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1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28#include <linux/errno.h>
29#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30#include <linux/sched/task.h>
31#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40#include <linux/swap.h>
41#include <linux/spinlock.h>
42#include <linux/syscalls.h>
43#include <linux/dcache.h>
44#include <linux/file.h>
45#include <linux/fdtable.h>
46#include <linux/namei.h>
47#include <linux/mount.h>
48#include <linux/fs_context.h>
49#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57#include <net/net_namespace.h>
58#include <net/netlabel.h>
59#include <linux/uaccess.h>
60#include <asm/ioctls.h>
61#include <linux/atomic.h>
62#include <linux/bitops.h>
63#include <linux/interrupt.h>
64#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65#include <net/netlink.h>
66#include <linux/tcp.h>
67#include <linux/udp.h>
68#include <linux/dccp.h>
69#include <linux/sctp.h>
70#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71#include <linux/quota.h>
72#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <linux/parser.h>
75#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
76#include <net/ipv6.h>
77#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78#include <linux/personality.h>
79#include <linux/audit.h>
80#include <linux/string.h>
81#include <linux/mutex.h>
82#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83#include <linux/syslog.h>
84#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85#include <linux/export.h>
86#include <linux/msg.h>
87#include <linux/shm.h>
88#include <uapi/linux/shm.h>
89#include <linux/bpf.h>
90#include <linux/kernfs.h>
91#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94#include <linux/fanotify.h>
95#include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h>
96#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
97
98#include "avc.h"
99#include "objsec.h"
100#include "netif.h"
101#include "netnode.h"
102#include "netport.h"
103#include "ibpkey.h"
104#include "xfrm.h"
105#include "netlabel.h"
106#include "audit.h"
107#include "avc_ss.h"
108
109#define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
110
111struct selinux_state selinux_state;
112
113/* SECMARK reference count */
114static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
115
116#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
117static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
118
119static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
120{
121 unsigned long enforcing;
122 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
123 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
124 return 1;
125}
126__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
127#else
128#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
129#endif
130
131int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
132#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
133static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
134{
135 unsigned long enabled;
136 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
137 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
138 return 1;
139}
140__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
141#endif
142
143static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
144{
145 unsigned long checkreqprot;
146
147 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
148 if (checkreqprot)
149 pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is no longer supported.\n");
150 }
151 return 1;
152}
153__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
154
155/**
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
157 *
158 * Description:
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
164 *
165 */
166static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167{
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
170}
171
172/**
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
174 *
175 * Description:
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
180 *
181 */
182static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183{
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
186}
187
188static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189{
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
191 sel_netif_flush();
192 sel_netnode_flush();
193 sel_netport_flush();
194 synchronize_net();
195 }
196 return 0;
197}
198
199static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200{
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
204 }
205
206 return 0;
207}
208
209/*
210 * initialise the security for the init task
211 */
212static void cred_init_security(void)
213{
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
215
216 tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
217 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
218}
219
220/*
221 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
222 */
223static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
224{
225 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
226
227 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
228 return tsec->sid;
229}
230
231static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad,
232 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
233 int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family)
234{
235 ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
236 ad->u.net = net;
237 net->netif = ifindex;
238 net->sk = sk;
239 net->family = family;
240}
241
242static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad,
243 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
244 struct sock *sk)
245{
246 __ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0);
247}
248
249static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad,
250 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
251 int ifindex, u16 family)
252{
253 __ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, NULL, family);
254}
255
256/*
257 * get the objective security ID of a task
258 */
259static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
260{
261 u32 sid;
262
263 rcu_read_lock();
264 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
265 rcu_read_unlock();
266 return sid;
267}
268
269static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
270
271/*
272 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
273 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
274 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
275 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
276 */
277static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
278 struct dentry *dentry,
279 bool may_sleep)
280{
281 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
282
283 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
284
285 /*
286 * The check of isec->initialized below is racy but
287 * inode_doinit_with_dentry() will recheck with
288 * isec->lock held.
289 */
290 if (selinux_initialized() &&
291 data_race(isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED)) {
292 if (!may_sleep)
293 return -ECHILD;
294
295 /*
296 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
297 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
298 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
299 */
300 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
301 }
302 return 0;
303}
304
305static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
306{
307 return selinux_inode(inode);
308}
309
310static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
311{
312 int error;
313
314 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
315 if (error)
316 return ERR_PTR(error);
317 return selinux_inode(inode);
318}
319
320/*
321 * Get the security label of an inode.
322 */
323static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
324{
325 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
326 return selinux_inode(inode);
327}
328
329static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
330{
331 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
332
333 return selinux_inode(inode);
334}
335
336/*
337 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
338 */
339static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
340{
341 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
342
343 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
344 return selinux_inode(inode);
345}
346
347static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
348{
349 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
350 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
351
352 if (!isec)
353 return;
354 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
355 /*
356 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
357 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
358 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
359 *
360 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
361 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
362 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
363 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
364 */
365 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
366 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
367 list_del_init(&isec->list);
368 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
369 }
370}
371
372struct selinux_mnt_opts {
373 u32 fscontext_sid;
374 u32 context_sid;
375 u32 rootcontext_sid;
376 u32 defcontext_sid;
377};
378
379static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
380{
381 kfree(mnt_opts);
382}
383
384enum {
385 Opt_error = -1,
386 Opt_context = 0,
387 Opt_defcontext = 1,
388 Opt_fscontext = 2,
389 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
390 Opt_seclabel = 4,
391};
392
393#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
394static const struct {
395 const char *name;
396 int len;
397 int opt;
398 bool has_arg;
399} tokens[] = {
400 A(context, true),
401 A(fscontext, true),
402 A(defcontext, true),
403 A(rootcontext, true),
404 A(seclabel, false),
405};
406#undef A
407
408static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
409{
410 int i;
411
412 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
413 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
414 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
415 continue;
416 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
417 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
418 continue;
419 *arg = s + len + 1;
420 } else if (len != l)
421 continue;
422 return tokens[i].opt;
423 }
424 return Opt_error;
425}
426
427#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
428
429static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
430 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
431 const struct cred *cred)
432{
433 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
434 int rc;
435
436 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
437 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
438 if (rc)
439 return rc;
440
441 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
442 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
443 return rc;
444}
445
446static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
448 const struct cred *cred)
449{
450 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
451 int rc;
452 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
453 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
454 if (rc)
455 return rc;
456
457 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
458 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
459 return rc;
460}
461
462static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
463{
464 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
465 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
466 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
467 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
468 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
469 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
470 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
471 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
472 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
473}
474
475static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
476{
477 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
478
479 /*
480 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
481 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
482 */
483 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
484
485 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
486 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
487 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
488 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
489 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
490 return 1;
491
492 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
493 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
494
495 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
496 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
497 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
498 default:
499 return 0;
500 }
501}
502
503static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
504{
505 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
506 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
507 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
508 u32 sid;
509 int rc;
510
511 /*
512 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
513 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
514 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
515 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
516 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
517 */
518 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
519 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
520 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
521 goto fallback;
522 }
523
524 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
525 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
526 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
527 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
528 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
529 goto fallback;
530 } else {
531 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
532 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
533 return rc;
534 }
535 }
536 return 0;
537
538fallback:
539 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
540 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, "/",
541 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
542 if (rc)
543 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
544
545 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
546 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
547 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
548 sbsec->sid = sid;
549 return 0;
550}
551
552static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
553{
554 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
555 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
556 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
557 int rc = 0;
558
559 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
560 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
561 if (rc)
562 return rc;
563 }
564
565 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
566
567 /*
568 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
569 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
570 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
571 */
572 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
573 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
574 else
575 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
576
577 /* Initialize the root inode. */
578 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
579
580 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
581 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
582 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
583 populates itself. */
584 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
585 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
586 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
587 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
588 struct inode_security_struct, list);
589 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
590 list_del_init(&isec->list);
591 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
592 inode = igrab(inode);
593 if (inode) {
594 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
595 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
596 iput(inode);
597 }
598 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
599 }
600 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
601 return rc;
602}
603
604static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
605 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
606{
607 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
608
609 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
610 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
611 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
612 (old_sid != new_sid))
613 return 1;
614
615 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
616 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
617 */
618 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
619 if (mnt_flags & flag)
620 return 1;
621 return 0;
622}
623
624/*
625 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
626 * labeling information.
627 */
628static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
629 void *mnt_opts,
630 unsigned long kern_flags,
631 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
632{
633 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
634 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
635 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
636 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
637 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
638 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
639 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
640 int rc = 0;
641
642 /*
643 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
644 * place the results is not allowed
645 */
646 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
647 return -EINVAL;
648
649 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
650
651 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
652 if (!opts) {
653 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
654 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
655 server is ready to handle calls. */
656 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
657 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
658 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
659 }
660 goto out;
661 }
662 rc = -EINVAL;
663 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
664 "before the security server is initialized\n");
665 goto out;
666 }
667
668 /*
669 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
670 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
671 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
672 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
673 *
674 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
675 * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
676 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
677 * will be used for both mounts)
678 */
679 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
680 && !opts)
681 goto out;
682
683 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
684
685 /*
686 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
687 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
688 * than once with different security options.
689 */
690 if (opts) {
691 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
692 fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
693 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
694 fscontext_sid))
695 goto out_double_mount;
696 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
697 }
698 if (opts->context_sid) {
699 context_sid = opts->context_sid;
700 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
701 context_sid))
702 goto out_double_mount;
703 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
704 }
705 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
706 rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
707 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
708 rootcontext_sid))
709 goto out_double_mount;
710 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
711 }
712 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
713 defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
714 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
715 defcontext_sid))
716 goto out_double_mount;
717 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
718 }
719 }
720
721 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
722 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
723 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
724 goto out_double_mount;
725 rc = 0;
726 goto out;
727 }
728
729 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
730 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
731
732 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
733 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
734 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
735 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
736 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
737 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
738 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
739
740 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
741 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
742 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
743 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
744
745 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
746 /*
747 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
748 * filesystem type.
749 */
750 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
751 if (rc) {
752 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
753 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
754 goto out;
755 }
756 }
757
758 /*
759 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
760 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
761 * line and security labels must be ignored.
762 */
763 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
764 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
765 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
766 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
767 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
768 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
769 defcontext_sid) {
770 rc = -EACCES;
771 goto out;
772 }
773 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
774 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
775 rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(),
776 current_sid(),
777 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
778 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
779 if (rc)
780 goto out;
781 }
782 goto out_set_opts;
783 }
784
785 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
786 if (fscontext_sid) {
787 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
788 if (rc)
789 goto out;
790
791 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
792 }
793
794 /*
795 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
796 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
797 * the superblock context if not already set.
798 */
799 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
800 /*
801 * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
802 * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
803 * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
804 * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
805 * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
806 * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
807 */
808 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
809 } else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
810 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
811 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
812 }
813
814 if (context_sid) {
815 if (!fscontext_sid) {
816 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
817 cred);
818 if (rc)
819 goto out;
820 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
821 } else {
822 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
823 cred);
824 if (rc)
825 goto out;
826 }
827 if (!rootcontext_sid)
828 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
829
830 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
831 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
832 }
833
834 if (rootcontext_sid) {
835 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
836 cred);
837 if (rc)
838 goto out;
839
840 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
841 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
842 }
843
844 if (defcontext_sid) {
845 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
846 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
847 rc = -EINVAL;
848 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
849 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
850 goto out;
851 }
852
853 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
854 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
855 sbsec, cred);
856 if (rc)
857 goto out;
858 }
859
860 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
861 }
862
863out_set_opts:
864 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
865out:
866 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
867 return rc;
868out_double_mount:
869 rc = -EINVAL;
870 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
871 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
872 sb->s_type->name);
873 goto out;
874}
875
876static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
877 const struct super_block *newsb)
878{
879 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
880 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
881 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
882 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
883
884 if (oldflags != newflags)
885 goto mismatch;
886 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
887 goto mismatch;
888 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
889 goto mismatch;
890 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
891 goto mismatch;
892 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
893 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
894 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
895 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
896 goto mismatch;
897 }
898 return 0;
899mismatch:
900 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
901 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
902 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
903 return -EBUSY;
904}
905
906static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
907 struct super_block *newsb,
908 unsigned long kern_flags,
909 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
910{
911 int rc = 0;
912 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
913 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
914 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
915
916 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
917 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
918 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
919
920 /*
921 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
922 * place the results is not allowed.
923 */
924 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
925 return -EINVAL;
926
927 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
928
929 /*
930 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
931 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
932 */
933 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
934 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
935 newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
936 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
937 }
938 goto out;
939 }
940
941 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
942 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
943
944 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
945 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
946 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
947 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
948 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
949 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
950 }
951
952 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
953
954 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
955 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
956 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
957
958 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
959 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
960 rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
961 if (rc)
962 goto out;
963 }
964
965 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
966 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
967 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
968 }
969
970 if (set_context) {
971 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
972
973 if (!set_fscontext)
974 newsbsec->sid = sid;
975 if (!set_rootcontext) {
976 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
977 newisec->sid = sid;
978 }
979 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
980 }
981 if (set_rootcontext) {
982 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
983 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
984
985 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
986 }
987
988 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
989out:
990 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
991 return rc;
992}
993
994/*
995 * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
996 */
997static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
998{
999 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
1000 u32 *dst_sid;
1001 int rc;
1002
1003 if (token == Opt_seclabel)
1004 /* eaten and completely ignored */
1005 return 0;
1006 if (!s)
1007 return -EINVAL;
1008
1009 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
1010 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
1011 return -EINVAL;
1012 }
1013
1014 if (!opts) {
1015 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1016 if (!opts)
1017 return -ENOMEM;
1018 *mnt_opts = opts;
1019 }
1020
1021 switch (token) {
1022 case Opt_context:
1023 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1024 goto err;
1025 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
1026 break;
1027 case Opt_fscontext:
1028 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
1029 goto err;
1030 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
1031 break;
1032 case Opt_rootcontext:
1033 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
1034 goto err;
1035 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
1036 break;
1037 case Opt_defcontext:
1038 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1039 goto err;
1040 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
1041 break;
1042 default:
1043 WARN_ON(1);
1044 return -EINVAL;
1045 }
1046 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1047 if (rc)
1048 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1049 s, rc);
1050 return rc;
1051
1052err:
1053 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1054 return -EINVAL;
1055}
1056
1057static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1058{
1059 char *context = NULL;
1060 u32 len;
1061 int rc;
1062
1063 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
1064 if (!rc) {
1065 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1066
1067 seq_putc(m, '=');
1068 if (has_comma)
1069 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1070 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1071 if (has_comma)
1072 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1073 }
1074 kfree(context);
1075 return rc;
1076}
1077
1078static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1079{
1080 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1081 int rc;
1082
1083 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1084 return 0;
1085
1086 if (!selinux_initialized())
1087 return 0;
1088
1089 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1090 seq_putc(m, ',');
1091 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1092 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1093 if (rc)
1094 return rc;
1095 }
1096 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1097 seq_putc(m, ',');
1098 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1099 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1100 if (rc)
1101 return rc;
1102 }
1103 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1104 seq_putc(m, ',');
1105 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1106 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1107 if (rc)
1108 return rc;
1109 }
1110 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1111 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1112 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1113 seq_putc(m, ',');
1114 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1115 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1116 if (rc)
1117 return rc;
1118 }
1119 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1120 seq_putc(m, ',');
1121 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1122 }
1123 return 0;
1124}
1125
1126static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1127{
1128 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1129 case S_IFSOCK:
1130 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1131 case S_IFLNK:
1132 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1133 case S_IFREG:
1134 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1135 case S_IFBLK:
1136 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1137 case S_IFDIR:
1138 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1139 case S_IFCHR:
1140 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1141 case S_IFIFO:
1142 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1143
1144 }
1145
1146 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1147}
1148
1149static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1150{
1151 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1152 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1153}
1154
1155static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1156{
1157 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1158}
1159
1160static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1161{
1162 bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1163
1164 switch (family) {
1165 case PF_UNIX:
1166 switch (type) {
1167 case SOCK_STREAM:
1168 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1169 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1170 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1171 case SOCK_RAW:
1172 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1173 }
1174 break;
1175 case PF_INET:
1176 case PF_INET6:
1177 switch (type) {
1178 case SOCK_STREAM:
1179 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1180 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1181 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1182 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1183 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1184 else
1185 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1186 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1187 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1188 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1189 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1190 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1191 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1192 else
1193 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1194 case SOCK_DCCP:
1195 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1196 default:
1197 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1198 }
1199 break;
1200 case PF_NETLINK:
1201 switch (protocol) {
1202 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1203 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1204 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1205 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1206 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1207 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1208 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1209 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1210 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1211 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1212 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1213 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1214 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1215 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1216 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1217 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1218 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1219 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1220 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1221 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1222 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1223 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1224 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1225 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1226 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1227 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1228 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1229 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1230 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1231 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1232 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1233 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1234 default:
1235 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1236 }
1237 case PF_PACKET:
1238 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1239 case PF_KEY:
1240 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1241 case PF_APPLETALK:
1242 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1243 }
1244
1245 if (extsockclass) {
1246 switch (family) {
1247 case PF_AX25:
1248 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1249 case PF_IPX:
1250 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1251 case PF_NETROM:
1252 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1253 case PF_ATMPVC:
1254 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1255 case PF_X25:
1256 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1257 case PF_ROSE:
1258 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1259 case PF_DECnet:
1260 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1261 case PF_ATMSVC:
1262 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1263 case PF_RDS:
1264 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1265 case PF_IRDA:
1266 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1267 case PF_PPPOX:
1268 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1269 case PF_LLC:
1270 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1271 case PF_CAN:
1272 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1273 case PF_TIPC:
1274 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1275 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1276 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1277 case PF_IUCV:
1278 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1279 case PF_RXRPC:
1280 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1281 case PF_ISDN:
1282 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1283 case PF_PHONET:
1284 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1285 case PF_IEEE802154:
1286 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1287 case PF_CAIF:
1288 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1289 case PF_ALG:
1290 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1291 case PF_NFC:
1292 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1293 case PF_VSOCK:
1294 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1295 case PF_KCM:
1296 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1297 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1298 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1299 case PF_SMC:
1300 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1301 case PF_XDP:
1302 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1303 case PF_MCTP:
1304 return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1305#if PF_MAX > 46
1306#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1307#endif
1308 }
1309 }
1310
1311 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1312}
1313
1314static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1315 u16 tclass,
1316 u16 flags,
1317 u32 *sid)
1318{
1319 int rc;
1320 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1321 char *buffer, *path;
1322
1323 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1324 if (!buffer)
1325 return -ENOMEM;
1326
1327 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1328 if (IS_ERR(path))
1329 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1330 else {
1331 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1332 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1333 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1334 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1335 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1336 path[1] = '/';
1337 path++;
1338 }
1339 }
1340 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name,
1341 path, tclass, sid);
1342 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1343 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1344 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1345 rc = 0;
1346 }
1347 }
1348 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1349 return rc;
1350}
1351
1352static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1353 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1354{
1355#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1356 char *context;
1357 unsigned int len;
1358 int rc;
1359
1360 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1361 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1362 if (!context)
1363 return -ENOMEM;
1364
1365 context[len] = '\0';
1366 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1367 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1368 kfree(context);
1369
1370 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1371 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1372 if (rc < 0)
1373 return rc;
1374
1375 len = rc;
1376 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1377 if (!context)
1378 return -ENOMEM;
1379
1380 context[len] = '\0';
1381 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1382 context, len);
1383 }
1384 if (rc < 0) {
1385 kfree(context);
1386 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1387 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1388 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1389 return rc;
1390 }
1391 *sid = def_sid;
1392 return 0;
1393 }
1394
1395 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, sid,
1396 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1397 if (rc) {
1398 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1399 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1400
1401 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1402 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1403 ino, dev, context);
1404 } else {
1405 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1406 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1407 }
1408 }
1409 kfree(context);
1410 return 0;
1411}
1412
1413/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1414static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1415{
1416 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1417 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1418 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1419 u16 sclass;
1420 struct dentry *dentry;
1421 int rc = 0;
1422
1423 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1424 return 0;
1425
1426 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1427 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1428 goto out_unlock;
1429
1430 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1431 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1432
1433 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1434 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1435 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1436 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1437 server is ready to handle calls. */
1438 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1439 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1440 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1441 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1442 goto out_unlock;
1443 }
1444
1445 sclass = isec->sclass;
1446 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1447 sid = isec->sid;
1448 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1449 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1450
1451 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1452 /*
1453 * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
1454 * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
1455 */
1456 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1457 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1458 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1459 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1460 break;
1461 }
1462 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1463 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1464 if (opt_dentry) {
1465 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1466 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1467 } else {
1468 /*
1469 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1470 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1471 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1472 * two, depending upon that...
1473 */
1474 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1475 if (!dentry)
1476 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1477 }
1478 if (!dentry) {
1479 /*
1480 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1481 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1482 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1483 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1484 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1485 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1486 * be used again by userspace.
1487 */
1488 goto out_invalid;
1489 }
1490
1491 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1492 &sid);
1493 dput(dentry);
1494 if (rc)
1495 goto out;
1496 break;
1497 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1498 sid = task_sid;
1499 break;
1500 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1501 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1502 sid = sbsec->sid;
1503
1504 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1505 rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid,
1506 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1507 if (rc)
1508 goto out;
1509 break;
1510 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1511 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1512 break;
1513 default:
1514 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1515 sid = sbsec->sid;
1516
1517 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1518 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1519 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1520 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1521 * procfs inodes */
1522 if (opt_dentry) {
1523 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1524 * d_splice_alias. */
1525 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1526 } else {
1527 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1528 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1529 * a connected one, so try that first.
1530 */
1531 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1532 if (!dentry)
1533 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1534 }
1535 /*
1536 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1537 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1538 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1539 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1540 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1541 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1542 * could be used again by userspace.
1543 */
1544 if (!dentry)
1545 goto out_invalid;
1546 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1547 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1548 if (rc) {
1549 dput(dentry);
1550 goto out;
1551 }
1552
1553 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1554 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1555 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1556 sid, &sid);
1557 if (rc) {
1558 dput(dentry);
1559 goto out;
1560 }
1561 }
1562 dput(dentry);
1563 }
1564 break;
1565 }
1566
1567out:
1568 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1569 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1570 if (rc) {
1571 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1572 goto out_unlock;
1573 }
1574 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1575 isec->sid = sid;
1576 }
1577
1578out_unlock:
1579 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1580 return rc;
1581
1582out_invalid:
1583 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1584 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1585 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1586 isec->sid = sid;
1587 }
1588 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1589 return 0;
1590}
1591
1592/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1593static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1594{
1595 u32 perm = 0;
1596
1597 switch (sig) {
1598 case SIGCHLD:
1599 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1600 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1601 break;
1602 case SIGKILL:
1603 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1604 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1605 break;
1606 case SIGSTOP:
1607 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1608 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1609 break;
1610 default:
1611 /* All other signals. */
1612 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1613 break;
1614 }
1615
1616 return perm;
1617}
1618
1619#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1620#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1621#endif
1622
1623/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1624static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1625 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1626{
1627 struct common_audit_data ad;
1628 struct av_decision avd;
1629 u16 sclass;
1630 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1631 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1632 int rc;
1633
1634 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1635 ad.u.cap = cap;
1636
1637 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1638 case 0:
1639 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1640 break;
1641 case 1:
1642 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1643 break;
1644 default:
1645 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1646 BUG();
1647 return -EINVAL;
1648 }
1649
1650 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1651 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1652 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1653 if (rc2)
1654 return rc2;
1655 }
1656 return rc;
1657}
1658
1659/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1660 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1661 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1662static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1663 struct inode *inode,
1664 u32 perms,
1665 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1666{
1667 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1668 u32 sid;
1669
1670 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1671 return 0;
1672
1673 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1674 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1675
1676 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1677}
1678
1679/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1680 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1681 pathname if needed. */
1682static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1683 struct dentry *dentry,
1684 u32 av)
1685{
1686 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1687 struct common_audit_data ad;
1688
1689 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1690 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1691 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1692 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1693}
1694
1695/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1696 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1697 pathname if needed. */
1698static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1699 const struct path *path,
1700 u32 av)
1701{
1702 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1703 struct common_audit_data ad;
1704
1705 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1706 ad.u.path = *path;
1707 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1708 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1709}
1710
1711/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1712static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1713 struct file *file,
1714 u32 av)
1715{
1716 struct common_audit_data ad;
1717
1718 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1719 ad.u.file = file;
1720 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1721}
1722
1723#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1724static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
1725#endif
1726
1727/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1728 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1729 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1730 check a particular permission to the file.
