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1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
21 *
22 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
23 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
24 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
25 */
26
27#include <linux/init.h>
28#include <linux/kd.h>
29#include <linux/kernel.h>
30#include <linux/tracehook.h>
31#include <linux/errno.h>
32#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
33#include <linux/sched/task.h>
34#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
35#include <linux/xattr.h>
36#include <linux/capability.h>
37#include <linux/unistd.h>
38#include <linux/mm.h>
39#include <linux/mman.h>
40#include <linux/slab.h>
41#include <linux/pagemap.h>
42#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
43#include <linux/swap.h>
44#include <linux/spinlock.h>
45#include <linux/syscalls.h>
46#include <linux/dcache.h>
47#include <linux/file.h>
48#include <linux/fdtable.h>
49#include <linux/namei.h>
50#include <linux/mount.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53#include <linux/tty.h>
54#include <net/icmp.h>
55#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58#include <net/net_namespace.h>
59#include <net/netlabel.h>
60#include <linux/uaccess.h>
61#include <asm/ioctls.h>
62#include <linux/atomic.h>
63#include <linux/bitops.h>
64#include <linux/interrupt.h>
65#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66#include <net/netlink.h>
67#include <linux/tcp.h>
68#include <linux/udp.h>
69#include <linux/dccp.h>
70#include <linux/sctp.h>
71#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72#include <linux/quota.h>
73#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75#include <linux/parser.h>
76#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
77#include <net/ipv6.h>
78#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79#include <linux/personality.h>
80#include <linux/audit.h>
81#include <linux/string.h>
82#include <linux/selinux.h>
83#include <linux/mutex.h>
84#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
85#include <linux/syslog.h>
86#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
87#include <linux/export.h>
88#include <linux/msg.h>
89#include <linux/shm.h>
90#include <linux/bpf.h>
91
92#include "avc.h"
93#include "objsec.h"
94#include "netif.h"
95#include "netnode.h"
96#include "netport.h"
97#include "ibpkey.h"
98#include "xfrm.h"
99#include "netlabel.h"
100#include "audit.h"
101#include "avc_ss.h"
102
103struct selinux_state selinux_state;
104
105/* SECMARK reference count */
106static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
107
108#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
109static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
110
111static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
112{
113 unsigned long enforcing;
114 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
115 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
116 return 1;
117}
118__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
119#else
120#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
121#endif
122
123#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
124int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
125
126static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
127{
128 unsigned long enabled;
129 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
130 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
131 return 1;
132}
133__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
134#else
135int selinux_enabled = 1;
136#endif
137
138static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
139 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
140
141static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
142{
143 unsigned long checkreqprot;
144
145 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
146 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
147 return 1;
148}
149__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
150
151static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
152static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
153
154/**
155 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
156 *
157 * Description:
158 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
159 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
160 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
161 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
162 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
163 *
164 */
165static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
166{
167 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
168 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
169}
170
171/**
172 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
173 *
174 * Description:
175 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
176 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
177 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
178 * is always considered enabled.
179 *
180 */
181static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
182{
183 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
184 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
185}
186
187static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
188{
189 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
190 sel_netif_flush();
191 sel_netnode_flush();
192 sel_netport_flush();
193 synchronize_net();
194 }
195 return 0;
196}
197
198static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
199{
200 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
201 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
202 call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
203 }
204
205 return 0;
206}
207
208/*
209 * initialise the security for the init task
210 */
211static void cred_init_security(void)
212{
213 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
215
216 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
217 if (!tsec)
218 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
219
220 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
221 cred->security = tsec;
222}
223
224/*
225 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
226 */
227static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
228{
229 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
230
231 tsec = cred->security;
232 return tsec->sid;
233}
234
235/*
236 * get the objective security ID of a task
237 */
238static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
239{
240 u32 sid;
241
242 rcu_read_lock();
243 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
244 rcu_read_unlock();
245 return sid;
246}
247
248/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
249
250static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
251{
252 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
253 u32 sid = current_sid();
254
255 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
256 if (!isec)
257 return -ENOMEM;
258
259 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
260 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
261 isec->inode = inode;
262 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
263 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
264 isec->task_sid = sid;
265 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
266 inode->i_security = isec;
267
268 return 0;
269}
270
271static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
272
273/*
274 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
275 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
276 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
277 * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
278 * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
279 */
280static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
281 struct dentry *opt_dentry,
282 bool may_sleep)
283{
284 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
285
286 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
287
288 if (selinux_state.initialized &&
289 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
290 if (!may_sleep)
291 return -ECHILD;
292
293 /*
294 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
295 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
296 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
297 */
298 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, opt_dentry);
299 }
300 return 0;
301}
302
303static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
304{
305 return inode->i_security;
306}
307
308static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
309{
310 int error;
311
312 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
313 if (error)
314 return ERR_PTR(error);
315 return inode->i_security;
316}
317
318/*
319 * Get the security label of an inode.
