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1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28#include <linux/errno.h>
29#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30#include <linux/sched/task.h>
31#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40#include <linux/swap.h>
41#include <linux/spinlock.h>
42#include <linux/syscalls.h>
43#include <linux/dcache.h>
44#include <linux/file.h>
45#include <linux/fdtable.h>
46#include <linux/namei.h>
47#include <linux/mount.h>
48#include <linux/fs_context.h>
49#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57#include <net/net_namespace.h>
58#include <net/netlabel.h>
59#include <linux/uaccess.h>
60#include <asm/ioctls.h>
61#include <linux/atomic.h>
62#include <linux/bitops.h>
63#include <linux/interrupt.h>
64#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65#include <net/netlink.h>
66#include <linux/tcp.h>
67#include <linux/udp.h>
68#include <linux/dccp.h>
69#include <linux/sctp.h>
70#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71#include <linux/quota.h>
72#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <linux/parser.h>
75#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
76#include <net/ipv6.h>
77#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78#include <linux/personality.h>
79#include <linux/audit.h>
80#include <linux/string.h>
81#include <linux/mutex.h>
82#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83#include <linux/syslog.h>
84#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85#include <linux/export.h>
86#include <linux/msg.h>
87#include <linux/shm.h>
88#include <linux/bpf.h>
89#include <linux/kernfs.h>
90#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
91#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
92#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
93#include <linux/fanotify.h>
94#include <linux/io_uring.h>
95
96#include "avc.h"
97#include "objsec.h"
98#include "netif.h"
99#include "netnode.h"
100#include "netport.h"
101#include "ibpkey.h"
102#include "xfrm.h"
103#include "netlabel.h"
104#include "audit.h"
105#include "avc_ss.h"
106
107struct selinux_state selinux_state;
108
109/* SECMARK reference count */
110static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
111
112#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
114
115static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
116{
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
120 return 1;
121}
122__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
123#else
124#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
125#endif
126
127int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
130{
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
134 return 1;
135}
136__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
137#endif
138
139static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
141
142static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143{
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
148 if (checkreqprot)
149 pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
150 }
151 return 1;
152}
153__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
154
155/**
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
157 *
158 * Description:
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
164 *
165 */
166static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167{
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
170}
171
172/**
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
174 *
175 * Description:
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
180 *
181 */
182static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183{
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
186}
187
188static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189{
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
191 sel_netif_flush();
192 sel_netnode_flush();
193 sel_netport_flush();
194 synchronize_net();
195 }
196 return 0;
197}
198
199static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200{
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
204 }
205
206 return 0;
207}
208
209/*
210 * initialise the security for the init task
211 */
212static void cred_init_security(void)
213{
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
215
216 tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
217 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
218}
219
220/*
221 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
222 */
223static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
224{
225 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
226
227 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
228 return tsec->sid;
229}
230
231/*
232 * get the objective security ID of a task
233 */
234static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
235{
236 u32 sid;
237
238 rcu_read_lock();
239 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
240 rcu_read_unlock();
241 return sid;
242}
243
244static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
245
246/*
247 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
248 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
249 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
250 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
251 */
252static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
253 struct dentry *dentry,
254 bool may_sleep)
255{
256 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
257
258 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
259
260 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
261 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
262 if (!may_sleep)
263 return -ECHILD;
264
265 /*
266 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
267 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
268 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
269 */
270 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
271 }
272 return 0;
273}
274
275static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
276{
277 return selinux_inode(inode);
278}
279
280static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
281{
282 int error;
283
284 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
285 if (error)
286 return ERR_PTR(error);
287 return selinux_inode(inode);
288}
289
290/*
291 * Get the security label of an inode.
292 */
293static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
294{
295 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
296 return selinux_inode(inode);
297}
298
299static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
300{
301 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
302
303 return selinux_inode(inode);
304}
305
306/*
307 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
308 */
309static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
310{
311 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
312
313 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
314 return selinux_inode(inode);
315}
316
317static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
318{
319 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
320 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
321
322 if (!isec)
323 return;
324 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
325 /*
326 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
327 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
328 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
329 *
330 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
331 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
332 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
333 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
334 */
335 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
336 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
337 list_del_init(&isec->list);
338 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
339 }
340}
341
342struct selinux_mnt_opts {
343 u32 fscontext_sid;
344 u32 context_sid;
345 u32 rootcontext_sid;
346 u32 defcontext_sid;
347};
348
349static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
350{
351 kfree(mnt_opts);
352}
353
354enum {
355 Opt_error = -1,
356 Opt_context = 0,
357 Opt_defcontext = 1,
358 Opt_fscontext = 2,
359 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
360 Opt_seclabel = 4,
361};
362
363#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
364static struct {
365 const char *name;
366 int len;
367 int opt;
368 bool has_arg;
369} tokens[] = {
370 A(context, true),
371 A(fscontext, true),
372 A(defcontext, true),
373 A(rootcontext, true),
374 A(seclabel, false),
375};
376#undef A
377
378static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
379{
380 int i;
381
382 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
383 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
384 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
385 continue;
386 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
387 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
388 continue;
389 *arg = s + len + 1;
390 } else if (len != l)
391 continue;
392 return tokens[i].opt;
393 }
394 return Opt_error;
395}
396
397#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
398
399static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
400 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
401 const struct cred *cred)
402{
403 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
404 int rc;
405
406 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
407 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
408 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
409 if (rc)
410 return rc;
411
412 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
413 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
414 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
415 return rc;
416}
417
418static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
419 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
420 const struct cred *cred)
421{
422 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
423 int rc;
424 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
425 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
426 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
427 if (rc)
428 return rc;
429
430 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
431 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
432 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
433 return rc;
434}
435
436static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
437{
438 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
439 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
440 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
441 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
442 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
443 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
444 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
445 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
446 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
447}
448
449static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
450{
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
452
453 /*
454 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
455 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
456 */
457 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
458
459 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
460 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
461 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
463 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
464 return 1;
465
466 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
467 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
468
469 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
472 default:
473 return 0;
474 }
475}
476
477static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
478{
479 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
480 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
481 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
482 u32 sid;
483 int rc;
484
485 /*
486 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
487 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
488 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
489 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
490 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
491 */
492 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
493 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
494 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
495 goto fallback;
496 }
497
498 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
499 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
500 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
501 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
502 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
503 goto fallback;
504 } else {
505 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
506 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
507 return rc;
508 }
509 }
510 return 0;
511
512fallback:
513 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
514 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, "/",
515 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
516 if (rc)
517 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
518
519 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
520 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
521 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
522 sbsec->sid = sid;
523 return 0;
524}
525
526static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
527{
528 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
529 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
530 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
531 int rc = 0;
532
533 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
534 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
535 if (rc)
536 return rc;
537 }
538
539 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
540
541 /*
542 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
543 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
544 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
545 */
546 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
547 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
548 else
549 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
550
551 /* Initialize the root inode. */
552 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
553
554 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
555 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
556 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
557 populates itself. */
558 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
559 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
560 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
561 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
562 struct inode_security_struct, list);
563 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
564 list_del_init(&isec->list);
565 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
566 inode = igrab(inode);
567 if (inode) {
568 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
569 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
570 iput(inode);
571 }
572 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
573 }
574 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
575 return rc;
576}
577
578static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
579 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
580{
581 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
582
583 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
584 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
585 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
586 (old_sid != new_sid))
587 return 1;
588
589 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
590 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
591 */
592 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
593 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 return 1;
595 return 0;
596}
597
598/*
599 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
600 * labeling information.
601 */
602static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
603 void *mnt_opts,
604 unsigned long kern_flags,
605 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
606{
607 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
608 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
609 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
610 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
611 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
612 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
613 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
614 int rc = 0;
615
616 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
617
618 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
619 if (!opts) {
620 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
621 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
622 server is ready to handle calls. */
623 goto out;
624 }
625 rc = -EINVAL;
626 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
628 goto out;
629 }
630 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
631 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
632 * place the results is not allowed */
633 rc = -EINVAL;
634 goto out;
635 }
636
637 /*
638 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
639 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
640 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
641 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
642 *
643 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
644 * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
645 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
646 * will be used for both mounts)
647 */
648 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
649 && !opts)
650 goto out;
651
652 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
653
654 /*
655 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
656 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
657 * than once with different security options.
658 */
659 if (opts) {
660 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
661 fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
662 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
663 fscontext_sid))
664 goto out_double_mount;
665 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
666 }
667 if (opts->context_sid) {
668 context_sid = opts->context_sid;
669 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
670 context_sid))
671 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
673 }
674 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
675 rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
677 rootcontext_sid))
678 goto out_double_mount;
679 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
680 }
681 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
682 defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
683 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
684 defcontext_sid))
685 goto out_double_mount;
686 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
687 }
688 }
689
690 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
691 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
692 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
693 goto out_double_mount;
694 rc = 0;
695 goto out;
696 }
697
698 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
699 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
700
701 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
702 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
703 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
704 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
705 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
706 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
707 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
708
709 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
710 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
711 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
712 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
713
714 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
715 /*
716 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
717 * filesystem type.
718 */
719 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
720 if (rc) {
721 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
722 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
723 goto out;
724 }
725 }
726
727 /*
728 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
729 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
730 * line and security labels must be ignored.
731 */
732 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
733 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
734 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
736 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
737 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
738 defcontext_sid) {
739 rc = -EACCES;
740 goto out;
741 }
742 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
744 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
745 current_sid(),
746 current_sid(),
747 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
748 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
749 if (rc)
750 goto out;
751 }
752 goto out_set_opts;
753 }
754
755 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
756 if (fscontext_sid) {
757 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
758 if (rc)
759 goto out;
760
761 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
762 }
763
764 /*
765 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
766 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
767 * the superblock context if not already set.
768 */
769 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
770 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
771 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
772 }
773
774 if (context_sid) {
775 if (!fscontext_sid) {
776 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
777 cred);
778 if (rc)
779 goto out;
780 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
781 } else {
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
783 cred);
784 if (rc)
785 goto out;
786 }
787 if (!rootcontext_sid)
788 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
789
790 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
792 }
793
794 if (rootcontext_sid) {
795 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
796 cred);
797 if (rc)
798 goto out;
799
800 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
801 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
802 }
803
804 if (defcontext_sid) {
805 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
806 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
807 rc = -EINVAL;
808 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
809 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
810 goto out;
811 }
812
813 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
815 sbsec, cred);
816 if (rc)
817 goto out;
818 }
819
820 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
821 }
822
823out_set_opts:
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
825out:
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
827 return rc;
828out_double_mount:
829 rc = -EINVAL;
830 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
832 sb->s_type->name);
833 goto out;
834}
835
836static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
837 const struct super_block *newsb)
838{
839 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
840 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
841 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
842 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
843
844 if (oldflags != newflags)
845 goto mismatch;
846 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
847 goto mismatch;
848 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
849 goto mismatch;
850 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
851 goto mismatch;
852 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
853 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
854 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
855 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
856 goto mismatch;
857 }
858 return 0;
859mismatch:
860 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
861 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
862 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
863 return -EBUSY;
864}
865
866static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
867 struct super_block *newsb,
868 unsigned long kern_flags,
869 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
870{
871 int rc = 0;
872 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
873 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
874 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
875
876 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
877 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
878 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
879
880 /*
881 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
882 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
883 */
884 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
885 return 0;
886
887 /*
888 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
889 * place the results is not allowed.
890 */
891 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
892 return -EINVAL;
893
894 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
895 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
896
897 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
898 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
899 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
900 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
901 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
902 }
903
904 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
905
906 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
907
908 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
909 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
910 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
911
912 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
913 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
914 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
915 if (rc)
916 goto out;
917 }
918
919 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
920 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
921 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
922 }
923
924 if (set_context) {
925 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
926
927 if (!set_fscontext)
928 newsbsec->sid = sid;
929 if (!set_rootcontext) {
930 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
931 newisec->sid = sid;
932 }
933 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
934 }
935 if (set_rootcontext) {
936 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
937 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
938
939 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
940 }
941
942 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
943out:
944 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
945 return rc;
946}
947
948/*
949 * NOTE: the caller is resposible for freeing the memory even if on error.
950 */
951static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
952{
953 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
954 u32 *dst_sid;
955 int rc;
956
957 if (token == Opt_seclabel)
958 /* eaten and completely ignored */
959 return 0;
960 if (!s)
961 return -EINVAL;
962
963 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
964 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
965 return -EINVAL;
966 }
967
968 if (!opts) {
969 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
970 if (!opts)
971 return -ENOMEM;
972 *mnt_opts = opts;
973 }
974
975 switch (token) {
976 case Opt_context:
977 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
978 goto err;
979 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
980 break;
981 case Opt_fscontext:
982 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
983 goto err;
984 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
985 break;
986 case Opt_rootcontext:
987 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
988 goto err;
989 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
990 break;
991 case Opt_defcontext:
992 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
993 goto err;
994 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
995 break;
996 default:
997 WARN_ON(1);
998 return -EINVAL;
999 }
1000 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1001 if (rc)
1002 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1003 s, rc);
1004 return rc;
1005
1006err:
1007 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1008 return -EINVAL;
1009}
1010
1011static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1012{
1013 char *context = NULL;
1014 u32 len;
1015 int rc;
1016
1017 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1018 &context, &len);
1019 if (!rc) {
1020 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1021
1022 seq_putc(m, '=');
1023 if (has_comma)
1024 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1025 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1026 if (has_comma)
1027 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1028 }
1029 kfree(context);
1030 return rc;
1031}
1032
1033static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1034{
1035 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1036 int rc;
1037
1038 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1039 return 0;
1040
1041 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1042 return 0;
1043
1044 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1045 seq_putc(m, ',');
1046 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1047 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1048 if (rc)
1049 return rc;
1050 }
1051 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1052 seq_putc(m, ',');
1053 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1054 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1055 if (rc)
1056 return rc;
1057 }
1058 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1059 seq_putc(m, ',');
1060 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1061 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1062 if (rc)
1063 return rc;
1064 }
1065 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1066 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1067 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1068 seq_putc(m, ',');
1069 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1070 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1071 if (rc)
1072 return rc;
1073 }
1074 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1075 seq_putc(m, ',');
1076 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1077 }
1078 return 0;
1079}
1080
1081static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1082{
1083 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1084 case S_IFSOCK:
1085 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1086 case S_IFLNK:
1087 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1088 case S_IFREG:
1089 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1090 case S_IFBLK:
1091 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1092 case S_IFDIR:
1093 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1094 case S_IFCHR:
1095 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1096 case S_IFIFO:
1097 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1098
1099 }
1100
1101 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1102}
1103
1104static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1105{
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1107 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1108}
1109
1110static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1111{
1112 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1113}
1114
1115static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116{
1117 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1118
1119 switch (family) {
1120 case PF_UNIX:
1121 switch (type) {
1122 case SOCK_STREAM:
1123 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1124 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1125 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1126 case SOCK_RAW:
1127 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1128 }
1129 break;
1130 case PF_INET:
1131 case PF_INET6:
1132 switch (type) {
1133 case SOCK_STREAM:
1134 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1135 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1136 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1137 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1138 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1139 else
1140 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1141 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1142 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1143 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1144 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1145 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1146 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1147 else
1148 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1149 case SOCK_DCCP:
1150 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1151 default:
1152 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1153 }
1154 break;
1155 case PF_NETLINK:
1156 switch (protocol) {
1157 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1163 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1165 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1166 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1167 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1168 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1169 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1170 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1171 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1172 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1173 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1174 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1175 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1176 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1177 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1178 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1179 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1180 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1181 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1182 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1183 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1184 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1185 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1186 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1187 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1188 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1189 default:
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1191 }
1192 case PF_PACKET:
1193 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1194 case PF_KEY:
1195 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1196 case PF_APPLETALK:
1197 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1198 }
1199
1200 if (extsockclass) {
1201 switch (family) {
1202 case PF_AX25:
1203 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1204 case PF_IPX:
1205 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1206 case PF_NETROM:
1207 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1208 case PF_ATMPVC:
1209 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1210 case PF_X25:
1211 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1212 case PF_ROSE:
1213 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1214 case PF_DECnet:
1215 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1216 case PF_ATMSVC:
1217 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1218 case PF_RDS:
1219 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1220 case PF_IRDA:
1221 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1222 case PF_PPPOX:
1223 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1224 case PF_LLC:
1225 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1226 case PF_CAN:
1227 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1228 case PF_TIPC:
1229 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1230 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1231 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1232 case PF_IUCV:
1233 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1234 case PF_RXRPC:
1235 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1236 case PF_ISDN:
1237 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1238 case PF_PHONET:
1239 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1240 case PF_IEEE802154:
1241 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1242 case PF_CAIF:
1243 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1244 case PF_ALG:
1245 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1246 case PF_NFC:
1247 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1248 case PF_VSOCK:
1249 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1250 case PF_KCM:
1251 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1252 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1253 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1254 case PF_SMC:
1255 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1256 case PF_XDP:
1257 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1258 case PF_MCTP:
1259 return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1260#if PF_MAX > 46
1261#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1262#endif
1263 }
1264 }
1265
1266 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1267}
1268
1269static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1270 u16 tclass,
1271 u16 flags,
1272 u32 *sid)
1273{
1274 int rc;
1275 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1276 char *buffer, *path;
1277
1278 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1279 if (!buffer)
1280 return -ENOMEM;
1281
1282 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1283 if (IS_ERR(path))
1284 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1285 else {
1286 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1287 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1288 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1289 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1290 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1291 path[1] = '/';
1292 path++;
1293 }
1294 }
1295 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1296 path, tclass, sid);
1297 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1298 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1299 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1300 rc = 0;
1301 }
1302 }
1303 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1304 return rc;
1305}
1306
1307static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1308 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1309{
1310#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1311 char *context;
1312 unsigned int len;
1313 int rc;
1314
1315 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1316 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1317 if (!context)
1318 return -ENOMEM;
1319
1320 context[len] = '\0';
1321 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1322 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1323 kfree(context);
1324
1325 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1326 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1327 if (rc < 0)
1328 return rc;
1329
1330 len = rc;
1331 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1332 if (!context)
1333 return -ENOMEM;
1334
1335 context[len] = '\0';
1336 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1337 context, len);
1338 }
1339 if (rc < 0) {
1340 kfree(context);
1341 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1342 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1343 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1344 return rc;
1345 }
1346 *sid = def_sid;
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349
1350 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1351 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1352 if (rc) {
1353 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1354 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1355
1356 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1357 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1358 ino, dev, context);
1359 } else {
1360 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1361 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1362 }
1363 }
1364 kfree(context);
1365 return 0;
1366}
1367
1368/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1369static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1370{
1371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1372 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1373 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1374 u16 sclass;
1375 struct dentry *dentry;
1376 int rc = 0;
1377
1378 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1379 return 0;
1380
1381 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1382 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1383 goto out_unlock;
1384
1385 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1386 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1387
1388 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1389 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1390 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1391 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1392 server is ready to handle calls. */
1393 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1394 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1395 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1396 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1397 goto out_unlock;
1398 }
1399
1400 sclass = isec->sclass;
1401 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1402 sid = isec->sid;
1403 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1404 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1405
1406 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1407 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1408 break;
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1410 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1411 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1412 break;
1413 }
1414 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1415 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1416 if (opt_dentry) {
1417 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1418 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1419 } else {
1420 /*
1421 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1422 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1423 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1424 * two, depending upon that...
1425 */
1426 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1427 if (!dentry)
1428 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1429 }
1430 if (!dentry) {
1431 /*
1432 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1433 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1434 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1435 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1436 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1437 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1438 * be used again by userspace.
1439 */
1440 goto out_invalid;
1441 }
1442
1443 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1444 &sid);
1445 dput(dentry);
1446 if (rc)
1447 goto out;
1448 break;
1449 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1450 sid = task_sid;
1451 break;
1452 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1453 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1454 sid = sbsec->sid;
1455
1456 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1457 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1458 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1459 if (rc)
1460 goto out;
1461 break;
1462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1463 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1464 break;
1465 default:
1466 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1467 sid = sbsec->sid;
1468
1469 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1470 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1471 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1472 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1473 * procfs inodes */
1474 if (opt_dentry) {
1475 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1476 * d_splice_alias. */
1477 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1478 } else {
1479 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1480 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1481 * a connected one, so try that first.
1482 */
1483 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1484 if (!dentry)
1485 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1486 }
1487 /*
1488 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1489 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1490 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1491 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1492 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1493 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1494 * could be used again by userspace.
1495 */
1496 if (!dentry)
1497 goto out_invalid;
1498 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1499 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1500 if (rc) {
1501 dput(dentry);
1502 goto out;
1503 }
1504
1505 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1506 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1507 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1508 sid, &sid);
1509 if (rc) {
1510 dput(dentry);
1511 goto out;
1512 }
1513 }
1514 dput(dentry);
1515 }
1516 break;
1517 }
1518
1519out:
1520 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1521 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1522 if (rc) {
1523 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1524 goto out_unlock;
1525 }
1526 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1527 isec->sid = sid;
1528 }
1529
1530out_unlock:
1531 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1532 return rc;
1533
1534out_invalid:
1535 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1536 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1537 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1538 isec->sid = sid;
1539 }
1540 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1541 return 0;
1542}
1543
1544/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1545static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1546{
1547 u32 perm = 0;
1548
1549 switch (sig) {
1550 case SIGCHLD:
1551 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1552 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1553 break;
1554 case SIGKILL:
1555 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1556 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1557 break;
1558 case SIGSTOP:
1559 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1560 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1561 break;
1562 default:
1563 /* All other signals. */
1564 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1565 break;
1566 }
1567
1568 return perm;
1569}
1570
1571#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1572#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1573#endif
1574
1575/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1576static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1577 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1578{
1579 struct common_audit_data ad;
1580 struct av_decision avd;
1581 u16 sclass;
1582 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1583 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1584 int rc;
1585
1586 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1587 ad.u.cap = cap;
1588
1589 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1590 case 0:
1591 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1592 break;
1593 case 1:
1594 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1595 break;
1596 default:
1597 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1598 BUG();
1599 return -EINVAL;
1600 }
1601
1602 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1603 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1604 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1605 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1606 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1607 if (rc2)
1608 return rc2;
1609 }
1610 return rc;
1611}
1612
1613/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1614 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1615 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1616static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1617 struct inode *inode,
1618 u32 perms,
1619 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1620{
1621 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1622 u32 sid;
1623
1624 validate_creds(cred);
1625
1626 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1627 return 0;
1628
1629 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1630 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1631
1632 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1633 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1634}
1635
1636/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1637 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1638 pathname if needed. */
1639static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1640 struct dentry *dentry,
1641 u32 av)
1642{
1643 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1644 struct common_audit_data ad;
1645
1646 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1647 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1648 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1649 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1650}
1651
1652/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1653 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1654 pathname if needed. */
1655static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1656 const struct path *path,
1657 u32 av)
1658{
1659 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1660 struct common_audit_data ad;
1661
1662 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1663 ad.u.path = *path;
1664 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1665 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1666}
1667
1668/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1669static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1670 struct file *file,
1671 u32 av)
1672{
1673 struct common_audit_data ad;
1674
1675 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1676 ad.u.file = file;
1677 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1678}
1679
1680#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1681static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1682#endif
1683
1684/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1685 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1686 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1687 check a particular permission to the file.