1731 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1732 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1733 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1734 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1735static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1736 struct file *file,
1737 u32 av)
1738{
1739 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1740 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1741 struct common_audit_data ad;
1742 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1743 int rc;
1744
1745 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1746 ad.u.file = file;
1747
1748 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1749 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1750 SECCLASS_FD,
1751 FD__USE,
1752 &ad);
1753 if (rc)
1754 goto out;
1755 }
1756
1757#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1758 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1759 if (rc)
1760 return rc;
1761#endif
1762
1763 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1764 rc = 0;
1765 if (av)
1766 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1767
1768out:
1769 return rc;
1770}
1771
1772/*
1773 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1774 */
1775static int
1776selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1777 struct inode *dir,
1778 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1779 u32 *_new_isid)
1780{
1781 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1782 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1783
1784 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1785 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1786 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1787 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1788 tsec->create_sid) {
1789 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1790 } else {
1791 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1792 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
1793 dsec->sid, tclass,
1794 name, _new_isid);
1795 }
1796
1797 return 0;
1798}
1799
1800/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1801static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1802 struct dentry *dentry,
1803 u16 tclass)
1804{
1805 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1806 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1807 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1808 u32 sid, newsid;
1809 struct common_audit_data ad;
1810 int rc;
1811
1812 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1813 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1814
1815 sid = tsec->sid;
1816
1817 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1818 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1819
1820 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1821 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1822 &ad);
1823 if (rc)
1824 return rc;
1825
1826 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1827 &newsid);
1828 if (rc)
1829 return rc;
1830
1831 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1832 if (rc)
1833 return rc;
1834
1835 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1836 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1837 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1838}
1839
1840#define MAY_LINK 0
1841#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1842#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1843
1844/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1845static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1846 struct dentry *dentry,
1847 int kind)
1848
1849{
1850 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1851 struct common_audit_data ad;
1852 u32 sid = current_sid();
1853 u32 av;
1854 int rc;
1855
1856 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1857 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1858
1859 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1860 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1861
1862 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1863 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1864 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1865 if (rc)
1866 return rc;
1867
1868 switch (kind) {
1869 case MAY_LINK:
1870 av = FILE__LINK;
1871 break;
1872 case MAY_UNLINK:
1873 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1874 break;
1875 case MAY_RMDIR:
1876 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1877 break;
1878 default:
1879 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1880 __func__, kind);
1881 return 0;
1882 }
1883
1884 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1885 return rc;
1886}
1887
1888static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1889 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1890 struct inode *new_dir,
1891 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1892{
1893 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1894 struct common_audit_data ad;
1895 u32 sid = current_sid();
1896 u32 av;
1897 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1898 int rc;
1899
1900 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1901 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1902 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1903 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1904
1905 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1906
1907 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1908 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1909 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1910 if (rc)
1911 return rc;
1912 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1913 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1914 if (rc)
1915 return rc;
1916 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1917 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1918 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1919 if (rc)
1920 return rc;
1921 }
1922
1923 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1924 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1925 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1926 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1927 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1928 if (rc)
1929 return rc;
1930 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1931 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1932 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1933 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1934 new_isec->sclass,
1935 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1936 if (rc)
1937 return rc;
1938 }
1939
1940 return 0;
1941}
1942
1943/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1944static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1945 const struct super_block *sb,
1946 u32 perms,
1947 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1948{
1949 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1950 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1951
1952 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1953 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1954}
1955
1956/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1957static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1958{
1959 u32 av = 0;
1960
1961 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1962 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1963 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1964 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1965 av |= FILE__READ;
1966
1967 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1968 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1969 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1970 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1971
1972 } else {
1973 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1974 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1975 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1976 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1977 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1978 av |= DIR__READ;
1979 }
1980
1981 return av;
1982}
1983
1984/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1985static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file)
1986{
1987 u32 av = 0;
1988
1989 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1990 av |= FILE__READ;
1991 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1992 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1993 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1994 else
1995 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1996 }
1997 if (!av) {
1998 /*
1999 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2000 */
2001 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2002 }
2003
2004 return av;
2005}
2006
2007/*
2008 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
2009 * open permission.
2010 */
2011static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2012{
2013 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2014 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2015
2016 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2017 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2018 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2019
2020 return av;
2021}
2022
2023/* Hook functions begin here. */
2024
2025static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
2026{
2027 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2028 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2029}
2030
2031static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2032 const struct cred *to)
2033{
2034 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2035 u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2036 u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2037 int rc;
2038
2039 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2040 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2041 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2042 if (rc)
2043 return rc;
2044 }
2045
2046 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid,
2047 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2048}
2049
2050static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2051 const struct cred *to)
2052{
2053 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2054 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2055 NULL);
2056}
2057
2058static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2059 const struct cred *to,
2060 const struct file *file)
2061{
2062 u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2063 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2064 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2065 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2066 struct common_audit_data ad;
2067 int rc;
2068
2069 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2070 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2071
2072 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2073 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2074 SECCLASS_FD,
2075 FD__USE,
2076 &ad);
2077 if (rc)
2078 return rc;
2079 }
2080
2081#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2082 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2083 if (rc)
2084 return rc;
2085#endif
2086
2087 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2088 return 0;
2089
2090 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2091 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2092 &ad);
2093}
2094
2095static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2096 unsigned int mode)
2097{
2098 u32 sid = current_sid();
2099 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2100
2101 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2102 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ,
2103 NULL);
2104
2105 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
2106 NULL);
2107}
2108
2109static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2110{
2111 return avc_has_perm(task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2112 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2113}
2114
2115static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2116 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2117{
2118 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target),
2119 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2120}
2121
2122static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2123 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2124 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2125 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2126{
2127 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2128 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2129}
2130
2131/*
2132 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2133 * which was removed).
2134 *
2135 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2136 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2137 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2138 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2139 */
2140
2141static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2142 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2143{
2144 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2145}
2146
2147static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
2148{
2149 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2150 int rc = 0;
2151
2152 if (!sb)
2153 return 0;
2154
2155 switch (cmds) {
2156 case Q_SYNC:
2157 case Q_QUOTAON:
2158 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2159 case Q_SETINFO:
2160 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2161 case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2162 case Q_XQUOTAON:
2163 case Q_XSETQLIM:
2164 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2165 break;
2166 case Q_GETFMT:
2167 case Q_GETINFO:
2168 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2169 case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2170 case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2171 case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2172 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2173 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2174 break;
2175 default:
2176 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2177 break;
2178 }
2179 return rc;
2180}
2181
2182static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2183{
2184 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2185
2186 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2187}
2188
2189static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2190{
2191 switch (type) {
2192 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2193 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2194 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2195 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2196 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2197 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2198 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2199 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2200 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2201 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2202 NULL);
2203 }
2204 /* All other syslog types */
2205 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2206 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2207}
2208
2209/*
2210 * Check permission for allocating a new virtual mapping. Returns
2211 * 0 if permission is granted, negative error code if not.
2212 *
2213 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2214 * processes that allocate mappings.
2215 */
2216static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2217{
2218 return cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2219 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2220}
2221
2222/* binprm security operations */
2223
2224static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2225{
2226 u32 sid = 0;
2227 struct task_struct *tracer;
2228
2229 rcu_read_lock();
2230 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2231 if (tracer)
2232 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2233 rcu_read_unlock();
2234
2235 return sid;
2236}
2237
2238static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2239 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2240 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2241{
2242 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2243 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2244 int rc;
2245 u32 av;
2246
2247 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2248 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2249
2250 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2251 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2252
2253 /*
2254 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2255 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2256 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2257 * the old and new contexts.
2258 */
2259 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2260 av = 0;
2261 if (nnp)
2262 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2263 if (nosuid)
2264 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2265 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2266 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2267 if (!rc)
2268 return 0;
2269 }
2270
2271 /*
2272 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2273 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2274 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2275 */
2276 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid,
2277 new_tsec->sid);
2278 if (!rc)
2279 return 0;
2280
2281 /*
2282 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2283 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2284 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2285 */
2286 if (nnp)
2287 return -EPERM;
2288 return -EACCES;
2289}
2290
2291static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2292{
2293 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2294 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2295 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2296 struct common_audit_data ad;
2297 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2298 int rc;
2299
2300 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2301 * the script interpreter */
2302
2303 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2304 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2305 isec = inode_security(inode);
2306
2307 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2308 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2309 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2310
2311 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2312 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2313 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2314 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2315
2316 /*
2317 * Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space
2318 * as SECINITSID_INIT, so that any userspace tasks surviving from
2319 * early boot end up with a label different from SECINITSID_KERNEL
2320 * (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL).
2321 */
2322 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
2323 new_tsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT;
2324 /* also clear the exec_sid just in case */
2325 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2326 return 0;
2327 }
2328
2329 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2330 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2331 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2332 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2333
2334 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2335 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2336 if (rc)
2337 return rc;
2338 } else {
2339 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2340 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid,
2341 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2342 &new_tsec->sid);
2343 if (rc)
2344 return rc;
2345
2346 /*
2347 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2348 * transition.
2349 */
2350 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2351 if (rc)
2352 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2353 }
2354
2355 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2356 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2357
2358 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2359 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2360 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2361 if (rc)
2362 return rc;
2363 } else {
2364 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2365 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2366 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2367 if (rc)
2368 return rc;
2369
2370 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2371 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2372 if (rc)
2373 return rc;
2374
2375 /* Check for shared state */
2376 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2377 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2378 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2379 NULL);
2380 if (rc)
2381 return -EPERM;
2382 }
2383
2384 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2385 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2386 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2387 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2388 if (ptsid != 0) {
2389 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2390 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2391 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2392 if (rc)
2393 return -EPERM;
2394 }
2395 }
2396
2397 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2398 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2399
2400 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2401 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2402 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2403 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2404 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2405 NULL);
2406 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2407 }
2408
2409 return 0;
2410}
2411
2412static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2413{
2414 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2415}
2416
2417/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2418static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2419 struct files_struct *files)
2420{
2421 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2422 struct tty_struct *tty;
2423 int drop_tty = 0;
2424 unsigned n;
2425
2426 tty = get_current_tty();
2427 if (tty) {
2428 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2429 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2430 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2431
2432 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2433 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2434 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2435 open file may belong to another process and we are
2436 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2437 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2438 struct tty_file_private, list);
2439 file = file_priv->file;
2440 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2441 drop_tty = 1;
2442 }
2443 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2444 tty_kref_put(tty);
2445 }
2446 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2447 if (drop_tty)
2448 no_tty();
2449
2450 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2451 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2452 if (!n) /* none found? */
2453 return;
2454
2455 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2456 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2457 devnull = NULL;
2458 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2459 do {
2460 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2461 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2462 if (devnull)
2463 fput(devnull);
2464}
2465
2466/*
2467 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2468 */
2469static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2470{
2471 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2472 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2473 int rc, i;
2474
2475 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2476 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2477 return;
2478
2479 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2480 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2481
2482 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2483 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2484
2485 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2486 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2487 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2488 *
2489 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2490 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2491 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2492 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2493 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2494 */
2495 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2496 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2497 if (rc) {
2498 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2499 task_lock(current);
2500 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2501 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2502 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2503 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2504 }
2505 task_unlock(current);
2506 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2507 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2508 }
2509}
2510
2511/*
2512 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2513 * due to exec
2514 */
2515static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2516{
2517 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2518 u32 osid, sid;
2519 int rc;
2520
2521 osid = tsec->osid;
2522 sid = tsec->sid;
2523
2524 if (sid == osid)
2525 return;
2526
2527 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2528 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2529 * flush and unblock signals.
2530 *
2531 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2532 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2533 */
2534 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2535 if (rc) {
2536 clear_itimer();
2537
2538 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2539 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2540 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2541 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2542 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2543 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2544 recalc_sigpending();
2545 }
2546 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2547 }
2548
2549 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2550 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2551 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2552 __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2553 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2554}
2555
2556/* superblock security operations */
2557
2558static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2559{
2560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2561
2562 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2563 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2564 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2565 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2566 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2567 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2568
2569 return 0;
2570}
2571
2572static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2573{
2574 bool open_quote = false;
2575 int len;
2576 char c;
2577
2578 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2579 if (c == '"')
2580 open_quote = !open_quote;
2581 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2582 break;
2583 }
2584 return len;
2585}
2586
2587static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2588{
2589 char *from = options;
2590 char *to = options;
2591 bool first = true;
2592 int rc;
2593
2594 while (1) {
2595 int len = opt_len(from);
2596 int token;
2597 char *arg = NULL;
2598
2599 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2600
2601 if (token != Opt_error) {
2602 char *p, *q;
2603
2604 /* strip quotes */
2605 if (arg) {
2606 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2607 char c = *p;
2608 if (c != '"')
2609 *q++ = c;
2610 }
2611 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2612 if (!arg) {
2613 rc = -ENOMEM;
2614 goto free_opt;
2615 }
2616 }
2617 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2618 kfree(arg);
2619 arg = NULL;
2620 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2621 goto free_opt;
2622 }
2623 } else {
2624 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2625 from--;
2626 len++;
2627 }
2628 if (to != from)
2629 memmove(to, from, len);
2630 to += len;
2631 first = false;
2632 }
2633 if (!from[len])
2634 break;
2635 from += len + 1;
2636 }
2637 *to = '\0';
2638 return 0;
2639
2640free_opt:
2641 if (*mnt_opts) {
2642 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2643 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2644 }
2645 return rc;
2646}
2647
2648static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2649{
2650 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2651 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2652
2653 /*
2654 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2655 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2656 */
2657 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2658 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2659
2660 /*
2661 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2662 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2663 */
2664 if (!opts)
2665 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2666
2667 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2669 opts->fscontext_sid))
2670 return 1;
2671 }
2672 if (opts->context_sid) {
2673 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2674 opts->context_sid))
2675 return 1;
2676 }
2677 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2678 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2679
2680 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2681 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2682 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2683 return 1;
2684 }
2685 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2686 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2687 opts->defcontext_sid))
2688 return 1;
2689 }
2690 return 0;
2691}
2692
2693static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2694{
2695 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2696 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2697
2698 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2699 return 0;
2700
2701 if (!opts)
2702 return 0;
2703
2704 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2705 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2706 opts->fscontext_sid))
2707 goto out_bad_option;
2708 }
2709 if (opts->context_sid) {
2710 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2711 opts->context_sid))
2712 goto out_bad_option;
2713 }
2714 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2715 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2716 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2717 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2718 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2719 goto out_bad_option;
2720 }
2721 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2722 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2723 opts->defcontext_sid))
2724 goto out_bad_option;
2725 }
2726 return 0;
2727
2728out_bad_option:
2729 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2730 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2731 sb->s_type->name);
2732 return -EINVAL;
2733}
2734
2735static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
2736{
2737 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2738 struct common_audit_data ad;
2739
2740 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2741 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2742 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2743}
2744
2745static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2746{
2747 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2748 struct common_audit_data ad;
2749
2750 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2751 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2752 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2753}
2754
2755static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2756 const struct path *path,
2757 const char *type,
2758 unsigned long flags,
2759 void *data)
2760{
2761 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2762
2763 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2764 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2765 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2766 else
2767 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2768}
2769
2770static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2771 const struct path *to_path)
2772{
2773 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2774
2775 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2776}
2777
2778static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2779{
2780 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2781
2782 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2783 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2784}
2785
2786static int selinux_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
2787 struct super_block *reference)
2788{
2789 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference);
2790 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2791
2792 /*
2793 * Ensure that fc->security remains NULL when no options are set
2794 * as expected by selinux_set_mnt_opts().
2795 */
2796 if (!(sbsec->flags & (FSCONTEXT_MNT|CONTEXT_MNT|DEFCONTEXT_MNT)))
2797 return 0;
2798
2799 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2800 if (!opts)
2801 return -ENOMEM;
2802
2803 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT)
2804 opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid;
2805 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT)
2806 opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2807 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT)
2808 opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid;
2809 fc->security = opts;
2810 return 0;
2811}
2812
2813static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2814 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2815{
2816 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2817
2818 if (!src)
2819 return 0;
2820
2821 fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2822 return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2823}
2824
2825static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2826 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2827 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2828 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2829 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2830 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2831 {}
2832};
2833
2834static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2835 struct fs_parameter *param)
2836{
2837 struct fs_parse_result result;
2838 int opt;
2839
2840 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2841 if (opt < 0)
2842 return opt;
2843
2844 return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2845}
2846
2847/* inode security operations */
2848
2849static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2850{
2851 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2852 u32 sid = current_sid();
2853
2854 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2855 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2856 isec->inode = inode;
2857 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2858 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2859 isec->task_sid = sid;
2860 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2861
2862 return 0;
2863}
2864
2865static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2866{
2867 inode_free_security(inode);
2868}
2869
2870static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2871 const struct qstr *name,
2872 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2873 u32 *ctxlen)
2874{
2875 u32 newsid;
2876 int rc;
2877
2878 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2879 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2880 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2881 &newsid);
2882 if (rc)
2883 return rc;
2884
2885 if (xattr_name)
2886 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2887
2888 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx,
2889 ctxlen);
2890}
2891
2892static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2893 struct qstr *name,
2894 const struct cred *old,
2895 struct cred *new)
2896{
2897 u32 newsid;
2898 int rc;
2899 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2900
2901 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2902 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2903 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2904 &newsid);
2905 if (rc)
2906 return rc;
2907
2908 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2909 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2910 return 0;
2911}
2912
2913static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2914 const struct qstr *qstr,
2915 struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
2916{
2917 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2918 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2919 struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
2920 u32 newsid, clen;
2921 u16 newsclass;
2922 int rc;
2923 char *context;
2924
2925 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2926
2927 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2928 newsclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2929 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, newsclass, &newsid);
2930 if (rc)
2931 return rc;
2932
2933 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2934 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2935 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2936 isec->sclass = newsclass;
2937 isec->sid = newsid;
2938 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2939 }
2940
2941 if (!selinux_initialized() ||
2942 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2943 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2944
2945 if (xattr) {
2946 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
2947 &context, &clen);
2948 if (rc)
2949 return rc;
2950 xattr->value = context;
2951 xattr->value_len = clen;
2952 xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2953 }
2954
2955 return 0;
2956}
2957
2958static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2959 const struct qstr *name,
2960 const struct inode *context_inode)
2961{
2962 u32 sid = current_sid();
2963 struct common_audit_data ad;
2964 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2965 int rc;
2966
2967 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized()))
2968 return 0;
2969
2970 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2971
2972 /*
2973 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
2974 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2975 * untouched.
2976 */
2977
2978 if (context_inode) {
2979 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2980 selinux_inode(context_inode);
2981 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2982 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized\n");
2983 return -EACCES;
2984 }
2985
2986 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2987 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2988 } else {
2989 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2990 rc = security_transition_sid(
2991 sid, sid,
2992 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2993 if (rc)
2994 return rc;
2995 }
2996
2997 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2998 /*
2999 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
3000 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
3001 */
3002
3003 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
3004 ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
3005
3006 return avc_has_perm(sid,
3007 isec->sid,
3008 isec->sclass,
3009 FILE__CREATE,
3010 &ad);
3011}
3012
3013static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3014{
3015 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3016}
3017
3018static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3019{
3020 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3021}
3022
3023static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3024{
3025 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3026}
3027
3028static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3029{
3030 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3031}
3032
3033static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3034{
3035 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3036}
3037
3038static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3039{
3040 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3041}
3042
3043static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3044{
3045 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3046}
3047
3048static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3049 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3050{
3051 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3052}
3053
3054static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3055{
3056 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3057
3058 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3059}
3060
3061static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3062 bool rcu)
3063{
3064 struct common_audit_data ad;
3065 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3066 u32 sid = current_sid();
3067
3068 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3069 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3070 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3071 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3072 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3073
3074 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3075}
3076
3077static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3078 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3079 int result)
3080{
3081 struct common_audit_data ad;
3082 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3083
3084 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3085 ad.u.inode = inode;
3086
3087 return slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3088 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3089}
3090
3091static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3092{
3093 u32 perms;
3094 bool from_access;
3095 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3096 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3097 u32 sid = current_sid();
3098 struct av_decision avd;
3099 int rc, rc2;
3100 u32 audited, denied;
3101
3102 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3103 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3104
3105 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3106 if (!mask)
3107 return 0;
3108
3109 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3110 return 0;
3111
3112 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3113
3114 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3115 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3116 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3117
3118 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3119 &avd);
3120 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3121 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3122 &denied);
3123 if (likely(!audited))
3124 return rc;
3125
3126 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3127 if (rc2)
3128 return rc2;
3129 return rc;
3130}
3131
3132static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
3133 struct iattr *iattr)
3134{
3135 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3136 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3137 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3138 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3139
3140 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3141 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3142 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3143 ATTR_FORCE);
3144 if (!ia_valid)
3145 return 0;
3146 }
3147
3148 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3149 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3150 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3151
3152 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3153 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3154 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3155 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3156 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3157
3158 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3159}
3160
3161static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3162{
3163 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3164}
3165
3166static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3167{
3168 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3169 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3170
3171 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3172 return false;
3173 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3174 return false;
3175 return true;
3176}
3177
3178/**
3179 * selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks?
3180 * @name: name of the xattr
3181 *
3182 * Returns 1 to indicate that SELinux "owns" the access control rights to xattrs
3183 * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional
3184 * capability based access controls on this xattr. Returns 0 to indicate that
3185 * SELinux does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is
3186 * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability
3187 * based controls.
3188 */
3189static int selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name)
3190{
3191 /* require capability check if not a selinux xattr */
3192 return !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3193}
3194
3195static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3196 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3197 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3198{
3199 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3200 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3201 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3202 struct common_audit_data ad;
3203 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3204 int rc = 0;
3205
3206 /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */
3207 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3208 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3209
3210 if (!selinux_initialized())
3211 return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3212
3213 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3214 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3215 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3216
3217 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
3218 return -EPERM;
3219
3220 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3221 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3222
3223 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3224 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3225 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3226 if (rc)
3227 return rc;
3228
3229 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3230 GFP_KERNEL);
3231 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3232 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3233 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3234 size_t audit_size;
3235
3236 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3237 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3238 if (value) {
3239 const char *str = value;
3240
3241 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3242 audit_size = size - 1;
3243 else
3244 audit_size = size;
3245 } else {
3246 audit_size = 0;
3247 }
3248 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3249 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3250 if (!ab)
3251 return rc;
3252 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3253 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3254 audit_log_end(ab);
3255
3256 return rc;
3257 }
3258 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value,
3259 size, &newsid);
3260 }
3261 if (rc)
3262 return rc;
3263
3264 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3265 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3266 if (rc)
3267 return rc;
3268
3269 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid,
3270 sid, isec->sclass);
3271 if (rc)
3272 return rc;
3273
3274 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3275 sbsec->sid,
3276 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3277 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3278 &ad);
3279}
3280
3281static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3282 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3283 struct posix_acl *kacl)
3284{
3285 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3286}
3287
3288static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3289 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3290{
3291 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3292}
3293
3294static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3295 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3296{
3297 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3298}
3299
3300static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3301 const void *value, size_t size,
3302 int flags)
3303{
3304 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3305 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3306 u32 newsid;
3307 int rc;
3308
3309 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3310 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3311 return;
3312 }
3313
3314 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
3315 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3316 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3317 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3318 * we've since initialized.
3319 */
3320 return;
3321 }
3322
3323 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
3324 &newsid);
3325 if (rc) {
3326 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3327 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3328 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3329 return;
3330 }
3331
3332 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3333 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3335 isec->sid = newsid;
3336 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3337 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3338}
3339
3340static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3341{
3342 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3343
3344 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3345}
3346
3347static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3348{
3349 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3350
3351 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3352}
3353
3354static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3355 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3356{
3357 /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */
3358 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3359 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3360
3361 if (!selinux_initialized())
3362 return 0;
3363
3364 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3365 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3366 return -EACCES;
3367}
3368
3369static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3370 unsigned int obj_type)
3371{
3372 int ret;
3373 u32 perm;
3374
3375 struct common_audit_data ad;
3376
3377 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3378 ad.u.path = *path;
3379
3380 /*
3381 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3382 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3383 */
3384 switch (obj_type) {
3385 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3386 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3387 break;
3388 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3389 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3390 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3391 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3392 if (ret)
3393 return ret;
3394 break;
3395 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3396 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3397 break;
3398 default:
3399 return -EINVAL;
3400 }
3401
3402 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3403 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3404 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3405
3406 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3407 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3408 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3409
3410 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3411}
3412
3413/*
3414 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3415 *
3416 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3417 */
3418static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3419 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3420 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3421{
3422 u32 size;
3423 int error;
3424 char *context = NULL;
3425 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3426
3427 /*
3428 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3429 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3430 */
3431 if (!selinux_initialized() ||
3432 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3433 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3434
3435 /*
3436 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3437 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3438 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3439 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3440 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3441 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3442 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3443 */
3444 isec = inode_security(inode);
3445 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3446 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3447 &size);
3448 else
3449 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid,
3450 &context, &size);
3451 if (error)
3452 return error;
3453 error = size;
3454 if (alloc) {
3455 *buffer = context;
3456 goto out_nofree;
3457 }
3458 kfree(context);
3459out_nofree:
3460 return error;
3461}
3462
3463static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3464 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3465{
3466 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3467 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3468 u32 newsid;
3469 int rc;
3470
3471 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3472 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3473
3474 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3475 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3476 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3477
3478 if (!value || !size)
3479 return -EACCES;
3480
3481 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3482 GFP_KERNEL);
3483 if (rc)
3484 return rc;
3485
3486 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3487 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3488 isec->sid = newsid;
3489 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3490 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3491 return 0;
3492}
3493
3494static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3495{
3496 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3497
3498 if (!selinux_initialized())
3499 return 0;
3500
3501 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3502 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3503 return len;
3504}
3505
3506static void selinux_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop)
3507{
3508 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3509
3510 prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid;
3511}
3512
3513static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3514{
3515 struct lsm_prop prop;
3516 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3517 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3518
3519 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3520 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3521 if (!new_creds)
3522 return -ENOMEM;
3523 }
3524
3525 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3526 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3527 selinux_inode_getlsmprop(d_inode(src), &prop);
3528 tsec->create_sid = prop.selinux.secid;
3529 *new = new_creds;
3530 return 0;
3531}
3532
3533static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3534{
3535 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3536 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3537 * xattrs up. Instead, filter out SELinux-related xattrs following
3538 * policy load.
3539 */
3540 if (selinux_initialized() && !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3541 return -ECANCELED; /* Discard */
3542 /*
3543 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3544 * by selinux.
3545 */
3546 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3547}
3548
3549/* kernfs node operations */
3550
3551static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3552 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3553{
3554 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3555 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3556 int rc;
3557 char *context;
3558
3559 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3560 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3561 return 0;
3562 else if (rc < 0)
3563 return rc;
3564
3565 clen = (u32)rc;
3566 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3567 if (!context)
3568 return -ENOMEM;
3569
3570 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3571 if (rc < 0) {
3572 kfree(context);
3573 return rc;
3574 }
3575
3576 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, clen, &parent_sid,
3577 GFP_KERNEL);
3578 kfree(context);
3579 if (rc)
3580 return rc;
3581
3582 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3583 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3584 } else {
3585 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3586 struct qstr q;
3587
3588 q.name = kn->name;
3589 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3590
3591 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3592 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3593 &newsid);
3594 if (rc)
3595 return rc;
3596 }
3597
3598 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
3599 &context, &clen);
3600 if (rc)
3601 return rc;
3602
3603 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3604 XATTR_CREATE);
3605 kfree(context);
3606 return rc;
3607}
3608
3609
3610/* file security operations */
3611
3612static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3613{
3614 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3615 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3616
3617 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3618 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3619 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3620
3621 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3622 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3623}
3624
3625static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3626{
3627 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3628 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3629 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3630 u32 sid = current_sid();
3631
3632 if (!mask)
3633 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3634 return 0;
3635
3636 isec = inode_security(inode);
3637 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3638 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3639 /* No change since file_open check. */
3640 return 0;
3641
3642 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3643}
3644
3645static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3646{
3647 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3648 u32 sid = current_sid();
3649
3650 fsec->sid = sid;
3651 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3652
3653 return 0;
3654}
3655
3656/*
3657 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3658 * operation to an inode.