320 */
321static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
322{
323 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
324 return inode->i_security;
325}
326
327static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
328{
329 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
330
331 return inode->i_security;
332}
333
334/*
335 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
336 */
337static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
338{
339 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
340
341 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
342 return inode->i_security;
343}
344
345static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
346{
347 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
348
349 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
350 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
351}
352
353static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
354{
355 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
357
358 /*
359 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
360 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
361 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
362 *
363 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
364 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
365 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
366 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
367 */
368 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
369 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
370 list_del_init(&isec->list);
371 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
372 }
373
374 /*
375 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
376 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
377 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
378 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
379 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
380 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
381 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
382 */
383 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
384}
385
386static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
387{
388 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
389 u32 sid = current_sid();
390
391 fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
392 if (!fsec)
393 return -ENOMEM;
394
395 fsec->sid = sid;
396 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
397 file->f_security = fsec;
398
399 return 0;
400}
401
402static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
403{
404 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
405 file->f_security = NULL;
406 kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
407}
408
409static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
410{
411 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
412
413 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
414 if (!sbsec)
415 return -ENOMEM;
416
417 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
418 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
419 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
420 sbsec->sb = sb;
421 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
422 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
423 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
424 sb->s_security = sbsec;
425
426 return 0;
427}
428
429static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
430{
431 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
432 sb->s_security = NULL;
433 kfree(sbsec);
434}
435
436static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
437{
438 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
439}
440
441enum {
442 Opt_error = -1,
443 Opt_context = 1,
444 Opt_fscontext = 2,
445 Opt_defcontext = 3,
446 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
447 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
448 Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
449};
450
451#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
452
453static const match_table_t tokens = {
454 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
455 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
456 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
457 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
458 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
459 {Opt_error, NULL},
460};
461
462#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
463
464static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
465 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
466 const struct cred *cred)
467{
468 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
469 int rc;
470
471 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
472 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
473 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
474 if (rc)
475 return rc;
476
477 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
478 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
479 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
480 return rc;
481}
482
483static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
484 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
485 const struct cred *cred)
486{
487 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
488 int rc;
489 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
490 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
491 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
492 if (rc)
493 return rc;
494
495 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
496 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
497 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
498 return rc;
499}
500
501static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
502{
503 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
504
505 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
506 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
507 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
508 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
509 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
510 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
511 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
512 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
513 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
514 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
515 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
516 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
517 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
518}
519
520static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
521{
522 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
523 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
524 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
525 int rc = 0;
526
527 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
528 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
529 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
530 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
531 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
532 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
533 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
534 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
535 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
536 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
537 goto out;
538 }
539
540 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
541 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
542 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
543 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
544 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
545 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
546 else
547 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
548 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
549 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
550 goto out;
551 }
552 }
553
554 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
555
556 /*
557 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
558 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
559 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
560 */
561 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
562 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
563 else
564 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
565
566 /* Initialize the root inode. */
567 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
568
569 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
570 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
571 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
572 populates itself. */
573 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
574next_inode:
575 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
576 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
577 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
578 struct inode_security_struct, list);
579 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
580 list_del_init(&isec->list);
581 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
582 inode = igrab(inode);
583 if (inode) {
584 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
585 inode_doinit(inode);
586 iput(inode);
587 }
588 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
589 goto next_inode;
590 }
591 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
592out:
593 return rc;
594}
595
596/*
597 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
598 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
599 * mount options, or whatever.