1688 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1689 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1690 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1691 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1692static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1693 struct file *file,
1694 u32 av)
1695{
1696 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1697 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1698 struct common_audit_data ad;
1699 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1700 int rc;
1701
1702 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1703 ad.u.file = file;
1704
1705 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1706 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1707 sid, fsec->sid,
1708 SECCLASS_FD,
1709 FD__USE,
1710 &ad);
1711 if (rc)
1712 goto out;
1713 }
1714
1715#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1716 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1717 if (rc)
1718 return rc;
1719#endif
1720
1721 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1722 rc = 0;
1723 if (av)
1724 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1725
1726out:
1727 return rc;
1728}
1729
1730/*
1731 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1732 */
1733static int
1734selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1735 struct inode *dir,
1736 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1737 u32 *_new_isid)
1738{
1739 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1740 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1741
1742 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1743 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1744 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1745 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1746 tsec->create_sid) {
1747 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1748 } else {
1749 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1750 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1751 dsec->sid, tclass,
1752 name, _new_isid);
1753 }
1754
1755 return 0;
1756}
1757
1758/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1759static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1760 struct dentry *dentry,
1761 u16 tclass)
1762{
1763 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1764 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1766 u32 sid, newsid;
1767 struct common_audit_data ad;
1768 int rc;
1769
1770 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1771 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1772
1773 sid = tsec->sid;
1774
1775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1776 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1777
1778 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1779 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1780 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1781 &ad);
1782 if (rc)
1783 return rc;
1784
1785 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1786 &newsid);
1787 if (rc)
1788 return rc;
1789
1790 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1791 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1792 if (rc)
1793 return rc;
1794
1795 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1796 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1797 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1798 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1799}
1800
1801#define MAY_LINK 0
1802#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1803#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1804
1805/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1806static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1807 struct dentry *dentry,
1808 int kind)
1809
1810{
1811 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1812 struct common_audit_data ad;
1813 u32 sid = current_sid();
1814 u32 av;
1815 int rc;
1816
1817 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1818 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1819
1820 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1821 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1822
1823 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1824 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1825 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1826 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1827 if (rc)
1828 return rc;
1829
1830 switch (kind) {
1831 case MAY_LINK:
1832 av = FILE__LINK;
1833 break;
1834 case MAY_UNLINK:
1835 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1836 break;
1837 case MAY_RMDIR:
1838 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1839 break;
1840 default:
1841 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1842 __func__, kind);
1843 return 0;
1844 }
1845
1846 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1847 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1848 return rc;
1849}
1850
1851static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1852 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1853 struct inode *new_dir,
1854 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1855{
1856 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1857 struct common_audit_data ad;
1858 u32 sid = current_sid();
1859 u32 av;
1860 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1861 int rc;
1862
1863 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1864 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1865 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1866 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1867
1868 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1869
1870 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1871 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1872 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1873 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1874 if (rc)
1875 return rc;
1876 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1877 sid, old_isec->sid,
1878 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1879 if (rc)
1880 return rc;
1881 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1882 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1883 sid, old_isec->sid,
1884 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1885 if (rc)
1886 return rc;
1887 }
1888
1889 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1890 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1891 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1892 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1893 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1894 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1895 if (rc)
1896 return rc;
1897 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1898 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1899 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1900 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1901 sid, new_isec->sid,
1902 new_isec->sclass,
1903 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1904 if (rc)
1905 return rc;
1906 }
1907
1908 return 0;
1909}
1910
1911/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1912static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1913 struct super_block *sb,
1914 u32 perms,
1915 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1916{
1917 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1918 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1919
1920 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1921 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1922 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1923}
1924
1925/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1926static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1927{
1928 u32 av = 0;
1929
1930 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1931 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1932 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1933 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1934 av |= FILE__READ;
1935
1936 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1937 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1938 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1939 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1940
1941 } else {
1942 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1943 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1944 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1945 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1946 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1947 av |= DIR__READ;
1948 }
1949
1950 return av;
1951}
1952
1953/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1954static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1955{
1956 u32 av = 0;
1957
1958 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1959 av |= FILE__READ;
1960 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1961 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1962 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1963 else
1964 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1965 }
1966 if (!av) {
1967 /*
1968 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1969 */
1970 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1971 }
1972
1973 return av;
1974}
1975
1976/*
1977 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
1978 * open permission.
1979 */
1980static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1981{
1982 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1983 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1984
1985 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1986 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1987 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1988
1989 return av;
1990}
1991
1992/* Hook functions begin here. */
1993
1994static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
1995{
1996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1997 current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
1998 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1999}
2000
2001static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2002 const struct cred *to)
2003{
2004 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2005 u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2006 u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2007 int rc;
2008
2009 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2010 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2011 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2012 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2013 if (rc)
2014 return rc;
2015 }
2016
2017 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,
2018 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2019}
2020
2021static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2022 const struct cred *to)
2023{
2024 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2025 cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2026 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2027 NULL);
2028}
2029
2030static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2031 const struct cred *to,
2032 struct file *file)
2033{
2034 u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2035 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2036 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2037 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2038 struct common_audit_data ad;
2039 int rc;
2040
2041 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2042 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2043
2044 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2045 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2046 sid, fsec->sid,
2047 SECCLASS_FD,
2048 FD__USE,
2049 &ad);
2050 if (rc)
2051 return rc;
2052 }
2053
2054#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2055 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2056 if (rc)
2057 return rc;
2058#endif
2059
2060 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2061 return 0;
2062
2063 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2064 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2065 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2066 &ad);
2067}
2068
2069static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2070 unsigned int mode)
2071{
2072 u32 sid = current_sid();
2073 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2074
2075 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2076 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2077 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2078
2079 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2080 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2081}
2082
2083static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2084{
2085 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2086 task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2087 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2088}
2089
2090static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2091 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2092{
2093 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2094 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2095 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2096}
2097
2098static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2099 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2100 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2101 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2102{
2103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2104 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2105 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2106}
2107
2108/*
2109 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2110 * which was removed).
2111 *
2112 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2113 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2114 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2115 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2116 */
2117
2118static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2119 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2120{
2121 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2122}
2123
2124static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2125{
2126 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2127 int rc = 0;
2128
2129 if (!sb)
2130 return 0;
2131
2132 switch (cmds) {
2133 case Q_SYNC:
2134 case Q_QUOTAON:
2135 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2136 case Q_SETINFO:
2137 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2138 case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2139 case Q_XQUOTAON:
2140 case Q_XSETQLIM:
2141 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2142 break;
2143 case Q_GETFMT:
2144 case Q_GETINFO:
2145 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2146 case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2147 case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2148 case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2149 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2150 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2151 break;
2152 default:
2153 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2154 break;
2155 }
2156 return rc;
2157}
2158
2159static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2160{
2161 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2162
2163 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2164}
2165
2166static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2167{
2168 switch (type) {
2169 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2170 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2171 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2172 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2173 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2174 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2175 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2176 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2177 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2178 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2179 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2180 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2181 NULL);
2182 }
2183 /* All other syslog types */
2184 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2185 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2186 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2187}
2188
2189/*
2190 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2191 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2192 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2193 *
2194 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2195 * processes that allocate mappings.
2196 */
2197static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2198{
2199 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2200
2201 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2202 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2203 if (rc == 0)
2204 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2205
2206 return cap_sys_admin;
2207}
2208
2209/* binprm security operations */
2210
2211static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2212{
2213 u32 sid = 0;
2214 struct task_struct *tracer;
2215
2216 rcu_read_lock();
2217 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2218 if (tracer)
2219 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2220 rcu_read_unlock();
2221
2222 return sid;
2223}
2224
2225static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2226 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2227 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2228{
2229 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2230 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2231 int rc;
2232 u32 av;
2233
2234 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2235 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2236
2237 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2238 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2239
2240 /*
2241 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2242 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2243 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2244 * the old and new contexts.
2245 */
2246 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2247 av = 0;
2248 if (nnp)
2249 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2250 if (nosuid)
2251 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2252 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2253 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2254 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2255 if (!rc)
2256 return 0;
2257 }
2258
2259 /*
2260 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2261 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2262 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2263 */
2264 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2265 new_tsec->sid);
2266 if (!rc)
2267 return 0;
2268
2269 /*
2270 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2271 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2272 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2273 */
2274 if (nnp)
2275 return -EPERM;
2276 return -EACCES;
2277}
2278
2279static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2280{
2281 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2282 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2283 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2284 struct common_audit_data ad;
2285 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2286 int rc;
2287
2288 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2289 * the script interpreter */
2290
2291 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2292 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2293 isec = inode_security(inode);
2294
2295 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2296 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2297 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2298
2299 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2300 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2301 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2302 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2303
2304 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2305 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2306 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2307 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2308
2309 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2310 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2311 if (rc)
2312 return rc;
2313 } else {
2314 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2315 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2316 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2317 &new_tsec->sid);
2318 if (rc)
2319 return rc;
2320
2321 /*
2322 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2323 * transition.
2324 */
2325 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2326 if (rc)
2327 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2328 }
2329
2330 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2331 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2332
2333 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2335 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2336 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2337 if (rc)
2338 return rc;
2339 } else {
2340 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2341 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2342 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2343 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2344 if (rc)
2345 return rc;
2346
2347 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2348 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2349 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2350 if (rc)
2351 return rc;
2352
2353 /* Check for shared state */
2354 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2356 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2358 NULL);
2359 if (rc)
2360 return -EPERM;
2361 }
2362
2363 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2364 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2365 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2366 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2367 if (ptsid != 0) {
2368 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2369 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2370 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2371 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2372 if (rc)
2373 return -EPERM;
2374 }
2375 }
2376
2377 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2378 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2379
2380 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2381 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2382 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2383 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2384 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2385 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2386 NULL);
2387 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2388 }
2389
2390 return 0;
2391}
2392
2393static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2394{
2395 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2396}
2397
2398/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2399static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2400 struct files_struct *files)
2401{
2402 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2403 struct tty_struct *tty;
2404 int drop_tty = 0;
2405 unsigned n;
2406
2407 tty = get_current_tty();
2408 if (tty) {
2409 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2410 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2411 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2412
2413 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2414 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2415 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2416 open file may belong to another process and we are
2417 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2418 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2419 struct tty_file_private, list);
2420 file = file_priv->file;
2421 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2422 drop_tty = 1;
2423 }
2424 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2425 tty_kref_put(tty);
2426 }
2427 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2428 if (drop_tty)
2429 no_tty();
2430
2431 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2432 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2433 if (!n) /* none found? */
2434 return;
2435
2436 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2437 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2438 devnull = NULL;
2439 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2440 do {
2441 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2442 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2443 if (devnull)
2444 fput(devnull);
2445}
2446
2447/*
2448 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2449 */
2450static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2451{
2452 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2453 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2454 int rc, i;
2455
2456 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2457 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2458 return;
2459
2460 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2461 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2462
2463 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2464 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2465
2466 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2467 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2468 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2469 *
2470 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2471 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2472 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2473 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2474 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2475 */
2476 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2477 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2478 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2479 if (rc) {
2480 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2481 task_lock(current);
2482 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2483 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2484 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2485 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2486 }
2487 task_unlock(current);
2488 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2489 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2490 }
2491}
2492
2493/*
2494 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2495 * due to exec
2496 */
2497static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2498{
2499 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2500 u32 osid, sid;
2501 int rc;
2502
2503 osid = tsec->osid;
2504 sid = tsec->sid;
2505
2506 if (sid == osid)
2507 return;
2508
2509 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2510 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2511 * flush and unblock signals.
2512 *
2513 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2514 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2515 */
2516 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2517 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2518 if (rc) {
2519 clear_itimer();
2520
2521 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2522 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2523 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2524 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2525 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2526 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2527 recalc_sigpending();
2528 }
2529 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2530 }
2531
2532 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2533 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2534 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2535 __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2536 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2537}
2538
2539/* superblock security operations */
2540
2541static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2542{
2543 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2544
2545 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2546 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2547 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2548 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2549 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2550 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2551
2552 return 0;
2553}
2554
2555static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2556{
2557 bool open_quote = false;
2558 int len;
2559 char c;
2560
2561 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2562 if (c == '"')
2563 open_quote = !open_quote;
2564 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2565 break;
2566 }
2567 return len;
2568}
2569
2570static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2571{
2572 char *from = options;
2573 char *to = options;
2574 bool first = true;
2575 int rc;
2576
2577 while (1) {
2578 int len = opt_len(from);
2579 int token;
2580 char *arg = NULL;
2581
2582 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2583
2584 if (token != Opt_error) {
2585 char *p, *q;
2586
2587 /* strip quotes */
2588 if (arg) {
2589 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2590 char c = *p;
2591 if (c != '"')
2592 *q++ = c;
2593 }
2594 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2595 if (!arg) {
2596 rc = -ENOMEM;
2597 goto free_opt;
2598 }
2599 }
2600 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2601 kfree(arg);
2602 arg = NULL;
2603 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2604 goto free_opt;
2605 }
2606 } else {
2607 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2608 from--;
2609 len++;
2610 }
2611 if (to != from)
2612 memmove(to, from, len);
2613 to += len;
2614 first = false;
2615 }
2616 if (!from[len])
2617 break;
2618 from += len + 1;
2619 }
2620 *to = '\0';
2621 return 0;
2622
2623free_opt:
2624 if (*mnt_opts) {
2625 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2626 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2627 }
2628 return rc;
2629}
2630
2631static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2632{
2633 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2634 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2635
2636 /*
2637 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2638 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2639 */
2640 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2641 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2642
2643 /*
2644 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2645 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2646 */
2647 if (!opts)
2648 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2649
2650 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2651 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2652 opts->fscontext_sid))
2653 return 1;
2654 }
2655 if (opts->context_sid) {
2656 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2657 opts->context_sid))
2658 return 1;
2659 }
2660 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2661 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2662
2663 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2664 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2665 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2666 return 1;
2667 }
2668 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2669 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2670 opts->defcontext_sid))
2671 return 1;
2672 }
2673 return 0;
2674}
2675
2676static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2677{
2678 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2679 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2680
2681 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2682 return 0;
2683
2684 if (!opts)
2685 return 0;
2686
2687 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2688 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2689 opts->fscontext_sid))
2690 goto out_bad_option;
2691 }
2692 if (opts->context_sid) {
2693 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2694 opts->context_sid))
2695 goto out_bad_option;
2696 }
2697 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2698 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2699 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2700 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2701 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2702 goto out_bad_option;
2703 }
2704 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2705 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2706 opts->defcontext_sid))
2707 goto out_bad_option;
2708 }
2709 return 0;
2710
2711out_bad_option:
2712 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2713 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2714 sb->s_type->name);
2715 return -EINVAL;
2716}
2717
2718static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2719{
2720 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2721 struct common_audit_data ad;
2722
2723 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2724 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2725 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2726}
2727
2728static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2729{
2730 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2731 struct common_audit_data ad;
2732
2733 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2734 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2735 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2736}
2737
2738static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2739 const struct path *path,
2740 const char *type,
2741 unsigned long flags,
2742 void *data)
2743{
2744 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2745
2746 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2747 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2748 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2749 else
2750 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2751}
2752
2753static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2754 const struct path *to_path)
2755{
2756 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2757
2758 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2759}
2760
2761static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2762{
2763 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2764
2765 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2766 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2767}
2768
2769static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2770 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2771{
2772 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2773
2774 if (!src)
2775 return 0;
2776
2777 fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2778 return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2779}
2780
2781static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2782 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2783 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2784 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2785 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2786 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2787 {}
2788};
2789
2790static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2791 struct fs_parameter *param)
2792{
2793 struct fs_parse_result result;
2794 int opt;
2795
2796 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2797 if (opt < 0)
2798 return opt;
2799
2800 return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2801}
2802
2803/* inode security operations */
2804
2805static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2806{
2807 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2808 u32 sid = current_sid();
2809
2810 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2811 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2812 isec->inode = inode;
2813 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2814 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2815 isec->task_sid = sid;
2816 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2817
2818 return 0;
2819}
2820
2821static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2822{
2823 inode_free_security(inode);
2824}
2825
2826static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2827 const struct qstr *name,
2828 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2829 u32 *ctxlen)
2830{
2831 u32 newsid;
2832 int rc;
2833
2834 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2835 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2836 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2837 &newsid);
2838 if (rc)
2839 return rc;
2840
2841 if (xattr_name)
2842 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2843
2844 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2845 ctxlen);
2846}
2847
2848static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2849 struct qstr *name,
2850 const struct cred *old,
2851 struct cred *new)
2852{
2853 u32 newsid;
2854 int rc;
2855 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2856
2857 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2858 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2859 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2860 &newsid);
2861 if (rc)
2862 return rc;
2863
2864 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2865 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2866 return 0;
2867}
2868
2869static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2870 const struct qstr *qstr,
2871 const char **name,
2872 void **value, size_t *len)
2873{
2874 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2875 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2876 u32 newsid, clen;
2877 int rc;
2878 char *context;
2879
2880 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2881
2882 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2883
2884 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2885 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2886 &newsid);
2887 if (rc)
2888 return rc;
2889
2890 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2891 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2892 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2893 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2894 isec->sid = newsid;
2895 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2896 }
2897
2898 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
2899 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2900 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2901
2902 if (name)
2903 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2904
2905 if (value && len) {
2906 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2907 &context, &clen);
2908 if (rc)
2909 return rc;
2910 *value = context;
2911 *len = clen;
2912 }
2913
2914 return 0;
2915}
2916
2917static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2918 const struct qstr *name,
2919 const struct inode *context_inode)
2920{
2921 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2922 struct common_audit_data ad;
2923 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2924 int rc;
2925
2926 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
2927 return 0;
2928
2929 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2930
2931 /*
2932 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
2933 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2934 * untouched.
2935 */
2936
2937 if (context_inode) {
2938 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2939 selinux_inode(context_inode);
2940 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2941 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized");
2942 return -EACCES;
2943 }
2944
2945 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2946 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2947 } else {
2948 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2949 rc = security_transition_sid(
2950 &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2951 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2952 if (rc)
2953 return rc;
2954 }
2955
2956 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2957 /*
2958 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
2959 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
2960 */
2961
2962 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
2963 ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
2964
2965 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2966 tsec->sid,
2967 isec->sid,
2968 isec->sclass,
2969 FILE__CREATE,
2970 &ad);
2971}
2972
2973static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2974{
2975 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2976}
2977
2978static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2979{
2980 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2981}
2982
2983static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2984{
2985 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2986}
2987
2988static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2989{
2990 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2991}
2992
2993static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2994{
2995 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2996}
2997
2998static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2999{
3000 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3001}
3002
3003static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3004{
3005 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3006}
3007
3008static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3009 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3010{
3011 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3012}
3013
3014static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3015{
3016 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3017
3018 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3019}
3020
3021static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3022 bool rcu)
3023{
3024 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3025 struct common_audit_data ad;
3026 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3027 u32 sid;
3028
3029 validate_creds(cred);
3030
3031 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3032 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3033 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3034 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3035 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3036 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3037
3038 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3039 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3040}
3041
3042static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3043 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3044 int result)
3045{
3046 struct common_audit_data ad;
3047 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3048
3049 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3050 ad.u.inode = inode;
3051
3052 return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3053 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3054 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3055}
3056
3057static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3058{
3059 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3060 u32 perms;
3061 bool from_access;
3062 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3063 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3064 u32 sid;
3065 struct av_decision avd;
3066 int rc, rc2;
3067 u32 audited, denied;
3068
3069 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3070 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3071
3072 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3073 if (!mask)
3074 return 0;
3075
3076 validate_creds(cred);
3077
3078 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3079 return 0;
3080
3081 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3082
3083 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3084 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3085 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3086 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3087
3088 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3089 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3090 &avd);
3091 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3092 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3093 &denied);
3094 if (likely(!audited))
3095 return rc;
3096
3097 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3098 if (rc2)
3099 return rc2;
3100 return rc;
3101}
3102
3103static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3104{
3105 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3106 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3107 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3108 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3109
3110 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3111 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3112 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3113 ATTR_FORCE);
3114 if (!ia_valid)
3115 return 0;
3116 }
3117
3118 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3119 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3120 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3121
3122 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3123 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3124 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3125 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3126 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3127
3128 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3129}
3130
3131static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3132{
3133 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3134}
3135
3136static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3137{
3138 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3139 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3140
3141 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3142 return false;
3143 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3144 return false;
3145 return true;
3146}
3147
3148static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3149 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3150 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3151{
3152 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3153 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3154 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3155 struct common_audit_data ad;
3156 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3157 int rc = 0;
3158
3159 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3160 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3161 if (rc)
3162 return rc;
3163
3164 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3165 ordinary setattr permission. */
3166 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3167 }
3168
3169 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3170 return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3171
3172 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3173 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3174 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3175
3176 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
3177 return -EPERM;
3178
3179 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3180 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3181
3182 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3183 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3184 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3185 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3186 if (rc)
3187 return rc;
3188
3189 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3190 GFP_KERNEL);
3191 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3192 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3193 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3194 size_t audit_size;
3195
3196 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3197 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3198 if (value) {
3199 const char *str = value;
3200
3201 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3202 audit_size = size - 1;
3203 else
3204 audit_size = size;
3205 } else {
3206 audit_size = 0;
3207 }
3208 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3209 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3210 if (!ab)
3211 return rc;
3212 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3213 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3214 audit_log_end(ab);
3215
3216 return rc;
3217 }
3218 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3219 size, &newsid);
3220 }
3221 if (rc)
3222 return rc;
3223
3224 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3225 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3226 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3227 if (rc)
3228 return rc;
3229
3230 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3231 sid, isec->sclass);
3232 if (rc)
3233 return rc;
3234
3235 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3236 newsid,
3237 sbsec->sid,
3238 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3239 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3240 &ad);
3241}
3242
3243static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3244 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3245 struct posix_acl *kacl)
3246{
3247 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3248}
3249
3250static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3251 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3252{
3253 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3254}
3255
3256static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3257 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3258{
3259 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3260}
3261
3262static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3263 const void *value, size_t size,
3264 int flags)
3265{
3266 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3267 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3268 u32 newsid;
3269 int rc;
3270
3271 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3272 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3273 return;
3274 }
3275
3276 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3277 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3278 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3279 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3280 * we've since initialized.
3281 */
3282 return;
3283 }
3284
3285 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3286 &newsid);
3287 if (rc) {
3288 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3289 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3290 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3291 return;
3292 }
3293
3294 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3295 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3296 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3297 isec->sid = newsid;
3298 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3299 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3300}
3301
3302static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3303{
3304 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3305
3306 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3307}
3308
3309static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3310{
3311 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3312
3313 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3314}
3315
3316static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3317 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3318{
3319 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3320 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
3321 if (rc)
3322 return rc;
3323
3324 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3325 ordinary setattr permission. */
3326 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3327 }
3328
3329 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3330 return 0;
3331
3332 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3333 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3334 return -EACCES;
3335}
3336
3337static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3338 unsigned int obj_type)
3339{
3340 int ret;
3341 u32 perm;
3342
3343 struct common_audit_data ad;
3344
3345 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3346 ad.u.path = *path;
3347
3348 /*
3349 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3350 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3351 */
3352 switch (obj_type) {
3353 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3354 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3355 break;
3356 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3357 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3358 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3359 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3360 if (ret)
3361 return ret;
3362 break;
3363 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3364 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3365 break;
3366 default:
3367 return -EINVAL;
3368 }
3369
3370 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3371 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3372 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3373
3374 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3375 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3376 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3377
3378 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3379}
3380
3381/*
3382 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3383 *
3384 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3385 */
3386static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3387 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3388 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3389{
3390 u32 size;
3391 int error;
3392 char *context = NULL;
3393 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3394
3395 /*
3396 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3397 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3398 */
3399 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3400 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3401 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3402
3403 /*
3404 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3405 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3406 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3407 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3408 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3409 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3410 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3411 */
3412 isec = inode_security(inode);
3413 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3414 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3415 isec->sid, &context,
3416 &size);
3417 else
3418 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3419 &context, &size);
3420 if (error)
3421 return error;
3422 error = size;
3423 if (alloc) {
3424 *buffer = context;
3425 goto out_nofree;
3426 }
3427 kfree(context);
3428out_nofree:
3429 return error;
3430}
3431
3432static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3433 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3434{
3435 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3436 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3437 u32 newsid;
3438 int rc;
3439
3440 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3441 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3442
3443 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3444 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3445 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3446
3447 if (!value || !size)
3448 return -EACCES;
3449
3450 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3451 GFP_KERNEL);
3452 if (rc)
3453 return rc;
3454
3455 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3456 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3457 isec->sid = newsid;
3458 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3459 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3460 return 0;
3461}
3462
3463static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3464{
3465 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3466
3467 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3468 return 0;
3469
3470 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3471 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3472 return len;
3473}
3474
3475static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3476{
3477 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3478 *secid = isec->sid;
3479}
3480
3481static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3482{
3483 u32 sid;
3484 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3485 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3486
3487 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3488 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3489 if (!new_creds)
3490 return -ENOMEM;
3491 }
3492
3493 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3494 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3495 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3496 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3497 *new = new_creds;
3498 return 0;
3499}
3500
3501static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3502{
3503 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3504 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3505 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3506 */
3507 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3508 return 1; /* Discard */
3509 /*
3510 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3511 * by selinux.
3512 */
3513 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3514}
3515
3516/* kernfs node operations */
3517
3518static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3519 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3520{
3521 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3522 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3523 int rc;
3524 char *context;
3525
3526 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3527 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3528 return 0;
3529 else if (rc < 0)
3530 return rc;
3531
3532 clen = (u32)rc;
3533 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3534 if (!context)
3535 return -ENOMEM;
3536
3537 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3538 if (rc < 0) {
3539 kfree(context);
3540 return rc;
3541 }
3542
3543 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3544 GFP_KERNEL);
3545 kfree(context);
3546 if (rc)
3547 return rc;
3548
3549 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3550 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3551 } else {
3552 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3553 struct qstr q;
3554
3555 q.name = kn->name;
3556 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3557
3558 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3559 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3560 &newsid);
3561 if (rc)
3562 return rc;
3563 }
3564
3565 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3566 &context, &clen);
3567 if (rc)
3568 return rc;
3569
3570 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3571 XATTR_CREATE);
3572 kfree(context);
3573 return rc;
3574}
3575
3576
3577/* file security operations */
3578
3579static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3580{
3581 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3582 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3583
3584 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3585 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3586 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3587
3588 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3589 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3590}
3591
3592static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3593{
3594 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3595 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3596 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3597 u32 sid = current_sid();
3598
3599 if (!mask)
3600 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3601 return 0;
3602
3603 isec = inode_security(inode);
3604 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3605 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3606 /* No change since file_open check. */
3607 return 0;
3608
3609 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3610}
3611
3612static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3613{
3614 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3615 u32 sid = current_sid();
3616
3617 fsec->sid = sid;
3618 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3619
3620 return 0;
3621}
3622
3623/*
3624 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3625 * operation to an inode.