3659 */
3660static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3661 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3662{
3663 struct common_audit_data ad;
3664 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3665 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3666 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3667 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3668 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3669 int rc;
3670 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3671 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3672
3673 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3674 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3675 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3676 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3677
3678 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3679 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3680 SECCLASS_FD,
3681 FD__USE,
3682 &ad);
3683 if (rc)
3684 goto out;
3685 }
3686
3687 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3688 return 0;
3689
3690 isec = inode_security(inode);
3691 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested,
3692 driver, AVC_EXT_IOCTL, xperm, &ad);
3693out:
3694 return rc;
3695}
3696
3697static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3698 unsigned long arg)
3699{
3700 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3701 int error = 0;
3702
3703 switch (cmd) {
3704 case FIONREAD:
3705 case FIBMAP:
3706 case FIGETBSZ:
3707 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3708 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3709 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3710 break;
3711
3712 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3713 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3714 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3715 break;
3716
3717 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3718 case FIONBIO:
3719 case FIOASYNC:
3720 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3721 break;
3722
3723 case KDSKBENT:
3724 case KDSKBSENT:
3725 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3726 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3727 break;
3728
3729 case FIOCLEX:
3730 case FIONCLEX:
3731 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3732 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3733 break;
3734
3735 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3736 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3737 */
3738 default:
3739 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3740 }
3741 return error;
3742}
3743
3744static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3745 unsigned long arg)
3746{
3747 /*
3748 * If we are in a 64-bit kernel running 32-bit userspace, we need to
3749 * make sure we don't compare 32-bit flags to 64-bit flags.
3750 */
3751 switch (cmd) {
3752 case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
3753 cmd = FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
3754 break;
3755 case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
3756 cmd = FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
3757 break;
3758 case FS_IOC32_GETVERSION:
3759 cmd = FS_IOC_GETVERSION;
3760 break;
3761 case FS_IOC32_SETVERSION:
3762 cmd = FS_IOC_SETVERSION;
3763 break;
3764 default:
3765 break;
3766 }
3767
3768 return selinux_file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
3769}
3770
3771static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3772
3773static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3774{
3775 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3776 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3777 int rc = 0;
3778
3779 if (default_noexec &&
3780 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3781 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3782 /*
3783 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3784 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3785 * This has an additional check.
3786 */
3787 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3788 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3789 if (rc)
3790 goto error;
3791 }
3792
3793 if (file) {
3794 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3795 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3796
3797 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3798 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3799 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3800
3801 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3802 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3803
3804 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3805 }
3806
3807error:
3808 return rc;
3809}
3810
3811static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3812{
3813 int rc = 0;
3814
3815 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3816 u32 sid = current_sid();
3817 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3818 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3819 }
3820
3821 return rc;
3822}
3823
3824static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
3825 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3826 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3827{
3828 struct common_audit_data ad;
3829 int rc;
3830
3831 if (file) {
3832 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3833 ad.u.file = file;
3834 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3835 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3836 if (rc)
3837 return rc;
3838 }
3839
3840 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3841 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3842}
3843
3844static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3845 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3846 unsigned long prot)
3847{
3848 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3849 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3850
3851 if (default_noexec &&
3852 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3853 int rc = 0;
3854 /*
3855 * We don't use the vma_is_initial_heap() helper as it has
3856 * a history of problems and is currently broken on systems
3857 * where there is no heap, e.g. brk == start_brk. Before
3858 * replacing the conditional below with vma_is_initial_heap(),
3859 * or something similar, please ensure that the logic is the
3860 * same as what we have below or you have tested every possible
3861 * corner case you can think to test.
3862 */
3863 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3864 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3865 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3866 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3867 } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
3868 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3869 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3870 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3871 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3872 /*
3873 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3874 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3875 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3876 * modified content. This typically should only
3877 * occur for text relocations.
3878 */
3879 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3880 }
3881 if (rc)
3882 return rc;
3883 }
3884
3885 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3886}
3887
3888static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3889{
3890 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3891
3892 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3893}
3894
3895static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3896 unsigned long arg)
3897{
3898 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3899 int err = 0;
3900
3901 switch (cmd) {
3902 case F_SETFL:
3903 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3904 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3905 break;
3906 }
3907 fallthrough;
3908 case F_SETOWN:
3909 case F_SETSIG:
3910 case F_GETFL:
3911 case F_GETOWN:
3912 case F_GETSIG:
3913 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3914 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3915 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3916 break;
3917 case F_GETLK:
3918 case F_SETLK:
3919 case F_SETLKW:
3920 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3921 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3922 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3923#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3924 case F_GETLK64:
3925 case F_SETLK64:
3926 case F_SETLKW64:
3927#endif
3928 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3929 break;
3930 }
3931
3932 return err;
3933}
3934
3935static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3936{
3937 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3938
3939 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3940 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3941}
3942
3943static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3944 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3945{
3946 struct file *file;
3947 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3948 u32 perm;
3949 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3950
3951 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3952 file = fown->file;
3953
3954 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3955
3956 if (!signum)
3957 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3958 else
3959 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3960
3961 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3962 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3963}
3964
3965static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3966{
3967 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3968
3969 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3970}
3971
3972static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3973{
3974 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3975 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3976
3977 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3978 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3979 /*
3980 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3981 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3982 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3983 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3984 * struct as its SID.
3985 */
3986 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3987 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3988 /*
3989 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3990 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3991 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3992 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3993 * new inode label or new policy.
3994 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3995 */
3996 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3997}
3998
3999/* task security operations */
4000
4001static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
4002 unsigned long clone_flags)
4003{
4004 u32 sid = current_sid();
4005
4006 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
4007}
4008
4009/*
4010 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
4011 */
4012static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
4013 gfp_t gfp)
4014{
4015 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4016 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4017
4018 *tsec = *old_tsec;
4019 return 0;
4020}
4021
4022/*
4023 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
4024 */
4025static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
4026{
4027 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4028 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4029
4030 *tsec = *old_tsec;
4031}
4032
4033static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
4034{
4035 *secid = cred_sid(c);
4036}
4037
4038static void selinux_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop)
4039{
4040 prop->selinux.secid = cred_sid(c);
4041}
4042
4043/*
4044 * set the security data for a kernel service
4045 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
4046 */
4047static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
4048{
4049 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4050 u32 sid = current_sid();
4051 int ret;
4052
4053 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
4054 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4055 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
4056 NULL);
4057 if (ret == 0) {
4058 tsec->sid = secid;
4059 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4060 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4061 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4062 }
4063 return ret;
4064}
4065
4066/*
4067 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4068 * objective context of the specified inode
4069 */
4070static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4071{
4072 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4073 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4074 u32 sid = current_sid();
4075 int ret;
4076
4077 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4078 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4079 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4080 NULL);
4081
4082 if (ret == 0)
4083 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4084 return ret;
4085}
4086
4087static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4088{
4089 struct common_audit_data ad;
4090
4091 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4092 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4093
4094 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4095 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4096}
4097
4098static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4099{
4100 struct common_audit_data ad;
4101 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4102 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4103 u32 sid = current_sid();
4104 int rc;
4105
4106 /* init_module */
4107 if (file == NULL)
4108 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4109 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4110
4111 /* finit_module */
4112
4113 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4114 ad.u.file = file;
4115
4116 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4117 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4118 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4119 if (rc)
4120 return rc;
4121 }
4122
4123 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4124 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4125 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4126}
4127
4128static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4129 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4130 bool contents)
4131{
4132 int rc = 0;
4133
4134 switch (id) {
4135 case READING_MODULE:
4136 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4137 break;
4138 default:
4139 break;
4140 }
4141
4142 return rc;
4143}
4144
4145static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4146{
4147 int rc = 0;
4148
4149 switch (id) {
4150 case LOADING_MODULE:
4151 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4152 break;
4153 default:
4154 break;
4155 }
4156
4157 return rc;
4158}
4159
4160static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4161{
4162 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4163 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4164}
4165
4166static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4167{
4168 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4169 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4170}
4171
4172static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4173{
4174 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4175 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4176}
4177
4178static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
4179{
4180 prop->selinux.secid = current_sid();
4181}
4182
4183static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
4184 struct lsm_prop *prop)
4185{
4186 prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4187}
4188
4189static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4190{
4191 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4192 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4193}
4194
4195static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4196{
4197 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4198 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4199}
4200
4201static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4202{
4203 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4204 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4205}
4206
4207static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4208 unsigned int flags)
4209{
4210 u32 av = 0;
4211
4212 if (!flags)
4213 return 0;
4214 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4215 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4216 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4217 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4218 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4219 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4220}
4221
4222static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4223 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4224{
4225 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4226
4227 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4228 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4229 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4230 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4231 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4232 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4233 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4234
4235 return 0;
4236}
4237
4238static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4239{
4240 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4241 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4242}
4243
4244static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4245{
4246 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4247 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4248}
4249
4250static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4251{
4252 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4253 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4254}
4255
4256static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4257 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4258{
4259 u32 secid;
4260 u32 perm;
4261
4262 if (!sig)
4263 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4264 else
4265 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4266 if (!cred)
4267 secid = current_sid();
4268 else
4269 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4270 return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4271}
4272
4273static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4274 struct inode *inode)
4275{
4276 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4277 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4278
4279 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4280 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4281 isec->sid = sid;
4282 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4283 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4284}
4285
4286static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4287{
4288 u32 sid = current_sid();
4289
4290 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4291 USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4292}
4293
4294/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4295static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4296 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4297{
4298 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4299 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4300
4301 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4302 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4303 if (ih == NULL)
4304 goto out;
4305
4306 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4307 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4308 goto out;
4309
4310 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4311 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4312 ret = 0;
4313
4314 if (proto)
4315 *proto = ih->protocol;
4316
4317 switch (ih->protocol) {
4318 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4319 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4320
4321 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4322 break;
4323
4324 offset += ihlen;
4325 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4326 if (th == NULL)
4327 break;
4328
4329 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4330 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4331 break;
4332 }
4333
4334 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4335 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4336
4337 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4338 break;
4339
4340 offset += ihlen;
4341 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4342 if (uh == NULL)
4343 break;
4344
4345 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4346 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4347 break;
4348 }
4349
4350 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4351 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4352
4353 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4354 break;
4355
4356 offset += ihlen;
4357 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4358 if (dh == NULL)
4359 break;
4360
4361 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4362 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4363 break;
4364 }
4365
4366#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4367 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4368 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4369
4370 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4371 break;
4372
4373 offset += ihlen;
4374 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4375 if (sh == NULL)
4376 break;
4377
4378 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4379 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4380 break;
4381 }
4382#endif
4383 default:
4384 break;
4385 }
4386out:
4387 return ret;
4388}
4389
4390#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4391
4392/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4393static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4394 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4395{
4396 u8 nexthdr;
4397 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4398 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4399 __be16 frag_off;
4400
4401 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4402 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4403 if (ip6 == NULL)
4404 goto out;
4405
4406 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4407 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4408 ret = 0;
4409
4410 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4411 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4412 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4413 if (offset < 0)
4414 goto out;
4415
4416 if (proto)
4417 *proto = nexthdr;
4418
4419 switch (nexthdr) {
4420 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4421 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4422
4423 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4424 if (th == NULL)
4425 break;
4426
4427 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4428 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4429 break;
4430 }
4431
4432 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4433 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4434
4435 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4436 if (uh == NULL)
4437 break;
4438
4439 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4440 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4441 break;
4442 }
4443
4444 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4445 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4446
4447 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4448 if (dh == NULL)
4449 break;
4450
4451 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4452 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4453 break;
4454 }
4455
4456#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4457 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4458 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4459
4460 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4461 if (sh == NULL)
4462 break;
4463
4464 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4465 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4466 break;
4467 }
4468#endif
4469 /* includes fragments */
4470 default:
4471 break;
4472 }
4473out:
4474 return ret;
4475}
4476
4477#endif /* IPV6 */
4478
4479static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4480 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4481{
4482 char *addrp;
4483 int ret;
4484
4485 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4486 case PF_INET:
4487 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4488 if (ret)
4489 goto parse_error;
4490 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4491 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4492 goto okay;
4493
4494#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4495 case PF_INET6:
4496 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4497 if (ret)
4498 goto parse_error;
4499 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4500 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4501 goto okay;
4502#endif /* IPV6 */
4503 default:
4504 addrp = NULL;
4505 goto okay;
4506 }
4507
4508parse_error:
4509 pr_warn(
4510 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4511 " unable to parse packet\n");
4512 return ret;
4513
4514okay:
4515 if (_addrp)
4516 *_addrp = addrp;
4517 return 0;
4518}
4519
4520/**
4521 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4522 * @skb: the packet
4523 * @family: protocol family
4524 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4525 *
4526 * Description:
4527 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4528 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4529 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4530 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4531 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4532 * peer labels.
4533 *
4534 */
4535static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4536{
4537 int err;
4538 u32 xfrm_sid;
4539 u32 nlbl_sid;
4540 u32 nlbl_type;
4541
4542 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4543 if (unlikely(err))
4544 return -EACCES;
4545 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4546 if (unlikely(err))
4547 return -EACCES;
4548
4549 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid,
4550 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4551 if (unlikely(err)) {
4552 pr_warn(
4553 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4554 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4555 return -EACCES;
4556 }
4557
4558 return 0;
4559}
4560
4561/**
4562 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4563 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4564 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4565 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4566 *
4567 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4568 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4569 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4570 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4571 *
4572 */
4573static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4574{
4575 int err = 0;
4576
4577 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4578 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid,
4579 conn_sid);
4580 else
4581 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4582
4583 return err;
4584}
4585
4586/* socket security operations */
4587
4588static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4589 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4590{
4591 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4592 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4593 return 0;
4594 }
4595
4596 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4597 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4598}
4599
4600static bool sock_skip_has_perm(u32 sid)
4601{
4602 if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4603 return true;
4604
4605 /*
4606 * Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that
4607 * inherited the kernel context from early boot used to be skipped
4608 * here, so preserve that behavior unless the capability is set.
4609 *
4610 * By setting the capability the policy signals that it is ready
4611 * for this quirk to be fixed. Note that sockets created by a kernel
4612 * thread or a usermode helper executed without a transition will
4613 * still be skipped in this check regardless of the policycap
4614 * setting.
4615 */
4616 if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context() &&
4617 sid == SECINITSID_INIT)
4618 return true;
4619 return false;
4620}
4621
4622
4623static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4624{
4625 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4626 struct common_audit_data ad;
4627 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4628
4629 if (sock_skip_has_perm(sksec->sid))
4630 return 0;
4631
4632 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
4633
4634 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4635 &ad);
4636}
4637
4638static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4639 int protocol, int kern)
4640{
4641 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4642 u32 newsid;
4643 u16 secclass;
4644 int rc;
4645
4646 if (kern)
4647 return 0;
4648
4649 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4650 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4651 if (rc)
4652 return rc;
4653
4654 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4655}
4656
4657static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4658 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4659{
4660 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4661 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4662 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4663 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4664 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4665 int err = 0;
4666
4667 if (!kern) {
4668 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4669 if (err)
4670 return err;
4671 }
4672
4673 isec->sclass = sclass;
4674 isec->sid = sid;
4675 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4676
4677 if (sock->sk) {
4678 sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
4679 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4680 sksec->sid = sid;
4681 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4682 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4683 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4684
4685 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4686 }
4687
4688 return err;
4689}
4690
4691static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4692 struct socket *sockb)
4693{
4694 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
4695 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
4696
4697 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4698 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4699
4700 return 0;
4701}
4702
4703/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4704 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4705 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4706
4707static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4708{
4709 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4710 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
4711 u16 family;
4712 int err;
4713
4714 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4715 if (err)
4716 goto out;
4717
4718 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4719 family = sk->sk_family;
4720 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4721 char *addrp;
4722 struct common_audit_data ad;
4723 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4724 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4725 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4726 u16 family_sa;
4727 unsigned short snum;
4728 u32 sid, node_perm;
4729
4730 /*
4731 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4732 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4733 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4734 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4735 */
4736 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4737 return -EINVAL;
4738 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4739 switch (family_sa) {
4740 case AF_UNSPEC:
4741 case AF_INET:
4742 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4743 return -EINVAL;
4744 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4745 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4746 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4747 /* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
4748 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4749 return -EINVAL;
4750 /* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
4751 goto err_af;
4752 }
4753 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4754 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4755 */
4756 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4757 goto err_af;
4758 family_sa = AF_INET;
4759 }
4760 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4761 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4762 break;
4763 case AF_INET6:
4764 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4765 return -EINVAL;
4766 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4767 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4768 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4769 break;
4770 default:
4771 goto err_af;
4772 }
4773
4774 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4775 ad.u.net = &net;
4776 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4777 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4778
4779 if (snum) {
4780 int low, high;
4781
4782 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4783
4784 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4785 snum < low || snum > high) {
4786 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4787 snum, &sid);
4788 if (err)
4789 goto out;
4790 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4791 sksec->sclass,
4792 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4793 if (err)
4794 goto out;
4795 }
4796 }
4797
4798 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4799 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4800 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4801 break;
4802
4803 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4804 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4805 break;
4806
4807 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4808 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4809 break;
4810
4811 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4812 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4813 break;
4814
4815 default:
4816 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4817 break;
4818 }
4819
4820 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4821 if (err)
4822 goto out;
4823
4824 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4825 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4826 else
4827 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4828
4829 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4830 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4831 if (err)
4832 goto out;
4833 }
4834out:
4835 return err;
4836err_af:
4837 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4838 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4839 return -EINVAL;
4840 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4841}
4842
4843/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4844 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4845 */
4846static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4847 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4848{
4849 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4850 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
4851 int err;
4852
4853 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4854 if (err)
4855 return err;
4856 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4857 return -EINVAL;
4858
4859 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4860 * way to disconnect the socket
4861 */
4862 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4863 return 0;
4864
4865 /*
4866 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4867 * for the port.
4868 */
4869 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4870 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4871 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4872 struct common_audit_data ad;
4873 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4874 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4875 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4876 unsigned short snum;
4877 u32 sid, perm;
4878
4879 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4880 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4881 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4882 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4883 */
4884 switch (address->sa_family) {
4885 case AF_INET:
4886 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4887 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4888 return -EINVAL;
4889 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4890 break;
4891 case AF_INET6:
4892 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4893 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4894 return -EINVAL;
4895 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4896 break;
4897 default:
4898 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4899 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4900 */
4901 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4902 return -EINVAL;
4903 else
4904 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4905 }
4906
4907 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4908 if (err)
4909 return err;
4910
4911 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4912 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4913 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4914 break;
4915 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4916 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4917 break;
4918 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4919 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4920 break;
4921 }
4922
4923 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4924 ad.u.net = &net;
4925 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4926 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4927 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4928 if (err)
4929 return err;
4930 }
4931
4932 return 0;
4933}
4934
4935/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4936static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4937 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4938{
4939 int err;
4940 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4941
4942 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4943 if (err)
4944 return err;
4945
4946 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4947}
4948
4949static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4950{
4951 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4952}
4953
4954static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4955{
4956 int err;
4957 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4958 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4959 u16 sclass;
4960 u32 sid;
4961
4962 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4963 if (err)
4964 return err;
4965
4966 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4967 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4968 sclass = isec->sclass;
4969 sid = isec->sid;
4970 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4971
4972 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4973 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4974 newisec->sid = sid;
4975 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4976
4977 return 0;
4978}
4979
4980static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4981 int size)
4982{
4983 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4984}
4985
4986static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4987 int size, int flags)
4988{
4989 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4990}
4991
4992static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4993{
4994 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4995}
4996
4997static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4998{
4999 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
5000}
5001
5002static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
5003{
5004 int err;
5005
5006 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
5007 if (err)
5008 return err;
5009
5010 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
5011}
5012
5013static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
5014 int optname)
5015{
5016 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
5017}
5018
5019static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
5020{
5021 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
5022}
5023
5024static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
5025 struct sock *other,
5026 struct sock *newsk)
5027{
5028 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
5029 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
5030 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
5031 struct common_audit_data ad;
5032 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5033 int err;
5034
5035 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
5036
5037 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
5038 sksec_other->sclass,
5039 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
5040 if (err)
5041 return err;
5042
5043 /* server child socket */
5044 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
5045 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid,
5046 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
5047 if (err)
5048 return err;
5049
5050 /* connecting socket */
5051 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
5052
5053 return 0;
5054}
5055
5056static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
5057 struct socket *other)
5058{
5059 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
5060 struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
5061 struct common_audit_data ad;
5062 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5063
5064 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
5065
5066 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5067 &ad);
5068}
5069
5070static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5071 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5072 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5073{
5074 int err;
5075 u32 if_sid;
5076 u32 node_sid;
5077
5078 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5079 if (err)
5080 return err;
5081 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5082 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5083 if (err)
5084 return err;
5085
5086 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5087 if (err)
5088 return err;
5089 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5090 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5091}
5092
5093static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5094 u16 family)
5095{
5096 int err = 0;
5097 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5098 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5099 struct common_audit_data ad;
5100 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5101 char *addrp;
5102
5103 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5104 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5105 if (err)
5106 return err;
5107
5108 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5109 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5110 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5111 if (err)
5112 return err;
5113 }
5114
5115 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5116 if (err)
5117 return err;
5118 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5119
5120 return err;
5121}
5122
5123static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5124{
5125 int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active;
5126 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5127 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5128 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5129 struct common_audit_data ad;
5130 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5131 char *addrp;
5132
5133 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5134 return 0;
5135
5136 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5137 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5138 family = PF_INET;
5139
5140 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5141 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5142 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5143 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5144 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5145 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5146
5147 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5148 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5149 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5150 return 0;
5151
5152 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5153 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5154 if (err)
5155 return err;
5156
5157 if (peerlbl_active) {
5158 u32 peer_sid;
5159
5160 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5161 if (err)
5162 return err;
5163 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5164 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5165 if (err) {
5166 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5167 return err;
5168 }
5169 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5170 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5171 if (err) {
5172 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5173 return err;
5174 }
5175 }
5176
5177 if (secmark_active) {
5178 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5179 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5180 if (err)
5181 return err;
5182 }
5183
5184 return err;
5185}
5186
5187static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5188 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5189 unsigned int len)
5190{
5191 int err = 0;
5192 char *scontext = NULL;
5193 u32 scontext_len;
5194 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
5195 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5196
5197 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5198 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5199 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5200 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5201 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5202 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5203
5204 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext,
5205 &scontext_len);
5206 if (err)
5207 return err;
5208 if (scontext_len > len) {
5209 err = -ERANGE;
5210 goto out_len;
5211 }
5212
5213 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5214 err = -EFAULT;
5215out_len:
5216 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5217 err = -EFAULT;
5218 kfree(scontext);
5219 return err;
5220}
5221
5222static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
5223 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5224{
5225 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5226 u16 family;
5227
5228 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5229 family = PF_INET;
5230 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5231 family = PF_INET6;
5232 else if (sock)
5233 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5234 else {
5235 *secid = SECSID_NULL;
5236 return -EINVAL;
5237 }
5238
5239 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5240 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5241 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5242 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5243 } else if (skb)
5244 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5245
5246 *secid = peer_secid;
5247 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5248 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5249 return 0;
5250}
5251
5252static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5253{
5254 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5255
5256 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5257 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5258 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5259 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5260
5261 return 0;
5262}
5263
5264static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5265{
5266 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5267
5268 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5269}
5270
5271static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5272{
5273 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5274 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
5275
5276 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5277 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5278 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5279
5280 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5281}
5282
5283static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5284{
5285 if (!sk)
5286 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5287 else {
5288 const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5289
5290 *secid = sksec->sid;
5291 }
5292}
5293
5294static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5295{
5296 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5297 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5298 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5299
5300 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5301 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5302 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5303 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5304}
5305
5306/*
5307 * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5308 * if it's the first association on the socket.
5309 */
5310static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5311 struct sk_buff *skb)
5312{
5313 struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5314 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5315 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5316 struct common_audit_data ad;
5317 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5318 int err;
5319
5320 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5321 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5322 family = PF_INET;
5323
5324 if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5325 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5326
5327 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5328 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5329 */
5330 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5331 if (err)
5332 return err;
5333
5334 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5335 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5336 } else {
5337 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5338 }
5339
5340 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5341 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5342
5343 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5344 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5345 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5346 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5347 */
5348 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5349 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5350 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5351 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5352 */
5353 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
5354 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5355 sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5356 &ad);
5357 if (err)
5358 return err;
5359 }
5360 return 0;
5361}
5362
5363/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5364 * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5365 * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5366 */
5367static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5368 struct sk_buff *skb)
5369{
5370 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
5371 u32 conn_sid;
5372 int err;
5373
5374 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5375 return 0;
5376
5377 err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5378 if (err)
5379 return err;
5380
5381 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5382 * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5383 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5384 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5385 * plug this into the new socket.
5386 */
5387 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5388 if (err)
5389 return err;
5390
5391 asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5392
5393 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5394 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5395}
5396
5397/* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5398 * response to an association request (initited by us).
5399 */
5400static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5401 struct sk_buff *skb)
5402{
5403 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk);
5404
5405 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5406 return 0;
5407
5408 /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5409 * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5410 * into a new socket.
5411 */
5412 asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5413
5414 return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5415}
5416
5417/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5418 * based on their @optname.
5419 */
5420static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5421 struct sockaddr *address,
5422 int addrlen)
5423{
5424 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5425 void *addr_buf;
5426 struct sockaddr *addr;
5427 struct socket *sock;
5428
5429 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5430 return 0;
5431
5432 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5433 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5434 addr_buf = address;
5435
5436 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5437 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5438 return -EINVAL;
5439
5440 addr = addr_buf;
5441 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5442 case AF_UNSPEC:
5443 case AF_INET:
5444 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5445 break;
5446 case AF_INET6:
5447 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5448 break;
5449 default:
5450 return -EINVAL;
5451 }
5452
5453 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5454 return -EINVAL;
5455
5456 err = -EINVAL;
5457 switch (optname) {
5458 /* Bind checks */
5459 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5460 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5461 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5462 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5463 break;
5464 /* Connect checks */
5465 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5466 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5467 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5468 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5469 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5470 if (err)
5471 return err;
5472
5473 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5474 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5475 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5476 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5477 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5478 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5479 * primary address is selected.