600 */
601static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
602 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
603{
604 int rc = 0, i;
605 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
606 char *context = NULL;
607 u32 len;
608 char tmp;
609
610 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
611
612 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
613 return -EINVAL;
614
615 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
616 return -EINVAL;
617
618 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
619 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
620
621 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
622 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
623 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
624 if (tmp & 0x01)
625 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
626 tmp >>= 1;
627 }
628 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
629 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
630 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
631
632 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
633 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
634 rc = -ENOMEM;
635 goto out_free;
636 }
637
638 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
639 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
640 rc = -ENOMEM;
641 goto out_free;
642 }
643
644 i = 0;
645 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
646 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid,
647 &context, &len);
648 if (rc)
649 goto out_free;
650 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
651 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
652 }
653 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
654 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
655 sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
656 &context, &len);
657 if (rc)
658 goto out_free;
659 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
660 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
661 }
662 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
663 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
664 &context, &len);
665 if (rc)
666 goto out_free;
667 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
668 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
669 }
670 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
671 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
672 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
673
674 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
675 &context, &len);
676 if (rc)
677 goto out_free;
678 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
679 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
680 }
681 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
682 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
683 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
684 }
685
686 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
687
688 return 0;
689
690out_free:
691 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
692 return rc;
693}
694
695static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
696 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
697{
698 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
699
700 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
701 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
702 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
703 (old_sid != new_sid))
704 return 1;
705
706 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
707 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
708 */
709 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
710 if (mnt_flags & flag)
711 return 1;
712 return 0;
713}
714
715/*
716 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
717 * labeling information.
718 */
719static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
720 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
721 unsigned long kern_flags,
722 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
723{
724 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
725 int rc = 0, i;
726 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
727 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
728 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
729 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
730 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
731 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
732 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
733 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
734 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
735
736 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
737
738 if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
739 if (!num_opts) {
740 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
741 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
742 server is ready to handle calls. */
743 goto out;
744 }
745 rc = -EINVAL;
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
747 "before the security server is initialized\n");
748 goto out;
749 }
750 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
751 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
752 * place the results is not allowed */
753 rc = -EINVAL;
754 goto out;
755 }
756
757 /*
758 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
759 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
760 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
761 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
762 *
763 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
764 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
765 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
766 * will be used for both mounts)
767 */
768 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
769 && (num_opts == 0))
770 goto out;
771
772 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
773
774 /*
775 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
776 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
777 * than once with different security options.
778 */
779 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
780 u32 sid;
781
782 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
783 continue;
784 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
785 mount_options[i], &sid,
786 GFP_KERNEL);
787 if (rc) {
788 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
789 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
790 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
791 goto out;
792 }
793 switch (flags[i]) {
794 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
795 fscontext_sid = sid;
796
797 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
798 fscontext_sid))
799 goto out_double_mount;
800
801 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
802 break;
803 case CONTEXT_MNT:
804 context_sid = sid;
805
806 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
807 context_sid))
808 goto out_double_mount;
809
810 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
811 break;
812 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
813 rootcontext_sid = sid;
814
815 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
816 rootcontext_sid))
817 goto out_double_mount;
818
819 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
820
821 break;
822 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
823 defcontext_sid = sid;
824
825 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
826 defcontext_sid))
827 goto out_double_mount;
828
829 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
830
831 break;
832 default:
833 rc = -EINVAL;
834 goto out;
835 }
836 }
837
838 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
839 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
840 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
841 goto out_double_mount;
842 rc = 0;
843 goto out;
844 }
845
846 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
847 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
848
849 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
850 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
851 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
852 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
853 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
854 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
855 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
856
857 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
858 /*
859 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
860 * filesystem type.
861 */
862 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
863 if (rc) {
864 printk(KERN_WARNING
865 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
866 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
867 goto out;
868 }
869 }
870
871 /*
872 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
873 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
874 * line and security labels must be ignored.
875 */
876 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
877 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
878 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
879 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
880 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
881 defcontext_sid) {
882 rc = -EACCES;
883 goto out;
884 }
885 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
886 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
887 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
888 current_sid(),
889 current_sid(),
890 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
891 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
892 if (rc)
893 goto out;
894 }
895 goto out_set_opts;
896 }
897
898 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
899 if (fscontext_sid) {
900 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
901 if (rc)
902 goto out;
903
904 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
905 }
906
907 /*
908 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
909 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
910 * the superblock context if not already set.
