
2004 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2005 u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2006 u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2007 int rc;
2008
2009 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2010 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2011 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2012 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2013 if (rc)
2014 return rc;
2015 }
2016
2017 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,
2018 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2019}
2020
2021static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2022 const struct cred *to)
2023{
2024 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2025 cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2026 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2027 NULL);
2028}
2029
2030static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2031 const struct cred *to,
2032 struct file *file)
2033{
2034 u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2035 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2036 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2037 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2038 struct common_audit_data ad;
2039 int rc;
2040
2041 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2042 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2043
2044 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2045 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2046 sid, fsec->sid,
2047 SECCLASS_FD,
2048 FD__USE,
2049 &ad);
2050 if (rc)
2051 return rc;
2052 }
2053
2054#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2055 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2056 if (rc)
2057 return rc;
2058#endif
2059
2060 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2061 return 0;
2062
2063 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2064 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2065 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2066 &ad);
2067}
2068
2069static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2070 unsigned int mode)
2071{
2072 u32 sid = current_sid();
2073 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2074
2075 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2076 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2077 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2078
2079 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2080 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2081}
2082
2083static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2084{
2085 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2086 task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2087 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2088}
2089
2090static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2091 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2092{
2093 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2094 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2095 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2096}
2097
2098static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2099 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2100 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2101 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2102{
2103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2104 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2105 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2106}
2107
2108/*
2109 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2110 * which was removed).
2111 *
2112 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2113 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2114 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2115 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2116 */
2117
2118static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2119 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2120{
2121 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2122}
2123
2124static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2125{
2126 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2127 int rc = 0;
2128
2129 if (!sb)
2130 return 0;
2131
2132 switch (cmds) {
2133 case Q_SYNC:
2134 case Q_QUOTAON:
2135 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2136 case Q_SETINFO:
2137 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2138 case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2139 case Q_XQUOTAON:
2140 case Q_XSETQLIM:
2141 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2142 break;
2143 case Q_GETFMT:
2144 case Q_GETINFO:
2145 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2146 case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2147 case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2148 case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2149 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2150 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2151 break;
2152 default:
2153 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2154 break;
2155 }
2156 return rc;
2157}
2158
2159static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2160{
2161 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2162
2163 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2164}
2165
2166static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2167{
2168 switch (type) {
2169 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2170 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2171 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2172 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2173 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2174 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2175 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2176 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2177 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2178 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2179 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2180 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2181 NULL);
2182 }
2183 /* All other syslog types */
2184 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2185 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2186 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2187}
2188
2189/*
2190 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2191 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2192 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2193 *
2194 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2195 * processes that allocate mappings.
2196 */
2197static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2198{
2199 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2200
2201 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2202 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2203 if (rc == 0)
2204 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2205
2206 return cap_sys_admin;
2207}
2208
2209/* binprm security operations */
2210
2211static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2212{
2213 u32 sid = 0;
2214 struct task_struct *tracer;
2215
2216 rcu_read_lock();
2217 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2218 if (tracer)
2219 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2220 rcu_read_unlock();
2221
2222 return sid;
2223}
2224
2225static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2226 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2227 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2228{
2229 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2230 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2231 int rc;
2232 u32 av;
2233
2234 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2235 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2236
2237 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2238 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2239
2240 /*
2241 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2242 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2243 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2244 * the old and new contexts.
2245 */
2246 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2247 av = 0;
2248 if (nnp)
2249 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2250 if (nosuid)
2251 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2252 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2253 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2254 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2255 if (!rc)
2256 return 0;
2257 }
2258
2259 /*
2260 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2261 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2262 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2263 */
2264 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2265 new_tsec->sid);
2266 if (!rc)
2267 return 0;
2268
2269 /*
2270 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2271 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2272 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2273 */
2274 if (nnp)
2275 return -EPERM;
2276 return -EACCES;
2277}
2278
2279static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2280{
2281 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2282 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2283 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2284 struct common_audit_data ad;
2285 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2286 int rc;
2287
2288 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2289 * the script interpreter */
2290
2291 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2292 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2293 isec = inode_security(inode);
2294
2295 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2296 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2297 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2298
2299 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2300 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2301 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2302 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2303
2304 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2305 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2306 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2307 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2308
2309 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2310 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2311 if (rc)
2312 return rc;
2313 } else {
2314 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2315 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2316 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2317 &new_tsec->sid);
2318 if (rc)
2319 return rc;
2320
2321 /*
2322 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2323 * transition.
2324 */
2325 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2326 if (rc)
2327 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2328 }
2329
2330 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2331 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2332
2333 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2335 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2336 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2337 if (rc)
2338 return rc;
2339 } else {
2340 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2341 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2342 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2343 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2344 if (rc)
2345 return rc;
2346
2347 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2348 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2349 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2350 if (rc)
2351 return rc;
2352
2353 /* Check for shared state */
2354 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2356 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2358 NULL);
2359 if (rc)
2360 return -EPERM;
2361 }
2362
2363 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2364 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2365 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2366 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2367 if (ptsid != 0) {
2368 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2369 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2370 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2371 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2372 if (rc)
2373 return -EPERM;
2374 }
2375 }
2376
2377 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2378 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2379
2380 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2381 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2382 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2383 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2384 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2385 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2386 NULL);
2387 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2388 }
2389
2390 return 0;
2391}
2392
2393static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2394{
2395 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2396}
2397
2398/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2399static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2400 struct files_struct *files)
2401{
2402 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2403 struct tty_struct *tty;
2404 int drop_tty = 0;
2405 unsigned n;
2406
2407 tty = get_current_tty();
2408 if (tty) {
2409 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2410 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2411 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2412
2413 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2414 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2415 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2416 open file may belong to another process and we are
2417 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2418 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2419 struct tty_file_private, list);
2420 file = file_priv->file;
2421 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2422 drop_tty = 1;
2423 }
2424 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2425 tty_kref_put(tty);
2426 }
2427 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2428 if (drop_tty)
2429 no_tty();
2430
2431 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2432 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2433 if (!n) /* none found? */
2434 return;
2435
2436 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2437 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2438 devnull = NULL;
2439 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2440 do {
2441 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2442 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2443 if (devnull)
2444 fput(devnull);
2445}
2446
2447/*
2448 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2449 */
2450static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2451{
2452 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2453 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2454 int rc, i;
2455
2456 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2457 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2458 return;
2459
2460 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2461 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2462
2463 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2464 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2465
2466 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2467 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2468 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2469 *
2470 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2471 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2472 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2473 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2474 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2475 */
2476 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2477 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2478 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2479 if (rc) {
2480 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2481 task_lock(current);
2482 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2483 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2484 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2485 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2486 }
2487 task_unlock(current);
2488 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2489 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2490 }
2491}
2492
2493/*
2494 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2495 * due to exec
2496 */
2497static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2498{
2499 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2500 u32 osid, sid;
2501 int rc;
2502
2503 osid = tsec->osid;
2504 sid = tsec->sid;
2505
2506 if (sid == osid)
2507 return;
2508
2509 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2510 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2511 * flush and unblock signals.
2512 *
2513 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2514 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2515 */
2516 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2517 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2518 if (rc) {
2519 clear_itimer();
2520
2521 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2522 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2523 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2524 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2525 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2526 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2527 recalc_sigpending();
2528 }
2529 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2530 }
2531
2532 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2533 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2534 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2535 __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2536 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2537}
2538
2539/* superblock security operations */
2540
2541static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2542{
2543 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2544
2545 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2546 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2547 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2548 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2549 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2550 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2551
2552 return 0;
2553}
2554
2555static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2556{
2557 bool open_quote = false;
2558 int len;
2559 char c;
2560
2561 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2562 if (c == '"')
2563 open_quote = !open_quote;
2564 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2565 break;
2566 }
2567 return len;
2568}
2569
2570static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2571{
2572 char *from = options;
2573 char *to = options;
2574 bool first = true;
2575 int rc;
2576
2577 while (1) {
2578 int len = opt_len(from);
2579 int token;
2580 char *arg = NULL;
2581
2582 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2583
2584 if (token != Opt_error) {
2585 char *p, *q;
2586
2587 /* strip quotes */
2588 if (arg) {
2589 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2590 char c = *p;
2591 if (c != '"')
2592 *q++ = c;
2593 }
2594 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2595 if (!arg) {
2596 rc = -ENOMEM;
2597 goto free_opt;
2598 }
2599 }
2600 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2601 kfree(arg);
2602 arg = NULL;
2603 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2604 goto free_opt;
2605 }
2606 } else {
2607 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2608 from--;
2609 len++;
2610 }
2611 if (to != from)
2612 memmove(to, from, len);
2613 to += len;
2614 first = false;
2615 }
2616 if (!from[len])
2617 break;
2618 from += len + 1;
2619 }
2620 *to = '\0';
2621 return 0;
2622
2623free_opt:
2624 if (*mnt_opts) {
2625 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2626 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2627 }
2628 return rc;
2629}
2630
2631static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2632{
2633 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2634 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2635
2636 /*
2637 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2638 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2639 */
2640 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2641 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2642
2643 /*
2644 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2645 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2646 */
2647 if (!opts)
2648 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2649
2650 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2651 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2652 opts->fscontext_sid))
2653 return 1;
2654 }
2655 if (opts->context_sid) {
2656 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2657 opts->context_sid))
2658 return 1;
2659 }
2660 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2661 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2662
2663 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2664 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2665 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2666 return 1;
2667 }
2668 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2669 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2670 opts->defcontext_sid))
2671 return 1;
2672 }
2673 return 0;
2674}
2675
2676static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2677{
2678 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2679 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2680
2681 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2682 return 0;
2683
2684 if (!opts)
2685 return 0;
2686
2687 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2688 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2689 opts->fscontext_sid))
2690 goto out_bad_option;
2691 }
2692 if (opts->context_sid) {
2693 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2694 opts->context_sid))
2695 goto out_bad_option;
2696 }
2697 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2698 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2699 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2700 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2701 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2702 goto out_bad_option;
2703 }
2704 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2705 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2706 opts->defcontext_sid))
2707 goto out_bad_option;
2708 }
2709 return 0;
2710
2711out_bad_option:
2712 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2713 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2714 sb->s_type->name);
2715 return -EINVAL;
2716}
2717
2718static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2719{
2720 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2721 struct common_audit_data ad;
2722
2723 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2724 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2725 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2726}
2727
2728static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2729{
2730 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2731 struct common_audit_data ad;
2732
2733 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2734 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2735 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2736}
2737
2738static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2739 const struct path *path,
2740 const char *type,
2741 unsigned long flags,
2742 void *data)
2743{
2744 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2745
2746 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2747 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2748 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2749 else
2750 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2751}
2752
2753static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2754 const struct path *to_path)
2755{
2756 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2757
2758 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2759}
2760
2761static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2762{
2763 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2764
2765 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2766 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2767}
2768
2769static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2770 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2771{
2772 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2773
2774 if (!src)
2775 return 0;
2776
2777 fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2778 return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2779}
2780
2781static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2782 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2783 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2784 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2785 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2786 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2787 {}
2788};
2789
2790static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2791 struct fs_parameter *param)
2792{
2793 struct fs_parse_result result;
2794 int opt;
2795
2796 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2797 if (opt < 0)
2798 return opt;
2799
2800 return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2801}
2802
2803/* inode security operations */
2804
2805static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2806{
2807 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2808 u32 sid = current_sid();
2809
2810 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2811 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2812 isec->inode = inode;
2813 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2814 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2815 isec->task_sid = sid;
2816 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2817
2818 return 0;
2819}
2820
2821static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2822{
2823 inode_free_security(inode);
2824}
2825
2826static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2827 const struct qstr *name,
2828 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2829 u32 *ctxlen)
2830{
2831 u32 newsid;
2832 int rc;
2833
2834 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2835 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2836 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2837 &newsid);
2838 if (rc)
2839 return rc;
2840
2841 if (xattr_name)
2842 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2843
2844 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2845 ctxlen);
2846}
2847
2848static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2849 struct qstr *name,
2850 const struct cred *old,
2851 struct cred *new)
2852{
2853 u32 newsid;
2854 int rc;
2855 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2856
2857 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2858 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2859 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2860 &newsid);
2861 if (rc)
2862 return rc;
2863
2864 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2865 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2866 return 0;
2867}
2868
2869static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2870 const struct qstr *qstr,
2871 const char **name,
2872 void **value, size_t *len)
2873{
2874 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2875 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2876 u32 newsid, clen;
2877 int rc;
2878 char *context;
2879
2880 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2881
2882 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2883
2884 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2885 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2886 &newsid);
2887 if (rc)
2888 return rc;
2889
2890 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2891 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2892 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2893 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2894 isec->sid = newsid;
2895 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2896 }
2897
2898 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
2899 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2900 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2901
2902 if (name)
2903 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2904
2905 if (value && len) {
2906 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2907 &context, &clen);
2908 if (rc)
2909 return rc;
2910 *value = context;
2911 *len = clen;
2912 }
2913
2914 return 0;
2915}
2916
2917static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2918 const struct qstr *name,
2919 const struct inode *context_inode)
2920{
2921 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2922 struct common_audit_data ad;
2923 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2924 int rc;
2925
2926 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
2927 return 0;
2928
2929 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2930
2931 /*
2932 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
2933 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2934 * untouched.
2935 */
2936
2937 if (context_inode) {
2938 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2939 selinux_inode(context_inode);
2940 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2941 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized");
2942 return -EACCES;
2943 }
2944
2945 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2946 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2947 } else {
2948 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2949 rc = security_transition_sid(
2950 &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2951 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2952 if (rc)
2953 return rc;
2954 }
2955
2956 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2957 /*
2958 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
2959 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
2960 */
2961
2962 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
2963 ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
2964
2965 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2966 tsec->sid,
2967 isec->sid,
2968 isec->sclass,
2969 FILE__CREATE,
2970 &ad);
2971}
2972
2973static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2974{
2975 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2976}
2977
2978static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2979{
2980 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2981}
2982
2983static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2984{
2985 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2986}
2987
2988static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2989{
2990 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2991}
2992
2993static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2994{
2995 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2996}
2997
2998static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2999{
3000 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3001}
3002
3003static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3004{
3005 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3006}
3007
3008static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3009 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3010{
3011 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3012}
3013
3014static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3015{
3016 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3017
3018 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3019}
3020
3021static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3022 bool rcu)
3023{
3024 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3025 struct common_audit_data ad;
3026 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3027 u32 sid;
3028
3029 validate_creds(cred);
3030
3031 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3032 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3033 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3034 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3035 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3036 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3037
3038 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3039 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3040}
3041
3042static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3043 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3044 int result)
3045{
3046 struct common_audit_data ad;
3047 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3048
3049 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3050 ad.u.inode = inode;
3051
3052 return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3053 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3054 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3055}
3056
3057static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3058{
3059 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3060 u32 perms;
3061 bool from_access;
3062 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3063 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3064 u32 sid;
3065 struct av_decision avd;
3066 int rc, rc2;
3067 u32 audited, denied;
3068
3069 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3070 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3071
3072 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3073 if (!mask)
3074 return 0;
3075
3076 validate_creds(cred);
3077
3078 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3079 return 0;
3080
3081 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3082
3083 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3084 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3085 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3086 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3087
3088 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3089 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3090 &avd);
3091 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3092 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3093 &denied);
3094 if (likely(!audited))
3095 return rc;
3096
3097 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3098 if (rc2)
3099 return rc2;
3100 return rc;
3101}
3102
3103static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3104{
3105 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3106 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3107 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3108 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3109
3110 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3111 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3112 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3113 ATTR_FORCE);
3114 if (!ia_valid)
3115 return 0;
3116 }
3117
3118 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3119 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3120 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3121
3122 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3123 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3124 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3125 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3126 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3127
3128 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3129}
3130
3131static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3132{
3133 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3134}
3135
3136static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3137{
3138 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3139 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3140
3141 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3142 return false;
3143 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3144 return false;
3145 return true;
3146}
3147
3148static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3149 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3150 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3151{
3152 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3153 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3154 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3155 struct common_audit_data ad;
3156 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3157 int rc = 0;
3158
3159 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3160 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3161 if (rc)
3162 return rc;
3163
3164 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3165 ordinary setattr permission. */
3166 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3167 }
3168
3169 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3170 return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3171
3172 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3173 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3174 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3175
3176 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
3177 return -EPERM;
3178
3179 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3180 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3181
3182 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3183 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3184 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3185 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3186 if (rc)
3187 return rc;
3188
3189 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3190 GFP_KERNEL);
3191 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3192 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3193 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3194 size_t audit_size;
3195
3196 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3197 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3198 if (value) {
3199 const char *str = value;
3200
3201 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3202 audit_size = size - 1;
3203 else
3204 audit_size = size;
3205 } else {
3206 audit_size = 0;
3207 }
3208 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3209 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3210 if (!ab)
3211 return rc;
3212 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3213 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3214 audit_log_end(ab);
3215
3216 return rc;
3217 }
3218 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3219 size, &newsid);
3220 }
3221 if (rc)
3222 return rc;
3223
3224 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3225 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3226 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3227 if (rc)
3228 return rc;
3229
3230 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3231 sid, isec->sclass);
3232 if (rc)
3233 return rc;
3234
3235 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3236 newsid,
3237 sbsec->sid,
3238 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3239 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3240 &ad);
3241}
3242
3243static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3244 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3245 struct posix_acl *kacl)
3246{
3247 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3248}
3249
3250static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3251 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3252{
3253 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3254}
3255
3256static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3257 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3258{
3259 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3260}
3261
3262static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3263 const void *value, size_t size,
3264 int flags)
3265{
3266 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3267 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3268 u32 newsid;
3269 int rc;
3270
3271 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3272 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3273 return;
3274 }
3275
3276 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3277 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3278 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3279 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3280 * we've since initialized.
3281 */
3282 return;
3283 }
3284
3285 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3286 &newsid);
3287 if (rc) {
3288 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3289 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3290 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3291 return;
3292 }
3293
3294 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3295 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3296 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3297 isec->sid = newsid;
3298 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3299 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3300}
3301
3302static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3303{
3304 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3305
3306 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3307}
3308
3309static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3310{
3311 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3312
3313 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3314}
3315
3316static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3317 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3318{
3319 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3320 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
3321 if (rc)
3322 return rc;
3323
3324 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3325 ordinary setattr permission. */
3326 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3327 }
3328
3329 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3330 return 0;
3331
3332 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3333 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3334 return -EACCES;
3335}
3336
3337static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3338 unsigned int obj_type)
3339{
3340 int ret;
3341 u32 perm;
3342
3343 struct common_audit_data ad;
3344
3345 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3346 ad.u.path = *path;
3347
3348 /*
3349 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3350 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3351 */
3352 switch (obj_type) {
3353 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3354 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3355 break;
3356 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3357 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3358 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3359 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3360 if (ret)
3361 return ret;
3362 break;
3363 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3364 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3365 break;
3366 default:
3367 return -EINVAL;
3368 }
3369
3370 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3371 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3372 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3373
3374 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3375 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3376 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3377
3378 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3379}
3380
3381/*
3382 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3383 *
3384 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3385 */
3386static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3387 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3388 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3389{
3390 u32 size;
3391 int error;
3392 char *context = NULL;
3393 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3394
3395 /*
3396 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3397 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3398 */
3399 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3400 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3401 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3402
3403 /*
3404 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3405 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3406 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3407 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3408 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3409 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3410 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3411 */
3412 isec = inode_security(inode);
3413 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3414 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3415 isec->sid, &context,
3416 &size);
3417 else
3418 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3419 &context, &size);
3420 if (error)
3421 return error;
3422 error = size;
3423 if (alloc) {
3424 *buffer = context;
3425 goto out_nofree;
3426 }
3427 kfree(context);
3428out_nofree:
3429 return error;
3430}
3431
3432static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3433 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3434{
3435 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3436 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3437 u32 newsid;
3438 int rc;
3439
3440 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3441 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3442
3443 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3444 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3445 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3446
3447 if (!value || !size)
3448 return -EACCES;
3449
3450 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3451 GFP_KERNEL);
3452 if (rc)
3453 return rc;
3454
3455 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3456 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3457 isec->sid = newsid;
3458 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3459 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3460 return 0;
3461}
3462
3463static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3464{
3465 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3466
3467 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3468 return 0;
3469
3470 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3471 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3472 return len;
3473}
3474
3475static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3476{
3477 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3478 *secid = isec->sid;
3479}
3480
3481static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3482{
3483 u32 sid;
3484 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3485 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3486
3487 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3488 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3489 if (!new_creds)
3490 return -ENOMEM;
3491 }
3492
3493 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3494 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3495 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3496 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3497 *new = new_creds;
3498 return 0;
3499}
3500
3501static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3502{
3503 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3504 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3505 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3506 */
3507 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3508 return 1; /* Discard */
3509 /*
3510 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3511 * by selinux.
3512 */
3513 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3514}
3515
3516/* kernfs node operations */
3517
3518static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3519 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3520{
3521 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3522 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3523 int rc;
3524 char *context;
3525
3526 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3527 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3528 return 0;
3529 else if (rc < 0)
3530 return rc;
3531
3532 clen = (u32)rc;
3533 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3534 if (!context)
3535 return -ENOMEM;
3536
3537 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3538 if (rc < 0) {
3539 kfree(context);
3540 return rc;
3541 }
3542
3543 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3544 GFP_KERNEL);
3545 kfree(context);
3546 if (rc)
3547 return rc;
3548
3549 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3550 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3551 } else {
3552 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3553 struct qstr q;
3554
3555 q.name = kn->name;
3556 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3557
3558 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3559 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3560 &newsid);
3561 if (rc)
3562 return rc;
3563 }
3564
3565 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3566 &context, &clen);
3567 if (rc)
3568 return rc;
3569
3570 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3571 XATTR_CREATE);
3572 kfree(context);
3573 return rc;
3574}
3575
3576
3577/* file security operations */
3578
3579static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3580{
3581 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3582 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3583
3584 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3585 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3586 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3587
3588 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3589 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3590}
3591
3592static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3593{
3594 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3595 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3596 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3597 u32 sid = current_sid();
3598
3599 if (!mask)
3600 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3601 return 0;
3602
3603 isec = inode_security(inode);
3604 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3605 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3606 /* No change since file_open check. */
3607 return 0;
3608
3609 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3610}
3611
3612static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3613{
3614 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3615 u32 sid = current_sid();
3616
3617 fsec->sid = sid;
3618 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3619
3620 return 0;
3621}
3622
3623/*
3624 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3625 * operation to an inode.