3626 */
3627static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3628 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3629{
3630 struct common_audit_data ad;
3631 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3632 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3633 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3634 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3635 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3636 int rc;
3637 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3638 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3639
3640 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3641 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3642 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3643 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3644
3645 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3646 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3647 ssid, fsec->sid,
3648 SECCLASS_FD,
3649 FD__USE,
3650 &ad);
3651 if (rc)
3652 goto out;
3653 }
3654
3655 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3656 return 0;
3657
3658 isec = inode_security(inode);
3659 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3660 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3661 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3662out:
3663 return rc;
3664}
3665
3666static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3667 unsigned long arg)
3668{
3669 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3670 int error = 0;
3671
3672 switch (cmd) {
3673 case FIONREAD:
3674 case FIBMAP:
3675 case FIGETBSZ:
3676 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3677 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3678 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3679 break;
3680
3681 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3682 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3683 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3684 break;
3685
3686 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3687 case FIONBIO:
3688 case FIOASYNC:
3689 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3690 break;
3691
3692 case KDSKBENT:
3693 case KDSKBSENT:
3694 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3695 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3696 break;
3697
3698 case FIOCLEX:
3699 case FIONCLEX:
3700 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3701 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3702 break;
3703
3704 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3705 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3706 */
3707 default:
3708 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3709 }
3710 return error;
3711}
3712
3713static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3714
3715static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3716{
3717 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3718 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3719 int rc = 0;
3720
3721 if (default_noexec &&
3722 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3723 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3724 /*
3725 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3726 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3727 * This has an additional check.
3728 */
3729 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3730 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3731 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3732 if (rc)
3733 goto error;
3734 }
3735
3736 if (file) {
3737 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3738 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3739
3740 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3741 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3742 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3743
3744 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3745 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3746
3747 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3748 }
3749
3750error:
3751 return rc;
3752}
3753
3754static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3755{
3756 int rc = 0;
3757
3758 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3759 u32 sid = current_sid();
3760 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3761 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3762 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3763 }
3764
3765 return rc;
3766}
3767
3768static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3769 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3770{
3771 struct common_audit_data ad;
3772 int rc;
3773
3774 if (file) {
3775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3776 ad.u.file = file;
3777 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3778 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3779 if (rc)
3780 return rc;
3781 }
3782
3783 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3784 prot = reqprot;
3785
3786 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3787 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3788}
3789
3790static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3791 unsigned long reqprot,
3792 unsigned long prot)
3793{
3794 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3795 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3796
3797 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3798 prot = reqprot;
3799
3800 if (default_noexec &&
3801 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3802 int rc = 0;
3803 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3804 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3805 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3806 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3807 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3808 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3809 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3810 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3811 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3812 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3813 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3814 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3815 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3816 /*
3817 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3818 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3819 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3820 * modified content. This typically should only
3821 * occur for text relocations.
3822 */
3823 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3824 }
3825 if (rc)
3826 return rc;
3827 }
3828
3829 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3830}
3831
3832static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3833{
3834 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3835
3836 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3837}
3838
3839static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3840 unsigned long arg)
3841{
3842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3843 int err = 0;
3844
3845 switch (cmd) {
3846 case F_SETFL:
3847 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3848 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3849 break;
3850 }
3851 fallthrough;
3852 case F_SETOWN:
3853 case F_SETSIG:
3854 case F_GETFL:
3855 case F_GETOWN:
3856 case F_GETSIG:
3857 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3858 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3859 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3860 break;
3861 case F_GETLK:
3862 case F_SETLK:
3863 case F_SETLKW:
3864 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3865 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3866 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3867#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3868 case F_GETLK64:
3869 case F_SETLK64:
3870 case F_SETLKW64:
3871#endif
3872 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3873 break;
3874 }
3875
3876 return err;
3877}
3878
3879static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3880{
3881 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3882
3883 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3884 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3885}
3886
3887static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3888 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3889{
3890 struct file *file;
3891 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3892 u32 perm;
3893 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3894
3895 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3896 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3897
3898 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3899
3900 if (!signum)
3901 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3902 else
3903 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3904
3905 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3906 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3907 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3908}
3909
3910static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3911{
3912 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3913
3914 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3915}
3916
3917static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3918{
3919 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3920 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3921
3922 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3923 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3924 /*
3925 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3926 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3927 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3928 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3929 * struct as its SID.
3930 */
3931 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3932 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3933 /*
3934 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3935 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3936 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3937 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3938 * new inode label or new policy.
3939 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3940 */
3941 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3942}
3943
3944/* task security operations */
3945
3946static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3947 unsigned long clone_flags)
3948{
3949 u32 sid = current_sid();
3950
3951 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3952 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3953}
3954
3955/*
3956 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3957 */
3958static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3959 gfp_t gfp)
3960{
3961 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3962 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3963
3964 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3965 return 0;
3966}
3967
3968/*
3969 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3970 */
3971static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3972{
3973 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3974 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3975
3976 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3977}
3978
3979static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3980{
3981 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3982}
3983
3984/*
3985 * set the security data for a kernel service
3986 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3987 */
3988static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3989{
3990 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3991 u32 sid = current_sid();
3992 int ret;
3993
3994 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3995 sid, secid,
3996 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3997 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3998 NULL);
3999 if (ret == 0) {
4000 tsec->sid = secid;
4001 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4002 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4003 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4004 }
4005 return ret;
4006}
4007
4008/*
4009 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4010 * objective context of the specified inode
4011 */
4012static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4013{
4014 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4015 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4016 u32 sid = current_sid();
4017 int ret;
4018
4019 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4020 sid, isec->sid,
4021 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4022 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4023 NULL);
4024
4025 if (ret == 0)
4026 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4027 return ret;
4028}
4029
4030static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4031{
4032 struct common_audit_data ad;
4033
4034 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4035 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4036
4037 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4038 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4039 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4040}
4041
4042static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4043{
4044 struct common_audit_data ad;
4045 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4046 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4047 u32 sid = current_sid();
4048 int rc;
4049
4050 /* init_module */
4051 if (file == NULL)
4052 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4053 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4054 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4055
4056 /* finit_module */
4057
4058 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4059 ad.u.file = file;
4060
4061 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4062 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4063 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4064 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4065 if (rc)
4066 return rc;
4067 }
4068
4069 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4070 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4071 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4072 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4073}
4074
4075static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4076 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4077 bool contents)
4078{
4079 int rc = 0;
4080
4081 switch (id) {
4082 case READING_MODULE:
4083 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4084 break;
4085 default:
4086 break;
4087 }
4088
4089 return rc;
4090}
4091
4092static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4093{
4094 int rc = 0;
4095
4096 switch (id) {
4097 case LOADING_MODULE:
4098 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4099 break;
4100 default:
4101 break;
4102 }
4103
4104 return rc;
4105}
4106
4107static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4108{
4109 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4110 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4111 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4112}
4113
4114static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4115{
4116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4117 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4118 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4119}
4120
4121static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4122{
4123 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4124 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4125 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4126}
4127
4128static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
4129{
4130 *secid = current_sid();
4131}
4132
4133static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4134{
4135 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4136}
4137
4138static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4139{
4140 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4141 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4142 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4143}
4144
4145static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4146{
4147 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4148 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4149 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4150}
4151
4152static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4153{
4154 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4155 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4156 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4157}
4158
4159static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4160 unsigned int flags)
4161{
4162 u32 av = 0;
4163
4164 if (!flags)
4165 return 0;
4166 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4167 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4168 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4169 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4170 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4171 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4172 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4173}
4174
4175static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4176 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4177{
4178 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4179
4180 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4181 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4182 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4183 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4184 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4185 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4186 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4187 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4188
4189 return 0;
4190}
4191
4192static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4193{
4194 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4195 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4196 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4197}
4198
4199static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4200{
4201 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4202 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4203 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4204}
4205
4206static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4207{
4208 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4209 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4210 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4211}
4212
4213static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4214 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4215{
4216 u32 secid;
4217 u32 perm;
4218
4219 if (!sig)
4220 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4221 else
4222 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4223 if (!cred)
4224 secid = current_sid();
4225 else
4226 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4227 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4228 secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4229}
4230
4231static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4232 struct inode *inode)
4233{
4234 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4235 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4236
4237 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4238 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4239 isec->sid = sid;
4240 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4241 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4242}
4243
4244static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4245{
4246 u32 sid = current_sid();
4247
4248 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4249 USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4250}
4251
4252/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4253static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4254 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4255{
4256 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4257 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4258
4259 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4260 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4261 if (ih == NULL)
4262 goto out;
4263
4264 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4265 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4266 goto out;
4267
4268 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4269 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4270 ret = 0;
4271
4272 if (proto)
4273 *proto = ih->protocol;
4274
4275 switch (ih->protocol) {
4276 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4277 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4278
4279 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4280 break;
4281
4282 offset += ihlen;
4283 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4284 if (th == NULL)
4285 break;
4286
4287 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4288 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4289 break;
4290 }
4291
4292 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4293 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4294
4295 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4296 break;
4297
4298 offset += ihlen;
4299 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4300 if (uh == NULL)
4301 break;
4302
4303 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4304 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4305 break;
4306 }
4307
4308 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4309 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4310
4311 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4312 break;
4313
4314 offset += ihlen;
4315 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4316 if (dh == NULL)
4317 break;
4318
4319 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4320 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4321 break;
4322 }
4323
4324#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4325 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4326 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4327
4328 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4329 break;
4330
4331 offset += ihlen;
4332 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4333 if (sh == NULL)
4334 break;
4335
4336 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4337 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4338 break;
4339 }
4340#endif
4341 default:
4342 break;
4343 }
4344out:
4345 return ret;
4346}
4347
4348#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4349
4350/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4351static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4352 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4353{
4354 u8 nexthdr;
4355 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4356 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4357 __be16 frag_off;
4358
4359 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4360 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4361 if (ip6 == NULL)
4362 goto out;
4363
4364 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4365 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4366 ret = 0;
4367
4368 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4369 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4370 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4371 if (offset < 0)
4372 goto out;
4373
4374 if (proto)
4375 *proto = nexthdr;
4376
4377 switch (nexthdr) {
4378 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4379 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4380
4381 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4382 if (th == NULL)
4383 break;
4384
4385 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4386 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4387 break;
4388 }
4389
4390 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4391 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4392
4393 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4394 if (uh == NULL)
4395 break;
4396
4397 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4398 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4399 break;
4400 }
4401
4402 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4403 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4404
4405 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4406 if (dh == NULL)
4407 break;
4408
4409 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4410 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4411 break;
4412 }
4413
4414#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4415 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4416 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4417
4418 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4419 if (sh == NULL)
4420 break;
4421
4422 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4423 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4424 break;
4425 }
4426#endif
4427 /* includes fragments */
4428 default:
4429 break;
4430 }
4431out:
4432 return ret;
4433}
4434
4435#endif /* IPV6 */
4436
4437static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4438 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4439{
4440 char *addrp;
4441 int ret;
4442
4443 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4444 case PF_INET:
4445 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4446 if (ret)
4447 goto parse_error;
4448 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4449 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4450 goto okay;
4451
4452#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4453 case PF_INET6:
4454 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4455 if (ret)
4456 goto parse_error;
4457 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4458 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4459 goto okay;
4460#endif /* IPV6 */
4461 default:
4462 addrp = NULL;
4463 goto okay;
4464 }
4465
4466parse_error:
4467 pr_warn(
4468 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4469 " unable to parse packet\n");
4470 return ret;
4471
4472okay:
4473 if (_addrp)
4474 *_addrp = addrp;
4475 return 0;
4476}
4477
4478/**
4479 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4480 * @skb: the packet
4481 * @family: protocol family
4482 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4483 *
4484 * Description:
4485 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4486 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4487 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4488 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4489 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4490 * peer labels.
4491 *
4492 */
4493static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4494{
4495 int err;
4496 u32 xfrm_sid;
4497 u32 nlbl_sid;
4498 u32 nlbl_type;
4499
4500 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4501 if (unlikely(err))
4502 return -EACCES;
4503 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4504 if (unlikely(err))
4505 return -EACCES;
4506
4507 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4508 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4509 if (unlikely(err)) {
4510 pr_warn(
4511 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4512 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4513 return -EACCES;
4514 }
4515
4516 return 0;
4517}
4518
4519/**
4520 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4521 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4522 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4523 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4524 *
4525 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4526 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4527 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4528 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4529 *
4530 */
4531static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4532{
4533 int err = 0;
4534
4535 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4536 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4537 conn_sid);
4538 else
4539 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4540
4541 return err;
4542}
4543
4544/* socket security operations */
4545
4546static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4547 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4548{
4549 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4550 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4551 return 0;
4552 }
4553
4554 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4555 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4556}
4557
4558static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4559{
4560 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4561 struct common_audit_data ad;
4562 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4563
4564 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4565 return 0;
4566
4567 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4568 ad.u.net = &net;
4569 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4570
4571 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4572 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4573 &ad);
4574}
4575
4576static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4577 int protocol, int kern)
4578{
4579 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4580 u32 newsid;
4581 u16 secclass;
4582 int rc;
4583
4584 if (kern)
4585 return 0;
4586
4587 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4588 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4589 if (rc)
4590 return rc;
4591
4592 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4593 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4594}
4595
4596static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4597 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4598{
4599 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4600 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4601 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4602 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4603 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4604 int err = 0;
4605
4606 if (!kern) {
4607 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4608 if (err)
4609 return err;
4610 }
4611
4612 isec->sclass = sclass;
4613 isec->sid = sid;
4614 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4615
4616 if (sock->sk) {
4617 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4618 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4619 sksec->sid = sid;
4620 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4621 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4622 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4623
4624 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4625 }
4626
4627 return err;
4628}
4629
4630static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4631 struct socket *sockb)
4632{
4633 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4634 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4635
4636 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4637 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4638
4639 return 0;
4640}
4641
4642/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4643 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4644 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4645
4646static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4647{
4648 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4649 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4650 u16 family;
4651 int err;
4652
4653 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4654 if (err)
4655 goto out;
4656
4657 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4658 family = sk->sk_family;
4659 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4660 char *addrp;
4661 struct common_audit_data ad;
4662 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4663 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4664 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4665 u16 family_sa;
4666 unsigned short snum;
4667 u32 sid, node_perm;
4668
4669 /*
4670 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4671 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4672 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4673 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4674 */
4675 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4676 return -EINVAL;
4677 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4678 switch (family_sa) {
4679 case AF_UNSPEC:
4680 case AF_INET:
4681 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4682 return -EINVAL;
4683 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4684 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4685 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4686 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4687 */
4688 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4689 goto err_af;
4690 family_sa = AF_INET;
4691 }
4692 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4693 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4694 break;
4695 case AF_INET6:
4696 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4697 return -EINVAL;
4698 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4699 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4700 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4701 break;
4702 default:
4703 goto err_af;
4704 }
4705
4706 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4707 ad.u.net = &net;
4708 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4709 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4710
4711 if (snum) {
4712 int low, high;
4713
4714 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4715
4716 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4717 snum < low || snum > high) {
4718 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4719 snum, &sid);
4720 if (err)
4721 goto out;
4722 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4723 sksec->sid, sid,
4724 sksec->sclass,
4725 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4726 if (err)
4727 goto out;
4728 }
4729 }
4730
4731 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4732 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4733 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4734 break;
4735
4736 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4737 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4738 break;
4739
4740 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4741 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4742 break;
4743
4744 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4745 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4746 break;
4747
4748 default:
4749 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4750 break;
4751 }
4752
4753 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4754 if (err)
4755 goto out;
4756
4757 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4758 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4759 else
4760 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4761
4762 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4763 sksec->sid, sid,
4764 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4765 if (err)
4766 goto out;
4767 }
4768out:
4769 return err;
4770err_af:
4771 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4772 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4773 return -EINVAL;
4774 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4775}
4776
4777/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4778 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4779 */
4780static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4781 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4782{
4783 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4784 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4785 int err;
4786
4787 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4788 if (err)
4789 return err;
4790 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4791 return -EINVAL;
4792
4793 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4794 * way to disconnect the socket
4795 */
4796 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4797 return 0;
4798
4799 /*
4800 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4801 * for the port.
4802 */
4803 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4804 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4805 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4806 struct common_audit_data ad;
4807 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4808 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4809 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4810 unsigned short snum;
4811 u32 sid, perm;
4812
4813 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4814 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4815 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4816 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4817 */
4818 switch (address->sa_family) {
4819 case AF_INET:
4820 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4821 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4822 return -EINVAL;
4823 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4824 break;
4825 case AF_INET6:
4826 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4827 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4828 return -EINVAL;
4829 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4830 break;
4831 default:
4832 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4833 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4834 */
4835 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4836 return -EINVAL;
4837 else
4838 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4839 }
4840
4841 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4842 if (err)
4843 return err;
4844
4845 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4846 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4847 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4848 break;
4849 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4850 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4851 break;
4852 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4853 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4854 break;
4855 }
4856
4857 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4858 ad.u.net = &net;
4859 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4860 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4861 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4862 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4863 if (err)
4864 return err;
4865 }
4866
4867 return 0;
4868}
4869
4870/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4871static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4872 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4873{
4874 int err;
4875 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4876
4877 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4878 if (err)
4879 return err;
4880
4881 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4882}
4883
4884static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4885{
4886 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4887}
4888
4889static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4890{
4891 int err;
4892 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4893 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4894 u16 sclass;
4895 u32 sid;
4896
4897 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4898 if (err)
4899 return err;
4900
4901 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4902 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4903 sclass = isec->sclass;
4904 sid = isec->sid;
4905 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4906
4907 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4908 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4909 newisec->sid = sid;
4910 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4911
4912 return 0;
4913}
4914
4915static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4916 int size)
4917{
4918 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4919}
4920
4921static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4922 int size, int flags)
4923{
4924 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4925}
4926
4927static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4928{
4929 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4930}
4931
4932static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4933{
4934 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4935}
4936
4937static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4938{
4939 int err;
4940
4941 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4942 if (err)
4943 return err;
4944
4945 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4946}
4947
4948static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4949 int optname)
4950{
4951 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4952}
4953
4954static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4955{
4956 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4957}
4958
4959static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4960 struct sock *other,
4961 struct sock *newsk)
4962{
4963 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4964 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4965 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4966 struct common_audit_data ad;
4967 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4968 int err;
4969
4970 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4971 ad.u.net = &net;
4972 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4973
4974 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4975 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4976 sksec_other->sclass,
4977 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4978 if (err)
4979 return err;
4980
4981 /* server child socket */
4982 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4983 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4984 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4985 if (err)
4986 return err;
4987
4988 /* connecting socket */
4989 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4990
4991 return 0;
4992}
4993
4994static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4995 struct socket *other)
4996{
4997 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4998 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4999 struct common_audit_data ad;
5000 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5001
5002 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5003 ad.u.net = &net;
5004 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
5005
5006 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5007 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5008 &ad);
5009}
5010
5011static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5012 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5013 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5014{
5015 int err;
5016 u32 if_sid;
5017 u32 node_sid;
5018
5019 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5020 if (err)
5021 return err;
5022 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5023 peer_sid, if_sid,
5024 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5025 if (err)
5026 return err;
5027
5028 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5029 if (err)
5030 return err;
5031 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5032 peer_sid, node_sid,
5033 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5034}
5035
5036static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5037 u16 family)
5038{
5039 int err = 0;
5040 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5041 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5042 struct common_audit_data ad;
5043 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5044 char *addrp;
5045
5046 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5047 ad.u.net = &net;
5048 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5049 ad.u.net->family = family;
5050 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5051 if (err)
5052 return err;
5053
5054 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5055 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5056 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5057 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5058 if (err)
5059 return err;
5060 }
5061
5062 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5063 if (err)
5064 return err;
5065 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5066
5067 return err;
5068}
5069
5070static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5071{
5072 int err;
5073 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5074 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5075 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5076 struct common_audit_data ad;
5077 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5078 char *addrp;
5079 u8 secmark_active;
5080 u8 peerlbl_active;
5081
5082 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5083 return 0;
5084
5085 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5086 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5087 family = PF_INET;
5088
5089 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5090 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5091 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5092 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5093 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5094 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5095
5096 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5097 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5098 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5099 return 0;
5100
5101 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5102 ad.u.net = &net;
5103 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5104 ad.u.net->family = family;
5105 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5106 if (err)
5107 return err;
5108
5109 if (peerlbl_active) {
5110 u32 peer_sid;
5111
5112 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5113 if (err)
5114 return err;
5115 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5116 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5117 if (err) {
5118 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5119 return err;
5120 }
5121 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5122 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5123 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5124 if (err) {
5125 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5126 return err;
5127 }
5128 }
5129
5130 if (secmark_active) {
5131 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5132 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5133 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5134 if (err)
5135 return err;
5136 }
5137
5138 return err;
5139}
5140
5141static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5142 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5143 unsigned int len)
5144{
5145 int err = 0;
5146 char *scontext = NULL;
5147 u32 scontext_len;
5148 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5149 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5150
5151 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5152 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5153 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5154 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5155 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5156 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5157
5158 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5159 &scontext_len);
5160 if (err)
5161 return err;
5162 if (scontext_len > len) {
5163 err = -ERANGE;
5164 goto out_len;
5165 }
5166
5167 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5168 err = -EFAULT;
5169out_len:
5170 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5171 err = -EFAULT;
5172 kfree(scontext);
5173 return err;
5174}
5175
5176static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5177{
5178 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5179 u16 family;
5180 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5181
5182 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5183 family = PF_INET;
5184 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5185 family = PF_INET6;
5186 else if (sock)
5187 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5188 else
5189 goto out;
5190
5191 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5192 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5193 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5194 } else if (skb)
5195 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5196
5197out:
5198 *secid = peer_secid;
5199 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5200 return -EINVAL;
5201 return 0;
5202}
5203
5204static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5205{
5206 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5207
5208 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5209 if (!sksec)
5210 return -ENOMEM;
5211
5212 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5213 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5214 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5215 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5216 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5217
5218 return 0;
5219}
5220
5221static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5222{
5223 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5224
5225 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5226 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5227 kfree(sksec);
5228}
5229
5230static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5231{
5232 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5233 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5234
5235 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5236 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5237 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5238
5239 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5240}
5241
5242static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5243{
5244 if (!sk)
5245 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5246 else {
5247 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5248
5249 *secid = sksec->sid;
5250 }
5251}
5252
5253static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5254{
5255 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5256 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5257 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5258
5259 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5260 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5261 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5262 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5263}
5264
5265/*
5266 * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5267 * if it's the first association on the socket.
5268 */
5269static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5270 struct sk_buff *skb)
5271{
5272 struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5273 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5274 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5275 struct common_audit_data ad;
5276 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5277 int err;
5278
5279 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5280 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5281 family = PF_INET;
5282
5283 if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5284 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5285
5286 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5287 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5288 */
5289 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5290 if (err)
5291 return err;
5292
5293 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5294 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5295 } else {
5296 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5297 }
5298
5299 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5300 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5301
5302 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5303 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5304 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5305 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5306 */
5307 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5308 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5309 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5310 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5311 */
5312 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5313 ad.u.net = &net;
5314 ad.u.net->sk = asoc->base.sk;
5315 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5316 sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5317 sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5318 &ad);
5319 if (err)
5320 return err;
5321 }
5322 return 0;
5323}
5324
5325/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5326 * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5327 * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5328 */
5329static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5330 struct sk_buff *skb)
5331{
5332 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5333 u32 conn_sid;
5334 int err;
5335
5336 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5337 return 0;
5338
5339 err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5340 if (err)
5341 return err;
5342
5343 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5344 * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5345 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5346 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5347 * plug this into the new socket.
5348 */
5349 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5350 if (err)
5351 return err;
5352
5353 asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5354
5355 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5356 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5357}
5358
5359/* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5360 * response to an association request (initited by us).
5361 */
5362static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5363 struct sk_buff *skb)
5364{
5365 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5366
5367 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5368 return 0;
5369
5370 /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5371 * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5372 * into a new socket.
5373 */
5374 asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5375
5376 return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5377}
5378
5379/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5380 * based on their @optname.
5381 */
5382static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5383 struct sockaddr *address,
5384 int addrlen)
5385{
5386 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5387 void *addr_buf;
5388 struct sockaddr *addr;
5389 struct socket *sock;
5390
5391 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5392 return 0;
5393
5394 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5395 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5396 addr_buf = address;
5397
5398 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5399 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5400 return -EINVAL;
5401
5402 addr = addr_buf;
5403 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5404 case AF_UNSPEC:
5405 case AF_INET:
5406 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5407 break;
5408 case AF_INET6:
5409 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5410 break;
5411 default:
5412 return -EINVAL;
5413 }
5414
5415 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5416 return -EINVAL;
5417
5418 err = -EINVAL;
5419 switch (optname) {
5420 /* Bind checks */
5421 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5422 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5423 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5424 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5425 break;
5426 /* Connect checks */
5427 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5428 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5429 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5430 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5431 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5432 if (err)
5433 return err;
5434
5435 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5436 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5437 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5438 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5439 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5440 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5441 * primary address is selected.
5442 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5443 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5444 * selinux_socket_connect().
5445 */
5446 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5447 break;
5448 }
5449
5450 if (err)
5451 return err;
5452
5453 addr_buf += len;
5454 walk_size += len;
5455 }
5456
5457 return 0;
5458}
5459
5460/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5461static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5462 struct sock *newsk)
5463{
5464 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5465 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5466
5467 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5468 * the non-sctp clone version.
