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1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26#include <linux/init.h>
27#include <linux/kd.h>
28#include <linux/kernel.h>
29#include <linux/tracehook.h>
30#include <linux/errno.h>
31#include <linux/sched.h>
32#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33#include <linux/xattr.h>
34#include <linux/capability.h>
35#include <linux/unistd.h>
36#include <linux/mm.h>
37#include <linux/mman.h>
38#include <linux/slab.h>
39#include <linux/pagemap.h>
40#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41#include <linux/swap.h>
42#include <linux/spinlock.h>
43#include <linux/syscalls.h>
44#include <linux/dcache.h>
45#include <linux/file.h>
46#include <linux/fdtable.h>
47#include <linux/namei.h>
48#include <linux/mount.h>
49#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51#include <linux/tty.h>
52#include <net/icmp.h>
53#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56#include <net/net_namespace.h>
57#include <net/netlabel.h>
58#include <linux/uaccess.h>
59#include <asm/ioctls.h>
60#include <linux/atomic.h>
61#include <linux/bitops.h>
62#include <linux/interrupt.h>
63#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64#include <net/netlink.h>
65#include <linux/tcp.h>
66#include <linux/udp.h>
67#include <linux/dccp.h>
68#include <linux/quota.h>
69#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71#include <linux/parser.h>
72#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73#include <net/ipv6.h>
74#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75#include <linux/personality.h>
76#include <linux/audit.h>
77#include <linux/string.h>
78#include <linux/selinux.h>
79#include <linux/mutex.h>
80#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81#include <linux/syslog.h>
82#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83#include <linux/export.h>
84#include <linux/msg.h>
85#include <linux/shm.h>
86
87#include "avc.h"
88#include "objsec.h"
89#include "netif.h"
90#include "netnode.h"
91#include "netport.h"
92#include "xfrm.h"
93#include "netlabel.h"
94#include "audit.h"
95#include "avc_ss.h"
96
97/* SECMARK reference count */
98static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
99
100#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101int selinux_enforcing;
102
103static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
104{
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
108 return 1;
109}
110__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
111#endif
112
113#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
115
116static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
117{
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
121 return 1;
122}
123__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
124#else
125int selinux_enabled = 1;
126#endif
127
128static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
129static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
130
131/**
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
133 *
134 * Description:
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
139 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
140 *
141 */
142static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143{
144 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
145}
146
147/**
148 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
149 *
150 * Description:
151 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
152 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
153 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
154 * is always considered enabled.
155 *
156 */
157static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158{
159 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
160}
161
162static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163{
164 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
165 sel_netif_flush();
166 sel_netnode_flush();
167 sel_netport_flush();
168 synchronize_net();
169 }
170 return 0;
171}
172
173/*
174 * initialise the security for the init task
175 */
176static void cred_init_security(void)
177{
178 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
179 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180
181 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 if (!tsec)
183 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184
185 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
186 cred->security = tsec;
187}
188
189/*
190 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 */
192static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193{
194 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195
196 tsec = cred->security;
197 return tsec->sid;
198}
199
200/*
201 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 */
203static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
204{
205 u32 sid;
206
207 rcu_read_lock();
208 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
209 rcu_read_unlock();
210 return sid;
211}
212
213/*
214 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 */
216static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217{
218 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
219
220 return tsec->sid;
221}
222
223/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224
225static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226{
227 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
228 u32 sid = current_sid();
229
230 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
231 if (!isec)
232 return -ENOMEM;
233
234 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->inode = inode;
237 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
238 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
239 isec->task_sid = sid;
240 inode->i_security = isec;
241
242 return 0;
243}
244
245static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
246
247/*
248 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
249 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
250 * allowed; when set to false, returns ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) when the label is
251 * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
252 * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
253 */
254static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
255 struct dentry *opt_dentry,
256 bool may_sleep)
257{
258 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
259
260 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
261
262 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INVALID) {
263 if (!may_sleep)
264 return -ECHILD;
265
266 /*
267 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
268 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
269 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
270 */
271 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, opt_dentry);
272 }
273 return 0;
274}
275
276static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
277{
278 return inode->i_security;
279}
280
281static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
282{
283 int error;
284
285 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
286 if (error)
287 return ERR_PTR(error);
288 return inode->i_security;
289}
290
291/*
292 * Get the security label of an inode.
293 */
294static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
295{
296 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
297 return inode->i_security;
298}
299
300/*
301 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
302 */
303static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
304{
305 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
306
307 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
308 return inode->i_security;
309}
310
311static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
312{
313 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
314
315 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
316 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
317}
318
319static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
320{
321 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
322 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
323
324 /*
325 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
326 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
327 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
328 *
329 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
330 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
331 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
332 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
333 */
334 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
335 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
336 list_del_init(&isec->list);
337 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
338 }
339
340 /*
341 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
342 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
343 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
344 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
345 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
346 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
347 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
348 */
349 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
350}
351
352static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
353{
354 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
355 u32 sid = current_sid();
356
357 fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
358 if (!fsec)
359 return -ENOMEM;
360
361 fsec->sid = sid;
362 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
363 file->f_security = fsec;
364
365 return 0;
366}
367
368static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
369{
370 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
371 file->f_security = NULL;
372 kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
373}
374
375static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
376{
377 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
378
379 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
380 if (!sbsec)
381 return -ENOMEM;
382
383 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
384 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
385 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
386 sbsec->sb = sb;
387 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
388 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
389 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
390 sb->s_security = sbsec;
391
392 return 0;
393}
394
395static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
396{
397 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
398 sb->s_security = NULL;
399 kfree(sbsec);
400}
401
402/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
403
404static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
405 "uses xattr",
406 "uses transition SIDs",
407 "uses task SIDs",
408 "uses genfs_contexts",
409 "not configured for labeling",
410 "uses mountpoint labeling",
411 "uses native labeling",
412};
413
414static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
415{
416 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
417}
418
419enum {
420 Opt_error = -1,
421 Opt_context = 1,
422 Opt_fscontext = 2,
423 Opt_defcontext = 3,
424 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
425 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
426 Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
427};
428
429#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
430
431static const match_table_t tokens = {
432 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
433 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
434 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
435 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
436 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
437 {Opt_error, NULL},
438};
439
440#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
441
442static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
443 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
444 const struct cred *cred)
445{
446 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
447 int rc;
448
449 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
450 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
451 if (rc)
452 return rc;
453
454 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
455 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
456 return rc;
457}
458
459static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
460 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
461 const struct cred *cred)
462{
463 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
464 int rc;
465 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
466 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
467 if (rc)
468 return rc;
469
470 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
471 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
472 return rc;
473}
474
475static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
476{
477 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
478
479 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
480 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
481 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
482 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
483 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
484 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
485 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
486 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
487 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
488}
489
490static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
491{
492 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
493 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
494 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
495 int rc = 0;
496
497 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
498 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
499 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
500 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
501 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
502 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
503 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
504 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
505 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
506 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
507 goto out;
508 }
509 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
510 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
511 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
512 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
513 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
514 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
515 else
516 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
517 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
518 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
519 goto out;
520 }
521 }
522
523 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
524 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
525 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
526
527 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
528 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
529 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
530
531 /* Initialize the root inode. */
532 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
533
534 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
535 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
536 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
537 populates itself. */
538 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
539next_inode:
540 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
541 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
542 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
543 struct inode_security_struct, list);
544 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
545 list_del_init(&isec->list);
546 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
547 inode = igrab(inode);
548 if (inode) {
549 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
550 inode_doinit(inode);
551 iput(inode);
552 }
553 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
554 goto next_inode;
555 }
556 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
557out:
558 return rc;
559}
560
561/*
562 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
563 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
564 * mount options, or whatever.
565 */
566static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
567 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
568{
569 int rc = 0, i;
570 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
571 char *context = NULL;
572 u32 len;
573 char tmp;
574
575 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
576
577 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
578 return -EINVAL;
579
580 if (!ss_initialized)
581 return -EINVAL;
582
583 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
584 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
585
586 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
587 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
588 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
589 if (tmp & 0x01)
590 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
591 tmp >>= 1;
592 }
593 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
594 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
595 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
596
597 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
598 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
599 rc = -ENOMEM;
600 goto out_free;
601 }
602
603 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
604 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
605 rc = -ENOMEM;
606 goto out_free;
607 }
608
609 i = 0;
610 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
611 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
612 if (rc)
613 goto out_free;
614 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
615 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
616 }
617 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
618 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
619 if (rc)
620 goto out_free;
621 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
622 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
623 }
624 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
625 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
626 if (rc)
627 goto out_free;
628 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
629 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
630 }
631 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
632 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
633 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
634
635 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
636 if (rc)
637 goto out_free;
638 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
639 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
640 }
641 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
642 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
643 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
644 }
645
646 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
647
648 return 0;
649
650out_free:
651 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
652 return rc;
653}
654
655static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
656 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
657{
658 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
659
660 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
662 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
663 (old_sid != new_sid))
664 return 1;
665
666 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
667 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
668 */
669 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
670 if (mnt_flags & flag)
671 return 1;
672 return 0;
673}
674
675/*
676 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
677 * labeling information.
678 */
679static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
680 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
681 unsigned long kern_flags,
682 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
683{
684 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
685 int rc = 0, i;
686 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
687 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
688 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
689 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = backing_inode_security(root);
690 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
691 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
692 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
693 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
694 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
695
696 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
697
698 if (!ss_initialized) {
699 if (!num_opts) {
700 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
701 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
702 server is ready to handle calls. */
703 goto out;
704 }
705 rc = -EINVAL;
706 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
707 "before the security server is initialized\n");
708 goto out;
709 }
710 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
711 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
712 * place the results is not allowed */
713 rc = -EINVAL;
714 goto out;
715 }
716
717 /*
718 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
719 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
720 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
721 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
722 *
723 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
724 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
725 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
726 * will be used for both mounts)
727 */
728 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
729 && (num_opts == 0))
730 goto out;
731
732 /*
733 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
734 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
735 * than once with different security options.
736 */
737 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
738 u32 sid;
739
740 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
741 continue;
742 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
743 if (rc) {
744 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
745 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
746 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
747 goto out;
748 }
749 switch (flags[i]) {
750 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
751 fscontext_sid = sid;
752
753 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
754 fscontext_sid))
755 goto out_double_mount;
756
757 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
758 break;
759 case CONTEXT_MNT:
760 context_sid = sid;
761
762 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
763 context_sid))
764 goto out_double_mount;
765
766 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
767 break;
768 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
769 rootcontext_sid = sid;
770
771 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
772 rootcontext_sid))
773 goto out_double_mount;
774
775 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
776
777 break;
778 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
779 defcontext_sid = sid;
780
781 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
782 defcontext_sid))
783 goto out_double_mount;
784
785 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
786
787 break;
788 default:
789 rc = -EINVAL;
790 goto out;
791 }
792 }
793
794 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
795 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
796 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
797 goto out_double_mount;
798 rc = 0;
799 goto out;
800 }
801
802 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
803 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
804
805 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
806 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
807 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
808 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
809
810 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
811 /*
812 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
813 * filesystem type.
814 */
815 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
816 if (rc) {
817 printk(KERN_WARNING
818 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
819 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
820 goto out;
821 }
822 }
823 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
824 if (fscontext_sid) {
825 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
826 if (rc)
827 goto out;
828
829 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
830 }
831
832 /*
833 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
834 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
835 * the superblock context if not already set.
836 */
837 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
838 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
839 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
840 }
841
842 if (context_sid) {
843 if (!fscontext_sid) {
844 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
845 cred);
846 if (rc)
847 goto out;
848 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
849 } else {
850 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
851 cred);
852 if (rc)
853 goto out;
854 }
855 if (!rootcontext_sid)
856 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
857
858 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
859 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
860 }
861
862 if (rootcontext_sid) {
863 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
864 cred);
865 if (rc)
866 goto out;
867
868 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
869 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
870 }
871
872 if (defcontext_sid) {
873 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
874 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
875 rc = -EINVAL;
876 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
877 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
878 goto out;
879 }
880
881 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
882 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
883 sbsec, cred);
884 if (rc)
885 goto out;
886 }
887
888 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
889 }
890
891 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
892out:
893 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
894 return rc;
895out_double_mount:
896 rc = -EINVAL;
897 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
898 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
899 goto out;
900}
901
902static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
903 const struct super_block *newsb)
904{
905 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
906 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
907 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
908 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
909
910 if (oldflags != newflags)
911 goto mismatch;
912 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
913 goto mismatch;
914 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
915 goto mismatch;
916 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
917 goto mismatch;
918 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
919 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
920 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
921 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
922 goto mismatch;
923 }
924 return 0;
925mismatch:
926 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
927 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
928 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
929 return -EBUSY;
930}
931
932static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
933 struct super_block *newsb)
934{
935 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
936 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
937
938 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
939 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
940 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
941
942 /*
943 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
944 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
945 */
946 if (!ss_initialized)
947 return 0;
948
949 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
950 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
951
952 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
953 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
954 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
955
956 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
957
958 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
959
960 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
961 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
962 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
963
964 if (set_context) {
965 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
966
967 if (!set_fscontext)
968 newsbsec->sid = sid;
969 if (!set_rootcontext) {
970 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
971 newisec->sid = sid;
972 }
973 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
974 }
975 if (set_rootcontext) {
976 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
977 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
978
979 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
980 }
981
982 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
983 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
984 return 0;
985}
986
987static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
988 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
989{
990 char *p;
991 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
992 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
993 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
994
995 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
996
997 /* Standard string-based options. */
998 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
999 int token;
1000 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
1001
1002 if (!*p)
1003 continue;
1004
1005 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
1006
1007 switch (token) {
1008 case Opt_context:
1009 if (context || defcontext) {
1010 rc = -EINVAL;
1011 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1012 goto out_err;
1013 }
1014 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1015 if (!context) {
1016 rc = -ENOMEM;
1017 goto out_err;
1018 }
1019 break;
1020
1021 case Opt_fscontext:
1022 if (fscontext) {
1023 rc = -EINVAL;
1024 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1025 goto out_err;
1026 }
1027 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1028 if (!fscontext) {
1029 rc = -ENOMEM;
1030 goto out_err;
1031 }
1032 break;
1033
1034 case Opt_rootcontext:
1035 if (rootcontext) {
1036 rc = -EINVAL;
1037 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1038 goto out_err;
1039 }
1040 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1041 if (!rootcontext) {
1042 rc = -ENOMEM;
1043 goto out_err;
1044 }
1045 break;
1046
1047 case Opt_defcontext:
1048 if (context || defcontext) {
1049 rc = -EINVAL;
1050 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1051 goto out_err;
1052 }
1053 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1054 if (!defcontext) {
1055 rc = -ENOMEM;
1056 goto out_err;
1057 }
1058 break;
1059 case Opt_labelsupport:
1060 break;
1061 default:
1062 rc = -EINVAL;
1063 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1064 goto out_err;
1065
1066 }
1067 }
1068
1069 rc = -ENOMEM;
1070 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
1071 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1072 goto out_err;
1073
1074 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1075 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
1076 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1077 goto out_err;
1078 }
1079
1080 if (fscontext) {
1081 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1082 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1083 }
1084 if (context) {
1085 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1086 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1087 }
1088 if (rootcontext) {
1089 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1090 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1091 }
1092 if (defcontext) {
1093 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1094 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1095 }
1096
1097 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1098 return 0;
1099
1100out_err:
1101 kfree(context);
1102 kfree(defcontext);
1103 kfree(fscontext);
1104 kfree(rootcontext);
1105 return rc;
1106}
1107/*
1108 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1109 */
1110static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1111{
1112 int rc = 0;
1113 char *options = data;
1114 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1115
1116 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1117
1118 if (!data)
1119 goto out;
1120
1121 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1122
1123 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1124 if (rc)
1125 goto out_err;
1126
1127out:
1128 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1129
1130out_err:
1131 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1132 return rc;
1133}
1134
1135static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1136 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1137{
1138 int i;
1139 char *prefix;
1140
1141 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1142 char *has_comma;
1143
1144 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1145 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1146 else
1147 has_comma = NULL;
1148
1149 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1150 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1151 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1152 break;
1153 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1154 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1155 break;
1156 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1157 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1158 break;
1159 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1160 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1161 break;
1162 case SBLABEL_MNT:
1163 seq_putc(m, ',');
1164 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1165 continue;
1166 default:
1167 BUG();
1168 return;
1169 };
1170 /* we need a comma before each option */
1171 seq_putc(m, ',');
1172 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1173 if (has_comma)
1174 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1175 seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
1176 if (has_comma)
1177 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1178 }
1179}
1180
1181static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1182{
1183 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1184 int rc;
1185
1186 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1187 if (rc) {
1188 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1189 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1190 rc = 0;
1191 return rc;
1192 }
1193
1194 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1195
1196 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1197
1198 return rc;
1199}
1200
1201static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1202{
1203 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1204 case S_IFSOCK:
1205 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1206 case S_IFLNK:
1207 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1208 case S_IFREG:
1209 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1210 case S_IFBLK:
1211 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1212 case S_IFDIR:
1213 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1214 case S_IFCHR:
1215 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1216 case S_IFIFO:
1217 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1218
1219 }
1220
1221 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1222}
1223
1224static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1225{
1226 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1227}
1228
1229static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1230{
1231 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1232}
1233
1234static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1235{
1236 switch (family) {
1237 case PF_UNIX:
1238 switch (type) {
1239 case SOCK_STREAM:
1240 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1241 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1242 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1243 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1244 }
1245 break;
1246 case PF_INET:
1247 case PF_INET6:
1248 switch (type) {
1249 case SOCK_STREAM:
1250 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1251 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1252 else
1253 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1254 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1255 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1256 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1257 else
1258 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1259 case SOCK_DCCP:
1260 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1261 default:
1262 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1263 }
1264 break;
1265 case PF_NETLINK:
1266 switch (protocol) {
1267 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1268 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1269 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1270 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1271 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1272 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1273 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1274 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1275 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1276 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1277 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1278 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1279 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1280 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1281 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1282 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1283 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1284 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1285 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1286 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1287 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1288 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1289 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1290 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1291 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1292 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1293 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1294 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1295 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1296 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1297 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1298 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1299 default:
1300 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1301 }
1302 case PF_PACKET:
1303 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1304 case PF_KEY:
1305 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1306 case PF_APPLETALK:
1307 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1308 }
1309
1310 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1311}
1312
1313static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1314 u16 tclass,
1315 u16 flags,
1316 u32 *sid)
1317{
1318 int rc;
1319 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
1320 char *buffer, *path;
1321
1322 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1323 if (!buffer)
1324 return -ENOMEM;
1325
1326 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1327 if (IS_ERR(path))
1328 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1329 else {
1330 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1331 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1332 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1333 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1334 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1335 path[1] = '/';
1336 path++;
1337 }
1338 }
1339 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
1340 }
1341 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1342 return rc;
1343}
1344
1345/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1346static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1347{
1348 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1349 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1350 u32 sid;
1351 struct dentry *dentry;
1352#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1353 char *context = NULL;
1354 unsigned len = 0;
1355 int rc = 0;
1356
1357 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1358 goto out;
1359
1360 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1361 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1362 goto out_unlock;
1363
1364 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1365 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1366 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1367 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1368 server is ready to handle calls. */
1369 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1370 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1371 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1372 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1373 goto out_unlock;
1374 }
1375
1376 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1377 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1378 break;
1379 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1380 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1381 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1382 break;
1383 }
1384
1385 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1386 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1387 if (opt_dentry) {
1388 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1389 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1390 } else {
1391 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1392 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1393 }
1394 if (!dentry) {
1395 /*
1396 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1397 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1398 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1399 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1400 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1401 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1402 * be used again by userspace.
1403 */
1404 goto out_unlock;
1405 }
1406
1407 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1408 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1409 if (!context) {
1410 rc = -ENOMEM;
1411 dput(dentry);
1412 goto out_unlock;
1413 }
1414 context[len] = '\0';
1415 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1416 context, len);
1417 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1418 kfree(context);
1419
1420 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1421 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1422 NULL, 0);
1423 if (rc < 0) {
1424 dput(dentry);
1425 goto out_unlock;
1426 }
1427 len = rc;
1428 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1429 if (!context) {
1430 rc = -ENOMEM;
1431 dput(dentry);
1432 goto out_unlock;
1433 }
1434 context[len] = '\0';
1435 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1436 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1437 context, len);
1438 }
1439 dput(dentry);
1440 if (rc < 0) {
1441 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1442 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1443 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1444 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1445 kfree(context);
1446 goto out_unlock;
1447 }
1448 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1449 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1450 rc = 0;
1451 } else {
1452 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1453 sbsec->def_sid,
1454 GFP_NOFS);
1455 if (rc) {
1456 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1457 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1458
1459 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1460 if (printk_ratelimit())
1461 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1462 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1463 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1464 } else {
1465 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1466 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1467 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1468 }
1469 kfree(context);
1470 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1471 rc = 0;
1472 break;
1473 }
1474 }
1475 kfree(context);
1476 isec->sid = sid;
1477 break;
1478 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1479 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1480 break;
1481 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1482 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1483 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1484
1485 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1486 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1487 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1488 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1489 if (rc)
1490 goto out_unlock;
1491 isec->sid = sid;
1492 break;
1493 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1494 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1495 break;
1496 default:
1497 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1498 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1499
1500 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1501 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1502 * procfs inodes */
1503 if (opt_dentry)
1504 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1505 * d_splice_alias. */
1506 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1507 else
1508 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1509 * find a dentry. */
1510 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1511 /*
1512 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1513 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1514 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1515 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1516 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1517 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1518 * could be used again by userspace.