3626 */
3627static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3628 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3629{
3630 struct common_audit_data ad;
3631 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3632 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3633 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3634 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3635 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3636 int rc;
3637 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3638 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3639
3640 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3641 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3642 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3643 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3644
3645 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3646 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3647 ssid, fsec->sid,
3648 SECCLASS_FD,
3649 FD__USE,
3650 &ad);
3651 if (rc)
3652 goto out;
3653 }
3654
3655 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3656 return 0;
3657
3658 isec = inode_security(inode);
3659 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3660 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3661 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3662out:
3663 return rc;
3664}
3665
3666static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3667 unsigned long arg)
3668{
3669 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3670 int error = 0;
3671
3672 switch (cmd) {
3673 case FIONREAD:
3674 case FIBMAP:
3675 case FIGETBSZ:
3676 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3677 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3678 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3679 break;
3680
3681 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3682 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3683 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3684 break;
3685
3686 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3687 case FIONBIO:
3688 case FIOASYNC:
3689 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3690 break;
3691
3692 case KDSKBENT:
3693 case KDSKBSENT:
3694 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3695 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3696 break;
3697
3698 case FIOCLEX:
3699 case FIONCLEX:
3700 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3701 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3702 break;
3703
3704 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3705 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3706 */
3707 default:
3708 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3709 }
3710 return error;
3711}
3712
3713static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3714
3715static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3716{
3717 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3718 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3719 int rc = 0;
3720
3721 if (default_noexec &&
3722 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3723 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3724 /*
3725 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3726 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3727 * This has an additional check.
3728 */
3729 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3730 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3731 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3732 if (rc)
3733 goto error;
3734 }
3735
3736 if (file) {
3737 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3738 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3739
3740 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3741 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3742 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3743
3744 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3745 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3746
3747 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3748 }
3749
3750error:
3751 return rc;
3752}
3753
3754static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3755{
3756 int rc = 0;
3757
3758 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3759 u32 sid = current_sid();
3760 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3761 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3762 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3763 }
3764
3765 return rc;
3766}
3767
3768static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3769 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3770{
3771 struct common_audit_data ad;
3772 int rc;
3773
3774 if (file) {
3775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3776 ad.u.file = file;
3777 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3778 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3779 if (rc)
3780 return rc;
3781 }
3782
3783 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3784 prot = reqprot;
3785
3786 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3787 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3788}
3789
3790static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3791 unsigned long reqprot,
3792 unsigned long prot)
3793{
3794 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3795 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3796
3797 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3798 prot = reqprot;
3799
3800 if (default_noexec &&
3801 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3802 int rc = 0;
3803 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3804 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3805 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3806 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3807 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3808 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3809 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3810 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3811 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3812 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3813 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3814 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3815 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3816 /*
3817 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3818 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3819 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3820 * modified content. This typically should only
3821 * occur for text relocations.
3822 */
3823 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3824 }
3825 if (rc)
3826 return rc;
3827 }
3828
3829 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3830}
3831
3832static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3833{
3834 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3835
3836 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3837}
3838
3839static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3840 unsigned long arg)
3841{
3842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3843 int err = 0;
3844
3845 switch (cmd) {
3846 case F_SETFL:
3847 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3848 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3849 break;
3850 }
3851 fallthrough;
3852 case F_SETOWN:
3853 case F_SETSIG:
3854 case F_GETFL:
3855 case F_GETOWN:
3856 case F_GETSIG:
3857 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3858 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3859 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3860 break;
3861 case F_GETLK:
3862 case F_SETLK:
3863 case F_SETLKW:
3864 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3865 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3866 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3867#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3868 case F_GETLK64:
3869 case F_SETLK64:
3870 case F_SETLKW64:
3871#endif
3872 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3873 break;
3874 }
3875
3876 return err;
3877}
3878
3879static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3880{
3881 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3882
3883 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3884 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3885}
3886
3887static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3888 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3889{
3890 struct file *file;
3891 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3892 u32 perm;
3893 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3894
3895 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3896 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3897
3898 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3899
3900 if (!signum)
3901 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3902 else
3903 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3904
3905 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3906 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3907 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3908}
3909
3910static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3911{
3912 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3913
3914 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3915}
3916
3917static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3918{
3919 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3920 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3921
3922 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3923 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3924 /*
3925 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3926 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3927 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3928 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3929 * struct as its SID.
3930 */
3931 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3932 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3933 /*
3934 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3935 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3936 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3937 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3938 * new inode label or new policy.
3939 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3940 */
3941 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3942}
3943
3944/* task security operations */
3945
3946static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3947 unsigned long clone_flags)
3948{
3949 u32 sid = current_sid();
3950
3951 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3952 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3953}
3954
3955/*
3956 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3957 */
3958static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3959 gfp_t gfp)
3960{
3961 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3962 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3963
3964 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3965 return 0;
3966}
3967
3968/*
3969 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3970 */
3971static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3972{
3973 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3974 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3975
3976 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3977}
3978
3979static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3980{
3981 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3982}
3983
3984/*
3985 * set the security data for a kernel service
3986 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3987 */
3988static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3989{
3990 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3991 u32 sid = current_sid();
3992 int ret;
3993
3994 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3995 sid, secid,
3996 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3997 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3998 NULL);
3999 if (ret == 0) {
4000 tsec->sid = secid;
4001 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4002 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4003 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4004 }
4005 return ret;
4006}
4007
4008/*
4009 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4010 * objective context of the specified inode
4011 */
4012static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4013{
4014 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4015 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4016 u32 sid = current_sid();
4017 int ret;
4018
4019 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4020 sid, isec->sid,
4021 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4022 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4023 NULL);
4024
4025 if (ret == 0)
4026 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4027 return ret;
4028}
4029
4030static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4031{
4032 struct common_audit_data ad;
4033
4034 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4035 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4036
4037 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4038 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4039 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4040}
4041
4042static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4043{
4044 struct common_audit_data ad;
4045 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4046 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4047 u32 sid = current_sid();
4048 int rc;
4049
4050 /* init_module */
4051 if (file == NULL)
4052 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4053 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4054 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4055
4056 /* finit_module */
4057
4058 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4059 ad.u.file = file;
4060
4061 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4062 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4063 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4064 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4065 if (rc)
4066 return rc;
4067 }
4068
4069 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4070 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4071 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4072 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4073}
4074
4075static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4076 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4077 bool contents)
4078{
4079 int rc = 0;
4080
4081 switch (id) {
4082 case READING_MODULE:
4083 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4084 break;
4085 default:
4086 break;
4087 }
4088
4089 return rc;
4090}
4091
4092static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4093{
4094 int rc = 0;
4095
4096 switch (id) {
4097 case LOADING_MODULE:
4098 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4099 break;
4100 default:
4101 break;
4102 }
4103
4104 return rc;
4105}
4106
4107static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4108{
4109 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4110 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4111 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4112}
4113
4114static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4115{
4116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4117 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4118 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4119}
4120
4121static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4122{
4123 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4124 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4125 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4126}
4127
4128static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
4129{
4130 *secid = current_sid();
4131}
4132
4133static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4134{
4135 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4136}
4137
4138static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4139{
4140 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4141 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4142 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4143}
4144
4145static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4146{
4147 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4148 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4149 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4150}
4151
4152static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4153{
4154 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4155 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4156 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4157}
4158
4159static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4160 unsigned int flags)
4161{
4162 u32 av = 0;
4163
4164 if (!flags)
4165 return 0;
4166 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4167 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4168 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4169 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4170 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4171 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4172 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4173}
4174
4175static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4176 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4177{
4178 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4179
4180 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4181 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4182 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4183 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4184 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4185 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4186 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4187 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4188
4189 return 0;
4190}
4191
4192static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4193{
4194 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4195 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4196 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4197}
4198
4199static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4200{
4201 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4202 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4203 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4204}
4205
4206static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4207{
4208 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4209 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4210 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4211}
4212
4213static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4214 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4215{
4216 u32 secid;
4217 u32 perm;
4218
4219 if (!sig)
4220 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4221 else
4222 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4223 if (!cred)
4224 secid = current_sid();
4225 else
4226 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4227 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4228 secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4229}
4230
4231static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4232 struct inode *inode)
4233{
4234 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4235 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4236
4237 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4238 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4239 isec->sid = sid;
4240 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4241 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4242}
4243
4244static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4245{
4246 u32 sid = current_sid();
4247
4248 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4249 USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4250}
4251
4252/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4253static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4254 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4255{
4256 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4257 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4258
4259 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4260 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4261 if (ih == NULL)
4262 goto out;
4263
4264 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4265 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4266 goto out;
4267
4268 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4269 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4270 ret = 0;
4271
4272 if (proto)
4273 *proto = ih->protocol;
4274
4275 switch (ih->protocol) {
4276 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4277 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4278
4279 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4280 break;
4281
4282 offset += ihlen;
4283 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4284 if (th == NULL)
4285 break;
4286
4287 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4288 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4289 break;
4290 }
4291
4292 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4293 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4294
4295 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4296 break;
4297
4298 offset += ihlen;
4299 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4300 if (uh == NULL)
4301 break;
4302
4303 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4304 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4305 break;
4306 }
4307
4308 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4309 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4310
4311 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4312 break;
4313
4314 offset += ihlen;
4315 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4316 if (dh == NULL)
4317 break;
4318
4319 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4320 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4321 break;
4322 }
4323
4324#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4325 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4326 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4327
4328 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4329 break;
4330
4331 offset += ihlen;
4332 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4333 if (sh == NULL)
4334 break;
4335
4336 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4337 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4338 break;
4339 }
4340#endif
4341 default:
4342 break;
4343 }
4344out:
4345 return ret;
4346}
4347
4348#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4349
4350/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4351static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4352 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4353{
4354 u8 nexthdr;
4355 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4356 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4357 __be16 frag_off;
4358
4359 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4360 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4361 if (ip6 == NULL)
4362 goto out;
4363
4364 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4365 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4366 ret = 0;
4367
4368 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4369 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4370 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4371 if (offset < 0)
4372 goto out;
4373
4374 if (proto)
4375 *proto = nexthdr;
4376
4377 switch (nexthdr) {
4378 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4379 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4380
4381 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4382 if (th == NULL)
4383 break;
4384
4385 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4386 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4387 break;
4388 }
4389
4390 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4391 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4392
4393 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4394 if (uh == NULL)
4395 break;
4396
4397 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4398 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4399 break;
4400 }
4401
4402 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4403 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4404
4405 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4406 if (dh == NULL)
4407 break;
4408
4409 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4410 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4411 break;
4412 }
4413
4414#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4415 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4416 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4417
4418 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4419 if (sh == NULL)
4420 break;
4421
4422 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4423 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4424 break;
4425 }
4426#endif
4427 /* includes fragments */
4428 default:
4429 break;
4430 }
4431out:
4432 return ret;
4433}
4434
4435#endif /* IPV6 */
4436
4437static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4438 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4439{
4440 char *addrp;
4441 int ret;
4442
4443 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4444 case PF_INET:
4445 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4446 if (ret)
4447 goto parse_error;
4448 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4449 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4450 goto okay;
4451
4452#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4453 case PF_INET6:
4454 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4455 if (ret)
4456 goto parse_error;
4457 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4458 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4459 goto okay;
4460#endif /* IPV6 */
4461 default:
4462 addrp = NULL;
4463 goto okay;
4464 }
4465
4466parse_error:
4467 pr_warn(
4468 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4469 " unable to parse packet\n");
4470 return ret;
4471
4472okay:
4473 if (_addrp)
4474 *_addrp = addrp;
4475 return 0;
4476}
4477
4478/**
4479 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4480 * @skb: the packet
4481 * @family: protocol family
4482 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4483 *
4484 * Description:
4485 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4486 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4487 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4488 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4489 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4490 * peer labels.
4491 *
4492 */
4493static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4494{
4495 int err;
4496 u32 xfrm_sid;
4497 u32 nlbl_sid;
4498 u32 nlbl_type;
4499
4500 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4501 if (unlikely(err))
4502 return -EACCES;
4503 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4504 if (unlikely(err))
4505 return -EACCES;
4506
4507 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4508 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4509 if (unlikely(err)) {
4510 pr_warn(
4511 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4512 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4513 return -EACCES;
4514 }
4515
4516 return 0;
4517}
4518
4519/**
4520 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4521 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4522 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4523 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4524 *
4525 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4526 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4527 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4528 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4529 *
4530 */
4531static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4532{
4533 int err = 0;
4534
4535 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4536 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4537 conn_sid);
4538 else
4539 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4540
4541 return err;
4542}
4543
4544/* socket security operations */
4545
4546static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4547 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4548{
4549 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4550 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4551 return 0;
4552 }
4553
4554 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4555 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4556}
4557
4558static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4559{
4560 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4561 struct common_audit_data ad;
4562 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4563
4564 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4565 return 0;
4566
4567 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4568 ad.u.net = &net;
4569 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4570
4571 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4572 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4573 &ad);
4574}
4575
4576static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4577 int protocol, int kern)
4578{
4579 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4580 u32 newsid;
4581 u16 secclass;
4582 int rc;
4583
4584 if (kern)
4585 return 0;
4586
4587 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4588 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4589 if (rc)
4590 return rc;
4591
4592 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4593 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4594}
4595
4596static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4597 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4598{
4599 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4600 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4601 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4602 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4603 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4604 int err = 0;
4605
4606 if (!kern) {
4607 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4608 if (err)
4609 return err;
4610 }
4611
4612 isec->sclass = sclass;
4613 isec->sid = sid;
4614 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4615
4616 if (sock->sk) {
4617 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4618 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4619 sksec->sid = sid;
4620 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4621 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4622 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4623
4624 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4625 }
4626
4627 return err;
4628}
4629
4630static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4631 struct socket *sockb)
4632{
4633 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4634 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4635
4636 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4637 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4638
4639 return 0;
4640}
4641
4642/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4643 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4644 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4645
4646static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4647{
4648 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4649 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4650 u16 family;
4651 int err;
4652
4653 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4654 if (err)
4655 goto out;
4656
4657 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4658 family = sk->sk_family;
4659 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4660 char *addrp;
4661 struct common_audit_data ad;
4662 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4663 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4664 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4665 u16 family_sa;
4666 unsigned short snum;
4667 u32 sid, node_perm;
4668
4669 /*
4670 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4671 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4672 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4673 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4674 */
4675 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4676 return -EINVAL;
4677 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4678 switch (family_sa) {
4679 case AF_UNSPEC:
4680 case AF_INET:
4681 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4682 return -EINVAL;
4683 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4684 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4685 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4686 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4687 */
4688 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4689 goto err_af;
4690 family_sa = AF_INET;
4691 }
4692 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4693 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4694 break;
4695 case AF_INET6:
4696 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4697 return -EINVAL;
4698 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4699 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4700 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4701 break;
4702 default:
4703 goto err_af;
4704 }
4705
4706 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4707 ad.u.net = &net;
4708 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4709 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4710
4711 if (snum) {
4712 int low, high;
4713
4714 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4715
4716 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4717 snum < low || snum > high) {
4718 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4719 snum, &sid);
4720 if (err)
4721 goto out;
4722 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4723 sksec->sid, sid,
4724 sksec->sclass,
4725 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4726 if (err)
4727 goto out;
4728 }
4729 }
4730
4731 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4732 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4733 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4734 break;
4735
4736 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4737 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4738 break;
4739
4740 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4741 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4742 break;
4743
4744 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4745 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4746 break;
4747
4748 default:
4749 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4750 break;
4751 }
4752
4753 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4754 if (err)
4755 goto out;
4756
4757 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4758 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4759 else
4760 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4761
4762 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4763 sksec->sid, sid,
4764 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4765 if (err)
4766 goto out;
4767 }
4768out:
4769 return err;
4770err_af:
4771 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4772 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4773 return -EINVAL;
4774 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4775}
4776
4777/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4778 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4779 */
4780static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4781 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4782{
4783 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4784 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4785 int err;
4786
4787 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4788 if (err)
4789 return err;
4790 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4791 return -EINVAL;
4792
4793 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4794 * way to disconnect the socket
4795 */
4796 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4797 return 0;
4798
4799 /*
4800 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4801 * for the port.
4802 */
4803 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4804 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4805 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4806 struct common_audit_data ad;
4807 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4808 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4809 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4810 unsigned short snum;
4811 u32 sid, perm;
4812
4813 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4814 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4815 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4816 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4817 */
4818 switch (address->sa_family) {
4819 case AF_INET:
4820 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4821 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4822 return -EINVAL;
4823 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4824 break;
4825 case AF_INET6:
4826 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4827 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4828 return -EINVAL;
4829 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4830 break;
4831 default:
4832 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4833 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4834 */
4835 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4836 return -EINVAL;
4837 else
4838 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4839 }
4840
4841 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4842 if (err)
4843 return err;
4844
4845 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4846 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4847 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4848 break;
4849 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4850 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4851 break;
4852 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4853 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4854 break;
4855 }
4856
4857 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4858 ad.u.net = &net;
4859 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4860 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4861 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4862 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4863 if (err)
4864 return err;
4865 }
4866
4867 return 0;
4868}
4869
4870/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4871static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4872 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4873{
4874 int err;
4875 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4876
4877 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4878 if (err)
4879 return err;
4880
4881 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4882}
4883
4884static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4885{
4886 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4887}
4888
4889static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4890{
4891 int err;
4892 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4893 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4894 u16 sclass;
4895 u32 sid;
4896
4897 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4898 if (err)
4899 return err;
4900
4901 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4902 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4903 sclass = isec->sclass;
4904 sid = isec->sid;
4905 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4906
4907 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4908 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4909 newisec->sid = sid;
4910 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4911
4912 return 0;
4913}
4914
4915static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4916 int size)
4917{
4918 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4919}
4920
4921static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4922 int size, int flags)
4923{
4924 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4925}
4926
4927static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4928{
4929 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4930}
4931
4932static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4933{
4934 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4935}
4936
4937static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4938{
4939 int err;
4940
4941 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4942 if (err)
4943 return err;
4944
4945 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4946}
4947
4948static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4949 int optname)
4950{
4951 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4952}
4953
4954static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4955{
4956 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4957}
4958
4959static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4960 struct sock *other,
4961 struct sock *newsk)
4962{
4963 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4964 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4965 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4966 struct common_audit_data ad;
4967 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4968 int err;
4969
4970 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4971 ad.u.net = &net;
4972 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4973
4974 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4975 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4976 sksec_other->sclass,
4977 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4978 if (err)
4979 return err;
4980
4981 /* server child socket */
4982 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4983 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4984 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4985 if (err)
4986 return err;
4987
4988 /* connecting socket */
4989 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4990
4991 return 0;
4992}
4993
4994static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4995 struct socket *other)
4996{
4997 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4998 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4999 struct common_audit_data ad;
5000 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5001
5002 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5003 ad.u.net = &net;
5004 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
5005
5006 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5007 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5008 &ad);
5009}
5010
5011static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5012 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5013 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5014{
5015 int err;
5016 u32 if_sid;
5017 u32 node_sid;
5018
5019 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5020 if (err)
5021 return err;
5022 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5023 peer_sid, if_sid,
5024 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5025 if (err)
5026 return err;
5027
5028 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5029 if (err)
5030 return err;
5031 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5032 peer_sid, node_sid,
5033 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5034}
5035
5036static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5037 u16 family)
5038{
5039 int err = 0;
5040 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5041 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5042 struct common_audit_data ad;
5043 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5044 char *addrp;
5045
5046 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5047 ad.u.net = &net;
5048 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5049 ad.u.net->family = family;
5050 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5051 if (err)
5052 return err;
5053
5054 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5055 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5056 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5057 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5058 if (err)
5059 return err;
5060 }
5061
5062 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5063 if (err)
5064 return err;
5065 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5066
5067 return err;
5068}
5069
5070static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5071{
5072 int err;
5073 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5074 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5075 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5076 struct common_audit_data ad;
5077 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5078 char *addrp;
5079 u8 secmark_active;
5080 u8 peerlbl_active;
5081
5082 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5083 return 0;
5084
5085 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5086 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5087 family = PF_INET;
5088
5089 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5090 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5091 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5092 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5093 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5094 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5095
5096 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5097 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5098 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5099 return 0;
5100
5101 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5102 ad.u.net = &net;
5103 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5104 ad.u.net->family = family;
5105 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5106 if (err)
5107 return err;
5108
5109 if (peerlbl_active) {
5110 u32 peer_sid;
5111
5112 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5113 if (err)
5114 return err;
5115 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5116 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5117 if (err) {
5118 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5119 return err;
5120 }
5121 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5122 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5123 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5124 if (err) {
5125 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5126 return err;
5127 }
5128 }
5129
5130 if (secmark_active) {
5131 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5132 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5133 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5134 if (err)
5135 return err;
5136 }
5137
5138 return err;
5139}
5140
5141static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5142 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5143 unsigned int len)
5144{
5145 int err = 0;
5146 char *scontext = NULL;
5147 u32 scontext_len;
5148 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5149 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5150
5151 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5152 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5153 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5154 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5155 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5156 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5157
5158 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5159 &scontext_len);
5160 if (err)
5161 return err;
5162 if (scontext_len > len) {
5163 err = -ERANGE;
5164 goto out_len;
5165 }
5166
5167 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5168 err = -EFAULT;
5169out_len:
5170 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5171 err = -EFAULT;
5172 kfree(scontext);
5173 return err;
5174}
5175
5176static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5177{
5178 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5179 u16 family;
5180 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5181
5182 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5183 family = PF_INET;
5184 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5185 family = PF_INET6;
5186 else if (sock)
5187 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5188 else
5189 goto out;
5190
5191 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5192 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5193 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5194 } else if (skb)
5195 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5196
5197out:
5198 *secid = peer_secid;
5199 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5200 return -EINVAL;
5201 return 0;
5202}
5203
5204static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5205{
5206 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5207
5208 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5209 if (!sksec)
5210 return -ENOMEM;
5211
5212 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5213 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5214 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5215 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5216 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5217
5218 return 0;
5219}
5220
5221static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5222{
5223 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5224
5225 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5226 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5227 kfree(sksec);
5228}
5229
5230static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5231{
5232 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5233 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5234
5235 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5236 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5237 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5238
5239 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5240}
5241
5242static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5243{
5244 if (!sk)
5245 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5246 else {
5247 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5248
5249 *secid = sksec->sid;
5250 }
5251}
5252
5253static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5254{
5255 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5256 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5257 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5258
5259 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5260 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5261 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5262 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5263}
5264
5265/*
5266 * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5267 * if it's the first association on the socket.