5480 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5481 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5482 * selinux_socket_connect().
5483 */
5484 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5485 break;
5486 }
5487
5488 if (err)
5489 return err;
5490
5491 addr_buf += len;
5492 walk_size += len;
5493 }
5494
5495 return 0;
5496}
5497
5498/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5499static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5500 struct sock *newsk)
5501{
5502 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5503 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
5504
5505 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5506 * the non-sctp clone version.
5507 */
5508 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5509 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5510
5511 newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5512 newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5513 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5514 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5515}
5516
5517static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
5518{
5519 struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = selinux_sock(ssk);
5520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5521
5522 ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5523 ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5524
5525 /* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
5526 * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
5527 */
5528 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
5529 return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
5530}
5531
5532static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5533 struct request_sock *req)
5534{
5535 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5536 int err;
5537 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5538 u32 connsid;
5539 u32 peersid;
5540
5541 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5542 if (err)
5543 return err;
5544 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5545 if (err)
5546 return err;
5547 req->secid = connsid;
5548 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5549
5550 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5551}
5552
5553static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5554 const struct request_sock *req)
5555{
5556 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
5557
5558 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5559 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5560 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5561 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5562 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5563 time it will have been created and available. */
5564
5565 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5566 * thread with access to newsksec */
5567 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5568}
5569
5570static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5571{
5572 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5573 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5574
5575 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5576 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5577 family = PF_INET;
5578
5579 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5580}
5581
5582static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5583{
5584 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5585 NULL);
5586}
5587
5588static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5589{
5590 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5591}
5592
5593static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5594{
5595 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5596}
5597
5598static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5599 struct flowi_common *flic)
5600{
5601 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5602}
5603
5604static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void *security)
5605{
5606 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
5607
5608 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5609 return 0;
5610}
5611
5612static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5613{
5614 u32 sid = current_sid();
5615
5616 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5617 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5618 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5619 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5620 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5621 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5622
5623 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5624 NULL);
5625}
5626
5627static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5628{
5629 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
5630
5631 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5632 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5633}
5634
5635static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5636{
5637 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
5638 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5639
5640 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5641 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5642 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5643 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5644 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5645 * protocols were being used */
5646
5647 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5648 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5649
5650 return 0;
5651}
5652
5653static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5654{
5655 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security);
5656 u32 sid = current_sid();
5657 int err;
5658
5659 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5660 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5661 if (err)
5662 return err;
5663 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5664 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5665 if (err)
5666 return err;
5667 tunsec->sid = sid;
5668
5669 return 0;
5670}
5671
5672#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5673
5674static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5675 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5676{
5677 int ifindex;
5678 u16 family;
5679 char *addrp;
5680 u32 peer_sid;
5681 struct common_audit_data ad;
5682 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5683 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5684
5685 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5686 return NF_ACCEPT;
5687
5688 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5689 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5690 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5691 return NF_ACCEPT;
5692
5693 family = state->pf;
5694 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5695 return NF_DROP;
5696
5697 ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5698 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5699 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5700 return NF_DROP;
5701
5702 if (peerlbl_active) {
5703 int err;
5704
5705 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5706 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5707 if (err) {
5708 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5709 return NF_DROP;
5710 }
5711 }
5712
5713 if (secmark_active)
5714 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5715 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5716 return NF_DROP;
5717
5718 if (netlbl_enabled())
5719 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5720 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5721 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5722 * protection */
5723 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5724 return NF_DROP;
5725
5726 return NF_ACCEPT;
5727}
5728
5729static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5730 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5731{
5732 struct sock *sk;
5733 u32 sid;
5734
5735 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5736 return NF_ACCEPT;
5737
5738 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5739 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5740 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5741 sk = sk_to_full_sk(skb->sk);
5742 if (sk) {
5743 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5744
5745 if (sk_listener(sk))
5746 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5747 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5748 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5749 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5750 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5751 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5752 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5753 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5754 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5755 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5756 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5757 * best we can do. */
5758 return NF_ACCEPT;
5759
5760 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5761 sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5762 sid = sksec->sid;
5763 } else
5764 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5765 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5766 return NF_DROP;
5767
5768 return NF_ACCEPT;
5769}
5770
5771
5772static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5773 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5774{
5775 struct sock *sk;
5776 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5777 struct common_audit_data ad;
5778 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5779 u8 proto = 0;
5780
5781 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5782 if (sk == NULL)
5783 return NF_ACCEPT;
5784 sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5785
5786 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf);
5787 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5788 return NF_DROP;
5789
5790 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5791 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5792 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5793 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5794
5795 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5796 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5797
5798 return NF_ACCEPT;
5799}
5800
5801static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5802 struct sk_buff *skb,
5803 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5804{
5805 u16 family;
5806 u32 secmark_perm;
5807 u32 peer_sid;
5808 int ifindex;
5809 struct sock *sk;
5810 struct common_audit_data ad;
5811 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5812 char *addrp;
5813 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5814
5815 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5816 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5817 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5818 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5819 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5820 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5821
5822 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5823 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5824 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5825 return NF_ACCEPT;
5826
5827 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5828
5829#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5830 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5831 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5832 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5833 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5834 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5835 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5836 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5837 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5838 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5839 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5840 * connection. */
5841 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5842 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5843 return NF_ACCEPT;
5844#endif
5845
5846 family = state->pf;
5847 if (sk == NULL) {
5848 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5849 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5850 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5851 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5852 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5853 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5854 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5855 return NF_DROP;
5856 } else {
5857 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5858 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5859 }
5860 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5861 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5862 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5863 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5864 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5865 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5866 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5867 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5868 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5869 * for similar problems. */
5870 u32 skb_sid;
5871 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5872
5873 sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5874 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5875 return NF_DROP;
5876 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5877 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5878 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5879 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5880 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5881 * pass the packet. */
5882 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5883 switch (family) {
5884 case PF_INET:
5885 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5886 return NF_ACCEPT;
5887 break;
5888 case PF_INET6:
5889 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5890 return NF_ACCEPT;
5891 break;
5892 default:
5893 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5894 }
5895 }
5896 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5897 return NF_DROP;
5898 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5899 } else {
5900 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5901 * associated socket. */
5902 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5903 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5904 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5905 }
5906
5907 ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5908 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5909 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5910 return NF_DROP;
5911
5912 if (secmark_active)
5913 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5914 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5915 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5916
5917 if (peerlbl_active) {
5918 u32 if_sid;
5919 u32 node_sid;
5920
5921 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5922 return NF_DROP;
5923 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5924 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5925 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5926
5927 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5928 return NF_DROP;
5929 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5930 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5931 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5932 }
5933
5934 return NF_ACCEPT;
5935}
5936#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5937
5938static int nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms(struct sock *sk, u32 perms, u16 nlmsg_type)
5939{
5940 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5941 struct common_audit_data ad;
5942 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5943 u8 driver;
5944 u8 xperm;
5945
5946 if (sock_skip_has_perm(sksec->sid))
5947 return 0;
5948
5949 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
5950
5951 driver = nlmsg_type >> 8;
5952 xperm = nlmsg_type & 0xff;
5953
5954 return avc_has_extended_perms(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass,
5955 perms, driver, AVC_EXT_NLMSG, xperm, &ad);
5956}
5957
5958static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5959{
5960 int rc = 0;
5961 unsigned int msg_len;
5962 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5963 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5964 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5965 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
5966 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5967 u32 perm;
5968
5969 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5970 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5971
5972 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5973 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5974 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5975 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5976 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5977 */
5978 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5979 return 0;
5980
5981 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5982 if (rc == 0) {
5983 if (selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm()) {
5984 rc = nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms(
5985 sk, perm, nlh->nlmsg_type);
5986 } else {
5987 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5988 }
5989 if (rc)
5990 return rc;
5991 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5992 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5993 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5994 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5995 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5996 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5997 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5998 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5999 if (enforcing_enabled() &&
6000 !security_get_allow_unknown())
6001 return rc;
6002 rc = 0;
6003 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
6004 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
6005 rc = 0;
6006 } else {
6007 return rc;
6008 }
6009
6010 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
6011 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
6012 if (msg_len >= data_len)
6013 return 0;
6014 data_len -= msg_len;
6015 data += msg_len;
6016 }
6017
6018 return rc;
6019}
6020
6021static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
6022{
6023 isec->sclass = sclass;
6024 isec->sid = current_sid();
6025}
6026
6027static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
6028 u32 perms)
6029{
6030 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6031 struct common_audit_data ad;
6032 u32 sid = current_sid();
6033
6034 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
6035
6036 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6037 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
6038
6039 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
6040}
6041
6042static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6043{
6044 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6045
6046 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6047 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6048
6049 return 0;
6050}
6051
6052/* message queue security operations */
6053static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6054{
6055 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6056 struct common_audit_data ad;
6057 u32 sid = current_sid();
6058
6059 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6060 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6061
6062 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6063 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6064
6065 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6066 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
6067}
6068
6069static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6070{
6071 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6072 struct common_audit_data ad;
6073 u32 sid = current_sid();
6074
6075 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6076
6077 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6078 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6079
6080 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6081 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6082}
6083
6084static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6085{
6086 u32 perms;
6087
6088 switch (cmd) {
6089 case IPC_INFO:
6090 case MSG_INFO:
6091 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6092 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6093 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6094 case IPC_STAT:
6095 case MSG_STAT:
6096 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6097 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6098 break;
6099 case IPC_SET:
6100 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6101 break;
6102 case IPC_RMID:
6103 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6104 break;
6105 default:
6106 return 0;
6107 }
6108
6109 return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6110}
6111
6112static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6113{
6114 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6115 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6116 struct common_audit_data ad;
6117 u32 sid = current_sid();
6118 int rc;
6119
6120 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6121 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6122
6123 /*
6124 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6125 */
6126 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6127 /*
6128 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6129 * message queue this message will be stored in
6130 */
6131 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid,
6132 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6133 if (rc)
6134 return rc;
6135 }
6136
6137 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6138 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6139
6140 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6141 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6142 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6143 if (!rc)
6144 /* Can this process send the message */
6145 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6146 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6147 if (!rc)
6148 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6149 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6150 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6151
6152 return rc;
6153}
6154
6155static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6156 struct task_struct *target,
6157 long type, int mode)
6158{
6159 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6160 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6161 struct common_audit_data ad;
6162 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6163 int rc;
6164
6165 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6166 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6167
6168 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6169 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6170
6171 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
6172 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6173 if (!rc)
6174 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
6175 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6176 return rc;
6177}
6178
6179/* Shared Memory security operations */
6180static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6181{
6182 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6183 struct common_audit_data ad;
6184 u32 sid = current_sid();
6185
6186 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6187 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6188
6189 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6190 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6191
6192 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6193 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6194}
6195
6196static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6197{
6198 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6199 struct common_audit_data ad;
6200 u32 sid = current_sid();
6201
6202 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6203
6204 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6205 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6206
6207 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6208 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6209}
6210
6211/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6212static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6213{
6214 u32 perms;
6215
6216 switch (cmd) {
6217 case IPC_INFO:
6218 case SHM_INFO:
6219 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6220 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6221 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6222 case IPC_STAT:
6223 case SHM_STAT:
6224 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6225 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6226 break;
6227 case IPC_SET:
6228 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6229 break;
6230 case SHM_LOCK:
6231 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6232 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6233 break;
6234 case IPC_RMID:
6235 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6236 break;
6237 default:
6238 return 0;
6239 }
6240
6241 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6242}
6243
6244static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6245 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6246{
6247 u32 perms;
6248
6249 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6250 perms = SHM__READ;
6251 else
6252 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6253
6254 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6255}
6256
6257/* Semaphore security operations */
6258static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6259{
6260 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6261 struct common_audit_data ad;
6262 u32 sid = current_sid();
6263
6264 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6265 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6266
6267 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6268 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6269
6270 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6271 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6272}
6273
6274static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6275{
6276 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6277 struct common_audit_data ad;
6278 u32 sid = current_sid();
6279
6280 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6281
6282 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6283 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6284
6285 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6286 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6287}
6288
6289/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6290static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6291{
6292 int err;
6293 u32 perms;
6294
6295 switch (cmd) {
6296 case IPC_INFO:
6297 case SEM_INFO:
6298 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6299 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6300 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6301 case GETPID:
6302 case GETNCNT:
6303 case GETZCNT:
6304 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6305 break;
6306 case GETVAL:
6307 case GETALL:
6308 perms = SEM__READ;
6309 break;
6310 case SETVAL:
6311 case SETALL:
6312 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6313 break;
6314 case IPC_RMID:
6315 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6316 break;
6317 case IPC_SET:
6318 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6319 break;
6320 case IPC_STAT:
6321 case SEM_STAT:
6322 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6323 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6324 break;
6325 default:
6326 return 0;
6327 }
6328
6329 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6330 return err;
6331}
6332
6333static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6334 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6335{
6336 u32 perms;
6337
6338 if (alter)
6339 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6340 else
6341 perms = SEM__READ;
6342
6343 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6344}
6345
6346static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6347{
6348 u32 av = 0;
6349
6350 av = 0;
6351 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6352 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6353 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6354 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6355
6356 if (av == 0)
6357 return 0;
6358
6359 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6360}
6361
6362static void selinux_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
6363 struct lsm_prop *prop)
6364{
6365 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6366 prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid;
6367}
6368
6369static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6370{
6371 if (inode)
6372 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6373}
6374
6375static int selinux_lsm_getattr(unsigned int attr, struct task_struct *p,
6376 char **value)
6377{
6378 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6379 int error;
6380 u32 sid;
6381 u32 len;
6382
6383 rcu_read_lock();
6384 tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6385 if (p != current) {
6386 error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tsec->sid,
6387 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6388 if (error)
6389 goto err_unlock;
6390 }
6391 switch (attr) {
6392 case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
6393 sid = tsec->sid;
6394 break;
6395 case LSM_ATTR_PREV:
6396 sid = tsec->osid;
6397 break;
6398 case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
6399 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
6400 break;
6401 case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
6402 sid = tsec->create_sid;
6403 break;
6404 case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
6405 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6406 break;
6407 case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
6408 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6409 break;
6410 default:
6411 error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
6412 goto err_unlock;
6413 }
6414 rcu_read_unlock();
6415
6416 if (sid == SECSID_NULL) {
6417 *value = NULL;
6418 return 0;
6419 }
6420
6421 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
6422 if (error)
6423 return error;
6424 return len;
6425
6426err_unlock:
6427 rcu_read_unlock();
6428 return error;
6429}
6430
6431static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
6432{
6433 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6434 struct cred *new;
6435 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6436 int error;
6437 char *str = value;
6438
6439 /*
6440 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6441 */
6442 switch (attr) {
6443 case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
6444 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6445 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6446 break;
6447 case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
6448 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6449 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6450 break;
6451 case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
6452 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6453 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6454 break;
6455 case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
6456 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6457 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6458 break;
6459 case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
6460 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6461 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6462 break;
6463 default:
6464 error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
6465 break;
6466 }
6467 if (error)
6468 return error;
6469
6470 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6471 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6472 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6473 str[size-1] = 0;
6474 size--;
6475 }
6476 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size,
6477 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6478 if (error == -EINVAL && attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
6479 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6480 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6481 size_t audit_size;
6482
6483 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end,
6484 * otherwise the context contains a nul and
6485 * we should audit that */
6486 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6487 audit_size = size - 1;
6488 else
6489 audit_size = size;
6490 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6491 GFP_ATOMIC,
6492 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6493 if (!ab)
6494 return error;
6495 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6496 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value,
6497 audit_size);
6498 audit_log_end(ab);
6499
6500 return error;
6501 }
6502 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
6503 &sid);
6504 }
6505 if (error)
6506 return error;
6507 }
6508
6509 new = prepare_creds();
6510 if (!new)
6511 return -ENOMEM;
6512
6513 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6514 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6515 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6516 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6517 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6518 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6519 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6520 if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
6521 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6522 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
6523 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6524 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE) {
6525 if (sid) {
6526 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid,
6527 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6528 if (error)
6529 goto abort_change;
6530 }
6531 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6532 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE) {
6533 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6534 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
6535 error = -EINVAL;
6536 if (sid == 0)
6537 goto abort_change;
6538
6539 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6540 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
6541 if (error)
6542 goto abort_change;
6543 }
6544
6545 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6546 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6547 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6548 if (error)
6549 goto abort_change;
6550
6551 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6552 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6553 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6554 if (ptsid != 0) {
6555 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6556 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6557 if (error)
6558 goto abort_change;
6559 }
6560
6561 tsec->sid = sid;
6562 } else {
6563 error = -EINVAL;
6564 goto abort_change;
6565 }
6566
6567 commit_creds(new);
6568 return size;
6569
6570abort_change:
6571 abort_creds(new);
6572 return error;
6573}
6574
6575/**
6576 * selinux_getselfattr - Get SELinux current task attributes
6577 * @attr: the requested attribute
6578 * @ctx: buffer to receive the result
6579 * @size: buffer size (input), buffer size used (output)
6580 * @flags: unused
6581 *
6582 * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
6583 * attribute.
6584 *
6585 * Returns the number of attributes on success, an error code otherwise.
6586 * There will only ever be one attribute.
6587 */
6588static int selinux_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
6589 u32 *size, u32 flags)
6590{
6591 int rc;
6592 char *val = NULL;
6593 int val_len;
6594
6595 val_len = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, current, &val);
6596 if (val_len < 0)
6597 return val_len;
6598 rc = lsm_fill_user_ctx(ctx, size, val, val_len, LSM_ID_SELINUX, 0);
6599 kfree(val);
6600 return (!rc ? 1 : rc);
6601}
6602
6603static int selinux_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
6604 u32 size, u32 flags)
6605{
6606 int rc;
6607
6608 rc = selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
6609 if (rc > 0)
6610 return 0;
6611 return rc;
6612}
6613
6614static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6615 const char *name, char **value)
6616{
6617 unsigned int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
6618 int rc;
6619
6620 if (attr) {
6621 rc = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, p, value);
6622 if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
6623 return rc;
6624 }
6625
6626 return -EINVAL;
6627}
6628
6629static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6630{
6631 int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
6632
6633 if (attr)
6634 return selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, value, size);
6635 return -EINVAL;
6636}
6637
6638static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6639{
6640 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6641}
6642
6643static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6644{
6645 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
6646}
6647
6648static int selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata,
6649 u32 *seclen)
6650{
6651 return selinux_secid_to_secctx(prop->selinux.secid, secdata, seclen);
6652}
6653
6654static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6655{
6656 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen,
6657 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6658}
6659
6660static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6661{
6662 kfree(secdata);
6663}
6664
6665static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6666{
6667 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6668
6669 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6670 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6671 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6672}
6673
6674/*
6675 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6676 */
6677static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6678{
6679 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6680 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6681 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6682 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6683}
6684
6685/*
6686 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6687 */
6688static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6689{
6690 return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6691 ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
6692}
6693
6694static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6695{
6696 int len = 0;
6697 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,
6698 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6699 if (len < 0)
6700 return len;
6701 *ctxlen = len;
6702 return 0;
6703}
6704#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6705
6706static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6707 unsigned long flags)
6708{
6709 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6710 struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
6711
6712 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6713 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6714 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6715 else
6716 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6717
6718 return 0;
6719}
6720
6721static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6722 const struct cred *cred,
6723 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6724{
6725 struct key *key;
6726 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6727 u32 perm, sid;
6728
6729 switch (need_perm) {
6730 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6731 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6732 break;
6733 case KEY_NEED_READ:
6734 perm = KEY__READ;
6735 break;
6736 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6737 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6738 break;
6739 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6740 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6741 break;
6742 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6743 perm = KEY__LINK;
6744 break;
6745 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6746 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6747 break;
6748 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6749 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6750 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6751 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6752 return 0;
6753 default:
6754 WARN_ON(1);
6755 return -EPERM;
6756
6757 }
6758
6759 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6760 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6761 ksec = selinux_key(key);
6762
6763 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6764}
6765
6766static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6767{
6768 struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
6769 char *context = NULL;
6770 unsigned len;
6771 int rc;
6772
6773 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid,
6774 &context, &len);
6775 if (!rc)
6776 rc = len;
6777 *_buffer = context;
6778 return rc;
6779}
6780
6781#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6782static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6783{
6784 struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
6785 u32 sid = current_sid();
6786
6787 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6788}
6789#endif
6790#endif
6791
6792#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6793static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6794{
6795 struct common_audit_data ad;
6796 int err;
6797 u32 sid = 0;
6798 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6799 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6800
6801 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6802 if (err)
6803 return err;
6804
6805 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6806 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6807 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6808 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6809 return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6810 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6811 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6812}
6813
6814static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6815 u8 port_num)
6816{
6817 struct common_audit_data ad;
6818 int err;
6819 u32 sid = 0;
6820 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6821 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6822
6823 err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num,
6824 &sid);
6825
6826 if (err)
6827 return err;
6828
6829 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6830 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6831 ibendport.port = port_num;
6832 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6833 return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6834 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6835 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6836}
6837
6838static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec)
6839{
6840 struct ib_security_struct *sec = selinux_ib(ib_sec);
6841
6842 sec->sid = current_sid();
6843 return 0;
6844}
6845#endif
6846
6847#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6848static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6849 unsigned int size)
6850{
6851 u32 sid = current_sid();
6852 int ret;
6853
6854 switch (cmd) {
6855 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6856 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6857 NULL);
6858 break;
6859 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6860 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6861 NULL);
6862 break;
6863 default:
6864 ret = 0;
6865 break;
6866 }
6867
6868 return ret;
6869}
6870
6871static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6872{
6873 u32 av = 0;
6874
6875 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6876 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6877 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6878 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6879 return av;
6880}
6881
6882/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6883 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6884 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6885 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6886 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6887 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6888 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6889 */
6890static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid)
6891{
6892 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6893 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6894 struct bpf_map *map;
6895 int ret;
6896
6897 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6898 map = file->private_data;
6899 bpfsec = map->security;
6900 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6901 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6902 if (ret)
6903 return ret;
6904 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6905 prog = file->private_data;
6906 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6907 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6908 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6909 if (ret)
6910 return ret;
6911 }
6912 return 0;
6913}
6914
6915static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6916{
6917 u32 sid = current_sid();
6918 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6919
6920 bpfsec = map->security;
6921 return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6922 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6923}
6924
6925static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6926{
6927 u32 sid = current_sid();
6928 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6929
6930 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6931 return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6932 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6933}
6934
6935static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
6936 struct bpf_token *token)
6937{
6938 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6939
6940 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6941 if (!bpfsec)
6942 return -ENOMEM;
6943
6944 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6945 map->security = bpfsec;
6946
6947 return 0;
6948}
6949
6950static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6951{
6952 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6953
6954 map->security = NULL;
6955 kfree(bpfsec);
6956}
6957
6958static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
6959 struct bpf_token *token)
6960{
6961 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6962
6963 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6964 if (!bpfsec)
6965 return -ENOMEM;
6966
6967 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6968 prog->aux->security = bpfsec;
6969
6970 return 0;
6971}
6972
6973static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6974{
6975 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6976
6977 prog->aux->security = NULL;
6978 kfree(bpfsec);
6979}
6980
6981static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
6982 const struct path *path)
6983{
6984 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6985
6986 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6987 if (!bpfsec)
6988 return -ENOMEM;
6989
6990 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6991 token->security = bpfsec;
6992
6993 return 0;
6994}
6995
6996static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
6997{
6998 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
6999
7000 token->security = NULL;
7001 kfree(bpfsec);
7002}
7003#endif
7004
7005struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
7006 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
7007 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
7008 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
7009 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
7010 .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
7011 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
7012#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7013 .lbs_perf_event = sizeof(struct perf_event_security_struct),
7014#endif
7015 .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
7016 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
7017 .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
7018 .lbs_tun_dev = sizeof(struct tun_security_struct),
7019 .lbs_ib = sizeof(struct ib_security_struct),
7020};
7021
7022#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7023static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
7024{
7025 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
7026
7027 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
7028 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
7029 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
7030 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
7031 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
7032 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
7033 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
7034 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
7035 else
7036 return -EINVAL;
7037
7038 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
7039 requested, NULL);
7040}
7041
7042static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
7043{
7044 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
7045
7046 perfsec = selinux_perf_event(event->security);
7047 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
7048
7049 return 0;
7050}
7051
7052static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
7053{
7054 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7055 u32 sid = current_sid();
7056
7057 return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
7058 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
7059}
7060
7061static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
7062{
7063 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7064 u32 sid = current_sid();
7065
7066 return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
7067 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
7068}
7069#endif
7070
7071#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7072/**
7073 * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
7074 * @new: the target creds
7075 *
7076 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
7077 * to service an io_uring operation.
7078 */
7079static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
7080{
7081 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
7082 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
7083}
7084
7085/**
7086 * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
7087 *
7088 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
7089 * kernel polling thread.