1519 */
1520 if (!dentry)
1521 goto out_unlock;
1522 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1523 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass,
1524 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1525 dput(dentry);
1526 if (rc)
1527 goto out_unlock;
1528 isec->sid = sid;
1529 }
1530 break;
1531 }
1532
1533 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1534
1535out_unlock:
1536 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1537out:
1538 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1539 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1540 return rc;
1541}
1542
1543/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1544static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1545{
1546 u32 perm = 0;
1547
1548 switch (sig) {
1549 case SIGCHLD:
1550 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1551 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1552 break;
1553 case SIGKILL:
1554 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1555 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1556 break;
1557 case SIGSTOP:
1558 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1559 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1560 break;
1561 default:
1562 /* All other signals. */
1563 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1564 break;
1565 }
1566
1567 return perm;
1568}
1569
1570/*
1571 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1572 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1573 */
1574static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1575 const struct cred *target,
1576 u32 perms)
1577{
1578 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1579
1580 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1581}
1582
1583/*
1584 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1585 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1586 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1587 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1588 */
1589static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1590 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1591 u32 perms)
1592{
1593 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1594 u32 sid1, sid2;
1595
1596 rcu_read_lock();
1597 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1598 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1599 rcu_read_unlock();
1600 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1601}
1602
1603/*
1604 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1605 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1606 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1607 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1608 */
1609static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1610 u32 perms)
1611{
1612 u32 sid, tsid;
1613
1614 sid = current_sid();
1615 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1616 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1617}
1618
1619#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1620#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1621#endif
1622
1623/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1624static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1625 int cap, int audit)
1626{
1627 struct common_audit_data ad;
1628 struct av_decision avd;
1629 u16 sclass;
1630 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1631 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1632 int rc;
1633
1634 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1635 ad.u.cap = cap;
1636
1637 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1638 case 0:
1639 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1640 break;
1641 case 1:
1642 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1643 break;
1644 default:
1645 printk(KERN_ERR
1646 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1647 BUG();
1648 return -EINVAL;
1649 }
1650
1651 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1652 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1653 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1654 if (rc2)
1655 return rc2;
1656 }
1657 return rc;
1658}
1659
1660/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1661static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1662 u32 perms)
1663{
1664 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1665
1666 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1667 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1668}
1669
1670/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1671 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1672 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1673static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1674 struct inode *inode,
1675 u32 perms,
1676 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1677{
1678 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1679 u32 sid;
1680
1681 validate_creds(cred);
1682
1683 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1684 return 0;
1685
1686 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1687 isec = inode->i_security;
1688
1689 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1690}
1691
1692/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1693 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1694 pathname if needed. */
1695static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1696 struct dentry *dentry,
1697 u32 av)
1698{
1699 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1700 struct common_audit_data ad;
1701
1702 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1703 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1704 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1705 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1706}
1707
1708/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1709 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1710 pathname if needed. */
1711static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1712 const struct path *path,
1713 u32 av)
1714{
1715 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1716 struct common_audit_data ad;
1717
1718 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1719 ad.u.path = *path;
1720 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1721 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1722}
1723
1724/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1725static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1726 struct file *file,
1727 u32 av)
1728{
1729 struct common_audit_data ad;
1730
1731 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1732 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1733 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1734}
1735
1736/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1737 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1738 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1739 check a particular permission to the file.
1740 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1741 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1742 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1743 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1744static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct file *file,
1746 u32 av)
1747{
1748 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1749 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1750 struct common_audit_data ad;
1751 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 int rc;
1753
1754 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1755 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1756
1757 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1758 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1759 SECCLASS_FD,
1760 FD__USE,
1761 &ad);
1762 if (rc)
1763 goto out;
1764 }
1765
1766 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1767 rc = 0;
1768 if (av)
1769 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1770
1771out:
1772 return rc;
1773}
1774
1775/*
1776 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1777 */
1778static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
1779 const struct qstr *name,
1780 u16 tclass,
1781 u32 *_new_isid)
1782{
1783 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1784 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1785 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1786
1787 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1788 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1789 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1790 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1791 tsec->create_sid) {
1792 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1793 } else {
1794 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1795 name, _new_isid);
1796 }
1797
1798 return 0;
1799}
1800
1801/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1802static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1803 struct dentry *dentry,
1804 u16 tclass)
1805{
1806 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1807 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1808 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1809 u32 sid, newsid;
1810 struct common_audit_data ad;
1811 int rc;
1812
1813 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1814 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1815
1816 sid = tsec->sid;
1817
1818 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1819 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1820
1821 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1822 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1823 &ad);
1824 if (rc)
1825 return rc;
1826
1827 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1828 &newsid);
1829 if (rc)
1830 return rc;
1831
1832 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1833 if (rc)
1834 return rc;
1835
1836 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1837 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1838 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1839}
1840
1841/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1842static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1843 struct task_struct *ctx)
1844{
1845 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1846
1847 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1848}
1849
1850#define MAY_LINK 0
1851#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1852#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1853
1854/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1855static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1856 struct dentry *dentry,
1857 int kind)
1858
1859{
1860 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1861 struct common_audit_data ad;
1862 u32 sid = current_sid();
1863 u32 av;
1864 int rc;
1865
1866 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1867 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1868
1869 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1870 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1871
1872 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1873 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1874 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1875 if (rc)
1876 return rc;
1877
1878 switch (kind) {
1879 case MAY_LINK:
1880 av = FILE__LINK;
1881 break;
1882 case MAY_UNLINK:
1883 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1884 break;
1885 case MAY_RMDIR:
1886 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1887 break;
1888 default:
1889 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1890 __func__, kind);
1891 return 0;
1892 }
1893
1894 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1895 return rc;
1896}
1897
1898static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1899 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1900 struct inode *new_dir,
1901 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1902{
1903 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1904 struct common_audit_data ad;
1905 u32 sid = current_sid();
1906 u32 av;
1907 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1908 int rc;
1909
1910 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1911 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1912 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1913 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1914
1915 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1916
1917 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1918 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1919 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1920 if (rc)
1921 return rc;
1922 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1923 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1924 if (rc)
1925 return rc;
1926 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1927 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1928 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1929 if (rc)
1930 return rc;
1931 }
1932
1933 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1934 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1935 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1936 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1937 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1938 if (rc)
1939 return rc;
1940 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1941 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1942 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1943 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1944 new_isec->sclass,
1945 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1946 if (rc)
1947 return rc;
1948 }
1949
1950 return 0;
1951}
1952
1953/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1954static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1955 struct super_block *sb,
1956 u32 perms,
1957 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1958{
1959 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1960 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1961
1962 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1963 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1964}
1965
1966/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1967static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1968{
1969 u32 av = 0;
1970
1971 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1972 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1973 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1974 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1975 av |= FILE__READ;
1976
1977 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1978 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1979 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1980 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1981
1982 } else {
1983 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1984 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1985 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1986 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1987 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1988 av |= DIR__READ;
1989 }
1990
1991 return av;
1992}
1993
1994/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1995static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1996{
1997 u32 av = 0;
1998
1999 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2000 av |= FILE__READ;
2001 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2002 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2003 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2004 else
2005 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2006 }
2007 if (!av) {
2008 /*
2009 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2010 */
2011 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2012 }
2013
2014 return av;
2015}
2016
2017/*
2018 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2019 * open permission.
2020 */
2021static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2022{
2023 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2024
2025 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
2026 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2027
2028 return av;
2029}
2030
2031/* Hook functions begin here. */
2032
2033static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2034{
2035 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2036 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2037
2038 return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2039 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2040}
2041
2042static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2043 struct task_struct *to)
2044{
2045 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2046 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2047 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2048 int rc;
2049
2050 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2051 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2052 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2053 if (rc)
2054 return rc;
2055 }
2056
2057 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2058 NULL);
2059}
2060
2061static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2062 struct task_struct *to)
2063{
2064 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2065 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2066
2067 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2068 NULL);
2069}
2070
2071static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2072 struct task_struct *to,
2073 struct file *file)
2074{
2075 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2076 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2077 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2078 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2079 struct common_audit_data ad;
2080 int rc;
2081
2082 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2083 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2084
2085 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2086 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2087 SECCLASS_FD,
2088 FD__USE,
2089 &ad);
2090 if (rc)
2091 return rc;
2092 }
2093
2094 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2095 return 0;
2096
2097 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2098 &ad);
2099}
2100
2101static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2102 unsigned int mode)
2103{
2104 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
2105 u32 sid = current_sid();
2106 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2107 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2108 }
2109
2110 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2111}
2112
2113static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2114{
2115 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2116}
2117
2118static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2119 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2120{
2121 return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
2122}
2123
2124static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2125 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2126 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2127 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2128{
2129 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
2130}
2131
2132/*
2133 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2134 * which was removed).
2135 *
2136 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2137 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2138 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2139 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2140 */
2141
2142static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2143 int cap, int audit)
2144{
2145 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2146}
2147
2148static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2149{
2150 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2151 int rc = 0;
2152
2153 if (!sb)
2154 return 0;
2155
2156 switch (cmds) {
2157 case Q_SYNC:
2158 case Q_QUOTAON:
2159 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2160 case Q_SETINFO:
2161 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2162 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2163 break;
2164 case Q_GETFMT:
2165 case Q_GETINFO:
2166 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2167 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2168 break;
2169 default:
2170 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2171 break;
2172 }
2173 return rc;
2174}
2175
2176static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2177{
2178 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2179
2180 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2181}
2182
2183static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2184{
2185 int rc;
2186
2187 switch (type) {
2188 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2189 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2190 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2191 break;
2192 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2193 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2194 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2195 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2196 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2197 break;
2198 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2199 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2200 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2201 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2202 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2203 default:
2204 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2205 break;
2206 }
2207 return rc;
2208}
2209
2210/*
2211 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2212 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2213 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2214 *
2215 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2216 * processes that allocate mappings.
2217 */
2218static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2219{
2220 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2221
2222 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2223 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2224 if (rc == 0)
2225 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2226
2227 return cap_sys_admin;
2228}
2229
2230/* binprm security operations */
2231
2232static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2233 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2234 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2235{
2236 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2237 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2238 int rc;
2239
2240 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2241 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2242
2243 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2244 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2245
2246 /*
2247 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2248 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2249 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2250 * of the current SID.
2251 */
2252 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2253 if (rc) {
2254 /*
2255 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2256 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2257 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2258 */
2259 if (nnp)
2260 return -EPERM;
2261 else
2262 return -EACCES;
2263 }
2264 return 0;
2265}
2266
2267static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2268{
2269 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2270 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2271 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2272 struct common_audit_data ad;
2273 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2274 int rc;
2275
2276 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2277 * the script interpreter */
2278 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2279 return 0;
2280
2281 old_tsec = current_security();
2282 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2283 isec = inode_security(inode);
2284
2285 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2286 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2287 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2288
2289 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2290 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2291 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2292 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2293
2294 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2295 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2296 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2297 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2298
2299 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2300 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2301 if (rc)
2302 return rc;
2303 } else {
2304 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2305 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2306 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2307 &new_tsec->sid);
2308 if (rc)
2309 return rc;
2310
2311 /*
2312 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2313 * transition.
2314 */
2315 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2316 if (rc)
2317 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2318 }
2319
2320 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2321 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2322
2323 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2324 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2325 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2326 if (rc)
2327 return rc;
2328 } else {
2329 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2330 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2331 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2332 if (rc)
2333 return rc;
2334
2335 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2336 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2337 if (rc)
2338 return rc;
2339
2340 /* Check for shared state */
2341 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2342 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2343 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2344 NULL);
2345 if (rc)
2346 return -EPERM;
2347 }
2348
2349 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2350 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2351 if (bprm->unsafe &
2352 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2353 struct task_struct *tracer;
2354 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2355 u32 ptsid = 0;
2356
2357 rcu_read_lock();
2358 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2359 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2360 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2361 ptsid = sec->sid;
2362 }
2363 rcu_read_unlock();
2364
2365 if (ptsid != 0) {
2366 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2367 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2368 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2369 if (rc)
2370 return -EPERM;
2371 }
2372 }
2373
2374 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2375 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2376 }
2377
2378 return 0;
2379}
2380
2381static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2382{
2383 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2384 u32 sid, osid;
2385 int atsecure = 0;
2386
2387 sid = tsec->sid;
2388 osid = tsec->osid;
2389
2390 if (osid != sid) {
2391 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2392 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2393 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2394 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2395 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2396 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2397 }
2398
2399 return !!atsecure;
2400}
2401
2402static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2403{
2404 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2405}
2406
2407/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2408static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2409 struct files_struct *files)
2410{
2411 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2412 struct tty_struct *tty;
2413 int drop_tty = 0;
2414 unsigned n;
2415
2416 tty = get_current_tty();
2417 if (tty) {
2418 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2419 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2420 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2421
2422 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2423 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2424 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2425 open file may belong to another process and we are
2426 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2427 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2428 struct tty_file_private, list);
2429 file = file_priv->file;
2430 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2431 drop_tty = 1;
2432 }
2433 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2434 tty_kref_put(tty);
2435 }
2436 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2437 if (drop_tty)
2438 no_tty();
2439
2440 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2441 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2442 if (!n) /* none found? */
2443 return;
2444
2445 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2446 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2447 devnull = NULL;
2448 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2449 do {
2450 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2451 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2452 if (devnull)
2453 fput(devnull);
2454}
2455
2456/*
2457 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2458 */
2459static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2460{
2461 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2462 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2463 int rc, i;
2464
2465 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2466 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2467 return;
2468
2469 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2470 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2471
2472 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2473 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2474
2475 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2476 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2477 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2478 *
2479 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2480 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2481 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2482 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2483 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2484 */
2485 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2486 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2487 if (rc) {
2488 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2489 task_lock(current);
2490 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2491 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2492 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2493 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2494 }
2495 task_unlock(current);
2496 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2497 }
2498}
2499
2500/*
2501 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2502 * due to exec
2503 */
2504static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2505{
2506 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2507 struct itimerval itimer;
2508 u32 osid, sid;
2509 int rc, i;
2510
2511 osid = tsec->osid;
2512 sid = tsec->sid;
2513
2514 if (sid == osid)
2515 return;
2516
2517 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2518 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2519 * flush and unblock signals.
2520 *
2521 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2522 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2523 */
2524 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2525 if (rc) {
2526 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2527 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2528 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2529 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2530 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2531 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2532 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2533 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2534 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2535 recalc_sigpending();
2536 }
2537 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2538 }
2539
2540 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2541 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2542 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2543 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2544 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2545}
2546
2547/* superblock security operations */
2548
2549static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2550{
2551 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2552}
2553
2554static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2555{
2556 superblock_free_security(sb);
2557}
2558
2559static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2560{
2561 if (plen > olen)
2562 return 0;
2563
2564 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2565}
2566
2567static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2568{
2569 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2570 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2571 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2572 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2573 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2574}
2575
2576static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2577{
2578 if (!*first) {
2579 **to = ',';
2580 *to += 1;
2581 } else
2582 *first = 0;
2583 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2584 *to += len;
2585}
2586
2587static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2588 int len)
2589{
2590 int current_size = 0;
2591
2592 if (!*first) {
2593 **to = '|';
2594 *to += 1;
2595 } else
2596 *first = 0;
2597
2598 while (current_size < len) {
2599 if (*from != '"') {
2600 **to = *from;
2601 *to += 1;
2602 }
2603 from += 1;
2604 current_size += 1;
2605 }
2606}
2607
2608static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2609{
2610 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2611 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2612 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2613 int open_quote = 0;
2614
2615 in_curr = orig;
2616 sec_curr = copy;
2617
2618 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2619 if (!nosec) {
2620 rc = -ENOMEM;
2621 goto out;
2622 }
2623
2624 nosec_save = nosec;
2625 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2626 in_save = in_end = orig;
2627
2628 do {
2629 if (*in_end == '"')
2630 open_quote = !open_quote;
2631 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2632 *in_end == '\0') {
2633 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2634
2635 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2636 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2637 else
2638 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2639
2640 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2641 }
2642 } while (*in_end++);
2643
2644 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2645 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2646out:
2647 return rc;
2648}
2649
2650static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2651{
2652 int rc, i, *flags;
2653 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2654 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2655 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2656
2657 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2658 return 0;
2659
2660 if (!data)
2661 return 0;
2662
2663 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2664 return 0;
2665
2666 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2667 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2668 if (!secdata)
2669 return -ENOMEM;
2670 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2671 if (rc)
2672 goto out_free_secdata;
2673
2674 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2675 if (rc)
2676 goto out_free_secdata;
2677
2678 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2679 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2680
2681 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2682 u32 sid;
2683
2684 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2685 continue;
2686 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
2687 if (rc) {
2688 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2689 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2690 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2691 goto out_free_opts;
2692 }
2693 rc = -EINVAL;
2694 switch (flags[i]) {
2695 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2696 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2697 goto out_bad_option;
2698 break;
2699 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2700 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2701 goto out_bad_option;
2702 break;
2703 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2704 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2705 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2706
2707 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2708 goto out_bad_option;
2709 break;
2710 }
2711 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2712 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2713 goto out_bad_option;
2714 break;
2715 default:
2716 goto out_free_opts;
2717 }
2718 }
2719
2720 rc = 0;
2721out_free_opts:
2722 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2723out_free_secdata:
2724 free_secdata(secdata);
2725 return rc;
2726out_bad_option:
2727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2728 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2729 sb->s_type->name);
2730 goto out_free_opts;
2731}
2732
2733static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2734{
2735 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2736 struct common_audit_data ad;
2737 int rc;
2738
2739 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2740 if (rc)
2741 return rc;
2742
2743 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2744 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2745 return 0;
2746
2747 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2748 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2749 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2750}
2751
2752static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2753{
2754 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2755 struct common_audit_data ad;
2756
2757 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2758 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2759 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2760}
2761
2762static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2763 struct path *path,
2764 const char *type,
2765 unsigned long flags,
2766 void *data)
2767{
2768 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2769
2770 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2771 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2772 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2773 else
2774 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2775}
2776
2777static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2778{
2779 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2780
2781 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2782 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2783}
2784
2785/* inode security operations */
2786
2787static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2788{
2789 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2790}
2791
2792static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2793{
2794 inode_free_security(inode);
2795}
2796
2797static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2798 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2799 u32 *ctxlen)
2800{
2801 u32 newsid;
2802 int rc;
2803
2804 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2805 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2806 &newsid);
2807 if (rc)
2808 return rc;
2809
2810 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2811}
2812
2813static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2814 const struct qstr *qstr,
2815 const char **name,
2816 void **value, size_t *len)
2817{
2818 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2819 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2820 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2821 int rc;
2822 char *context;
2823
2824 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2825
2826 sid = tsec->sid;
2827 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2828
2829 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
2830 dir, qstr,
2831 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2832 &newsid);
2833 if (rc)
2834 return rc;
2835
2836 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2837 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2838 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2839 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2840 isec->sid = newsid;
2841 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2842 }
2843
2844 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2845 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2846
2847 if (name)
2848 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2849
2850 if (value && len) {
2851 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2852 if (rc)
2853 return rc;
2854 *value = context;
2855 *len = clen;
2856 }
2857
2858 return 0;
2859}
2860
2861static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2862{
2863 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2864}
2865
2866static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2867{
2868 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2869}
2870
2871static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2872{
2873 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2874}
2875
2876static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2877{
2878 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2879}
2880
2881static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2882{
2883 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2884}
2885
2886static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2887{
2888 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2889}
2890
2891static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2892{
2893 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2894}
2895
2896static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2897 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2898{
2899 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2900}
2901
2902static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2903{
2904 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2905
2906 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2907}
2908
2909static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2910 bool rcu)
2911{
2912 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2913 struct common_audit_data ad;
2914 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2915 u32 sid;
2916
2917 validate_creds(cred);
2918
2919 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2920 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2921 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2922 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
2923 if (IS_ERR(isec))
2924 return PTR_ERR(isec);
2925
2926 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
2927 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
2928}
2929
2930static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2931 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2932 int result,
2933 unsigned flags)
2934{
2935 struct common_audit_data ad;
2936 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2937 int rc;
2938
2939 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2940 ad.u.inode = inode;
2941
2942 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2943 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2944 if (rc)
2945 return rc;
2946 return 0;
2947}
2948
2949static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2950{
2951 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2952 u32 perms;
2953 bool from_access;
2954 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2955 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2956 u32 sid;
2957 struct av_decision avd;
2958 int rc, rc2;
2959 u32 audited, denied;
2960
2961 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2962 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2963
2964 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2965 if (!mask)
2966 return 0;
2967
2968 validate_creds(cred);
2969
2970 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2971 return 0;
2972
2973 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2974
2975 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2976 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
2977 if (IS_ERR(isec))
2978 return PTR_ERR(isec);
2979
2980 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2981 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2982 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2983 &denied);
2984 if (likely(!audited))
2985 return rc;
2986
2987 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2988 if (rc2)
2989 return rc2;
2990 return rc;
2991}
2992
2993static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2994{
2995 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2996 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2997 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2998
2999 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3000 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3001 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3002 ATTR_FORCE);
3003 if (!ia_valid)
3004 return 0;
3005 }
3006
3007 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3008 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3009 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3010
3011 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
3012 && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3013 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3014
3015 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3016}
3017
3018static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3019{
3020 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3021}
3022
3023static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3024{
3025 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3026
3027 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
3028 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
3029 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
3030 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
3031 return -EPERM;
3032 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
3033 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
3034 Restrict to administrator. */
3035 return -EPERM;
3036 }
3037 }
3038
3039 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3040 ordinary setattr permission. */
3041 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3042}
3043
3044static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3045 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3046{
3047 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3048 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3049 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3050 struct common_audit_data ad;
3051 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3052 int rc = 0;
3053
3054 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3055 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3056
3057 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3058 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3059 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3060
3061 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3062 return -EPERM;
3063
3064 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3065 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3066
3067 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3068 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3069 if (rc)
3070 return rc;
3071
3072 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3073 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3074 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3075 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3076 size_t audit_size;
3077 const char *str;
3078
3079 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3080 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3081 if (value) {
3082 str = value;
3083 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3084 audit_size = size - 1;
3085 else
3086 audit_size = size;
3087 } else {
3088 str = "";
3089 audit_size = 0;
3090 }
3091 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3092 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3093 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3094 audit_log_end(ab);
3095
3096 return rc;
3097 }
3098 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3099 }
3100 if (rc)
3101 return rc;
3102
3103 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3104 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3105 if (rc)
3106 return rc;
3107
3108 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3109 isec->sclass);
3110 if (rc)
3111 return rc;
3112
3113 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3114 sbsec->sid,
3115 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3116 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3117 &ad);
3118}
3119
3120static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3121 const void *value, size_t size,
3122 int flags)
3123{
3124 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3125 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3126 u32 newsid;
3127 int rc;
3128
3129 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3130 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3131 return;
3132 }
3133
3134 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3135 if (rc) {
3136 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3137 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3138 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3139 return;
3140 }
3141
3142 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3143 isec->sid = newsid;
3144 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3145
3146 return;
3147}
3148
3149static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3150{
3151 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3152
3153 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3154}
3155
3156static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3157{
3158 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3159
3160 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3161}
3162
3163static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3164{
3165 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3166 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3167
3168 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3169 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3170 return -EACCES;
3171}
3172
3173/*
3174 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3175 *
3176 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3177 */
3178static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3179{
3180 u32 size;
3181 int error;
3182 char *context = NULL;
3183 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3184
3185 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3186 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3187
3188 /*
3189 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3190 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3191 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3192 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3193 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3194 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3195 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3196 */
3197 error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3198 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3199 if (!error)
3200 error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3201 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3202 if (!error)
3203 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3204 &size);
3205 else
3206 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3207 if (error)
3208 return error;
3209 error = size;
3210 if (alloc) {
3211 *buffer = context;
3212 goto out_nofree;
3213 }
3214 kfree(context);
3215out_nofree:
3216 return error;
3217}
3218
3219static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3220 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3221{
3222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3223 u32 newsid;
3224 int rc;
3225
3226 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3227 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3228
3229 if (!value || !size)
3230 return -EACCES;
3231
3232 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3233 if (rc)
3234 return rc;
3235
3236 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3237 isec->sid = newsid;
3238 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3239 return 0;
3240}
3241
3242static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3243{
3244 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3245 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3246 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3247 return len;
3248}
3249
3250static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3251{
3252 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3253 *secid = isec->sid;
3254}
3255
3256/* file security operations */
3257
3258static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3259{
3260 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3261 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3262
3263 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3264 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3265 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3266
3267 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3268 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3269}
3270
3271static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3272{
3273 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3274 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3275 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3276 u32 sid = current_sid();
3277
3278 if (!mask)
3279 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3280 return 0;
3281
3282 isec = inode_security(inode);
3283 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3284 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3285 /* No change since file_open check. */
3286 return 0;
3287
3288 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3289}
3290
3291static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3292{
3293 return file_alloc_security(file);
3294}
3295
3296static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3297{
3298 file_free_security(file);
3299}
3300
3301/*
3302 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3303 * operation to an inode.