5268 */
5269static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5270 struct sk_buff *skb)
5271{
5272 struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5273 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5274 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5275 struct common_audit_data ad;
5276 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5277 int err;
5278
5279 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5280 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5281 family = PF_INET;
5282
5283 if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5284 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5285
5286 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5287 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5288 */
5289 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5290 if (err)
5291 return err;
5292
5293 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5294 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5295 } else {
5296 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5297 }
5298
5299 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5300 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5301
5302 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5303 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5304 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5305 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5306 */
5307 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5308 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5309 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5310 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5311 */
5312 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5313 ad.u.net = &net;
5314 ad.u.net->sk = asoc->base.sk;
5315 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5316 sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5317 sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5318 &ad);
5319 if (err)
5320 return err;
5321 }
5322 return 0;
5323}
5324
5325/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5326 * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5327 * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5328 */
5329static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5330 struct sk_buff *skb)
5331{
5332 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5333 u32 conn_sid;
5334 int err;
5335
5336 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5337 return 0;
5338
5339 err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5340 if (err)
5341 return err;
5342
5343 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5344 * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5345 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5346 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5347 * plug this into the new socket.
5348 */
5349 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5350 if (err)
5351 return err;
5352
5353 asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5354
5355 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5356 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5357}
5358
5359/* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5360 * response to an association request (initited by us).
5361 */
5362static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5363 struct sk_buff *skb)
5364{
5365 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5366
5367 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5368 return 0;
5369
5370 /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5371 * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5372 * into a new socket.
5373 */
5374 asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5375
5376 return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5377}
5378
5379/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5380 * based on their @optname.
5381 */
5382static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5383 struct sockaddr *address,
5384 int addrlen)
5385{
5386 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5387 void *addr_buf;
5388 struct sockaddr *addr;
5389 struct socket *sock;
5390
5391 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5392 return 0;
5393
5394 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5395 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5396 addr_buf = address;
5397
5398 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5399 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5400 return -EINVAL;
5401
5402 addr = addr_buf;
5403 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5404 case AF_UNSPEC:
5405 case AF_INET:
5406 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5407 break;
5408 case AF_INET6:
5409 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5410 break;
5411 default:
5412 return -EINVAL;
5413 }
5414
5415 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5416 return -EINVAL;
5417
5418 err = -EINVAL;
5419 switch (optname) {
5420 /* Bind checks */
5421 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5422 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5423 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5424 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5425 break;
5426 /* Connect checks */
5427 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5428 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5429 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5430 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5431 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5432 if (err)
5433 return err;
5434
5435 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5436 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5437 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5438 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5439 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5440 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5441 * primary address is selected.
5442 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5443 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5444 * selinux_socket_connect().
5445 */
5446 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5447 break;
5448 }
5449
5450 if (err)
5451 return err;
5452
5453 addr_buf += len;
5454 walk_size += len;
5455 }
5456
5457 return 0;
5458}
5459
5460/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5461static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5462 struct sock *newsk)
5463{
5464 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5465 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5466
5467 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5468 * the non-sctp clone version.
5469 */
5470 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5471 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5472
5473 newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5474 newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5475 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5476 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5477}
5478
5479static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5480 struct request_sock *req)
5481{
5482 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5483 int err;
5484 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5485 u32 connsid;
5486 u32 peersid;
5487
5488 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5489 if (err)
5490 return err;
5491 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5492 if (err)
5493 return err;
5494 req->secid = connsid;
5495 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5496
5497 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5498}
5499
5500static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5501 const struct request_sock *req)
5502{
5503 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5504
5505 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5506 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5507 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5508 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5509 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5510 time it will have been created and available. */
5511
5512 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5513 * thread with access to newsksec */
5514 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5515}
5516
5517static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5518{
5519 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5521
5522 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5523 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5524 family = PF_INET;
5525
5526 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5527}
5528
5529static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5530{
5531 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5532 u32 tsid;
5533
5534 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5535 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5536
5537 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5538 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5539 NULL);
5540}
5541
5542static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5543{
5544 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5545}
5546
5547static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5548{
5549 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5550}
5551
5552static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5553 struct flowi_common *flic)
5554{
5555 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5556}
5557
5558static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5559{
5560 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5561
5562 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5563 if (!tunsec)
5564 return -ENOMEM;
5565 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5566
5567 *security = tunsec;
5568 return 0;
5569}
5570
5571static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5572{
5573 kfree(security);
5574}
5575
5576static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5577{
5578 u32 sid = current_sid();
5579
5580 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5581 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5582 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5583 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5584 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5585 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5586
5587 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5588 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5589 NULL);
5590}
5591
5592static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5593{
5594 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5595
5596 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5597 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5598 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5599}
5600
5601static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5602{
5603 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5604 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5605
5606 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5607 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5608 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5609 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5610 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5611 * protocols were being used */
5612
5613 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5614 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5615
5616 return 0;
5617}
5618
5619static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5620{
5621 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5622 u32 sid = current_sid();
5623 int err;
5624
5625 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5626 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5627 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5628 if (err)
5629 return err;
5630 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5631 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5632 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5633 if (err)
5634 return err;
5635 tunsec->sid = sid;
5636
5637 return 0;
5638}
5639
5640#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5641
5642static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5643 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5644{
5645 int ifindex;
5646 u16 family;
5647 char *addrp;
5648 u32 peer_sid;
5649 struct common_audit_data ad;
5650 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5651 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5652
5653 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5654 return NF_ACCEPT;
5655
5656 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5657 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5658 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5659 return NF_ACCEPT;
5660
5661 family = state->pf;
5662 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5663 return NF_DROP;
5664
5665 ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5666 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5667 ad.u.net = &net;
5668 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5669 ad.u.net->family = family;
5670 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5671 return NF_DROP;
5672
5673 if (peerlbl_active) {
5674 int err;
5675
5676 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5677 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5678 if (err) {
5679 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5680 return NF_DROP;
5681 }
5682 }
5683
5684 if (secmark_active)
5685 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5686 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5687 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5688 return NF_DROP;
5689
5690 if (netlbl_enabled())
5691 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5692 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5693 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5694 * protection */
5695 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5696 return NF_DROP;
5697
5698 return NF_ACCEPT;
5699}
5700
5701static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5702 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5703{
5704 struct sock *sk;
5705 u32 sid;
5706
5707 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5708 return NF_ACCEPT;
5709
5710 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5711 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5712 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5713 sk = skb->sk;
5714 if (sk) {
5715 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5716
5717 if (sk_listener(sk))
5718 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5719 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5720 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5721 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5722 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5723 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5724 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5725 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5726 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5727 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5728 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5729 * best we can do. */
5730 return NF_ACCEPT;
5731
5732 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5733 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5734 sid = sksec->sid;
5735 } else
5736 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5737 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5738 return NF_DROP;
5739
5740 return NF_ACCEPT;
5741}
5742
5743
5744static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5745 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5746{
5747 struct sock *sk;
5748 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5749 struct common_audit_data ad;
5750 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5751 u8 proto = 0;
5752
5753 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5754 if (sk == NULL)
5755 return NF_ACCEPT;
5756 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5757
5758 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5759 ad.u.net = &net;
5760 ad.u.net->netif = state->out->ifindex;
5761 ad.u.net->family = state->pf;
5762 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5763 return NF_DROP;
5764
5765 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5766 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5767 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5768 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5769 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5770
5771 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5772 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5773
5774 return NF_ACCEPT;
5775}
5776
5777static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5778 struct sk_buff *skb,
5779 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5780{
5781 u16 family;
5782 u32 secmark_perm;
5783 u32 peer_sid;
5784 int ifindex;
5785 struct sock *sk;
5786 struct common_audit_data ad;
5787 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5788 char *addrp;
5789 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5790
5791 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5792 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5793 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5794 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5795 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5796 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5797
5798 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5799 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5800 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5801 return NF_ACCEPT;
5802
5803 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5804
5805#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5806 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5807 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5808 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5809 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5810 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5811 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5812 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5813 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5814 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5815 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5816 * connection. */
5817 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5818 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5819 return NF_ACCEPT;
5820#endif
5821
5822 family = state->pf;
5823 if (sk == NULL) {
5824 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5825 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5826 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5827 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5828 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5829 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5830 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5831 return NF_DROP;
5832 } else {
5833 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5834 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5835 }
5836 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5837 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5838 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5839 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5840 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5841 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5842 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5843 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5844 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5845 * for similar problems. */
5846 u32 skb_sid;
5847 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5848
5849 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5850 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5851 return NF_DROP;
5852 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5853 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5854 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5855 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5856 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5857 * pass the packet. */
5858 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5859 switch (family) {
5860 case PF_INET:
5861 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5862 return NF_ACCEPT;
5863 break;
5864 case PF_INET6:
5865 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5866 return NF_ACCEPT;
5867 break;
5868 default:
5869 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5870 }
5871 }
5872 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5873 return NF_DROP;
5874 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5875 } else {
5876 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5877 * associated socket. */
5878 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5879 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5880 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5881 }
5882
5883 ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5884 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5885 ad.u.net = &net;
5886 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5887 ad.u.net->family = family;
5888 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5889 return NF_DROP;
5890
5891 if (secmark_active)
5892 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5893 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5894 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5895 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5896
5897 if (peerlbl_active) {
5898 u32 if_sid;
5899 u32 node_sid;
5900
5901 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5902 return NF_DROP;
5903 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5904 peer_sid, if_sid,
5905 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5906 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5907
5908 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5909 return NF_DROP;
5910 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5911 peer_sid, node_sid,
5912 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5913 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5914 }
5915
5916 return NF_ACCEPT;
5917}
5918#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5919
5920static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5921{
5922 int rc = 0;
5923 unsigned int msg_len;
5924 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5925 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5926 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5927 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5928 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5929 u32 perm;
5930
5931 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5932 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5933
5934 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5935 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5936 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5937 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5938 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5939 */
5940 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5941 return 0;
5942
5943 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5944 if (rc == 0) {
5945 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5946 if (rc)
5947 return rc;
5948 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5949 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5950 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5951 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5952 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5953 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5954 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5955 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5956 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
5957 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5958 return rc;
5959 rc = 0;
5960 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5961 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5962 rc = 0;
5963 } else {
5964 return rc;
5965 }
5966
5967 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5968 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5969 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5970 return 0;
5971 data_len -= msg_len;
5972 data += msg_len;
5973 }
5974
5975 return rc;
5976}
5977
5978static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5979{
5980 isec->sclass = sclass;
5981 isec->sid = current_sid();
5982}
5983
5984static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5985 u32 perms)
5986{
5987 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5988 struct common_audit_data ad;
5989 u32 sid = current_sid();
5990
5991 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5992
5993 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5994 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5995
5996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5997 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5998}
5999
6000static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6001{
6002 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6003
6004 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6005 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6006
6007 return 0;
6008}
6009
6010/* message queue security operations */
6011static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6012{
6013 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6014 struct common_audit_data ad;
6015 u32 sid = current_sid();
6016
6017 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6018 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6019
6020 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6021 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6022
6023 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6024 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6025 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
6026}
6027
6028static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6029{
6030 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6031 struct common_audit_data ad;
6032 u32 sid = current_sid();
6033
6034 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6035
6036 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6037 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6038
6039 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6040 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6041 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6042}
6043
6044static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6045{
6046 int err;
6047 int perms;
6048
6049 switch (cmd) {
6050 case IPC_INFO:
6051 case MSG_INFO:
6052 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6053 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6054 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6055 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6056 case IPC_STAT:
6057 case MSG_STAT:
6058 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6059 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6060 break;
6061 case IPC_SET:
6062 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6063 break;
6064 case IPC_RMID:
6065 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6066 break;
6067 default:
6068 return 0;
6069 }
6070
6071 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6072 return err;
6073}
6074
6075static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6076{
6077 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6078 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6079 struct common_audit_data ad;
6080 u32 sid = current_sid();
6081 int rc;
6082
6083 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6084 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6085
6086 /*
6087 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6088 */
6089 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6090 /*
6091 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6092 * message queue this message will be stored in
6093 */
6094 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6095 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6096 if (rc)
6097 return rc;
6098 }
6099
6100 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6101 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6102
6103 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6104 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6105 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6106 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6107 if (!rc)
6108 /* Can this process send the message */
6109 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6110 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6111 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6112 if (!rc)
6113 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6114 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6115 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6116 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6117
6118 return rc;
6119}
6120
6121static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6122 struct task_struct *target,
6123 long type, int mode)
6124{
6125 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6126 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6127 struct common_audit_data ad;
6128 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6129 int rc;
6130
6131 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6132 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6133
6134 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6135 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6136
6137 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6138 sid, isec->sid,
6139 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6140 if (!rc)
6141 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6142 sid, msec->sid,
6143 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6144 return rc;
6145}
6146
6147/* Shared Memory security operations */
6148static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6149{
6150 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6151 struct common_audit_data ad;
6152 u32 sid = current_sid();
6153
6154 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6155 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6156
6157 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6158 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6159
6160 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6161 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6162 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6163}
6164
6165static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6166{
6167 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6168 struct common_audit_data ad;
6169 u32 sid = current_sid();
6170
6171 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6172
6173 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6174 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6175
6176 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6177 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6178 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6179}
6180
6181/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6182static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6183{
6184 int perms;
6185 int err;
6186
6187 switch (cmd) {
6188 case IPC_INFO:
6189 case SHM_INFO:
6190 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6191 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6192 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6193 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6194 case IPC_STAT:
6195 case SHM_STAT:
6196 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6197 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6198 break;
6199 case IPC_SET:
6200 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6201 break;
6202 case SHM_LOCK:
6203 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6204 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6205 break;
6206 case IPC_RMID:
6207 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6208 break;
6209 default:
6210 return 0;
6211 }
6212
6213 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6214 return err;
6215}
6216
6217static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6218 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6219{
6220 u32 perms;
6221
6222 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6223 perms = SHM__READ;
6224 else
6225 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6226
6227 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6228}
6229
6230/* Semaphore security operations */
6231static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6232{
6233 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6234 struct common_audit_data ad;
6235 u32 sid = current_sid();
6236
6237 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6238 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6239
6240 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6241 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6242
6243 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6244 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6245 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6246}
6247
6248static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6249{
6250 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6251 struct common_audit_data ad;
6252 u32 sid = current_sid();
6253
6254 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6255
6256 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6257 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6258
6259 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6260 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6261 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6262}
6263
6264/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6265static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6266{
6267 int err;
6268 u32 perms;
6269
6270 switch (cmd) {
6271 case IPC_INFO:
6272 case SEM_INFO:
6273 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6274 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6275 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6276 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6277 case GETPID:
6278 case GETNCNT:
6279 case GETZCNT:
6280 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6281 break;
6282 case GETVAL:
6283 case GETALL:
6284 perms = SEM__READ;
6285 break;
6286 case SETVAL:
6287 case SETALL:
6288 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6289 break;
6290 case IPC_RMID:
6291 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6292 break;
6293 case IPC_SET:
6294 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6295 break;
6296 case IPC_STAT:
6297 case SEM_STAT:
6298 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6299 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6300 break;
6301 default:
6302 return 0;
6303 }
6304
6305 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6306 return err;
6307}
6308
6309static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6310 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6311{
6312 u32 perms;
6313
6314 if (alter)
6315 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6316 else
6317 perms = SEM__READ;
6318
6319 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6320}
6321
6322static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6323{
6324 u32 av = 0;
6325
6326 av = 0;
6327 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6328 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6329 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6330 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6331
6332 if (av == 0)
6333 return 0;
6334
6335 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6336}
6337
6338static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6339{
6340 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6341 *secid = isec->sid;
6342}
6343
6344static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6345{
6346 if (inode)
6347 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6348}
6349
6350static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6351 const char *name, char **value)
6352{
6353 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6354 u32 sid;
6355 int error;
6356 unsigned len;
6357
6358 rcu_read_lock();
6359 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6360
6361 if (current != p) {
6362 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6363 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6364 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6365 if (error)
6366 goto bad;
6367 }
6368
6369 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6370 sid = __tsec->sid;
6371 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6372 sid = __tsec->osid;
6373 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6374 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6375 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6376 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6377 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6378 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6379 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6380 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6381 else {
6382 error = -EINVAL;
6383 goto bad;
6384 }
6385 rcu_read_unlock();
6386
6387 if (!sid)
6388 return 0;
6389
6390 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6391 if (error)
6392 return error;
6393 return len;
6394
6395bad:
6396 rcu_read_unlock();
6397 return error;
6398}
6399
6400static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6401{
6402 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6403 struct cred *new;
6404 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6405 int error;
6406 char *str = value;
6407
6408 /*
6409 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6410 */
6411 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6412 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6413 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6414 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6415 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6416 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6417 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6418 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6419 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6420 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6421 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6422 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6423 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6424 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6425 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6426 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6427 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6428 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6429 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6430 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6431 else
6432 error = -EINVAL;
6433 if (error)
6434 return error;
6435
6436 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6437 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6438 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6439 str[size-1] = 0;
6440 size--;
6441 }
6442 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6443 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6444 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6445 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6446 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6447 size_t audit_size;
6448
6449 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6450 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6451 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6452 audit_size = size - 1;
6453 else
6454 audit_size = size;
6455 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6456 GFP_ATOMIC,
6457 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6458 if (!ab)
6459 return error;
6460 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6461 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6462 audit_log_end(ab);
6463
6464 return error;
6465 }
6466 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6467 &selinux_state,
6468 value, size, &sid);
6469 }
6470 if (error)
6471 return error;
6472 }
6473
6474 new = prepare_creds();
6475 if (!new)
6476 return -ENOMEM;
6477
6478 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6479 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6480 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6481 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6482 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6483 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6484 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6485 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6486 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6487 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6488 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6489 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6490 if (sid) {
6491 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6492 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6493 if (error)
6494 goto abort_change;
6495 }
6496 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6497 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6498 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6499 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6500 error = -EINVAL;
6501 if (sid == 0)
6502 goto abort_change;
6503
6504 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6505 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6506 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6507 tsec->sid, sid);
6508 if (error)
6509 goto abort_change;
6510 }
6511
6512 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6513 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6514 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6516 if (error)
6517 goto abort_change;
6518
6519 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6520 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6521 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6522 if (ptsid != 0) {
6523 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6524 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6525 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6526 if (error)
6527 goto abort_change;
6528 }
6529
6530 tsec->sid = sid;
6531 } else {
6532 error = -EINVAL;
6533 goto abort_change;
6534 }
6535
6536 commit_creds(new);
6537 return size;
6538
6539abort_change:
6540 abort_creds(new);
6541 return error;
6542}
6543
6544static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6545{
6546 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6547}
6548
6549static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6550{
6551 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6552 secdata, seclen);
6553}
6554
6555static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6556{
6557 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6558 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6559}
6560
6561static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6562{
6563 kfree(secdata);
6564}
6565
6566static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6567{
6568 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6569
6570 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6571 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6572 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6573}
6574
6575/*
6576 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6577 */
6578static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6579{
6580 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6581 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6582 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6583 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6584}
6585
6586/*
6587 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6588 */
6589static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6590{
6591 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6592 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6593}
6594
6595static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6596{
6597 int len = 0;
6598 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&init_user_ns, inode,
6599 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6600 if (len < 0)
6601 return len;
6602 *ctxlen = len;
6603 return 0;
6604}
6605#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6606
6607static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6608 unsigned long flags)
6609{
6610 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6611 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6612
6613 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6614 if (!ksec)
6615 return -ENOMEM;
6616
6617 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6618 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6619 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6620 else
6621 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6622
6623 k->security = ksec;
6624 return 0;
6625}
6626
6627static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6628{
6629 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6630
6631 k->security = NULL;
6632 kfree(ksec);
6633}
6634
6635static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6636 const struct cred *cred,
6637 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6638{
6639 struct key *key;
6640 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6641 u32 perm, sid;
6642
6643 switch (need_perm) {
6644 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6645 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6646 break;
6647 case KEY_NEED_READ:
6648 perm = KEY__READ;
6649 break;
6650 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6651 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6652 break;
6653 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6654 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6655 break;
6656 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6657 perm = KEY__LINK;
6658 break;
6659 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6660 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6661 break;
6662 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6663 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6664 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6665 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6666 return 0;
6667 default:
6668 WARN_ON(1);
6669 return -EPERM;
6670
6671 }
6672
6673 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6674 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6675 ksec = key->security;
6676
6677 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6678 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6679}
6680
6681static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6682{
6683 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6684 char *context = NULL;
6685 unsigned len;
6686 int rc;
6687
6688 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6689 &context, &len);
6690 if (!rc)
6691 rc = len;
6692 *_buffer = context;
6693 return rc;
6694}
6695
6696#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6697static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6698{
6699 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6700 u32 sid = current_sid();
6701
6702 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6703 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6704}
6705#endif
6706#endif
6707
6708#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6709static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6710{
6711 struct common_audit_data ad;
6712 int err;
6713 u32 sid = 0;
6714 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6715 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6716
6717 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6718 if (err)
6719 return err;
6720
6721 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6722 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6723 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6724 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6725 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6726 sec->sid, sid,
6727 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6728 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6729}
6730
6731static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6732 u8 port_num)
6733{
6734 struct common_audit_data ad;
6735 int err;
6736 u32 sid = 0;
6737 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6738 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6739
6740 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6741 &sid);
6742
6743 if (err)
6744 return err;
6745
6746 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6747 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6748 ibendport.port = port_num;
6749 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6750 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6751 sec->sid, sid,
6752 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6753 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6754}
6755
6756static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6757{
6758 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6759
6760 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6761 if (!sec)
6762 return -ENOMEM;
6763 sec->sid = current_sid();
6764
6765 *ib_sec = sec;
6766 return 0;
6767}
6768
6769static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6770{
6771 kfree(ib_sec);
6772}
6773#endif
6774
6775#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6776static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6777 unsigned int size)
6778{
6779 u32 sid = current_sid();
6780 int ret;
6781
6782 switch (cmd) {
6783 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6784 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6785 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6786 NULL);
6787 break;
6788 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6789 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6790 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6791 NULL);
6792 break;
6793 default:
6794 ret = 0;
6795 break;
6796 }
6797
6798 return ret;
6799}
6800
6801static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6802{
6803 u32 av = 0;
6804
6805 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6806 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6807 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6808 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6809 return av;
6810}
6811
6812/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6813 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6814 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6815 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6816 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6817 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6818 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6819 */
6820static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6821{
6822 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6823 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6824 struct bpf_map *map;
6825 int ret;
6826
6827 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6828 map = file->private_data;
6829 bpfsec = map->security;
6830 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6831 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6832 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6833 if (ret)
6834 return ret;
6835 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6836 prog = file->private_data;
6837 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6838 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6839 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6840 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6841 if (ret)
6842 return ret;
6843 }
6844 return 0;
6845}
6846
6847static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6848{
6849 u32 sid = current_sid();
6850 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6851
6852 bpfsec = map->security;
6853 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6854 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6855 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6856}
6857
6858static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6859{
6860 u32 sid = current_sid();
6861 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6862
6863 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6864 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6865 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6866 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6867}
6868
6869static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6870{
6871 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6872
6873 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6874 if (!bpfsec)
6875 return -ENOMEM;
6876
6877 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6878 map->security = bpfsec;
6879
6880 return 0;
6881}
6882
6883static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6884{
6885 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6886
6887 map->security = NULL;
6888 kfree(bpfsec);
6889}
6890
6891static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6892{
6893 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6894
6895 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6896 if (!bpfsec)
6897 return -ENOMEM;
6898
6899 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6900 aux->security = bpfsec;
6901
6902 return 0;
6903}
6904
6905static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6906{
6907 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6908
6909 aux->security = NULL;
6910 kfree(bpfsec);
6911}
6912#endif
6913
6914struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6915 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6916 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6917 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6918 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6919 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6920 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
6921};
6922
6923#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6924static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6925{
6926 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6927
6928 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6929 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6930 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6931 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6932 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6933 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6934 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6935 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6936 else
6937 return -EINVAL;
6938
6939 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6940 requested, NULL);
6941}
6942
6943static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6944{
6945 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6946
6947 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6948 if (!perfsec)
6949 return -ENOMEM;
6950
6951 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6952 event->security = perfsec;
6953
6954 return 0;
6955}
6956
6957static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6958{
6959 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6960
6961 event->security = NULL;
6962 kfree(perfsec);
6963}
6964
6965static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6966{
6967 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6968 u32 sid = current_sid();
6969
6970 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6971 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6972}
6973
6974static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6975{
6976 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6977 u32 sid = current_sid();
6978
6979 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6980 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6981}
6982#endif
6983
6984#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
6985/**
6986 * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
6987 * @new: the target creds
6988 *
6989 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
6990 * to service an io_uring operation.