7090 */
7091static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
7092{
7093 u32 sid = current_sid();
7094
7095 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid,
7096 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
7097}
7098
7099/**
7100 * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
7101 * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
7102 *
7103 * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
7104 * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
7105 *
7106 */
7107static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
7108{
7109 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
7110 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
7111 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
7112 struct common_audit_data ad;
7113
7114 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
7115 ad.u.file = file;
7116
7117 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
7118 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
7119}
7120#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
7121
7122static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
7123 .name = "selinux",
7124 .id = LSM_ID_SELINUX,
7125};
7126
7127/*
7128 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7129 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7130 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7131 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7132 * hooks),
7133 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7134 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7135 *
7136 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7137 */
7138static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7143
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7153
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7155
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7159
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7170
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7172
7173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7175
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, selinux_inode_getlsmprop),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7208
7209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7210
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7223
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7225
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7230 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, selinux_cred_getlsmprop),
7231 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7233 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7234 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7235 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7236 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7237 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7238 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7239 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7242 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7244 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7246 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7247 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7248 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7252
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7254 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, selinux_ipc_getlsmprop),
7255
7256 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7257 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7260
7261 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7262 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7263 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7264
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7268
7269 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7270
7271 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, selinux_getselfattr),
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, selinux_setselfattr),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7275
7276 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7277 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7278 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7282
7283 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7284 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7285
7286 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7290 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7292 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7293 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7294 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7295 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7296 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7299 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7302 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7304 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7305 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7308 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7310 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7311 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7312 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7314 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7315 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7316 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7317 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7319 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7320 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7321 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7322 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7323 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7324#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7325 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7326 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7327 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7328#endif
7329#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7330 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7331 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7332 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7333 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7334 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7335 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7336 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7337 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7338#endif
7339
7340#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7341 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7342 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7343#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7344 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7345#endif
7346#endif
7347
7348#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7349 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7350 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7351 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7352#endif
7353
7354#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7355 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7356 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7357 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7358 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7359 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7360 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free),
7361#endif
7362
7363#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7364 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7365 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7366 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7367#endif
7368
7369#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7370 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7371 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7372 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7373#endif
7374
7375 /*
7376 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7377 */
7378 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, selinux_fs_context_submount),
7379 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7380 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7381 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7382#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7383 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7384#endif
7385
7386 /*
7387 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7388 */
7389 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7390 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7391 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7392 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7393 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7394 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7395 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7396 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7397 LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx),
7398 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7399 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7400 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7401#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7402 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7403#endif
7404#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7405 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7406 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7407 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7408 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7409#endif
7410#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7411 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7412#endif
7413#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7414 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7415#endif
7416#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7417 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_create, selinux_bpf_map_create),
7418 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_load, selinux_bpf_prog_load),
7419 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_create, selinux_bpf_token_create),
7420#endif
7421#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7422 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7423#endif
7424};
7425
7426static __init int selinux_init(void)
7427{
7428 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7429
7430 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7431 enforcing_set(selinux_enforcing_boot);
7432 selinux_avc_init();
7433 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7434 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7435
7436 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7437 cred_init_security();
7438
7439 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7440 if (!default_noexec)
7441 pr_notice("SELinux: virtual memory is executable by default\n");
7442
7443 avc_init();
7444
7445 avtab_cache_init();
7446
7447 ebitmap_cache_init();
7448
7449 hashtab_cache_init();
7450
7451 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
7452 &selinux_lsmid);
7453
7454 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7455 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7456
7457 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7458 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7459
7460 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7461 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7462 else
7463 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7464
7465 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7466
7467 return 0;
7468}
7469
7470static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7471{
7472 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7473}
7474
7475void selinux_complete_init(void)
7476{
7477 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7478
7479 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7480 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7481 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7482}
7483
7484/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7485 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7486DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7487 .name = "selinux",
7488 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7489 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7490 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7491 .init = selinux_init,
7492};
7493
7494#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7495static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7496 {
7497 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7498 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7499 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7500 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7501 },
7502 {
7503 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7504 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7505 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7506 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7507 },
7508 {
7509 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7510 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7511 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7512 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7513 },
7514#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7515 {
7516 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7517 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7518 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7519 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7520 },
7521 {
7522 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7523 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7524 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7525 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7526 },
7527 {
7528 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7529 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7530 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7531 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7532 },
7533#endif /* IPV6 */
7534};
7535
7536static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7537{
7538 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7539 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7540}
7541
7542static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7543{
7544 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7545 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7546}
7547
7548static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7549 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7550 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7551};
7552
7553static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7554{
7555 int err;
7556
7557 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7558 return 0;
7559
7560 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7561
7562 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7563 if (err)
7564 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7565
7566 return 0;
7567}
7568__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7569#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28#include <linux/errno.h>
29#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30#include <linux/sched/task.h>
31#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40#include <linux/swap.h>
41#include <linux/spinlock.h>
42#include <linux/syscalls.h>
43#include <linux/dcache.h>
44#include <linux/file.h>
45#include <linux/fdtable.h>
46#include <linux/namei.h>
47#include <linux/mount.h>
48#include <linux/fs_context.h>
49#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57#include <net/net_namespace.h>
58#include <net/netlabel.h>
59#include <linux/uaccess.h>
60#include <asm/ioctls.h>
61#include <linux/atomic.h>
62#include <linux/bitops.h>
63#include <linux/interrupt.h>
64#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65#include <net/netlink.h>
66#include <linux/tcp.h>
67#include <linux/udp.h>
68#include <linux/dccp.h>
69#include <linux/sctp.h>
70#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71#include <linux/quota.h>
72#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <linux/parser.h>
75#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
76#include <net/ipv6.h>
77#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78#include <linux/personality.h>
79#include <linux/audit.h>
80#include <linux/string.h>
81#include <linux/mutex.h>
82#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83#include <linux/syslog.h>
84#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85#include <linux/export.h>
86#include <linux/msg.h>
87#include <linux/shm.h>
88#include <linux/bpf.h>
89#include <linux/kernfs.h>
90#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
91#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
92#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
93#include <linux/fanotify.h>
94#include <linux/io_uring.h>
95
96#include "avc.h"
97#include "objsec.h"
98#include "netif.h"
99#include "netnode.h"
100#include "netport.h"
101#include "ibpkey.h"
102#include "xfrm.h"
103#include "netlabel.h"
104#include "audit.h"
105#include "avc_ss.h"
106
107struct selinux_state selinux_state;
108
109/* SECMARK reference count */
110static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
111
112#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
114
115static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
116{
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
120 return 1;
121}
122__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
123#else
124#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
125#endif
126
127int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
130{
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
134 return 1;
135}
136__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
137#endif
138
139static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
141
142static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143{
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
148 if (checkreqprot)
149 pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
150 }
151 return 1;
152}
153__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
154
155/**
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
157 *
158 * Description:
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
164 *
165 */
166static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167{
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
170}
171
172/**
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
174 *
175 * Description:
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
180 *
181 */
182static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183{
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
186}
187
188static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189{
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
191 sel_netif_flush();
192 sel_netnode_flush();
193 sel_netport_flush();
194 synchronize_net();
195 }
196 return 0;
197}
198
199static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200{
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
204 }
205
206 return 0;
207}
208
209/*
210 * initialise the security for the init task
211 */
212static void cred_init_security(void)
213{
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
215
216 tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
217 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
218}
219
220/*
221 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
222 */
223static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
224{
225 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
226
227 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
228 return tsec->sid;
229}
230
231/*
232 * get the objective security ID of a task
233 */
234static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
235{
236 u32 sid;
237
238 rcu_read_lock();
239 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
240 rcu_read_unlock();
241 return sid;
242}
243
244static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
245
246/*
247 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
248 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
249 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
250 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
251 */
252static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
253 struct dentry *dentry,
254 bool may_sleep)
255{
256 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
257
258 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
259
260 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
261 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
262 if (!may_sleep)
263 return -ECHILD;
264
265 /*
266 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
267 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
268 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
269 */
270 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
271 }
272 return 0;
273}
274
275static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
276{
277 return selinux_inode(inode);
278}
279
280static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
281{
282 int error;
283
284 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
285 if (error)
286 return ERR_PTR(error);
287 return selinux_inode(inode);
288}
289
290/*
291 * Get the security label of an inode.
292 */
293static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
294{
295 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
296 return selinux_inode(inode);
297}
298
299static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
300{
301 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
302
303 return selinux_inode(inode);
304}
305
306/*
307 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
308 */
309static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
310{
311 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
312
313 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
314 return selinux_inode(inode);
315}
316
317static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
318{
319 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
320 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
321
322 if (!isec)
323 return;
324 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
325 /*
326 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
327 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
328 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
329 *
330 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
331 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
332 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
333 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
334 */
335 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
336 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
337 list_del_init(&isec->list);
338 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
339 }
340}
341
342struct selinux_mnt_opts {
343 u32 fscontext_sid;
344 u32 context_sid;
345 u32 rootcontext_sid;
346 u32 defcontext_sid;
347};
348
349static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
350{
351 kfree(mnt_opts);
352}
353
354enum {
355 Opt_error = -1,
356 Opt_context = 0,
357 Opt_defcontext = 1,
358 Opt_fscontext = 2,
359 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
360 Opt_seclabel = 4,
361};
362
363#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
364static struct {
365 const char *name;
366 int len;
367 int opt;
368 bool has_arg;
369} tokens[] = {
370 A(context, true),
371 A(fscontext, true),
372 A(defcontext, true),
373 A(rootcontext, true),
374 A(seclabel, false),
375};
376#undef A
377
378static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
379{
380 int i;
381
382 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
383 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
384 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
385 continue;
386 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
387 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
388 continue;
389 *arg = s + len + 1;
390 } else if (len != l)
391 continue;
392 return tokens[i].opt;
393 }
394 return Opt_error;
395}
396
397#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
398
399static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
400 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
401 const struct cred *cred)
402{
403 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
404 int rc;
405
406 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
407 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
408 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
409 if (rc)
410 return rc;
411
412 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
413 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
414 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
415 return rc;
416}
417
418static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
419 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
420 const struct cred *cred)
421{
422 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
423 int rc;
424 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
425 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
426 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
427 if (rc)
428 return rc;
429
430 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
431 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
432 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
433 return rc;
434}
435
436static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
437{
438 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
439 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
440 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
441 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
442 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
443 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
444 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
445 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
446 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
447}
448
449static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
450{
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
452
453 /*
454 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
455 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
456 */
457 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
458
459 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
460 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
461 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
463 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
464 return 1;
465
466 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
467 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
468
469 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
472 default:
473 return 0;
474 }
475}
476
477static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
478{
479 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
480 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
481 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
482 u32 sid;
483 int rc;
484
485 /*
486 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
487 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
488 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
489 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
490 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
491 */
492 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
493 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
494 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
495 goto fallback;
496 }
497
498 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
499 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
500 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
501 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
502 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
503 goto fallback;
504 } else {
505 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
506 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
507 return rc;
508 }
509 }
510 return 0;
511
512fallback:
513 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
514 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, "/",
515 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
516 if (rc)
517 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
518
519 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
520 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
521 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
522 sbsec->sid = sid;
523 return 0;
524}
525
526static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
527{
528 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
529 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
530 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
531 int rc = 0;
532
533 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
534 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
535 if (rc)
536 return rc;
537 }
538
539 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
540
541 /*
542 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
543 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
544 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
545 */
546 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
547 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
548 else
549 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
550
551 /* Initialize the root inode. */
552 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
553
554 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
555 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
556 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
557 populates itself. */
558 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
559 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
560 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
561 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
562 struct inode_security_struct, list);
563 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
564 list_del_init(&isec->list);
565 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
566 inode = igrab(inode);
567 if (inode) {
568 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
569 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
570 iput(inode);
571 }
572 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
573 }
574 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
575 return rc;
576}
577
578static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
579 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
580{
581 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
582
583 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
584 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
585 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
586 (old_sid != new_sid))
587 return 1;
588
589 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
590 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
591 */
592 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
593 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 return 1;
595 return 0;
596}
597
598/*
599 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
600 * labeling information.
601 */
602static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
603 void *mnt_opts,
604 unsigned long kern_flags,
605 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
606{
607 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
608 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
609 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
610 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
611 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
612 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
613 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
614 int rc = 0;
615
616 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
617
618 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
619 if (!opts) {
620 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
621 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
622 server is ready to handle calls. */
623 goto out;
624 }
625 rc = -EINVAL;
626 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
628 goto out;
629 }
630 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
631 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
632 * place the results is not allowed */
633 rc = -EINVAL;
634 goto out;
635 }
636
637 /*
638 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
639 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
640 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
641 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
642 *
643 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
644 * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
645 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
646 * will be used for both mounts)
647 */
648 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
649 && !opts)
650 goto out;
651
652 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
653
654 /*
655 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
656 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
657 * than once with different security options.
658 */
659 if (opts) {
660 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
661 fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
662 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
663 fscontext_sid))
664 goto out_double_mount;
665 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
666 }
667 if (opts->context_sid) {
668 context_sid = opts->context_sid;
669 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
670 context_sid))
671 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
673 }
674 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
675 rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
677 rootcontext_sid))
678 goto out_double_mount;
679 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
680 }
681 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
682 defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
683 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
684 defcontext_sid))
685 goto out_double_mount;
686 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
687 }
688 }
689
690 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
691 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
692 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
693 goto out_double_mount;
694 rc = 0;
695 goto out;
696 }
697
698 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
699 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
700
701 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
702 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
703 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
704 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
705 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
706 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
707 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
708
709 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
710 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
711 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
712 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
713
714 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
715 /*
716 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
717 * filesystem type.
718 */
719 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
720 if (rc) {
721 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
722 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
723 goto out;
724 }
725 }
726
727 /*
728 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
729 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
730 * line and security labels must be ignored.
731 */
732 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
733 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
734 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
736 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
737 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
738 defcontext_sid) {
739 rc = -EACCES;
740 goto out;
741 }
742 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
743 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
744 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
745 current_sid(),
746 current_sid(),
747 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
748 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
749 if (rc)
750 goto out;
751 }
752 goto out_set_opts;
753 }
754
755 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
756 if (fscontext_sid) {
757 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
758 if (rc)
759 goto out;
760
761 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
762 }
763
764 /*
765 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
766 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
767 * the superblock context if not already set.
768 */
769 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
770 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
771 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
772 }
773
774 if (context_sid) {
775 if (!fscontext_sid) {
776 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
777 cred);
778 if (rc)
779 goto out;
780 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
781 } else {
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
783 cred);
784 if (rc)
785 goto out;
786 }
787 if (!rootcontext_sid)
788 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
789
790 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
792 }
793
794 if (rootcontext_sid) {
795 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
796 cred);
797 if (rc)
798 goto out;
799
800 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
801 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
802 }
803
804 if (defcontext_sid) {
805 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
806 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
807 rc = -EINVAL;
808 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
809 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
810 goto out;
811 }
812
813 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
815 sbsec, cred);
816 if (rc)
817 goto out;
818 }
819
820 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
821 }
822
823out_set_opts:
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
825out:
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
827 return rc;
828out_double_mount:
829 rc = -EINVAL;
830 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
832 sb->s_type->name);
833 goto out;
834}
835
836static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
837 const struct super_block *newsb)
838{
839 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
840 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
841 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
842 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
843
844 if (oldflags != newflags)
845 goto mismatch;
846 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
847 goto mismatch;
848 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
849 goto mismatch;
850 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
851 goto mismatch;
852 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
853 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
854 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
855 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
856 goto mismatch;
857 }
858 return 0;
859mismatch:
860 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
861 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
862 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
863 return -EBUSY;
864}
865
866static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
867 struct super_block *newsb,
868 unsigned long kern_flags,
869 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
870{
871 int rc = 0;
872 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
873 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
874 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
875
876 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
877 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
878 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
879
880 /*
881 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
882 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
883 */
884 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
885 return 0;
886
887 /*
888 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
889 * place the results is not allowed.
890 */
891 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
892 return -EINVAL;
893
894 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
895 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
896
897 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
898 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
899 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
900 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
901 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
902 }
903
904 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
905
906 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
907
908 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
909 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
910 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
911
912 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
913 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
914 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
915 if (rc)
916 goto out;
917 }
918
919 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
920 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
921 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
922 }
923
924 if (set_context) {
925 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
926
927 if (!set_fscontext)
928 newsbsec->sid = sid;
929 if (!set_rootcontext) {
930 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
931 newisec->sid = sid;
932 }
933 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
934 }
935 if (set_rootcontext) {
936 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
937 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
938
939 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
940 }
941
942 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
943out:
944 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
945 return rc;
946}
947
948/*
949 * NOTE: the caller is resposible for freeing the memory even if on error.
950 */
951static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
952{
953 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
954 u32 *dst_sid;
955 int rc;
956
957 if (token == Opt_seclabel)
958 /* eaten and completely ignored */
959 return 0;
960 if (!s)
961 return -EINVAL;
962
963 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
964 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
965 return -EINVAL;
966 }
967
968 if (!opts) {
969 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
970 if (!opts)
971 return -ENOMEM;
972 *mnt_opts = opts;
973 }
974
975 switch (token) {
976 case Opt_context:
977 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
978 goto err;
979 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
980 break;
981 case Opt_fscontext:
982 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
983 goto err;
984 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
985 break;
986 case Opt_rootcontext:
987 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
988 goto err;
989 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
990 break;
991 case Opt_defcontext:
992 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
993 goto err;
994 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
995 break;
996 default:
997 WARN_ON(1);
998 return -EINVAL;
999 }
1000 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1001 if (rc)
1002 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1003 s, rc);
1004 return rc;
1005
1006err:
1007 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1008 return -EINVAL;
1009}
1010
1011static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1012{
1013 char *context = NULL;
1014 u32 len;
1015 int rc;
1016
1017 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1018 &context, &len);
1019 if (!rc) {
1020 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1021
1022 seq_putc(m, '=');
1023 if (has_comma)
1024 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1025 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1026 if (has_comma)
1027 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1028 }
1029 kfree(context);
1030 return rc;
1031}
1032
1033static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1034{
1035 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1036 int rc;
1037
1038 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1039 return 0;
1040
1041 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1042 return 0;
1043
1044 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1045 seq_putc(m, ',');
1046 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1047 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1048 if (rc)
1049 return rc;
1050 }
1051 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1052 seq_putc(m, ',');
1053 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1054 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1055 if (rc)
1056 return rc;
1057 }
1058 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1059 seq_putc(m, ',');
1060 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1061 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1062 if (rc)
1063 return rc;
1064 }
1065 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1066 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1067 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1068 seq_putc(m, ',');
1069 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1070 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1071 if (rc)
1072 return rc;
1073 }
1074 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1075 seq_putc(m, ',');
1076 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1077 }
1078 return 0;
1079}
1080
1081static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1082{
1083 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1084 case S_IFSOCK:
1085 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1086 case S_IFLNK:
1087 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1088 case S_IFREG:
1089 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1090 case S_IFBLK:
1091 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1092 case S_IFDIR:
1093 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1094 case S_IFCHR:
1095 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1096 case S_IFIFO:
1097 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1098
1099 }
1100
1101 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1102}
1103
1104static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1105{
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1107 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1108}
1109
1110static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1111{
1112 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1113}
1114
1115static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116{
1117 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1118
1119 switch (family) {
1120 case PF_UNIX:
1121 switch (type) {
1122 case SOCK_STREAM:
1123 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1124 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1125 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1126 case SOCK_RAW:
1127 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1128 }
1129 break;
1130 case PF_INET:
1131 case PF_INET6:
1132 switch (type) {
1133 case SOCK_STREAM:
1134 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1135 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1136 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1137 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1138 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1139 else
1140 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1141 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1142 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1143 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1144 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1145 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1146 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1147 else
1148 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1149 case SOCK_DCCP:
1150 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1151 default:
1152 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1153 }
1154 break;
1155 case PF_NETLINK:
1156 switch (protocol) {
1157 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1163 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1165 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1166 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1167 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1168 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1169 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1170 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1171 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1172 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1173 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1174 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1175 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1176 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1177 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1178 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1179 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1180 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1181 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1182 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1183 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1184 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1185 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1186 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1187 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1188 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1189 default:
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1191 }
1192 case PF_PACKET:
1193 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1194 case PF_KEY:
1195 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1196 case PF_APPLETALK:
1197 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1198 }
1199
1200 if (extsockclass) {
1201 switch (family) {
1202 case PF_AX25:
1203 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1204 case PF_IPX:
1205 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1206 case PF_NETROM:
1207 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1208 case PF_ATMPVC:
1209 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1210 case PF_X25:
1211 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1212 case PF_ROSE:
1213 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1214 case PF_DECnet:
1215 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1216 case PF_ATMSVC:
1217 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1218 case PF_RDS:
1219 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1220 case PF_IRDA:
1221 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1222 case PF_PPPOX:
1223 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1224 case PF_LLC:
1225 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1226 case PF_CAN:
1227 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1228 case PF_TIPC:
1229 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1230 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1231 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1232 case PF_IUCV:
1233 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1234 case PF_RXRPC:
1235 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1236 case PF_ISDN:
1237 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1238 case PF_PHONET:
1239 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1240 case PF_IEEE802154:
1241 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1242 case PF_CAIF:
1243 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1244 case PF_ALG:
1245 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1246 case PF_NFC:
1247 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1248 case PF_VSOCK:
1249 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1250 case PF_KCM:
1251 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1252 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1253 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1254 case PF_SMC:
1255 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1256 case PF_XDP:
1257 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1258 case PF_MCTP:
1259 return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1260#if PF_MAX > 46
1261#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1262#endif
1263 }
1264 }
1265
1266 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1267}
1268
1269static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1270 u16 tclass,
1271 u16 flags,
1272 u32 *sid)
1273{
1274 int rc;
1275 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1276 char *buffer, *path;
1277
1278 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1279 if (!buffer)
1280 return -ENOMEM;
1281
1282 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1283 if (IS_ERR(path))
1284 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1285 else {
1286 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1287 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1288 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1289 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1290 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1291 path[1] = '/';
1292 path++;
1293 }
1294 }
1295 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1296 path, tclass, sid);
1297 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1298 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1299 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1300 rc = 0;
1301 }
1302 }
1303 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1304 return rc;
1305}
1306
1307static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1308 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1309{
1310#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1311 char *context;
1312 unsigned int len;
1313 int rc;
1314
1315 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1316 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1317 if (!context)
1318 return -ENOMEM;
1319
1320 context[len] = '\0';
1321 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1322 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1323 kfree(context);
1324
1325 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1326 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1327 if (rc < 0)
1328 return rc;
1329
1330 len = rc;
1331 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1332 if (!context)
1333 return -ENOMEM;
1334
1335 context[len] = '\0';
1336 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1337 context, len);
1338 }
1339 if (rc < 0) {
1340 kfree(context);
1341 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1342 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1343 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1344 return rc;
1345 }
1346 *sid = def_sid;
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349
1350 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1351 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1352 if (rc) {
1353 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1354 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1355
1356 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1357 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1358 ino, dev, context);
1359 } else {
1360 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1361 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1362 }
1363 }
1364 kfree(context);
1365 return 0;
1366}
1367
1368/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1369static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1370{
1371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1372 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1373 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1374 u16 sclass;
1375 struct dentry *dentry;
1376 int rc = 0;
1377
1378 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1379 return 0;
1380
1381 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1382 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1383 goto out_unlock;
1384
1385 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1386 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1387
1388 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1389 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1390 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1391 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1392 server is ready to handle calls. */
1393 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1394 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1395 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1396 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1397 goto out_unlock;
1398 }
1399
1400 sclass = isec->sclass;
1401 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1402 sid = isec->sid;
1403 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1404 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1405
1406 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1407 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1408 break;
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1410 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1411 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1412 break;
1413 }
1414 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1415 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1416 if (opt_dentry) {
1417 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1418 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1419 } else {
1420 /*
1421 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1422 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1423 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1424 * two, depending upon that...
1425 */
1426 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1427 if (!dentry)
1428 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1429 }
1430 if (!dentry) {
1431 /*
1432 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1433 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1434 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1435 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1436 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1437 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1438 * be used again by userspace.
1439 */
1440 goto out_invalid;
1441 }
1442
1443 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1444 &sid);
1445 dput(dentry);
1446 if (rc)
1447 goto out;
1448 break;
1449 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1450 sid = task_sid;
1451 break;
1452 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1453 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1454 sid = sbsec->sid;
1455
1456 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1457 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1458 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1459 if (rc)
1460 goto out;
1461 break;
1462 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1463 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1464 break;
1465 default:
1466 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1467 sid = sbsec->sid;
1468
1469 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1470 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1471 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1472 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1473 * procfs inodes */
1474 if (opt_dentry) {
1475 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1476 * d_splice_alias. */
1477 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1478 } else {
1479 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1480 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1481 * a connected one, so try that first.
1482 */
1483 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1484 if (!dentry)
1485 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1486 }
1487 /*
1488 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1489 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1490 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1491 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1492 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1493 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1494 * could be used again by userspace.
1495 */
1496 if (!dentry)
1497 goto out_invalid;
1498 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1499 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1500 if (rc) {
1501 dput(dentry);
1502 goto out;
1503 }
1504
1505 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1506 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1507 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1508 sid, &sid);
1509 if (rc) {
1510 dput(dentry);
1511 goto out;
1512 }
1513 }
1514 dput(dentry);
1515 }
1516 break;
1517 }
1518
1519out:
1520 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1521 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1522 if (rc) {
1523 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1524 goto out_unlock;
1525 }
1526 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1527 isec->sid = sid;
1528 }
1529
1530out_unlock:
1531 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1532 return rc;
1533
1534out_invalid:
1535 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1536 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1537 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1538 isec->sid = sid;
1539 }
1540 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1541 return 0;
1542}
1543
1544/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1545static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1546{
1547 u32 perm = 0;
1548
1549 switch (sig) {
1550 case SIGCHLD:
1551 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1552 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1553 break;
1554 case SIGKILL:
1555 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1556 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1557 break;
1558 case SIGSTOP:
1559 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1560 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1561 break;
1562 default:
1563 /* All other signals. */
1564 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1565 break;
1566 }
1567
1568 return perm;
1569}
1570
1571#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1572#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1573#endif
1574
1575/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1576static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1577 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1578{
1579 struct common_audit_data ad;
1580 struct av_decision avd;
1581 u16 sclass;
1582 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1583 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1584 int rc;
1585
1586 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1587 ad.u.cap = cap;
1588
1589 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1590 case 0:
1591 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1592 break;
1593 case 1:
1594 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1595 break;
1596 default:
1597 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1598 BUG();
1599 return -EINVAL;
1600 }
1601
1602 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1603 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1604 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1605 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1606 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1607 if (rc2)
1608 return rc2;
1609 }
1610 return rc;
1611}
1612
1613/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1614 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1615 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1616static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1617 struct inode *inode,
1618 u32 perms,
1619 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1620{
1621 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1622 u32 sid;
1623
1624 validate_creds(cred);
1625
1626 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1627 return 0;
1628
1629 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1630 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1631
1632 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1633 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1634}
1635
1636/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1637 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1638 pathname if needed. */
1639static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1640 struct dentry *dentry,
1641 u32 av)
1642{
1643 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1644 struct common_audit_data ad;
1645
1646 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1647 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1648 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1649 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1650}
1651
1652/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1653 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1654 pathname if needed. */
1655static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1656 const struct path *path,
1657 u32 av)
1658{
1659 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1660 struct common_audit_data ad;
1661
1662 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1663 ad.u.path = *path;
1664 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1665 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1666}
1667
1668/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1669static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1670 struct file *file,
1671 u32 av)
1672{
1673 struct common_audit_data ad;
1674
1675 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1676 ad.u.file = file;
1677 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1678}
1679
1680#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1681static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1682#endif
1683
1684/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1685 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1686 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1687 check a particular permission to the file.