3304 */
3305static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3306 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3307{
3308 struct common_audit_data ad;
3309 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3310 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3311 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3312 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3313 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3314 int rc;
3315 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3316 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3317
3318 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3319 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3320 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3321 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3322
3323 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3324 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3325 SECCLASS_FD,
3326 FD__USE,
3327 &ad);
3328 if (rc)
3329 goto out;
3330 }
3331
3332 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3333 return 0;
3334
3335 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3336 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3337out:
3338 return rc;
3339}
3340
3341static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3342 unsigned long arg)
3343{
3344 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3345 int error = 0;
3346
3347 switch (cmd) {
3348 case FIONREAD:
3349 /* fall through */
3350 case FIBMAP:
3351 /* fall through */
3352 case FIGETBSZ:
3353 /* fall through */
3354 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3355 /* fall through */
3356 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3357 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3358 break;
3359
3360 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3361 /* fall through */
3362 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3363 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3364 break;
3365
3366 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3367 case FIONBIO:
3368 /* fall through */
3369 case FIOASYNC:
3370 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3371 break;
3372
3373 case KDSKBENT:
3374 case KDSKBSENT:
3375 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3376 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3377 break;
3378
3379 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3380 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3381 */
3382 default:
3383 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3384 }
3385 return error;
3386}
3387
3388static int default_noexec;
3389
3390static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3391{
3392 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3393 int rc = 0;
3394
3395 if (default_noexec &&
3396 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3397 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3398 /*
3399 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3400 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3401 * This has an additional check.
3402 */
3403 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3404 if (rc)
3405 goto error;
3406 }
3407
3408 if (file) {
3409 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3410 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3411
3412 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3413 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3414 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3415
3416 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3417 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3418
3419 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3420 }
3421
3422error:
3423 return rc;
3424}
3425
3426static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3427{
3428 int rc = 0;
3429
3430 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3431 u32 sid = current_sid();
3432 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3433 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3434 }
3435
3436 return rc;
3437}
3438
3439static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3440 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3441{
3442 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3443 prot = reqprot;
3444
3445 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3446 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3447}
3448
3449static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3450 unsigned long reqprot,
3451 unsigned long prot)
3452{
3453 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3454
3455 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3456 prot = reqprot;
3457
3458 if (default_noexec &&
3459 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3460 int rc = 0;
3461 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3462 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3463 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3464 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3465 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3466 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3467 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3468 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3469 /*
3470 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3471 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3472 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3473 * modified content. This typically should only
3474 * occur for text relocations.
3475 */
3476 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3477 }
3478 if (rc)
3479 return rc;
3480 }
3481
3482 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3483}
3484
3485static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3486{
3487 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3488
3489 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3490}
3491
3492static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3493 unsigned long arg)
3494{
3495 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3496 int err = 0;
3497
3498 switch (cmd) {
3499 case F_SETFL:
3500 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3501 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3502 break;
3503 }
3504 /* fall through */
3505 case F_SETOWN:
3506 case F_SETSIG:
3507 case F_GETFL:
3508 case F_GETOWN:
3509 case F_GETSIG:
3510 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3511 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3512 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3513 break;
3514 case F_GETLK:
3515 case F_SETLK:
3516 case F_SETLKW:
3517 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3518 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3519 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3520#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3521 case F_GETLK64:
3522 case F_SETLK64:
3523 case F_SETLKW64:
3524#endif
3525 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3526 break;
3527 }
3528
3529 return err;
3530}
3531
3532static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3533{
3534 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3535
3536 fsec = file->f_security;
3537 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3538}
3539
3540static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3541 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3542{
3543 struct file *file;
3544 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3545 u32 perm;
3546 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3547
3548 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3549 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3550
3551 fsec = file->f_security;
3552
3553 if (!signum)
3554 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3555 else
3556 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3557
3558 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3559 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3560}
3561
3562static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3563{
3564 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3565
3566 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3567}
3568
3569static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3570{
3571 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3572 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3573
3574 fsec = file->f_security;
3575 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3576 /*
3577 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3578 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3579 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3580 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3581 * struct as its SID.
3582 */
3583 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3584 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3585 /*
3586 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3587 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3588 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3589 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3590 * new inode label or new policy.
3591 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3592 */
3593 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3594}
3595
3596/* task security operations */
3597
3598static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3599{
3600 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3601}
3602
3603/*
3604 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3605 */
3606static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3607{
3608 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3609
3610 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3611 if (!tsec)
3612 return -ENOMEM;
3613
3614 cred->security = tsec;
3615 return 0;
3616}
3617
3618/*
3619 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3620 */
3621static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3622{
3623 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3624
3625 /*
3626 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3627 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3628 */
3629 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3630 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3631 kfree(tsec);
3632}
3633
3634/*
3635 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3636 */
3637static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3638 gfp_t gfp)
3639{
3640 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3641 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3642
3643 old_tsec = old->security;
3644
3645 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3646 if (!tsec)
3647 return -ENOMEM;
3648
3649 new->security = tsec;
3650 return 0;
3651}
3652
3653/*
3654 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3655 */
3656static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3657{
3658 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3659 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3660
3661 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3662}
3663
3664/*
3665 * set the security data for a kernel service
3666 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3667 */
3668static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3669{
3670 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3671 u32 sid = current_sid();
3672 int ret;
3673
3674 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3675 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3676 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3677 NULL);
3678 if (ret == 0) {
3679 tsec->sid = secid;
3680 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3681 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3682 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3683 }
3684 return ret;
3685}
3686
3687/*
3688 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3689 * objective context of the specified inode
3690 */
3691static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3692{
3693 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3694 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3695 u32 sid = current_sid();
3696 int ret;
3697
3698 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3699 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3700 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3701 NULL);
3702
3703 if (ret == 0)
3704 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3705 return ret;
3706}
3707
3708static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3709{
3710 u32 sid;
3711 struct common_audit_data ad;
3712
3713 sid = task_sid(current);
3714
3715 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3716 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3717
3718 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3719 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3720}
3721
3722static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3723{
3724 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3725}
3726
3727static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3728{
3729 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3730}
3731
3732static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3733{
3734 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3735}
3736
3737static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3738{
3739 *secid = task_sid(p);
3740}
3741
3742static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3743{
3744 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3745}
3746
3747static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3748{
3749 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3750}
3751
3752static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3753{
3754 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3755}
3756
3757static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3758 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3759{
3760 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3761
3762 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3763 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3764 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3765 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3766 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3767 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3768
3769 return 0;
3770}
3771
3772static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3773{
3774 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3775}
3776
3777static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3778{
3779 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3780}
3781
3782static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3783{
3784 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3785}
3786
3787static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3788 int sig, u32 secid)
3789{
3790 u32 perm;
3791 int rc;
3792
3793 if (!sig)
3794 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3795 else
3796 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3797 if (secid)
3798 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3799 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3800 else
3801 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3802 return rc;
3803}
3804
3805static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3806{
3807 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3808}
3809
3810static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3811 struct inode *inode)
3812{
3813 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3814 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3815
3816 isec->sid = sid;
3817 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3818}
3819
3820/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3821static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3822 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3823{
3824 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3825 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3826
3827 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3828 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3829 if (ih == NULL)
3830 goto out;
3831
3832 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3833 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3834 goto out;
3835
3836 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3837 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3838 ret = 0;
3839
3840 if (proto)
3841 *proto = ih->protocol;
3842
3843 switch (ih->protocol) {
3844 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3845 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3846
3847 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3848 break;
3849
3850 offset += ihlen;
3851 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3852 if (th == NULL)
3853 break;
3854
3855 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3856 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3857 break;
3858 }
3859
3860 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3861 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3862
3863 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3864 break;
3865
3866 offset += ihlen;
3867 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3868 if (uh == NULL)
3869 break;
3870
3871 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3872 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3873 break;
3874 }
3875
3876 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3877 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3878
3879 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3880 break;
3881
3882 offset += ihlen;
3883 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3884 if (dh == NULL)
3885 break;
3886
3887 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3888 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3889 break;
3890 }
3891
3892 default:
3893 break;
3894 }
3895out:
3896 return ret;
3897}
3898
3899#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3900
3901/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3902static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3903 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3904{
3905 u8 nexthdr;
3906 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3907 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3908 __be16 frag_off;
3909
3910 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3911 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3912 if (ip6 == NULL)
3913 goto out;
3914
3915 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3916 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3917 ret = 0;
3918
3919 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3920 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3921 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3922 if (offset < 0)
3923 goto out;
3924
3925 if (proto)
3926 *proto = nexthdr;
3927
3928 switch (nexthdr) {
3929 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3930 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3931
3932 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3933 if (th == NULL)
3934 break;
3935
3936 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3937 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3938 break;
3939 }
3940
3941 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3942 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3943
3944 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3945 if (uh == NULL)
3946 break;
3947
3948 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3949 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3950 break;
3951 }
3952
3953 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3954 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3955
3956 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3957 if (dh == NULL)
3958 break;
3959
3960 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3961 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3962 break;
3963 }
3964
3965 /* includes fragments */
3966 default:
3967 break;
3968 }
3969out:
3970 return ret;
3971}
3972
3973#endif /* IPV6 */
3974
3975static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3976 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3977{
3978 char *addrp;
3979 int ret;
3980
3981 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3982 case PF_INET:
3983 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3984 if (ret)
3985 goto parse_error;
3986 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3987 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3988 goto okay;
3989
3990#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3991 case PF_INET6:
3992 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3993 if (ret)
3994 goto parse_error;
3995 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3996 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3997 goto okay;
3998#endif /* IPV6 */
3999 default:
4000 addrp = NULL;
4001 goto okay;
4002 }
4003
4004parse_error:
4005 printk(KERN_WARNING
4006 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4007 " unable to parse packet\n");
4008 return ret;
4009
4010okay:
4011 if (_addrp)
4012 *_addrp = addrp;
4013 return 0;
4014}
4015
4016/**
4017 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4018 * @skb: the packet
4019 * @family: protocol family
4020 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4021 *
4022 * Description:
4023 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4024 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4025 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4026 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4027 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4028 * peer labels.
4029 *
4030 */
4031static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4032{
4033 int err;
4034 u32 xfrm_sid;
4035 u32 nlbl_sid;
4036 u32 nlbl_type;
4037
4038 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4039 if (unlikely(err))
4040 return -EACCES;
4041 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4042 if (unlikely(err))
4043 return -EACCES;
4044
4045 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4046 if (unlikely(err)) {
4047 printk(KERN_WARNING
4048 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4049 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4050 return -EACCES;
4051 }
4052
4053 return 0;
4054}
4055
4056/**
4057 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4058 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4059 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4060 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4061 *
4062 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4063 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4064 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4065 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4066 *
4067 */
4068static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4069{
4070 int err = 0;
4071
4072 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4073 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
4074 else
4075 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4076
4077 return err;
4078}
4079
4080/* socket security operations */
4081
4082static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4083 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4084{
4085 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4086 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4087 return 0;
4088 }
4089
4090 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
4091 socksid);
4092}
4093
4094static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4095{
4096 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4097 struct common_audit_data ad;
4098 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4099 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
4100
4101 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4102 return 0;
4103
4104 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4105 ad.u.net = &net;
4106 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4107
4108 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4109}
4110
4111static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4112 int protocol, int kern)
4113{
4114 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4115 u32 newsid;
4116 u16 secclass;
4117 int rc;
4118
4119 if (kern)
4120 return 0;
4121
4122 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4123 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4124 if (rc)
4125 return rc;
4126
4127 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4128}
4129
4130static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4131 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4132{
4133 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4134 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4135 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4136 int err = 0;
4137
4138 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4139
4140 if (kern)
4141 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4142 else {
4143 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4144 if (err)
4145 return err;
4146 }
4147
4148 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4149
4150 if (sock->sk) {
4151 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4152 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4153 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4154 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4155 }
4156
4157 return err;
4158}
4159
4160/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4161 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4162 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4163
4164static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4165{
4166 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4167 u16 family;
4168 int err;
4169
4170 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4171 if (err)
4172 goto out;
4173
4174 /*
4175 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4176 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4177 * check the first address now.