5469 */
5470 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5471 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5472
5473 newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5474 newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5475 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5476 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5477}
5478
5479static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5480 struct request_sock *req)
5481{
5482 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5483 int err;
5484 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5485 u32 connsid;
5486 u32 peersid;
5487
5488 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5489 if (err)
5490 return err;
5491 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5492 if (err)
5493 return err;
5494 req->secid = connsid;
5495 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5496
5497 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5498}
5499
5500static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5501 const struct request_sock *req)
5502{
5503 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5504
5505 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5506 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5507 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5508 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5509 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5510 time it will have been created and available. */
5511
5512 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5513 * thread with access to newsksec */
5514 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5515}
5516
5517static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5518{
5519 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5521
5522 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5523 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5524 family = PF_INET;
5525
5526 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5527}
5528
5529static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5530{
5531 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5532 u32 tsid;
5533
5534 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5535 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5536
5537 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5538 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5539 NULL);
5540}
5541
5542static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5543{
5544 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5545}
5546
5547static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5548{
5549 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5550}
5551
5552static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5553 struct flowi_common *flic)
5554{
5555 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5556}
5557
5558static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5559{
5560 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5561
5562 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5563 if (!tunsec)
5564 return -ENOMEM;
5565 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5566
5567 *security = tunsec;
5568 return 0;
5569}
5570
5571static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5572{
5573 kfree(security);
5574}
5575
5576static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5577{
5578 u32 sid = current_sid();
5579
5580 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5581 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5582 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5583 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5584 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5585 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5586
5587 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5588 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5589 NULL);
5590}
5591
5592static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5593{
5594 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5595
5596 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5597 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5598 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5599}
5600
5601static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5602{
5603 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5604 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5605
5606 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5607 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5608 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5609 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5610 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5611 * protocols were being used */
5612
5613 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5614 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5615
5616 return 0;
5617}
5618
5619static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5620{
5621 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5622 u32 sid = current_sid();
5623 int err;
5624
5625 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5626 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5627 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5628 if (err)
5629 return err;
5630 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5631 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5632 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5633 if (err)
5634 return err;
5635 tunsec->sid = sid;
5636
5637 return 0;
5638}
5639
5640#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5641
5642static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5643 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5644{
5645 int ifindex;
5646 u16 family;
5647 char *addrp;
5648 u32 peer_sid;
5649 struct common_audit_data ad;
5650 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5651 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5652
5653 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5654 return NF_ACCEPT;
5655
5656 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5657 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5658 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5659 return NF_ACCEPT;
5660
5661 family = state->pf;
5662 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5663 return NF_DROP;
5664
5665 ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5666 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5667 ad.u.net = &net;
5668 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5669 ad.u.net->family = family;
5670 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5671 return NF_DROP;
5672
5673 if (peerlbl_active) {
5674 int err;
5675
5676 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5677 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5678 if (err) {
5679 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5680 return NF_DROP;
5681 }
5682 }
5683
5684 if (secmark_active)
5685 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5686 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5687 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5688 return NF_DROP;
5689
5690 if (netlbl_enabled())
5691 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5692 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5693 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5694 * protection */
5695 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5696 return NF_DROP;
5697
5698 return NF_ACCEPT;
5699}
5700
5701static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5702 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5703{
5704 struct sock *sk;
5705 u32 sid;
5706
5707 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5708 return NF_ACCEPT;
5709
5710 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5711 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5712 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5713 sk = skb->sk;
5714 if (sk) {
5715 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5716
5717 if (sk_listener(sk))
5718 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5719 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5720 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5721 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5722 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5723 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5724 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5725 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5726 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5727 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5728 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5729 * best we can do. */
5730 return NF_ACCEPT;
5731
5732 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5733 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5734 sid = sksec->sid;
5735 } else
5736 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5737 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5738 return NF_DROP;
5739
5740 return NF_ACCEPT;
5741}
5742
5743
5744static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5745 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5746{
5747 struct sock *sk;
5748 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5749 struct common_audit_data ad;
5750 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5751 u8 proto = 0;
5752
5753 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5754 if (sk == NULL)
5755 return NF_ACCEPT;
5756 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5757
5758 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5759 ad.u.net = &net;
5760 ad.u.net->netif = state->out->ifindex;
5761 ad.u.net->family = state->pf;
5762 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5763 return NF_DROP;
5764
5765 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5766 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5767 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5768 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5769 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5770
5771 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5772 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5773
5774 return NF_ACCEPT;
5775}
5776
5777static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5778 struct sk_buff *skb,
5779 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5780{
5781 u16 family;
5782 u32 secmark_perm;
5783 u32 peer_sid;
5784 int ifindex;
5785 struct sock *sk;
5786 struct common_audit_data ad;
5787 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5788 char *addrp;
5789 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5790
5791 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5792 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5793 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5794 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5795 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5796 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5797
5798 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5799 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5800 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5801 return NF_ACCEPT;
5802
5803 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5804
5805#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5806 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5807 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5808 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5809 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5810 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5811 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5812 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5813 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5814 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5815 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5816 * connection. */
5817 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5818 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5819 return NF_ACCEPT;
5820#endif
5821
5822 family = state->pf;
5823 if (sk == NULL) {
5824 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5825 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5826 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5827 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5828 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5829 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5830 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5831 return NF_DROP;
5832 } else {
5833 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5834 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5835 }
5836 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5837 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5838 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5839 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5840 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5841 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5842 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5843 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5844 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5845 * for similar problems. */
5846 u32 skb_sid;
5847 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5848
5849 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5850 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5851 return NF_DROP;
5852 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5853 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5854 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5855 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5856 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5857 * pass the packet. */
5858 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5859 switch (family) {
5860 case PF_INET:
5861 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5862 return NF_ACCEPT;
5863 break;
5864 case PF_INET6:
5865 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5866 return NF_ACCEPT;
5867 break;
5868 default:
5869 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5870 }
5871 }
5872 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5873 return NF_DROP;
5874 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5875 } else {
5876 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5877 * associated socket. */
5878 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5879 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5880 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5881 }
5882
5883 ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5884 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5885 ad.u.net = &net;
5886 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5887 ad.u.net->family = family;
5888 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5889 return NF_DROP;
5890
5891 if (secmark_active)
5892 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5893 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5894 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5895 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5896
5897 if (peerlbl_active) {
5898 u32 if_sid;
5899 u32 node_sid;
5900
5901 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5902 return NF_DROP;
5903 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5904 peer_sid, if_sid,
5905 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5906 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5907
5908 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5909 return NF_DROP;
5910 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5911 peer_sid, node_sid,
5912 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5913 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5914 }
5915
5916 return NF_ACCEPT;
5917}
5918#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5919
5920static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5921{
5922 int rc = 0;
5923 unsigned int msg_len;
5924 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5925 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5926 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5927 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5928 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5929 u32 perm;
5930
5931 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5932 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5933
5934 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5935 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5936 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5937 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5938 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5939 */
5940 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5941 return 0;
5942
5943 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5944 if (rc == 0) {
5945 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5946 if (rc)
5947 return rc;
5948 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5949 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5950 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5951 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5952 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5953 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5954 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5955 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5956 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
5957 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5958 return rc;
5959 rc = 0;
5960 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5961 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5962 rc = 0;
5963 } else {
5964 return rc;
5965 }
5966
5967 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5968 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5969 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5970 return 0;
5971 data_len -= msg_len;
5972 data += msg_len;
5973 }
5974
5975 return rc;
5976}
5977
5978static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5979{
5980 isec->sclass = sclass;
5981 isec->sid = current_sid();
5982}
5983
5984static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5985 u32 perms)
5986{
5987 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5988 struct common_audit_data ad;
5989 u32 sid = current_sid();
5990
5991 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5992
5993 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5994 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5995
5996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5997 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5998}
5999
6000static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6001{
6002 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6003
6004 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6005 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6006
6007 return 0;
6008}
6009
6010/* message queue security operations */
6011static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6012{
6013 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6014 struct common_audit_data ad;
6015 u32 sid = current_sid();
6016
6017 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6018 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6019
6020 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6021 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6022
6023 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6024 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6025 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
6026}
6027
6028static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6029{
6030 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6031 struct common_audit_data ad;
6032 u32 sid = current_sid();
6033
6034 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6035
6036 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6037 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6038
6039 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6040 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6041 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6042}
6043
6044static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6045{
6046 int err;
6047 int perms;
6048
6049 switch (cmd) {
6050 case IPC_INFO:
6051 case MSG_INFO:
6052 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6053 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6054 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6055 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6056 case IPC_STAT:
6057 case MSG_STAT:
6058 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6059 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6060 break;
6061 case IPC_SET:
6062 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6063 break;
6064 case IPC_RMID:
6065 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6066 break;
6067 default:
6068 return 0;
6069 }
6070
6071 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6072 return err;
6073}
6074
6075static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6076{
6077 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6078 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6079 struct common_audit_data ad;
6080 u32 sid = current_sid();
6081 int rc;
6082
6083 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6084 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6085
6086 /*
6087 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6088 */
6089 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6090 /*
6091 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6092 * message queue this message will be stored in
6093 */
6094 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6095 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6096 if (rc)
6097 return rc;
6098 }
6099
6100 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6101 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6102
6103 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6104 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6105 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6106 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6107 if (!rc)
6108 /* Can this process send the message */
6109 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6110 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6111 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6112 if (!rc)
6113 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6114 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6115 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6116 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6117
6118 return rc;
6119}
6120
6121static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6122 struct task_struct *target,
6123 long type, int mode)
6124{
6125 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6126 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6127 struct common_audit_data ad;
6128 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6129 int rc;
6130
6131 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6132 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6133
6134 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6135 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6136
6137 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6138 sid, isec->sid,
6139 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6140 if (!rc)
6141 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6142 sid, msec->sid,
6143 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6144 return rc;
6145}
6146
6147/* Shared Memory security operations */
6148static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6149{
6150 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6151 struct common_audit_data ad;
6152 u32 sid = current_sid();
6153
6154 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6155 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6156
6157 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6158 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6159
6160 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6161 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6162 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6163}
6164
6165static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6166{
6167 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6168 struct common_audit_data ad;
6169 u32 sid = current_sid();
6170
6171 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6172
6173 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6174 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6175
6176 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6177 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6178 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6179}
6180
6181/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6182static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6183{
6184 int perms;
6185 int err;
6186
6187 switch (cmd) {
6188 case IPC_INFO:
6189 case SHM_INFO:
6190 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6191 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6192 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6193 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6194 case IPC_STAT:
6195 case SHM_STAT:
6196 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6197 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6198 break;
6199 case IPC_SET:
6200 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6201 break;
6202 case SHM_LOCK:
6203 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6204 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6205 break;
6206 case IPC_RMID:
6207 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6208 break;
6209 default:
6210 return 0;
6211 }
6212
6213 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6214 return err;
6215}
6216
6217static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6218 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6219{
6220 u32 perms;
6221
6222 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6223 perms = SHM__READ;
6224 else
6225 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6226
6227 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6228}
6229
6230/* Semaphore security operations */
6231static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6232{
6233 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6234 struct common_audit_data ad;
6235 u32 sid = current_sid();
6236
6237 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6238 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6239
6240 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6241 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6242
6243 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6244 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6245 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6246}
6247
6248static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6249{
6250 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6251 struct common_audit_data ad;
6252 u32 sid = current_sid();
6253
6254 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6255
6256 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6257 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6258
6259 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6260 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6261 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6262}
6263
6264/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6265static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6266{
6267 int err;
6268 u32 perms;
6269
6270 switch (cmd) {
6271 case IPC_INFO:
6272 case SEM_INFO:
6273 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6274 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6275 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6276 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6277 case GETPID:
6278 case GETNCNT:
6279 case GETZCNT:
6280 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6281 break;
6282 case GETVAL:
6283 case GETALL:
6284 perms = SEM__READ;
6285 break;
6286 case SETVAL:
6287 case SETALL:
6288 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6289 break;
6290 case IPC_RMID:
6291 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6292 break;
6293 case IPC_SET:
6294 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6295 break;
6296 case IPC_STAT:
6297 case SEM_STAT:
6298 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6299 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6300 break;
6301 default:
6302 return 0;
6303 }
6304
6305 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6306 return err;
6307}
6308
6309static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6310 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6311{
6312 u32 perms;
6313
6314 if (alter)
6315 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6316 else
6317 perms = SEM__READ;
6318
6319 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6320}
6321
6322static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6323{
6324 u32 av = 0;
6325
6326 av = 0;
6327 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6328 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6329 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6330 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6331
6332 if (av == 0)
6333 return 0;
6334
6335 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6336}
6337
6338static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6339{
6340 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6341 *secid = isec->sid;
6342}
6343
6344static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6345{
6346 if (inode)
6347 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6348}
6349
6350static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6351 const char *name, char **value)
6352{
6353 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6354 u32 sid;
6355 int error;
6356 unsigned len;
6357
6358 rcu_read_lock();
6359 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6360
6361 if (current != p) {
6362 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6363 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6364 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6365 if (error)
6366 goto bad;
6367 }
6368
6369 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6370 sid = __tsec->sid;
6371 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6372 sid = __tsec->osid;
6373 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6374 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6375 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6376 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6377 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6378 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6379 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6380 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6381 else {
6382 error = -EINVAL;
6383 goto bad;
6384 }
6385 rcu_read_unlock();
6386
6387 if (!sid)
6388 return 0;
6389
6390 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6391 if (error)
6392 return error;
6393 return len;
6394
6395bad:
6396 rcu_read_unlock();
6397 return error;
6398}
6399
6400static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6401{
6402 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6403 struct cred *new;
6404 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6405 int error;
6406 char *str = value;
6407
6408 /*
6409 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6410 */
6411 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6412 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6413 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6414 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6415 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6416 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6417 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6418 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6419 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6420 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6421 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6422 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6423 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6424 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6425 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6426 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6427 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6428 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6429 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6430 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6431 else
6432 error = -EINVAL;
6433 if (error)
6434 return error;
6435
6436 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6437 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6438 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6439 str[size-1] = 0;
6440 size--;
6441 }
6442 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6443 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6444 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6445 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6446 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6447 size_t audit_size;
6448
6449 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6450 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6451 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6452 audit_size = size - 1;
6453 else
6454 audit_size = size;
6455 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6456 GFP_ATOMIC,
6457 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6458 if (!ab)
6459 return error;
6460 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6461 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6462 audit_log_end(ab);
6463
6464 return error;
6465 }
6466 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6467 &selinux_state,
6468 value, size, &sid);
6469 }
6470 if (error)
6471 return error;
6472 }
6473
6474 new = prepare_creds();
6475 if (!new)
6476 return -ENOMEM;
6477
6478 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6479 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6480 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6481 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6482 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6483 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6484 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6485 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6486 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6487 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6488 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6489 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6490 if (sid) {
6491 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6492 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6493 if (error)
6494 goto abort_change;
6495 }
6496 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6497 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6498 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6499 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6500 error = -EINVAL;
6501 if (sid == 0)
6502 goto abort_change;
6503
6504 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6505 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6506 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6507 tsec->sid, sid);
6508 if (error)
6509 goto abort_change;
6510 }
6511
6512 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6513 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6514 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6516 if (error)
6517 goto abort_change;
6518
6519 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6520 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6521 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6522 if (ptsid != 0) {
6523 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6524 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6525 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6526 if (error)
6527 goto abort_change;
6528 }
6529
6530 tsec->sid = sid;
6531 } else {
6532 error = -EINVAL;
6533 goto abort_change;
6534 }
6535
6536 commit_creds(new);
6537 return size;
6538
6539abort_change:
6540 abort_creds(new);
6541 return error;
6542}
6543
6544static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6545{
6546 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6547}
6548
6549static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6550{
6551 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6552 secdata, seclen);
6553}
6554
6555static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6556{
6557 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6558 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6559}
6560
6561static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6562{
6563 kfree(secdata);
6564}
6565
6566static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6567{
6568 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6569
6570 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6571 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6572 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6573}
6574
6575/*
6576 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6577 */
6578static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6579{
6580 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6581 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6582 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6583 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6584}
6585
6586/*
6587 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6588 */
6589static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6590{
6591 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6592 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6593}
6594
6595static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6596{
6597 int len = 0;
6598 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&init_user_ns, inode,
6599 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6600 if (len < 0)
6601 return len;
6602 *ctxlen = len;
6603 return 0;
6604}
6605#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6606
6607static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6608 unsigned long flags)
6609{
6610 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6611 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6612
6613 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6614 if (!ksec)
6615 return -ENOMEM;
6616
6617 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6618 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6619 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6620 else
6621 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6622
6623 k->security = ksec;
6624 return 0;
6625}
6626
6627static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6628{
6629 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6630
6631 k->security = NULL;
6632 kfree(ksec);
6633}
6634
6635static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6636 const struct cred *cred,
6637 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6638{
6639 struct key *key;
6640 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6641 u32 perm, sid;
6642
6643 switch (need_perm) {
6644 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6645 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6646 break;
6647 case KEY_NEED_READ:
6648 perm = KEY__READ;
6649 break;
6650 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6651 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6652 break;
6653 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6654 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6655 break;
6656 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6657 perm = KEY__LINK;
6658 break;
6659 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6660 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6661 break;
6662 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6663 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6664 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6665 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6666 return 0;
6667 default:
6668 WARN_ON(1);
6669 return -EPERM;
6670
6671 }
6672
6673 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6674 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6675 ksec = key->security;
6676
6677 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6678 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6679}
6680
6681static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6682{
6683 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6684 char *context = NULL;
6685 unsigned len;
6686 int rc;
6687
6688 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6689 &context, &len);
6690 if (!rc)
6691 rc = len;
6692 *_buffer = context;
6693 return rc;
6694}
6695
6696#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6697static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6698{
6699 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6700 u32 sid = current_sid();
6701
6702 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6703 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6704}
6705#endif
6706#endif
6707
6708#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6709static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6710{
6711 struct common_audit_data ad;
6712 int err;
6713 u32 sid = 0;
6714 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6715 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6716
6717 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6718 if (err)
6719 return err;
6720
6721 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6722 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6723 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6724 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6725 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6726 sec->sid, sid,
6727 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6728 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6729}
6730
6731static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6732 u8 port_num)
6733{
6734 struct common_audit_data ad;
6735 int err;
6736 u32 sid = 0;
6737 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6738 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6739
6740 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6741 &sid);
6742
6743 if (err)
6744 return err;
6745
6746 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6747 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6748 ibendport.port = port_num;
6749 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6750 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6751 sec->sid, sid,
6752 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6753 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6754}
6755
6756static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6757{
6758 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6759
6760 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6761 if (!sec)
6762 return -ENOMEM;
6763 sec->sid = current_sid();
6764
6765 *ib_sec = sec;
6766 return 0;
6767}
6768
6769static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6770{
6771 kfree(ib_sec);
6772}
6773#endif
6774
6775#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6776static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6777 unsigned int size)
6778{
6779 u32 sid = current_sid();
6780 int ret;
6781
6782 switch (cmd) {
6783 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6784 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6785 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6786 NULL);
6787 break;
6788 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6789 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6790 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6791 NULL);
6792 break;
6793 default:
6794 ret = 0;
6795 break;
6796 }
6797
6798 return ret;
6799}
6800
6801static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6802{
6803 u32 av = 0;
6804
6805 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6806 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6807 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6808 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6809 return av;
6810}
6811
6812/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6813 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6814 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6815 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6816 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6817 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6818 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6819 */
6820static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6821{
6822 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6823 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6824 struct bpf_map *map;
6825 int ret;
6826
6827 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6828 map = file->private_data;
6829 bpfsec = map->security;
6830 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6831 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6832 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6833 if (ret)
6834 return ret;
6835 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6836 prog = file->private_data;
6837 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6838 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6839 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6840 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6841 if (ret)
6842 return ret;
6843 }
6844 return 0;
6845}
6846
6847static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6848{
6849 u32 sid = current_sid();
6850 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6851
6852 bpfsec = map->security;
6853 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6854 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6855 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6856}
6857
6858static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6859{
6860 u32 sid = current_sid();
6861 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6862
6863 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6864 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6865 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6866 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6867}
6868
6869static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6870{
6871 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6872
6873 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6874 if (!bpfsec)
6875 return -ENOMEM;
6876
6877 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6878 map->security = bpfsec;
6879
6880 return 0;
6881}
6882
6883static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6884{
6885 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6886
6887 map->security = NULL;
6888 kfree(bpfsec);
6889}
6890
6891static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6892{
6893 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6894
6895 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6896 if (!bpfsec)
6897 return -ENOMEM;
6898
6899 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6900 aux->security = bpfsec;
6901
6902 return 0;
6903}
6904
6905static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6906{
6907 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6908
6909 aux->security = NULL;
6910 kfree(bpfsec);
6911}
6912#endif
6913
6914struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6915 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6916 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6917 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6918 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6919 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6920 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
6921};
6922
6923#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6924static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6925{
6926 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6927
6928 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6929 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6930 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6931 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6932 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6933 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6934 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6935 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6936 else
6937 return -EINVAL;
6938
6939 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6940 requested, NULL);
6941}
6942
6943static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6944{
6945 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6946
6947 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6948 if (!perfsec)
6949 return -ENOMEM;
6950
6951 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6952 event->security = perfsec;
6953
6954 return 0;
6955}
6956
6957static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6958{
6959 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6960
6961 event->security = NULL;
6962 kfree(perfsec);
6963}
6964
6965static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6966{
6967 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6968 u32 sid = current_sid();
6969
6970 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6971 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6972}
6973
6974static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6975{
6976 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6977 u32 sid = current_sid();
6978
6979 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6980 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6981}
6982#endif
6983
6984#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
6985/**
6986 * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
6987 * @new: the target creds
6988 *
6989 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
6990 * to service an io_uring operation.
6991 */
6992static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
6993{
6994 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
6995 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
6996}
6997
6998/**
6999 * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
7000 *
7001 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
7002 * kernel polling thread.
7003 */
7004static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
7005{
7006 int sid = current_sid();
7007
7008 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
7009 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
7010}
7011
7012/**
7013 * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
7014 * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
7015 *
7016 * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
7017 * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
7018 *
7019 */
7020static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
7021{
7022 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
7023 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
7024 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
7025 struct common_audit_data ad;
7026
7027 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
7028 ad.u.file = file;
7029
7030 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
7031 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
7032}
7033#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
7034
7035/*
7036 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7037 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7038 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7039 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7040 * hooks),
7041 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7042 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7043 *
7044 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7045 *
7046 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
7047 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
7048 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
7049 */
7050static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7055
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7065
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7067
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7071
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7082
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7084
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7087
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7119
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7121
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7133
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7135
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7161
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7164
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7169
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7173
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7177
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7179
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7182
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7189
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7192
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7209 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7230 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7231#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7233 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7234 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7235 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7236#endif
7237#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7238 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7239 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7242 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7244 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7246#endif
7247
7248#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7252#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7254#endif
7255#endif
7256
7257#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7261#endif
7262
7263#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7264 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7269#endif
7270
7271#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7276#endif
7277
7278#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7282#endif
7283
7284 /*
7285 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7286 */
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7290#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7292#endif
7293
7294 /*
7295 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7296 */
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7299 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7302 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7304 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7305 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7308#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7310#endif
7311#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7312 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7314 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7315 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7316#endif
7317#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7319#endif
7320#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7321 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7322#endif
7323#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7324 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7325 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7326#endif
7327#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7328 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7329#endif
7330};
7331
7332static __init int selinux_init(void)
7333{
7334 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7335
7336 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7337 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7338 if (CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE)
7339 pr_err("SELinux: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is non-zero. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
7340 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7341 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7342 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7343 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7344
7345 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7346 cred_init_security();
7347
7348 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7349
7350 avc_init();
7351
7352 avtab_cache_init();
7353
7354 ebitmap_cache_init();
7355
7356 hashtab_cache_init();
7357
7358 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7359
7360 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7361 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7362
7363 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7364 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7365
7366 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7367 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7368 else
7369 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7370
7371 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7372
7373 return 0;
7374}
7375
7376static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7377{
7378 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7379}
7380
7381void selinux_complete_init(void)
7382{
7383 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7384
7385 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7386 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7387 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7388}
7389
7390/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7391 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7392DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7393 .name = "selinux",
7394 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7395 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7396 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7397 .init = selinux_init,
7398};
7399
7400#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7401
7402static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7403 {
7404 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7405 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7406 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7407 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7408 },
7409 {
7410 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7411 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7412 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7413 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7414 },
7415 {
7416 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7417 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7418 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7419 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7420 },
7421#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7422 {
7423 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7424 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7425 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7426 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7427 },
7428 {
7429 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7430 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7431 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7432 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7433 },
7434 {
7435 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7436 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7437 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7438 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7439 },
7440#endif /* IPV6 */
7441};
7442
7443static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7444{
7445 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7446 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7447}
7448
7449static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7450{
7451 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7452 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7453}
7454
7455static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7456 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7457 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7458};
7459
7460static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7461{
7462 int err;
7463
7464 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7465 return 0;
7466
7467 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7468
7469 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7470 if (err)
7471 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7472
7473 return 0;
7474}
7475__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7476
7477#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7478static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7479{
7480 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7481
7482 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7483}
7484#endif
7485
7486#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7487
7488#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7489#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7490#endif
7491
7492#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7493
7494#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7495int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7496{
7497 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7498 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7499 return -EINVAL;
7500 }
7501
7502 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7503 /* Only do this once. */
7504 return -EINVAL;
7505 }
7506
7507 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7508
7509 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7510
7511 /*
7512 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7513 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7514 * runtime disable.