1688 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1689 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1690 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1691 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1692static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1693 struct file *file,
1694 u32 av)
1695{
1696 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1697 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1698 struct common_audit_data ad;
1699 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1700 int rc;
1701
1702 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1703 ad.u.file = file;
1704
1705 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1706 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1707 sid, fsec->sid,
1708 SECCLASS_FD,
1709 FD__USE,
1710 &ad);
1711 if (rc)
1712 goto out;
1713 }
1714
1715#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1716 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1717 if (rc)
1718 return rc;
1719#endif
1720
1721 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1722 rc = 0;
1723 if (av)
1724 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1725
1726out:
1727 return rc;
1728}
1729
1730/*
1731 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1732 */
1733static int
1734selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1735 struct inode *dir,
1736 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1737 u32 *_new_isid)
1738{
1739 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1740 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1741
1742 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1743 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1744 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1745 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1746 tsec->create_sid) {
1747 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1748 } else {
1749 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1750 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1751 dsec->sid, tclass,
1752 name, _new_isid);
1753 }
1754
1755 return 0;
1756}
1757
1758/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1759static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1760 struct dentry *dentry,
1761 u16 tclass)
1762{
1763 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1764 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1766 u32 sid, newsid;
1767 struct common_audit_data ad;
1768 int rc;
1769
1770 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1771 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1772
1773 sid = tsec->sid;
1774
1775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1776 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1777
1778 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1779 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1780 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1781 &ad);
1782 if (rc)
1783 return rc;
1784
1785 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1786 &newsid);
1787 if (rc)
1788 return rc;
1789
1790 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1791 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1792 if (rc)
1793 return rc;
1794
1795 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1796 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1797 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1798 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1799}
1800
1801#define MAY_LINK 0
1802#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1803#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1804
1805/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1806static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1807 struct dentry *dentry,
1808 int kind)
1809
1810{
1811 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1812 struct common_audit_data ad;
1813 u32 sid = current_sid();
1814 u32 av;
1815 int rc;
1816
1817 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1818 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1819
1820 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1821 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1822
1823 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1824 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1825 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1826 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1827 if (rc)
1828 return rc;
1829
1830 switch (kind) {
1831 case MAY_LINK:
1832 av = FILE__LINK;
1833 break;
1834 case MAY_UNLINK:
1835 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1836 break;
1837 case MAY_RMDIR:
1838 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1839 break;
1840 default:
1841 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1842 __func__, kind);
1843 return 0;
1844 }
1845
1846 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1847 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1848 return rc;
1849}
1850
1851static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1852 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1853 struct inode *new_dir,
1854 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1855{
1856 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1857 struct common_audit_data ad;
1858 u32 sid = current_sid();
1859 u32 av;
1860 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1861 int rc;
1862
1863 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1864 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1865 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1866 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1867
1868 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1869
1870 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1871 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1872 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1873 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1874 if (rc)
1875 return rc;
1876 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1877 sid, old_isec->sid,
1878 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1879 if (rc)
1880 return rc;
1881 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1882 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1883 sid, old_isec->sid,
1884 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1885 if (rc)
1886 return rc;
1887 }
1888
1889 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1890 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1891 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1892 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1893 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1894 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1895 if (rc)
1896 return rc;
1897 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1898 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1899 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1900 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1901 sid, new_isec->sid,
1902 new_isec->sclass,
1903 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1904 if (rc)
1905 return rc;
1906 }
1907
1908 return 0;
1909}
1910
1911/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1912static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1913 struct super_block *sb,
1914 u32 perms,
1915 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1916{
1917 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1918 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1919
1920 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1921 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1922 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1923}
1924
1925/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1926static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1927{
1928 u32 av = 0;
1929
1930 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1931 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1932 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1933 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1934 av |= FILE__READ;
1935
1936 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1937 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1938 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1939 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1940
1941 } else {
1942 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1943 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1944 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1945 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1946 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1947 av |= DIR__READ;
1948 }
1949
1950 return av;
1951}
1952
1953/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1954static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1955{
1956 u32 av = 0;
1957
1958 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1959 av |= FILE__READ;
1960 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1961 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1962 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1963 else
1964 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1965 }
1966 if (!av) {
1967 /*
1968 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1969 */
1970 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1971 }
1972
1973 return av;
1974}
1975
1976/*
1977 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
1978 * open permission.
1979 */
1980static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1981{
1982 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1983 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1984
1985 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1986 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1987 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1988
1989 return av;
1990}
1991
1992/* Hook functions begin here. */
1993
1994static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
1995{
1996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1997 current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
1998 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1999}
2000
2001static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2002 const struct cred *to)
2003{
2004 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2005 u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2006 u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2007 int rc;
2008
2009 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2010 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2011 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2012 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2013 if (rc)
2014 return rc;
2015 }
2016
2017 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,
2018 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2019}
2020
2021static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2022 const struct cred *to)
2023{
2024 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2025 cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2026 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2027 NULL);
2028}
2029
2030static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2031 const struct cred *to,
2032 struct file *file)
2033{
2034 u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2035 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2036 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2037 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2038 struct common_audit_data ad;
2039 int rc;
2040
2041 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2042 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2043
2044 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2045 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2046 sid, fsec->sid,
2047 SECCLASS_FD,
2048 FD__USE,
2049 &ad);
2050 if (rc)
2051 return rc;
2052 }
2053
2054#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2055 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2056 if (rc)
2057 return rc;
2058#endif
2059
2060 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2061 return 0;
2062
2063 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2064 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2065 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2066 &ad);
2067}
2068
2069static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2070 unsigned int mode)
2071{
2072 u32 sid = current_sid();
2073 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2074
2075 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2076 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2077 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2078
2079 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2080 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2081}
2082
2083static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2084{
2085 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2086 task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2087 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2088}
2089
2090static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2091 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2092{
2093 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2094 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2095 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2096}
2097
2098static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2099 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2100 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2101 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2102{
2103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2104 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2105 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2106}
2107
2108/*
2109 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2110 * which was removed).
2111 *
2112 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2113 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2114 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2115 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2116 */
2117
2118static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2119 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2120{
2121 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2122}
2123
2124static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2125{
2126 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2127 int rc = 0;
2128
2129 if (!sb)
2130 return 0;
2131
2132 switch (cmds) {
2133 case Q_SYNC:
2134 case Q_QUOTAON:
2135 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2136 case Q_SETINFO:
2137 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2138 case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2139 case Q_XQUOTAON:
2140 case Q_XSETQLIM:
2141 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2142 break;
2143 case Q_GETFMT:
2144 case Q_GETINFO:
2145 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2146 case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2147 case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2148 case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2149 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2150 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2151 break;
2152 default:
2153 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2154 break;
2155 }
2156 return rc;
2157}
2158
2159static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2160{
2161 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2162
2163 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2164}
2165
2166static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2167{
2168 switch (type) {
2169 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2170 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2171 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2172 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2173 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2174 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2175 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2176 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2177 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2178 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2179 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2180 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2181 NULL);
2182 }
2183 /* All other syslog types */
2184 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2185 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2186 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2187}
2188
2189/*
2190 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2191 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2192 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2193 *
2194 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2195 * processes that allocate mappings.
2196 */
2197static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2198{
2199 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2200
2201 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2202 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2203 if (rc == 0)
2204 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2205
2206 return cap_sys_admin;
2207}
2208
2209/* binprm security operations */
2210
2211static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2212{
2213 u32 sid = 0;
2214 struct task_struct *tracer;
2215
2216 rcu_read_lock();
2217 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2218 if (tracer)
2219 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2220 rcu_read_unlock();
2221
2222 return sid;
2223}
2224
2225static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2226 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2227 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2228{
2229 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2230 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2231 int rc;
2232 u32 av;
2233
2234 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2235 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2236
2237 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2238 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2239
2240 /*
2241 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2242 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2243 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2244 * the old and new contexts.
2245 */
2246 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2247 av = 0;
2248 if (nnp)
2249 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2250 if (nosuid)
2251 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2252 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2253 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2254 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2255 if (!rc)
2256 return 0;
2257 }
2258
2259 /*
2260 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2261 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2262 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2263 */
2264 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2265 new_tsec->sid);
2266 if (!rc)
2267 return 0;
2268
2269 /*
2270 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2271 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2272 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2273 */
2274 if (nnp)
2275 return -EPERM;
2276 return -EACCES;
2277}
2278
2279static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2280{
2281 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2282 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2283 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2284 struct common_audit_data ad;
2285 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2286 int rc;
2287
2288 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2289 * the script interpreter */
2290
2291 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2292 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2293 isec = inode_security(inode);
2294
2295 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2296 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2297 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2298
2299 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2300 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2301 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2302 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2303
2304 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2305 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2306 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2307 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2308
2309 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2310 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2311 if (rc)
2312 return rc;
2313 } else {
2314 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2315 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2316 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2317 &new_tsec->sid);
2318 if (rc)
2319 return rc;
2320
2321 /*
2322 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2323 * transition.
2324 */
2325 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2326 if (rc)
2327 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2328 }
2329
2330 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2331 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2332
2333 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2335 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2336 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2337 if (rc)
2338 return rc;
2339 } else {
2340 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2341 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2342 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2343 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2344 if (rc)
2345 return rc;
2346
2347 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2348 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2349 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2350 if (rc)
2351 return rc;
2352
2353 /* Check for shared state */
2354 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2356 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2358 NULL);
2359 if (rc)
2360 return -EPERM;
2361 }
2362
2363 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2364 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2365 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2366 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2367 if (ptsid != 0) {
2368 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2369 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2370 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2371 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2372 if (rc)
2373 return -EPERM;
2374 }
2375 }
2376
2377 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2378 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2379
2380 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2381 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2382 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2383 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2384 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2385 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2386 NULL);
2387 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2388 }
2389
2390 return 0;
2391}
2392
2393static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2394{
2395 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2396}
2397
2398/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2399static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2400 struct files_struct *files)
2401{
2402 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2403 struct tty_struct *tty;
2404 int drop_tty = 0;
2405 unsigned n;
2406
2407 tty = get_current_tty();
2408 if (tty) {
2409 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2410 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2411 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2412
2413 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2414 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2415 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2416 open file may belong to another process and we are
2417 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2418 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2419 struct tty_file_private, list);
2420 file = file_priv->file;
2421 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2422 drop_tty = 1;
2423 }
2424 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2425 tty_kref_put(tty);
2426 }
2427 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2428 if (drop_tty)
2429 no_tty();
2430
2431 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2432 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2433 if (!n) /* none found? */
2434 return;
2435
2436 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2437 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2438 devnull = NULL;
2439 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2440 do {
2441 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2442 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2443 if (devnull)
2444 fput(devnull);
2445}
2446
2447/*
2448 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2449 */
2450static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2451{
2452 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2453 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2454 int rc, i;
2455
2456 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2457 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2458 return;
2459
2460 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2461 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2462
2463 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2464 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2465
2466 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2467 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2468 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2469 *
2470 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2471 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2472 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2473 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2474 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2475 */
2476 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2477 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2478 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2479 if (rc) {
2480 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2481 task_lock(current);
2482 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2483 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2484 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2485 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2486 }
2487 task_unlock(current);
2488 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2489 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2490 }
2491}
2492
2493/*
2494 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2495 * due to exec
2496 */
2497static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2498{
2499 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2500 u32 osid, sid;
2501 int rc;
2502
2503 osid = tsec->osid;
2504 sid = tsec->sid;
2505
2506 if (sid == osid)
2507 return;
2508
2509 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2510 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2511 * flush and unblock signals.
2512 *
2513 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2514 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2515 */
2516 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2517 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2518 if (rc) {
2519 clear_itimer();
2520
2521 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2522 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2523 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2524 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2525 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2526 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2527 recalc_sigpending();
2528 }
2529 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2530 }
2531
2532 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2533 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2534 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2535 __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2536 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2537}
2538
2539/* superblock security operations */
2540
2541static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2542{
2543 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2544
2545 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2546 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2547 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2548 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2549 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2550 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2551
2552 return 0;
2553}
2554
2555static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2556{
2557 bool open_quote = false;
2558 int len;
2559 char c;
2560
2561 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2562 if (c == '"')
2563 open_quote = !open_quote;
2564 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2565 break;
2566 }
2567 return len;
2568}
2569
2570static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2571{
2572 char *from = options;
2573 char *to = options;
2574 bool first = true;
2575 int rc;
2576
2577 while (1) {
2578 int len = opt_len(from);
2579 int token;
2580 char *arg = NULL;
2581
2582 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2583
2584 if (token != Opt_error) {
2585 char *p, *q;
2586
2587 /* strip quotes */
2588 if (arg) {
2589 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2590 char c = *p;
2591 if (c != '"')
2592 *q++ = c;
2593 }
2594 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2595 if (!arg) {
2596 rc = -ENOMEM;
2597 goto free_opt;
2598 }
2599 }
2600 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2601 kfree(arg);
2602 arg = NULL;
2603 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2604 goto free_opt;
2605 }
2606 } else {
2607 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2608 from--;
2609 len++;
2610 }
2611 if (to != from)
2612 memmove(to, from, len);
2613 to += len;
2614 first = false;
2615 }
2616 if (!from[len])
2617 break;
2618 from += len + 1;
2619 }
2620 *to = '\0';
2621 return 0;
2622
2623free_opt:
2624 if (*mnt_opts) {
2625 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2626 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2627 }
2628 return rc;
2629}
2630
2631static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2632{
2633 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2634 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2635
2636 /*
2637 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2638 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2639 */
2640 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2641 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2642
2643 /*
2644 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2645 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2646 */
2647 if (!opts)
2648 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2649
2650 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2651 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2652 opts->fscontext_sid))
2653 return 1;
2654 }
2655 if (opts->context_sid) {
2656 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2657 opts->context_sid))
2658 return 1;
2659 }
2660 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2661 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2662
2663 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2664 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2665 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2666 return 1;
2667 }
2668 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2669 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2670 opts->defcontext_sid))
2671 return 1;
2672 }
2673 return 0;
2674}
2675
2676static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2677{
2678 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2679 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2680
2681 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2682 return 0;
2683
2684 if (!opts)
2685 return 0;
2686
2687 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2688 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2689 opts->fscontext_sid))
2690 goto out_bad_option;
2691 }
2692 if (opts->context_sid) {
2693 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2694 opts->context_sid))
2695 goto out_bad_option;
2696 }
2697 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2698 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2699 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2700 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2701 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2702 goto out_bad_option;
2703 }
2704 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2705 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2706 opts->defcontext_sid))
2707 goto out_bad_option;
2708 }
2709 return 0;
2710
2711out_bad_option:
2712 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2713 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2714 sb->s_type->name);
2715 return -EINVAL;
2716}
2717
2718static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2719{
2720 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2721 struct common_audit_data ad;
2722
2723 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2724 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2725 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2726}
2727
2728static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2729{
2730 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2731 struct common_audit_data ad;
2732
2733 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2734 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2735 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2736}
2737
2738static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2739 const struct path *path,
2740 const char *type,
2741 unsigned long flags,
2742 void *data)
2743{
2744 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2745
2746 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2747 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2748 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2749 else
2750 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2751}
2752
2753static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2754 const struct path *to_path)
2755{
2756 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2757
2758 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2759}
2760
2761static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2762{
2763 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2764
2765 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2766 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2767}
2768
2769static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2770 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2771{
2772 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2773
2774 if (!src)
2775 return 0;
2776
2777 fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2778 return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2779}
2780
2781static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2782 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2783 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2784 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2785 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2786 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2787 {}
2788};
2789
2790static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2791 struct fs_parameter *param)
2792{
2793 struct fs_parse_result result;
2794 int opt;
2795
2796 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2797 if (opt < 0)
2798 return opt;
2799
2800 return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2801}
2802
2803/* inode security operations */
2804
2805static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2806{
2807 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2808 u32 sid = current_sid();
2809
2810 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2811 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2812 isec->inode = inode;
2813 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2814 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2815 isec->task_sid = sid;
2816 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2817
2818 return 0;
2819}
2820
2821static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2822{
2823 inode_free_security(inode);
2824}
2825
2826static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2827 const struct qstr *name,
2828 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2829 u32 *ctxlen)
2830{
2831 u32 newsid;
2832 int rc;
2833
2834 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2835 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2836 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2837 &newsid);
2838 if (rc)
2839 return rc;
2840
2841 if (xattr_name)
2842 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2843
2844 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2845 ctxlen);
2846}
2847
2848static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2849 struct qstr *name,
2850 const struct cred *old,
2851 struct cred *new)
2852{
2853 u32 newsid;
2854 int rc;
2855 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2856
2857 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2858 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2859 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2860 &newsid);
2861 if (rc)
2862 return rc;
2863
2864 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2865 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2866 return 0;
2867}
2868
2869static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2870 const struct qstr *qstr,
2871 const char **name,
2872 void **value, size_t *len)
2873{
2874 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2875 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2876 u32 newsid, clen;
2877 int rc;
2878 char *context;
2879
2880 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2881
2882 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2883
2884 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2885 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2886 &newsid);
2887 if (rc)
2888 return rc;
2889
2890 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2891 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2892 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2893 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2894 isec->sid = newsid;
2895 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2896 }
2897
2898 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
2899 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2900 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2901
2902 if (name)
2903 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2904
2905 if (value && len) {
2906 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2907 &context, &clen);
2908 if (rc)
2909 return rc;
2910 *value = context;
2911 *len = clen;
2912 }
2913
2914 return 0;
2915}
2916
2917static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2918 const struct qstr *name,
2919 const struct inode *context_inode)
2920{
2921 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2922 struct common_audit_data ad;
2923 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2924 int rc;
2925
2926 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
2927 return 0;
2928
2929 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2930
2931 /*
2932 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
2933 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2934 * untouched.
2935 */
2936
2937 if (context_inode) {
2938 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2939 selinux_inode(context_inode);
2940 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2941 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized");
2942 return -EACCES;
2943 }
2944
2945 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2946 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2947 } else {
2948 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2949 rc = security_transition_sid(
2950 &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2951 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2952 if (rc)
2953 return rc;
2954 }
2955
2956 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2957 /*
2958 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
2959 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
2960 */
2961
2962 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
2963 ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
2964
2965 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2966 tsec->sid,
2967 isec->sid,
2968 isec->sclass,
2969 FILE__CREATE,
2970 &ad);
2971}
2972
2973static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2974{
2975 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2976}
2977
2978static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2979{
2980 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2981}
2982
2983static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2984{
2985 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2986}
2987
2988static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2989{
2990 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2991}
2992
2993static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2994{
2995 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2996}
2997
2998static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2999{
3000 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3001}
3002
3003static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3004{
3005 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3006}
3007
3008static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3009 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3010{
3011 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3012}
3013
3014static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3015{
3016 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3017
3018 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3019}
3020
3021static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3022 bool rcu)
3023{
3024 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3025 struct common_audit_data ad;
3026 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3027 u32 sid;
3028
3029 validate_creds(cred);
3030
3031 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3032 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3033 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3034 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3035 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3036 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3037
3038 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3039 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3040}
3041
3042static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3043 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3044 int result)
3045{
3046 struct common_audit_data ad;
3047 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3048
3049 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3050 ad.u.inode = inode;
3051
3052 return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3053 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3054 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3055}
3056
3057static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3058{
3059 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3060 u32 perms;
3061 bool from_access;
3062 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3063 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3064 u32 sid;
3065 struct av_decision avd;
3066 int rc, rc2;
3067 u32 audited, denied;
3068
3069 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3070 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3071
3072 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3073 if (!mask)
3074 return 0;
3075
3076 validate_creds(cred);
3077
3078 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3079 return 0;
3080
3081 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3082
3083 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3084 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3085 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3086 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3087
3088 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3089 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3090 &avd);
3091 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3092 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3093 &denied);
3094 if (likely(!audited))
3095 return rc;
3096
3097 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3098 if (rc2)
3099 return rc2;
3100 return rc;
3101}
3102
3103static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3104{
3105 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3106 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3107 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3108 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3109
3110 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3111 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3112 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3113 ATTR_FORCE);
3114 if (!ia_valid)
3115 return 0;
3116 }
3117
3118 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3119 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3120 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3121
3122 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3123 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3124 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3125 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3126 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3127
3128 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3129}
3130
3131static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3132{
3133 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3134}
3135
3136static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3137{
3138 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3139 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3140
3141 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3142 return false;
3143 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3144 return false;
3145 return true;
3146}
3147
3148static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3149 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3150 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3151{
3152 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3153 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3154 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3155 struct common_audit_data ad;
3156 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3157 int rc = 0;
3158
3159 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3160 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3161 if (rc)
3162 return rc;
3163
3164 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3165 ordinary setattr permission. */
3166 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3167 }
3168
3169 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3170 return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3171
3172 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3173 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3174 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3175
3176 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
3177 return -EPERM;
3178
3179 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3180 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3181
3182 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3183 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3184 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3185 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3186 if (rc)
3187 return rc;
3188
3189 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3190 GFP_KERNEL);
3191 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3192 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3193 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3194 size_t audit_size;
3195
3196 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3197 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3198 if (value) {
3199 const char *str = value;
3200
3201 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3202 audit_size = size - 1;
3203 else
3204 audit_size = size;
3205 } else {
3206 audit_size = 0;
3207 }
3208 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3209 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3210 if (!ab)
3211 return rc;
3212 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3213 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3214 audit_log_end(ab);
3215
3216 return rc;
3217 }
3218 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3219 size, &newsid);
3220 }
3221 if (rc)
3222 return rc;
3223
3224 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3225 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3226 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3227 if (rc)
3228 return rc;
3229
3230 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3231 sid, isec->sclass);
3232 if (rc)
3233 return rc;
3234
3235 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3236 newsid,
3237 sbsec->sid,
3238 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3239 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3240 &ad);
3241}
3242
3243static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3244 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3245 struct posix_acl *kacl)
3246{
3247 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3248}
3249
3250static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3251 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3252{
3253 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3254}
3255
3256static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3257 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3258{
3259 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3260}
3261
3262static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3263 const void *value, size_t size,
3264 int flags)
3265{
3266 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3267 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3268 u32 newsid;
3269 int rc;
3270
3271 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3272 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3273 return;
3274 }
3275
3276 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3277 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3278 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3279 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3280 * we've since initialized.
3281 */
3282 return;
3283 }
3284
3285 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3286 &newsid);
3287 if (rc) {
3288 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3289 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3290 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3291 return;
3292 }
3293
3294 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3295 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3296 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3297 isec->sid = newsid;
3298 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3299 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3300}
3301
3302static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3303{
3304 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3305
3306 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3307}
3308
3309static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3310{
3311 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3312
3313 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3314}
3315
3316static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3317 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3318{
3319 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3320 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
3321 if (rc)
3322 return rc;
3323
3324 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3325 ordinary setattr permission. */
3326 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3327 }
3328
3329 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3330 return 0;
3331
3332 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3333 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3334 return -EACCES;
3335}
3336
3337static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3338 unsigned int obj_type)
3339{
3340 int ret;
3341 u32 perm;
3342
3343 struct common_audit_data ad;
3344
3345 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3346 ad.u.path = *path;
3347
3348 /*
3349 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3350 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3351 */
3352 switch (obj_type) {
3353 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3354 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3355 break;
3356 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3357 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3358 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3359 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3360 if (ret)
3361 return ret;
3362 break;
3363 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3364 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3365 break;
3366 default:
3367 return -EINVAL;
3368 }
3369
3370 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3371 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3372 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3373
3374 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3375 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3376 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3377
3378 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3379}
3380
3381/*
3382 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3383 *
3384 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3385 */
3386static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3387 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3388 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3389{
3390 u32 size;
3391 int error;
3392 char *context = NULL;
3393 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3394
3395 /*
3396 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3397 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3398 */
3399 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3400 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3401 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3402
3403 /*
3404 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3405 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3406 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3407 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3408 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3409 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3410 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3411 */
3412 isec = inode_security(inode);
3413 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3414 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3415 isec->sid, &context,
3416 &size);
3417 else
3418 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3419 &context, &size);
3420 if (error)
3421 return error;
3422 error = size;
3423 if (alloc) {
3424 *buffer = context;
3425 goto out_nofree;
3426 }
3427 kfree(context);
3428out_nofree:
3429 return error;
3430}
3431
3432static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3433 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3434{
3435 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3436 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3437 u32 newsid;
3438 int rc;
3439
3440 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3441 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3442
3443 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3444 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3445 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3446
3447 if (!value || !size)
3448 return -EACCES;
3449
3450 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3451 GFP_KERNEL);
3452 if (rc)
3453 return rc;
3454
3455 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3456 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3457 isec->sid = newsid;
3458 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3459 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3460 return 0;
3461}
3462
3463static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3464{
3465 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3466
3467 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3468 return 0;
3469
3470 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3471 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3472 return len;
3473}
3474
3475static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3476{
3477 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3478 *secid = isec->sid;
3479}
3480
3481static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3482{
3483 u32 sid;
3484 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3485 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3486
3487 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3488 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3489 if (!new_creds)
3490 return -ENOMEM;
3491 }
3492
3493 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3494 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3495 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3496 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3497 *new = new_creds;
3498 return 0;
3499}
3500
3501static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3502{
3503 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3504 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3505 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3506 */
3507 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3508 return 1; /* Discard */
3509 /*
3510 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3511 * by selinux.