4178 */
4179 family = sk->sk_family;
4180 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4181 char *addrp;
4182 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4183 struct common_audit_data ad;
4184 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4185 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4186 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4187 unsigned short snum;
4188 u32 sid, node_perm;
4189
4190 if (family == PF_INET) {
4191 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4192 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4193 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4194 } else {
4195 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4196 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4197 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4198 }
4199
4200 if (snum) {
4201 int low, high;
4202
4203 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4204
4205 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4206 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4207 snum, &sid);
4208 if (err)
4209 goto out;
4210 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4211 ad.u.net = &net;
4212 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4213 ad.u.net->family = family;
4214 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4215 sksec->sclass,
4216 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4217 if (err)
4218 goto out;
4219 }
4220 }
4221
4222 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4223 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4224 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4225 break;
4226
4227 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4228 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4229 break;
4230
4231 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4232 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4233 break;
4234
4235 default:
4236 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4237 break;
4238 }
4239
4240 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4241 if (err)
4242 goto out;
4243
4244 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4245 ad.u.net = &net;
4246 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4247 ad.u.net->family = family;
4248
4249 if (family == PF_INET)
4250 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4251 else
4252 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4253
4254 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4255 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4256 if (err)
4257 goto out;
4258 }
4259out:
4260 return err;
4261}
4262
4263static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4264{
4265 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4266 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4267 int err;
4268
4269 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4270 if (err)
4271 return err;
4272
4273 /*
4274 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4275 */
4276 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4277 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4278 struct common_audit_data ad;
4279 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4280 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4281 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4282 unsigned short snum;
4283 u32 sid, perm;
4284
4285 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4286 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4287 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4288 return -EINVAL;
4289 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4290 } else {
4291 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4292 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4293 return -EINVAL;
4294 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4295 }
4296
4297 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4298 if (err)
4299 goto out;
4300
4301 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4302 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4303
4304 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4305 ad.u.net = &net;
4306 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4307 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4308 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4309 if (err)
4310 goto out;
4311 }
4312
4313 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4314
4315out:
4316 return err;
4317}
4318
4319static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4320{
4321 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4322}
4323
4324static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4325{
4326 int err;
4327 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4328 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4329
4330 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4331 if (err)
4332 return err;
4333
4334 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4335
4336 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4337 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4338 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4339 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4340
4341 return 0;
4342}
4343
4344static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4345 int size)
4346{
4347 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4348}
4349
4350static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4351 int size, int flags)
4352{
4353 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4354}
4355
4356static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4357{
4358 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4359}
4360
4361static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4362{
4363 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4364}
4365
4366static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4367{
4368 int err;
4369
4370 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4371 if (err)
4372 return err;
4373
4374 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4375}
4376
4377static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4378 int optname)
4379{
4380 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4381}
4382
4383static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4384{
4385 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4386}
4387
4388static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4389 struct sock *other,
4390 struct sock *newsk)
4391{
4392 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4393 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4394 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4395 struct common_audit_data ad;
4396 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4397 int err;
4398
4399 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4400 ad.u.net = &net;
4401 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4402
4403 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4404 sksec_other->sclass,
4405 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4406 if (err)
4407 return err;
4408
4409 /* server child socket */
4410 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4411 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4412 &sksec_new->sid);
4413 if (err)
4414 return err;
4415
4416 /* connecting socket */
4417 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4418
4419 return 0;
4420}
4421
4422static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4423 struct socket *other)
4424{
4425 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4426 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4427 struct common_audit_data ad;
4428 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4429
4430 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4431 ad.u.net = &net;
4432 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4433
4434 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4435 &ad);
4436}
4437
4438static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4439 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4440 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4441{
4442 int err;
4443 u32 if_sid;
4444 u32 node_sid;
4445
4446 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4447 if (err)
4448 return err;
4449 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4450 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4451 if (err)
4452 return err;
4453
4454 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4455 if (err)
4456 return err;
4457 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4458 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4459}
4460
4461static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4462 u16 family)
4463{
4464 int err = 0;
4465 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4466 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4467 struct common_audit_data ad;
4468 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4469 char *addrp;
4470
4471 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4472 ad.u.net = &net;
4473 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4474 ad.u.net->family = family;
4475 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4476 if (err)
4477 return err;
4478
4479 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4480 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4481 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4482 if (err)
4483 return err;
4484 }
4485
4486 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4487 if (err)
4488 return err;
4489 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4490
4491 return err;
4492}
4493
4494static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4495{
4496 int err;
4497 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4498 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4499 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4500 struct common_audit_data ad;
4501 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4502 char *addrp;
4503 u8 secmark_active;
4504 u8 peerlbl_active;
4505
4506 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4507 return 0;
4508
4509 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4510 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4511 family = PF_INET;
4512
4513 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4514 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4515 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4516 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4517 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4518 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4519
4520 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4521 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4522 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4523 return 0;
4524
4525 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4526 ad.u.net = &net;
4527 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4528 ad.u.net->family = family;
4529 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4530 if (err)
4531 return err;
4532
4533 if (peerlbl_active) {
4534 u32 peer_sid;
4535
4536 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4537 if (err)
4538 return err;
4539 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4540 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4541 if (err) {
4542 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4543 return err;
4544 }
4545 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4546 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4547 if (err) {
4548 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4549 return err;
4550 }
4551 }
4552
4553 if (secmark_active) {
4554 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4555 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4556 if (err)
4557 return err;
4558 }
4559
4560 return err;
4561}
4562
4563static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4564 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4565{
4566 int err = 0;
4567 char *scontext;
4568 u32 scontext_len;
4569 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4570 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4571
4572 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4573 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4574 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4575 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4576 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4577
4578 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4579 if (err)
4580 return err;
4581
4582 if (scontext_len > len) {
4583 err = -ERANGE;
4584 goto out_len;
4585 }
4586
4587 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4588 err = -EFAULT;
4589
4590out_len:
4591 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4592 err = -EFAULT;
4593 kfree(scontext);
4594 return err;
4595}
4596
4597static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4598{
4599 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4600 u16 family;
4601
4602 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4603 family = PF_INET;
4604 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4605 family = PF_INET6;
4606 else if (sock)
4607 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4608 else
4609 goto out;
4610
4611 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4612 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4613 else if (skb)
4614 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4615
4616out:
4617 *secid = peer_secid;
4618 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4619 return -EINVAL;
4620 return 0;
4621}
4622
4623static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4624{
4625 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4626
4627 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4628 if (!sksec)
4629 return -ENOMEM;
4630
4631 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4632 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4633 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
4634 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4635 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4636
4637 return 0;
4638}
4639
4640static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4641{
4642 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4643
4644 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4645 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4646 kfree(sksec);
4647}
4648
4649static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4650{
4651 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4652 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4653
4654 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4655 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4656 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4657
4658 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4659}
4660
4661static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4662{
4663 if (!sk)
4664 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4665 else {
4666 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4667
4668 *secid = sksec->sid;
4669 }
4670}
4671
4672static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4673{
4674 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
4675 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
4676 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4677
4678 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4679 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4680 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4681 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4682}
4683
4684static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4685 struct request_sock *req)
4686{
4687 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4688 int err;
4689 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4690 u32 connsid;
4691 u32 peersid;
4692
4693 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4694 if (err)
4695 return err;
4696 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4697 if (err)
4698 return err;
4699 req->secid = connsid;
4700 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4701
4702 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4703}
4704
4705static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4706 const struct request_sock *req)
4707{
4708 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4709
4710 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4711 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4712 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4713 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4714 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4715 time it will have been created and available. */
4716
4717 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4718 * thread with access to newsksec */
4719 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4720}
4721
4722static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4723{
4724 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4725 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4726
4727 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4728 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4729 family = PF_INET;
4730
4731 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4732}
4733
4734static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4735{
4736 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4737 u32 tsid;
4738
4739 __tsec = current_security();
4740 tsid = __tsec->sid;
4741
4742 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4743}
4744
4745static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4746{
4747 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4748}
4749
4750static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4751{
4752 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4753}
4754
4755static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4756 struct flowi *fl)
4757{
4758 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4759}
4760
4761static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4762{
4763 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4764
4765 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4766 if (!tunsec)
4767 return -ENOMEM;
4768 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4769
4770 *security = tunsec;
4771 return 0;
4772}
4773
4774static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4775{
4776 kfree(security);
4777}
4778
4779static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4780{
4781 u32 sid = current_sid();
4782
4783 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4784 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4785 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4786 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4787 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4788 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4789
4790 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4791 NULL);
4792}
4793
4794static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4795{
4796 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4797
4798 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4799 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4800}
4801
4802static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4803{
4804 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4805 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4806
4807 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4808 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4809 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4810 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4811 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4812 * protocols were being used */
4813
4814 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4815 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4816
4817 return 0;
4818}
4819
4820static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4821{
4822 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4823 u32 sid = current_sid();
4824 int err;
4825
4826 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4827 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4828 if (err)
4829 return err;
4830 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4831 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4832 if (err)
4833 return err;
4834 tunsec->sid = sid;
4835
4836 return 0;
4837}
4838
4839static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4840{
4841 int err = 0;
4842 u32 perm;
4843 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4844 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4845
4846 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4847 err = -EINVAL;
4848 goto out;
4849 }
4850 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4851
4852 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4853 if (err) {
4854 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4855 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
4856 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
4857 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
4858 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
4859 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
4860 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
4861 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4862 err = 0;
4863 }
4864
4865 /* Ignore */
4866 if (err == -ENOENT)
4867 err = 0;
4868 goto out;
4869 }
4870
4871 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4872out:
4873 return err;
4874}
4875
4876#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4877
4878static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4879 const struct net_device *indev,
4880 u16 family)
4881{
4882 int err;
4883 char *addrp;
4884 u32 peer_sid;
4885 struct common_audit_data ad;
4886 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4887 u8 secmark_active;
4888 u8 netlbl_active;
4889 u8 peerlbl_active;
4890
4891 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4892 return NF_ACCEPT;
4893
4894 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4895 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4896 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4897 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4898 return NF_ACCEPT;
4899
4900 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4901 return NF_DROP;
4902
4903 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4904 ad.u.net = &net;
4905 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4906 ad.u.net->family = family;
4907 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4908 return NF_DROP;
4909
4910 if (peerlbl_active) {
4911 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4912 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4913 if (err) {
4914 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4915 return NF_DROP;
4916 }
4917 }
4918
4919 if (secmark_active)
4920 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4921 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4922 return NF_DROP;
4923
4924 if (netlbl_active)
4925 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4926 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4927 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4928 * protection */
4929 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4930 return NF_DROP;
4931
4932 return NF_ACCEPT;
4933}
4934
4935static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
4936 struct sk_buff *skb,
4937 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4938{
4939 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
4940}
4941
4942#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4943static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
4944 struct sk_buff *skb,
4945 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4946{
4947 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
4948}
4949#endif /* IPV6 */
4950
4951static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4952 u16 family)
4953{
4954 struct sock *sk;
4955 u32 sid;
4956
4957 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4958 return NF_ACCEPT;
4959
4960 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4961 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4962 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4963 sk = skb->sk;
4964 if (sk) {
4965 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4966
4967 if (sk_listener(sk))
4968 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4969 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4970 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4971 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4972 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4973 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4974 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4975 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4976 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4977 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4978 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4979 * best we can do. */
4980 return NF_ACCEPT;
4981
4982 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4983 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4984 sid = sksec->sid;
4985 } else
4986 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4987 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4988 return NF_DROP;
4989
4990 return NF_ACCEPT;
4991}
4992
4993static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
4994 struct sk_buff *skb,
4995 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4996{
4997 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4998}
4999
5000static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5001 int ifindex,
5002 u16 family)
5003{
5004 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5005 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5006 struct common_audit_data ad;
5007 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5008 char *addrp;
5009 u8 proto;
5010
5011 if (sk == NULL)
5012 return NF_ACCEPT;
5013 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5014
5015 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5016 ad.u.net = &net;
5017 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5018 ad.u.net->family = family;
5019 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5020 return NF_DROP;
5021
5022 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5023 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5024 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5025 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5026
5027 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5028 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5029
5030 return NF_ACCEPT;
5031}
5032
5033static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5034 const struct net_device *outdev,
5035 u16 family)
5036{
5037 u32 secmark_perm;
5038 u32 peer_sid;
5039 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5040 struct sock *sk;
5041 struct common_audit_data ad;
5042 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5043 char *addrp;
5044 u8 secmark_active;
5045 u8 peerlbl_active;
5046
5047 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5048 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5049 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5050 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5051 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
5052 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5053
5054 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5055 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5056 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5057 return NF_ACCEPT;
5058
5059 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5060
5061#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5062 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5063 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5064 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5065 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5066 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5067 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5068 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5069 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5070 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5071 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5072 * connection. */
5073 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5074 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5075 return NF_ACCEPT;
5076#endif
5077
5078 if (sk == NULL) {
5079 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5080 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5081 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5082 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5083 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5084 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5085 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5086 return NF_DROP;
5087 } else {
5088 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5089 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5090 }
5091 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5092 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5093 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5094 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5095 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5096 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5097 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5098 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5099 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5100 * for similar problems. */
5101 u32 skb_sid;
5102 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5103
5104 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5105 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5106 return NF_DROP;
5107 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5108 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5109 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5110 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5111 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5112 * pass the packet. */
5113 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5114 switch (family) {
5115 case PF_INET:
5116 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5117 return NF_ACCEPT;
5118 break;
5119 case PF_INET6:
5120 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5121 return NF_ACCEPT;
5122 break;
5123 default:
5124 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5125 }
5126 }
5127 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5128 return NF_DROP;
5129 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5130 } else {
5131 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5132 * associated socket. */
5133 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5134 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5135 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5136 }
5137
5138 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5139 ad.u.net = &net;
5140 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5141 ad.u.net->family = family;
5142 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5143 return NF_DROP;
5144
5145 if (secmark_active)
5146 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5147 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5148 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5149
5150 if (peerlbl_active) {
5151 u32 if_sid;
5152 u32 node_sid;
5153
5154 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5155 return NF_DROP;
5156 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5157 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5158 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5159
5160 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5161 return NF_DROP;
5162 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5163 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5164 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5165 }
5166
5167 return NF_ACCEPT;
5168}
5169
5170static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5171 struct sk_buff *skb,
5172 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5173{
5174 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5175}
5176
5177#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5178static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5179 struct sk_buff *skb,
5180 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5181{
5182 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5183}
5184#endif /* IPV6 */
5185
5186#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5187
5188static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5189{
5190 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5191}
5192
5193static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5194 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5195 u16 sclass)
5196{
5197 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5198 u32 sid;
5199
5200 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5201 if (!isec)
5202 return -ENOMEM;
5203
5204 sid = task_sid(task);
5205 isec->sclass = sclass;
5206 isec->sid = sid;
5207 perm->security = isec;
5208
5209 return 0;
5210}
5211
5212static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5213{
5214 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5215 perm->security = NULL;
5216 kfree(isec);
5217}
5218
5219static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5220{
5221 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5222
5223 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5224 if (!msec)
5225 return -ENOMEM;
5226
5227 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5228 msg->security = msec;
5229
5230 return 0;
5231}
5232
5233static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5234{
5235 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5236
5237 msg->security = NULL;
5238 kfree(msec);
5239}
5240
5241static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5242 u32 perms)
5243{
5244 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5245 struct common_audit_data ad;
5246 u32 sid = current_sid();
5247
5248 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5249
5250 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5251 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5252
5253 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5254}
5255
5256static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5257{
5258 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5259}
5260
5261static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5262{
5263 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5264}
5265
5266/* message queue security operations */
5267static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5268{
5269 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5270 struct common_audit_data ad;
5271 u32 sid = current_sid();
5272 int rc;
5273
5274 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5275 if (rc)
5276 return rc;
5277
5278 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5279
5280 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5281 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5282
5283 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5284 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5285 if (rc) {
5286 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5287 return rc;
5288 }
5289 return 0;
5290}
5291
5292static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5293{
5294 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5295}
5296
5297static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5298{
5299 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5300 struct common_audit_data ad;
5301 u32 sid = current_sid();
5302
5303 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5304
5305 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5306 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5307
5308 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5309 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5310}
5311
5312static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5313{
5314 int err;
5315 int perms;
5316
5317 switch (cmd) {
5318 case IPC_INFO:
5319 case MSG_INFO:
5320 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5321 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5322 case IPC_STAT:
5323 case MSG_STAT:
5324 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5325 break;
5326 case IPC_SET:
5327 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5328 break;
5329 case IPC_RMID:
5330 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5331 break;
5332 default:
5333 return 0;
5334 }
5335
5336 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5337 return err;
5338}
5339
5340static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5341{
5342 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5343 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5344 struct common_audit_data ad;
5345 u32 sid = current_sid();
5346 int rc;
5347
5348 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5349 msec = msg->security;
5350
5351 /*
5352 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5353 */
5354 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5355 /*
5356 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5357 * message queue this message will be stored in
5358 */
5359 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5360 NULL, &msec->sid);
5361 if (rc)
5362 return rc;
5363 }
5364
5365 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5366 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5367
5368 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5369 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5370 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
5371 if (!rc)
5372 /* Can this process send the message */
5373 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5374 MSG__SEND, &ad);
5375 if (!rc)
5376 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5377 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5378 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5379
5380 return rc;
5381}
5382
5383static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5384 struct task_struct *target,
5385 long type, int mode)
5386{
5387 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5388 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5389 struct common_audit_data ad;
5390 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5391 int rc;
5392
5393 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5394 msec = msg->security;
5395
5396 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5397 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5398
5399 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5400 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5401 if (!rc)
5402 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5403 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5404 return rc;
5405}
5406
5407/* Shared Memory security operations */
5408static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5409{
5410 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5411 struct common_audit_data ad;
5412 u32 sid = current_sid();
5413 int rc;
5414
5415 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5416 if (rc)
5417 return rc;
5418
5419 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5420
5421 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5422 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5423
5424 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5425 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5426 if (rc) {
5427 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5428 return rc;
5429 }
5430 return 0;
5431}
5432
5433static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5434{
5435 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5436}
5437
5438static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5439{
5440 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5441 struct common_audit_data ad;
5442 u32 sid = current_sid();
5443
5444 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5445
5446 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5447 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5448
5449 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5450 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5451}
5452
5453/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5454static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5455{
5456 int perms;
5457 int err;
5458
5459 switch (cmd) {
5460 case IPC_INFO:
5461 case SHM_INFO:
5462 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5463 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5464 case IPC_STAT:
5465 case SHM_STAT:
5466 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5467 break;
5468 case IPC_SET:
5469 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5470 break;
5471 case SHM_LOCK:
5472 case SHM_UNLOCK:
5473 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5474 break;
5475 case IPC_RMID:
5476 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5477 break;
5478 default:
5479 return 0;
5480 }
5481
5482 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5483 return err;
5484}
5485
5486static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5487 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5488{
5489 u32 perms;
5490
5491 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5492 perms = SHM__READ;
5493 else
5494 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5495
5496 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5497}
5498
5499/* Semaphore security operations */
5500static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5501{
5502 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5503 struct common_audit_data ad;
5504 u32 sid = current_sid();
5505 int rc;
5506
5507 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5508 if (rc)
5509 return rc;
5510
5511 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5512
5513 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5514 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5515
5516 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5517 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5518 if (rc) {
5519 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5520 return rc;
5521 }
5522 return 0;
5523}
5524
5525static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5526{
5527 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5528}
5529
5530static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5531{
5532 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5533 struct common_audit_data ad;
5534 u32 sid = current_sid();
5535
5536 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5537
5538 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5539 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5540
5541 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5542 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5543}
5544
5545/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5546static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5547{
5548 int err;
5549 u32 perms;
5550
5551 switch (cmd) {
5552 case IPC_INFO:
5553 case SEM_INFO:
5554 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5555 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5556 case GETPID:
5557 case GETNCNT:
5558 case GETZCNT:
5559 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5560 break;
5561 case GETVAL:
5562 case GETALL:
5563 perms = SEM__READ;
5564 break;
5565 case SETVAL:
5566 case SETALL:
5567 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5568 break;
5569 case IPC_RMID:
5570 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5571 break;
5572 case IPC_SET:
5573 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5574 break;
5575 case IPC_STAT:
5576 case SEM_STAT:
5577 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5578 break;
5579 default:
5580 return 0;
5581 }
5582
5583 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5584 return err;
5585}
5586
5587static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5588 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5589{
5590 u32 perms;
5591
5592 if (alter)
5593 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5594 else
5595 perms = SEM__READ;
5596
5597 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5598}
5599
5600static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5601{
5602 u32 av = 0;
5603
5604 av = 0;
5605 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5606 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5607 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5608 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5609
5610 if (av == 0)
5611 return 0;
5612
5613 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5614}
5615
5616static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5617{
5618 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5619 *secid = isec->sid;
5620}
5621
5622static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5623{
5624 if (inode)
5625 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5626}
5627
5628static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5629 char *name, char **value)
5630{
5631 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5632 u32 sid;
5633 int error;
5634 unsigned len;
5635
5636 if (current != p) {
5637 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5638 if (error)
5639 return error;
5640 }
5641
5642 rcu_read_lock();
5643 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5644
5645 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5646 sid = __tsec->sid;
5647 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5648 sid = __tsec->osid;
5649 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5650 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5651 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5652 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5653 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5654 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5655 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5656 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5657 else
5658 goto invalid;
5659 rcu_read_unlock();
5660
5661 if (!sid)
5662 return 0;
5663
5664 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5665 if (error)
5666 return error;
5667 return len;
5668
5669invalid:
5670 rcu_read_unlock();
5671 return -EINVAL;
5672}
5673
5674static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5675 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5676{
5677 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5678 struct task_struct *tracer;
5679 struct cred *new;
5680 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5681 int error;
5682 char *str = value;
5683
5684 if (current != p) {
5685 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5686 security attributes. */
5687 return -EACCES;
5688 }
5689
5690 /*
5691 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5692 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5693 * above restriction is ever removed.