6991 */
6992static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
6993{
6994 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
6995 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
6996}
6997
6998/**
6999 * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
7000 *
7001 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
7002 * kernel polling thread.
7003 */
7004static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
7005{
7006 int sid = current_sid();
7007
7008 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
7009 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
7010}
7011
7012/**
7013 * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
7014 * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
7015 *
7016 * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
7017 * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
7018 *
7019 */
7020static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
7021{
7022 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
7023 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
7024 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
7025 struct common_audit_data ad;
7026
7027 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
7028 ad.u.file = file;
7029
7030 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
7031 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
7032}
7033#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
7034
7035/*
7036 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7037 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7038 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7039 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7040 * hooks),
7041 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7042 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7043 *
7044 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7045 *
7046 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
7047 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
7048 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
7049 */
7050static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7055
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7065
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7067
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7071
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7082
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7084
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7087
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7119
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7121
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7133
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7135
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7161
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7164
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7169
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7173
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7177
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7179
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7182
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7189
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7192
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7209 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7230 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7231#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7233 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7234 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7235 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7236#endif
7237#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7238 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7239 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7242 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7244 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7246#endif
7247
7248#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7252#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7254#endif
7255#endif
7256
7257#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7261#endif
7262
7263#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7264 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7269#endif
7270
7271#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7276#endif
7277
7278#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7282#endif
7283
7284 /*
7285 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7286 */
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7290#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7292#endif
7293
7294 /*
7295 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7296 */
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7299 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7302 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7304 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7305 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7308#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7310#endif
7311#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7312 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7314 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7315 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7316#endif
7317#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7319#endif
7320#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7321 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7322#endif
7323#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7324 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7325 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7326#endif
7327#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7328 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7329#endif
7330};
7331
7332static __init int selinux_init(void)
7333{
7334 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7335
7336 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7337 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7338 if (CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE)
7339 pr_err("SELinux: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is non-zero. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
7340 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7341 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7342 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7343 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7344
7345 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7346 cred_init_security();
7347
7348 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7349
7350 avc_init();
7351
7352 avtab_cache_init();
7353
7354 ebitmap_cache_init();
7355
7356 hashtab_cache_init();
7357
7358 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7359
7360 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7361 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7362
7363 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7364 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7365
7366 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7367 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7368 else
7369 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7370
7371 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7372
7373 return 0;
7374}
7375
7376static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7377{
7378 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7379}
7380
7381void selinux_complete_init(void)
7382{
7383 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7384
7385 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7386 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7387 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7388}
7389
7390/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7391 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7392DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7393 .name = "selinux",
7394 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7395 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7396 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7397 .init = selinux_init,
7398};
7399
7400#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7401
7402static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7403 {
7404 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7405 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7406 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7407 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7408 },
7409 {
7410 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7411 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7412 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7413 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7414 },
7415 {
7416 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7417 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7418 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7419 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7420 },
7421#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7422 {
7423 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7424 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7425 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7426 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7427 },
7428 {
7429 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7430 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7431 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7432 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7433 },
7434 {
7435 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7436 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7437 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7438 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7439 },
7440#endif /* IPV6 */
7441};
7442
7443static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7444{
7445 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7446 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7447}
7448
7449static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7450{
7451 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7452 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7453}
7454
7455static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7456 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7457 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7458};
7459
7460static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7461{
7462 int err;
7463
7464 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7465 return 0;
7466
7467 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7468
7469 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7470 if (err)
7471 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7472
7473 return 0;
7474}
7475__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7476
7477#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7478static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7479{
7480 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7481
7482 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7483}
7484#endif
7485
7486#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7487
7488#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7489#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7490#endif
7491
7492#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7493
7494#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7495int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7496{
7497 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7498 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7499 return -EINVAL;
7500 }
7501
7502 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7503 /* Only do this once. */
7504 return -EINVAL;
7505 }
7506
7507 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7508
7509 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7510
7511 /*
7512 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7513 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7514 * runtime disable.
7515 */
7516 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7517
7518 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7519
7520 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7521 avc_disable();
7522
7523 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7524 exit_sel_fs();
7525
7526 return 0;
7527}
7528#endif
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28#include <linux/tracehook.h>
29#include <linux/errno.h>
30#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
31#include <linux/sched/task.h>
32#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33#include <linux/xattr.h>
34#include <linux/capability.h>
35#include <linux/unistd.h>
36#include <linux/mm.h>
37#include <linux/mman.h>
38#include <linux/slab.h>
39#include <linux/pagemap.h>
40#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41#include <linux/swap.h>
42#include <linux/spinlock.h>
43#include <linux/syscalls.h>
44#include <linux/dcache.h>
45#include <linux/file.h>
46#include <linux/fdtable.h>
47#include <linux/namei.h>
48#include <linux/mount.h>
49#include <linux/fs_context.h>
50#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53#include <linux/tty.h>
54#include <net/icmp.h>
55#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58#include <net/net_namespace.h>
59#include <net/netlabel.h>
60#include <linux/uaccess.h>
61#include <asm/ioctls.h>
62#include <linux/atomic.h>
63#include <linux/bitops.h>
64#include <linux/interrupt.h>
65#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66#include <net/netlink.h>
67#include <linux/tcp.h>
68#include <linux/udp.h>
69#include <linux/dccp.h>
70#include <linux/sctp.h>
71#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72#include <linux/quota.h>
73#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75#include <linux/parser.h>
76#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
77#include <net/ipv6.h>
78#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79#include <linux/personality.h>
80#include <linux/audit.h>
81#include <linux/string.h>
82#include <linux/mutex.h>
83#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
84#include <linux/syslog.h>
85#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
86#include <linux/export.h>
87#include <linux/msg.h>
88#include <linux/shm.h>
89#include <linux/bpf.h>
90#include <linux/kernfs.h>
91#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94#include <linux/fanotify.h>
95
96#include "avc.h"
97#include "objsec.h"
98#include "netif.h"
99#include "netnode.h"
100#include "netport.h"
101#include "ibpkey.h"
102#include "xfrm.h"
103#include "netlabel.h"
104#include "audit.h"
105#include "avc_ss.h"
106
107struct selinux_state selinux_state;
108
109/* SECMARK reference count */
110static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
111
112#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
114
115static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
116{
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
120 return 1;
121}
122__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
123#else
124#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
125#endif
126
127int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
130{
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
134 return 1;
135}
136__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
137#endif
138
139static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
141
142static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143{
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
148 if (checkreqprot)
149 pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
150 }
151 return 1;
152}
153__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
154
155/**
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
157 *
158 * Description:
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
164 *
165 */
166static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167{
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
170}
171
172/**
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
174 *
175 * Description:
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
180 *
181 */
182static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183{
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
186}
187
188static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189{
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
191 sel_netif_flush();
192 sel_netnode_flush();
193 sel_netport_flush();
194 synchronize_net();
195 }
196 return 0;
197}
198
199static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200{
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
204 }
205
206 return 0;
207}
208
209/*
210 * initialise the security for the init task
211 */
212static void cred_init_security(void)
213{
214 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
216
217 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
219}
220
221/*
222 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
223 */
224static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
225{
226 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
227
228 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
229 return tsec->sid;
230}
231
232/*
233 * get the subjective security ID of a task
234 */
235static inline u32 task_sid_subj(const struct task_struct *task)
236{
237 u32 sid;
238
239 rcu_read_lock();
240 sid = cred_sid(rcu_dereference(task->cred));
241 rcu_read_unlock();
242 return sid;
243}
244
245/*
246 * get the objective security ID of a task
247 */
248static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
249{
250 u32 sid;
251
252 rcu_read_lock();
253 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
254 rcu_read_unlock();
255 return sid;
256}
257
258/*
259 * get the security ID of a task for use with binder
260 */
261static inline u32 task_sid_binder(const struct task_struct *task)
262{
263 /*
264 * In many case where this function is used we should be using the
265 * task's subjective SID, but we can't reliably access the subjective
266 * creds of a task other than our own so we must use the objective
267 * creds/SID, which are safe to access. The downside is that if a task
268 * is temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected here;
269 * however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that case well
270 * anyway.
271 *
272 * If this ever changes and we can safely reference the subjective
273 * creds/SID of another task, this function will make it easier to
274 * identify the various places where we make use of the task SIDs in
275 * the binder code. It is also likely that we will need to adjust
276 * the main drivers/android binder code as well.
277 */
278 return task_sid_obj(task);
279}
280
281static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
282
283/*
284 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
285 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
286 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
287 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
288 */
289static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
290 struct dentry *dentry,
291 bool may_sleep)
292{
293 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
294
295 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
296
297 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
298 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
299 if (!may_sleep)
300 return -ECHILD;
301
302 /*
303 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
304 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
305 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
306 */
307 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
308 }
309 return 0;
310}
311
312static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
313{
314 return selinux_inode(inode);
315}
316
317static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
318{
319 int error;
320
321 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
322 if (error)
323 return ERR_PTR(error);
324 return selinux_inode(inode);
325}
326
327/*
328 * Get the security label of an inode.
329 */
330static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
331{
332 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
333 return selinux_inode(inode);
334}
335
336static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
337{
338 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
339
340 return selinux_inode(inode);
341}
342
343/*
344 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
345 */
346static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
347{
348 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
349
350 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
351 return selinux_inode(inode);
352}
353
354static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
355{
356 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
358
359 if (!isec)
360 return;
361 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
362 /*
363 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
364 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
365 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
366 *
367 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
368 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
369 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
370 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
371 */
372 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
373 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
374 list_del_init(&isec->list);
375 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
376 }
377}
378
379struct selinux_mnt_opts {
380 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
381};
382
383static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
384{
385 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
386 kfree(opts->fscontext);
387 kfree(opts->context);
388 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
389 kfree(opts->defcontext);
390 kfree(opts);
391}
392
393enum {
394 Opt_error = -1,
395 Opt_context = 0,
396 Opt_defcontext = 1,
397 Opt_fscontext = 2,
398 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
399 Opt_seclabel = 4,
400};
401
402#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
403static struct {
404 const char *name;
405 int len;
406 int opt;
407 bool has_arg;
408} tokens[] = {
409 A(context, true),
410 A(fscontext, true),
411 A(defcontext, true),
412 A(rootcontext, true),
413 A(seclabel, false),
414};
415#undef A
416
417static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
418{
419 int i;
420
421 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
422 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
423 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
424 continue;
425 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
426 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
427 continue;
428 *arg = s + len + 1;
429 } else if (len != l)
430 continue;
431 return tokens[i].opt;
432 }
433 return Opt_error;
434}
435
436#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
437
438static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
439 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
440 const struct cred *cred)
441{
442 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
443 int rc;
444
445 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
446 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
447 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
448 if (rc)
449 return rc;
450
451 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
452 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
453 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
454 return rc;
455}
456
457static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
458 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
459 const struct cred *cred)
460{
461 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
462 int rc;
463 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
464 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
465 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
466 if (rc)
467 return rc;
468
469 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
470 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
471 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
472 return rc;
473}
474
475static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
476{
477 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
478 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
479 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
480 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
481 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
482 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
483 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
484 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
485 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
486}
487
488static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
489{
490 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
491
492 /*
493 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
494 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
495 */
496 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
497
498 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
499 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
500 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
501 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
502 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
503 return 1;
504
505 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
506 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
507
508 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
509 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
510 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
511 default:
512 return 0;
513 }
514}
515
516static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
517{
518 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
519 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
520 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
521 u32 sid;
522 int rc;
523
524 /*
525 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
526 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
527 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
528 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
529 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
530 */
531 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
532 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
533 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
534 goto fallback;
535 }
536
537 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
538 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
539 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
540 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
541 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
542 goto fallback;
543 } else {
544 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
545 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
546 return rc;
547 }
548 }
549 return 0;
550
551fallback:
552 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
553 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, "/",
554 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
555 if (rc)
556 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
557
558 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
559 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
560 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
561 sbsec->sid = sid;
562 return 0;
563}
564
565static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
566{
567 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
568 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
569 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
570 int rc = 0;
571
572 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
573 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
574 if (rc)
575 return rc;
576 }
577
578 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
579
580 /*
581 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
582 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
583 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
584 */
585 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
586 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
587 else
588 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
589
590 /* Initialize the root inode. */
591 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
592
593 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
594 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
595 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
596 populates itself. */
597 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
598 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
599 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
600 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
601 struct inode_security_struct, list);
602 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
603 list_del_init(&isec->list);
604 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
605 inode = igrab(inode);
606 if (inode) {
607 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
608 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
609 iput(inode);
610 }
611 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
612 }
613 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
614 return rc;
615}
616
617static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
618 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
619{
620 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
621
622 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
623 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
624 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
625 (old_sid != new_sid))
626 return 1;
627
628 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
629 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
630 */
631 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
632 if (mnt_flags & flag)
633 return 1;
634 return 0;
635}
636
637static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
638{
639 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
640 sid, GFP_KERNEL);
641 if (rc)
642 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
643 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
644 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
645 return rc;
646}
647
648/*
649 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
650 * labeling information.
651 */
652static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
653 void *mnt_opts,
654 unsigned long kern_flags,
655 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
656{
657 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
658 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
659 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
660 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
661 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
662 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
663 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
664 int rc = 0;
665
666 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
667
668 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
669 if (!opts) {
670 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
671 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
672 server is ready to handle calls. */
673 goto out;
674 }
675 rc = -EINVAL;
676 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
677 "before the security server is initialized\n");
678 goto out;
679 }
680 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
681 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
682 * place the results is not allowed */
683 rc = -EINVAL;
684 goto out;
685 }
686
687 /*
688 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
689 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
690 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
691 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
692 *
693 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
694 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
695 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
696 * will be used for both mounts)
697 */
698 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
699 && !opts)
700 goto out;
701
702 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
703
704 /*
705 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
706 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
707 * than once with different security options.
708 */
709 if (opts) {
710 if (opts->fscontext) {
711 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
712 if (rc)
713 goto out;
714 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
715 fscontext_sid))
716 goto out_double_mount;
717 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
718 }
719 if (opts->context) {
720 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
721 if (rc)
722 goto out;
723 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
724 context_sid))
725 goto out_double_mount;
726 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
727 }
728 if (opts->rootcontext) {
729 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
730 if (rc)
731 goto out;
732 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
733 rootcontext_sid))
734 goto out_double_mount;
735 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
736 }
737 if (opts->defcontext) {
738 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
739 if (rc)
740 goto out;
741 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
742 defcontext_sid))
743 goto out_double_mount;
744 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
745 }
746 }
747
748 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
749 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
750 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
751 goto out_double_mount;
752 rc = 0;
753 goto out;
754 }
755
756 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
757 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
758
759 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
760 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
761 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
762 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
763 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
764 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
765
766 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
767 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
768 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
769 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
770
771 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
772 /*
773 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
774 * filesystem type.
775 */
776 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
777 if (rc) {
778 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
779 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
780 goto out;
781 }
782 }
783
784 /*
785 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
786 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
787 * line and security labels must be ignored.
788 */
789 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
790 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
791 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
792 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
793 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
794 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
795 defcontext_sid) {
796 rc = -EACCES;
797 goto out;
798 }
799 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
800 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
801 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
802 current_sid(),
803 current_sid(),
804 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
805 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
806 if (rc)
807 goto out;
808 }
809 goto out_set_opts;
810 }
811
812 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
813 if (fscontext_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
815 if (rc)
816 goto out;
817
818 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
819 }
820
821 /*
822 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
823 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
824 * the superblock context if not already set.
825 */
826 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
827 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
828 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
829 }
830
831 if (context_sid) {
832 if (!fscontext_sid) {
833 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
834 cred);
835 if (rc)
836 goto out;
837 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
838 } else {
839 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
840 cred);
841 if (rc)
842 goto out;
843 }
844 if (!rootcontext_sid)
845 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
846
847 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
848 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
849 }
850
851 if (rootcontext_sid) {
852 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
853 cred);
854 if (rc)
855 goto out;
856
857 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
858 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
859 }
860
861 if (defcontext_sid) {
862 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
863 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
864 rc = -EINVAL;
865 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
866 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
867 goto out;
868 }
869
870 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
871 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
872 sbsec, cred);
873 if (rc)
874 goto out;
875 }
876
877 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
878 }
879
880out_set_opts:
881 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
882out:
883 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
884 return rc;
885out_double_mount:
886 rc = -EINVAL;
887 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
888 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
889 sb->s_type->name);
890 goto out;
891}
892
893static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
894 const struct super_block *newsb)
895{
896 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
897 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
898 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
899 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
900
901 if (oldflags != newflags)
902 goto mismatch;
903 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
904 goto mismatch;
905 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
906 goto mismatch;
907 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
908 goto mismatch;
909 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
910 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
911 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
912 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
913 goto mismatch;
914 }
915 return 0;
916mismatch:
917 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
918 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
919 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
920 return -EBUSY;
921}
922
923static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
924 struct super_block *newsb,
925 unsigned long kern_flags,
926 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
927{
928 int rc = 0;
929 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
930 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
931 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
932
933 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
934 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
935 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
936
937 /*
938 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
939 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
940 */
941 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
942 return 0;
943
944 /*
945 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
946 * place the results is not allowed.