3512 */
3513 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3514}
3515
3516/* kernfs node operations */
3517
3518static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3519 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3520{
3521 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3522 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3523 int rc;
3524 char *context;
3525
3526 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3527 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3528 return 0;
3529 else if (rc < 0)
3530 return rc;
3531
3532 clen = (u32)rc;
3533 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3534 if (!context)
3535 return -ENOMEM;
3536
3537 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3538 if (rc < 0) {
3539 kfree(context);
3540 return rc;
3541 }
3542
3543 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3544 GFP_KERNEL);
3545 kfree(context);
3546 if (rc)
3547 return rc;
3548
3549 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3550 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3551 } else {
3552 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3553 struct qstr q;
3554
3555 q.name = kn->name;
3556 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3557
3558 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3559 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3560 &newsid);
3561 if (rc)
3562 return rc;
3563 }
3564
3565 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3566 &context, &clen);
3567 if (rc)
3568 return rc;
3569
3570 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3571 XATTR_CREATE);
3572 kfree(context);
3573 return rc;
3574}
3575
3576
3577/* file security operations */
3578
3579static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3580{
3581 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3582 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3583
3584 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3585 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3586 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3587
3588 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3589 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3590}
3591
3592static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3593{
3594 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3595 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3596 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3597 u32 sid = current_sid();
3598
3599 if (!mask)
3600 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3601 return 0;
3602
3603 isec = inode_security(inode);
3604 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3605 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3606 /* No change since file_open check. */
3607 return 0;
3608
3609 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3610}
3611
3612static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3613{
3614 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3615 u32 sid = current_sid();
3616
3617 fsec->sid = sid;
3618 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3619
3620 return 0;
3621}
3622
3623/*
3624 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3625 * operation to an inode.
3626 */
3627static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3628 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3629{
3630 struct common_audit_data ad;
3631 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3632 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3633 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3634 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3635 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3636 int rc;
3637 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3638 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3639
3640 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3641 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3642 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3643 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3644
3645 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3646 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3647 ssid, fsec->sid,
3648 SECCLASS_FD,
3649 FD__USE,
3650 &ad);
3651 if (rc)
3652 goto out;
3653 }
3654
3655 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3656 return 0;
3657
3658 isec = inode_security(inode);
3659 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3660 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3661 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3662out:
3663 return rc;
3664}
3665
3666static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3667 unsigned long arg)
3668{
3669 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3670 int error = 0;
3671
3672 switch (cmd) {
3673 case FIONREAD:
3674 case FIBMAP:
3675 case FIGETBSZ:
3676 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3677 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3678 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3679 break;
3680
3681 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3682 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3683 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3684 break;
3685
3686 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3687 case FIONBIO:
3688 case FIOASYNC:
3689 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3690 break;
3691
3692 case KDSKBENT:
3693 case KDSKBSENT:
3694 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3695 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3696 break;
3697
3698 case FIOCLEX:
3699 case FIONCLEX:
3700 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3701 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3702 break;
3703
3704 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3705 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3706 */
3707 default:
3708 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3709 }
3710 return error;
3711}
3712
3713static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3714
3715static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3716{
3717 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3718 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3719 int rc = 0;
3720
3721 if (default_noexec &&
3722 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3723 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3724 /*
3725 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3726 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3727 * This has an additional check.
3728 */
3729 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3730 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3731 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3732 if (rc)
3733 goto error;
3734 }
3735
3736 if (file) {
3737 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3738 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3739
3740 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3741 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3742 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3743
3744 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3745 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3746
3747 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3748 }
3749
3750error:
3751 return rc;
3752}
3753
3754static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3755{
3756 int rc = 0;
3757
3758 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3759 u32 sid = current_sid();
3760 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3761 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3762 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3763 }
3764
3765 return rc;
3766}
3767
3768static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3769 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3770{
3771 struct common_audit_data ad;
3772 int rc;
3773
3774 if (file) {
3775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3776 ad.u.file = file;
3777 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3778 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3779 if (rc)
3780 return rc;
3781 }
3782
3783 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3784 prot = reqprot;
3785
3786 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3787 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3788}
3789
3790static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3791 unsigned long reqprot,
3792 unsigned long prot)
3793{
3794 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3795 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3796
3797 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3798 prot = reqprot;
3799
3800 if (default_noexec &&
3801 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3802 int rc = 0;
3803 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3804 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3805 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3806 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3807 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3808 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3809 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3810 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3811 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3812 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3813 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3814 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3815 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3816 /*
3817 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3818 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3819 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3820 * modified content. This typically should only
3821 * occur for text relocations.
3822 */
3823 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3824 }
3825 if (rc)
3826 return rc;
3827 }
3828
3829 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3830}
3831
3832static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3833{
3834 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3835
3836 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3837}
3838
3839static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3840 unsigned long arg)
3841{
3842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3843 int err = 0;
3844
3845 switch (cmd) {
3846 case F_SETFL:
3847 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3848 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3849 break;
3850 }
3851 fallthrough;
3852 case F_SETOWN:
3853 case F_SETSIG:
3854 case F_GETFL:
3855 case F_GETOWN:
3856 case F_GETSIG:
3857 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3858 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3859 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3860 break;
3861 case F_GETLK:
3862 case F_SETLK:
3863 case F_SETLKW:
3864 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3865 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3866 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3867#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3868 case F_GETLK64:
3869 case F_SETLK64:
3870 case F_SETLKW64:
3871#endif
3872 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3873 break;
3874 }
3875
3876 return err;
3877}
3878
3879static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3880{
3881 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3882
3883 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3884 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3885}
3886
3887static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3888 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3889{
3890 struct file *file;
3891 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3892 u32 perm;
3893 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3894
3895 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3896 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3897
3898 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3899
3900 if (!signum)
3901 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3902 else
3903 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3904
3905 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3906 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3907 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3908}
3909
3910static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3911{
3912 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3913
3914 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3915}
3916
3917static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3918{
3919 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3920 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3921
3922 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3923 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3924 /*
3925 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3926 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3927 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3928 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3929 * struct as its SID.
3930 */
3931 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3932 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3933 /*
3934 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3935 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3936 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3937 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3938 * new inode label or new policy.
3939 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3940 */
3941 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3942}
3943
3944/* task security operations */
3945
3946static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3947 unsigned long clone_flags)
3948{
3949 u32 sid = current_sid();
3950
3951 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3952 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3953}
3954
3955/*
3956 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3957 */
3958static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3959 gfp_t gfp)
3960{
3961 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3962 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3963
3964 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3965 return 0;
3966}
3967
3968/*
3969 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3970 */
3971static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3972{
3973 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3974 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3975
3976 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3977}
3978
3979static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3980{
3981 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3982}
3983
3984/*
3985 * set the security data for a kernel service
3986 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3987 */
3988static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3989{
3990 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3991 u32 sid = current_sid();
3992 int ret;
3993
3994 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3995 sid, secid,
3996 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3997 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3998 NULL);
3999 if (ret == 0) {
4000 tsec->sid = secid;
4001 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4002 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4003 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4004 }
4005 return ret;
4006}
4007
4008/*
4009 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4010 * objective context of the specified inode
4011 */
4012static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4013{
4014 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4015 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4016 u32 sid = current_sid();
4017 int ret;
4018
4019 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4020 sid, isec->sid,
4021 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4022 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4023 NULL);
4024
4025 if (ret == 0)
4026 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4027 return ret;
4028}
4029
4030static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4031{
4032 struct common_audit_data ad;
4033
4034 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4035 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4036
4037 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4038 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4039 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4040}
4041
4042static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4043{
4044 struct common_audit_data ad;
4045 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4046 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4047 u32 sid = current_sid();
4048 int rc;
4049
4050 /* init_module */
4051 if (file == NULL)
4052 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4053 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4054 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4055
4056 /* finit_module */
4057
4058 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4059 ad.u.file = file;
4060
4061 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4062 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4063 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4064 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4065 if (rc)
4066 return rc;
4067 }
4068
4069 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4070 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4071 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4072 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4073}
4074
4075static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4076 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4077 bool contents)
4078{
4079 int rc = 0;
4080
4081 switch (id) {
4082 case READING_MODULE:
4083 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4084 break;
4085 default:
4086 break;
4087 }
4088
4089 return rc;
4090}
4091
4092static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4093{
4094 int rc = 0;
4095
4096 switch (id) {
4097 case LOADING_MODULE:
4098 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4099 break;
4100 default:
4101 break;
4102 }
4103
4104 return rc;
4105}
4106
4107static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4108{
4109 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4110 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4111 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4112}
4113
4114static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4115{
4116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4117 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4118 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4119}
4120
4121static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4122{
4123 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4124 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4125 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4126}
4127
4128static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
4129{
4130 *secid = current_sid();
4131}
4132
4133static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4134{
4135 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4136}
4137
4138static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4139{
4140 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4141 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4142 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4143}
4144
4145static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4146{
4147 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4148 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4149 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4150}
4151
4152static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4153{
4154 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4155 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4156 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4157}
4158
4159static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4160 unsigned int flags)
4161{
4162 u32 av = 0;
4163
4164 if (!flags)
4165 return 0;
4166 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4167 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4168 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4169 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4170 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4171 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4172 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4173}
4174
4175static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4176 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4177{
4178 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4179
4180 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4181 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4182 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4183 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4184 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4185 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4186 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4187 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4188
4189 return 0;
4190}
4191
4192static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4193{
4194 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4195 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4196 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4197}
4198
4199static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4200{
4201 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4202 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4203 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4204}
4205
4206static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4207{
4208 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4209 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4210 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4211}
4212
4213static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4214 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4215{
4216 u32 secid;
4217 u32 perm;
4218
4219 if (!sig)
4220 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4221 else
4222 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4223 if (!cred)
4224 secid = current_sid();
4225 else
4226 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4227 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4228 secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4229}
4230
4231static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4232 struct inode *inode)
4233{
4234 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4235 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4236
4237 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4238 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4239 isec->sid = sid;
4240 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4241 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4242}
4243
4244static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4245{
4246 u32 sid = current_sid();
4247
4248 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4249 USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4250}
4251
4252/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4253static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4254 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4255{
4256 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4257 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4258
4259 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4260 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4261 if (ih == NULL)
4262 goto out;
4263
4264 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4265 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4266 goto out;
4267
4268 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4269 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4270 ret = 0;
4271
4272 if (proto)
4273 *proto = ih->protocol;
4274
4275 switch (ih->protocol) {
4276 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4277 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4278
4279 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4280 break;
4281
4282 offset += ihlen;
4283 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4284 if (th == NULL)
4285 break;
4286
4287 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4288 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4289 break;
4290 }
4291
4292 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4293 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4294
4295 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4296 break;
4297
4298 offset += ihlen;
4299 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4300 if (uh == NULL)
4301 break;
4302
4303 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4304 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4305 break;
4306 }
4307
4308 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4309 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4310
4311 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4312 break;
4313
4314 offset += ihlen;
4315 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4316 if (dh == NULL)
4317 break;
4318
4319 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4320 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4321 break;
4322 }
4323
4324#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4325 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4326 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4327
4328 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4329 break;
4330
4331 offset += ihlen;
4332 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4333 if (sh == NULL)
4334 break;
4335
4336 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4337 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4338 break;
4339 }
4340#endif
4341 default:
4342 break;
4343 }
4344out:
4345 return ret;
4346}
4347
4348#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4349
4350/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4351static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4352 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4353{
4354 u8 nexthdr;
4355 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4356 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4357 __be16 frag_off;
4358
4359 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4360 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4361 if (ip6 == NULL)
4362 goto out;
4363
4364 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4365 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4366 ret = 0;
4367
4368 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4369 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4370 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4371 if (offset < 0)
4372 goto out;
4373
4374 if (proto)
4375 *proto = nexthdr;
4376
4377 switch (nexthdr) {
4378 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4379 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4380
4381 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4382 if (th == NULL)
4383 break;
4384
4385 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4386 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4387 break;
4388 }
4389
4390 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4391 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4392
4393 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4394 if (uh == NULL)
4395 break;
4396
4397 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4398 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4399 break;
4400 }
4401
4402 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4403 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4404
4405 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4406 if (dh == NULL)
4407 break;
4408
4409 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4410 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4411 break;
4412 }
4413
4414#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4415 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4416 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4417
4418 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4419 if (sh == NULL)
4420 break;
4421
4422 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4423 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4424 break;
4425 }
4426#endif
4427 /* includes fragments */
4428 default:
4429 break;
4430 }
4431out:
4432 return ret;
4433}
4434
4435#endif /* IPV6 */
4436
4437static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4438 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4439{
4440 char *addrp;
4441 int ret;
4442
4443 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4444 case PF_INET:
4445 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4446 if (ret)
4447 goto parse_error;
4448 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4449 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4450 goto okay;
4451
4452#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4453 case PF_INET6:
4454 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4455 if (ret)
4456 goto parse_error;
4457 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4458 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4459 goto okay;
4460#endif /* IPV6 */
4461 default:
4462 addrp = NULL;
4463 goto okay;
4464 }
4465
4466parse_error:
4467 pr_warn(
4468 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4469 " unable to parse packet\n");
4470 return ret;
4471
4472okay:
4473 if (_addrp)
4474 *_addrp = addrp;
4475 return 0;
4476}
4477
4478/**
4479 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4480 * @skb: the packet
4481 * @family: protocol family
4482 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4483 *
4484 * Description:
4485 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4486 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4487 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4488 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4489 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4490 * peer labels.
4491 *
4492 */
4493static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4494{
4495 int err;
4496 u32 xfrm_sid;
4497 u32 nlbl_sid;
4498 u32 nlbl_type;
4499
4500 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4501 if (unlikely(err))
4502 return -EACCES;
4503 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4504 if (unlikely(err))
4505 return -EACCES;
4506
4507 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4508 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4509 if (unlikely(err)) {
4510 pr_warn(
4511 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4512 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4513 return -EACCES;
4514 }
4515
4516 return 0;
4517}
4518
4519/**
4520 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4521 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4522 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4523 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4524 *
4525 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4526 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4527 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4528 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4529 *
4530 */
4531static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4532{
4533 int err = 0;
4534
4535 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4536 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4537 conn_sid);
4538 else
4539 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4540
4541 return err;
4542}
4543
4544/* socket security operations */
4545
4546static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4547 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4548{
4549 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4550 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4551 return 0;
4552 }
4553
4554 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4555 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4556}
4557
4558static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4559{
4560 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4561 struct common_audit_data ad;
4562 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4563
4564 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4565 return 0;
4566
4567 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4568 ad.u.net = &net;
4569 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4570
4571 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4572 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4573 &ad);
4574}
4575
4576static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4577 int protocol, int kern)
4578{
4579 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4580 u32 newsid;
4581 u16 secclass;
4582 int rc;
4583
4584 if (kern)
4585 return 0;
4586
4587 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4588 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4589 if (rc)
4590 return rc;
4591
4592 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4593 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4594}
4595
4596static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4597 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4598{
4599 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4600 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4601 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4602 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4603 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4604 int err = 0;
4605
4606 if (!kern) {
4607 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4608 if (err)
4609 return err;
4610 }
4611
4612 isec->sclass = sclass;
4613 isec->sid = sid;
4614 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4615
4616 if (sock->sk) {
4617 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4618 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4619 sksec->sid = sid;
4620 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4621 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4622 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4623
4624 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4625 }
4626
4627 return err;
4628}
4629
4630static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4631 struct socket *sockb)
4632{
4633 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4634 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4635
4636 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4637 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4638
4639 return 0;
4640}
4641
4642/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4643 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4644 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4645
4646static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4647{
4648 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4649 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4650 u16 family;
4651 int err;
4652
4653 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4654 if (err)
4655 goto out;
4656
4657 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4658 family = sk->sk_family;
4659 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4660 char *addrp;
4661 struct common_audit_data ad;
4662 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4663 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4664 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4665 u16 family_sa;
4666 unsigned short snum;
4667 u32 sid, node_perm;
4668
4669 /*
4670 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4671 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4672 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4673 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4674 */
4675 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4676 return -EINVAL;
4677 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4678 switch (family_sa) {
4679 case AF_UNSPEC:
4680 case AF_INET:
4681 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4682 return -EINVAL;
4683 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4684 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4685 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4686 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4687 */
4688 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4689 goto err_af;
4690 family_sa = AF_INET;
4691 }
4692 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4693 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4694 break;
4695 case AF_INET6:
4696 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4697 return -EINVAL;
4698 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4699 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4700 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4701 break;
4702 default:
4703 goto err_af;
4704 }
4705
4706 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4707 ad.u.net = &net;
4708 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4709 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4710
4711 if (snum) {
4712 int low, high;
4713
4714 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4715
4716 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4717 snum < low || snum > high) {
4718 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4719 snum, &sid);
4720 if (err)
4721 goto out;
4722 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4723 sksec->sid, sid,
4724 sksec->sclass,
4725 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4726 if (err)
4727 goto out;
4728 }
4729 }
4730
4731 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4732 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4733 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4734 break;
4735
4736 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4737 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4738 break;
4739
4740 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4741 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4742 break;
4743
4744 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4745 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4746 break;
4747
4748 default:
4749 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4750 break;
4751 }
4752
4753 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4754 if (err)
4755 goto out;
4756
4757 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4758 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4759 else
4760 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4761
4762 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4763 sksec->sid, sid,
4764 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4765 if (err)
4766 goto out;
4767 }
4768out:
4769 return err;
4770err_af:
4771 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4772 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4773 return -EINVAL;
4774 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4775}
4776
4777/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4778 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4779 */
4780static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4781 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4782{
4783 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4784 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4785 int err;
4786
4787 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4788 if (err)
4789 return err;
4790 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4791 return -EINVAL;
4792
4793 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4794 * way to disconnect the socket
4795 */
4796 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4797 return 0;
4798
4799 /*
4800 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4801 * for the port.
4802 */
4803 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4804 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4805 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4806 struct common_audit_data ad;
4807 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4808 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4809 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4810 unsigned short snum;
4811 u32 sid, perm;
4812
4813 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4814 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4815 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4816 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4817 */
4818 switch (address->sa_family) {
4819 case AF_INET:
4820 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4821 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4822 return -EINVAL;
4823 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4824 break;
4825 case AF_INET6:
4826 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4827 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4828 return -EINVAL;
4829 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4830 break;
4831 default:
4832 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4833 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4834 */
4835 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4836 return -EINVAL;
4837 else
4838 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4839 }
4840
4841 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4842 if (err)
4843 return err;
4844
4845 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4846 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4847 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4848 break;
4849 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4850 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4851 break;
4852 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4853 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4854 break;
4855 }
4856
4857 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4858 ad.u.net = &net;
4859 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4860 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4861 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4862 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4863 if (err)
4864 return err;
4865 }
4866
4867 return 0;
4868}
4869
4870/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4871static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4872 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4873{
4874 int err;
4875 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4876
4877 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4878 if (err)
4879 return err;
4880
4881 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4882}
4883
4884static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4885{
4886 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4887}
4888
4889static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4890{
4891 int err;
4892 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4893 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4894 u16 sclass;
4895 u32 sid;
4896
4897 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4898 if (err)
4899 return err;
4900
4901 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4902 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4903 sclass = isec->sclass;
4904 sid = isec->sid;
4905 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4906
4907 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4908 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4909 newisec->sid = sid;
4910 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4911
4912 return 0;
4913}
4914
4915static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4916 int size)
4917{
4918 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4919}
4920
4921static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4922 int size, int flags)
4923{
4924 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4925}
4926
4927static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4928{
4929 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4930}
4931
4932static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4933{
4934 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4935}
4936
4937static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4938{
4939 int err;
4940
4941 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4942 if (err)
4943 return err;
4944
4945 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4946}
4947
4948static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4949 int optname)
4950{
4951 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4952}
4953
4954static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4955{
4956 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4957}
4958
4959static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4960 struct sock *other,
4961 struct sock *newsk)
4962{
4963 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4964 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4965 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4966 struct common_audit_data ad;
4967 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4968 int err;
4969
4970 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4971 ad.u.net = &net;
4972 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4973
4974 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4975 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4976 sksec_other->sclass,
4977 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4978 if (err)
4979 return err;
4980
4981 /* server child socket */
4982 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4983 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4984 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4985 if (err)
4986 return err;
4987
4988 /* connecting socket */
4989 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4990
4991 return 0;
4992}
4993
4994static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4995 struct socket *other)
4996{
4997 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4998 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4999 struct common_audit_data ad;
5000 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5001
5002 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5003 ad.u.net = &net;
5004 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
5005
5006 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5007 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5008 &ad);
5009}
5010
5011static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5012 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5013 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5014{
5015 int err;
5016 u32 if_sid;
5017 u32 node_sid;
5018
5019 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5020 if (err)
5021 return err;
5022 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5023 peer_sid, if_sid,
5024 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5025 if (err)
5026 return err;
5027
5028 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5029 if (err)
5030 return err;
5031 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5032 peer_sid, node_sid,
5033 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5034}
5035
5036static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5037 u16 family)
5038{
5039 int err = 0;
5040 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5041 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5042 struct common_audit_data ad;
5043 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5044 char *addrp;
5045
5046 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5047 ad.u.net = &net;
5048 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5049 ad.u.net->family = family;
5050 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5051 if (err)
5052 return err;
5053
5054 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5055 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5056 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5057 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5058 if (err)
5059 return err;
5060 }
5061
5062 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5063 if (err)
5064 return err;
5065 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5066
5067 return err;
5068}
5069
5070static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5071{
5072 int err;
5073 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5074 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5075 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5076 struct common_audit_data ad;
5077 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5078 char *addrp;
5079 u8 secmark_active;
5080 u8 peerlbl_active;
5081
5082 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5083 return 0;
5084
5085 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5086 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5087 family = PF_INET;
5088
5089 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5090 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5091 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5092 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5093 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5094 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5095
5096 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5097 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5098 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5099 return 0;
5100
5101 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5102 ad.u.net = &net;
5103 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5104 ad.u.net->family = family;
5105 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5106 if (err)
5107 return err;
5108
5109 if (peerlbl_active) {
5110 u32 peer_sid;
5111
5112 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5113 if (err)
5114 return err;
5115 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5116 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5117 if (err) {
5118 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5119 return err;
5120 }
5121 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5122 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5123 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5124 if (err) {
5125 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5126 return err;
5127 }
5128 }
5129
5130 if (secmark_active) {
5131 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5132 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5133 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5134 if (err)
5135 return err;
5136 }
5137
5138 return err;
5139}
5140
5141static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5142 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5143 unsigned int len)
5144{
5145 int err = 0;
5146 char *scontext = NULL;
5147 u32 scontext_len;
5148 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5149 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5150
5151 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5152 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5153 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5154 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5155 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5156 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5157
5158 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5159 &scontext_len);
5160 if (err)
5161 return err;
5162 if (scontext_len > len) {
5163 err = -ERANGE;
5164 goto out_len;
5165 }
5166
5167 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5168 err = -EFAULT;
5169out_len:
5170 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5171 err = -EFAULT;
5172 kfree(scontext);
5173 return err;
5174}
5175
5176static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5177{
5178 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5179 u16 family;
5180 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5181
5182 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5183 family = PF_INET;
5184 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5185 family = PF_INET6;
5186 else if (sock)
5187 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5188 else
5189 goto out;
5190
5191 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5192 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5193 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5194 } else if (skb)
5195 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5196
5197out:
5198 *secid = peer_secid;
5199 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5200 return -EINVAL;
5201 return 0;
5202}
5203
5204static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5205{
5206 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5207
5208 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5209 if (!sksec)
5210 return -ENOMEM;
5211
5212 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5213 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5214 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5215 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5216 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5217
5218 return 0;
5219}
5220
5221static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5222{
5223 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5224
5225 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5226 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5227 kfree(sksec);
5228}
5229
5230static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5231{
5232 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5233 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5234
5235 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5236 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5237 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5238
5239 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5240}
5241
5242static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5243{
5244 if (!sk)
5245 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5246 else {
5247 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5248
5249 *secid = sksec->sid;
5250 }
5251}
5252
5253static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5254{
5255 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5256 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5257 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5258
5259 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5260 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5261 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5262 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5263}
5264
5265/*
5266 * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5267 * if it's the first association on the socket.
5268 */
5269static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5270 struct sk_buff *skb)
5271{
5272 struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5273 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5274 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5275 struct common_audit_data ad;
5276 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5277 int err;
5278
5279 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5280 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5281 family = PF_INET;
5282
5283 if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5284 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5285
5286 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5287 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5288 */
5289 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5290 if (err)
5291 return err;
5292
5293 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5294 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5295 } else {
5296 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5297 }
5298
5299 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5300 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5301
5302 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5303 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5304 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5305 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5306 */
5307 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5308 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5309 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5310 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5311 */
5312 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5313 ad.u.net = &net;
5314 ad.u.net->sk = asoc->base.sk;
5315 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5316 sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5317 sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5318 &ad);
5319 if (err)
5320 return err;
5321 }
5322 return 0;
5323}
5324
5325/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5326 * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5327 * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5328 */
5329static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5330 struct sk_buff *skb)
5331{
5332 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5333 u32 conn_sid;
5334 int err;
5335
5336 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5337 return 0;
5338
5339 err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5340 if (err)
5341 return err;
5342
5343 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5344 * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5345 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5346 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5347 * plug this into the new socket.
5348 */
5349 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5350 if (err)
5351 return err;
5352
5353 asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5354
5355 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5356 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5357}
5358
5359/* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5360 * response to an association request (initited by us).
5361 */
5362static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5363 struct sk_buff *skb)
5364{
5365 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5366
5367 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5368 return 0;
5369
5370 /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5371 * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5372 * into a new socket.
5373 */
5374 asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5375
5376 return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5377}
5378
5379/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5380 * based on their @optname.
5381 */
5382static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5383 struct sockaddr *address,
5384 int addrlen)
5385{
5386 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5387 void *addr_buf;
5388 struct sockaddr *addr;
5389 struct socket *sock;
5390
5391 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5392 return 0;
5393
5394 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5395 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5396 addr_buf = address;
5397
5398 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5399 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5400 return -EINVAL;
5401
5402 addr = addr_buf;
5403 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5404 case AF_UNSPEC:
5405 case AF_INET:
5406 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5407 break;
5408 case AF_INET6:
5409 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5410 break;
5411 default:
5412 return -EINVAL;
5413 }
5414
5415 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5416 return -EINVAL;
5417
5418 err = -EINVAL;
5419 switch (optname) {
5420 /* Bind checks */
5421 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5422 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5423 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5424 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5425 break;
5426 /* Connect checks */
5427 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5428 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5429 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5430 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5431 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5432 if (err)
5433 return err;
5434
5435 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5436 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5437 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5438 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5439 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5440 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5441 * primary address is selected.