5694 */
5695 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5696 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5697 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5698 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5699 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5700 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5701 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5702 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5703 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5704 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5705 else
5706 error = -EINVAL;
5707 if (error)
5708 return error;
5709
5710 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5711 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5712 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5713 str[size-1] = 0;
5714 size--;
5715 }
5716 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5717 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5718 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5719 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5720 size_t audit_size;
5721
5722 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5723 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5724 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5725 audit_size = size - 1;
5726 else
5727 audit_size = size;
5728 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5729 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5730 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5731 audit_log_end(ab);
5732
5733 return error;
5734 }
5735 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5736 &sid);
5737 }
5738 if (error)
5739 return error;
5740 }
5741
5742 new = prepare_creds();
5743 if (!new)
5744 return -ENOMEM;
5745
5746 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5747 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5748 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5749 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5750 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5751 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5752 tsec = new->security;
5753 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5754 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5755 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5756 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5757 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5758 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5759 if (error)
5760 goto abort_change;
5761 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5762 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5763 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5764 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5765 error = -EINVAL;
5766 if (sid == 0)
5767 goto abort_change;
5768
5769 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5770 error = -EPERM;
5771 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5772 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5773 if (error)
5774 goto abort_change;
5775 }
5776
5777 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5778 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5779 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5780 if (error)
5781 goto abort_change;
5782
5783 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5784 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5785 ptsid = 0;
5786 rcu_read_lock();
5787 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5788 if (tracer)
5789 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5790 rcu_read_unlock();
5791
5792 if (tracer) {
5793 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5794 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5795 if (error)
5796 goto abort_change;
5797 }
5798
5799 tsec->sid = sid;
5800 } else {
5801 error = -EINVAL;
5802 goto abort_change;
5803 }
5804
5805 commit_creds(new);
5806 return size;
5807
5808abort_change:
5809 abort_creds(new);
5810 return error;
5811}
5812
5813static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5814{
5815 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5816}
5817
5818static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5819{
5820 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5821}
5822
5823static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5824{
5825 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5826}
5827
5828static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5829{
5830 kfree(secdata);
5831}
5832
5833static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
5834{
5835 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
5836
5837 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
5838 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
5839 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
5840}
5841
5842/*
5843 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5844 */
5845static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5846{
5847 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5848}
5849
5850/*
5851 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5852 */
5853static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5854{
5855 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5856}
5857
5858static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5859{
5860 int len = 0;
5861 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5862 ctx, true);
5863 if (len < 0)
5864 return len;
5865 *ctxlen = len;
5866 return 0;
5867}
5868#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5869
5870static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5871 unsigned long flags)
5872{
5873 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5874 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5875
5876 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5877 if (!ksec)
5878 return -ENOMEM;
5879
5880 tsec = cred->security;
5881 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5882 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5883 else
5884 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5885
5886 k->security = ksec;
5887 return 0;
5888}
5889
5890static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5891{
5892 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5893
5894 k->security = NULL;
5895 kfree(ksec);
5896}
5897
5898static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5899 const struct cred *cred,
5900 unsigned perm)
5901{
5902 struct key *key;
5903 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5904 u32 sid;
5905
5906 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5907 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5908 appear to be created. */
5909 if (perm == 0)
5910 return 0;
5911
5912 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5913
5914 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5915 ksec = key->security;
5916
5917 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5918}
5919
5920static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5921{
5922 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5923 char *context = NULL;
5924 unsigned len;
5925 int rc;
5926
5927 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5928 if (!rc)
5929 rc = len;
5930 *_buffer = context;
5931 return rc;
5932}
5933
5934#endif
5935
5936static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
5937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
5938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
5939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
5940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
5941
5942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
5943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
5944 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
5945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
5946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
5947 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
5948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
5949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
5950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
5951
5952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
5953
5954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
5955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
5956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
5957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec),
5958
5959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
5960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
5961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
5962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
5963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
5964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
5965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
5966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
5967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
5968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
5969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
5970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
5971
5972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
5973
5974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
5975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
5976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
5977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
5978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
5979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
5980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
5981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
5982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
5983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
5984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
5985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
5986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
5987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
5988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
5989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
5990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
5991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
5992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
5993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
5994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
5995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
5996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
5997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
5998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
5999
6000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
6001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
6002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
6003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
6004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
6005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
6006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
6007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
6008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
6009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
6010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
6011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
6012
6013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
6014
6015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create),
6016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
6017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
6018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
6019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
6020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
6021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
6022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
6023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
6024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
6025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
6026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
6027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
6028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
6029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
6030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
6031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
6032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
6033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
6034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
6035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait),
6036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
6037
6038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
6039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
6040
6041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
6042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
6043
6044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
6045 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
6046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
6047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
6048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
6049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
6050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
6051
6052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
6053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
6054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
6055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
6056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
6057
6058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
6059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
6060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
6061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
6062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
6063
6064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
6065
6066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
6067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
6068
6069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
6070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
6071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
6072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
6073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
6074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
6075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
6076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
6077
6078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
6079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
6080
6081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
6082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
6083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
6084 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
6085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
6086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
6087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
6088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
6089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
6090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
6091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
6092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
6093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
6094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
6095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
6096 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
6097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
6098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
6099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
6100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
6101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
6102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
6103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
6104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
6105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
6106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
6107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
6108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
6109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
6110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
6111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
6112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
6113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
6114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
6115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
6116
6117#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
6119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
6120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
6121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
6122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
6123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
6124 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
6125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
6126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
6127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
6128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
6129 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
6130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
6131#endif
6132
6133#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
6135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
6136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
6137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
6138#endif
6139
6140#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
6141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
6142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
6143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
6144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
6145#endif
6146};
6147
6148static __init int selinux_init(void)
6149{
6150 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6151 selinux_enabled = 0;
6152 return 0;
6153 }
6154
6155 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6156 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6157 return 0;
6158 }
6159
6160 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6161
6162 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6163 cred_init_security();
6164
6165 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6166
6167 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6168 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6169 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6170 file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
6171 sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6172 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6173 avc_init();
6174
6175 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6176
6177 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6178 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6179
6180 if (selinux_enforcing)
6181 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6182 else
6183 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6184
6185 return 0;
6186}
6187
6188static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6189{
6190 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6191}
6192
6193void selinux_complete_init(void)
6194{
6195 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6196
6197 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6198 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6199 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6200}
6201
6202/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6203 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6204security_initcall(selinux_init);
6205
6206#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6207
6208static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6209 {
6210 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6211 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6212 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6213 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6214 },
6215 {
6216 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6217 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6218 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6219 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6220 },
6221 {
6222 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6223 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6224 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6225 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6226 },
6227#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6228 {
6229 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6230 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
6231 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6232 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6233 },
6234 {
6235 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6236 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
6237 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6238 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6239 },
6240#endif /* IPV6 */
6241};
6242
6243static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6244{
6245 int err;
6246
6247 if (!selinux_enabled)
6248 return 0;
6249
6250 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6251
6252 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6253 if (err)
6254 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6255
6256 return 0;
6257}
6258
6259__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6260
6261#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6262static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6263{
6264 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6265
6266 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6267}
6268#endif
6269
6270#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6271
6272#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6273#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6274#endif
6275
6276#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6277
6278#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6279static int selinux_disabled;
6280
6281int selinux_disable(void)
6282{
6283 if (ss_initialized) {
6284 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6285 return -EINVAL;
6286 }
6287
6288 if (selinux_disabled) {
6289 /* Only do this once. */
6290 return -EINVAL;
6291 }
6292
6293 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6294
6295 selinux_disabled = 1;
6296 selinux_enabled = 0;
6297
6298 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6299
6300 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6301 avc_disable();
6302
6303 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6304 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6305
6306 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
6307 exit_sel_fs();
6308
6309 return 0;
6310}
6311#endif
1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26#include <linux/init.h>
27#include <linux/kd.h>
28#include <linux/kernel.h>
29#include <linux/tracehook.h>
30#include <linux/errno.h>
31#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
32#include <linux/sched.h>
33#include <linux/security.h>
34#include <linux/xattr.h>
35#include <linux/capability.h>
36#include <linux/unistd.h>
37#include <linux/mm.h>
38#include <linux/mman.h>
39#include <linux/slab.h>
40#include <linux/pagemap.h>
41#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
42#include <linux/swap.h>
43#include <linux/spinlock.h>
44#include <linux/syscalls.h>
45#include <linux/dcache.h>
46#include <linux/file.h>
47#include <linux/fdtable.h>
48#include <linux/namei.h>
49#include <linux/mount.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/net_namespace.h>
57#include <net/netlabel.h>
58#include <linux/uaccess.h>
59#include <asm/ioctls.h>
60#include <linux/atomic.h>
61#include <linux/bitops.h>
62#include <linux/interrupt.h>
63#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64#include <linux/netlink.h>
65#include <linux/tcp.h>
66#include <linux/udp.h>
67#include <linux/dccp.h>
68#include <linux/quota.h>
69#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71#include <linux/parser.h>
72#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73#include <net/ipv6.h>
74#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75#include <linux/personality.h>
76#include <linux/audit.h>
77#include <linux/string.h>
78#include <linux/selinux.h>
79#include <linux/mutex.h>
80#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81#include <linux/syslog.h>
82#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83
84#include "avc.h"
85#include "objsec.h"
86#include "netif.h"
87#include "netnode.h"
88#include "netport.h"
89#include "xfrm.h"
90#include "netlabel.h"
91#include "audit.h"
92
93#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94
95extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
97
98/* SECMARK reference count */
99atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
101#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102int selinux_enforcing;
103
104static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105{
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
109 return 1;
110}
111__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
112#endif
113
114#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116
117static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118{
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
122 return 1;
123}
124__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125#else
126int selinux_enabled = 1;
127#endif
128
129static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
130
131/**
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
133 *
134 * Description:
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
139 *
140 */
141static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
142{
143 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
144}
145
146/*
147 * initialise the security for the init task
148 */
149static void cred_init_security(void)
150{
151 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
152 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
153
154 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
155 if (!tsec)
156 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
157
158 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
159 cred->security = tsec;
160}
161
162/*
163 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
164 */
165static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
166{
167 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
168
169 tsec = cred->security;
170 return tsec->sid;
171}
172
173/*
174 * get the objective security ID of a task
175 */
176static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
177{
178 u32 sid;
179
180 rcu_read_lock();
181 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
182 rcu_read_unlock();
183 return sid;
184}
185
186/*
187 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
188 */
189static inline u32 current_sid(void)
190{
191 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
192
193 return tsec->sid;
194}
195
196/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
197
198static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
199{
200 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
201 u32 sid = current_sid();
202
203 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
204 if (!isec)
205 return -ENOMEM;
206
207 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
208 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
209 isec->inode = inode;
210 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
211 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
212 isec->task_sid = sid;
213 inode->i_security = isec;
214
215 return 0;
216}
217
218static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
219{
220 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
222
223 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
224 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
225 list_del_init(&isec->list);
226 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
227
228 inode->i_security = NULL;
229 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
230}
231
232static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
233{
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
235 u32 sid = current_sid();
236
237 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
238 if (!fsec)
239 return -ENOMEM;
240
241 fsec->sid = sid;
242 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
243 file->f_security = fsec;
244
245 return 0;
246}
247
248static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
249{
250 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
251 file->f_security = NULL;
252 kfree(fsec);
253}
254
255static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
256{
257 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
258
259 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
260 if (!sbsec)
261 return -ENOMEM;
262
263 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
264 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
265 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
266 sbsec->sb = sb;
267 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
268 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
269 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sb->s_security = sbsec;
271
272 return 0;
273}
274
275static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
276{
277 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
278 sb->s_security = NULL;
279 kfree(sbsec);
280}
281
282/* The security server must be initialized before
283 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
284extern int ss_initialized;
285
286/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
287
288static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
289 "uses xattr",
290 "uses transition SIDs",
291 "uses task SIDs",
292 "uses genfs_contexts",
293 "not configured for labeling",
294 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295};
296
297static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
298
299static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
300{
301 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
302}
303
304enum {
305 Opt_error = -1,
306 Opt_context = 1,
307 Opt_fscontext = 2,
308 Opt_defcontext = 3,
309 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
310 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311};
312
313static const match_table_t tokens = {
314 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
317 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
318 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
319 {Opt_error, NULL},
320};
321
322#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
323
324static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
325 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
326 const struct cred *cred)
327{
328 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 int rc;
330
331 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
332 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
333 if (rc)
334 return rc;
335
336 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
337 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
338 return rc;
339}
340
341static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
342 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
343 const struct cred *cred)
344{
345 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
346 int rc;
347 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 if (rc)
350 return rc;
351
352 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
353 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
354 return rc;
355}
356
357static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
358{
359 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
360 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
361 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 int rc = 0;
363
364 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
365 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
366 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
367 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
368 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
369 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
370 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
371 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
372 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
373 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
374 goto out;
375 }
376 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
377 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
378 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
379 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
380 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
381 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
382 else
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
384 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
385 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
386 goto out;
387 }
388 }
389
390 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
391
392 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
393 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 else
396 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
397 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
398 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
399
400 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
401 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
402 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
403 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
405
406 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
407 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
408 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
409
410 /* Initialize the root inode. */
411 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
412
413 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
414 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
415 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
416 populates itself. */
417 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
418next_inode:
419 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
420 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
421 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
422 struct inode_security_struct, list);
423 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
424 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
425 inode = igrab(inode);
426 if (inode) {
427 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
428 inode_doinit(inode);
429 iput(inode);
430 }
431 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
432 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 goto next_inode;
434 }
435 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
436out:
437 return rc;
438}
439
440/*
441 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
442 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
443 * mount options, or whatever.
444 */
445static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
446 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447{
448 int rc = 0, i;
449 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
450 char *context = NULL;
451 u32 len;
452 char tmp;
453
454 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
455
456 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
457 return -EINVAL;
458
459 if (!ss_initialized)
460 return -EINVAL;
461
462 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
463 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
464 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
465 if (tmp & 0x01)
466 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 tmp >>= 1;
468 }
469 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
470 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
472
473 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
474 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
475 rc = -ENOMEM;
476 goto out_free;
477 }
478
479 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
480 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
481 rc = -ENOMEM;
482 goto out_free;
483 }
484
485 i = 0;
486 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
487 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 if (rc)
489 goto out_free;
490 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
491 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
492 }
493 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
494 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 if (rc)
496 goto out_free;
497 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
498 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
499 }
500 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
501 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 if (rc)
503 goto out_free;
504 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
505 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
506 }
507 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
508 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
509 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
510
511 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 if (rc)
513 goto out_free;
514 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
515 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
516 }
517 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
518 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
519 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 }
521
522 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
523
524 return 0;
525
526out_free:
527 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
528 return rc;
529}
530
531static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
532 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533{
534 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
535
536 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
537 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
538 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
539 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 return 1;
541
542 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
543 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
544 */
545 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
546 if (mnt_flags & flag)
547 return 1;
548 return 0;
549}
550
551/*
552 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
553 * labeling information.
554 */
555static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
556 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
557{
558 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
559 int rc = 0, i;
560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
561 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
562 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
563 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
564 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
565 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
566 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
567 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
568 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
569
570 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
571
572 if (!ss_initialized) {
573 if (!num_opts) {
574 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
575 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
576 server is ready to handle calls. */
577 goto out;
578 }
579 rc = -EINVAL;
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
582 goto out;
583 }
584
585 /*
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
590 *
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
595 */
596 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
597 && (num_opts == 0))
598 goto out;
599
600 /*
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
604 */
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 u32 sid;
607
608 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
609 continue;
610 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
611 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
612 if (rc) {
613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
614 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
615 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
616 goto out;
617 }
618 switch (flags[i]) {
619 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
620 fscontext_sid = sid;
621
622 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
623 fscontext_sid))
624 goto out_double_mount;
625
626 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
627 break;
628 case CONTEXT_MNT:
629 context_sid = sid;
630
631 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
632 context_sid))
633 goto out_double_mount;
634
635 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
636 break;
637 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
638 rootcontext_sid = sid;
639
640 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
641 rootcontext_sid))
642 goto out_double_mount;
643
644 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645
646 break;
647 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
648 defcontext_sid = sid;
649
650 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
651 defcontext_sid))
652 goto out_double_mount;
653
654 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
655
656 break;
657 default:
658 rc = -EINVAL;
659 goto out;
660 }
661 }
662
663 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
664 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
665 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
666 goto out_double_mount;
667 rc = 0;
668 goto out;
669 }
670
671 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
673
674 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
675 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
676 if (rc) {
677 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
678 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 goto out;
680 }
681
682 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 if (fscontext_sid) {
684 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
685 if (rc)
686 goto out;
687
688 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
689 }
690
691 /*
692 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
693 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
694 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 */
696 if (context_sid) {
697 if (!fscontext_sid) {
698 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
699 cred);
700 if (rc)
701 goto out;
702 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
703 } else {
704 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
705 cred);
706 if (rc)
707 goto out;
708 }
709 if (!rootcontext_sid)
710 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
711
712 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
713 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 }
715
716 if (rootcontext_sid) {
717 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
718 cred);
719 if (rc)
720 goto out;
721
722 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
723 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 }
725
726 if (defcontext_sid) {
727 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
728 rc = -EINVAL;
729 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
730 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
731 goto out;
732 }
733
734 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
735 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
736 sbsec, cred);
737 if (rc)
738 goto out;
739 }
740
741 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 }
743
744 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
745out:
746 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
747 return rc;
748out_double_mount:
749 rc = -EINVAL;
750 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
751 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
752 goto out;
753}
754
755static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
756 struct super_block *newsb)
757{
758 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
759 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
760
761 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
762 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
763 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764
765 /*
766 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
767 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
768 */
769 if (!ss_initialized)
770 return;
771
772 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
773 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
774
775 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
776 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 return;
778
779 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
780
781 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
782
783 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
784 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
785 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786
787 if (set_context) {
788 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
789
790 if (!set_fscontext)
791 newsbsec->sid = sid;
792 if (!set_rootcontext) {
793 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
794 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newisec->sid = sid;
796 }
797 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
798 }
799 if (set_rootcontext) {
800 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
802 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
804
805 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 }
807
808 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
809 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810}
811
812static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
813 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814{
815 char *p;
816 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
817 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
818 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
819
820 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
821
822 /* Standard string-based options. */
823 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
824 int token;
825 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
826
827 if (!*p)
828 continue;
829
830 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
831
832 switch (token) {
833 case Opt_context:
834 if (context || defcontext) {
835 rc = -EINVAL;
836 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 goto out_err;
838 }
839 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
840 if (!context) {
841 rc = -ENOMEM;
842 goto out_err;
843 }
844 break;
845
846 case Opt_fscontext:
847 if (fscontext) {
848 rc = -EINVAL;
849 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 goto out_err;
851 }
852 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
853 if (!fscontext) {
854 rc = -ENOMEM;
855 goto out_err;
856 }
857 break;
858
859 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 if (rootcontext) {
861 rc = -EINVAL;
862 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 goto out_err;
864 }
865 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
866 if (!rootcontext) {
867 rc = -ENOMEM;
868 goto out_err;
869 }
870 break;
871
872 case Opt_defcontext:
873 if (context || defcontext) {
874 rc = -EINVAL;
875 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 goto out_err;
877 }
878 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
879 if (!defcontext) {
880 rc = -ENOMEM;
881 goto out_err;
882 }
883 break;
884 case Opt_labelsupport:
885 break;
886 default:
887 rc = -EINVAL;
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
889 goto out_err;
890
891 }
892 }
893
894 rc = -ENOMEM;
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
896 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
897 goto out_err;
898
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
902 goto out_err;
903 }
904
905 if (fscontext) {
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 }
909 if (context) {
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 }
913 if (rootcontext) {
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 }
917 if (defcontext) {
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 }
921
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
923 return 0;
924
925out_err:
926 kfree(context);
927 kfree(defcontext);
928 kfree(fscontext);
929 kfree(rootcontext);
930 return rc;
931}
932/*
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
934 */
935static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936{
937 int rc = 0;
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
940
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
942
943 if (!data)
944 goto out;
945
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
947
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
949 if (rc)
950 goto out_err;
951
952out:
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954
955out_err:
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
957 return rc;
958}
959
960static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
961 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
962{
963 int i;
964 char *prefix;
965
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 char *has_comma;
968
969 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
970 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
971 else
972 has_comma = NULL;
973
974 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
975 case CONTEXT_MNT:
976 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 break;
978 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
980 break;
981 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
982 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 break;
984 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
985 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
986 break;
987 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
988 seq_putc(m, ',');
989 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
990 continue;
991 default:
992 BUG();
993 return;
994 };
995 /* we need a comma before each option */
996 seq_putc(m, ',');
997 seq_puts(m, prefix);
998 if (has_comma)
999 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1000 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1001 if (has_comma)
1002 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1003 }
1004}
1005
1006static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1007{
1008 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 int rc;
1010
1011 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1012 if (rc) {
1013 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1014 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1015 rc = 0;
1016 return rc;
1017 }
1018
1019 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1020
1021 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1022
1023 return rc;
1024}
1025
1026static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1027{
1028 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1029 case S_IFSOCK:
1030 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1031 case S_IFLNK:
1032 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1033 case S_IFREG:
1034 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1035 case S_IFBLK:
1036 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1037 case S_IFDIR:
1038 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1039 case S_IFCHR:
1040 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1041 case S_IFIFO:
1042 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1043
1044 }
1045
1046 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047}
1048
1049static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1050{
1051 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052}
1053
1054static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1055{
1056 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057}
1058
1059static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1060{
1061 switch (family) {
1062 case PF_UNIX:
1063 switch (type) {
1064 case SOCK_STREAM:
1065 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1067 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1068 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1069 }
1070 break;
1071 case PF_INET:
1072 case PF_INET6:
1073 switch (type) {
1074 case SOCK_STREAM:
1075 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1076 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1077 else
1078 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1079 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1080 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1081 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1082 else
1083 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1084 case SOCK_DCCP:
1085 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1086 default:
1087 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1088 }
1089 break;
1090 case PF_NETLINK:
1091 switch (protocol) {
1092 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1102 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1110 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1112 default:
1113 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 }
1115 case PF_PACKET:
1116 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1117 case PF_KEY:
1118 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1119 case PF_APPLETALK:
1120 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 }
1122
1123 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124}
1125
1126#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1127static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1128 u16 tclass,
1129 u32 *sid)
1130{
1131 int rc;
1132 char *buffer, *path;
1133
1134 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1135 if (!buffer)
1136 return -ENOMEM;
1137
1138 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1139 if (IS_ERR(path))
1140 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1141 else {
1142 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1143 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1144 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1145 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1146 path[1] = '/';
1147 path++;
1148 }
1149 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1150 }
1151 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1152 return rc;
1153}
1154#else
1155static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1156 u16 tclass,
1157 u32 *sid)
1158{
1159 return -EINVAL;
1160}
1161#endif
1162
1163/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1164static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1165{
1166 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1168 u32 sid;
1169 struct dentry *dentry;
1170#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1171 char *context = NULL;
1172 unsigned len = 0;
1173 int rc = 0;
1174
1175 if (isec->initialized)
1176 goto out;
1177
1178 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1179 if (isec->initialized)
1180 goto out_unlock;
1181
1182 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1183 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1184 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1185 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1186 server is ready to handle calls. */
1187 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1189 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1190 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1191 goto out_unlock;
1192 }
1193
1194 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1195 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1196 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1197 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1198 break;
1199 }
1200
1201 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1202 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1203 if (opt_dentry) {
1204 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1205 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1206 } else {
1207 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1208 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1209 }
1210 if (!dentry) {
1211 /*
1212 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1213 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1214 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1215 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1216 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1217 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1218 * be used again by userspace.