7515 */
7516 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7517
7518 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7519
7520 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7521 avc_disable();
7522
7523 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7524 exit_sel_fs();
7525
7526 return 0;
7527}
7528#endif
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/tracehook.h>
28#include <linux/errno.h>
29#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30#include <linux/sched/task.h>
31#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40#include <linux/swap.h>
41#include <linux/spinlock.h>
42#include <linux/syscalls.h>
43#include <linux/dcache.h>
44#include <linux/file.h>
45#include <linux/fdtable.h>
46#include <linux/namei.h>
47#include <linux/mount.h>
48#include <linux/fs_context.h>
49#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57#include <net/net_namespace.h>
58#include <net/netlabel.h>
59#include <linux/uaccess.h>
60#include <asm/ioctls.h>
61#include <linux/atomic.h>
62#include <linux/bitops.h>
63#include <linux/interrupt.h>
64#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65#include <net/netlink.h>
66#include <linux/tcp.h>
67#include <linux/udp.h>
68#include <linux/dccp.h>
69#include <linux/sctp.h>
70#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71#include <linux/quota.h>
72#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <linux/parser.h>
75#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
76#include <net/ipv6.h>
77#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78#include <linux/personality.h>
79#include <linux/audit.h>
80#include <linux/string.h>
81#include <linux/mutex.h>
82#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83#include <linux/syslog.h>
84#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85#include <linux/export.h>
86#include <linux/msg.h>
87#include <linux/shm.h>
88#include <linux/bpf.h>
89#include <linux/kernfs.h>
90#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
91#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
92#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
93#include <linux/fanotify.h>
94
95#include "avc.h"
96#include "objsec.h"
97#include "netif.h"
98#include "netnode.h"
99#include "netport.h"
100#include "ibpkey.h"
101#include "xfrm.h"
102#include "netlabel.h"
103#include "audit.h"
104#include "avc_ss.h"
105
106struct selinux_state selinux_state;
107
108/* SECMARK reference count */
109static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
110
111#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
112static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
113
114static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
115{
116 unsigned long enforcing;
117 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
118 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
119 return 1;
120}
121__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
122#else
123#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
124#endif
125
126int selinux_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
127#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
128static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
129{
130 unsigned long enabled;
131 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
132 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
133 return 1;
134}
135__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
136#endif
137
138static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
139 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
140
141static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
142{
143 unsigned long checkreqprot;
144
145 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
146 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
147 return 1;
148}
149__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
150
151/**
152 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
153 *
154 * Description:
155 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
156 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
157 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
158 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
159 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
160 *
161 */
162static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
163{
164 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
165 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
166}
167
168/**
169 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
170 *
171 * Description:
172 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
173 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
174 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
175 * is always considered enabled.
176 *
177 */
178static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
179{
180 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
181 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
182}
183
184static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
185{
186 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
187 sel_netif_flush();
188 sel_netnode_flush();
189 sel_netport_flush();
190 synchronize_net();
191 }
192 return 0;
193}
194
195static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
196{
197 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
198 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
199 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
200 }
201
202 return 0;
203}
204
205/*
206 * initialise the security for the init task
207 */
208static void cred_init_security(void)
209{
210 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
211 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
212
213 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
214 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
215}
216
217/*
218 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
219 */
220static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
221{
222 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
223
224 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
225 return tsec->sid;
226}
227
228/*
229 * get the objective security ID of a task
230 */
231static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
232{
233 u32 sid;
234
235 rcu_read_lock();
236 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
237 rcu_read_unlock();
238 return sid;
239}
240
241/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
242
243static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
244{
245 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
246 u32 sid = current_sid();
247
248 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
250 isec->inode = inode;
251 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
253 isec->task_sid = sid;
254 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
255
256 return 0;
257}
258
259static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
260
261/*
262 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
263 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
264 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
265 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
266 */
267static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
268 struct dentry *dentry,
269 bool may_sleep)
270{
271 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
272
273 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
274
275 if (selinux_state.initialized &&
276 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
277 if (!may_sleep)
278 return -ECHILD;
279
280 /*
281 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
282 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
283 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
284 */
285 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
286 }
287 return 0;
288}
289
290static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
291{
292 return selinux_inode(inode);
293}
294
295static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
296{
297 int error;
298
299 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
300 if (error)
301 return ERR_PTR(error);
302 return selinux_inode(inode);
303}
304
305/*
306 * Get the security label of an inode.
307 */
308static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
309{
310 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
311 return selinux_inode(inode);
312}
313
314static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
315{
316 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
317
318 return selinux_inode(inode);
319}
320
321/*
322 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
323 */
324static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
325{
326 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
327
328 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
329 return selinux_inode(inode);
330}
331
332static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
333{
334 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
335 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
336
337 if (!isec)
338 return;
339 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
340 /*
341 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
342 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
343 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
344 *
345 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
346 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
347 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
348 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
349 */
350 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
351 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
352 list_del_init(&isec->list);
353 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
354 }
355}
356
357static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
358{
359 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
360 u32 sid = current_sid();
361
362 fsec->sid = sid;
363 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
364
365 return 0;
366}
367
368static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
369{
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
371
372 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
373 if (!sbsec)
374 return -ENOMEM;
375
376 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
377 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
378 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
379 sbsec->sb = sb;
380 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
381 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
382 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
383 sb->s_security = sbsec;
384
385 return 0;
386}
387
388static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
389{
390 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
391 sb->s_security = NULL;
392 kfree(sbsec);
393}
394
395struct selinux_mnt_opts {
396 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
397};
398
399static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
400{
401 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
402 kfree(opts->fscontext);
403 kfree(opts->context);
404 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
405 kfree(opts->defcontext);
406 kfree(opts);
407}
408
409static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
410{
411 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
412}
413
414enum {
415 Opt_error = -1,
416 Opt_context = 0,
417 Opt_defcontext = 1,
418 Opt_fscontext = 2,
419 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
420 Opt_seclabel = 4,
421};
422
423#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
424static struct {
425 const char *name;
426 int len;
427 int opt;
428 bool has_arg;
429} tokens[] = {
430 A(context, true),
431 A(fscontext, true),
432 A(defcontext, true),
433 A(rootcontext, true),
434 A(seclabel, false),
435};
436#undef A
437
438static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
439{
440 int i;
441
442 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
443 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
444 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
445 continue;
446 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
447 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
448 continue;
449 *arg = s + len + 1;
450 } else if (len != l)
451 continue;
452 return tokens[i].opt;
453 }
454 return Opt_error;
455}
456
457#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
458
459static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
460 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
461 const struct cred *cred)
462{
463 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
464 int rc;
465
466 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
467 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
468 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
469 if (rc)
470 return rc;
471
472 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
473 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
474 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
475 return rc;
476}
477
478static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
479 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
480 const struct cred *cred)
481{
482 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
483 int rc;
484 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
485 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
486 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
487 if (rc)
488 return rc;
489
490 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
491 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
492 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
493 return rc;
494}
495
496static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
497{
498 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
499 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
500 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
501 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
502 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
503 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
504 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
505 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
506 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
507}
508
509static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
510{
511 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
512
513 /*
514 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
515 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
516 */
517 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
518
519 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
520 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
521 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
522 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
523 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
524 return 1;
525
526 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
527 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
528
529 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
530 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
531 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
532 default:
533 return 0;
534 }
535}
536
537static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
538{
539 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
540 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
541 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
542 int rc = 0;
543
544 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
545 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
546 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
547 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
548 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
549 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
550 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
551 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
552 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
553 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
554 goto out;
555 }
556
557 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
558 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
559 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
560 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
561 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
562 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
563 else
564 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
565 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
566 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
567 goto out;
568 }
569 }
570
571 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
572
573 /*
574 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
575 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
576 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
577 */
578 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
579 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
580 else
581 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
582
583 /* Initialize the root inode. */
584 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
585
586 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
587 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
588 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
589 populates itself. */
590 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
591 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
592 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
593 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
594 struct inode_security_struct, list);
595 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
596 list_del_init(&isec->list);
597 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
598 inode = igrab(inode);
599 if (inode) {
600 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
601 inode_doinit(inode);
602 iput(inode);
603 }
604 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
605 }
606 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
607out:
608 return rc;
609}
610
611static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
612 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
613{
614 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
615
616 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
617 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
618 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
619 (old_sid != new_sid))
620 return 1;
621
622 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
623 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
624 */
625 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
626 if (mnt_flags & flag)
627 return 1;
628 return 0;
629}
630
631static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
632{
633 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
634 sid, GFP_KERNEL);
635 if (rc)
636 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
637 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
638 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
639 return rc;
640}
641
642/*
643 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
644 * labeling information.
645 */
646static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
647 void *mnt_opts,
648 unsigned long kern_flags,
649 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
650{
651 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
652 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
653 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
654 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
655 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
656 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
657 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
658 int rc = 0;
659
660 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
661
662 if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
663 if (!opts) {
664 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
665 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
666 server is ready to handle calls. */
667 goto out;
668 }
669 rc = -EINVAL;
670 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
671 "before the security server is initialized\n");
672 goto out;
673 }
674 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
675 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
676 * place the results is not allowed */
677 rc = -EINVAL;
678 goto out;
679 }
680
681 /*
682 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
683 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
684 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
685 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
686 *
687 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
688 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
689 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
690 * will be used for both mounts)
691 */
692 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
693 && !opts)
694 goto out;
695
696 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
697
698 /*
699 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
700 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
701 * than once with different security options.
702 */
703 if (opts) {
704 if (opts->fscontext) {
705 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
706 if (rc)
707 goto out;
708 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
709 fscontext_sid))
710 goto out_double_mount;
711 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
712 }
713 if (opts->context) {
714 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
715 if (rc)
716 goto out;
717 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
718 context_sid))
719 goto out_double_mount;
720 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
721 }
722 if (opts->rootcontext) {
723 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
724 if (rc)
725 goto out;
726 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
727 rootcontext_sid))
728 goto out_double_mount;
729 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
730 }
731 if (opts->defcontext) {
732 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
733 if (rc)
734 goto out;
735 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
736 defcontext_sid))
737 goto out_double_mount;
738 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
739 }
740 }
741
742 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
743 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
744 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
745 goto out_double_mount;
746 rc = 0;
747 goto out;
748 }
749
750 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
751 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
752
753 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
754 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
755 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
756 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
757
758 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
759 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
760 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
761 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
762
763 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
764 /*
765 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
766 * filesystem type.
767 */
768 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
769 if (rc) {
770 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
771 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
772 goto out;
773 }
774 }
775
776 /*
777 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
778 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
779 * line and security labels must be ignored.
780 */
781 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
782 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
783 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
784 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
785 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
786 defcontext_sid) {
787 rc = -EACCES;
788 goto out;
789 }
790 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
792 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
793 current_sid(),
794 current_sid(),
795 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
796 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
797 if (rc)
798 goto out;
799 }
800 goto out_set_opts;
801 }
802
803 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
804 if (fscontext_sid) {
805 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
806 if (rc)
807 goto out;
808
809 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
810 }
811
812 /*
813 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
814 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
815 * the superblock context if not already set.
816 */
817 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
818 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
819 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
820 }
821
822 if (context_sid) {
823 if (!fscontext_sid) {
824 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
825 cred);
826 if (rc)
827 goto out;
828 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
829 } else {
830 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
831 cred);
832 if (rc)
833 goto out;
834 }
835 if (!rootcontext_sid)
836 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
837
838 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
839 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
840 }
841
842 if (rootcontext_sid) {
843 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
844 cred);
845 if (rc)
846 goto out;
847
848 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
849 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
850 }
851
852 if (defcontext_sid) {
853 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
854 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
855 rc = -EINVAL;
856 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
857 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
858 goto out;
859 }
860
861 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
862 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
863 sbsec, cred);
864 if (rc)
865 goto out;
866 }
867
868 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
869 }
870
871out_set_opts:
872 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
873out:
874 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
875 return rc;
876out_double_mount:
877 rc = -EINVAL;
878 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
879 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
880 sb->s_type->name);
881 goto out;
882}
883
884static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
885 const struct super_block *newsb)
886{
887 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
888 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
889 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
890 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
891
892 if (oldflags != newflags)
893 goto mismatch;
894 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
895 goto mismatch;
896 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
897 goto mismatch;
898 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
899 goto mismatch;
900 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
901 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
902 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
903 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
904 goto mismatch;
905 }
906 return 0;
907mismatch:
908 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
909 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
910 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
911 return -EBUSY;
912}
913
914static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
915 struct super_block *newsb,
916 unsigned long kern_flags,
917 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
918{
919 int rc = 0;
920 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
921 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
922
923 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
924 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
925 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
926
927 /*
928 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
929 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
930 */
931 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
932 return 0;
933
934 /*
935 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
936 * place the results is not allowed.
937 */
938 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
939 return -EINVAL;
940
941 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
942 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
943
944 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
945 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
946 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
947 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
948 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
949 }
950
951 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
952
953 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
954
955 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
956 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
957 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
958
959 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
960 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
961 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
962 if (rc)
963 goto out;
964 }
965
966 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
967 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
968 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
969 }
970
971 if (set_context) {
972 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
973
974 if (!set_fscontext)
975 newsbsec->sid = sid;
976 if (!set_rootcontext) {
977 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
978 newisec->sid = sid;
979 }
980 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
981 }
982 if (set_rootcontext) {
983 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
984 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
985
986 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
987 }
988
989 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
990out:
991 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
992 return rc;
993}
994
995static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
996{
997 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
998
999 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
1000 return 0;
1001
1002 if (!opts) {
1003 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1004 if (!opts)
1005 return -ENOMEM;
1006 *mnt_opts = opts;
1007 }
1008 if (!s)
1009 return -ENOMEM;
1010 switch (token) {
1011 case Opt_context:
1012 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1013 goto Einval;
1014 opts->context = s;
1015 break;
1016 case Opt_fscontext:
1017 if (opts->fscontext)
1018 goto Einval;
1019 opts->fscontext = s;
1020 break;
1021 case Opt_rootcontext:
1022 if (opts->rootcontext)
1023 goto Einval;
1024 opts->rootcontext = s;
1025 break;
1026 case Opt_defcontext:
1027 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1028 goto Einval;
1029 opts->defcontext = s;
1030 break;
1031 }
1032 return 0;
1033Einval:
1034 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1035 return -EINVAL;
1036}
1037
1038static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
1039 void **mnt_opts)
1040{
1041 int token = Opt_error;
1042 int rc, i;
1043
1044 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
1045 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
1046 token = tokens[i].opt;
1047 break;
1048 }
1049 }
1050
1051 if (token == Opt_error)
1052 return -EINVAL;
1053
1054 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1055 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1056 if (!val) {
1057 rc = -ENOMEM;
1058 goto free_opt;
1059 }
1060 }
1061 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1062 if (unlikely(rc)) {
1063 kfree(val);
1064 goto free_opt;
1065 }
1066 return rc;
1067
1068free_opt:
1069 if (*mnt_opts) {
1070 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1071 *mnt_opts = NULL;
1072 }
1073 return rc;
1074}
1075
1076static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1077{
1078 char *context = NULL;
1079 u32 len;
1080 int rc;
1081
1082 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1083 &context, &len);
1084 if (!rc) {
1085 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1086
1087 seq_putc(m, '=');
1088 if (has_comma)
1089 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1090 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1091 if (has_comma)
1092 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1093 }
1094 kfree(context);
1095 return rc;
1096}
1097
1098static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1099{
1100 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
1101 int rc;
1102
1103 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1104 return 0;
1105
1106 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
1107 return 0;
1108
1109 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1110 seq_putc(m, ',');
1111 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1112 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1113 if (rc)
1114 return rc;
1115 }
1116 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1117 seq_putc(m, ',');
1118 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1119 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1120 if (rc)
1121 return rc;
1122 }
1123 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1124 seq_putc(m, ',');
1125 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1126 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1127 if (rc)
1128 return rc;
1129 }
1130 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1131 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
1132 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1133 seq_putc(m, ',');
1134 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1135 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1136 if (rc)
1137 return rc;
1138 }
1139 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1140 seq_putc(m, ',');
1141 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1142 }
1143 return 0;
1144}
1145
1146static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1147{
1148 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1149 case S_IFSOCK:
1150 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1151 case S_IFLNK:
1152 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1153 case S_IFREG:
1154 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1155 case S_IFBLK:
1156 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1157 case S_IFDIR:
1158 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1159 case S_IFCHR:
1160 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1161 case S_IFIFO:
1162 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1163
1164 }
1165
1166 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1167}
1168
1169static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1170{
1171 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1172}
1173
1174static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1175{
1176 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1177}
1178
1179static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1180{
1181 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1182
1183 switch (family) {
1184 case PF_UNIX:
1185 switch (type) {
1186 case SOCK_STREAM:
1187 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1188 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1189 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1190 case SOCK_RAW:
1191 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1192 }
1193 break;
1194 case PF_INET:
1195 case PF_INET6:
1196 switch (type) {
1197 case SOCK_STREAM:
1198 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1199 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1200 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1201 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1202 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1203 else
1204 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1205 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1206 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1207 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1208 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1209 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1210 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1211 else
1212 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1213 case SOCK_DCCP:
1214 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1215 default:
1216 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1217 }
1218 break;
1219 case PF_NETLINK:
1220 switch (protocol) {
1221 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1223 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1225 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1226 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1227 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1228 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1229 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1230 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1231 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1232 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1233 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1234 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1235 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1236 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1237 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1238 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1239 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1240 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1241 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1242 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1243 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1244 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1245 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1246 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1247 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1248 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1249 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1250 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1251 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1252 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1253 default:
1254 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1255 }
1256 case PF_PACKET:
1257 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1258 case PF_KEY:
1259 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1260 case PF_APPLETALK:
1261 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1262 }
1263
1264 if (extsockclass) {
1265 switch (family) {
1266 case PF_AX25:
1267 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1268 case PF_IPX:
1269 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1270 case PF_NETROM:
1271 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1272 case PF_ATMPVC:
1273 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1274 case PF_X25:
1275 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1276 case PF_ROSE:
1277 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1278 case PF_DECnet:
1279 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1280 case PF_ATMSVC:
1281 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1282 case PF_RDS:
1283 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1284 case PF_IRDA:
1285 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1286 case PF_PPPOX:
1287 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1288 case PF_LLC:
1289 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1290 case PF_CAN:
1291 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1292 case PF_TIPC:
1293 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1294 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1295 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1296 case PF_IUCV:
1297 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1298 case PF_RXRPC:
1299 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1300 case PF_ISDN:
1301 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1302 case PF_PHONET:
1303 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1304 case PF_IEEE802154:
1305 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1306 case PF_CAIF:
1307 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1308 case PF_ALG:
1309 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1310 case PF_NFC:
1311 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1312 case PF_VSOCK:
1313 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1314 case PF_KCM:
1315 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1316 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1317 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1318 case PF_SMC:
1319 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1320 case PF_XDP:
1321 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1322#if PF_MAX > 45
1323#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1324#endif
1325 }
1326 }
1327
1328 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1329}
1330
1331static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1332 u16 tclass,
1333 u16 flags,
1334 u32 *sid)
1335{
1336 int rc;
1337 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1338 char *buffer, *path;
1339
1340 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1341 if (!buffer)
1342 return -ENOMEM;
1343
1344 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1345 if (IS_ERR(path))
1346 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1347 else {
1348 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1349 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1350 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1351 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1352 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1353 path[1] = '/';
1354 path++;
1355 }
1356 }
1357 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1358 path, tclass, sid);
1359 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1360 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1361 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1362 rc = 0;
1363 }
1364 }
1365 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1366 return rc;
1367}
1368
1369static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1370 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1371{
1372#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1373 char *context;
1374 unsigned int len;
1375 int rc;
1376
1377 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1378 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1379 if (!context)
1380 return -ENOMEM;
1381
1382 context[len] = '\0';
1383 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1384 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1385 kfree(context);
1386
1387 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1388 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1389 if (rc < 0)
1390 return rc;
1391
1392 len = rc;
1393 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1394 if (!context)
1395 return -ENOMEM;
1396
1397 context[len] = '\0';
1398 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1399 context, len);
1400 }
1401 if (rc < 0) {
1402 kfree(context);
1403 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1404 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1405 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1406 return rc;
1407 }
1408 *sid = def_sid;
1409 return 0;
1410 }
1411
1412 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1413 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1414 if (rc) {
1415 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1416 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1417
1418 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1419 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1420 ino, dev, context);
1421 } else {
1422 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1423 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1424 }
1425 }
1426 kfree(context);
1427 return 0;
1428}
1429
1430/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1431static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1432{
1433 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1434 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1435 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1436 u16 sclass;
1437 struct dentry *dentry;
1438 int rc = 0;
1439
1440 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1441 return 0;
1442
1443 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1444 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1445 goto out_unlock;
1446
1447 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1448 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1449
1450 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1451 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1452 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1453 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1454 server is ready to handle calls. */
1455 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1456 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1457 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1458 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1459 goto out_unlock;
1460 }
1461
1462 sclass = isec->sclass;
1463 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1464 sid = isec->sid;
1465 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1466 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1467
1468 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1469 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1470 break;
1471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1472 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1473 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1474 break;
1475 }
1476 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1477 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1478 if (opt_dentry) {
1479 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1480 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1481 } else {
1482 /*
1483 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1484 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1485 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1486 * two, depending upon that...
1487 */
1488 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1489 if (!dentry)
1490 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1491 }
1492 if (!dentry) {
1493 /*
1494 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1495 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1496 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1497 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1498 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1499 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1500 * be used again by userspace.
1501 */
1502 goto out;
1503 }
1504
1505 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1506 &sid);
1507 dput(dentry);
1508 if (rc)
1509 goto out;
1510 break;
1511 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1512 sid = task_sid;
1513 break;
1514 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1515 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1516 sid = sbsec->sid;
1517
1518 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1519 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1520 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1521 if (rc)
1522 goto out;
1523 break;
1524 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1525 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1526 break;
1527 default:
1528 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1529 sid = sbsec->sid;
1530
1531 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1532 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1533 * procfs inodes */
1534 if (opt_dentry) {
1535 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1536 * d_splice_alias. */
1537 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1538 } else {
1539 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1540 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1541 * a connected one, so try that first.
1542 */
1543 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1544 if (!dentry)
1545 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1546 }
1547 /*
1548 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1549 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1550 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1551 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1552 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1553 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1554 * could be used again by userspace.
1555 */
1556 if (!dentry)
1557 goto out;
1558 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1559 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1560 if (rc) {
1561 dput(dentry);
1562 goto out;
1563 }
1564
1565 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1566 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1567 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1568 sid, &sid);
1569 if (rc) {
1570 dput(dentry);
1571 goto out;
1572 }
1573 }
1574 dput(dentry);
1575 }
1576 break;
1577 }
1578
1579out:
1580 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1581 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1582 if (!sid || rc) {
1583 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1584 goto out_unlock;
1585 }
1586
1587 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1588 isec->sid = sid;
1589 }
1590
1591out_unlock:
1592 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1593 return rc;
1594}
1595
1596/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1597static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1598{
1599 u32 perm = 0;
1600
1601 switch (sig) {
1602 case SIGCHLD:
1603 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1604 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1605 break;
1606 case SIGKILL:
1607 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1608 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1609 break;
1610 case SIGSTOP:
1611 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1612 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1613 break;
1614 default:
1615 /* All other signals. */
1616 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1617 break;
1618 }
1619
1620 return perm;
1621}
1622
1623#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1624#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1625#endif
1626
1627/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1628static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1629 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1630{
1631 struct common_audit_data ad;
1632 struct av_decision avd;
1633 u16 sclass;
1634 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1635 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1636 int rc;
1637
1638 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1639 ad.u.cap = cap;
1640
1641 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1642 case 0:
1643 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1644 break;
1645 case 1:
1646 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1647 break;
1648 default:
1649 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1650 BUG();
1651 return -EINVAL;
1652 }
1653
1654 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1655 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1656 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1657 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1658 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1659 if (rc2)
1660 return rc2;
1661 }
1662 return rc;
1663}
1664
1665/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1666 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1667 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1668static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1669 struct inode *inode,
1670 u32 perms,
1671 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1672{
1673 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1674 u32 sid;
1675
1676 validate_creds(cred);
1677
1678 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1679 return 0;
1680
1681 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1682 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1683
1684 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1685 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1686}
1687
1688/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1689 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1690 pathname if needed. */
1691static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1692 struct dentry *dentry,
1693 u32 av)
1694{
1695 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1696 struct common_audit_data ad;
1697
1698 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1699 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1700 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1701 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1702}
1703
1704/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1705 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1706 pathname if needed. */
1707static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1708 const struct path *path,
1709 u32 av)
1710{
1711 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1712 struct common_audit_data ad;
1713
1714 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1715 ad.u.path = *path;
1716 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1717 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1718}
1719
1720/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1721static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1722 struct file *file,
1723 u32 av)
1724{
1725 struct common_audit_data ad;
1726
1727 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1728 ad.u.file = file;
1729 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1730}
1731
1732#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1733static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1734#endif
1735
1736/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1737 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1738 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1739 check a particular permission to the file.