5442 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5443 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5444 * selinux_socket_connect().
5445 */
5446 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5447 break;
5448 }
5449
5450 if (err)
5451 return err;
5452
5453 addr_buf += len;
5454 walk_size += len;
5455 }
5456
5457 return 0;
5458}
5459
5460/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5461static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5462 struct sock *newsk)
5463{
5464 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5465 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5466
5467 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5468 * the non-sctp clone version.
5469 */
5470 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5471 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5472
5473 newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5474 newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5475 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5476 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5477}
5478
5479static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5480 struct request_sock *req)
5481{
5482 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5483 int err;
5484 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5485 u32 connsid;
5486 u32 peersid;
5487
5488 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5489 if (err)
5490 return err;
5491 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5492 if (err)
5493 return err;
5494 req->secid = connsid;
5495 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5496
5497 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5498}
5499
5500static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5501 const struct request_sock *req)
5502{
5503 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5504
5505 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5506 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5507 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5508 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5509 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5510 time it will have been created and available. */
5511
5512 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5513 * thread with access to newsksec */
5514 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5515}
5516
5517static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5518{
5519 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5521
5522 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5523 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5524 family = PF_INET;
5525
5526 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5527}
5528
5529static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5530{
5531 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5532 u32 tsid;
5533
5534 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5535 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5536
5537 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5538 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5539 NULL);
5540}
5541
5542static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5543{
5544 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5545}
5546
5547static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5548{
5549 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5550}
5551
5552static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5553 struct flowi_common *flic)
5554{
5555 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5556}
5557
5558static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5559{
5560 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5561
5562 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5563 if (!tunsec)
5564 return -ENOMEM;
5565 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5566
5567 *security = tunsec;
5568 return 0;
5569}
5570
5571static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5572{
5573 kfree(security);
5574}
5575
5576static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5577{
5578 u32 sid = current_sid();
5579
5580 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5581 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5582 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5583 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5584 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5585 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5586
5587 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5588 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5589 NULL);
5590}
5591
5592static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5593{
5594 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5595
5596 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5597 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5598 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5599}
5600
5601static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5602{
5603 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5604 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5605
5606 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5607 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5608 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5609 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5610 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5611 * protocols were being used */
5612
5613 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5614 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5615
5616 return 0;
5617}
5618
5619static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5620{
5621 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5622 u32 sid = current_sid();
5623 int err;
5624
5625 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5626 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5627 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5628 if (err)
5629 return err;
5630 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5631 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5632 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5633 if (err)
5634 return err;
5635 tunsec->sid = sid;
5636
5637 return 0;
5638}
5639
5640#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5641
5642static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5643 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5644{
5645 int ifindex;
5646 u16 family;
5647 char *addrp;
5648 u32 peer_sid;
5649 struct common_audit_data ad;
5650 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5651 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5652
5653 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5654 return NF_ACCEPT;
5655
5656 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5657 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5658 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5659 return NF_ACCEPT;
5660
5661 family = state->pf;
5662 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5663 return NF_DROP;
5664
5665 ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5666 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5667 ad.u.net = &net;
5668 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5669 ad.u.net->family = family;
5670 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5671 return NF_DROP;
5672
5673 if (peerlbl_active) {
5674 int err;
5675
5676 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5677 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5678 if (err) {
5679 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5680 return NF_DROP;
5681 }
5682 }
5683
5684 if (secmark_active)
5685 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5686 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5687 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5688 return NF_DROP;
5689
5690 if (netlbl_enabled())
5691 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5692 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5693 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5694 * protection */
5695 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5696 return NF_DROP;
5697
5698 return NF_ACCEPT;
5699}
5700
5701static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5702 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5703{
5704 struct sock *sk;
5705 u32 sid;
5706
5707 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5708 return NF_ACCEPT;
5709
5710 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5711 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5712 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5713 sk = skb->sk;
5714 if (sk) {
5715 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5716
5717 if (sk_listener(sk))
5718 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5719 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5720 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5721 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5722 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5723 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5724 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5725 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5726 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5727 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5728 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5729 * best we can do. */
5730 return NF_ACCEPT;
5731
5732 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5733 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5734 sid = sksec->sid;
5735 } else
5736 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5737 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5738 return NF_DROP;
5739
5740 return NF_ACCEPT;
5741}
5742
5743
5744static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5745 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5746{
5747 struct sock *sk;
5748 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5749 struct common_audit_data ad;
5750 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5751 u8 proto = 0;
5752
5753 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5754 if (sk == NULL)
5755 return NF_ACCEPT;
5756 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5757
5758 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5759 ad.u.net = &net;
5760 ad.u.net->netif = state->out->ifindex;
5761 ad.u.net->family = state->pf;
5762 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5763 return NF_DROP;
5764
5765 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5766 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5767 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5768 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5769 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5770
5771 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5772 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5773
5774 return NF_ACCEPT;
5775}
5776
5777static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5778 struct sk_buff *skb,
5779 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5780{
5781 u16 family;
5782 u32 secmark_perm;
5783 u32 peer_sid;
5784 int ifindex;
5785 struct sock *sk;
5786 struct common_audit_data ad;
5787 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5788 char *addrp;
5789 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5790
5791 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5792 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5793 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5794 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5795 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5796 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5797
5798 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5799 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5800 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5801 return NF_ACCEPT;
5802
5803 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5804
5805#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5806 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5807 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5808 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5809 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5810 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5811 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5812 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5813 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5814 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5815 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5816 * connection. */
5817 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5818 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5819 return NF_ACCEPT;
5820#endif
5821
5822 family = state->pf;
5823 if (sk == NULL) {
5824 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5825 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5826 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5827 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5828 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5829 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5830 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5831 return NF_DROP;
5832 } else {
5833 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5834 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5835 }
5836 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5837 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5838 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5839 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5840 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5841 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5842 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5843 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5844 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5845 * for similar problems. */
5846 u32 skb_sid;
5847 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5848
5849 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5850 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5851 return NF_DROP;
5852 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5853 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5854 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5855 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5856 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5857 * pass the packet. */
5858 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5859 switch (family) {
5860 case PF_INET:
5861 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5862 return NF_ACCEPT;
5863 break;
5864 case PF_INET6:
5865 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5866 return NF_ACCEPT;
5867 break;
5868 default:
5869 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5870 }
5871 }
5872 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5873 return NF_DROP;
5874 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5875 } else {
5876 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5877 * associated socket. */
5878 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5879 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5880 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5881 }
5882
5883 ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5884 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5885 ad.u.net = &net;
5886 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5887 ad.u.net->family = family;
5888 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5889 return NF_DROP;
5890
5891 if (secmark_active)
5892 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5893 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5894 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5895 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5896
5897 if (peerlbl_active) {
5898 u32 if_sid;
5899 u32 node_sid;
5900
5901 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5902 return NF_DROP;
5903 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5904 peer_sid, if_sid,
5905 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5906 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5907
5908 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5909 return NF_DROP;
5910 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5911 peer_sid, node_sid,
5912 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5913 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5914 }
5915
5916 return NF_ACCEPT;
5917}
5918#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5919
5920static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5921{
5922 int rc = 0;
5923 unsigned int msg_len;
5924 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5925 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5926 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5927 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5928 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5929 u32 perm;
5930
5931 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5932 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5933
5934 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5935 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5936 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5937 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5938 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5939 */
5940 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5941 return 0;
5942
5943 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5944 if (rc == 0) {
5945 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5946 if (rc)
5947 return rc;
5948 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5949 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5950 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5951 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5952 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5953 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5954 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5955 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5956 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
5957 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5958 return rc;
5959 rc = 0;
5960 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5961 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5962 rc = 0;
5963 } else {
5964 return rc;
5965 }
5966
5967 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5968 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5969 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5970 return 0;
5971 data_len -= msg_len;
5972 data += msg_len;
5973 }
5974
5975 return rc;
5976}
5977
5978static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5979{
5980 isec->sclass = sclass;
5981 isec->sid = current_sid();
5982}
5983
5984static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5985 u32 perms)
5986{
5987 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5988 struct common_audit_data ad;
5989 u32 sid = current_sid();
5990
5991 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5992
5993 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5994 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5995
5996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5997 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5998}
5999
6000static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6001{
6002 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6003
6004 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6005 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6006
6007 return 0;
6008}
6009
6010/* message queue security operations */
6011static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6012{
6013 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6014 struct common_audit_data ad;
6015 u32 sid = current_sid();
6016
6017 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6018 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6019
6020 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6021 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6022
6023 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6024 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6025 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
6026}
6027
6028static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6029{
6030 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6031 struct common_audit_data ad;
6032 u32 sid = current_sid();
6033
6034 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6035
6036 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6037 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6038
6039 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6040 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6041 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6042}
6043
6044static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6045{
6046 int err;
6047 int perms;
6048
6049 switch (cmd) {
6050 case IPC_INFO:
6051 case MSG_INFO:
6052 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6053 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6054 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6055 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6056 case IPC_STAT:
6057 case MSG_STAT:
6058 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6059 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6060 break;
6061 case IPC_SET:
6062 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6063 break;
6064 case IPC_RMID:
6065 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6066 break;
6067 default:
6068 return 0;
6069 }
6070
6071 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6072 return err;
6073}
6074
6075static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6076{
6077 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6078 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6079 struct common_audit_data ad;
6080 u32 sid = current_sid();
6081 int rc;
6082
6083 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6084 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6085
6086 /*
6087 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6088 */
6089 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6090 /*
6091 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6092 * message queue this message will be stored in
6093 */
6094 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6095 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6096 if (rc)
6097 return rc;
6098 }
6099
6100 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6101 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6102
6103 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6104 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6105 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6106 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6107 if (!rc)
6108 /* Can this process send the message */
6109 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6110 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6111 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6112 if (!rc)
6113 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6114 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6115 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6116 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6117
6118 return rc;
6119}
6120
6121static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6122 struct task_struct *target,
6123 long type, int mode)
6124{
6125 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6126 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6127 struct common_audit_data ad;
6128 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6129 int rc;
6130
6131 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6132 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6133
6134 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6135 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6136
6137 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6138 sid, isec->sid,
6139 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6140 if (!rc)
6141 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6142 sid, msec->sid,
6143 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6144 return rc;
6145}
6146
6147/* Shared Memory security operations */
6148static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6149{
6150 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6151 struct common_audit_data ad;
6152 u32 sid = current_sid();
6153
6154 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6155 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6156
6157 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6158 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6159
6160 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6161 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6162 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6163}
6164
6165static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6166{
6167 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6168 struct common_audit_data ad;
6169 u32 sid = current_sid();
6170
6171 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6172
6173 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6174 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6175
6176 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6177 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6178 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6179}
6180
6181/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6182static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6183{
6184 int perms;
6185 int err;
6186
6187 switch (cmd) {
6188 case IPC_INFO:
6189 case SHM_INFO:
6190 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6191 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6192 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6193 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6194 case IPC_STAT:
6195 case SHM_STAT:
6196 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6197 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6198 break;
6199 case IPC_SET:
6200 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6201 break;
6202 case SHM_LOCK:
6203 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6204 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6205 break;
6206 case IPC_RMID:
6207 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6208 break;
6209 default:
6210 return 0;
6211 }
6212
6213 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6214 return err;
6215}
6216
6217static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6218 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6219{
6220 u32 perms;
6221
6222 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6223 perms = SHM__READ;
6224 else
6225 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6226
6227 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6228}
6229
6230/* Semaphore security operations */
6231static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6232{
6233 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6234 struct common_audit_data ad;
6235 u32 sid = current_sid();
6236
6237 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6238 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6239
6240 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6241 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6242
6243 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6244 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6245 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6246}
6247
6248static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6249{
6250 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6251 struct common_audit_data ad;
6252 u32 sid = current_sid();
6253
6254 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6255
6256 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6257 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6258
6259 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6260 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6261 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6262}
6263
6264/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6265static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6266{
6267 int err;
6268 u32 perms;
6269
6270 switch (cmd) {
6271 case IPC_INFO:
6272 case SEM_INFO:
6273 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6274 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6275 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6276 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6277 case GETPID:
6278 case GETNCNT:
6279 case GETZCNT:
6280 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6281 break;
6282 case GETVAL:
6283 case GETALL:
6284 perms = SEM__READ;
6285 break;
6286 case SETVAL:
6287 case SETALL:
6288 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6289 break;
6290 case IPC_RMID:
6291 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6292 break;
6293 case IPC_SET:
6294 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6295 break;
6296 case IPC_STAT:
6297 case SEM_STAT:
6298 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6299 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6300 break;
6301 default:
6302 return 0;
6303 }
6304
6305 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6306 return err;
6307}
6308
6309static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6310 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6311{
6312 u32 perms;
6313
6314 if (alter)
6315 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6316 else
6317 perms = SEM__READ;
6318
6319 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6320}
6321
6322static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6323{
6324 u32 av = 0;
6325
6326 av = 0;
6327 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6328 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6329 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6330 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6331
6332 if (av == 0)
6333 return 0;
6334
6335 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6336}
6337
6338static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6339{
6340 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6341 *secid = isec->sid;
6342}
6343
6344static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6345{
6346 if (inode)
6347 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6348}
6349
6350static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6351 const char *name, char **value)
6352{
6353 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6354 u32 sid;
6355 int error;
6356 unsigned len;
6357
6358 rcu_read_lock();
6359 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6360
6361 if (current != p) {
6362 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6363 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6364 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6365 if (error)
6366 goto bad;
6367 }
6368
6369 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6370 sid = __tsec->sid;
6371 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6372 sid = __tsec->osid;
6373 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6374 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6375 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6376 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6377 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6378 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6379 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6380 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6381 else {
6382 error = -EINVAL;
6383 goto bad;
6384 }
6385 rcu_read_unlock();
6386
6387 if (!sid)
6388 return 0;
6389
6390 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6391 if (error)
6392 return error;
6393 return len;
6394
6395bad:
6396 rcu_read_unlock();
6397 return error;
6398}
6399
6400static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6401{
6402 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6403 struct cred *new;
6404 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6405 int error;
6406 char *str = value;
6407
6408 /*
6409 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6410 */
6411 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6412 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6413 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6414 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6415 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6416 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6417 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6418 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6419 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6420 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6421 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6422 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6423 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6424 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6425 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6426 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6427 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6428 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6429 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6430 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6431 else
6432 error = -EINVAL;
6433 if (error)
6434 return error;
6435
6436 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6437 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6438 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6439 str[size-1] = 0;
6440 size--;
6441 }
6442 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6443 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6444 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6445 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6446 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6447 size_t audit_size;
6448
6449 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6450 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6451 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6452 audit_size = size - 1;
6453 else
6454 audit_size = size;
6455 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6456 GFP_ATOMIC,
6457 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6458 if (!ab)
6459 return error;
6460 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6461 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6462 audit_log_end(ab);
6463
6464 return error;
6465 }
6466 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6467 &selinux_state,
6468 value, size, &sid);
6469 }
6470 if (error)
6471 return error;
6472 }
6473
6474 new = prepare_creds();
6475 if (!new)
6476 return -ENOMEM;
6477
6478 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6479 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6480 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6481 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6482 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6483 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6484 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6485 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6486 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6487 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6488 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6489 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6490 if (sid) {
6491 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6492 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6493 if (error)
6494 goto abort_change;
6495 }
6496 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6497 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6498 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6499 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6500 error = -EINVAL;
6501 if (sid == 0)
6502 goto abort_change;
6503
6504 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6505 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6506 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6507 tsec->sid, sid);
6508 if (error)
6509 goto abort_change;
6510 }
6511
6512 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6513 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6514 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6516 if (error)
6517 goto abort_change;
6518
6519 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6520 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6521 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6522 if (ptsid != 0) {
6523 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6524 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6525 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6526 if (error)
6527 goto abort_change;
6528 }
6529
6530 tsec->sid = sid;
6531 } else {
6532 error = -EINVAL;
6533 goto abort_change;
6534 }
6535
6536 commit_creds(new);
6537 return size;
6538
6539abort_change:
6540 abort_creds(new);
6541 return error;
6542}
6543
6544static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6545{
6546 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6547}
6548
6549static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6550{
6551 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6552 secdata, seclen);
6553}
6554
6555static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6556{
6557 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6558 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6559}
6560
6561static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6562{
6563 kfree(secdata);
6564}
6565
6566static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6567{
6568 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6569
6570 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6571 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6572 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6573}
6574
6575/*
6576 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6577 */
6578static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6579{
6580 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6581 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6582 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6583 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6584}
6585
6586/*
6587 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6588 */
6589static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6590{
6591 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6592 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6593}
6594
6595static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6596{
6597 int len = 0;
6598 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&init_user_ns, inode,
6599 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6600 if (len < 0)
6601 return len;
6602 *ctxlen = len;
6603 return 0;
6604}
6605#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6606
6607static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6608 unsigned long flags)
6609{
6610 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6611 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6612
6613 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6614 if (!ksec)
6615 return -ENOMEM;
6616
6617 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6618 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6619 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6620 else
6621 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6622
6623 k->security = ksec;
6624 return 0;
6625}
6626
6627static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6628{
6629 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6630
6631 k->security = NULL;
6632 kfree(ksec);
6633}
6634
6635static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6636 const struct cred *cred,
6637 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6638{
6639 struct key *key;
6640 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6641 u32 perm, sid;
6642
6643 switch (need_perm) {
6644 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6645 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6646 break;
6647 case KEY_NEED_READ:
6648 perm = KEY__READ;
6649 break;
6650 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6651 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6652 break;
6653 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6654 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6655 break;
6656 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6657 perm = KEY__LINK;
6658 break;
6659 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6660 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6661 break;
6662 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6663 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6664 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6665 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6666 return 0;
6667 default:
6668 WARN_ON(1);
6669 return -EPERM;
6670
6671 }
6672
6673 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6674 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6675 ksec = key->security;
6676
6677 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6678 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6679}
6680
6681static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6682{
6683 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6684 char *context = NULL;
6685 unsigned len;
6686 int rc;
6687
6688 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6689 &context, &len);
6690 if (!rc)
6691 rc = len;
6692 *_buffer = context;
6693 return rc;
6694}
6695
6696#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6697static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6698{
6699 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6700 u32 sid = current_sid();
6701
6702 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6703 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6704}
6705#endif
6706#endif
6707
6708#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6709static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6710{
6711 struct common_audit_data ad;
6712 int err;
6713 u32 sid = 0;
6714 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6715 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6716
6717 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6718 if (err)
6719 return err;
6720
6721 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6722 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6723 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6724 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6725 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6726 sec->sid, sid,
6727 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6728 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6729}
6730
6731static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6732 u8 port_num)
6733{
6734 struct common_audit_data ad;
6735 int err;
6736 u32 sid = 0;
6737 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6738 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6739
6740 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6741 &sid);
6742
6743 if (err)
6744 return err;
6745
6746 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6747 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6748 ibendport.port = port_num;
6749 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6750 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6751 sec->sid, sid,
6752 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6753 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6754}
6755
6756static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6757{
6758 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6759
6760 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6761 if (!sec)
6762 return -ENOMEM;
6763 sec->sid = current_sid();
6764
6765 *ib_sec = sec;
6766 return 0;
6767}
6768
6769static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6770{
6771 kfree(ib_sec);
6772}
6773#endif
6774
6775#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6776static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6777 unsigned int size)
6778{
6779 u32 sid = current_sid();
6780 int ret;
6781
6782 switch (cmd) {
6783 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6784 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6785 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6786 NULL);
6787 break;
6788 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6789 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6790 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6791 NULL);
6792 break;
6793 default:
6794 ret = 0;
6795 break;
6796 }
6797
6798 return ret;
6799}
6800
6801static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6802{
6803 u32 av = 0;
6804
6805 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6806 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6807 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6808 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6809 return av;
6810}
6811
6812/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6813 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6814 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6815 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6816 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6817 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6818 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6819 */
6820static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6821{
6822 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6823 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6824 struct bpf_map *map;
6825 int ret;
6826
6827 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6828 map = file->private_data;
6829 bpfsec = map->security;
6830 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6831 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6832 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6833 if (ret)
6834 return ret;
6835 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6836 prog = file->private_data;
6837 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6838 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6839 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6840 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6841 if (ret)
6842 return ret;
6843 }
6844 return 0;
6845}
6846
6847static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6848{
6849 u32 sid = current_sid();
6850 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6851
6852 bpfsec = map->security;
6853 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6854 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6855 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6856}
6857
6858static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6859{
6860 u32 sid = current_sid();
6861 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6862
6863 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6864 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6865 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6866 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6867}
6868
6869static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6870{
6871 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6872
6873 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6874 if (!bpfsec)
6875 return -ENOMEM;
6876
6877 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6878 map->security = bpfsec;
6879
6880 return 0;
6881}
6882
6883static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6884{
6885 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6886
6887 map->security = NULL;
6888 kfree(bpfsec);
6889}
6890
6891static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6892{
6893 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6894
6895 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6896 if (!bpfsec)
6897 return -ENOMEM;
6898
6899 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6900 aux->security = bpfsec;
6901
6902 return 0;
6903}
6904
6905static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6906{
6907 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6908
6909 aux->security = NULL;
6910 kfree(bpfsec);
6911}
6912#endif
6913
6914struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6915 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6916 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6917 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6918 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6919 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6920 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
6921};
6922
6923#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6924static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6925{
6926 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6927
6928 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6929 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6930 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6931 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6932 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6933 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6934 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6935 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6936 else
6937 return -EINVAL;
6938
6939 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6940 requested, NULL);
6941}
6942
6943static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6944{
6945 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6946
6947 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6948 if (!perfsec)
6949 return -ENOMEM;
6950
6951 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6952 event->security = perfsec;
6953
6954 return 0;
6955}
6956
6957static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6958{
6959 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6960
6961 event->security = NULL;
6962 kfree(perfsec);
6963}
6964
6965static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6966{
6967 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6968 u32 sid = current_sid();
6969
6970 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6971 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6972}
6973
6974static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6975{
6976 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6977 u32 sid = current_sid();
6978
6979 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
6980 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6981}
6982#endif
6983
6984#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
6985/**
6986 * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
6987 * @new: the target creds
6988 *
6989 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
6990 * to service an io_uring operation.
6991 */
6992static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
6993{
6994 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
6995 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
6996}
6997
6998/**
6999 * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
7000 *
7001 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
7002 * kernel polling thread.
7003 */
7004static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
7005{
7006 int sid = current_sid();
7007
7008 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
7009 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
7010}
7011
7012/**
7013 * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
7014 * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
7015 *
7016 * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
7017 * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
7018 *
7019 */
7020static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
7021{
7022 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
7023 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
7024 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
7025 struct common_audit_data ad;
7026
7027 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
7028 ad.u.file = file;
7029
7030 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
7031 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
7032}
7033#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
7034
7035/*
7036 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7037 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7038 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7039 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7040 * hooks),
7041 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7042 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7043 *
7044 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7045 *
7046 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
7047 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
7048 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
7049 */
7050static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7055
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7065
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7067
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7071
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7082
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7084
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7087
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7119
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7121
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7133
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7135
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7161
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7164
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7169
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7173
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7177
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7179
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7182
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7189
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7192
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7209 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7230 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7231#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7233 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7234 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7235 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7236#endif
7237#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7238 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7239 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7242 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7244 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7246#endif
7247
7248#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7252#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7254#endif
7255#endif
7256
7257#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7261#endif
7262
7263#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7264 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7269#endif
7270
7271#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7276#endif
7277
7278#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7282#endif
7283
7284 /*
7285 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7286 */
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7290#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7292#endif
7293
7294 /*
7295 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7296 */
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7299 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7302 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7304 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7305 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7308#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7310#endif
7311#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7312 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7314 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7315 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7316#endif
7317#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7319#endif
7320#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7321 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7322#endif
7323#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7324 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7325 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7326#endif
7327#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7328 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7329#endif
7330};
7331
7332static __init int selinux_init(void)
7333{
7334 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7335
7336 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7337 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7338 if (CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE)
7339 pr_err("SELinux: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is non-zero. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
7340 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7341 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7342 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7343 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7344
7345 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7346 cred_init_security();
7347
7348 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7349
7350 avc_init();
7351
7352 avtab_cache_init();
7353
7354 ebitmap_cache_init();
7355
7356 hashtab_cache_init();
7357
7358 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7359
7360 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7361 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7362
7363 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7364 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7365
7366 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7367 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7368 else
7369 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7370
7371 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7372
7373 return 0;
7374}
7375
7376static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7377{
7378 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7379}
7380
7381void selinux_complete_init(void)
7382{
7383 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7384
7385 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7386 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7387 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7388}
7389
7390/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7391 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7392DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7393 .name = "selinux",
7394 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7395 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7396 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7397 .init = selinux_init,
7398};
7399
7400#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7401
7402static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7403 {
7404 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7405 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7406 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7407 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7408 },
7409 {
7410 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7411 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7412 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7413 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7414 },
7415 {
7416 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7417 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7418 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7419 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7420 },
7421#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7422 {
7423 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7424 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7425 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7426 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7427 },
7428 {
7429 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7430 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7431 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7432 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7433 },
7434 {
7435 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7436 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7437 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7438 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7439 },
7440#endif /* IPV6 */
7441};
7442
7443static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7444{
7445 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7446 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7447}
7448
7449static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7450{
7451 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7452 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7453}
7454
7455static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7456 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7457 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7458};
7459
7460static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7461{
7462 int err;
7463
7464 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7465 return 0;
7466
7467 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7468
7469 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7470 if (err)
7471 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7472
7473 return 0;
7474}
7475__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7476
7477#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7478static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7479{
7480 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7481
7482 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7483}
7484#endif
7485
7486#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7487
7488#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7489#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7490#endif
7491
7492#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7493
7494#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7495int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7496{
7497 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7498 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7499 return -EINVAL;
7500 }
7501
7502 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7503 /* Only do this once. */
7504 return -EINVAL;
7505 }
7506
7507 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7508
7509 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7510
7511 /*
7512 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7513 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7514 * runtime disable.
7515 */
7516 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7517
7518 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7519
7520 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7521 avc_disable();
7522
7523 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7524 exit_sel_fs();
7525
7526 return 0;
7527}
7528#endif