1219 */
1220 goto out_unlock;
1221 }
1222
1223 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1224 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1225 if (!context) {
1226 rc = -ENOMEM;
1227 dput(dentry);
1228 goto out_unlock;
1229 }
1230 context[len] = '\0';
1231 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1232 context, len);
1233 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 kfree(context);
1235
1236 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1237 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1238 NULL, 0);
1239 if (rc < 0) {
1240 dput(dentry);
1241 goto out_unlock;
1242 }
1243 len = rc;
1244 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1245 if (!context) {
1246 rc = -ENOMEM;
1247 dput(dentry);
1248 goto out_unlock;
1249 }
1250 context[len] = '\0';
1251 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1252 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1253 context, len);
1254 }
1255 dput(dentry);
1256 if (rc < 0) {
1257 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1258 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1259 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1260 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1261 kfree(context);
1262 goto out_unlock;
1263 }
1264 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1265 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = 0;
1267 } else {
1268 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1269 sbsec->def_sid,
1270 GFP_NOFS);
1271 if (rc) {
1272 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1273 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1274
1275 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1276 if (printk_ratelimit())
1277 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1278 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1279 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1280 } else {
1281 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1282 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1283 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 }
1285 kfree(context);
1286 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1287 rc = 0;
1288 break;
1289 }
1290 }
1291 kfree(context);
1292 isec->sid = sid;
1293 break;
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1295 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1296 break;
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1298 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1299 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1300
1301 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1302 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1303 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1304 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1305 if (rc)
1306 goto out_unlock;
1307 isec->sid = sid;
1308 break;
1309 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1310 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 break;
1312 default:
1313 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1314 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1315
1316 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1317 if (opt_dentry) {
1318 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1319 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1320 isec->sclass,
1321 &sid);
1322 if (rc)
1323 goto out_unlock;
1324 isec->sid = sid;
1325 }
1326 }
1327 break;
1328 }
1329
1330 isec->initialized = 1;
1331
1332out_unlock:
1333 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1334out:
1335 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1336 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1337 return rc;
1338}
1339
1340/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1341static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1342{
1343 u32 perm = 0;
1344
1345 switch (sig) {
1346 case SIGCHLD:
1347 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1348 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 break;
1350 case SIGKILL:
1351 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1352 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 break;
1354 case SIGSTOP:
1355 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1356 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 break;
1358 default:
1359 /* All other signals. */
1360 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1361 break;
1362 }
1363
1364 return perm;
1365}
1366
1367/*
1368 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1369 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1370 */
1371static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1372 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 perms)
1374{
1375 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1376
1377 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1378}
1379
1380/*
1381 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1382 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1383 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1384 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1385 */
1386static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1387 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 u32 perms)
1389{
1390 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1391 u32 sid1, sid2;
1392
1393 rcu_read_lock();
1394 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1395 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1396 rcu_read_unlock();
1397 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1398}
1399
1400/*
1401 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1402 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1403 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1404 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1405 */
1406static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1407 u32 perms)
1408{
1409 u32 sid, tsid;
1410
1411 sid = current_sid();
1412 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1413 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414}
1415
1416#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1417#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418#endif
1419
1420/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1421static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1422 const struct cred *cred,
1423 int cap, int audit)
1424{
1425 struct common_audit_data ad;
1426 struct av_decision avd;
1427 u16 sclass;
1428 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1429 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1430 int rc;
1431
1432 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1433 ad.tsk = tsk;
1434 ad.u.cap = cap;
1435
1436 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1437 case 0:
1438 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1439 break;
1440 case 1:
1441 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1442 break;
1443 default:
1444 printk(KERN_ERR
1445 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1446 BUG();
1447 return -EINVAL;
1448 }
1449
1450 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1451 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1452 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1453 if (rc2)
1454 return rc2;
1455 }
1456 return rc;
1457}
1458
1459/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1460static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 u32 perms)
1462{
1463 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1464
1465 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1466 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1467}
1468
1469/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1470 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1471 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1472static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1473 struct inode *inode,
1474 u32 perms,
1475 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1476 unsigned flags)
1477{
1478 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1479 u32 sid;
1480
1481 validate_creds(cred);
1482
1483 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1484 return 0;
1485
1486 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1487 isec = inode->i_security;
1488
1489 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1490}
1491
1492static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
1493 struct inode *inode,
1494 u32 perms,
1495 unsigned flags)
1496{
1497 struct common_audit_data ad;
1498
1499 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
1500 ad.u.inode = inode;
1501 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
1502}
1503
1504/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1505 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1506 pathname if needed. */
1507static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1508 struct dentry *dentry,
1509 u32 av)
1510{
1511 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1512 struct common_audit_data ad;
1513
1514 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1515 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1516 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1517}
1518
1519/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1520 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1521 pathname if needed. */
1522static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1523 struct path *path,
1524 u32 av)
1525{
1526 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1527 struct common_audit_data ad;
1528
1529 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1530 ad.u.path = *path;
1531 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1532}
1533
1534/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1535 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1536 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1537 check a particular permission to the file.
1538 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1539 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1540 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1541 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1542static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1543 struct file *file,
1544 u32 av)
1545{
1546 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1547 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1548 struct common_audit_data ad;
1549 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1550 int rc;
1551
1552 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1553 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1554
1555 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1556 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1557 SECCLASS_FD,
1558 FD__USE,
1559 &ad);
1560 if (rc)
1561 goto out;
1562 }
1563
1564 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1565 rc = 0;
1566 if (av)
1567 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1568
1569out:
1570 return rc;
1571}
1572
1573/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1574static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1575 struct dentry *dentry,
1576 u16 tclass)
1577{
1578 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1579 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1580 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1581 u32 sid, newsid;
1582 struct common_audit_data ad;
1583 int rc;
1584
1585 dsec = dir->i_security;
1586 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1587
1588 sid = tsec->sid;
1589 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1590
1591 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1592 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1593
1594 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1595 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1596 &ad);
1597 if (rc)
1598 return rc;
1599
1600 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1601 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1602 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1603 if (rc)
1604 return rc;
1605 }
1606
1607 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1608 if (rc)
1609 return rc;
1610
1611 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1612 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1613 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1614}
1615
1616/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1617static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1618 struct task_struct *ctx)
1619{
1620 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1621
1622 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1623}
1624
1625#define MAY_LINK 0
1626#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1627#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1628
1629/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1630static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1631 struct dentry *dentry,
1632 int kind)
1633
1634{
1635 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1636 struct common_audit_data ad;
1637 u32 sid = current_sid();
1638 u32 av;
1639 int rc;
1640
1641 dsec = dir->i_security;
1642 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1643
1644 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1645 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1646
1647 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1648 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1649 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1650 if (rc)
1651 return rc;
1652
1653 switch (kind) {
1654 case MAY_LINK:
1655 av = FILE__LINK;
1656 break;
1657 case MAY_UNLINK:
1658 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1659 break;
1660 case MAY_RMDIR:
1661 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1662 break;
1663 default:
1664 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1665 __func__, kind);
1666 return 0;
1667 }
1668
1669 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1670 return rc;
1671}
1672
1673static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1674 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1675 struct inode *new_dir,
1676 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1677{
1678 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1679 struct common_audit_data ad;
1680 u32 sid = current_sid();
1681 u32 av;
1682 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1683 int rc;
1684
1685 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1686 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1687 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1688 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1689
1690 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1691
1692 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1693 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1694 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1695 if (rc)
1696 return rc;
1697 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1698 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1699 if (rc)
1700 return rc;
1701 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1702 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1703 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1704 if (rc)
1705 return rc;
1706 }
1707
1708 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1709 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1710 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1711 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1713 if (rc)
1714 return rc;
1715 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1716 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1717 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1718 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1719 new_isec->sclass,
1720 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1721 if (rc)
1722 return rc;
1723 }
1724
1725 return 0;
1726}
1727
1728/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1729static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1730 struct super_block *sb,
1731 u32 perms,
1732 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1733{
1734 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1735 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1736
1737 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1738 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1739}
1740
1741/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1742static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1743{
1744 u32 av = 0;
1745
1746 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1747 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1748 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1749 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1750 av |= FILE__READ;
1751
1752 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1753 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1754 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1755 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1756
1757 } else {
1758 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1759 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1760 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1761 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1762 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1763 av |= DIR__READ;
1764 }
1765
1766 return av;
1767}
1768
1769/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1770static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1771{
1772 u32 av = 0;
1773
1774 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1775 av |= FILE__READ;
1776 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1777 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1778 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1779 else
1780 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1781 }
1782 if (!av) {
1783 /*
1784 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1785 */
1786 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1787 }
1788
1789 return av;
1790}
1791
1792/*
1793 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1794 * open permission.
1795 */
1796static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1797{
1798 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1799
1800 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1801 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1802
1803 return av;
1804}
1805
1806/* Hook functions begin here. */
1807
1808static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1809 unsigned int mode)
1810{
1811 int rc;
1812
1813 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1814 if (rc)
1815 return rc;
1816
1817 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1818 u32 sid = current_sid();
1819 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1820 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1821 }
1822
1823 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1824}
1825
1826static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1827{
1828 int rc;
1829
1830 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1831 if (rc)
1832 return rc;
1833
1834 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1835}
1836
1837static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1838 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1839{
1840 int error;
1841
1842 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1843 if (error)
1844 return error;
1845
1846 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1847}
1848
1849static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1850 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1851 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1852 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1853{
1854 int error;
1855
1856 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1857 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1858 if (error)
1859 return error;
1860
1861 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1862}
1863
1864/*
1865 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1866 * which was removed).
1867 *
1868 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1869 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1870 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1871 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1872 */
1873
1874static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1875 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
1876{
1877 int rc;
1878
1879 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
1880 if (rc)
1881 return rc;
1882
1883 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1884}
1885
1886static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1887{
1888 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1889 int rc = 0;
1890
1891 if (!sb)
1892 return 0;
1893
1894 switch (cmds) {
1895 case Q_SYNC:
1896 case Q_QUOTAON:
1897 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1898 case Q_SETINFO:
1899 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1900 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1901 break;
1902 case Q_GETFMT:
1903 case Q_GETINFO:
1904 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1905 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1906 break;
1907 default:
1908 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1909 break;
1910 }
1911 return rc;
1912}
1913
1914static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1915{
1916 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1917
1918 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1919}
1920
1921static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1922{
1923 int rc;
1924
1925 switch (type) {
1926 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1927 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1928 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1929 break;
1930 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1931 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1932 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1933 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1934 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1935 break;
1936 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1937 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1938 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1939 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1940 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1941 default:
1942 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1943 break;
1944 }
1945 return rc;
1946}
1947
1948/*
1949 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1950 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1951 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1952 *
1953 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1954 * processes that allocate mappings.
1955 */
1956static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1957{
1958 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1959
1960 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
1961 &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1962 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1963 if (rc == 0)
1964 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1965
1966 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1967}
1968
1969/* binprm security operations */
1970
1971static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1972{
1973 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1974 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1975 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1976 struct common_audit_data ad;
1977 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1978 int rc;
1979
1980 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1981 if (rc)
1982 return rc;
1983
1984 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1985 * the script interpreter */
1986 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1987 return 0;
1988
1989 old_tsec = current_security();
1990 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1991 isec = inode->i_security;
1992
1993 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1994 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1995 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1996
1997 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1998 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1999 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2000 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2001
2002 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2003 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2004 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2005 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2006 } else {
2007 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2008 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2009 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2010 &new_tsec->sid);
2011 if (rc)
2012 return rc;
2013 }
2014
2015 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
2016 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2017
2018 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2019 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2020
2021 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2022 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2023 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2024 if (rc)
2025 return rc;
2026 } else {
2027 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2028 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2029 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2030 if (rc)
2031 return rc;
2032
2033 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2034 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2035 if (rc)
2036 return rc;
2037
2038 /* Check for shared state */
2039 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2040 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2041 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2042 NULL);
2043 if (rc)
2044 return -EPERM;
2045 }
2046
2047 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2048 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2049 if (bprm->unsafe &
2050 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2051 struct task_struct *tracer;
2052 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2053 u32 ptsid = 0;
2054
2055 rcu_read_lock();
2056 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2057 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2058 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2059 ptsid = sec->sid;
2060 }
2061 rcu_read_unlock();
2062
2063 if (ptsid != 0) {
2064 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2065 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2066 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2067 if (rc)
2068 return -EPERM;
2069 }
2070 }
2071
2072 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2073 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2074 }
2075
2076 return 0;
2077}
2078
2079static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080{
2081 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2082 u32 sid, osid;
2083 int atsecure = 0;
2084
2085 sid = tsec->sid;
2086 osid = tsec->osid;
2087
2088 if (osid != sid) {
2089 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2090 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2091 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2092 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2093 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2094 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2095 }
2096
2097 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2098}
2099
2100extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2101extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2102
2103/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2104static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2105 struct files_struct *files)
2106{
2107 struct common_audit_data ad;
2108 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2109 struct tty_struct *tty;
2110 struct fdtable *fdt;
2111 long j = -1;
2112 int drop_tty = 0;
2113
2114 tty = get_current_tty();
2115 if (tty) {
2116 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2117 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2118 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2119 struct inode *inode;
2120
2121 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2122 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2123 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2124 file may belong to another process and we are only
2125 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2126 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2127 struct tty_file_private, list);
2128 file = file_priv->file;
2129 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2130 if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
2131 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
2132 drop_tty = 1;
2133 }
2134 }
2135 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2136 tty_kref_put(tty);
2137 }
2138 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2139 if (drop_tty)
2140 no_tty();
2141
2142 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2143
2144 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2145
2146 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2147 for (;;) {
2148 unsigned long set, i;
2149 int fd;
2150
2151 j++;
2152 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2153 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2154 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2155 break;
2156 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2157 if (!set)
2158 continue;
2159 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2160 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2161 if (set & 1) {
2162 file = fget(i);
2163 if (!file)
2164 continue;
2165 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2166 file,
2167 file_to_av(file))) {
2168 sys_close(i);
2169 fd = get_unused_fd();
2170 if (fd != i) {
2171 if (fd >= 0)
2172 put_unused_fd(fd);
2173 fput(file);
2174 continue;
2175 }
2176 if (devnull) {
2177 get_file(devnull);
2178 } else {
2179 devnull = dentry_open(
2180 dget(selinux_null),
2181 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2182 O_RDWR, cred);
2183 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2184 devnull = NULL;
2185 put_unused_fd(fd);
2186 fput(file);
2187 continue;
2188 }
2189 }
2190 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2191 }
2192 fput(file);
2193 }
2194 }
2195 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2196
2197 }
2198 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2199}
2200
2201/*
2202 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2203 */
2204static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2205{
2206 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2207 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2208 int rc, i;
2209
2210 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2211 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2212 return;
2213
2214 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2215 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2216
2217 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2218 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2219
2220 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2221 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2222 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2223 *
2224 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2225 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2226 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2227 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2228 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2229 */
2230 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2231 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2232 if (rc) {
2233 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2234 task_lock(current);
2235 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2236 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2237 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2238 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2239 }
2240 task_unlock(current);
2241 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2242 }
2243}
2244
2245/*
2246 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2247 * due to exec
2248 */
2249static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2250{
2251 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2252 struct itimerval itimer;
2253 u32 osid, sid;
2254 int rc, i;
2255
2256 osid = tsec->osid;
2257 sid = tsec->sid;
2258
2259 if (sid == osid)
2260 return;
2261
2262 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2263 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2264 * flush and unblock signals.
2265 *
2266 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2267 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2268 */
2269 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2270 if (rc) {
2271 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2272 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2273 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2274 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2275 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2276 __flush_signals(current);
2277 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2278 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2279 }
2280 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2281 }
2282
2283 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2284 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2285 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2286 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2287 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2288}
2289
2290/* superblock security operations */
2291
2292static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2293{
2294 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2295}
2296
2297static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2298{
2299 superblock_free_security(sb);
2300}
2301
2302static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2303{
2304 if (plen > olen)
2305 return 0;
2306
2307 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2308}
2309
2310static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2311{
2312 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2313 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2314 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2315 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2316 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2317}
2318
2319static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2320{
2321 if (!*first) {
2322 **to = ',';
2323 *to += 1;
2324 } else
2325 *first = 0;
2326 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2327 *to += len;
2328}
2329
2330static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2331 int len)
2332{
2333 int current_size = 0;
2334
2335 if (!*first) {
2336 **to = '|';
2337 *to += 1;
2338 } else
2339 *first = 0;
2340
2341 while (current_size < len) {
2342 if (*from != '"') {
2343 **to = *from;
2344 *to += 1;
2345 }
2346 from += 1;
2347 current_size += 1;
2348 }
2349}
2350
2351static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2352{
2353 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2354 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2355 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2356 int open_quote = 0;
2357
2358 in_curr = orig;
2359 sec_curr = copy;
2360
2361 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2362 if (!nosec) {
2363 rc = -ENOMEM;
2364 goto out;
2365 }
2366
2367 nosec_save = nosec;
2368 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2369 in_save = in_end = orig;
2370
2371 do {
2372 if (*in_end == '"')
2373 open_quote = !open_quote;
2374 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2375 *in_end == '\0') {
2376 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2377
2378 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2379 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2380 else
2381 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2382
2383 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2384 }
2385 } while (*in_end++);
2386
2387 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2388 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2389out:
2390 return rc;
2391}
2392
2393static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2394{
2395 int rc, i, *flags;
2396 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2397 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2398 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2399
2400 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2401 return 0;
2402
2403 if (!data)
2404 return 0;
2405
2406 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2407 return 0;
2408
2409 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2410 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2411 if (!secdata)
2412 return -ENOMEM;
2413 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2414 if (rc)
2415 goto out_free_secdata;
2416
2417 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2418 if (rc)
2419 goto out_free_secdata;
2420
2421 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2422 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2423
2424 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2425 u32 sid;
2426 size_t len;
2427
2428 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2429 continue;
2430 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2431 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2432 if (rc) {
2433 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2434 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2435 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2436 goto out_free_opts;
2437 }
2438 rc = -EINVAL;
2439 switch (flags[i]) {
2440 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2441 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2442 goto out_bad_option;
2443 break;
2444 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2445 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2446 goto out_bad_option;
2447 break;
2448 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2449 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2450 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2451
2452 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2453 goto out_bad_option;
2454 break;
2455 }
2456 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2457 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2458 goto out_bad_option;
2459 break;
2460 default:
2461 goto out_free_opts;
2462 }
2463 }
2464
2465 rc = 0;
2466out_free_opts:
2467 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2468out_free_secdata:
2469 free_secdata(secdata);
2470 return rc;
2471out_bad_option:
2472 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2473 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2474 sb->s_type->name);
2475 goto out_free_opts;
2476}
2477
2478static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2479{
2480 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2481 struct common_audit_data ad;
2482 int rc;
2483
2484 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2485 if (rc)
2486 return rc;
2487
2488 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2489 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2490 return 0;
2491
2492 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2493 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2494 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2495}
2496
2497static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2498{
2499 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2500 struct common_audit_data ad;
2501
2502 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2503 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2504 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2505}
2506
2507static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2508 struct path *path,
2509 char *type,
2510 unsigned long flags,
2511 void *data)
2512{
2513 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2514
2515 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2516 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2517 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2518 else
2519 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2520}
2521
2522static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2523{
2524 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2525
2526 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2527 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2528}
2529
2530/* inode security operations */
2531
2532static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2533{
2534 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2535}
2536
2537static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2538{
2539 inode_free_security(inode);
2540}
2541
2542static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2543 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2544 void **value, size_t *len)
2545{
2546 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2547 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2548 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2549 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2550 int rc;
2551 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2552
2553 dsec = dir->i_security;
2554 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2555
2556 sid = tsec->sid;
2557 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2558
2559 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2560 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2561 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2562 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2563 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2564 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2565 qstr, &newsid);
2566 if (rc) {
2567 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2568 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2569 "ino=%ld)\n",
2570 __func__,
2571 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2572 return rc;
2573 }
2574 }
2575
2576 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2577 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2578 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2579 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2580 isec->sid = newsid;
2581 isec->initialized = 1;
2582 }
2583
2584 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2585 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2586
2587 if (name) {
2588 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2589 if (!namep)
2590 return -ENOMEM;
2591 *name = namep;
2592 }
2593
2594 if (value && len) {
2595 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2596 if (rc) {
2597 kfree(namep);
2598 return rc;
2599 }
2600 *value = context;
2601 *len = clen;
2602 }
2603
2604 return 0;
2605}
2606
2607static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2608{
2609 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2610}
2611
2612static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2613{
2614 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2615}
2616
2617static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2618{
2619 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2620}
2621
2622static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2623{
2624 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2625}
2626
2627static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2628{
2629 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2630}
2631
2632static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2633{
2634 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2635}
2636
2637static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2638{
2639 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2640}
2641
2642static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2643 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2644{
2645 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2646}
2647
2648static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2649{
2650 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2651
2652 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2653}
2654
2655static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2656{
2657 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2658
2659 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2660}
2661
2662static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2663{
2664 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2665 struct common_audit_data ad;
2666 u32 perms;
2667 bool from_access;
2668 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2669
2670 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2671 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2672
2673 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2674 if (!mask)
2675 return 0;
2676
2677 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2678 ad.u.inode = inode;
2679
2680 if (from_access)
2681 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2682
2683 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2684
2685 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
2686}
2687
2688static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2689{
2690 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2691 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2692
2693 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2694 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2695 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2696 ATTR_FORCE);
2697 if (!ia_valid)
2698 return 0;
2699 }
2700
2701 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2702 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2703 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2704
2705 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2706}
2707
2708static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2709{
2710 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2711 struct path path;
2712
2713 path.dentry = dentry;
2714 path.mnt = mnt;
2715
2716 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2717}
2718
2719static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2720{
2721 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2722
2723 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2724 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2725 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2726 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2727 return -EPERM;
2728 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2729 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2730 Restrict to administrator. */
2731 return -EPERM;
2732 }
2733 }
2734
2735 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2736 ordinary setattr permission. */
2737 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2738}
2739
2740static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2741 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2742{
2743 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2744 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2745 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2746 struct common_audit_data ad;
2747 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2748 int rc = 0;
2749
2750 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2751 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2752
2753 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2754 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2755 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2756
2757 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2758 return -EPERM;
2759
2760 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2761 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2762
2763 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2764 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2765 if (rc)
2766 return rc;
2767
2768 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2769 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2770 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2771 return rc;
2772 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2773 }
2774 if (rc)
2775 return rc;
2776
2777 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2778 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2779 if (rc)
2780 return rc;
2781
2782 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2783 isec->sclass);
2784 if (rc)
2785 return rc;
2786
2787 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2788 sbsec->sid,
2789 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2790 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2791 &ad);
2792}
2793
2794static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2795 const void *value, size_t size,
2796 int flags)
2797{
2798 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2799 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2800 u32 newsid;
2801 int rc;
2802
2803 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2804 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2805 return;
2806 }
2807
2808 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2809 if (rc) {
2810 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2811 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2812 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2813 return;
2814 }
2815
2816 isec->sid = newsid;
2817 return;
2818}
2819
2820static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2821{
2822 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2823
2824 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2825}
2826
2827static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2828{
2829 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2830
2831 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2832}
2833
2834static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2835{
2836 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2837 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2838
2839 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2840 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2841 return -EACCES;
2842}
2843
2844/*
2845 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2846 *
2847 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2848 */
2849static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2850{
2851 u32 size;
2852 int error;
2853 char *context = NULL;
2854 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2855
2856 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2857 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2858
2859 /*
2860 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2861 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2862 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2863 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2864 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2865 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2866 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2867 */
2868 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
2869 &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2870 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2871 if (!error)
2872 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2873 &size);
2874 else
2875 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2876 if (error)
2877 return error;
2878 error = size;
2879 if (alloc) {
2880 *buffer = context;
2881 goto out_nofree;
2882 }
2883 kfree(context);
2884out_nofree:
2885 return error;
2886}
2887
2888static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2889 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2890{
2891 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2892 u32 newsid;
2893 int rc;
2894
2895 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2896 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2897
2898 if (!value || !size)
2899 return -EACCES;
2900
2901 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2902 if (rc)
2903 return rc;
2904
2905 isec->sid = newsid;
2906 isec->initialized = 1;
2907 return 0;
2908}
2909
2910static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2911{
2912 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2913 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2914 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2915 return len;
2916}
2917
2918static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2919{
2920 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2921 *secid = isec->sid;
2922}
2923
2924/* file security operations */
2925
2926static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2927{
2928 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2929 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2930
2931 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2932 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2933 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2934
2935 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2936 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2937}
2938
2939static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2940{
2941 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2942 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2943 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2944 u32 sid = current_sid();
2945
2946 if (!mask)
2947 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2948 return 0;
2949
2950 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2951 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2952 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2953 return 0;
2954
2955 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2956}
2957
2958static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2959{
2960 return file_alloc_security(file);
2961}
2962
2963static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2964{
2965 file_free_security(file);
2966}
2967
2968static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2969 unsigned long arg)
2970{
2971 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2972 int error = 0;
2973
2974 switch (cmd) {
2975 case FIONREAD:
2976 /* fall through */
2977 case FIBMAP:
2978 /* fall through */
2979 case FIGETBSZ:
2980 /* fall through */
2981 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2982 /* fall through */
2983 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2984 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2985 break;
2986
2987 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2988 /* fall through */
2989 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2990 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2991 break;
2992
2993 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2994 case FIONBIO:
2995 /* fall through */
2996 case FIOASYNC:
2997 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
2998 break;
2999
3000 case KDSKBENT:
3001 case KDSKBSENT:
3002 error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3003 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3004 break;
3005
3006 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3007 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3008 */
3009 default:
3010 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3011 }
3012 return error;
3013}
3014
3015static int default_noexec;
3016
3017static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3018{
3019 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3020 int rc = 0;
3021
3022 if (default_noexec &&
3023 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3024 /*
3025 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3026 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3027 * This has an additional check.