947 */
948 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
949 return -EINVAL;
950
951 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
952 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
953
954 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
955 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
956 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
957 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
958 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
959 }
960
961 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
962
963 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
964
965 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
966 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
967 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
968
969 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
970 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
971 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
972 if (rc)
973 goto out;
974 }
975
976 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
977 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
978 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
979 }
980
981 if (set_context) {
982 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
983
984 if (!set_fscontext)
985 newsbsec->sid = sid;
986 if (!set_rootcontext) {
987 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
988 newisec->sid = sid;
989 }
990 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
991 }
992 if (set_rootcontext) {
993 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
994 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
995
996 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
997 }
998
999 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
1000out:
1001 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
1002 return rc;
1003}
1004
1005static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
1006{
1007 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
1008
1009 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
1010 return 0;
1011
1012 if (!opts) {
1013 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1014 if (!opts)
1015 return -ENOMEM;
1016 *mnt_opts = opts;
1017 }
1018 if (!s)
1019 return -ENOMEM;
1020 switch (token) {
1021 case Opt_context:
1022 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1023 goto Einval;
1024 opts->context = s;
1025 break;
1026 case Opt_fscontext:
1027 if (opts->fscontext)
1028 goto Einval;
1029 opts->fscontext = s;
1030 break;
1031 case Opt_rootcontext:
1032 if (opts->rootcontext)
1033 goto Einval;
1034 opts->rootcontext = s;
1035 break;
1036 case Opt_defcontext:
1037 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1038 goto Einval;
1039 opts->defcontext = s;
1040 break;
1041 }
1042 return 0;
1043Einval:
1044 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1045 return -EINVAL;
1046}
1047
1048static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
1049 void **mnt_opts)
1050{
1051 int token = Opt_error;
1052 int rc, i;
1053
1054 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
1055 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
1056 token = tokens[i].opt;
1057 break;
1058 }
1059 }
1060
1061 if (token == Opt_error)
1062 return -EINVAL;
1063
1064 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1065 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1066 if (!val) {
1067 rc = -ENOMEM;
1068 goto free_opt;
1069 }
1070 }
1071 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1072 if (unlikely(rc)) {
1073 kfree(val);
1074 goto free_opt;
1075 }
1076 return rc;
1077
1078free_opt:
1079 if (*mnt_opts) {
1080 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1081 *mnt_opts = NULL;
1082 }
1083 return rc;
1084}
1085
1086static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1087{
1088 char *context = NULL;
1089 u32 len;
1090 int rc;
1091
1092 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1093 &context, &len);
1094 if (!rc) {
1095 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1096
1097 seq_putc(m, '=');
1098 if (has_comma)
1099 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1100 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1101 if (has_comma)
1102 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1103 }
1104 kfree(context);
1105 return rc;
1106}
1107
1108static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1109{
1110 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1111 int rc;
1112
1113 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1114 return 0;
1115
1116 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1117 return 0;
1118
1119 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1120 seq_putc(m, ',');
1121 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1122 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1123 if (rc)
1124 return rc;
1125 }
1126 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1127 seq_putc(m, ',');
1128 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1129 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1130 if (rc)
1131 return rc;
1132 }
1133 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1134 seq_putc(m, ',');
1135 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1136 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1137 if (rc)
1138 return rc;
1139 }
1140 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1141 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1142 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1143 seq_putc(m, ',');
1144 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1145 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1146 if (rc)
1147 return rc;
1148 }
1149 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1150 seq_putc(m, ',');
1151 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1152 }
1153 return 0;
1154}
1155
1156static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1157{
1158 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1159 case S_IFSOCK:
1160 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1161 case S_IFLNK:
1162 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1163 case S_IFREG:
1164 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1165 case S_IFBLK:
1166 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1167 case S_IFDIR:
1168 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1169 case S_IFCHR:
1170 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1171 case S_IFIFO:
1172 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1173
1174 }
1175
1176 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1177}
1178
1179static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1180{
1181 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1182 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1183}
1184
1185static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1186{
1187 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1188}
1189
1190static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1191{
1192 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1193
1194 switch (family) {
1195 case PF_UNIX:
1196 switch (type) {
1197 case SOCK_STREAM:
1198 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1199 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1200 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1201 case SOCK_RAW:
1202 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1203 }
1204 break;
1205 case PF_INET:
1206 case PF_INET6:
1207 switch (type) {
1208 case SOCK_STREAM:
1209 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1210 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1211 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1212 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1213 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1214 else
1215 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1216 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1217 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1218 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1219 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1220 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1221 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1222 else
1223 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1224 case SOCK_DCCP:
1225 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1226 default:
1227 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1228 }
1229 break;
1230 case PF_NETLINK:
1231 switch (protocol) {
1232 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1233 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1234 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1235 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1236 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1237 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1238 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1239 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1240 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1241 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1242 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1243 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1244 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1245 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1246 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1247 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1248 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1249 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1250 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1251 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1252 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1253 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1254 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1255 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1256 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1257 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1258 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1259 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1260 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1261 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1262 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1263 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1264 default:
1265 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1266 }
1267 case PF_PACKET:
1268 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1269 case PF_KEY:
1270 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1271 case PF_APPLETALK:
1272 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1273 }
1274
1275 if (extsockclass) {
1276 switch (family) {
1277 case PF_AX25:
1278 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1279 case PF_IPX:
1280 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1281 case PF_NETROM:
1282 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1283 case PF_ATMPVC:
1284 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1285 case PF_X25:
1286 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1287 case PF_ROSE:
1288 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1289 case PF_DECnet:
1290 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1291 case PF_ATMSVC:
1292 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1293 case PF_RDS:
1294 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1295 case PF_IRDA:
1296 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1297 case PF_PPPOX:
1298 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1299 case PF_LLC:
1300 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1301 case PF_CAN:
1302 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1303 case PF_TIPC:
1304 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1305 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1306 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1307 case PF_IUCV:
1308 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1309 case PF_RXRPC:
1310 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1311 case PF_ISDN:
1312 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1313 case PF_PHONET:
1314 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1315 case PF_IEEE802154:
1316 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1317 case PF_CAIF:
1318 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1319 case PF_ALG:
1320 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1321 case PF_NFC:
1322 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1323 case PF_VSOCK:
1324 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1325 case PF_KCM:
1326 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1327 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1328 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1329 case PF_SMC:
1330 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1331 case PF_XDP:
1332 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1333#if PF_MAX > 45
1334#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1335#endif
1336 }
1337 }
1338
1339 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1340}
1341
1342static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1343 u16 tclass,
1344 u16 flags,
1345 u32 *sid)
1346{
1347 int rc;
1348 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1349 char *buffer, *path;
1350
1351 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1352 if (!buffer)
1353 return -ENOMEM;
1354
1355 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1356 if (IS_ERR(path))
1357 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1358 else {
1359 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1360 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1361 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1362 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1363 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1364 path[1] = '/';
1365 path++;
1366 }
1367 }
1368 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1369 path, tclass, sid);
1370 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1371 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1372 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1373 rc = 0;
1374 }
1375 }
1376 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1377 return rc;
1378}
1379
1380static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1381 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1382{
1383#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1384 char *context;
1385 unsigned int len;
1386 int rc;
1387
1388 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1389 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1390 if (!context)
1391 return -ENOMEM;
1392
1393 context[len] = '\0';
1394 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1395 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1396 kfree(context);
1397
1398 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1399 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1400 if (rc < 0)
1401 return rc;
1402
1403 len = rc;
1404 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1405 if (!context)
1406 return -ENOMEM;
1407
1408 context[len] = '\0';
1409 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1410 context, len);
1411 }
1412 if (rc < 0) {
1413 kfree(context);
1414 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1415 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1416 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1417 return rc;
1418 }
1419 *sid = def_sid;
1420 return 0;
1421 }
1422
1423 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1424 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1425 if (rc) {
1426 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1427 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1428
1429 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1430 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1431 ino, dev, context);
1432 } else {
1433 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1434 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1435 }
1436 }
1437 kfree(context);
1438 return 0;
1439}
1440
1441/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1442static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1443{
1444 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1445 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1446 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1447 u16 sclass;
1448 struct dentry *dentry;
1449 int rc = 0;
1450
1451 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1452 return 0;
1453
1454 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1455 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1456 goto out_unlock;
1457
1458 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1459 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1460
1461 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1462 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1463 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1464 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1465 server is ready to handle calls. */
1466 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1467 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1468 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1469 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1470 goto out_unlock;
1471 }
1472
1473 sclass = isec->sclass;
1474 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1475 sid = isec->sid;
1476 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1477 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1478
1479 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1480 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1481 break;
1482 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1483 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1484 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1485 break;
1486 }
1487 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1488 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1489 if (opt_dentry) {
1490 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1491 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1492 } else {
1493 /*
1494 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1495 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1496 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1497 * two, depending upon that...
1498 */
1499 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1500 if (!dentry)
1501 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1502 }
1503 if (!dentry) {
1504 /*
1505 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1506 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1507 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1508 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1509 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1510 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1511 * be used again by userspace.
1512 */
1513 goto out_invalid;
1514 }
1515
1516 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1517 &sid);
1518 dput(dentry);
1519 if (rc)
1520 goto out;
1521 break;
1522 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1523 sid = task_sid;
1524 break;
1525 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1526 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1527 sid = sbsec->sid;
1528
1529 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1530 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1531 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1532 if (rc)
1533 goto out;
1534 break;
1535 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1536 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1537 break;
1538 default:
1539 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1540 sid = sbsec->sid;
1541
1542 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1543 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1544 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1545 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1546 * procfs inodes */
1547 if (opt_dentry) {
1548 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1549 * d_splice_alias. */
1550 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1551 } else {
1552 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1553 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1554 * a connected one, so try that first.
1555 */
1556 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1557 if (!dentry)
1558 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1559 }
1560 /*
1561 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1562 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1563 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1564 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1565 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1566 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1567 * could be used again by userspace.
1568 */
1569 if (!dentry)
1570 goto out_invalid;
1571 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1572 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1573 if (rc) {
1574 dput(dentry);
1575 goto out;
1576 }
1577
1578 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1579 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1580 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1581 sid, &sid);
1582 if (rc) {
1583 dput(dentry);
1584 goto out;
1585 }
1586 }
1587 dput(dentry);
1588 }
1589 break;
1590 }
1591
1592out:
1593 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1594 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1595 if (rc) {
1596 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1597 goto out_unlock;
1598 }
1599 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1600 isec->sid = sid;
1601 }
1602
1603out_unlock:
1604 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1605 return rc;
1606
1607out_invalid:
1608 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1609 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1610 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1611 isec->sid = sid;
1612 }
1613 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1614 return 0;
1615}
1616
1617/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1618static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1619{
1620 u32 perm = 0;
1621
1622 switch (sig) {
1623 case SIGCHLD:
1624 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1625 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1626 break;
1627 case SIGKILL:
1628 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1629 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1630 break;
1631 case SIGSTOP:
1632 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1633 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1634 break;
1635 default:
1636 /* All other signals. */
1637 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1638 break;
1639 }
1640
1641 return perm;
1642}
1643
1644#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1645#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1646#endif
1647
1648/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1649static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1650 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1651{
1652 struct common_audit_data ad;
1653 struct av_decision avd;
1654 u16 sclass;
1655 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1656 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1657 int rc;
1658
1659 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1660 ad.u.cap = cap;
1661
1662 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1663 case 0:
1664 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1665 break;
1666 case 1:
1667 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1668 break;
1669 default:
1670 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1671 BUG();
1672 return -EINVAL;
1673 }
1674
1675 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1676 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1677 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1678 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1679 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1680 if (rc2)
1681 return rc2;
1682 }
1683 return rc;
1684}
1685
1686/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1687 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1688 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1689static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1690 struct inode *inode,
1691 u32 perms,
1692 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1693{
1694 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1695 u32 sid;
1696
1697 validate_creds(cred);
1698
1699 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1700 return 0;
1701
1702 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1703 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1704
1705 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1706 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1707}
1708
1709/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1710 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1711 pathname if needed. */
1712static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1713 struct dentry *dentry,
1714 u32 av)
1715{
1716 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1717 struct common_audit_data ad;
1718
1719 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1720 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1721 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1722 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1723}
1724
1725/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1726 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1727 pathname if needed. */
1728static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1729 const struct path *path,
1730 u32 av)
1731{
1732 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1733 struct common_audit_data ad;
1734
1735 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1736 ad.u.path = *path;
1737 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1738 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1739}
1740
1741/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1742static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1743 struct file *file,
1744 u32 av)
1745{
1746 struct common_audit_data ad;
1747
1748 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1749 ad.u.file = file;
1750 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1751}
1752
1753#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1754static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1755#endif
1756
1757/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1758 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1759 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1760 check a particular permission to the file.
1761 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1762 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1763 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1764 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1765static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1766 struct file *file,
1767 u32 av)
1768{
1769 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1770 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1771 struct common_audit_data ad;
1772 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1773 int rc;
1774
1775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1776 ad.u.file = file;
1777
1778 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1779 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1780 sid, fsec->sid,
1781 SECCLASS_FD,
1782 FD__USE,
1783 &ad);
1784 if (rc)
1785 goto out;
1786 }
1787
1788#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1789 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1790 if (rc)
1791 return rc;
1792#endif
1793
1794 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1795 rc = 0;
1796 if (av)
1797 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1798
1799out:
1800 return rc;
1801}
1802
1803/*
1804 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1805 */
1806static int
1807selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1808 struct inode *dir,
1809 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1810 u32 *_new_isid)
1811{
1812 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1813 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1814
1815 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1816 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1817 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1818 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1819 tsec->create_sid) {
1820 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1821 } else {
1822 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1823 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1824 dsec->sid, tclass,
1825 name, _new_isid);
1826 }
1827
1828 return 0;
1829}
1830
1831/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1832static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1833 struct dentry *dentry,
1834 u16 tclass)
1835{
1836 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1837 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1838 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1839 u32 sid, newsid;
1840 struct common_audit_data ad;
1841 int rc;
1842
1843 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1844 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1845
1846 sid = tsec->sid;
1847
1848 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1849 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1850
1851 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1852 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1853 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1854 &ad);
1855 if (rc)
1856 return rc;
1857
1858 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1859 &newsid);
1860 if (rc)
1861 return rc;
1862
1863 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1864 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1865 if (rc)
1866 return rc;
1867
1868 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1869 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1870 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1871 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1872}
1873
1874#define MAY_LINK 0
1875#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1876#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1877
1878/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1879static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1880 struct dentry *dentry,
1881 int kind)
1882
1883{
1884 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1885 struct common_audit_data ad;
1886 u32 sid = current_sid();
1887 u32 av;
1888 int rc;
1889
1890 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1891 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1892
1893 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1894 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1895
1896 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1897 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1898 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1899 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1900 if (rc)
1901 return rc;
1902
1903 switch (kind) {
1904 case MAY_LINK:
1905 av = FILE__LINK;
1906 break;
1907 case MAY_UNLINK:
1908 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1909 break;
1910 case MAY_RMDIR:
1911 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1912 break;
1913 default:
1914 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1915 __func__, kind);
1916 return 0;
1917 }
1918
1919 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1920 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1921 return rc;
1922}
1923
1924static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1925 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1926 struct inode *new_dir,
1927 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1928{
1929 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1930 struct common_audit_data ad;
1931 u32 sid = current_sid();
1932 u32 av;
1933 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1934 int rc;
1935
1936 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1937 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1938 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1939 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1940
1941 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1942
1943 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1944 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1945 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1946 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1947 if (rc)
1948 return rc;
1949 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1950 sid, old_isec->sid,
1951 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1952 if (rc)
1953 return rc;
1954 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1955 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1956 sid, old_isec->sid,
1957 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1958 if (rc)
1959 return rc;
1960 }
1961
1962 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1963 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1964 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1965 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1966 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1967 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1968 if (rc)
1969 return rc;
1970 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1971 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1972 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1973 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1974 sid, new_isec->sid,
1975 new_isec->sclass,
1976 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1977 if (rc)
1978 return rc;
1979 }
1980
1981 return 0;
1982}
1983
1984/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1985static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1986 struct super_block *sb,
1987 u32 perms,
1988 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1989{
1990 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1991 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1992
1993 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1994 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1995 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1996}
1997
1998/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1999static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
2000{
2001 u32 av = 0;
2002
2003 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
2004 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2005 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2006 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2007 av |= FILE__READ;
2008
2009 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
2010 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2011 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2012 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2013
2014 } else {
2015 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2016 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
2017 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2018 av |= DIR__WRITE;
2019 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2020 av |= DIR__READ;
2021 }
2022
2023 return av;
2024}
2025
2026/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2027static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2028{
2029 u32 av = 0;
2030
2031 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2032 av |= FILE__READ;
2033 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2034 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2035 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2036 else
2037 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2038 }
2039 if (!av) {
2040 /*
2041 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2042 */
2043 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2044 }
2045
2046 return av;
2047}
2048
2049/*
2050 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
2051 * open permission.
2052 */
2053static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2054{
2055 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2056 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2057
2058 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2059 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2060 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2061
2062 return av;
2063}
2064
2065/* Hook functions begin here. */
2066
2067static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2068{
2069 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2070 current_sid(), task_sid_binder(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2071 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2072}
2073
2074static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2075 struct task_struct *to)
2076{
2077 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2078 u32 fromsid = task_sid_binder(from);
2079 int rc;
2080
2081 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2082 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2083 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2084 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2085 if (rc)
2086 return rc;
2087 }
2088
2089 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, task_sid_binder(to),
2090 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2091}
2092
2093static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2094 struct task_struct *to)
2095{
2096 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2097 task_sid_binder(from), task_sid_binder(to),
2098 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2099 NULL);
2100}
2101
2102static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2103 struct task_struct *to,
2104 struct file *file)
2105{
2106 u32 sid = task_sid_binder(to);
2107 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2108 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2109 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2110 struct common_audit_data ad;
2111 int rc;
2112
2113 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2114 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2115
2116 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2117 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2118 sid, fsec->sid,
2119 SECCLASS_FD,
2120 FD__USE,
2121 &ad);
2122 if (rc)
2123 return rc;
2124 }
2125
2126#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2127 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2128 if (rc)
2129 return rc;
2130#endif
2131
2132 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2133 return 0;
2134
2135 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2136 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2137 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2138 &ad);
2139}
2140
2141static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2142 unsigned int mode)
2143{
2144 u32 sid = current_sid();
2145 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2146
2147 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2148 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2149 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2150
2151 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2152 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2153}
2154
2155static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2156{
2157 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2158 task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2159 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2160}
2161
2162static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2163 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2164{
2165 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2166 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2167 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2168}
2169
2170static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2171 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2172 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2173 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2174{
2175 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2176 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2177 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2178}
2179
2180/*
2181 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2182 * which was removed).
2183 *
2184 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2185 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2186 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2187 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2188 */
2189
2190static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2191 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2192{
2193 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2194}
2195
2196static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2197{
2198 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2199 int rc = 0;
2200
2201 if (!sb)
2202 return 0;
2203
2204 switch (cmds) {
2205 case Q_SYNC:
2206 case Q_QUOTAON:
2207 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2208 case Q_SETINFO:
2209 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2210 case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2211 case Q_XQUOTAON:
2212 case Q_XSETQLIM:
2213 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2214 break;
2215 case Q_GETFMT:
2216 case Q_GETINFO:
2217 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2218 case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2219 case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2220 case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2221 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2222 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2223 break;
2224 default:
2225 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2226 break;
2227 }
2228 return rc;
2229}
2230
2231static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2232{
2233 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2234
2235 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2236}
2237
2238static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2239{
2240 switch (type) {
2241 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2242 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2243 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2244 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2245 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2246 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2247 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2248 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2249 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2250 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2251 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2252 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2253 NULL);
2254 }
2255 /* All other syslog types */
2256 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2257 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2258 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2259}
2260
2261/*
2262 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2263 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2264 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2265 *
2266 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2267 * processes that allocate mappings.
2268 */
2269static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2270{
2271 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2272
2273 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2274 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2275 if (rc == 0)
2276 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2277
2278 return cap_sys_admin;
2279}
2280
2281/* binprm security operations */
2282
2283static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2284{
2285 u32 sid = 0;
2286 struct task_struct *tracer;
2287
2288 rcu_read_lock();
2289 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2290 if (tracer)
2291 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2292 rcu_read_unlock();
2293
2294 return sid;
2295}
2296
2297static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2298 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2299 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2300{
2301 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2302 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2303 int rc;
2304 u32 av;
2305
2306 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2307 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2308
2309 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2310 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2311
2312 /*
2313 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2314 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2315 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2316 * the old and new contexts.
2317 */
2318 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2319 av = 0;
2320 if (nnp)
2321 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2322 if (nosuid)
2323 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2324 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2325 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2326 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2327 if (!rc)
2328 return 0;
2329 }
2330
2331 /*
2332 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2333 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2334 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2335 */
2336 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2337 new_tsec->sid);
2338 if (!rc)
2339 return 0;
2340
2341 /*
2342 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2343 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2344 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2345 */
2346 if (nnp)
2347 return -EPERM;
2348 return -EACCES;
2349}
2350
2351static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2352{
2353 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2354 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2355 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2356 struct common_audit_data ad;
2357 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2358 int rc;
2359
2360 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2361 * the script interpreter */
2362
2363 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2364 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2365 isec = inode_security(inode);
2366
2367 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2368 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2369 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2370
2371 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2372 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2373 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2374 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2375
2376 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2377 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2378 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2379 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2380
2381 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2382 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2383 if (rc)
2384 return rc;
2385 } else {
2386 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2387 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2388 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2389 &new_tsec->sid);
2390 if (rc)
2391 return rc;
2392
2393 /*
2394 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2395 * transition.
2396 */
2397 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2398 if (rc)
2399 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2400 }
2401
2402 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2403 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2404
2405 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2406 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2407 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2408 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2409 if (rc)
2410 return rc;
2411 } else {
2412 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2413 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2414 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2415 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2416 if (rc)
2417 return rc;
2418
2419 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2420 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2421 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2422 if (rc)
2423 return rc;
2424
2425 /* Check for shared state */
2426 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2427 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2428 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2429 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2430 NULL);
2431 if (rc)
2432 return -EPERM;
2433 }
2434
2435 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2436 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2437 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2438 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2439 if (ptsid != 0) {
2440 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2441 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2442 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2443 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2444 if (rc)
2445 return -EPERM;
2446 }
2447 }
2448
2449 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2450 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2451
2452 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2453 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2454 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2455 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2456 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2457 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2458 NULL);
2459 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2460 }
2461
2462 return 0;
2463}
2464
2465static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2466{
2467 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2468}
2469
2470/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2471static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2472 struct files_struct *files)
2473{
2474 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2475 struct tty_struct *tty;
2476 int drop_tty = 0;
2477 unsigned n;
2478
2479 tty = get_current_tty();
2480 if (tty) {
2481 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2482 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2483 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2484
2485 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2486 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2487 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2488 open file may belong to another process and we are
2489 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2490 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2491 struct tty_file_private, list);
2492 file = file_priv->file;
2493 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2494 drop_tty = 1;
2495 }
2496 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2497 tty_kref_put(tty);
2498 }
2499 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2500 if (drop_tty)
2501 no_tty();
2502
2503 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2504 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2505 if (!n) /* none found? */
2506 return;
2507
2508 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2509 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2510 devnull = NULL;
2511 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2512 do {
2513 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2514 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2515 if (devnull)
2516 fput(devnull);
2517}
2518
2519/*
2520 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2521 */
2522static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2523{
2524 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2525 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2526 int rc, i;
2527
2528 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2529 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2530 return;
2531
2532 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2533 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2534
2535 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2536 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2537
2538 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2539 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2540 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2541 *
2542 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2543 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2544 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2545 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2546 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2547 */
2548 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2549 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2550 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2551 if (rc) {
2552 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2553 task_lock(current);
2554 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2555 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2556 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2557 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2558 }
2559 task_unlock(current);
2560 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2561 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2562 }
2563}
2564
2565/*
2566 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2567 * due to exec
2568 */
2569static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2570{
2571 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2572 u32 osid, sid;
2573 int rc;
2574
2575 osid = tsec->osid;
2576 sid = tsec->sid;
2577
2578 if (sid == osid)
2579 return;
2580
2581 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2582 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2583 * flush and unblock signals.