1740 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1741 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1742 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1743 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1744static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct file *file,
1746 u32 av)
1747{
1748 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1749 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1750 struct common_audit_data ad;
1751 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 int rc;
1753
1754 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1755 ad.u.file = file;
1756
1757 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1758 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1759 sid, fsec->sid,
1760 SECCLASS_FD,
1761 FD__USE,
1762 &ad);
1763 if (rc)
1764 goto out;
1765 }
1766
1767#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1768 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1769 if (rc)
1770 return rc;
1771#endif
1772
1773 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1774 rc = 0;
1775 if (av)
1776 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1777
1778out:
1779 return rc;
1780}
1781
1782/*
1783 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1784 */
1785static int
1786selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1787 struct inode *dir,
1788 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1789 u32 *_new_isid)
1790{
1791 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1792
1793 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1794 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1795 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1796 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1797 tsec->create_sid) {
1798 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1799 } else {
1800 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1801 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1802 dsec->sid, tclass,
1803 name, _new_isid);
1804 }
1805
1806 return 0;
1807}
1808
1809/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1810static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1811 struct dentry *dentry,
1812 u16 tclass)
1813{
1814 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1815 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1816 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1817 u32 sid, newsid;
1818 struct common_audit_data ad;
1819 int rc;
1820
1821 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1822 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1823
1824 sid = tsec->sid;
1825
1826 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1827 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1828
1829 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1830 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1831 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1832 &ad);
1833 if (rc)
1834 return rc;
1835
1836 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), dir,
1837 &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
1838 if (rc)
1839 return rc;
1840
1841 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1842 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1843 if (rc)
1844 return rc;
1845
1846 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1847 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1848 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1849 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1850}
1851
1852#define MAY_LINK 0
1853#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1854#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1855
1856/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1857static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1858 struct dentry *dentry,
1859 int kind)
1860
1861{
1862 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1863 struct common_audit_data ad;
1864 u32 sid = current_sid();
1865 u32 av;
1866 int rc;
1867
1868 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1869 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1870
1871 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1872 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1873
1874 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1875 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1876 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1877 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1878 if (rc)
1879 return rc;
1880
1881 switch (kind) {
1882 case MAY_LINK:
1883 av = FILE__LINK;
1884 break;
1885 case MAY_UNLINK:
1886 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1887 break;
1888 case MAY_RMDIR:
1889 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1890 break;
1891 default:
1892 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1893 __func__, kind);
1894 return 0;
1895 }
1896
1897 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1898 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1899 return rc;
1900}
1901
1902static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1903 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1904 struct inode *new_dir,
1905 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1906{
1907 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1908 struct common_audit_data ad;
1909 u32 sid = current_sid();
1910 u32 av;
1911 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1912 int rc;
1913
1914 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1915 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1916 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1917 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1918
1919 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1920
1921 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1922 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1923 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1924 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1925 if (rc)
1926 return rc;
1927 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1928 sid, old_isec->sid,
1929 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1930 if (rc)
1931 return rc;
1932 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1933 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1934 sid, old_isec->sid,
1935 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1936 if (rc)
1937 return rc;
1938 }
1939
1940 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1941 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1942 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1943 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1944 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1945 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1946 if (rc)
1947 return rc;
1948 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1949 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1950 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1951 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1952 sid, new_isec->sid,
1953 new_isec->sclass,
1954 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1955 if (rc)
1956 return rc;
1957 }
1958
1959 return 0;
1960}
1961
1962/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1963static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1964 struct super_block *sb,
1965 u32 perms,
1966 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1967{
1968 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1969 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1970
1971 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1972 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1973 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1974}
1975
1976/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1977static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1978{
1979 u32 av = 0;
1980
1981 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1982 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1983 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1984 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1985 av |= FILE__READ;
1986
1987 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1988 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1989 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1990 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1991
1992 } else {
1993 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1994 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1995 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1996 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1997 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1998 av |= DIR__READ;
1999 }
2000
2001 return av;
2002}
2003
2004/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2005static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2006{
2007 u32 av = 0;
2008
2009 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2010 av |= FILE__READ;
2011 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2012 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2013 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2014 else
2015 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2016 }
2017 if (!av) {
2018 /*
2019 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2020 */
2021 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2022 }
2023
2024 return av;
2025}
2026
2027/*
2028 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2029 * open permission.
2030 */
2031static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2032{
2033 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2034 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2035
2036 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2037 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2038 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2039
2040 return av;
2041}
2042
2043/* Hook functions begin here. */
2044
2045static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2046{
2047 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2048 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2049
2050 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2051 mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2052 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2053}
2054
2055static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2056 struct task_struct *to)
2057{
2058 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2059 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2060 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2061 int rc;
2062
2063 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2064 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2065 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2066 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2067 if (rc)
2068 return rc;
2069 }
2070
2071 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2072 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2073 NULL);
2074}
2075
2076static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2077 struct task_struct *to)
2078{
2079 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2080 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2081
2082 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2083 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2084 NULL);
2085}
2086
2087static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2088 struct task_struct *to,
2089 struct file *file)
2090{
2091 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2092 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2093 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2094 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2095 struct common_audit_data ad;
2096 int rc;
2097
2098 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2099 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2100
2101 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2102 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2103 sid, fsec->sid,
2104 SECCLASS_FD,
2105 FD__USE,
2106 &ad);
2107 if (rc)
2108 return rc;
2109 }
2110
2111#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2112 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2113 if (rc)
2114 return rc;
2115#endif
2116
2117 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2118 return 0;
2119
2120 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2121 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2122 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2123 &ad);
2124}
2125
2126static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2127 unsigned int mode)
2128{
2129 u32 sid = current_sid();
2130 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2131
2132 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2133 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2134 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2135
2136 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2137 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2138}
2139
2140static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2141{
2142 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2143 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2144 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2145}
2146
2147static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2148 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2149{
2150 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2151 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2152 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2153}
2154
2155static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2156 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2157 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2158 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2159{
2160 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2161 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2162 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2163}
2164
2165/*
2166 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2167 * which was removed).
2168 *
2169 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2170 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2171 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2172 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2173 */
2174
2175static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2176 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2177{
2178 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2179}
2180
2181static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2182{
2183 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2184 int rc = 0;
2185
2186 if (!sb)
2187 return 0;
2188
2189 switch (cmds) {
2190 case Q_SYNC:
2191 case Q_QUOTAON:
2192 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2193 case Q_SETINFO:
2194 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2195 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2196 break;
2197 case Q_GETFMT:
2198 case Q_GETINFO:
2199 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2200 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2201 break;
2202 default:
2203 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2204 break;
2205 }
2206 return rc;
2207}
2208
2209static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2210{
2211 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2212
2213 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2214}
2215
2216static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2217{
2218 switch (type) {
2219 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2220 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2221 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2222 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2223 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2224 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2225 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2226 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2227 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2228 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2229 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2230 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2231 NULL);
2232 }
2233 /* All other syslog types */
2234 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2235 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2236 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2237}
2238
2239/*
2240 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2241 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2242 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2243 *
2244 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2245 * processes that allocate mappings.
2246 */
2247static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2248{
2249 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2250
2251 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2252 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2253 if (rc == 0)
2254 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2255
2256 return cap_sys_admin;
2257}
2258
2259/* binprm security operations */
2260
2261static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2262{
2263 u32 sid = 0;
2264 struct task_struct *tracer;
2265
2266 rcu_read_lock();
2267 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2268 if (tracer)
2269 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2270 rcu_read_unlock();
2271
2272 return sid;
2273}
2274
2275static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2276 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2277 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2278{
2279 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2280 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2281 int rc;
2282 u32 av;
2283
2284 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2285 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2286
2287 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2288 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2289
2290 /*
2291 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2292 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2293 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2294 * the old and new contexts.
2295 */
2296 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2297 av = 0;
2298 if (nnp)
2299 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2300 if (nosuid)
2301 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2302 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2303 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2304 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2305 if (!rc)
2306 return 0;
2307 }
2308
2309 /*
2310 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2311 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2312 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2313 */
2314 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2315 new_tsec->sid);
2316 if (!rc)
2317 return 0;
2318
2319 /*
2320 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2321 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2322 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2323 */
2324 if (nnp)
2325 return -EPERM;
2326 return -EACCES;
2327}
2328
2329static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2330{
2331 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2332 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2333 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2334 struct common_audit_data ad;
2335 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2336 int rc;
2337
2338 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2339 * the script interpreter */
2340 if (bprm->called_set_creds)
2341 return 0;
2342
2343 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2344 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2345 isec = inode_security(inode);
2346
2347 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2348 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2349 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2350
2351 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2352 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2353 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2354 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2355
2356 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2357 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2358 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2359 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2360
2361 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2362 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2363 if (rc)
2364 return rc;
2365 } else {
2366 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2367 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2368 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2369 &new_tsec->sid);
2370 if (rc)
2371 return rc;
2372
2373 /*
2374 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2375 * transition.
2376 */
2377 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2378 if (rc)
2379 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2380 }
2381
2382 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2383 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2384
2385 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2386 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2387 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2388 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2389 if (rc)
2390 return rc;
2391 } else {
2392 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2393 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2394 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2395 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2396 if (rc)
2397 return rc;
2398
2399 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2400 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2401 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2402 if (rc)
2403 return rc;
2404
2405 /* Check for shared state */
2406 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2407 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2408 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2409 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2410 NULL);
2411 if (rc)
2412 return -EPERM;
2413 }
2414
2415 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2416 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2417 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2418 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2419 if (ptsid != 0) {
2420 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2421 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2422 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2423 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2424 if (rc)
2425 return -EPERM;
2426 }
2427 }
2428
2429 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2430 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2431
2432 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2433 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2434 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2435 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2436 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2437 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2438 NULL);
2439 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2440 }
2441
2442 return 0;
2443}
2444
2445static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2446{
2447 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2448}
2449
2450/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2451static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2452 struct files_struct *files)
2453{
2454 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2455 struct tty_struct *tty;
2456 int drop_tty = 0;
2457 unsigned n;
2458
2459 tty = get_current_tty();
2460 if (tty) {
2461 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2462 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2463 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2464
2465 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2466 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2467 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2468 open file may belong to another process and we are
2469 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2470 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2471 struct tty_file_private, list);
2472 file = file_priv->file;
2473 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2474 drop_tty = 1;
2475 }
2476 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2477 tty_kref_put(tty);
2478 }
2479 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2480 if (drop_tty)
2481 no_tty();
2482
2483 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2484 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2485 if (!n) /* none found? */
2486 return;
2487
2488 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2489 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2490 devnull = NULL;
2491 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2492 do {
2493 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2494 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2495 if (devnull)
2496 fput(devnull);
2497}
2498
2499/*
2500 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2501 */
2502static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2503{
2504 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2505 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2506 int rc, i;
2507
2508 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2509 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2510 return;
2511
2512 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2513 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2514
2515 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2516 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2517
2518 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2519 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2520 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2521 *
2522 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2523 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2524 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2525 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2526 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2527 */
2528 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2529 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2530 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2531 if (rc) {
2532 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2533 task_lock(current);
2534 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2535 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2536 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2537 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2538 }
2539 task_unlock(current);
2540 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2541 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2542 }
2543}
2544
2545/*
2546 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2547 * due to exec
2548 */
2549static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2550{
2551 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2552 struct itimerval itimer;
2553 u32 osid, sid;
2554 int rc, i;
2555
2556 osid = tsec->osid;
2557 sid = tsec->sid;
2558
2559 if (sid == osid)
2560 return;
2561
2562 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2563 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2564 * flush and unblock signals.
2565 *
2566 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2567 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2568 */
2569 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2570 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2571 if (rc) {
2572 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
2573 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2574 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2575 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2576 }
2577 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2578 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2579 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2580 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2581 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2582 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2583 recalc_sigpending();
2584 }
2585 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2586 }
2587
2588 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2589 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2590 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2591 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2592 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2593}
2594
2595/* superblock security operations */
2596
2597static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2598{
2599 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2600}
2601
2602static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2603{
2604 superblock_free_security(sb);
2605}
2606
2607static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2608{
2609 bool open_quote = false;
2610 int len;
2611 char c;
2612
2613 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2614 if (c == '"')
2615 open_quote = !open_quote;
2616 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2617 break;
2618 }
2619 return len;
2620}
2621
2622static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2623{
2624 char *from = options;
2625 char *to = options;
2626 bool first = true;
2627 int rc;
2628
2629 while (1) {
2630 int len = opt_len(from);
2631 int token;
2632 char *arg = NULL;
2633
2634 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2635
2636 if (token != Opt_error) {
2637 char *p, *q;
2638
2639 /* strip quotes */
2640 if (arg) {
2641 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2642 char c = *p;
2643 if (c != '"')
2644 *q++ = c;
2645 }
2646 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2647 if (!arg) {
2648 rc = -ENOMEM;
2649 goto free_opt;
2650 }
2651 }
2652 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2653 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2654 kfree(arg);
2655 goto free_opt;
2656 }
2657 } else {
2658 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2659 from--;
2660 len++;
2661 }
2662 if (to != from)
2663 memmove(to, from, len);
2664 to += len;
2665 first = false;
2666 }
2667 if (!from[len])
2668 break;
2669 from += len + 1;
2670 }
2671 *to = '\0';
2672 return 0;
2673
2674free_opt:
2675 if (*mnt_opts) {
2676 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2677 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2678 }
2679 return rc;
2680}
2681
2682static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2683{
2684 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2685 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2686 u32 sid;
2687 int rc;
2688
2689 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2690 return 0;
2691
2692 if (!opts)
2693 return 0;
2694
2695 if (opts->fscontext) {
2696 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2697 if (rc)
2698 return rc;
2699 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2700 goto out_bad_option;
2701 }
2702 if (opts->context) {
2703 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2704 if (rc)
2705 return rc;
2706 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2707 goto out_bad_option;
2708 }
2709 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2710 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2711 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2712 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2713 if (rc)
2714 return rc;
2715 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2716 goto out_bad_option;
2717 }
2718 if (opts->defcontext) {
2719 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2720 if (rc)
2721 return rc;
2722 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2723 goto out_bad_option;
2724 }
2725 return 0;
2726
2727out_bad_option:
2728 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2729 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2730 sb->s_type->name);
2731 return -EINVAL;
2732}
2733
2734static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2735{
2736 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2737 struct common_audit_data ad;
2738
2739 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2740 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2741 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2742}
2743
2744static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2745{
2746 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2747 struct common_audit_data ad;
2748
2749 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2750 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2751 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2752}
2753
2754static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2755 const struct path *path,
2756 const char *type,
2757 unsigned long flags,
2758 void *data)
2759{
2760 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2761
2762 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2763 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2764 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2765 else
2766 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2767}
2768
2769static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2770{
2771 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2772
2773 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2774 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2775}
2776
2777static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2778 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2779{
2780 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2781 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2782
2783 if (!src)
2784 return 0;
2785
2786 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2787 if (!fc->security)
2788 return -ENOMEM;
2789
2790 opts = fc->security;
2791
2792 if (src->fscontext) {
2793 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2794 if (!opts->fscontext)
2795 return -ENOMEM;
2796 }
2797 if (src->context) {
2798 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2799 if (!opts->context)
2800 return -ENOMEM;
2801 }
2802 if (src->rootcontext) {
2803 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2804 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2805 return -ENOMEM;
2806 }
2807 if (src->defcontext) {
2808 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2809 if (!opts->defcontext)
2810 return -ENOMEM;
2811 }
2812 return 0;
2813}
2814
2815static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_param_specs[] = {
2816 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2817 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2818 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2819 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2820 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2821 {}
2822};
2823
2824static const struct fs_parameter_description selinux_fs_parameters = {
2825 .name = "SELinux",
2826 .specs = selinux_param_specs,
2827};
2828
2829static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2830 struct fs_parameter *param)
2831{
2832 struct fs_parse_result result;
2833 int opt, rc;
2834
2835 opt = fs_parse(fc, &selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2836 if (opt < 0)
2837 return opt;
2838
2839 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2840 if (!rc) {
2841 param->string = NULL;
2842 rc = 1;
2843 }
2844 return rc;
2845}
2846
2847/* inode security operations */
2848
2849static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2850{
2851 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2852}
2853
2854static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2855{
2856 inode_free_security(inode);
2857}
2858
2859static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2860 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2861 u32 *ctxlen)
2862{
2863 u32 newsid;
2864 int rc;
2865
2866 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2867 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2868 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2869 &newsid);
2870 if (rc)
2871 return rc;
2872
2873 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2874 ctxlen);
2875}
2876
2877static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2878 struct qstr *name,
2879 const struct cred *old,
2880 struct cred *new)
2881{
2882 u32 newsid;
2883 int rc;
2884 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2885
2886 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2887 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2888 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2889 &newsid);
2890 if (rc)
2891 return rc;
2892
2893 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2894 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2895 return 0;
2896}
2897
2898static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2899 const struct qstr *qstr,
2900 const char **name,
2901 void **value, size_t *len)
2902{
2903 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2904 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2905 u32 newsid, clen;
2906 int rc;
2907 char *context;
2908
2909 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2910
2911 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2912
2913 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2914 dir, qstr,
2915 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2916 &newsid);
2917 if (rc)
2918 return rc;
2919
2920 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2921 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2922 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2923 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2924 isec->sid = newsid;
2925 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2926 }
2927
2928 if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2929 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2930
2931 if (name)
2932 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2933
2934 if (value && len) {
2935 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2936 &context, &clen);
2937 if (rc)
2938 return rc;
2939 *value = context;
2940 *len = clen;
2941 }
2942
2943 return 0;
2944}
2945
2946static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2947{
2948 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2949}
2950
2951static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2952{
2953 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2954}
2955
2956static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2957{
2958 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2959}
2960
2961static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2962{
2963 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2964}
2965
2966static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2967{
2968 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2969}
2970
2971static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2972{
2973 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2974}
2975
2976static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2977{
2978 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2979}
2980
2981static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2982 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2983{
2984 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2985}
2986
2987static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2988{
2989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2990
2991 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2992}
2993
2994static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2995 bool rcu)
2996{
2997 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2998 struct common_audit_data ad;
2999 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3000 u32 sid;
3001
3002 validate_creds(cred);
3003
3004 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3005 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3006 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3007 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3008 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3009 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3010
3011 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3012 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3013}
3014
3015static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3016 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3017 int result,
3018 unsigned flags)
3019{
3020 struct common_audit_data ad;
3021 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3022 int rc;
3023
3024 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3025 ad.u.inode = inode;
3026
3027 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3028 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3029 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
3030 if (rc)
3031 return rc;
3032 return 0;
3033}
3034
3035static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3036{
3037 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3038 u32 perms;
3039 bool from_access;
3040 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3041 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3042 u32 sid;
3043 struct av_decision avd;
3044 int rc, rc2;
3045 u32 audited, denied;
3046
3047 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3048 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3049
3050 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3051 if (!mask)
3052 return 0;
3053
3054 validate_creds(cred);
3055
3056 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3057 return 0;
3058
3059 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3060
3061 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3062 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
3063 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3064 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3065
3066 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3067 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3068 (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
3069 &avd);
3070 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3071 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3072 &denied);
3073 if (likely(!audited))
3074 return rc;
3075
3076 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
3077 if (rc2)
3078 return rc2;
3079 return rc;
3080}
3081
3082static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3083{
3084 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3085 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3086 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3087 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3088
3089 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3090 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3091 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3092 ATTR_FORCE);
3093 if (!ia_valid)
3094 return 0;
3095 }
3096
3097 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3098 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3099 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3100
3101 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3102 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3103 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3104 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3105 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3106
3107 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3108}
3109
3110static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3111{
3112 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3113}
3114
3115static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3116{
3117 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3118 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3119
3120 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3121 return false;
3122 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3123 return false;
3124 return true;
3125}
3126
3127static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3128 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3129{
3130 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3131 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3132 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3133 struct common_audit_data ad;
3134 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3135 int rc = 0;
3136
3137 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3138 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3139 if (rc)
3140 return rc;
3141
3142 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3143 ordinary setattr permission. */
3144 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3145 }
3146
3147 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3148 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3149 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3150
3151 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3152 return -EPERM;
3153
3154 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3155 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3156
3157 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3158 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3159 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3160 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3161 if (rc)
3162 return rc;
3163
3164 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3165 GFP_KERNEL);
3166 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3167 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3168 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3169 size_t audit_size;
3170
3171 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3172 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3173 if (value) {
3174 const char *str = value;
3175
3176 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3177 audit_size = size - 1;
3178 else
3179 audit_size = size;
3180 } else {
3181 audit_size = 0;
3182 }
3183 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3184 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3185 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3186 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3187 audit_log_end(ab);
3188
3189 return rc;
3190 }
3191 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3192 size, &newsid);
3193 }
3194 if (rc)
3195 return rc;
3196
3197 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3198 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3199 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3200 if (rc)
3201 return rc;
3202
3203 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3204 sid, isec->sclass);
3205 if (rc)
3206 return rc;
3207
3208 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3209 newsid,
3210 sbsec->sid,
3211 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3212 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3213 &ad);
3214}
3215
3216static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3217 const void *value, size_t size,
3218 int flags)
3219{
3220 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3221 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3222 u32 newsid;
3223 int rc;
3224
3225 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3226 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3227 return;
3228 }
3229
3230 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3231 &newsid);
3232 if (rc) {
3233 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3234 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3236 return;
3237 }
3238
3239 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3240 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3241 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3242 isec->sid = newsid;
3243 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3244 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3245
3246 return;
3247}
3248
3249static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3250{
3251 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3252
3253 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3254}
3255
3256static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3257{
3258 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3259
3260 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3261}
3262
3263static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3264{
3265 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3266 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3267 if (rc)
3268 return rc;
3269
3270 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3271 ordinary setattr permission. */
3272 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3273 }
3274
3275 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3276 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3277 return -EACCES;
3278}
3279
3280static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3281 unsigned int obj_type)
3282{
3283 int ret;
3284 u32 perm;
3285
3286 struct common_audit_data ad;
3287
3288 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3289 ad.u.path = *path;
3290
3291 /*
3292 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3293 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3294 */
3295 switch (obj_type) {
3296 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3297 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3298 break;
3299 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3300 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3301 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3302 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3303 if (ret)
3304 return ret;
3305 break;
3306 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3307 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3308 break;
3309 default:
3310 return -EINVAL;
3311 }
3312
3313 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3314 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3315 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3316
3317 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3318 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3319 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3320
3321 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3322}
3323
3324/*
3325 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3326 *
3327 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3328 */
3329static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3330{
3331 u32 size;
3332 int error;
3333 char *context = NULL;
3334 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3335
3336 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3337 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3338
3339 /*
3340 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3341 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3342 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3343 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3344 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3345 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3346 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3347 */
3348 isec = inode_security(inode);
3349 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3350 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3351 isec->sid, &context,
3352 &size);
3353 else
3354 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3355 &context, &size);
3356 if (error)
3357 return error;
3358 error = size;
3359 if (alloc) {
3360 *buffer = context;
3361 goto out_nofree;
3362 }
3363 kfree(context);
3364out_nofree:
3365 return error;
3366}
3367
3368static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3369 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3370{
3371 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3372 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3373 u32 newsid;
3374 int rc;
3375
3376 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3377 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3378
3379 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3380 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3381
3382 if (!value || !size)
3383 return -EACCES;
3384
3385 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3386 GFP_KERNEL);
3387 if (rc)
3388 return rc;
3389
3390 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3391 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3392 isec->sid = newsid;
3393 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3394 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3395 return 0;
3396}
3397
3398static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3399{
3400 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3401 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3402 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3403 return len;
3404}
3405
3406static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3407{
3408 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3409 *secid = isec->sid;
3410}
3411
3412static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3413{
3414 u32 sid;
3415 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3416 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3417
3418 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3419 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3420 if (!new_creds)
3421 return -ENOMEM;
3422 }
3423
3424 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3425 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3426 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3427 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3428 *new = new_creds;
3429 return 0;
3430}
3431
3432static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3433{
3434 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3435 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3436 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3437 */
3438 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3439 return 1; /* Discard */
3440 /*
3441 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3442 * by selinux.
3443 */
3444 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3445}
3446
3447/* kernfs node operations */
3448
3449static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3450 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3451{
3452 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3453 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3454 int rc;
3455 char *context;
3456
3457 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3458 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3459 return 0;
3460 else if (rc < 0)
3461 return rc;
3462
3463 clen = (u32)rc;
3464 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3465 if (!context)
3466 return -ENOMEM;
3467
3468 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3469 if (rc < 0) {
3470 kfree(context);
3471 return rc;
3472 }
3473
3474 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3475 GFP_KERNEL);
3476 kfree(context);
3477 if (rc)
3478 return rc;
3479
3480 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3481 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3482 } else {
3483 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3484 struct qstr q;
3485
3486 q.name = kn->name;
3487 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3488
3489 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3490 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3491 &newsid);
3492 if (rc)
3493 return rc;
3494 }
3495
3496 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3497 &context, &clen);
3498 if (rc)
3499 return rc;
3500
3501 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3502 XATTR_CREATE);
3503 kfree(context);
3504 return rc;
3505}
3506
3507
3508/* file security operations */
3509
3510static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3511{
3512 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3513 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3514
3515 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3516 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3517 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3518
3519 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3520 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3521}
3522
3523static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3524{
3525 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3526 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3527 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3528 u32 sid = current_sid();
3529
3530 if (!mask)
3531 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3532 return 0;
3533
3534 isec = inode_security(inode);
3535 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3536 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3537 /* No change since file_open check. */
3538 return 0;
3539
3540 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3541}
3542
3543static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3544{
3545 return file_alloc_security(file);
3546}
3547
3548/*
3549 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3550 * operation to an inode.