3028 */
3029 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3030 if (rc)
3031 goto error;
3032 }
3033
3034 if (file) {
3035 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3036 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3037
3038 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3039 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3040 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3041
3042 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3043 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3044
3045 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3046 }
3047
3048error:
3049 return rc;
3050}
3051
3052static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3053 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3054 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3055{
3056 int rc = 0;
3057 u32 sid = current_sid();
3058
3059 /*
3060 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3061 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3062 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3063 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3064 */
3065 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3066 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3067 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3068 if (rc)
3069 return rc;
3070 }
3071
3072 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3073 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3074 if (rc || addr_only)
3075 return rc;
3076
3077 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3078 prot = reqprot;
3079
3080 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3081 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3082}
3083
3084static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3085 unsigned long reqprot,
3086 unsigned long prot)
3087{
3088 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3089
3090 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3091 prot = reqprot;
3092
3093 if (default_noexec &&
3094 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3095 int rc = 0;
3096 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3097 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3098 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3099 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3100 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3101 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3102 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3103 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3104 /*
3105 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3106 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3107 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3108 * modified content. This typically should only
3109 * occur for text relocations.
3110 */
3111 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3112 }
3113 if (rc)
3114 return rc;
3115 }
3116
3117 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3118}
3119
3120static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3121{
3122 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3123
3124 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3125}
3126
3127static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3128 unsigned long arg)
3129{
3130 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3131 int err = 0;
3132
3133 switch (cmd) {
3134 case F_SETFL:
3135 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3136 err = -EINVAL;
3137 break;
3138 }
3139
3140 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3141 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3142 break;
3143 }
3144 /* fall through */
3145 case F_SETOWN:
3146 case F_SETSIG:
3147 case F_GETFL:
3148 case F_GETOWN:
3149 case F_GETSIG:
3150 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3151 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3152 break;
3153 case F_GETLK:
3154 case F_SETLK:
3155 case F_SETLKW:
3156#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3157 case F_GETLK64:
3158 case F_SETLK64:
3159 case F_SETLKW64:
3160#endif
3161 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3162 err = -EINVAL;
3163 break;
3164 }
3165 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3166 break;
3167 }
3168
3169 return err;
3170}
3171
3172static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3173{
3174 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3175
3176 fsec = file->f_security;
3177 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3178
3179 return 0;
3180}
3181
3182static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3183 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3184{
3185 struct file *file;
3186 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3187 u32 perm;
3188 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3189
3190 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3191 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3192
3193 fsec = file->f_security;
3194
3195 if (!signum)
3196 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3197 else
3198 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3199
3200 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3201 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3202}
3203
3204static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3205{
3206 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3207
3208 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3209}
3210
3211static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3212{
3213 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3214 struct inode *inode;
3215 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3216
3217 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3218 fsec = file->f_security;
3219 isec = inode->i_security;
3220 /*
3221 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3222 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3223 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3224 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3225 * struct as its SID.
3226 */
3227 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3228 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3229 /*
3230 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3231 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3232 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3233 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3234 * new inode label or new policy.
3235 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3236 */
3237 return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
3238}
3239
3240/* task security operations */
3241
3242static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3243{
3244 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3245}
3246
3247/*
3248 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3249 */
3250static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3251{
3252 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3253
3254 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3255 if (!tsec)
3256 return -ENOMEM;
3257
3258 cred->security = tsec;
3259 return 0;
3260}
3261
3262/*
3263 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3264 */
3265static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3266{
3267 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3268
3269 /*
3270 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3271 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3272 */
3273 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3274 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3275 kfree(tsec);
3276}
3277
3278/*
3279 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3280 */
3281static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3282 gfp_t gfp)
3283{
3284 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3285 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3286
3287 old_tsec = old->security;
3288
3289 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3290 if (!tsec)
3291 return -ENOMEM;
3292
3293 new->security = tsec;
3294 return 0;
3295}
3296
3297/*
3298 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3299 */
3300static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3301{
3302 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3303 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3304
3305 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3306}
3307
3308/*
3309 * set the security data for a kernel service
3310 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3311 */
3312static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3313{
3314 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3315 u32 sid = current_sid();
3316 int ret;
3317
3318 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3319 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3320 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3321 NULL);
3322 if (ret == 0) {
3323 tsec->sid = secid;
3324 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3325 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3326 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3327 }
3328 return ret;
3329}
3330
3331/*
3332 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3333 * objective context of the specified inode
3334 */
3335static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3336{
3337 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3338 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3339 u32 sid = current_sid();
3340 int ret;
3341
3342 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3343 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3344 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3345 NULL);
3346
3347 if (ret == 0)
3348 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3349 return ret;
3350}
3351
3352static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3353{
3354 u32 sid;
3355 struct common_audit_data ad;
3356
3357 sid = task_sid(current);
3358
3359 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3360 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3361
3362 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3363 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3364}
3365
3366static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3367{
3368 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3369}
3370
3371static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3372{
3373 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3374}
3375
3376static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3377{
3378 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3379}
3380
3381static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3382{
3383 *secid = task_sid(p);
3384}
3385
3386static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3387{
3388 int rc;
3389
3390 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3391 if (rc)
3392 return rc;
3393
3394 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3395}
3396
3397static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3398{
3399 int rc;
3400
3401 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3402 if (rc)
3403 return rc;
3404
3405 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3406}
3407
3408static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3409{
3410 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3411}
3412
3413static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3414 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3415{
3416 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3417
3418 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3419 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3420 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3421 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3422 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3423 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3424
3425 return 0;
3426}
3427
3428static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3429{
3430 int rc;
3431
3432 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3433 if (rc)
3434 return rc;
3435
3436 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3437}
3438
3439static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3440{
3441 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3442}
3443
3444static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3445{
3446 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3447}
3448
3449static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3450 int sig, u32 secid)
3451{
3452 u32 perm;
3453 int rc;
3454
3455 if (!sig)
3456 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3457 else
3458 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3459 if (secid)
3460 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3461 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3462 else
3463 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3464 return rc;
3465}
3466
3467static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3468{
3469 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3470}
3471
3472static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3473 struct inode *inode)
3474{
3475 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3476 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3477
3478 isec->sid = sid;
3479 isec->initialized = 1;
3480}
3481
3482/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3483static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3484 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3485{
3486 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3487 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3488
3489 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3490 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3491 if (ih == NULL)
3492 goto out;
3493
3494 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3495 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3496 goto out;
3497
3498 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3499 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3500 ret = 0;
3501
3502 if (proto)
3503 *proto = ih->protocol;
3504
3505 switch (ih->protocol) {
3506 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3507 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3508
3509 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3510 break;
3511
3512 offset += ihlen;
3513 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3514 if (th == NULL)
3515 break;
3516
3517 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3518 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3519 break;
3520 }
3521
3522 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3523 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3524
3525 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3526 break;
3527
3528 offset += ihlen;
3529 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3530 if (uh == NULL)
3531 break;
3532
3533 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3534 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3535 break;
3536 }
3537
3538 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3539 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3540
3541 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3542 break;
3543
3544 offset += ihlen;
3545 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3546 if (dh == NULL)
3547 break;
3548
3549 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3550 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3551 break;
3552 }
3553
3554 default:
3555 break;
3556 }
3557out:
3558 return ret;
3559}
3560
3561#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3562
3563/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3564static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3565 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3566{
3567 u8 nexthdr;
3568 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3569 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3570
3571 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3572 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3573 if (ip6 == NULL)
3574 goto out;
3575
3576 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3577 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3578 ret = 0;
3579
3580 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3581 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3582 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3583 if (offset < 0)
3584 goto out;
3585
3586 if (proto)
3587 *proto = nexthdr;
3588
3589 switch (nexthdr) {
3590 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3591 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3592
3593 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3594 if (th == NULL)
3595 break;
3596
3597 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3598 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3599 break;
3600 }
3601
3602 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3603 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3604
3605 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3606 if (uh == NULL)
3607 break;
3608
3609 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3610 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3611 break;
3612 }
3613
3614 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3615 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3616
3617 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3618 if (dh == NULL)
3619 break;
3620
3621 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3622 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3623 break;
3624 }
3625
3626 /* includes fragments */
3627 default:
3628 break;
3629 }
3630out:
3631 return ret;
3632}
3633
3634#endif /* IPV6 */
3635
3636static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3637 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3638{
3639 char *addrp;
3640 int ret;
3641
3642 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3643 case PF_INET:
3644 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3645 if (ret)
3646 goto parse_error;
3647 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3648 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3649 goto okay;
3650
3651#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3652 case PF_INET6:
3653 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3654 if (ret)
3655 goto parse_error;
3656 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3657 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3658 goto okay;
3659#endif /* IPV6 */
3660 default:
3661 addrp = NULL;
3662 goto okay;
3663 }
3664
3665parse_error:
3666 printk(KERN_WARNING
3667 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3668 " unable to parse packet\n");
3669 return ret;
3670
3671okay:
3672 if (_addrp)
3673 *_addrp = addrp;
3674 return 0;
3675}
3676
3677/**
3678 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3679 * @skb: the packet
3680 * @family: protocol family
3681 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3682 *
3683 * Description:
3684 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3685 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3686 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3687 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3688 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3689 * peer labels.
3690 *
3691 */
3692static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3693{
3694 int err;
3695 u32 xfrm_sid;
3696 u32 nlbl_sid;
3697 u32 nlbl_type;
3698
3699 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3700 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3701
3702 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3703 if (unlikely(err)) {
3704 printk(KERN_WARNING
3705 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3706 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3707 return -EACCES;
3708 }
3709
3710 return 0;
3711}
3712
3713/* socket security operations */
3714
3715static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3716 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3717{
3718 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3719 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3720 return 0;
3721 }
3722
3723 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3724 socksid);
3725}
3726
3727static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3728{
3729 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3730 struct common_audit_data ad;
3731 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3732
3733 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3734 return 0;
3735
3736 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3737 ad.u.net.sk = sk;
3738
3739 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3740}
3741
3742static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3743 int protocol, int kern)
3744{
3745 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3746 u32 newsid;
3747 u16 secclass;
3748 int rc;
3749
3750 if (kern)
3751 return 0;
3752
3753 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3754 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3755 if (rc)
3756 return rc;
3757
3758 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3759}
3760
3761static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3762 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3763{
3764 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3765 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3766 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3767 int err = 0;
3768
3769 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3770
3771 if (kern)
3772 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3773 else {
3774 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3775 if (err)
3776 return err;
3777 }
3778
3779 isec->initialized = 1;
3780
3781 if (sock->sk) {
3782 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3783 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3784 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3785 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3786 }
3787
3788 return err;
3789}
3790
3791/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3792 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3793 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3794
3795static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3796{
3797 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3798 u16 family;
3799 int err;
3800
3801 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3802 if (err)
3803 goto out;
3804
3805 /*
3806 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3807 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3808 * check the first address now.
3809 */
3810 family = sk->sk_family;
3811 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3812 char *addrp;
3813 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3814 struct common_audit_data ad;
3815 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3816 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3817 unsigned short snum;
3818 u32 sid, node_perm;
3819
3820 if (family == PF_INET) {
3821 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3822 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3823 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3824 } else {
3825 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3826 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3827 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3828 }
3829
3830 if (snum) {
3831 int low, high;
3832
3833 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3834
3835 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3836 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3837 snum, &sid);
3838 if (err)
3839 goto out;
3840 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3841 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3842 ad.u.net.family = family;
3843 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3844 sksec->sclass,
3845 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3846 if (err)
3847 goto out;
3848 }
3849 }
3850
3851 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3852 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3853 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3854 break;
3855
3856 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3857 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3858 break;
3859
3860 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3861 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3862 break;
3863
3864 default:
3865 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3866 break;
3867 }
3868
3869 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3870 if (err)
3871 goto out;
3872
3873 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3874 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3875 ad.u.net.family = family;
3876
3877 if (family == PF_INET)
3878 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3879 else
3880 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3881
3882 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3883 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3884 if (err)
3885 goto out;
3886 }
3887out:
3888 return err;
3889}
3890
3891static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3892{
3893 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3894 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3895 int err;
3896
3897 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3898 if (err)
3899 return err;
3900
3901 /*
3902 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3903 */
3904 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3905 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3906 struct common_audit_data ad;
3907 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3908 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3909 unsigned short snum;
3910 u32 sid, perm;
3911
3912 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3913 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3914 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3915 return -EINVAL;
3916 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3917 } else {
3918 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3919 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3920 return -EINVAL;
3921 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3922 }
3923
3924 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3925 if (err)
3926 goto out;
3927
3928 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3929 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3930
3931 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3932 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3933 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3934 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3935 if (err)
3936 goto out;
3937 }
3938
3939 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3940
3941out:
3942 return err;
3943}
3944
3945static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3946{
3947 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3948}
3949
3950static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3951{
3952 int err;
3953 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3954 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3955
3956 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3957 if (err)
3958 return err;
3959
3960 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3961
3962 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3963 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3964 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3965 newisec->initialized = 1;
3966
3967 return 0;
3968}
3969
3970static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3971 int size)
3972{
3973 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3974}
3975
3976static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3977 int size, int flags)
3978{
3979 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3980}
3981
3982static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3983{
3984 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3985}
3986
3987static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3988{
3989 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3990}
3991
3992static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3993{
3994 int err;
3995
3996 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3997 if (err)
3998 return err;
3999
4000 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4001}
4002
4003static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4004 int optname)
4005{
4006 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4007}
4008
4009static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4010{
4011 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4012}
4013
4014static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4015 struct sock *other,
4016 struct sock *newsk)
4017{
4018 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4019 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4020 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4021 struct common_audit_data ad;
4022 int err;
4023
4024 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4025 ad.u.net.sk = other;
4026
4027 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4028 sksec_other->sclass,
4029 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4030 if (err)
4031 return err;
4032
4033 /* server child socket */
4034 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4035 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4036 &sksec_new->sid);
4037 if (err)
4038 return err;
4039
4040 /* connecting socket */
4041 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4042
4043 return 0;
4044}
4045
4046static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4047 struct socket *other)
4048{
4049 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4050 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4051 struct common_audit_data ad;
4052
4053 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4054 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4055
4056 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4057 &ad);
4058}
4059
4060static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4061 u32 peer_sid,
4062 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4063{
4064 int err;
4065 u32 if_sid;
4066 u32 node_sid;
4067
4068 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4069 if (err)
4070 return err;
4071 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4072 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4073 if (err)
4074 return err;
4075
4076 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4077 if (err)
4078 return err;
4079 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4080 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4081}
4082
4083static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4084 u16 family)
4085{
4086 int err = 0;
4087 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4088 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4089 struct common_audit_data ad;
4090 char *addrp;
4091
4092 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4093 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4094 ad.u.net.family = family;
4095 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4096 if (err)
4097 return err;
4098
4099 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4100 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4101 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4102 if (err)
4103 return err;
4104 }
4105
4106 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4107 if (err)
4108 return err;
4109 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4110
4111 return err;
4112}
4113
4114static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4115{
4116 int err;
4117 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4118 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4119 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4120 struct common_audit_data ad;
4121 char *addrp;
4122 u8 secmark_active;
4123 u8 peerlbl_active;
4124
4125 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4126 return 0;
4127
4128 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4129 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4130 family = PF_INET;
4131
4132 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4133 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4134 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4135 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4136 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4137 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4138
4139 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4140 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4141 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4142 return 0;
4143
4144 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4145 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4146 ad.u.net.family = family;
4147 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4148 if (err)
4149 return err;
4150
4151 if (peerlbl_active) {
4152 u32 peer_sid;
4153
4154 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4155 if (err)
4156 return err;
4157 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4158 peer_sid, &ad);
4159 if (err) {
4160 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4161 return err;
4162 }
4163 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4164 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4165 if (err)
4166 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4167 }
4168
4169 if (secmark_active) {
4170 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4171 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4172 if (err)
4173 return err;
4174 }
4175
4176 return err;
4177}
4178
4179static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4180 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4181{
4182 int err = 0;
4183 char *scontext;
4184 u32 scontext_len;
4185 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4186 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4187
4188 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4189 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4190 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4191 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4192 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4193
4194 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4195 if (err)
4196 return err;
4197
4198 if (scontext_len > len) {
4199 err = -ERANGE;
4200 goto out_len;
4201 }
4202
4203 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4204 err = -EFAULT;
4205
4206out_len:
4207 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4208 err = -EFAULT;
4209 kfree(scontext);
4210 return err;
4211}
4212
4213static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4214{
4215 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4216 u16 family;
4217
4218 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4219 family = PF_INET;
4220 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4221 family = PF_INET6;
4222 else if (sock)
4223 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4224 else
4225 goto out;
4226
4227 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4228 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4229 else if (skb)
4230 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4231
4232out:
4233 *secid = peer_secid;
4234 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4235 return -EINVAL;
4236 return 0;
4237}
4238
4239static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4240{
4241 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4242
4243 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4244 if (!sksec)
4245 return -ENOMEM;
4246
4247 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4248 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4249 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4250 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4251
4252 return 0;
4253}
4254
4255static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4256{
4257 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4258
4259 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4260 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4261 kfree(sksec);
4262}
4263
4264static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4265{
4266 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4267 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4268
4269 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4270 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4271 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4272
4273 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4274}
4275
4276static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4277{
4278 if (!sk)
4279 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4280 else {
4281 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4282
4283 *secid = sksec->sid;
4284 }
4285}
4286
4287static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4288{
4289 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4290 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4291
4292 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4293 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4294 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4295 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4296}
4297
4298static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4299 struct request_sock *req)
4300{
4301 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4302 int err;
4303 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4304 u32 newsid;
4305 u32 peersid;
4306
4307 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4308 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4309 family = PF_INET;
4310
4311 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4312 if (err)
4313 return err;
4314 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4315 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4316 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4317 } else {
4318 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4319 if (err)
4320 return err;
4321 req->secid = newsid;
4322 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4323 }
4324
4325 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4326}
4327
4328static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4329 const struct request_sock *req)
4330{
4331 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4332
4333 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4334 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4335 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4336 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4337 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4338 time it will have been created and available. */
4339
4340 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4341 * thread with access to newsksec */
4342 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4343}
4344
4345static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4346{
4347 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4348 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4349
4350 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4351 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4352 family = PF_INET;
4353
4354 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4355}
4356
4357static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4358{
4359 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4360 u32 tsid;
4361
4362 __tsec = current_security();
4363 tsid = __tsec->sid;
4364
4365 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4366}
4367
4368static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4369{
4370 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4371}
4372
4373static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4374{
4375 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4376}
4377
4378static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4379 struct flowi *fl)
4380{
4381 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4382}
4383
4384static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4385{
4386 u32 sid = current_sid();
4387
4388 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4389 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4390 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4391 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4392 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4393 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4394
4395 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4396 NULL);
4397}
4398
4399static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4400{
4401 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4402
4403 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4404 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4405 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4406 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4407 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4408 * protocols were being used */
4409
4410 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4411 * the sockcreate SID here */
4412
4413 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4414 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4415}
4416
4417static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4418{
4419 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4420 u32 sid = current_sid();
4421 int err;
4422
4423 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4424 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4425 if (err)
4426 return err;
4427 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4428 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4429 if (err)
4430 return err;
4431
4432 sksec->sid = sid;
4433
4434 return 0;
4435}
4436
4437static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4438{
4439 int err = 0;
4440 u32 perm;
4441 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4442 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4443
4444 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4445 err = -EINVAL;
4446 goto out;
4447 }
4448 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4449
4450 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4451 if (err) {
4452 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4453 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4454 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4455 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4456 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4457 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4458 err = 0;
4459 }
4460
4461 /* Ignore */
4462 if (err == -ENOENT)
4463 err = 0;
4464 goto out;
4465 }
4466
4467 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4468out:
4469 return err;
4470}
4471
4472#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4473
4474static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4475 u16 family)
4476{
4477 int err;
4478 char *addrp;
4479 u32 peer_sid;
4480 struct common_audit_data ad;
4481 u8 secmark_active;
4482 u8 netlbl_active;
4483 u8 peerlbl_active;
4484
4485 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4486 return NF_ACCEPT;
4487
4488 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4489 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4490 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4491 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4492 return NF_ACCEPT;
4493
4494 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4495 return NF_DROP;
4496
4497 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4498 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4499 ad.u.net.family = family;
4500 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4501 return NF_DROP;
4502