2584 *
2585 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2586 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2587 */
2588 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2589 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2590 if (rc) {
2591 clear_itimer();
2592
2593 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2594 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2595 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2596 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2597 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2598 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2599 recalc_sigpending();
2600 }
2601 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2602 }
2603
2604 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2605 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2606 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2607 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2608 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2609}
2610
2611/* superblock security operations */
2612
2613static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2614{
2615 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2616
2617 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2618 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2619 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2620 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2621 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2622 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2623
2624 return 0;
2625}
2626
2627static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2628{
2629 bool open_quote = false;
2630 int len;
2631 char c;
2632
2633 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2634 if (c == '"')
2635 open_quote = !open_quote;
2636 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2637 break;
2638 }
2639 return len;
2640}
2641
2642static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2643{
2644 char *from = options;
2645 char *to = options;
2646 bool first = true;
2647 int rc;
2648
2649 while (1) {
2650 int len = opt_len(from);
2651 int token;
2652 char *arg = NULL;
2653
2654 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2655
2656 if (token != Opt_error) {
2657 char *p, *q;
2658
2659 /* strip quotes */
2660 if (arg) {
2661 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2662 char c = *p;
2663 if (c != '"')
2664 *q++ = c;
2665 }
2666 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2667 if (!arg) {
2668 rc = -ENOMEM;
2669 goto free_opt;
2670 }
2671 }
2672 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2673 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2674 kfree(arg);
2675 goto free_opt;
2676 }
2677 } else {
2678 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2679 from--;
2680 len++;
2681 }
2682 if (to != from)
2683 memmove(to, from, len);
2684 to += len;
2685 first = false;
2686 }
2687 if (!from[len])
2688 break;
2689 from += len + 1;
2690 }
2691 *to = '\0';
2692 return 0;
2693
2694free_opt:
2695 if (*mnt_opts) {
2696 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2697 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2698 }
2699 return rc;
2700}
2701
2702static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2703{
2704 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2705 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2706 u32 sid;
2707 int rc;
2708
2709 /*
2710 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2711 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2712 */
2713 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2714 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2715
2716 /*
2717 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2718 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2719 */
2720 if (!opts)
2721 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2722
2723 if (opts->fscontext) {
2724 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2725 if (rc)
2726 return 1;
2727 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2728 return 1;
2729 }
2730 if (opts->context) {
2731 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2732 if (rc)
2733 return 1;
2734 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2735 return 1;
2736 }
2737 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2738 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2739
2740 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2741 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2742 if (rc)
2743 return 1;
2744 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2745 return 1;
2746 }
2747 if (opts->defcontext) {
2748 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2749 if (rc)
2750 return 1;
2751 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2752 return 1;
2753 }
2754 return 0;
2755}
2756
2757static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2758{
2759 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2760 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2761 u32 sid;
2762 int rc;
2763
2764 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2765 return 0;
2766
2767 if (!opts)
2768 return 0;
2769
2770 if (opts->fscontext) {
2771 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2772 if (rc)
2773 return rc;
2774 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2775 goto out_bad_option;
2776 }
2777 if (opts->context) {
2778 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2779 if (rc)
2780 return rc;
2781 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2782 goto out_bad_option;
2783 }
2784 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2785 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2786 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2787 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2788 if (rc)
2789 return rc;
2790 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2791 goto out_bad_option;
2792 }
2793 if (opts->defcontext) {
2794 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2795 if (rc)
2796 return rc;
2797 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2798 goto out_bad_option;
2799 }
2800 return 0;
2801
2802out_bad_option:
2803 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2804 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2805 sb->s_type->name);
2806 return -EINVAL;
2807}
2808
2809static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2810{
2811 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2812 struct common_audit_data ad;
2813
2814 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2815 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2816 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2817}
2818
2819static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2820{
2821 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2822 struct common_audit_data ad;
2823
2824 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2825 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2826 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2827}
2828
2829static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2830 const struct path *path,
2831 const char *type,
2832 unsigned long flags,
2833 void *data)
2834{
2835 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2836
2837 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2838 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2839 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2840 else
2841 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2842}
2843
2844static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2845 const struct path *to_path)
2846{
2847 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2848
2849 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2850}
2851
2852static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2853{
2854 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2855
2856 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2857 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2858}
2859
2860static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2861 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2862{
2863 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2864 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2865
2866 if (!src)
2867 return 0;
2868
2869 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2870 if (!fc->security)
2871 return -ENOMEM;
2872
2873 opts = fc->security;
2874
2875 if (src->fscontext) {
2876 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2877 if (!opts->fscontext)
2878 return -ENOMEM;
2879 }
2880 if (src->context) {
2881 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2882 if (!opts->context)
2883 return -ENOMEM;
2884 }
2885 if (src->rootcontext) {
2886 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2887 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2888 return -ENOMEM;
2889 }
2890 if (src->defcontext) {
2891 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2892 if (!opts->defcontext)
2893 return -ENOMEM;
2894 }
2895 return 0;
2896}
2897
2898static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2899 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2900 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2901 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2902 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2903 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2904 {}
2905};
2906
2907static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2908 struct fs_parameter *param)
2909{
2910 struct fs_parse_result result;
2911 int opt, rc;
2912
2913 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2914 if (opt < 0)
2915 return opt;
2916
2917 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2918 if (!rc) {
2919 param->string = NULL;
2920 rc = 1;
2921 }
2922 return rc;
2923}
2924
2925/* inode security operations */
2926
2927static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2928{
2929 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2930 u32 sid = current_sid();
2931
2932 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2933 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2934 isec->inode = inode;
2935 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2936 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2937 isec->task_sid = sid;
2938 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2939
2940 return 0;
2941}
2942
2943static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2944{
2945 inode_free_security(inode);
2946}
2947
2948static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2949 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2950 u32 *ctxlen)
2951{
2952 u32 newsid;
2953 int rc;
2954
2955 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2956 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2957 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2958 &newsid);
2959 if (rc)
2960 return rc;
2961
2962 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2963 ctxlen);
2964}
2965
2966static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2967 struct qstr *name,
2968 const struct cred *old,
2969 struct cred *new)
2970{
2971 u32 newsid;
2972 int rc;
2973 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2974
2975 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2976 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2977 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2978 &newsid);
2979 if (rc)
2980 return rc;
2981
2982 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2983 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2984 return 0;
2985}
2986
2987static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2988 const struct qstr *qstr,
2989 const char **name,
2990 void **value, size_t *len)
2991{
2992 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2993 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2994 u32 newsid, clen;
2995 int rc;
2996 char *context;
2997
2998 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2999
3000 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3001
3002 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
3003 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
3004 &newsid);
3005 if (rc)
3006 return rc;
3007
3008 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
3009 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
3010 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3011 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3012 isec->sid = newsid;
3013 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3014 }
3015
3016 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3017 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3018 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3019
3020 if (name)
3021 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
3022
3023 if (value && len) {
3024 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3025 &context, &clen);
3026 if (rc)
3027 return rc;
3028 *value = context;
3029 *len = clen;
3030 }
3031
3032 return 0;
3033}
3034
3035static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
3036 const struct qstr *name,
3037 const struct inode *context_inode)
3038{
3039 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3040 struct common_audit_data ad;
3041 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3042 int rc;
3043
3044 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
3045 return 0;
3046
3047 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3048
3049 /*
3050 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
3051 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
3052 * untouched.
3053 */
3054
3055 if (context_inode) {
3056 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
3057 selinux_inode(context_inode);
3058 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
3059 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized");
3060 return -EACCES;
3061 }
3062
3063 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
3064 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
3065 } else {
3066 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
3067 rc = security_transition_sid(
3068 &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3069 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
3070 if (rc)
3071 return rc;
3072 }
3073
3074 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3075 /*
3076 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
3077 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
3078 */
3079
3080 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3081 ad.u.inode = inode;
3082
3083 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3084 tsec->sid,
3085 isec->sid,
3086 isec->sclass,
3087 FILE__CREATE,
3088 &ad);
3089}
3090
3091static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3092{
3093 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3094}
3095
3096static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3097{
3098 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3099}
3100
3101static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3102{
3103 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3104}
3105
3106static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3107{
3108 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3109}
3110
3111static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3112{
3113 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3114}
3115
3116static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3117{
3118 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3119}
3120
3121static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3122{
3123 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3124}
3125
3126static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3127 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3128{
3129 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3130}
3131
3132static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3133{
3134 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3135
3136 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3137}
3138
3139static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3140 bool rcu)
3141{
3142 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3143 struct common_audit_data ad;
3144 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3145 u32 sid;
3146
3147 validate_creds(cred);
3148
3149 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3150 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3151 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3152 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3153 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3154 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3155
3156 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3157 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3158}
3159
3160static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3161 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3162 int result)
3163{
3164 struct common_audit_data ad;
3165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3166
3167 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3168 ad.u.inode = inode;
3169
3170 return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3171 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3172 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3173}
3174
3175static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3176{
3177 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3178 u32 perms;
3179 bool from_access;
3180 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3181 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3182 u32 sid;
3183 struct av_decision avd;
3184 int rc, rc2;
3185 u32 audited, denied;
3186
3187 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3188 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3189
3190 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3191 if (!mask)
3192 return 0;
3193
3194 validate_creds(cred);
3195
3196 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3197 return 0;
3198
3199 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3200
3201 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3202 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3203 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3204 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3205
3206 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3207 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3208 &avd);
3209 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3210 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3211 &denied);
3212 if (likely(!audited))
3213 return rc;
3214
3215 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3216 if (rc2)
3217 return rc2;
3218 return rc;
3219}
3220
3221static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3222{
3223 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3224 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3225 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3226 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3227
3228 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3229 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3230 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3231 ATTR_FORCE);
3232 if (!ia_valid)
3233 return 0;
3234 }
3235
3236 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3237 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3238 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3239
3240 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3241 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3242 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3243 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3244 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3245
3246 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3247}
3248
3249static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3250{
3251 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3252}
3253
3254static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3255{
3256 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3257 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3258
3259 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3260 return false;
3261 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3262 return false;
3263 return true;
3264}
3265
3266static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3267 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3268 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3269{
3270 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3271 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3272 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3273 struct common_audit_data ad;
3274 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3275 int rc = 0;
3276
3277 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3278 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3279 if (rc)
3280 return rc;
3281
3282 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3283 ordinary setattr permission. */
3284 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3285 }
3286
3287 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3288 return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3289
3290 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3291 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3292 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3293
3294 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
3295 return -EPERM;
3296
3297 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3298 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3299
3300 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3301 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3302 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3303 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3304 if (rc)
3305 return rc;
3306
3307 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3308 GFP_KERNEL);
3309 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3310 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3311 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3312 size_t audit_size;
3313
3314 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3315 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3316 if (value) {
3317 const char *str = value;
3318
3319 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3320 audit_size = size - 1;
3321 else
3322 audit_size = size;
3323 } else {
3324 audit_size = 0;
3325 }
3326 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3327 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3328 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3329 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3330 audit_log_end(ab);
3331
3332 return rc;
3333 }
3334 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3335 size, &newsid);
3336 }
3337 if (rc)
3338 return rc;
3339
3340 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3341 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3342 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3343 if (rc)
3344 return rc;
3345
3346 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3347 sid, isec->sclass);
3348 if (rc)
3349 return rc;
3350
3351 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3352 newsid,
3353 sbsec->sid,
3354 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3355 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3356 &ad);
3357}
3358
3359static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3360 const void *value, size_t size,
3361 int flags)
3362{
3363 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3364 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3365 u32 newsid;
3366 int rc;
3367
3368 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3369 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3370 return;
3371 }
3372
3373 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3374 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3375 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3376 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3377 * we've since initialized.
3378 */
3379 return;
3380 }
3381
3382 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3383 &newsid);
3384 if (rc) {
3385 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3386 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3387 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3388 return;
3389 }
3390
3391 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3392 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3393 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3394 isec->sid = newsid;
3395 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3396 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3397
3398 return;
3399}
3400
3401static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3402{
3403 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3404
3405 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3406}
3407
3408static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3409{
3410 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3411
3412 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3413}
3414
3415static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3416 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3417{
3418 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3419 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
3420 if (rc)
3421 return rc;
3422
3423 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3424 ordinary setattr permission. */
3425 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3426 }
3427
3428 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3429 return 0;
3430
3431 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3432 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3433 return -EACCES;
3434}
3435
3436static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3437 unsigned int obj_type)
3438{
3439 int ret;
3440 u32 perm;
3441
3442 struct common_audit_data ad;
3443
3444 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3445 ad.u.path = *path;
3446
3447 /*
3448 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3449 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3450 */
3451 switch (obj_type) {
3452 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3453 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3454 break;
3455 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3456 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3457 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3458 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3459 if (ret)
3460 return ret;
3461 break;
3462 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3463 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3464 break;
3465 default:
3466 return -EINVAL;
3467 }
3468
3469 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3470 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3471 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3472
3473 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3474 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3475 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3476
3477 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3478}
3479
3480/*
3481 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3482 *
3483 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3484 */
3485static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3486 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3487 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3488{
3489 u32 size;
3490 int error;
3491 char *context = NULL;
3492 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3493
3494 /*
3495 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3496 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3497 */
3498 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3499 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3500 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3501
3502 /*
3503 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3504 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3505 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3506 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3507 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3508 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3509 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3510 */
3511 isec = inode_security(inode);
3512 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3513 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3514 isec->sid, &context,
3515 &size);
3516 else
3517 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3518 &context, &size);
3519 if (error)
3520 return error;
3521 error = size;
3522 if (alloc) {
3523 *buffer = context;
3524 goto out_nofree;
3525 }
3526 kfree(context);
3527out_nofree:
3528 return error;
3529}
3530
3531static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3532 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3533{
3534 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3535 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3536 u32 newsid;
3537 int rc;
3538
3539 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3540 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3541
3542 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3544 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3545
3546 if (!value || !size)
3547 return -EACCES;
3548
3549 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3550 GFP_KERNEL);
3551 if (rc)
3552 return rc;
3553
3554 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3555 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3556 isec->sid = newsid;
3557 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3558 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3559 return 0;
3560}
3561
3562static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3563{
3564 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3565
3566 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3567 return 0;
3568
3569 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3570 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3571 return len;
3572}
3573
3574static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3575{
3576 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3577 *secid = isec->sid;
3578}
3579
3580static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3581{
3582 u32 sid;
3583 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3584 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3585
3586 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3587 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3588 if (!new_creds)
3589 return -ENOMEM;
3590 }
3591
3592 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3593 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3594 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3595 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3596 *new = new_creds;
3597 return 0;
3598}
3599
3600static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3601{
3602 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3603 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3604 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3605 */
3606 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3607 return 1; /* Discard */
3608 /*
3609 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3610 * by selinux.
3611 */
3612 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3613}
3614
3615/* kernfs node operations */
3616
3617static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3618 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3619{
3620 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3621 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3622 int rc;
3623 char *context;
3624
3625 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3626 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3627 return 0;
3628 else if (rc < 0)
3629 return rc;
3630
3631 clen = (u32)rc;
3632 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3633 if (!context)
3634 return -ENOMEM;
3635
3636 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3637 if (rc < 0) {
3638 kfree(context);
3639 return rc;
3640 }
3641
3642 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3643 GFP_KERNEL);
3644 kfree(context);
3645 if (rc)
3646 return rc;
3647
3648 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3649 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3650 } else {
3651 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3652 struct qstr q;
3653
3654 q.name = kn->name;
3655 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3656
3657 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3658 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3659 &newsid);
3660 if (rc)
3661 return rc;
3662 }
3663
3664 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3665 &context, &clen);
3666 if (rc)
3667 return rc;
3668
3669 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3670 XATTR_CREATE);
3671 kfree(context);
3672 return rc;
3673}
3674
3675
3676/* file security operations */
3677
3678static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3679{
3680 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3681 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3682
3683 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3684 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3685 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3686
3687 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3688 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3689}
3690
3691static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3692{
3693 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3694 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3695 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3696 u32 sid = current_sid();
3697
3698 if (!mask)
3699 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3700 return 0;
3701
3702 isec = inode_security(inode);
3703 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3704 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3705 /* No change since file_open check. */
3706 return 0;
3707
3708 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3709}
3710
3711static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3712{
3713 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3714 u32 sid = current_sid();
3715
3716 fsec->sid = sid;
3717 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3718
3719 return 0;
3720}
3721
3722/*
3723 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3724 * operation to an inode.
3725 */
3726static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3727 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3728{
3729 struct common_audit_data ad;
3730 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3731 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3732 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3733 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3734 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3735 int rc;
3736 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3737 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3738
3739 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3740 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3741 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3742 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3743
3744 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3745 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3746 ssid, fsec->sid,
3747 SECCLASS_FD,
3748 FD__USE,
3749 &ad);
3750 if (rc)
3751 goto out;
3752 }
3753
3754 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3755 return 0;
3756
3757 isec = inode_security(inode);
3758 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3759 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3760 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3761out:
3762 return rc;
3763}
3764
3765static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3766 unsigned long arg)
3767{
3768 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3769 int error = 0;
3770
3771 switch (cmd) {
3772 case FIONREAD:
3773 case FIBMAP:
3774 case FIGETBSZ:
3775 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3776 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3777 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3778 break;
3779
3780 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3781 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3782 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3783 break;
3784
3785 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3786 case FIONBIO:
3787 case FIOASYNC:
3788 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3789 break;
3790
3791 case KDSKBENT:
3792 case KDSKBSENT:
3793 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3794 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3795 break;
3796
3797 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3798 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3799 */
3800 default:
3801 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3802 }
3803 return error;
3804}
3805
3806static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3807
3808static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3809{
3810 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3811 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3812 int rc = 0;
3813
3814 if (default_noexec &&
3815 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3816 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3817 /*
3818 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3819 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3820 * This has an additional check.
3821 */
3822 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3823 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3824 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3825 if (rc)
3826 goto error;
3827 }
3828
3829 if (file) {
3830 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3831 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3832
3833 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3834 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3835 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3836
3837 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3838 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3839
3840 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3841 }
3842
3843error:
3844 return rc;
3845}
3846
3847static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3848{
3849 int rc = 0;
3850
3851 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3852 u32 sid = current_sid();
3853 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3854 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3855 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3856 }
3857
3858 return rc;
3859}
3860
3861static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3862 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3863{
3864 struct common_audit_data ad;
3865 int rc;
3866
3867 if (file) {
3868 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3869 ad.u.file = file;
3870 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3871 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3872 if (rc)
3873 return rc;
3874 }
3875
3876 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3877 prot = reqprot;
3878
3879 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3880 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3881}
3882
3883static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3884 unsigned long reqprot,
3885 unsigned long prot)
3886{
3887 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3888 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3889
3890 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3891 prot = reqprot;
3892
3893 if (default_noexec &&
3894 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3895 int rc = 0;
3896 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3897 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3898 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3899 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3900 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3901 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3902 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3903 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3904 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3905 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3906 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3907 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3908 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3909 /*
3910 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3911 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3912 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3913 * modified content. This typically should only
3914 * occur for text relocations.
3915 */
3916 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3917 }
3918 if (rc)
3919 return rc;
3920 }
3921
3922 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3923}
3924
3925static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3926{
3927 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3928
3929 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3930}
3931
3932static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3933 unsigned long arg)
3934{
3935 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3936 int err = 0;
3937
3938 switch (cmd) {
3939 case F_SETFL:
3940 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3941 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3942 break;
3943 }
3944 fallthrough;
3945 case F_SETOWN:
3946 case F_SETSIG:
3947 case F_GETFL:
3948 case F_GETOWN:
3949 case F_GETSIG:
3950 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3951 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3952 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3953 break;
3954 case F_GETLK:
3955 case F_SETLK:
3956 case F_SETLKW:
3957 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3958 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3959 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3960#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3961 case F_GETLK64:
3962 case F_SETLK64:
3963 case F_SETLKW64:
3964#endif
3965 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3966 break;
3967 }
3968
3969 return err;
3970}
3971
3972static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3973{
3974 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3975
3976 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3977 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3978}
3979
3980static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3981 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3982{
3983 struct file *file;
3984 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3985 u32 perm;
3986 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3987
3988 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3989 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3990
3991 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3992
3993 if (!signum)
3994 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3995 else
3996 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3997
3998 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3999 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
4000 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4001}
4002
4003static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
4004{
4005 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
4006
4007 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
4008}
4009
4010static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
4011{
4012 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4013 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4014
4015 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4016 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4017 /*
4018 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
4019 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
4020 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
4021 * Task label is already saved in the file security
4022 * struct as its SID.
4023 */
4024 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
4025 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
4026 /*
4027 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
4028 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
4029 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
4030 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
4031 * new inode label or new policy.