3551 */
3552static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3553 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3554{
3555 struct common_audit_data ad;
3556 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3557 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3558 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3559 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3560 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3561 int rc;
3562 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3563 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3564
3565 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3566 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3567 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3568 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3569
3570 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3571 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3572 ssid, fsec->sid,
3573 SECCLASS_FD,
3574 FD__USE,
3575 &ad);
3576 if (rc)
3577 goto out;
3578 }
3579
3580 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3581 return 0;
3582
3583 isec = inode_security(inode);
3584 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3585 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3586 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3587out:
3588 return rc;
3589}
3590
3591static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3592 unsigned long arg)
3593{
3594 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3595 int error = 0;
3596
3597 switch (cmd) {
3598 case FIONREAD:
3599 /* fall through */
3600 case FIBMAP:
3601 /* fall through */
3602 case FIGETBSZ:
3603 /* fall through */
3604 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3605 /* fall through */
3606 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3607 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3608 break;
3609
3610 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3611 /* fall through */
3612 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3613 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3614 break;
3615
3616 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3617 case FIONBIO:
3618 /* fall through */
3619 case FIOASYNC:
3620 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3621 break;
3622
3623 case KDSKBENT:
3624 case KDSKBSENT:
3625 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3626 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3627 break;
3628
3629 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3630 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3631 */
3632 default:
3633 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3634 }
3635 return error;
3636}
3637
3638static int default_noexec;
3639
3640static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3641{
3642 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3643 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3644 int rc = 0;
3645
3646 if (default_noexec &&
3647 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3648 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3649 /*
3650 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3651 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3652 * This has an additional check.
3653 */
3654 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3655 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3656 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3657 if (rc)
3658 goto error;
3659 }
3660
3661 if (file) {
3662 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3663 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3664
3665 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3666 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3667 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3668
3669 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3670 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3671
3672 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3673 }
3674
3675error:
3676 return rc;
3677}
3678
3679static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3680{
3681 int rc = 0;
3682
3683 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3684 u32 sid = current_sid();
3685 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3686 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3687 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3688 }
3689
3690 return rc;
3691}
3692
3693static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3694 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3695{
3696 struct common_audit_data ad;
3697 int rc;
3698
3699 if (file) {
3700 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3701 ad.u.file = file;
3702 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3703 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3704 if (rc)
3705 return rc;
3706 }
3707
3708 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3709 prot = reqprot;
3710
3711 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3712 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3713}
3714
3715static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3716 unsigned long reqprot,
3717 unsigned long prot)
3718{
3719 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3720 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3721
3722 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3723 prot = reqprot;
3724
3725 if (default_noexec &&
3726 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3727 int rc = 0;
3728 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3729 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3730 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3731 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3732 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3733 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3734 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3735 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3736 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3737 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3738 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3739 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3740 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3741 /*
3742 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3743 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3744 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3745 * modified content. This typically should only
3746 * occur for text relocations.
3747 */
3748 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3749 }
3750 if (rc)
3751 return rc;
3752 }
3753
3754 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3755}
3756
3757static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3758{
3759 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3760
3761 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3762}
3763
3764static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3765 unsigned long arg)
3766{
3767 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3768 int err = 0;
3769
3770 switch (cmd) {
3771 case F_SETFL:
3772 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3773 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3774 break;
3775 }
3776 /* fall through */
3777 case F_SETOWN:
3778 case F_SETSIG:
3779 case F_GETFL:
3780 case F_GETOWN:
3781 case F_GETSIG:
3782 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3783 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3784 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3785 break;
3786 case F_GETLK:
3787 case F_SETLK:
3788 case F_SETLKW:
3789 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3790 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3791 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3792#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3793 case F_GETLK64:
3794 case F_SETLK64:
3795 case F_SETLKW64:
3796#endif
3797 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3798 break;
3799 }
3800
3801 return err;
3802}
3803
3804static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3805{
3806 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3807
3808 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3809 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3810}
3811
3812static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3813 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3814{
3815 struct file *file;
3816 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3817 u32 perm;
3818 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3819
3820 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3821 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3822
3823 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3824
3825 if (!signum)
3826 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3827 else
3828 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3829
3830 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3831 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3832 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3833}
3834
3835static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3836{
3837 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3838
3839 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3840}
3841
3842static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3843{
3844 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3845 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3846
3847 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3848 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3849 /*
3850 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3851 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3852 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3853 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3854 * struct as its SID.
3855 */
3856 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3857 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3858 /*
3859 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3860 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3861 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3862 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3863 * new inode label or new policy.
3864 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3865 */
3866 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3867}
3868
3869/* task security operations */
3870
3871static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3872 unsigned long clone_flags)
3873{
3874 u32 sid = current_sid();
3875
3876 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3877 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3878}
3879
3880/*
3881 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3882 */
3883static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3884 gfp_t gfp)
3885{
3886 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3887 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3888
3889 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3890 return 0;
3891}
3892
3893/*
3894 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3895 */
3896static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3897{
3898 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3899 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3900
3901 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3902}
3903
3904static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3905{
3906 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3907}
3908
3909/*
3910 * set the security data for a kernel service
3911 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3912 */
3913static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3914{
3915 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3916 u32 sid = current_sid();
3917 int ret;
3918
3919 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3920 sid, secid,
3921 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3922 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3923 NULL);
3924 if (ret == 0) {
3925 tsec->sid = secid;
3926 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3927 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3928 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3929 }
3930 return ret;
3931}
3932
3933/*
3934 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3935 * objective context of the specified inode
3936 */
3937static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3938{
3939 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3940 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3941 u32 sid = current_sid();
3942 int ret;
3943
3944 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3945 sid, isec->sid,
3946 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3947 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3948 NULL);
3949
3950 if (ret == 0)
3951 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3952 return ret;
3953}
3954
3955static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3956{
3957 struct common_audit_data ad;
3958
3959 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3960 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3961
3962 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3963 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3964 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3965}
3966
3967static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
3968{
3969 struct common_audit_data ad;
3970 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3971 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3972 u32 sid = current_sid();
3973 int rc;
3974
3975 /* init_module */
3976 if (file == NULL)
3977 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3978 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3979 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
3980
3981 /* finit_module */
3982
3983 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3984 ad.u.file = file;
3985
3986 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3987 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
3988 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3989 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
3990 if (rc)
3991 return rc;
3992 }
3993
3994 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3995 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3996 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3997 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
3998}
3999
4000static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4001 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
4002{
4003 int rc = 0;
4004
4005 switch (id) {
4006 case READING_MODULE:
4007 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
4008 break;
4009 default:
4010 break;
4011 }
4012
4013 return rc;
4014}
4015
4016static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
4017{
4018 int rc = 0;
4019
4020 switch (id) {
4021 case LOADING_MODULE:
4022 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4023 default:
4024 break;
4025 }
4026
4027 return rc;
4028}
4029
4030static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4031{
4032 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4033 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4034 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4035}
4036
4037static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4038{
4039 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4040 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4041 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4042}
4043
4044static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4045{
4046 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4047 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4048 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4049}
4050
4051static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4052{
4053 *secid = task_sid(p);
4054}
4055
4056static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4057{
4058 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4059 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4060 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4061}
4062
4063static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4064{
4065 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4066 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4067 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4068}
4069
4070static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4071{
4072 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4073 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4074 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4075}
4076
4077static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4078 unsigned int flags)
4079{
4080 u32 av = 0;
4081
4082 if (!flags)
4083 return 0;
4084 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4085 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4086 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4087 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4088 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4089 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4090 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4091}
4092
4093static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4094 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4095{
4096 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4097
4098 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4099 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4100 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4101 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4102 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4104 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4105 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4106
4107 return 0;
4108}
4109
4110static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4111{
4112 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4113 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4114 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4115}
4116
4117static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4118{
4119 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4120 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4121 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4122}
4123
4124static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4125{
4126 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4127 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4128 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4129}
4130
4131static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4132 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4133{
4134 u32 secid;
4135 u32 perm;
4136
4137 if (!sig)
4138 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4139 else
4140 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4141 if (!cred)
4142 secid = current_sid();
4143 else
4144 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4145 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4146 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4147}
4148
4149static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4150 struct inode *inode)
4151{
4152 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4153 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4154
4155 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4156 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4157 isec->sid = sid;
4158 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4159 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4160}
4161
4162/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4163static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4164 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4165{
4166 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4167 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4168
4169 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4170 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4171 if (ih == NULL)
4172 goto out;
4173
4174 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4175 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4176 goto out;
4177
4178 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4179 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4180 ret = 0;
4181
4182 if (proto)
4183 *proto = ih->protocol;
4184
4185 switch (ih->protocol) {
4186 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4187 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4188
4189 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4190 break;
4191
4192 offset += ihlen;
4193 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4194 if (th == NULL)
4195 break;
4196
4197 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4198 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4199 break;
4200 }
4201
4202 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4203 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4204
4205 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4206 break;
4207
4208 offset += ihlen;
4209 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4210 if (uh == NULL)
4211 break;
4212
4213 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4214 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4215 break;
4216 }
4217
4218 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4219 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4220
4221 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4222 break;
4223
4224 offset += ihlen;
4225 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4226 if (dh == NULL)
4227 break;
4228
4229 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4230 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4231 break;
4232 }
4233
4234#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4235 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4236 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4237
4238 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4239 break;
4240
4241 offset += ihlen;
4242 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4243 if (sh == NULL)
4244 break;
4245
4246 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4247 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4248 break;
4249 }
4250#endif
4251 default:
4252 break;
4253 }
4254out:
4255 return ret;
4256}
4257
4258#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4259
4260/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4261static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4262 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4263{
4264 u8 nexthdr;
4265 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4266 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4267 __be16 frag_off;
4268
4269 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4270 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4271 if (ip6 == NULL)
4272 goto out;
4273
4274 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4275 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4276 ret = 0;
4277
4278 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4279 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4280 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4281 if (offset < 0)
4282 goto out;
4283
4284 if (proto)
4285 *proto = nexthdr;
4286
4287 switch (nexthdr) {
4288 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4289 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4290
4291 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4292 if (th == NULL)
4293 break;
4294
4295 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4296 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4297 break;
4298 }
4299
4300 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4301 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4302
4303 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4304 if (uh == NULL)
4305 break;
4306
4307 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4308 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4309 break;
4310 }
4311
4312 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4313 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4314
4315 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4316 if (dh == NULL)
4317 break;
4318
4319 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4320 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4321 break;
4322 }
4323
4324#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4325 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4326 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4327
4328 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4329 if (sh == NULL)
4330 break;
4331
4332 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4333 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4334 break;
4335 }
4336#endif
4337 /* includes fragments */
4338 default:
4339 break;
4340 }
4341out:
4342 return ret;
4343}
4344
4345#endif /* IPV6 */
4346
4347static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4348 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4349{
4350 char *addrp;
4351 int ret;
4352
4353 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4354 case PF_INET:
4355 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4356 if (ret)
4357 goto parse_error;
4358 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4359 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4360 goto okay;
4361
4362#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4363 case PF_INET6:
4364 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4365 if (ret)
4366 goto parse_error;
4367 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4368 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4369 goto okay;
4370#endif /* IPV6 */
4371 default:
4372 addrp = NULL;
4373 goto okay;
4374 }
4375
4376parse_error:
4377 pr_warn(
4378 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4379 " unable to parse packet\n");
4380 return ret;
4381
4382okay:
4383 if (_addrp)
4384 *_addrp = addrp;
4385 return 0;
4386}
4387
4388/**
4389 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4390 * @skb: the packet
4391 * @family: protocol family
4392 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4393 *
4394 * Description:
4395 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4396 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4397 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4398 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4399 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4400 * peer labels.
4401 *
4402 */
4403static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4404{
4405 int err;
4406 u32 xfrm_sid;
4407 u32 nlbl_sid;
4408 u32 nlbl_type;
4409
4410 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4411 if (unlikely(err))
4412 return -EACCES;
4413 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4414 if (unlikely(err))
4415 return -EACCES;
4416
4417 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4418 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4419 if (unlikely(err)) {
4420 pr_warn(
4421 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4422 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4423 return -EACCES;
4424 }
4425
4426 return 0;
4427}
4428
4429/**
4430 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4431 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4432 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4433 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4434 *
4435 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4436 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4437 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4438 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4439 *
4440 */
4441static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4442{
4443 int err = 0;
4444
4445 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4446 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4447 conn_sid);
4448 else
4449 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4450
4451 return err;
4452}
4453
4454/* socket security operations */
4455
4456static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4457 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4458{
4459 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4460 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4461 return 0;
4462 }
4463
4464 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4465 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4466}
4467
4468static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4469{
4470 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4471 struct common_audit_data ad;
4472 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4473
4474 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4475 return 0;
4476
4477 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4478 ad.u.net = &net;
4479 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4480
4481 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4482 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4483 &ad);
4484}
4485
4486static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4487 int protocol, int kern)
4488{
4489 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4490 u32 newsid;
4491 u16 secclass;
4492 int rc;
4493
4494 if (kern)
4495 return 0;
4496
4497 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4498 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4499 if (rc)
4500 return rc;
4501
4502 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4503 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4504}
4505
4506static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4507 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4508{
4509 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4510 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4511 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4512 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4513 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4514 int err = 0;
4515
4516 if (!kern) {
4517 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4518 if (err)
4519 return err;
4520 }
4521
4522 isec->sclass = sclass;
4523 isec->sid = sid;
4524 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4525
4526 if (sock->sk) {
4527 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4528 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4529 sksec->sid = sid;
4530 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4531 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4532 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4533
4534 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4535 }
4536
4537 return err;
4538}
4539
4540static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4541 struct socket *sockb)
4542{
4543 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4544 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4545
4546 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4547 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4548
4549 return 0;
4550}
4551
4552/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4553 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4554 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4555
4556static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4557{
4558 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4559 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4560 u16 family;
4561 int err;
4562
4563 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4564 if (err)
4565 goto out;
4566
4567 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4568 family = sk->sk_family;
4569 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4570 char *addrp;
4571 struct common_audit_data ad;
4572 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4573 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4574 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4575 u16 family_sa;
4576 unsigned short snum;
4577 u32 sid, node_perm;
4578
4579 /*
4580 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4581 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4582 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4583 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4584 */
4585 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4586 return -EINVAL;
4587 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4588 switch (family_sa) {
4589 case AF_UNSPEC:
4590 case AF_INET:
4591 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4592 return -EINVAL;
4593 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4594 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4595 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4596 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4597 */
4598 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4599 goto err_af;
4600 family_sa = AF_INET;
4601 }
4602 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4603 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4604 break;
4605 case AF_INET6:
4606 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4607 return -EINVAL;
4608 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4609 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4610 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4611 break;
4612 default:
4613 goto err_af;
4614 }
4615
4616 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4617 ad.u.net = &net;
4618 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4619 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4620
4621 if (snum) {
4622 int low, high;
4623
4624 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4625
4626 if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
4627 snum > high) {
4628 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4629 snum, &sid);
4630 if (err)
4631 goto out;
4632 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4633 sksec->sid, sid,
4634 sksec->sclass,
4635 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4636 if (err)
4637 goto out;
4638 }
4639 }
4640
4641 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4642 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4643 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4644 break;
4645
4646 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4647 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4648 break;
4649
4650 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4651 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4652 break;
4653
4654 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4655 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4656 break;
4657
4658 default:
4659 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4660 break;
4661 }
4662
4663 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4664 if (err)
4665 goto out;
4666
4667 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4668 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4669 else
4670 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4671
4672 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4673 sksec->sid, sid,
4674 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4675 if (err)
4676 goto out;
4677 }
4678out:
4679 return err;
4680err_af:
4681 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4682 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4683 return -EINVAL;
4684 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4685}
4686
4687/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4688 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4689 */
4690static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4691 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4692{
4693 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4694 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4695 int err;
4696
4697 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4698 if (err)
4699 return err;
4700 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4701 return -EINVAL;
4702
4703 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4704 * way to disconnect the socket
4705 */
4706 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4707 return 0;
4708
4709 /*
4710 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4711 * for the port.
4712 */
4713 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4714 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4715 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4716 struct common_audit_data ad;
4717 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4718 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4719 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4720 unsigned short snum;
4721 u32 sid, perm;
4722
4723 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4724 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4725 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4726 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4727 */
4728 switch (address->sa_family) {
4729 case AF_INET:
4730 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4731 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4732 return -EINVAL;
4733 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4734 break;
4735 case AF_INET6:
4736 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4737 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4738 return -EINVAL;
4739 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4740 break;
4741 default:
4742 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4743 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4744 */
4745 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4746 return -EINVAL;
4747 else
4748 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4749 }
4750
4751 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4752 if (err)
4753 return err;
4754
4755 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4756 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4757 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4758 break;
4759 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4760 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4761 break;
4762 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4763 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4764 break;
4765 }
4766
4767 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4768 ad.u.net = &net;
4769 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4770 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4771 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4772 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4773 if (err)
4774 return err;
4775 }
4776
4777 return 0;
4778}
4779
4780/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4781static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4782 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4783{
4784 int err;
4785 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4786
4787 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4788 if (err)
4789 return err;
4790
4791 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4792}
4793
4794static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4795{
4796 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4797}
4798
4799static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4800{
4801 int err;
4802 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4803 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4804 u16 sclass;
4805 u32 sid;
4806
4807 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4808 if (err)
4809 return err;
4810
4811 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4812 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4813 sclass = isec->sclass;
4814 sid = isec->sid;
4815 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4816
4817 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4818 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4819 newisec->sid = sid;
4820 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4821
4822 return 0;
4823}
4824
4825static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4826 int size)
4827{
4828 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4829}
4830
4831static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4832 int size, int flags)
4833{
4834 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4835}
4836
4837static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4838{
4839 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4840}
4841
4842static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4843{
4844 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4845}
4846
4847static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4848{
4849 int err;
4850
4851 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4852 if (err)
4853 return err;
4854
4855 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4856}
4857
4858static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4859 int optname)
4860{
4861 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4862}
4863
4864static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4865{
4866 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4867}
4868
4869static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4870 struct sock *other,
4871 struct sock *newsk)
4872{
4873 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4874 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4875 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4876 struct common_audit_data ad;
4877 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4878 int err;
4879
4880 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4881 ad.u.net = &net;
4882 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4883
4884 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4885 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4886 sksec_other->sclass,
4887 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4888 if (err)
4889 return err;
4890
4891 /* server child socket */
4892 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4893 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4894 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4895 if (err)
4896 return err;
4897
4898 /* connecting socket */
4899 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4900
4901 return 0;
4902}
4903
4904static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4905 struct socket *other)
4906{
4907 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4908 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4909 struct common_audit_data ad;
4910 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4911
4912 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4913 ad.u.net = &net;
4914 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4915
4916 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4917 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4918 &ad);
4919}
4920
4921static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4922 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4923 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4924{
4925 int err;
4926 u32 if_sid;
4927 u32 node_sid;
4928
4929 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4930 if (err)
4931 return err;
4932 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4933 peer_sid, if_sid,
4934 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4935 if (err)
4936 return err;
4937
4938 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4939 if (err)
4940 return err;
4941 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4942 peer_sid, node_sid,
4943 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4944}
4945
4946static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4947 u16 family)
4948{
4949 int err = 0;
4950 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4951 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4952 struct common_audit_data ad;
4953 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4954 char *addrp;
4955
4956 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4957 ad.u.net = &net;
4958 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4959 ad.u.net->family = family;
4960 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4961 if (err)
4962 return err;
4963
4964 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4965 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4966 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4967 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4968 if (err)
4969 return err;
4970 }
4971
4972 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4973 if (err)
4974 return err;
4975 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4976
4977 return err;
4978}
4979
4980static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4981{
4982 int err;
4983 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4984 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4985 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4986 struct common_audit_data ad;
4987 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4988 char *addrp;
4989 u8 secmark_active;
4990 u8 peerlbl_active;
4991
4992 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4993 return 0;
4994
4995 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4996 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4997 family = PF_INET;
4998
4999 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5000 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5001 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5002 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5003 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5004 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5005
5006 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5007 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5008 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5009 return 0;
5010
5011 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5012 ad.u.net = &net;
5013 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5014 ad.u.net->family = family;
5015 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5016 if (err)
5017 return err;
5018
5019 if (peerlbl_active) {
5020 u32 peer_sid;
5021
5022 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5023 if (err)
5024 return err;
5025 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5026 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5027 if (err) {
5028 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5029 return err;
5030 }
5031 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5032 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5033 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5034 if (err) {
5035 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5036 return err;
5037 }
5038 }
5039
5040 if (secmark_active) {
5041 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5042 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5043 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5044 if (err)
5045 return err;
5046 }
5047
5048 return err;
5049}
5050
5051static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5052 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5053{
5054 int err = 0;
5055 char *scontext;
5056 u32 scontext_len;
5057 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5058 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5059
5060 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5061 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5062 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5063 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5064 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5065 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5066
5067 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5068 &scontext_len);
5069 if (err)
5070 return err;
5071
5072 if (scontext_len > len) {
5073 err = -ERANGE;
5074 goto out_len;
5075 }
5076
5077 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5078 err = -EFAULT;
5079
5080out_len:
5081 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5082 err = -EFAULT;
5083 kfree(scontext);
5084 return err;
5085}
5086
5087static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5088{
5089 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5090 u16 family;
5091 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5092
5093 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5094 family = PF_INET;
5095 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5096 family = PF_INET6;
5097 else if (sock)
5098 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5099 else
5100 goto out;
5101
5102 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5103 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5104 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5105 } else if (skb)
5106 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5107
5108out:
5109 *secid = peer_secid;
5110 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5111 return -EINVAL;
5112 return 0;
5113}
5114
5115static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5116{
5117 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5118
5119 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5120 if (!sksec)
5121 return -ENOMEM;
5122
5123 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5124 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5125 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5126 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5127 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5128
5129 return 0;
5130}
5131
5132static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5133{
5134 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5135
5136 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5137 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5138 kfree(sksec);
5139}
5140
5141static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5142{
5143 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5144 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5145
5146 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5147 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5148 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5149
5150 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5151}
5152
5153static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5154{
5155 if (!sk)
5156 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5157 else {
5158 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5159
5160 *secid = sksec->sid;
5161 }
5162}
5163
5164static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5165{
5166 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5167 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5168 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5169
5170 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5171 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5172 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5173 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5174}
5175
5176/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5177 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5178 * already present).
5179 */
5180static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5181 struct sk_buff *skb)
5182{
5183 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5184 struct common_audit_data ad;
5185 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5186 u8 peerlbl_active;
5187 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5188 u32 conn_sid;
5189 int err = 0;
5190
5191 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5192 return 0;
5193
5194 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5195
5196 if (peerlbl_active) {
5197 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5198 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5199 */
5200 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5201 &peer_sid);
5202 if (err)
5203 return err;
5204
5205 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5206 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5207 }
5208
5209 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5210 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5211
5212 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5213 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5214 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5215 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5216 */
5217 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5218 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5219 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5220 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5221 */
5222 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5223 ad.u.net = &net;
5224 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5225 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5226 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5227 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5228 if (err)
5229 return err;
5230 }
5231
5232 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5233 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5234 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5235 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5236 * plug this into the new socket.
5237 */
5238 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5239 if (err)
5240 return err;
5241
5242 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5243 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5244
5245 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5246 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5247}
5248
5249/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5250 * based on their @optname.
5251 */
5252static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5253 struct sockaddr *address,
5254 int addrlen)
5255{
5256 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5257 void *addr_buf;
5258 struct sockaddr *addr;
5259 struct socket *sock;
5260
5261 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5262 return 0;
5263
5264 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5265 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5266 addr_buf = address;
5267
5268 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5269 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5270 return -EINVAL;
5271
5272 addr = addr_buf;
5273 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5274 case AF_UNSPEC:
5275 case AF_INET:
5276 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5277 break;
5278 case AF_INET6:
5279 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5280 break;
5281 default:
5282 return -EINVAL;
5283 }
5284
5285 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5286 return -EINVAL;
5287
5288 err = -EINVAL;
5289 switch (optname) {
5290 /* Bind checks */
5291 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5292 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5293 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5294 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5295 break;
5296 /* Connect checks */
5297 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5298 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5299 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5300 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5301 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5302 if (err)
5303 return err;
5304
5305 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5306 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5307 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
5308 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5309 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5310 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5311 * primary address is selected.
5312 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5313 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5314 * selinux_socket_connect().
5315 */
5316 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5317 break;
5318 }
5319
5320 if (err)
5321 return err;
5322
5323 addr_buf += len;
5324 walk_size += len;
5325 }
5326
5327 return 0;
5328}
5329
5330/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5331static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5332 struct sock *newsk)
5333{
5334 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5335 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5336
5337 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5338 * the non-sctp clone version.