4503 if (peerlbl_active) {
4504 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4505 peer_sid, &ad);
4506 if (err) {
4507 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4508 return NF_DROP;
4509 }
4510 }
4511
4512 if (secmark_active)
4513 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4514 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4515 return NF_DROP;
4516
4517 if (netlbl_active)
4518 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4519 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4520 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4521 * protection */
4522 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4523 return NF_DROP;
4524
4525 return NF_ACCEPT;
4526}
4527
4528static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4529 struct sk_buff *skb,
4530 const struct net_device *in,
4531 const struct net_device *out,
4532 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4533{
4534 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4535}
4536
4537#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4538static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4539 struct sk_buff *skb,
4540 const struct net_device *in,
4541 const struct net_device *out,
4542 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4543{
4544 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4545}
4546#endif /* IPV6 */
4547
4548static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4549 u16 family)
4550{
4551 u32 sid;
4552
4553 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4554 return NF_ACCEPT;
4555
4556 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4557 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4558 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4559 if (skb->sk) {
4560 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4561 sid = sksec->sid;
4562 } else
4563 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4564 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4565 return NF_DROP;
4566
4567 return NF_ACCEPT;
4568}
4569
4570static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4571 struct sk_buff *skb,
4572 const struct net_device *in,
4573 const struct net_device *out,
4574 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4575{
4576 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4577}
4578
4579static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4580 int ifindex,
4581 u16 family)
4582{
4583 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4584 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4585 struct common_audit_data ad;
4586 char *addrp;
4587 u8 proto;
4588
4589 if (sk == NULL)
4590 return NF_ACCEPT;
4591 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4592
4593 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4594 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4595 ad.u.net.family = family;
4596 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4597 return NF_DROP;
4598
4599 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4600 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4601 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4602 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4603
4604 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4605 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4606
4607 return NF_ACCEPT;
4608}
4609
4610static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4611 u16 family)
4612{
4613 u32 secmark_perm;
4614 u32 peer_sid;
4615 struct sock *sk;
4616 struct common_audit_data ad;
4617 char *addrp;
4618 u8 secmark_active;
4619 u8 peerlbl_active;
4620
4621 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4622 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4623 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4624 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4625 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4626 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4627#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4628 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4629 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4630 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4631 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4632 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4633 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4634 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4635 return NF_ACCEPT;
4636#endif
4637 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4638 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4639 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4640 return NF_ACCEPT;
4641
4642 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4643 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4644 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4645 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4646 sk = skb->sk;
4647 if (sk == NULL) {
4648 if (skb->skb_iif) {
4649 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4650 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4651 return NF_DROP;
4652 } else {
4653 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4654 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4655 }
4656 } else {
4657 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4658 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4659 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4660 }
4661
4662 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4663 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4664 ad.u.net.family = family;
4665 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4666 return NF_DROP;
4667
4668 if (secmark_active)
4669 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4670 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4671 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4672
4673 if (peerlbl_active) {
4674 u32 if_sid;
4675 u32 node_sid;
4676
4677 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4678 return NF_DROP;
4679 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4680 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4681 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4682
4683 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4684 return NF_DROP;
4685 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4686 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4687 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4688 }
4689
4690 return NF_ACCEPT;
4691}
4692
4693static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4694 struct sk_buff *skb,
4695 const struct net_device *in,
4696 const struct net_device *out,
4697 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4698{
4699 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4700}
4701
4702#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4703static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4704 struct sk_buff *skb,
4705 const struct net_device *in,
4706 const struct net_device *out,
4707 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4708{
4709 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4710}
4711#endif /* IPV6 */
4712
4713#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4714
4715static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4716{
4717 int err;
4718
4719 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4720 if (err)
4721 return err;
4722
4723 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4724}
4725
4726static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4727{
4728 int err;
4729 struct common_audit_data ad;
4730 u32 sid;
4731
4732 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4733 if (err)
4734 return err;
4735
4736 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4737 ad.u.cap = capability;
4738
4739 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
4740 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
4741 CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4742}
4743
4744static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4745 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4746 u16 sclass)
4747{
4748 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4749 u32 sid;
4750
4751 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4752 if (!isec)
4753 return -ENOMEM;
4754
4755 sid = task_sid(task);
4756 isec->sclass = sclass;
4757 isec->sid = sid;
4758 perm->security = isec;
4759
4760 return 0;
4761}
4762
4763static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4764{
4765 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4766 perm->security = NULL;
4767 kfree(isec);
4768}
4769
4770static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4771{
4772 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4773
4774 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4775 if (!msec)
4776 return -ENOMEM;
4777
4778 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4779 msg->security = msec;
4780
4781 return 0;
4782}
4783
4784static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4785{
4786 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4787
4788 msg->security = NULL;
4789 kfree(msec);
4790}
4791
4792static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4793 u32 perms)
4794{
4795 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4796 struct common_audit_data ad;
4797 u32 sid = current_sid();
4798
4799 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4800
4801 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4802 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4803
4804 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4805}
4806
4807static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4808{
4809 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4810}
4811
4812static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4813{
4814 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4815}
4816
4817/* message queue security operations */
4818static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4819{
4820 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4821 struct common_audit_data ad;
4822 u32 sid = current_sid();
4823 int rc;
4824
4825 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4826 if (rc)
4827 return rc;
4828
4829 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4830
4831 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4832 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4833
4834 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4835 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4836 if (rc) {
4837 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4838 return rc;
4839 }
4840 return 0;
4841}
4842
4843static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4844{
4845 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4846}
4847
4848static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4849{
4850 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4851 struct common_audit_data ad;
4852 u32 sid = current_sid();
4853
4854 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4855
4856 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4857 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4858
4859 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4860 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4861}
4862
4863static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4864{
4865 int err;
4866 int perms;
4867
4868 switch (cmd) {
4869 case IPC_INFO:
4870 case MSG_INFO:
4871 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4872 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4873 case IPC_STAT:
4874 case MSG_STAT:
4875 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4876 break;
4877 case IPC_SET:
4878 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4879 break;
4880 case IPC_RMID:
4881 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4882 break;
4883 default:
4884 return 0;
4885 }
4886
4887 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4888 return err;
4889}
4890
4891static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4892{
4893 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4894 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4895 struct common_audit_data ad;
4896 u32 sid = current_sid();
4897 int rc;
4898
4899 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4900 msec = msg->security;
4901
4902 /*
4903 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4904 */
4905 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4906 /*
4907 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4908 * message queue this message will be stored in
4909 */
4910 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4911 NULL, &msec->sid);
4912 if (rc)
4913 return rc;
4914 }
4915
4916 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4917 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4918
4919 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4920 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4921 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4922 if (!rc)
4923 /* Can this process send the message */
4924 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4925 MSG__SEND, &ad);
4926 if (!rc)
4927 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4928 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4929 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4930
4931 return rc;
4932}
4933
4934static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4935 struct task_struct *target,
4936 long type, int mode)
4937{
4938 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4939 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4940 struct common_audit_data ad;
4941 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4942 int rc;
4943
4944 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4945 msec = msg->security;
4946
4947 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4948 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4949
4950 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4951 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4952 if (!rc)
4953 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4954 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4955 return rc;
4956}
4957
4958/* Shared Memory security operations */
4959static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4960{
4961 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4962 struct common_audit_data ad;
4963 u32 sid = current_sid();
4964 int rc;
4965
4966 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4967 if (rc)
4968 return rc;
4969
4970 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4971
4972 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4973 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4974
4975 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4976 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4977 if (rc) {
4978 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4979 return rc;
4980 }
4981 return 0;
4982}
4983
4984static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4985{
4986 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4987}
4988
4989static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4990{
4991 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4992 struct common_audit_data ad;
4993 u32 sid = current_sid();
4994
4995 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4996
4997 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4998 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4999
5000 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5001 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5002}
5003
5004/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5005static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5006{
5007 int perms;
5008 int err;
5009
5010 switch (cmd) {
5011 case IPC_INFO:
5012 case SHM_INFO:
5013 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5014 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5015 case IPC_STAT:
5016 case SHM_STAT:
5017 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5018 break;
5019 case IPC_SET:
5020 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5021 break;
5022 case SHM_LOCK:
5023 case SHM_UNLOCK:
5024 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5025 break;
5026 case IPC_RMID:
5027 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5028 break;
5029 default:
5030 return 0;
5031 }
5032
5033 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5034 return err;
5035}
5036
5037static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5038 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5039{
5040 u32 perms;
5041
5042 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5043 perms = SHM__READ;
5044 else
5045 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5046
5047 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5048}
5049
5050/* Semaphore security operations */
5051static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5052{
5053 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5054 struct common_audit_data ad;
5055 u32 sid = current_sid();
5056 int rc;
5057
5058 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5059 if (rc)
5060 return rc;
5061
5062 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5063
5064 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5065 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5066
5067 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5068 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5069 if (rc) {
5070 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5071 return rc;
5072 }
5073 return 0;
5074}
5075
5076static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5077{
5078 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5079}
5080
5081static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5082{
5083 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5084 struct common_audit_data ad;
5085 u32 sid = current_sid();
5086
5087 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5088
5089 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5090 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5091
5092 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5093 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5094}
5095
5096/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5097static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5098{
5099 int err;
5100 u32 perms;
5101
5102 switch (cmd) {
5103 case IPC_INFO:
5104 case SEM_INFO:
5105 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5106 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5107 case GETPID:
5108 case GETNCNT:
5109 case GETZCNT:
5110 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5111 break;
5112 case GETVAL:
5113 case GETALL:
5114 perms = SEM__READ;
5115 break;
5116 case SETVAL:
5117 case SETALL:
5118 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5119 break;
5120 case IPC_RMID:
5121 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5122 break;
5123 case IPC_SET:
5124 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5125 break;
5126 case IPC_STAT:
5127 case SEM_STAT:
5128 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5129 break;
5130 default:
5131 return 0;
5132 }
5133
5134 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5135 return err;
5136}
5137
5138static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5139 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5140{
5141 u32 perms;
5142
5143 if (alter)
5144 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5145 else
5146 perms = SEM__READ;
5147
5148 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5149}
5150
5151static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5152{
5153 u32 av = 0;
5154
5155 av = 0;
5156 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5157 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5158 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5159 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5160
5161 if (av == 0)
5162 return 0;
5163
5164 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5165}
5166
5167static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5168{
5169 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5170 *secid = isec->sid;
5171}
5172
5173static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5174{
5175 if (inode)
5176 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5177}
5178
5179static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5180 char *name, char **value)
5181{
5182 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5183 u32 sid;
5184 int error;
5185 unsigned len;
5186
5187 if (current != p) {
5188 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5189 if (error)
5190 return error;
5191 }
5192
5193 rcu_read_lock();
5194 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5195
5196 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5197 sid = __tsec->sid;
5198 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5199 sid = __tsec->osid;
5200 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5201 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5202 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5203 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5204 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5205 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5206 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5207 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5208 else
5209 goto invalid;
5210 rcu_read_unlock();
5211
5212 if (!sid)
5213 return 0;
5214
5215 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5216 if (error)
5217 return error;
5218 return len;
5219
5220invalid:
5221 rcu_read_unlock();
5222 return -EINVAL;
5223}
5224
5225static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5226 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5227{
5228 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5229 struct task_struct *tracer;
5230 struct cred *new;
5231 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5232 int error;
5233 char *str = value;
5234
5235 if (current != p) {
5236 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5237 security attributes. */
5238 return -EACCES;
5239 }
5240
5241 /*
5242 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5243 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5244 * above restriction is ever removed.
5245 */
5246 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5247 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5248 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5249 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5250 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5251 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5252 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5253 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5254 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5255 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5256 else
5257 error = -EINVAL;
5258 if (error)
5259 return error;
5260
5261 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5262 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5263 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5264 str[size-1] = 0;
5265 size--;
5266 }
5267 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5268 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5269 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5270 return error;
5271 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5272 &sid);
5273 }
5274 if (error)
5275 return error;
5276 }
5277
5278 new = prepare_creds();
5279 if (!new)
5280 return -ENOMEM;
5281
5282 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5283 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5284 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5285 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5286 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5287 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5288 tsec = new->security;
5289 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5290 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5291 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5292 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5293 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5294 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5295 if (error)
5296 goto abort_change;
5297 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5298 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5299 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5300 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5301 error = -EINVAL;
5302 if (sid == 0)
5303 goto abort_change;
5304
5305 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5306 error = -EPERM;
5307 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5308 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5309 if (error)
5310 goto abort_change;
5311 }
5312
5313 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5314 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5315 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5316 if (error)
5317 goto abort_change;
5318
5319 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5320 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5321 ptsid = 0;
5322 task_lock(p);
5323 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5324 if (tracer)
5325 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5326 task_unlock(p);
5327
5328 if (tracer) {
5329 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5330 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5331 if (error)
5332 goto abort_change;
5333 }
5334
5335 tsec->sid = sid;
5336 } else {
5337 error = -EINVAL;
5338 goto abort_change;
5339 }
5340
5341 commit_creds(new);
5342 return size;
5343
5344abort_change:
5345 abort_creds(new);
5346 return error;
5347}
5348
5349static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5350{
5351 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5352}
5353
5354static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5355{
5356 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5357}
5358
5359static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5360{
5361 kfree(secdata);
5362}
5363
5364/*
5365 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5366 */
5367static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5368{
5369 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5370}
5371
5372/*
5373 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5374 */
5375static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5376{
5377 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5378}
5379
5380static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5381{
5382 int len = 0;
5383 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5384 ctx, true);
5385 if (len < 0)
5386 return len;
5387 *ctxlen = len;
5388 return 0;
5389}
5390#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5391
5392static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5393 unsigned long flags)
5394{
5395 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5396 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5397
5398 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5399 if (!ksec)
5400 return -ENOMEM;
5401
5402 tsec = cred->security;
5403 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5404 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5405 else
5406 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5407
5408 k->security = ksec;
5409 return 0;
5410}
5411
5412static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5413{
5414 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5415
5416 k->security = NULL;
5417 kfree(ksec);
5418}
5419
5420static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5421 const struct cred *cred,
5422 key_perm_t perm)
5423{
5424 struct key *key;
5425 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5426 u32 sid;
5427
5428 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5429 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5430 appear to be created. */
5431 if (perm == 0)
5432 return 0;
5433
5434 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5435
5436 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5437 ksec = key->security;
5438
5439 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5440}
5441
5442static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5443{
5444 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5445 char *context = NULL;
5446 unsigned len;
5447 int rc;
5448
5449 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5450 if (!rc)
5451 rc = len;
5452 *_buffer = context;
5453 return rc;
5454}
5455
5456#endif
5457
5458static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5459 .name = "selinux",
5460
5461 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5462 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5463 .capget = selinux_capget,
5464 .capset = selinux_capset,
5465 .capable = selinux_capable,
5466 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5467 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5468 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5469 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5470
5471 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5472 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5473
5474 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5475 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5476 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5477 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5478
5479 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5480 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5481 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5482 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5483 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5484 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5485 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5486 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5487 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5488 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5489 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5490 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5491
5492
5493 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5494 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5495 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5496 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5497 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5498 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5499 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5500 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5501 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5502 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5503 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5504 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5505 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5506 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5507 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5508 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5509 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5510 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5511 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5512 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5513 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5514 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5515 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5516 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5517 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5518
5519 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5520 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5521 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5522 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5523 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5524 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5525 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5526 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5527 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5528 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5529 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5530
5531 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5532
5533 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5534 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5535 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5536 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5537 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5538 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5539 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5540 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5541 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5542 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5543 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5544 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5545 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5546 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5547 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5548 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5549 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5550 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5551 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5552 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5553 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5554 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5555
5556 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5557 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5558
5559 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5560 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5561
5562 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5563 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5564 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5565 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5566 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5567 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5568
5569 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5570 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5571 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5572 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5573 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5574
5575 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5576 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5577 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5578 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5579 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5580
5581 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5582
5583 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5584 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5585
5586 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5587 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5588 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5589 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5590 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5591 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5592
5593 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5594 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5595
5596 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5597 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5598 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5599 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5600 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5601 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5602 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5603 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5604 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5605 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5606 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5607 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5608 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5609 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5610 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5611 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5612 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5613 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5614 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5615 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5616 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5617 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5618 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5619 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5620 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5621 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5622 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5623 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5624 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5625 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5626 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5627
5628#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5629 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5630 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5631 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5632 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5633 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5634 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5635 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5636 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5637 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5638 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5639#endif
5640
5641#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5642 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5643 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5644 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5645 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5646#endif
5647
5648#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5649 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5650 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5651 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5652 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5653#endif
5654};
5655
5656static __init int selinux_init(void)
5657{
5658 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5659 selinux_enabled = 0;
5660 return 0;
5661 }
5662
5663 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5664 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5665 return 0;
5666 }
5667
5668 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5669
5670 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5671 cred_init_security();
5672
5673 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5674
5675 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5676 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5677 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5678 avc_init();
5679
5680 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5681 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5682
5683 if (selinux_enforcing)
5684 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5685 else
5686 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5687
5688 return 0;
5689}
5690
5691static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5692{
5693 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5694}
5695
5696void selinux_complete_init(void)
5697{
5698 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5699
5700 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5701 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5702 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5703}
5704
5705/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5706 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5707security_initcall(selinux_init);
5708
5709#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5710
5711static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5712 {
5713 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5714 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5715 .pf = PF_INET,
5716 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5717 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5718 },
5719 {
5720 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5721 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5722 .pf = PF_INET,
5723 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5724 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5725 },
5726 {
5727 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5728 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5729 .pf = PF_INET,
5730 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5731 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5732 }
5733};
5734
5735#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5736
5737static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5738 {
5739 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5740 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5741 .pf = PF_INET6,
5742 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5743 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5744 },
5745 {
5746 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5747 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5748 .pf = PF_INET6,
5749 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5750 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5751 }
5752};
5753
5754#endif /* IPV6 */
5755
5756static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5757{
5758 int err = 0;
5759
5760 if (!selinux_enabled)
5761 goto out;
5762
5763 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5764
5765 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5766 if (err)
5767 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5768
5769#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5770 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5771 if (err)
5772 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5773#endif /* IPV6 */
5774
5775out:
5776 return err;
5777}
5778
5779__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5780
5781#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5782static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5783{
5784 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5785
5786 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5787#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5788 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5789#endif /* IPV6 */
5790}
5791#endif
5792
5793#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5794
5795#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5796#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5797#endif
5798
5799#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5800
5801#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5802static int selinux_disabled;
5803
5804int selinux_disable(void)
5805{
5806 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5807
5808 if (ss_initialized) {
5809 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5810 return -EINVAL;
5811 }
5812
5813 if (selinux_disabled) {
5814 /* Only do this once. */
5815 return -EINVAL;
5816 }
5817
5818 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5819
5820 selinux_disabled = 1;
5821 selinux_enabled = 0;
5822
5823 reset_security_ops();
5824
5825 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5826 avc_disable();
5827
5828 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5829 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5830
5831 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5832 exit_sel_fs();
5833
5834 return 0;
5835}
5836#endif