4032 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
4033 */
4034 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
4035}
4036
4037/* task security operations */
4038
4039static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
4040 unsigned long clone_flags)
4041{
4042 u32 sid = current_sid();
4043
4044 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4045 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
4046}
4047
4048/*
4049 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
4050 */
4051static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
4052 gfp_t gfp)
4053{
4054 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4055 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4056
4057 *tsec = *old_tsec;
4058 return 0;
4059}
4060
4061/*
4062 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
4063 */
4064static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
4065{
4066 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4067 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4068
4069 *tsec = *old_tsec;
4070}
4071
4072static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
4073{
4074 *secid = cred_sid(c);
4075}
4076
4077/*
4078 * set the security data for a kernel service
4079 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
4080 */
4081static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
4082{
4083 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4084 u32 sid = current_sid();
4085 int ret;
4086
4087 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4088 sid, secid,
4089 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4090 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
4091 NULL);
4092 if (ret == 0) {
4093 tsec->sid = secid;
4094 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4095 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4096 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4097 }
4098 return ret;
4099}
4100
4101/*
4102 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4103 * objective context of the specified inode
4104 */
4105static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4106{
4107 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4108 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4109 u32 sid = current_sid();
4110 int ret;
4111
4112 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4113 sid, isec->sid,
4114 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4115 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4116 NULL);
4117
4118 if (ret == 0)
4119 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4120 return ret;
4121}
4122
4123static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4124{
4125 struct common_audit_data ad;
4126
4127 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4128 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4129
4130 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4131 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4132 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4133}
4134
4135static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4136{
4137 struct common_audit_data ad;
4138 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4139 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4140 u32 sid = current_sid();
4141 int rc;
4142
4143 /* init_module */
4144 if (file == NULL)
4145 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4146 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4147 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4148
4149 /* finit_module */
4150
4151 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4152 ad.u.file = file;
4153
4154 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4155 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4156 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4157 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4158 if (rc)
4159 return rc;
4160 }
4161
4162 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4163 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4164 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4165 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4166}
4167
4168static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4169 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4170 bool contents)
4171{
4172 int rc = 0;
4173
4174 switch (id) {
4175 case READING_MODULE:
4176 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4177 break;
4178 default:
4179 break;
4180 }
4181
4182 return rc;
4183}
4184
4185static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4186{
4187 int rc = 0;
4188
4189 switch (id) {
4190 case LOADING_MODULE:
4191 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4192 break;
4193 default:
4194 break;
4195 }
4196
4197 return rc;
4198}
4199
4200static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4201{
4202 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4203 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4204 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4205}
4206
4207static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4208{
4209 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4210 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4211 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4212}
4213
4214static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4215{
4216 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4217 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4218 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4219}
4220
4221static void selinux_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4222{
4223 *secid = task_sid_subj(p);
4224}
4225
4226static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4227{
4228 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4229}
4230
4231static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4232{
4233 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4234 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4235 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4236}
4237
4238static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4239{
4240 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4241 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4242 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4243}
4244
4245static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4246{
4247 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4248 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4249 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4250}
4251
4252static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4253 unsigned int flags)
4254{
4255 u32 av = 0;
4256
4257 if (!flags)
4258 return 0;
4259 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4260 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4261 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4262 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4263 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4264 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4265 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4266}
4267
4268static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4269 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4270{
4271 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4272
4273 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4274 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4275 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4276 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4277 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4278 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4279 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4280 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4281
4282 return 0;
4283}
4284
4285static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4286{
4287 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4288 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4289 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4290}
4291
4292static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4293{
4294 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4295 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4296 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4297}
4298
4299static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4300{
4301 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4302 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4303 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4304}
4305
4306static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4307 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4308{
4309 u32 secid;
4310 u32 perm;
4311
4312 if (!sig)
4313 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4314 else
4315 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4316 if (!cred)
4317 secid = current_sid();
4318 else
4319 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4320 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4321 secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4322}
4323
4324static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4325 struct inode *inode)
4326{
4327 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4328 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4329
4330 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4331 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4332 isec->sid = sid;
4333 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4334 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4335}
4336
4337/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4338static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4339 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4340{
4341 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4342 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4343
4344 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4345 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4346 if (ih == NULL)
4347 goto out;
4348
4349 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4350 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4351 goto out;
4352
4353 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4354 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4355 ret = 0;
4356
4357 if (proto)
4358 *proto = ih->protocol;
4359
4360 switch (ih->protocol) {
4361 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4362 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4363
4364 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4365 break;
4366
4367 offset += ihlen;
4368 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4369 if (th == NULL)
4370 break;
4371
4372 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4373 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4374 break;
4375 }
4376
4377 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4378 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4379
4380 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4381 break;
4382
4383 offset += ihlen;
4384 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4385 if (uh == NULL)
4386 break;
4387
4388 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4389 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4390 break;
4391 }
4392
4393 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4394 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4395
4396 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4397 break;
4398
4399 offset += ihlen;
4400 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4401 if (dh == NULL)
4402 break;
4403
4404 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4405 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4406 break;
4407 }
4408
4409#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4410 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4411 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4412
4413 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4414 break;
4415
4416 offset += ihlen;
4417 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4418 if (sh == NULL)
4419 break;
4420
4421 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4422 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4423 break;
4424 }
4425#endif
4426 default:
4427 break;
4428 }
4429out:
4430 return ret;
4431}
4432
4433#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4434
4435/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4436static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4437 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4438{
4439 u8 nexthdr;
4440 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4441 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4442 __be16 frag_off;
4443
4444 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4445 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4446 if (ip6 == NULL)
4447 goto out;
4448
4449 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4450 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4451 ret = 0;
4452
4453 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4454 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4455 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4456 if (offset < 0)
4457 goto out;
4458
4459 if (proto)
4460 *proto = nexthdr;
4461
4462 switch (nexthdr) {
4463 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4464 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4465
4466 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4467 if (th == NULL)
4468 break;
4469
4470 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4471 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4472 break;
4473 }
4474
4475 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4476 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4477
4478 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4479 if (uh == NULL)
4480 break;
4481
4482 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4483 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4484 break;
4485 }
4486
4487 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4488 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4489
4490 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4491 if (dh == NULL)
4492 break;
4493
4494 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4495 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4496 break;
4497 }
4498
4499#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4500 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4501 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4502
4503 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4504 if (sh == NULL)
4505 break;
4506
4507 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4508 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4509 break;
4510 }
4511#endif
4512 /* includes fragments */
4513 default:
4514 break;
4515 }
4516out:
4517 return ret;
4518}
4519
4520#endif /* IPV6 */
4521
4522static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4523 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4524{
4525 char *addrp;
4526 int ret;
4527
4528 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4529 case PF_INET:
4530 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4531 if (ret)
4532 goto parse_error;
4533 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4534 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4535 goto okay;
4536
4537#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4538 case PF_INET6:
4539 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4540 if (ret)
4541 goto parse_error;
4542 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4543 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4544 goto okay;
4545#endif /* IPV6 */
4546 default:
4547 addrp = NULL;
4548 goto okay;
4549 }
4550
4551parse_error:
4552 pr_warn(
4553 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4554 " unable to parse packet\n");
4555 return ret;
4556
4557okay:
4558 if (_addrp)
4559 *_addrp = addrp;
4560 return 0;
4561}
4562
4563/**
4564 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4565 * @skb: the packet
4566 * @family: protocol family
4567 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4568 *
4569 * Description:
4570 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4571 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4572 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4573 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4574 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4575 * peer labels.
4576 *
4577 */
4578static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4579{
4580 int err;
4581 u32 xfrm_sid;
4582 u32 nlbl_sid;
4583 u32 nlbl_type;
4584
4585 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4586 if (unlikely(err))
4587 return -EACCES;
4588 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4589 if (unlikely(err))
4590 return -EACCES;
4591
4592 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4593 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4594 if (unlikely(err)) {
4595 pr_warn(
4596 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4597 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4598 return -EACCES;
4599 }
4600
4601 return 0;
4602}
4603
4604/**
4605 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4606 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4607 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4608 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4609 *
4610 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4611 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4612 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4613 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4614 *
4615 */
4616static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4617{
4618 int err = 0;
4619
4620 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4621 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4622 conn_sid);
4623 else
4624 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4625
4626 return err;
4627}
4628
4629/* socket security operations */
4630
4631static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4632 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4633{
4634 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4635 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4636 return 0;
4637 }
4638
4639 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4640 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4641}
4642
4643static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4644{
4645 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4646 struct common_audit_data ad;
4647 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4648
4649 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4650 return 0;
4651
4652 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4653 ad.u.net = &net;
4654 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4655
4656 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4657 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4658 &ad);
4659}
4660
4661static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4662 int protocol, int kern)
4663{
4664 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4665 u32 newsid;
4666 u16 secclass;
4667 int rc;
4668
4669 if (kern)
4670 return 0;
4671
4672 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4673 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4674 if (rc)
4675 return rc;
4676
4677 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4678 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4679}
4680
4681static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4682 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4683{
4684 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4685 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4686 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4687 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4688 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4689 int err = 0;
4690
4691 if (!kern) {
4692 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4693 if (err)
4694 return err;
4695 }
4696
4697 isec->sclass = sclass;
4698 isec->sid = sid;
4699 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4700
4701 if (sock->sk) {
4702 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4703 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4704 sksec->sid = sid;
4705 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4706 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4707 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4708
4709 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4710 }
4711
4712 return err;
4713}
4714
4715static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4716 struct socket *sockb)
4717{
4718 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4719 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4720
4721 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4722 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4723
4724 return 0;
4725}
4726
4727/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4728 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4729 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4730
4731static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4732{
4733 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4734 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4735 u16 family;
4736 int err;
4737
4738 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4739 if (err)
4740 goto out;
4741
4742 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4743 family = sk->sk_family;
4744 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4745 char *addrp;
4746 struct common_audit_data ad;
4747 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4748 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4749 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4750 u16 family_sa;
4751 unsigned short snum;
4752 u32 sid, node_perm;
4753
4754 /*
4755 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4756 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4757 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4758 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4759 */
4760 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4761 return -EINVAL;
4762 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4763 switch (family_sa) {
4764 case AF_UNSPEC:
4765 case AF_INET:
4766 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4767 return -EINVAL;
4768 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4769 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4770 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4771 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4772 */
4773 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4774 goto err_af;
4775 family_sa = AF_INET;
4776 }
4777 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4778 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4779 break;
4780 case AF_INET6:
4781 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4782 return -EINVAL;
4783 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4784 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4785 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4786 break;
4787 default:
4788 goto err_af;
4789 }
4790
4791 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4792 ad.u.net = &net;
4793 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4794 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4795
4796 if (snum) {
4797 int low, high;
4798
4799 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4800
4801 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4802 snum < low || snum > high) {
4803 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4804 snum, &sid);
4805 if (err)
4806 goto out;
4807 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4808 sksec->sid, sid,
4809 sksec->sclass,
4810 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4811 if (err)
4812 goto out;
4813 }
4814 }
4815
4816 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4817 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4818 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4819 break;
4820
4821 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4822 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4823 break;
4824
4825 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4826 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4827 break;
4828
4829 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4830 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4831 break;
4832
4833 default:
4834 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4835 break;
4836 }
4837
4838 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4839 if (err)
4840 goto out;
4841
4842 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4843 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4844 else
4845 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4846
4847 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4848 sksec->sid, sid,
4849 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4850 if (err)
4851 goto out;
4852 }
4853out:
4854 return err;
4855err_af:
4856 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4857 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4858 return -EINVAL;
4859 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4860}
4861
4862/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4863 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4864 */
4865static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4866 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4867{
4868 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4869 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4870 int err;
4871
4872 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4873 if (err)
4874 return err;
4875 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4876 return -EINVAL;
4877
4878 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4879 * way to disconnect the socket
4880 */
4881 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4882 return 0;
4883
4884 /*
4885 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4886 * for the port.
4887 */
4888 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4889 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4890 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4891 struct common_audit_data ad;
4892 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4893 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4894 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4895 unsigned short snum;
4896 u32 sid, perm;
4897
4898 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4899 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4900 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4901 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4902 */
4903 switch (address->sa_family) {
4904 case AF_INET:
4905 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4906 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4907 return -EINVAL;
4908 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4909 break;
4910 case AF_INET6:
4911 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4912 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4913 return -EINVAL;
4914 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4915 break;
4916 default:
4917 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4918 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4919 */
4920 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4921 return -EINVAL;
4922 else
4923 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4924 }
4925
4926 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4927 if (err)
4928 return err;
4929
4930 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4931 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4932 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4933 break;
4934 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4935 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4936 break;
4937 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4938 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4939 break;
4940 }
4941
4942 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4943 ad.u.net = &net;
4944 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4945 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4946 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4947 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4948 if (err)
4949 return err;
4950 }
4951
4952 return 0;
4953}
4954
4955/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4956static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4957 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4958{
4959 int err;
4960 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4961
4962 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4963 if (err)
4964 return err;
4965
4966 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4967}
4968
4969static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4970{
4971 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4972}
4973
4974static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4975{
4976 int err;
4977 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4978 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4979 u16 sclass;
4980 u32 sid;
4981
4982 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4983 if (err)
4984 return err;
4985
4986 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4987 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4988 sclass = isec->sclass;
4989 sid = isec->sid;
4990 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4991
4992 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4993 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4994 newisec->sid = sid;
4995 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4996
4997 return 0;
4998}
4999
5000static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
5001 int size)
5002{
5003 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
5004}
5005
5006static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
5007 int size, int flags)
5008{
5009 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
5010}
5011
5012static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
5013{
5014 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
5015}
5016
5017static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
5018{
5019 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
5020}
5021
5022static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
5023{
5024 int err;
5025
5026 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
5027 if (err)
5028 return err;
5029
5030 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
5031}
5032
5033static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
5034 int optname)
5035{
5036 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
5037}
5038
5039static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
5040{
5041 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
5042}
5043
5044static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
5045 struct sock *other,
5046 struct sock *newsk)
5047{
5048 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
5049 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
5050 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
5051 struct common_audit_data ad;
5052 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5053 int err;
5054
5055 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5056 ad.u.net = &net;
5057 ad.u.net->sk = other;
5058
5059 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5060 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
5061 sksec_other->sclass,
5062 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
5063 if (err)
5064 return err;
5065
5066 /* server child socket */
5067 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
5068 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
5069 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
5070 if (err)
5071 return err;
5072
5073 /* connecting socket */
5074 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
5075
5076 return 0;
5077}
5078
5079static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
5080 struct socket *other)
5081{
5082 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5083 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
5084 struct common_audit_data ad;
5085 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5086
5087 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5088 ad.u.net = &net;
5089 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
5090
5091 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5092 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5093 &ad);
5094}
5095
5096static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5097 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5098 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5099{
5100 int err;
5101 u32 if_sid;
5102 u32 node_sid;
5103
5104 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5105 if (err)
5106 return err;
5107 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5108 peer_sid, if_sid,
5109 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5110 if (err)
5111 return err;
5112
5113 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5114 if (err)
5115 return err;
5116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5117 peer_sid, node_sid,
5118 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5119}
5120
5121static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5122 u16 family)
5123{
5124 int err = 0;
5125 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5126 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5127 struct common_audit_data ad;
5128 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5129 char *addrp;
5130
5131 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5132 ad.u.net = &net;
5133 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5134 ad.u.net->family = family;
5135 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5136 if (err)
5137 return err;
5138
5139 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5140 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5141 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5142 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5143 if (err)
5144 return err;
5145 }
5146
5147 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5148 if (err)
5149 return err;
5150 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5151
5152 return err;
5153}
5154
5155static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5156{
5157 int err;
5158 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5159 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5160 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5161 struct common_audit_data ad;
5162 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5163 char *addrp;
5164 u8 secmark_active;
5165 u8 peerlbl_active;
5166
5167 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5168 return 0;
5169
5170 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5171 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5172 family = PF_INET;
5173
5174 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5175 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5176 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5177 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5178 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5179 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5180
5181 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5182 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5183 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5184 return 0;
5185
5186 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5187 ad.u.net = &net;
5188 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5189 ad.u.net->family = family;
5190 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5191 if (err)
5192 return err;
5193
5194 if (peerlbl_active) {
5195 u32 peer_sid;
5196
5197 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5198 if (err)
5199 return err;
5200 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5201 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5202 if (err) {
5203 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5204 return err;
5205 }
5206 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5207 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5208 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5209 if (err) {
5210 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5211 return err;
5212 }
5213 }
5214
5215 if (secmark_active) {
5216 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5217 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5218 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5219 if (err)
5220 return err;
5221 }
5222
5223 return err;
5224}
5225
5226static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5227 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5228{
5229 int err = 0;
5230 char *scontext;
5231 u32 scontext_len;
5232 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5233 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5234
5235 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5236 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5237 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5238 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5239 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5240 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5241
5242 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5243 &scontext_len);
5244 if (err)
5245 return err;
5246
5247 if (scontext_len > len) {
5248 err = -ERANGE;
5249 goto out_len;
5250 }
5251
5252 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5253 err = -EFAULT;
5254
5255out_len:
5256 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5257 err = -EFAULT;
5258 kfree(scontext);
5259 return err;
5260}
5261
5262static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5263{
5264 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5265 u16 family;
5266 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5267
5268 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5269 family = PF_INET;
5270 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5271 family = PF_INET6;
5272 else if (sock)
5273 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5274 else
5275 goto out;
5276
5277 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5278 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5279 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5280 } else if (skb)
5281 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5282
5283out:
5284 *secid = peer_secid;
5285 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5286 return -EINVAL;
5287 return 0;
5288}
5289
5290static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5291{
5292 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5293
5294 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5295 if (!sksec)
5296 return -ENOMEM;
5297
5298 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5299 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5300 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5301 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5302 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5303
5304 return 0;
5305}
5306
5307static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5308{
5309 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5310
5311 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5312 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5313 kfree(sksec);
5314}
5315
5316static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5317{
5318 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5319 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5320
5321 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5322 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5323 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5324
5325 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5326}
5327
5328static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5329{
5330 if (!sk)
5331 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5332 else {
5333 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5334
5335 *secid = sksec->sid;
5336 }
5337}
5338
5339static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5340{
5341 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5342 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5343 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5344
5345 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5346 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5347 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5348 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5349}
5350
5351/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5352 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5353 * already present).
5354 */
5355static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5356 struct sk_buff *skb)
5357{
5358 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5359 struct common_audit_data ad;
5360 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5361 u8 peerlbl_active;
5362 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5363 u32 conn_sid;
5364 int err = 0;
5365
5366 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5367 return 0;
5368
5369 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5370
5371 if (peerlbl_active) {
5372 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5373 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5374 */
5375 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5376 &peer_sid);
5377 if (err)
5378 return err;
5379
5380 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5381 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5382 }
5383
5384 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5385 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5386
5387 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5388 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5389 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5390 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5391 */
5392 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5393 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5394 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5395 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5396 */
5397 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5398 ad.u.net = &net;
5399 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5400 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5401 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5402 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5403 if (err)
5404 return err;
5405 }
5406
5407 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5408 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5409 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5410 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5411 * plug this into the new socket.
5412 */
5413 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5414 if (err)
5415 return err;
5416
5417 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5418 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5419
5420 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5421 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5422}
5423
5424/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5425 * based on their @optname.
5426 */
5427static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5428 struct sockaddr *address,
5429 int addrlen)
5430{
5431 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5432 void *addr_buf;
5433 struct sockaddr *addr;
5434 struct socket *sock;
5435
5436 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5437 return 0;
5438
5439 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5440 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5441 addr_buf = address;
5442
5443 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5444 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5445 return -EINVAL;
5446
5447 addr = addr_buf;
5448 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5449 case AF_UNSPEC:
5450 case AF_INET:
5451 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5452 break;
5453 case AF_INET6:
5454 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5455 break;
5456 default:
5457 return -EINVAL;
5458 }
5459
5460 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5461 return -EINVAL;
5462
5463 err = -EINVAL;
5464 switch (optname) {
5465 /* Bind checks */
5466 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5467 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5468 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5469 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5470 break;
5471 /* Connect checks */
5472 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5473 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5474 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5475 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5476 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5477 if (err)
5478 return err;
5479
5480 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5481 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5482 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5483 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5484 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5485 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5486 * primary address is selected.
5487 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5488 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5489 * selinux_socket_connect().
5490 */
5491 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5492 break;
5493 }
5494
5495 if (err)
5496 return err;
5497
5498 addr_buf += len;
5499 walk_size += len;
5500 }
5501
5502 return 0;
5503}
5504
5505/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5506static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5507 struct sock *newsk)
5508{
5509 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5510 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5511
5512 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5513 * the non-sctp clone version.