5339 */
5340 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5341 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5342
5343 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5344 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5345 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5346 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5347}
5348
5349static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5350 struct request_sock *req)
5351{
5352 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5353 int err;
5354 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5355 u32 connsid;
5356 u32 peersid;
5357
5358 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5359 if (err)
5360 return err;
5361 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5362 if (err)
5363 return err;
5364 req->secid = connsid;
5365 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5366
5367 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5368}
5369
5370static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5371 const struct request_sock *req)
5372{
5373 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5374
5375 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5376 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5377 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5378 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5379 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5380 time it will have been created and available. */
5381
5382 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5383 * thread with access to newsksec */
5384 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5385}
5386
5387static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5388{
5389 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5390 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5391
5392 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5393 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5394 family = PF_INET;
5395
5396 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5397}
5398
5399static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5400{
5401 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5402 u32 tsid;
5403
5404 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5405 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5406
5407 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5408 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5409 NULL);
5410}
5411
5412static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5413{
5414 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5415}
5416
5417static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5418{
5419 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5420}
5421
5422static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5423 struct flowi *fl)
5424{
5425 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5426}
5427
5428static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5429{
5430 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5431
5432 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5433 if (!tunsec)
5434 return -ENOMEM;
5435 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5436
5437 *security = tunsec;
5438 return 0;
5439}
5440
5441static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5442{
5443 kfree(security);
5444}
5445
5446static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5447{
5448 u32 sid = current_sid();
5449
5450 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5451 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5452 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5453 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5454 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5455 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5456
5457 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5458 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5459 NULL);
5460}
5461
5462static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5463{
5464 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5465
5466 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5467 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5468 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5469}
5470
5471static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5472{
5473 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5474 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5475
5476 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5477 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5478 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5479 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5480 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5481 * protocols were being used */
5482
5483 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5484 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5485
5486 return 0;
5487}
5488
5489static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5490{
5491 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5492 u32 sid = current_sid();
5493 int err;
5494
5495 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5496 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5497 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5498 if (err)
5499 return err;
5500 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5501 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5502 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5503 if (err)
5504 return err;
5505 tunsec->sid = sid;
5506
5507 return 0;
5508}
5509
5510static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5511{
5512 int err = 0;
5513 u32 perm;
5514 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5515 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5516
5517 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
5518 err = -EINVAL;
5519 goto out;
5520 }
5521 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
5522
5523 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5524 if (err) {
5525 if (err == -EINVAL) {
5526 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5527 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5528 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
5529 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5530 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
5531 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5532 if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
5533 security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5534 err = 0;
5535 }
5536
5537 /* Ignore */
5538 if (err == -ENOENT)
5539 err = 0;
5540 goto out;
5541 }
5542
5543 err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5544out:
5545 return err;
5546}
5547
5548#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5549
5550static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5551 const struct net_device *indev,
5552 u16 family)
5553{
5554 int err;
5555 char *addrp;
5556 u32 peer_sid;
5557 struct common_audit_data ad;
5558 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5559 u8 secmark_active;
5560 u8 netlbl_active;
5561 u8 peerlbl_active;
5562
5563 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5564 return NF_ACCEPT;
5565
5566 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5567 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5568 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5569 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5570 return NF_ACCEPT;
5571
5572 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5573 return NF_DROP;
5574
5575 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5576 ad.u.net = &net;
5577 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5578 ad.u.net->family = family;
5579 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5580 return NF_DROP;
5581
5582 if (peerlbl_active) {
5583 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5584 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5585 if (err) {
5586 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5587 return NF_DROP;
5588 }
5589 }
5590
5591 if (secmark_active)
5592 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5593 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5594 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5595 return NF_DROP;
5596
5597 if (netlbl_active)
5598 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5599 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5600 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5601 * protection */
5602 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5603 return NF_DROP;
5604
5605 return NF_ACCEPT;
5606}
5607
5608static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5609 struct sk_buff *skb,
5610 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5611{
5612 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5613}
5614
5615#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5616static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5617 struct sk_buff *skb,
5618 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5619{
5620 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5621}
5622#endif /* IPV6 */
5623
5624static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5625 u16 family)
5626{
5627 struct sock *sk;
5628 u32 sid;
5629
5630 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5631 return NF_ACCEPT;
5632
5633 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5634 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5635 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5636 sk = skb->sk;
5637 if (sk) {
5638 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5639
5640 if (sk_listener(sk))
5641 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5642 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5643 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5644 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5645 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5646 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5647 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5648 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5649 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5650 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5651 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5652 * best we can do. */
5653 return NF_ACCEPT;
5654
5655 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5656 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5657 sid = sksec->sid;
5658 } else
5659 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5660 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5661 return NF_DROP;
5662
5663 return NF_ACCEPT;
5664}
5665
5666static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5667 struct sk_buff *skb,
5668 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5669{
5670 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5671}
5672
5673#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5674static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5675 struct sk_buff *skb,
5676 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5677{
5678 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5679}
5680#endif /* IPV6 */
5681
5682static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5683 int ifindex,
5684 u16 family)
5685{
5686 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5687 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5688 struct common_audit_data ad;
5689 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5690 char *addrp;
5691 u8 proto;
5692
5693 if (sk == NULL)
5694 return NF_ACCEPT;
5695 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5696
5697 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5698 ad.u.net = &net;
5699 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5700 ad.u.net->family = family;
5701 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5702 return NF_DROP;
5703
5704 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5705 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5706 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5707 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5708 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5709
5710 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5711 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5712
5713 return NF_ACCEPT;
5714}
5715
5716static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5717 const struct net_device *outdev,
5718 u16 family)
5719{
5720 u32 secmark_perm;
5721 u32 peer_sid;
5722 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5723 struct sock *sk;
5724 struct common_audit_data ad;
5725 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5726 char *addrp;
5727 u8 secmark_active;
5728 u8 peerlbl_active;
5729
5730 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5731 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5732 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5733 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5734 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5735 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5736
5737 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5738 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5739 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5740 return NF_ACCEPT;
5741
5742 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5743
5744#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5745 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5746 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5747 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5748 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5749 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5750 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5751 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5752 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5753 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5754 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5755 * connection. */
5756 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5757 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5758 return NF_ACCEPT;
5759#endif
5760
5761 if (sk == NULL) {
5762 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5763 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5764 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5765 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5766 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5767 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5768 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5769 return NF_DROP;
5770 } else {
5771 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5772 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5773 }
5774 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5775 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5776 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5777 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5778 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5779 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5780 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5781 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5782 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5783 * for similar problems. */
5784 u32 skb_sid;
5785 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5786
5787 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5788 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5789 return NF_DROP;
5790 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5791 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5792 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5793 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5794 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5795 * pass the packet. */
5796 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5797 switch (family) {
5798 case PF_INET:
5799 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5800 return NF_ACCEPT;
5801 break;
5802 case PF_INET6:
5803 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5804 return NF_ACCEPT;
5805 break;
5806 default:
5807 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5808 }
5809 }
5810 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5811 return NF_DROP;
5812 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5813 } else {
5814 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5815 * associated socket. */
5816 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5817 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5818 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5819 }
5820
5821 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5822 ad.u.net = &net;
5823 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5824 ad.u.net->family = family;
5825 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5826 return NF_DROP;
5827
5828 if (secmark_active)
5829 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5830 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5831 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5832 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5833
5834 if (peerlbl_active) {
5835 u32 if_sid;
5836 u32 node_sid;
5837
5838 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5839 return NF_DROP;
5840 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5841 peer_sid, if_sid,
5842 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5843 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5844
5845 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5846 return NF_DROP;
5847 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5848 peer_sid, node_sid,
5849 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5850 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5851 }
5852
5853 return NF_ACCEPT;
5854}
5855
5856static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5857 struct sk_buff *skb,
5858 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5859{
5860 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5861}
5862
5863#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5864static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5865 struct sk_buff *skb,
5866 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5867{
5868 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5869}
5870#endif /* IPV6 */
5871
5872#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5873
5874static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5875{
5876 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5877}
5878
5879static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5880{
5881 isec->sclass = sclass;
5882 isec->sid = current_sid();
5883}
5884
5885static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5886{
5887 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5888
5889 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5890 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5891
5892 return 0;
5893}
5894
5895static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5896 u32 perms)
5897{
5898 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5899 struct common_audit_data ad;
5900 u32 sid = current_sid();
5901
5902 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5903
5904 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5905 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5906
5907 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5908 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5909}
5910
5911static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5912{
5913 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5914}
5915
5916/* message queue security operations */
5917static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5918{
5919 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5920 struct common_audit_data ad;
5921 u32 sid = current_sid();
5922 int rc;
5923
5924 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5925 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5926
5927 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5928 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5929
5930 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5931 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5932 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5933 return rc;
5934}
5935
5936static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5937{
5938 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5939 struct common_audit_data ad;
5940 u32 sid = current_sid();
5941
5942 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5943
5944 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5945 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5946
5947 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5948 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5949 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5950}
5951
5952static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
5953{
5954 int err;
5955 int perms;
5956
5957 switch (cmd) {
5958 case IPC_INFO:
5959 case MSG_INFO:
5960 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5961 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5962 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5963 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5964 case IPC_STAT:
5965 case MSG_STAT:
5966 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
5967 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5968 break;
5969 case IPC_SET:
5970 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5971 break;
5972 case IPC_RMID:
5973 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5974 break;
5975 default:
5976 return 0;
5977 }
5978
5979 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
5980 return err;
5981}
5982
5983static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5984{
5985 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5986 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5987 struct common_audit_data ad;
5988 u32 sid = current_sid();
5989 int rc;
5990
5991 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5992 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5993
5994 /*
5995 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5996 */
5997 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5998 /*
5999 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6000 * message queue this message will be stored in
6001 */
6002 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6003 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6004 if (rc)
6005 return rc;
6006 }
6007
6008 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6009 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6010
6011 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6012 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6013 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6014 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6015 if (!rc)
6016 /* Can this process send the message */
6017 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6018 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6019 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6020 if (!rc)
6021 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6022 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6023 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6024 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6025
6026 return rc;
6027}
6028
6029static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6030 struct task_struct *target,
6031 long type, int mode)
6032{
6033 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6034 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6035 struct common_audit_data ad;
6036 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6037 int rc;
6038
6039 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6040 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6041
6042 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6043 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6044
6045 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6046 sid, isec->sid,
6047 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6048 if (!rc)
6049 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6050 sid, msec->sid,
6051 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6052 return rc;
6053}
6054
6055/* Shared Memory security operations */
6056static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6057{
6058 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6059 struct common_audit_data ad;
6060 u32 sid = current_sid();
6061 int rc;
6062
6063 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6064 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6065
6066 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6067 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6068
6069 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6070 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6071 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6072 return rc;
6073}
6074
6075static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6076{
6077 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6078 struct common_audit_data ad;
6079 u32 sid = current_sid();
6080
6081 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6082
6083 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6084 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6085
6086 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6087 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6088 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6089}
6090
6091/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6092static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6093{
6094 int perms;
6095 int err;
6096
6097 switch (cmd) {
6098 case IPC_INFO:
6099 case SHM_INFO:
6100 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6101 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6102 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6103 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6104 case IPC_STAT:
6105 case SHM_STAT:
6106 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6107 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6108 break;
6109 case IPC_SET:
6110 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6111 break;
6112 case SHM_LOCK:
6113 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6114 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6115 break;
6116 case IPC_RMID:
6117 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6118 break;
6119 default:
6120 return 0;
6121 }
6122
6123 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6124 return err;
6125}
6126
6127static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6128 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6129{
6130 u32 perms;
6131
6132 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6133 perms = SHM__READ;
6134 else
6135 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6136
6137 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6138}
6139
6140/* Semaphore security operations */
6141static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6142{
6143 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6144 struct common_audit_data ad;
6145 u32 sid = current_sid();
6146 int rc;
6147
6148 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6149 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6150
6151 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6152 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6153
6154 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6155 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6156 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6157 return rc;
6158}
6159
6160static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6161{
6162 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6163 struct common_audit_data ad;
6164 u32 sid = current_sid();
6165
6166 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6167
6168 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6169 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6170
6171 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6172 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6173 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6174}
6175
6176/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6177static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6178{
6179 int err;
6180 u32 perms;
6181
6182 switch (cmd) {
6183 case IPC_INFO:
6184 case SEM_INFO:
6185 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6186 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6187 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6188 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6189 case GETPID:
6190 case GETNCNT:
6191 case GETZCNT:
6192 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6193 break;
6194 case GETVAL:
6195 case GETALL:
6196 perms = SEM__READ;
6197 break;
6198 case SETVAL:
6199 case SETALL:
6200 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6201 break;
6202 case IPC_RMID:
6203 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6204 break;
6205 case IPC_SET:
6206 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6207 break;
6208 case IPC_STAT:
6209 case SEM_STAT:
6210 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6211 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6212 break;
6213 default:
6214 return 0;
6215 }
6216
6217 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6218 return err;
6219}
6220
6221static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6222 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6223{
6224 u32 perms;
6225
6226 if (alter)
6227 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6228 else
6229 perms = SEM__READ;
6230
6231 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6232}
6233
6234static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6235{
6236 u32 av = 0;
6237
6238 av = 0;
6239 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6240 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6241 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6242 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6243
6244 if (av == 0)
6245 return 0;
6246
6247 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6248}
6249
6250static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6251{
6252 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6253 *secid = isec->sid;
6254}
6255
6256static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6257{
6258 if (inode)
6259 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6260}
6261
6262static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6263 char *name, char **value)
6264{
6265 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6266 u32 sid;
6267 int error;
6268 unsigned len;
6269
6270 rcu_read_lock();
6271 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6272
6273 if (current != p) {
6274 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6275 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6276 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6277 if (error)
6278 goto bad;
6279 }
6280
6281 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6282 sid = __tsec->sid;
6283 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6284 sid = __tsec->osid;
6285 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6286 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6287 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6288 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6289 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6290 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6291 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6292 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6293 else {
6294 error = -EINVAL;
6295 goto bad;
6296 }
6297 rcu_read_unlock();
6298
6299 if (!sid)
6300 return 0;
6301
6302 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6303 if (error)
6304 return error;
6305 return len;
6306
6307bad:
6308 rcu_read_unlock();
6309 return error;
6310}
6311
6312static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6313{
6314 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6315 struct cred *new;
6316 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6317 int error;
6318 char *str = value;
6319
6320 /*
6321 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6322 */
6323 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6324 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6325 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6326 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6327 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6328 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6329 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6330 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6331 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6332 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6333 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6334 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6335 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6336 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6337 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6338 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6339 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6340 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6341 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6342 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6343 else
6344 error = -EINVAL;
6345 if (error)
6346 return error;
6347
6348 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6349 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6350 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6351 str[size-1] = 0;
6352 size--;
6353 }
6354 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6355 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6356 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6357 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6358 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6359 size_t audit_size;
6360
6361 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6362 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6363 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6364 audit_size = size - 1;
6365 else
6366 audit_size = size;
6367 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6368 GFP_ATOMIC,
6369 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6370 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6371 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6372 audit_log_end(ab);
6373
6374 return error;
6375 }
6376 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6377 &selinux_state,
6378 value, size, &sid);
6379 }
6380 if (error)
6381 return error;
6382 }
6383
6384 new = prepare_creds();
6385 if (!new)
6386 return -ENOMEM;
6387
6388 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6389 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6390 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6391 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
6392 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6393 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6394 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6395 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6396 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6397 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6398 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6399 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6400 if (sid) {
6401 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6402 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6403 if (error)
6404 goto abort_change;
6405 }
6406 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6407 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6408 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6409 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6410 error = -EINVAL;
6411 if (sid == 0)
6412 goto abort_change;
6413
6414 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6415 error = -EPERM;
6416 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6417 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6418 tsec->sid, sid);
6419 if (error)
6420 goto abort_change;
6421 }
6422
6423 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6424 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6425 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6426 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6427 if (error)
6428 goto abort_change;
6429
6430 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6431 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6432 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6433 if (ptsid != 0) {
6434 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6435 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6436 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6437 if (error)
6438 goto abort_change;
6439 }
6440
6441 tsec->sid = sid;
6442 } else {
6443 error = -EINVAL;
6444 goto abort_change;
6445 }
6446
6447 commit_creds(new);
6448 return size;
6449
6450abort_change:
6451 abort_creds(new);
6452 return error;
6453}
6454
6455static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6456{
6457 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6458}
6459
6460static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6461{
6462 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6463 secdata, seclen);
6464}
6465
6466static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6467{
6468 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6469 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6470}
6471
6472static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6473{
6474 kfree(secdata);
6475}
6476
6477static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6478{
6479 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6480
6481 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6482 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6483 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6484}
6485
6486/*
6487 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6488 */
6489static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6490{
6491 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6492 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6493 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6494 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6495}
6496
6497/*
6498 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6499 */
6500static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6501{
6502 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6503}
6504
6505static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6506{
6507 int len = 0;
6508 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6509 ctx, true);
6510 if (len < 0)
6511 return len;
6512 *ctxlen = len;
6513 return 0;
6514}
6515#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6516
6517static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6518 unsigned long flags)
6519{
6520 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6521 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6522
6523 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6524 if (!ksec)
6525 return -ENOMEM;
6526
6527 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6528 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6529 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6530 else
6531 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6532
6533 k->security = ksec;
6534 return 0;
6535}
6536
6537static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6538{
6539 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6540
6541 k->security = NULL;
6542 kfree(ksec);
6543}
6544
6545static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6546 const struct cred *cred,
6547 unsigned perm)
6548{
6549 struct key *key;
6550 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6551 u32 sid;
6552
6553 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
6554 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
6555 appear to be created. */
6556 if (perm == 0)
6557 return 0;
6558
6559 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6560
6561 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6562 ksec = key->security;
6563
6564 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6565 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6566}
6567
6568static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6569{
6570 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6571 char *context = NULL;
6572 unsigned len;
6573 int rc;
6574
6575 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6576 &context, &len);
6577 if (!rc)
6578 rc = len;
6579 *_buffer = context;
6580 return rc;
6581}
6582#endif
6583
6584#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6585static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6586{
6587 struct common_audit_data ad;
6588 int err;
6589 u32 sid = 0;
6590 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6591 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6592
6593 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6594 if (err)
6595 return err;
6596
6597 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6598 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6599 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6600 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6601 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6602 sec->sid, sid,
6603 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6604 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6605}
6606
6607static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6608 u8 port_num)
6609{
6610 struct common_audit_data ad;
6611 int err;
6612 u32 sid = 0;
6613 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6614 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6615
6616 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6617 &sid);
6618
6619 if (err)
6620 return err;
6621
6622 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6623 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6624 ibendport.port = port_num;
6625 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6626 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6627 sec->sid, sid,
6628 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6629 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6630}
6631
6632static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6633{
6634 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6635
6636 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6637 if (!sec)
6638 return -ENOMEM;
6639 sec->sid = current_sid();
6640
6641 *ib_sec = sec;
6642 return 0;
6643}
6644
6645static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6646{
6647 kfree(ib_sec);
6648}
6649#endif
6650
6651#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6652static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6653 unsigned int size)
6654{
6655 u32 sid = current_sid();
6656 int ret;
6657
6658 switch (cmd) {
6659 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6660 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6661 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6662 NULL);
6663 break;
6664 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6665 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6666 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6667 NULL);
6668 break;
6669 default:
6670 ret = 0;
6671 break;
6672 }
6673
6674 return ret;
6675}
6676
6677static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6678{
6679 u32 av = 0;
6680
6681 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6682 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6683 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6684 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6685 return av;
6686}
6687
6688/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6689 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6690 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6691 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6692 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6693 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6694 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6695 */
6696static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6697{
6698 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6699 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6700 struct bpf_map *map;
6701 int ret;
6702
6703 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6704 map = file->private_data;
6705 bpfsec = map->security;
6706 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6707 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6708 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6709 if (ret)
6710 return ret;
6711 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6712 prog = file->private_data;
6713 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6714 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6715 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6716 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6717 if (ret)
6718 return ret;
6719 }
6720 return 0;
6721}
6722
6723static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6724{
6725 u32 sid = current_sid();
6726 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6727
6728 bpfsec = map->security;
6729 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6730 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6731 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6732}
6733
6734static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6735{
6736 u32 sid = current_sid();
6737 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6738
6739 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6740 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6741 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6742 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6743}
6744
6745static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6746{
6747 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6748
6749 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6750 if (!bpfsec)
6751 return -ENOMEM;
6752
6753 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6754 map->security = bpfsec;
6755
6756 return 0;
6757}
6758
6759static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6760{
6761 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6762
6763 map->security = NULL;
6764 kfree(bpfsec);
6765}
6766
6767static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6768{
6769 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6770
6771 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6772 if (!bpfsec)
6773 return -ENOMEM;
6774
6775 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6776 aux->security = bpfsec;
6777
6778 return 0;
6779}
6780
6781static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6782{
6783 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6784
6785 aux->security = NULL;
6786 kfree(bpfsec);
6787}
6788#endif
6789
6790struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6791 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6792 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6793 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6794 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6795 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6796};
6797
6798static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6799 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6800 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6801 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6802 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6803
6804 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6805 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6806 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6807 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6808 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6809 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6810 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6811 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6812 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6813
6814 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6815
6816 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
6817 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6818 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6819
6820 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
6821 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
6822
6823 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
6824 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6825 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
6826 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
6827 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6828 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6829 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6830 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6831 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6832 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6833 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6834 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6835 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
6836
6837 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6838 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6839
6840 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
6841 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6842 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6843 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6844 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6845 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6846 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6847 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6848 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6849 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6850 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6851 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
6852 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
6853 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
6854 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
6855 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
6856 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
6857 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
6858 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
6859 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
6860 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
6861 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
6862 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
6863 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
6864 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
6865 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
6866 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
6867 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
6868
6869 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
6870
6871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
6872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
6873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
6874 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
6875 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
6876 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
6877 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
6878 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
6879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
6880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
6881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
6882
6883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
6884
6885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
6886 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
6887 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
6888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
6889 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
6890 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
6891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
6892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
6893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
6894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
6895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
6896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
6897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
6898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
6899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
6900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
6901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
6902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
6903 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
6904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
6905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
6906 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
6907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
6908
6909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
6910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
6911
6912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
6913
6914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
6915 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
6916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
6917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
6918 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
6919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
6920
6921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
6922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
6923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
6924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
6925
6926 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
6927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
6928 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
6929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
6930
6931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
6932
6933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
6934 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
6935
6936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
6937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
6938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
6939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
6940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
6941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
6942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
6943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
6944
6945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
6946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
6947
6948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
6949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
6950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
6951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
6952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
6953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
6954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
6955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
6956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
6957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
6958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
6959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
6960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
6961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
6964 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
6966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
6968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
6972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
6974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
6976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
6977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
6978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
6980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
6982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
6984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
6987#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
6990 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
6993#endif
6994#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7001 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7006 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7008#endif
7009
7010#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7015#endif
7016
7017#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7022#endif
7023
7024#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7032#endif
7033};
7034
7035static __init int selinux_init(void)
7036{
7037 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7038
7039 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7040 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7041 selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
7042 selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
7043 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7044
7045 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7046 cred_init_security();
7047
7048 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7049
7050 avc_init();
7051
7052 avtab_cache_init();
7053
7054 ebitmap_cache_init();
7055
7056 hashtab_cache_init();
7057
7058 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7059
7060 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7061 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7062
7063 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7064 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7065
7066 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7067 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7068 else
7069 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7070
7071 fs_validate_description(&selinux_fs_parameters);
7072
7073 return 0;
7074}
7075
7076static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7077{
7078 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7079}
7080
7081void selinux_complete_init(void)
7082{
7083 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7084
7085 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7086 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7087 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7088}
7089
7090/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7091 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7092DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7093 .name = "selinux",
7094 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7095 .enabled = &selinux_enabled,
7096 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7097 .init = selinux_init,
7098};
7099
7100#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7101
7102static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7103 {
7104 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7105 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7106 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7107 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7108 },
7109 {
7110 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7111 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7112 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7113 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7114 },
7115 {
7116 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7117 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7118 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7119 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7120 },
7121#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7122 {
7123 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7124 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7125 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7126 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7127 },
7128 {
7129 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7130 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7131 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7132 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7133 },
7134 {
7135 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7136 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7137 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7138 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7139 },
7140#endif /* IPV6 */
7141};
7142
7143static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7144{
7145 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7146 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7147}
7148
7149static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7150{
7151 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7152 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7153}
7154
7155static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7156 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7157 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7158};
7159
7160static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7161{
7162 int err;
7163
7164 if (!selinux_enabled)
7165 return 0;
7166
7167 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7168
7169 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7170 if (err)
7171 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7172
7173 return 0;
7174}
7175__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7176
7177#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7178static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7179{
7180 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7181
7182 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7183}
7184#endif
7185
7186#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7187
7188#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7189#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7190#endif
7191
7192#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7193
7194#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7195int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7196{
7197 if (state->initialized) {
7198 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7199 return -EINVAL;
7200 }
7201
7202 if (state->disabled) {
7203 /* Only do this once. */
7204 return -EINVAL;
7205 }
7206
7207 state->disabled = 1;
7208
7209 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7210
7211 selinux_enabled = 0;
7212
7213 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7214
7215 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7216 avc_disable();
7217
7218 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
7219 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7220
7221 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7222 exit_sel_fs();
7223
7224 return 0;
7225}
7226#endif