5514 */
5515 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5516 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5517
5518 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5519 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5520 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5521 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5522}
5523
5524static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5525 struct request_sock *req)
5526{
5527 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5528 int err;
5529 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5530 u32 connsid;
5531 u32 peersid;
5532
5533 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5534 if (err)
5535 return err;
5536 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5537 if (err)
5538 return err;
5539 req->secid = connsid;
5540 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5541
5542 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5543}
5544
5545static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5546 const struct request_sock *req)
5547{
5548 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5549
5550 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5551 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5552 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5553 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5554 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5555 time it will have been created and available. */
5556
5557 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5558 * thread with access to newsksec */
5559 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5560}
5561
5562static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5563{
5564 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5565 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5566
5567 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5568 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5569 family = PF_INET;
5570
5571 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5572}
5573
5574static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5575{
5576 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5577 u32 tsid;
5578
5579 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5580 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5581
5582 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5583 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5584 NULL);
5585}
5586
5587static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5588{
5589 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5590}
5591
5592static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5593{
5594 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5595}
5596
5597static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5598 struct flowi_common *flic)
5599{
5600 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5601}
5602
5603static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5604{
5605 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5606
5607 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5608 if (!tunsec)
5609 return -ENOMEM;
5610 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5611
5612 *security = tunsec;
5613 return 0;
5614}
5615
5616static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5617{
5618 kfree(security);
5619}
5620
5621static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5622{
5623 u32 sid = current_sid();
5624
5625 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5626 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5627 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5628 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5629 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5630 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5631
5632 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5633 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5634 NULL);
5635}
5636
5637static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5638{
5639 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5640
5641 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5642 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5643 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5644}
5645
5646static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5647{
5648 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5649 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5650
5651 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5652 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5653 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5654 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5655 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5656 * protocols were being used */
5657
5658 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5659 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5660
5661 return 0;
5662}
5663
5664static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5665{
5666 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5667 u32 sid = current_sid();
5668 int err;
5669
5670 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5671 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5672 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5673 if (err)
5674 return err;
5675 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5676 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5677 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5678 if (err)
5679 return err;
5680 tunsec->sid = sid;
5681
5682 return 0;
5683}
5684
5685#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5686
5687static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5688 const struct net_device *indev,
5689 u16 family)
5690{
5691 int err;
5692 char *addrp;
5693 u32 peer_sid;
5694 struct common_audit_data ad;
5695 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5696 u8 secmark_active;
5697 u8 netlbl_active;
5698 u8 peerlbl_active;
5699
5700 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5701 return NF_ACCEPT;
5702
5703 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5704 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5705 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5706 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5707 return NF_ACCEPT;
5708
5709 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5710 return NF_DROP;
5711
5712 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5713 ad.u.net = &net;
5714 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5715 ad.u.net->family = family;
5716 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5717 return NF_DROP;
5718
5719 if (peerlbl_active) {
5720 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5721 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5722 if (err) {
5723 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5724 return NF_DROP;
5725 }
5726 }
5727
5728 if (secmark_active)
5729 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5730 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5731 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5732 return NF_DROP;
5733
5734 if (netlbl_active)
5735 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5736 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5737 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5738 * protection */
5739 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5740 return NF_DROP;
5741
5742 return NF_ACCEPT;
5743}
5744
5745static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5746 struct sk_buff *skb,
5747 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5748{
5749 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5750}
5751
5752#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5753static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5754 struct sk_buff *skb,
5755 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5756{
5757 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5758}
5759#endif /* IPV6 */
5760
5761static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5762 u16 family)
5763{
5764 struct sock *sk;
5765 u32 sid;
5766
5767 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5768 return NF_ACCEPT;
5769
5770 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5771 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5772 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5773 sk = skb->sk;
5774 if (sk) {
5775 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5776
5777 if (sk_listener(sk))
5778 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5779 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5780 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5781 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5782 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5783 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5784 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5785 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5786 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5787 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5788 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5789 * best we can do. */
5790 return NF_ACCEPT;
5791
5792 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5793 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5794 sid = sksec->sid;
5795 } else
5796 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5797 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5798 return NF_DROP;
5799
5800 return NF_ACCEPT;
5801}
5802
5803static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5804 struct sk_buff *skb,
5805 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5806{
5807 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5808}
5809
5810#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5811static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5812 struct sk_buff *skb,
5813 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5814{
5815 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5816}
5817#endif /* IPV6 */
5818
5819static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5820 int ifindex,
5821 u16 family)
5822{
5823 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5824 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5825 struct common_audit_data ad;
5826 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5827 char *addrp;
5828 u8 proto;
5829
5830 if (sk == NULL)
5831 return NF_ACCEPT;
5832 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5833
5834 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5835 ad.u.net = &net;
5836 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5837 ad.u.net->family = family;
5838 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5839 return NF_DROP;
5840
5841 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5842 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5843 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5844 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5845 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5846
5847 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5848 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5849
5850 return NF_ACCEPT;
5851}
5852
5853static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5854 const struct net_device *outdev,
5855 u16 family)
5856{
5857 u32 secmark_perm;
5858 u32 peer_sid;
5859 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5860 struct sock *sk;
5861 struct common_audit_data ad;
5862 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5863 char *addrp;
5864 u8 secmark_active;
5865 u8 peerlbl_active;
5866
5867 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5868 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5869 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5870 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5871 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5872 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5873
5874 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5875 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5876 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5877 return NF_ACCEPT;
5878
5879 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5880
5881#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5882 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5883 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5884 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5885 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5886 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5887 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5888 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5889 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5890 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5891 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5892 * connection. */
5893 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5894 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5895 return NF_ACCEPT;
5896#endif
5897
5898 if (sk == NULL) {
5899 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5900 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5901 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5902 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5903 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5904 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5905 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5906 return NF_DROP;
5907 } else {
5908 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5909 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5910 }
5911 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5912 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5913 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5914 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5915 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5916 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5917 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5918 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5919 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5920 * for similar problems. */
5921 u32 skb_sid;
5922 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5923
5924 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5925 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5926 return NF_DROP;
5927 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5928 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5929 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5930 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5931 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5932 * pass the packet. */
5933 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5934 switch (family) {
5935 case PF_INET:
5936 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5937 return NF_ACCEPT;
5938 break;
5939 case PF_INET6:
5940 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5941 return NF_ACCEPT;
5942 break;
5943 default:
5944 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5945 }
5946 }
5947 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5948 return NF_DROP;
5949 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5950 } else {
5951 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5952 * associated socket. */
5953 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5954 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5955 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5956 }
5957
5958 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5959 ad.u.net = &net;
5960 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5961 ad.u.net->family = family;
5962 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5963 return NF_DROP;
5964
5965 if (secmark_active)
5966 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5967 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5968 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5969 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5970
5971 if (peerlbl_active) {
5972 u32 if_sid;
5973 u32 node_sid;
5974
5975 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5976 return NF_DROP;
5977 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5978 peer_sid, if_sid,
5979 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5980 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5981
5982 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5983 return NF_DROP;
5984 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5985 peer_sid, node_sid,
5986 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5987 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5988 }
5989
5990 return NF_ACCEPT;
5991}
5992
5993static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5994 struct sk_buff *skb,
5995 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5996{
5997 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5998}
5999
6000#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
6001static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
6002 struct sk_buff *skb,
6003 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
6004{
6005 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
6006}
6007#endif /* IPV6 */
6008
6009#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6010
6011static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
6012{
6013 int rc = 0;
6014 unsigned int msg_len;
6015 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
6016 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
6017 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
6018 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
6019 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
6020 u32 perm;
6021
6022 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
6023 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
6024
6025 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
6026 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
6027 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
6028 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
6029 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
6030 */
6031 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
6032 return 0;
6033
6034 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
6035 if (rc == 0) {
6036 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
6037 if (rc)
6038 return rc;
6039 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
6040 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
6041 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
6042 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
6043 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
6044 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
6045 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
6046 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
6047 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
6048 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
6049 return rc;
6050 rc = 0;
6051 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
6052 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
6053 rc = 0;
6054 } else {
6055 return rc;
6056 }
6057
6058 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
6059 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
6060 if (msg_len >= data_len)
6061 return 0;
6062 data_len -= msg_len;
6063 data += msg_len;
6064 }
6065
6066 return rc;
6067}
6068
6069static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
6070{
6071 isec->sclass = sclass;
6072 isec->sid = current_sid();
6073}
6074
6075static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
6076 u32 perms)
6077{
6078 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6079 struct common_audit_data ad;
6080 u32 sid = current_sid();
6081
6082 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
6083
6084 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6085 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
6086
6087 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6088 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
6089}
6090
6091static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6092{
6093 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6094
6095 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6096 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6097
6098 return 0;
6099}
6100
6101/* message queue security operations */
6102static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6103{
6104 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6105 struct common_audit_data ad;
6106 u32 sid = current_sid();
6107 int rc;
6108
6109 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6110 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6111
6112 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6113 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6114
6115 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6116 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6117 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
6118 return rc;
6119}
6120
6121static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6122{
6123 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6124 struct common_audit_data ad;
6125 u32 sid = current_sid();
6126
6127 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6128
6129 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6130 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6131
6132 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6133 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6134 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6135}
6136
6137static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6138{
6139 int err;
6140 int perms;
6141
6142 switch (cmd) {
6143 case IPC_INFO:
6144 case MSG_INFO:
6145 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6146 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6147 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6148 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6149 case IPC_STAT:
6150 case MSG_STAT:
6151 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6152 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6153 break;
6154 case IPC_SET:
6155 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6156 break;
6157 case IPC_RMID:
6158 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6159 break;
6160 default:
6161 return 0;
6162 }
6163
6164 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6165 return err;
6166}
6167
6168static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6169{
6170 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6171 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6172 struct common_audit_data ad;
6173 u32 sid = current_sid();
6174 int rc;
6175
6176 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6177 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6178
6179 /*
6180 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6181 */
6182 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6183 /*
6184 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6185 * message queue this message will be stored in
6186 */
6187 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6188 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6189 if (rc)
6190 return rc;
6191 }
6192
6193 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6194 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6195
6196 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6197 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6198 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6199 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6200 if (!rc)
6201 /* Can this process send the message */
6202 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6203 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6204 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6205 if (!rc)
6206 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6207 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6208 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6209 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6210
6211 return rc;
6212}
6213
6214static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6215 struct task_struct *target,
6216 long type, int mode)
6217{
6218 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6219 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6220 struct common_audit_data ad;
6221 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6222 int rc;
6223
6224 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6225 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6226
6227 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6228 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6229
6230 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6231 sid, isec->sid,
6232 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6233 if (!rc)
6234 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6235 sid, msec->sid,
6236 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6237 return rc;
6238}
6239
6240/* Shared Memory security operations */
6241static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6242{
6243 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6244 struct common_audit_data ad;
6245 u32 sid = current_sid();
6246 int rc;
6247
6248 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6249 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6250
6251 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6252 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6253
6254 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6255 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6256 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6257 return rc;
6258}
6259
6260static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6261{
6262 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6263 struct common_audit_data ad;
6264 u32 sid = current_sid();
6265
6266 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6267
6268 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6269 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6270
6271 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6272 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6273 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6274}
6275
6276/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6277static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6278{
6279 int perms;
6280 int err;
6281
6282 switch (cmd) {
6283 case IPC_INFO:
6284 case SHM_INFO:
6285 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6286 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6287 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6288 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6289 case IPC_STAT:
6290 case SHM_STAT:
6291 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6292 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6293 break;
6294 case IPC_SET:
6295 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6296 break;
6297 case SHM_LOCK:
6298 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6299 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6300 break;
6301 case IPC_RMID:
6302 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6303 break;
6304 default:
6305 return 0;
6306 }
6307
6308 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6309 return err;
6310}
6311
6312static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6313 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6314{
6315 u32 perms;
6316
6317 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6318 perms = SHM__READ;
6319 else
6320 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6321
6322 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6323}
6324
6325/* Semaphore security operations */
6326static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6327{
6328 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6329 struct common_audit_data ad;
6330 u32 sid = current_sid();
6331 int rc;
6332
6333 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6334 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6335
6336 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6337 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6338
6339 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6340 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6341 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6342 return rc;
6343}
6344
6345static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6346{
6347 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6348 struct common_audit_data ad;
6349 u32 sid = current_sid();
6350
6351 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6352
6353 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6354 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6355
6356 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6357 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6358 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6359}
6360
6361/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6362static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6363{
6364 int err;
6365 u32 perms;
6366
6367 switch (cmd) {
6368 case IPC_INFO:
6369 case SEM_INFO:
6370 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6371 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6372 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6373 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6374 case GETPID:
6375 case GETNCNT:
6376 case GETZCNT:
6377 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6378 break;
6379 case GETVAL:
6380 case GETALL:
6381 perms = SEM__READ;
6382 break;
6383 case SETVAL:
6384 case SETALL:
6385 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6386 break;
6387 case IPC_RMID:
6388 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6389 break;
6390 case IPC_SET:
6391 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6392 break;
6393 case IPC_STAT:
6394 case SEM_STAT:
6395 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6396 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6397 break;
6398 default:
6399 return 0;
6400 }
6401
6402 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6403 return err;
6404}
6405
6406static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6407 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6408{
6409 u32 perms;
6410
6411 if (alter)
6412 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6413 else
6414 perms = SEM__READ;
6415
6416 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6417}
6418
6419static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6420{
6421 u32 av = 0;
6422
6423 av = 0;
6424 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6425 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6426 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6427 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6428
6429 if (av == 0)
6430 return 0;
6431
6432 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6433}
6434
6435static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6436{
6437 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6438 *secid = isec->sid;
6439}
6440
6441static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6442{
6443 if (inode)
6444 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6445}
6446
6447static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6448 char *name, char **value)
6449{
6450 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6451 u32 sid;
6452 int error;
6453 unsigned len;
6454
6455 rcu_read_lock();
6456 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6457
6458 if (current != p) {
6459 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6460 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6461 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6462 if (error)
6463 goto bad;
6464 }
6465
6466 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6467 sid = __tsec->sid;
6468 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6469 sid = __tsec->osid;
6470 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6471 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6472 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6473 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6474 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6475 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6476 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6477 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6478 else {
6479 error = -EINVAL;
6480 goto bad;
6481 }
6482 rcu_read_unlock();
6483
6484 if (!sid)
6485 return 0;
6486
6487 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6488 if (error)
6489 return error;
6490 return len;
6491
6492bad:
6493 rcu_read_unlock();
6494 return error;
6495}
6496
6497static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6498{
6499 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6500 struct cred *new;
6501 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6502 int error;
6503 char *str = value;
6504
6505 /*
6506 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6507 */
6508 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6509 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6510 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6511 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6512 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6513 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6514 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6516 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6517 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6518 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6519 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6520 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6521 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6522 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6523 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6524 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6525 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6526 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6527 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6528 else
6529 error = -EINVAL;
6530 if (error)
6531 return error;
6532
6533 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6534 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6535 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6536 str[size-1] = 0;
6537 size--;
6538 }
6539 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6540 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6541 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6542 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6543 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6544 size_t audit_size;
6545
6546 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6547 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6548 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6549 audit_size = size - 1;
6550 else
6551 audit_size = size;
6552 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6553 GFP_ATOMIC,
6554 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6555 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6556 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6557 audit_log_end(ab);
6558
6559 return error;
6560 }
6561 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6562 &selinux_state,
6563 value, size, &sid);
6564 }
6565 if (error)
6566 return error;
6567 }
6568
6569 new = prepare_creds();
6570 if (!new)
6571 return -ENOMEM;
6572
6573 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6574 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6575 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6576 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6577 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6578 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6579 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6580 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6581 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6582 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6583 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6584 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6585 if (sid) {
6586 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6587 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6588 if (error)
6589 goto abort_change;
6590 }
6591 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6592 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6593 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6594 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6595 error = -EINVAL;
6596 if (sid == 0)
6597 goto abort_change;
6598
6599 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6600 error = -EPERM;
6601 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6602 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6603 tsec->sid, sid);
6604 if (error)
6605 goto abort_change;
6606 }
6607
6608 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6609 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6610 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6611 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6612 if (error)
6613 goto abort_change;
6614
6615 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6616 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6617 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6618 if (ptsid != 0) {
6619 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6620 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6621 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6622 if (error)
6623 goto abort_change;
6624 }
6625
6626 tsec->sid = sid;
6627 } else {
6628 error = -EINVAL;
6629 goto abort_change;
6630 }
6631
6632 commit_creds(new);
6633 return size;
6634
6635abort_change:
6636 abort_creds(new);
6637 return error;
6638}
6639
6640static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6641{
6642 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6643}
6644
6645static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6646{
6647 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6648 secdata, seclen);
6649}
6650
6651static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6652{
6653 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6654 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6655}
6656
6657static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6658{
6659 kfree(secdata);
6660}
6661
6662static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6663{
6664 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6665
6666 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6667 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6668 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6669}
6670
6671/*
6672 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6673 */
6674static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6675{
6676 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6677 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6678 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6679 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6680}
6681
6682/*
6683 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6684 */
6685static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6686{
6687 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6688 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6689}
6690
6691static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6692{
6693 int len = 0;
6694 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&init_user_ns, inode,
6695 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6696 if (len < 0)
6697 return len;
6698 *ctxlen = len;
6699 return 0;
6700}
6701#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6702
6703static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6704 unsigned long flags)
6705{
6706 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6707 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6708
6709 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6710 if (!ksec)
6711 return -ENOMEM;
6712
6713 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6714 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6715 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6716 else
6717 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6718
6719 k->security = ksec;
6720 return 0;
6721}
6722
6723static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6724{
6725 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6726
6727 k->security = NULL;
6728 kfree(ksec);
6729}
6730
6731static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6732 const struct cred *cred,
6733 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6734{
6735 struct key *key;
6736 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6737 u32 perm, sid;
6738
6739 switch (need_perm) {
6740 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6741 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6742 break;
6743 case KEY_NEED_READ:
6744 perm = KEY__READ;
6745 break;
6746 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6747 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6748 break;
6749 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6750 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6751 break;
6752 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6753 perm = KEY__LINK;
6754 break;
6755 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6756 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6757 break;
6758 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6759 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6760 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6761 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6762 return 0;
6763 default:
6764 WARN_ON(1);
6765 return -EPERM;
6766
6767 }
6768
6769 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6770 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6771 ksec = key->security;
6772
6773 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6774 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6775}
6776
6777static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6778{
6779 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6780 char *context = NULL;
6781 unsigned len;
6782 int rc;
6783
6784 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6785 &context, &len);
6786 if (!rc)
6787 rc = len;
6788 *_buffer = context;
6789 return rc;
6790}
6791
6792#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6793static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6794{
6795 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6796 u32 sid = current_sid();
6797
6798 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6799 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6800}
6801#endif
6802#endif
6803
6804#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6805static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6806{
6807 struct common_audit_data ad;
6808 int err;
6809 u32 sid = 0;
6810 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6811 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6812
6813 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6814 if (err)
6815 return err;
6816
6817 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6818 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6819 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6820 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6821 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6822 sec->sid, sid,
6823 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6824 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6825}
6826
6827static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6828 u8 port_num)
6829{
6830 struct common_audit_data ad;
6831 int err;
6832 u32 sid = 0;
6833 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6834 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6835
6836 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6837 &sid);
6838
6839 if (err)
6840 return err;
6841
6842 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6843 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6844 ibendport.port = port_num;
6845 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6846 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6847 sec->sid, sid,
6848 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6849 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6850}
6851
6852static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6853{
6854 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6855
6856 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6857 if (!sec)
6858 return -ENOMEM;
6859 sec->sid = current_sid();
6860
6861 *ib_sec = sec;
6862 return 0;
6863}
6864
6865static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6866{
6867 kfree(ib_sec);
6868}
6869#endif
6870
6871#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6872static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6873 unsigned int size)
6874{
6875 u32 sid = current_sid();
6876 int ret;
6877
6878 switch (cmd) {
6879 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6880 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6881 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6882 NULL);
6883 break;
6884 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6885 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6886 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6887 NULL);
6888 break;
6889 default:
6890 ret = 0;
6891 break;
6892 }
6893
6894 return ret;
6895}
6896
6897static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6898{
6899 u32 av = 0;
6900
6901 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6902 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6903 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6904 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6905 return av;
6906}
6907
6908/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6909 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6910 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6911 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6912 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6913 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6914 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6915 */
6916static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6917{
6918 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6919 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6920 struct bpf_map *map;
6921 int ret;
6922
6923 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6924 map = file->private_data;
6925 bpfsec = map->security;
6926 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6927 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6928 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6929 if (ret)
6930 return ret;
6931 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6932 prog = file->private_data;
6933 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6934 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6935 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6936 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6937 if (ret)
6938 return ret;
6939 }
6940 return 0;
6941}
6942
6943static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6944{
6945 u32 sid = current_sid();
6946 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6947
6948 bpfsec = map->security;
6949 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6950 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6951 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6952}
6953
6954static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6955{
6956 u32 sid = current_sid();
6957 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6958
6959 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6960 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6961 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6962 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6963}
6964
6965static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6966{
6967 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6968
6969 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6970 if (!bpfsec)
6971 return -ENOMEM;
6972
6973 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6974 map->security = bpfsec;
6975
6976 return 0;
6977}
6978
6979static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6980{
6981 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6982
6983 map->security = NULL;
6984 kfree(bpfsec);
6985}
6986
6987static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6988{
6989 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6990
6991 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6992 if (!bpfsec)
6993 return -ENOMEM;
6994
6995 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6996 aux->security = bpfsec;
6997
6998 return 0;
6999}
7000
7001static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
7002{
7003 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
7004
7005 aux->security = NULL;
7006 kfree(bpfsec);
7007}
7008#endif
7009
7010static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
7011{
7012 struct common_audit_data ad;
7013 u32 sid = current_sid();
7014 int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
7015 (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
7016 (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
7017
7018 if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
7019 audit_log(audit_context(),
7020 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
7021 "lockdown_reason=invalid");
7022 return -EINVAL;
7023 }
7024
7025 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
7026 ad.u.reason = what;
7027
7028 if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
7029 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
7030 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
7031 LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
7032 else
7033 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
7034 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
7035 LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
7036}
7037
7038struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7039 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
7040 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
7041 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
7042 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
7043 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
7044 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
7045};
7046
7047#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7048static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
7049{
7050 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
7051
7052 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
7053 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
7054 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
7055 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
7056 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
7057 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
7058 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
7059 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
7060 else
7061 return -EINVAL;
7062
7063 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
7064 requested, NULL);
7065}
7066
7067static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
7068{
7069 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
7070
7071 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
7072 if (!perfsec)
7073 return -ENOMEM;
7074
7075 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
7076 event->security = perfsec;
7077
7078 return 0;
7079}
7080
7081static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
7082{
7083 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7084
7085 event->security = NULL;
7086 kfree(perfsec);
7087}
7088
7089static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
7090{
7091 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7092 u32 sid = current_sid();
7093
7094 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
7095 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
7096}
7097
7098static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
7099{
7100 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7101 u32 sid = current_sid();
7102
7103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
7104 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
7105}
7106#endif
7107
7108/*
7109 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7110 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7111 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7112 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7113 * hooks),
7114 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7115 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7116 *
7117 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7118 *
7119 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
7120 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
7121 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
7122 */
7123static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7128
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7138
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7140
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7144
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7155
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7157
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7160
7161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7189
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7191
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7203
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7205
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid_subj),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7230
7231 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7233
7234 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7235 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7236 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7237 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7238
7239 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7242
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7244 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7246
7247 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7248
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7251
7252 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7254 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7255 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7256 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7257 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7258
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7261
7262 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7263 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7264 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7269 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7270 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7271 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7276 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7277 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7278 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7282 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7283 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7284 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7285 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7286 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7290 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7292 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7293 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7294 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7295 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7296 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7299#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7302 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7304#endif
7305#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7308 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7310 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7311 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7312 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7314#endif
7315
7316#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7317 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7319 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7320#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7321 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7322#endif
7323#endif
7324
7325#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7326 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7327 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7328 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7329#endif
7330
7331#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7332 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7333 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7334 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7335 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7336 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7337#endif
7338
7339#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7340 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7341 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7342 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7343 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7344#endif
7345
7346 LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
7347
7348 /*
7349 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7350 */
7351 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7352 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7353 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7354 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
7355#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7356 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7357#endif
7358
7359 /*
7360 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7361 */
7362 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7363 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7364 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7365 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7366 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7367 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7368 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7369 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7370 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7371 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7372 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7373#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7374 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7375#endif
7376#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7377 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7378 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7379 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7380 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7381#endif
7382#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7383 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7384#endif
7385#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7386 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7387#endif
7388#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7389 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7390 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7391#endif
7392#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7393 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7394#endif
7395};
7396
7397static __init int selinux_init(void)
7398{
7399 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7400
7401 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7402 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7403 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7404 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7405 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7406 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7407
7408 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7409 cred_init_security();
7410
7411 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7412
7413 avc_init();
7414
7415 avtab_cache_init();
7416
7417 ebitmap_cache_init();
7418
7419 hashtab_cache_init();
7420
7421 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7422
7423 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7424 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7425
7426 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7427 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7428
7429 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7430 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7431 else
7432 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7433
7434 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7435
7436 return 0;
7437}
7438
7439static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7440{
7441 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7442}
7443
7444void selinux_complete_init(void)
7445{
7446 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7447
7448 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7449 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7450 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7451}
7452
7453/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7454 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7455DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7456 .name = "selinux",
7457 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7458 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7459 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7460 .init = selinux_init,
7461};
7462
7463#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7464
7465static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7466 {
7467 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7468 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7469 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7470 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7471 },
7472 {
7473 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7474 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7475 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7476 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7477 },
7478 {
7479 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7480 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7481 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7482 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7483 },
7484#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7485 {
7486 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7487 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7488 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7489 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7490 },
7491 {
7492 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7493 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7494 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7495 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7496 },
7497 {
7498 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7499 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7500 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7501 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7502 },
7503#endif /* IPV6 */
7504};
7505
7506static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7507{
7508 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7509 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7510}
7511
7512static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7513{
7514 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7515 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7516}
7517
7518static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7519 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7520 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7521};
7522
7523static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7524{
7525 int err;
7526
7527 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7528 return 0;
7529
7530 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7531
7532 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7533 if (err)
7534 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7535
7536 return 0;
7537}
7538__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7539
7540#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7541static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7542{
7543 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7544
7545 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7546}
7547#endif
7548
7549#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7550
7551#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7552#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7553#endif
7554
7555#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7556
7557#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7558int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7559{
7560 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7561 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7562 return -EINVAL;
7563 }
7564
7565 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7566 /* Only do this once. */
7567 return -EINVAL;
7568 }
7569
7570 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7571
7572 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7573
7574 /*
7575 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7576 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7577 * runtime disable.
7578 */
7579 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7580
7581 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7582
7583 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7584 avc_disable();
7585
7586 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7587 exit_sel_fs();
7588
7589 return 0;
7590}
7591#endif