911 */
912 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
913 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
914 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
915 }
916
917 if (context_sid) {
918 if (!fscontext_sid) {
919 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
920 cred);
921 if (rc)
922 goto out;
923 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
924 } else {
925 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
926 cred);
927 if (rc)
928 goto out;
929 }
930 if (!rootcontext_sid)
931 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
932
933 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
934 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
935 }
936
937 if (rootcontext_sid) {
938 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
939 cred);
940 if (rc)
941 goto out;
942
943 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
944 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
945 }
946
947 if (defcontext_sid) {
948 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
949 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
950 rc = -EINVAL;
951 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
952 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
953 goto out;
954 }
955
956 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
957 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
958 sbsec, cred);
959 if (rc)
960 goto out;
961 }
962
963 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
964 }
965
966out_set_opts:
967 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
968out:
969 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
970 return rc;
971out_double_mount:
972 rc = -EINVAL;
973 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
974 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
975 goto out;
976}
977
978static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
979 const struct super_block *newsb)
980{
981 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
982 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
983 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
984 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
985
986 if (oldflags != newflags)
987 goto mismatch;
988 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
989 goto mismatch;
990 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
991 goto mismatch;
992 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
993 goto mismatch;
994 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
995 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
996 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
997 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
998 goto mismatch;
999 }
1000 return 0;
1001mismatch:
1002 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
1003 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
1004 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
1005 return -EBUSY;
1006}
1007
1008static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
1009 struct super_block *newsb,
1010 unsigned long kern_flags,
1011 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
1012{
1013 int rc = 0;
1014 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
1015 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
1016
1017 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
1018 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
1019 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
1020
1021 /*
1022 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
1023 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
1024 */
1025 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
1026 return 0;
1027
1028 /*
1029 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
1030 * place the results is not allowed.
1031 */
1032 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
1033 return -EINVAL;
1034
1035 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
1036 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
1037
1038 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
1039 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
1040 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
1041
1042 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
1043
1044 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
1045
1046 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
1047 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
1048 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
1049
1050 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
1051 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
1052 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
1053 if (rc)
1054 goto out;
1055 }
1056
1057 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
1058 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
1059 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
1060 }
1061
1062 if (set_context) {
1063 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1064
1065 if (!set_fscontext)
1066 newsbsec->sid = sid;
1067 if (!set_rootcontext) {
1068 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
1069 newisec->sid = sid;
1070 }
1071 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
1072 }
1073 if (set_rootcontext) {
1074 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
1075 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
1076
1077 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
1078 }
1079
1080 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
1081out:
1082 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
1083 return rc;
1084}
1085
1086static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
1087 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1088{
1089 char *p;
1090 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
1091 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
1092 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
1093
1094 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
1095
1096 /* Standard string-based options. */
1097 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
1098 int token;
1099 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
1100
1101 if (!*p)
1102 continue;
1103
1104 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
1105
1106 switch (token) {
1107 case Opt_context:
1108 if (context || defcontext) {
1109 rc = -EINVAL;
1110 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1111 goto out_err;
1112 }
1113 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1114 if (!context) {
1115 rc = -ENOMEM;
1116 goto out_err;
1117 }
1118 break;
1119
1120 case Opt_fscontext:
1121 if (fscontext) {
1122 rc = -EINVAL;
1123 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1124 goto out_err;
1125 }
1126 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1127 if (!fscontext) {
1128 rc = -ENOMEM;
1129 goto out_err;
1130 }
1131 break;
1132
1133 case Opt_rootcontext:
1134 if (rootcontext) {
1135 rc = -EINVAL;
1136 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1137 goto out_err;
1138 }
1139 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1140 if (!rootcontext) {
1141 rc = -ENOMEM;
1142 goto out_err;
1143 }
1144 break;
1145
1146 case Opt_defcontext:
1147 if (context || defcontext) {
1148 rc = -EINVAL;
1149 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1150 goto out_err;
1151 }
1152 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1153 if (!defcontext) {
1154 rc = -ENOMEM;
1155 goto out_err;
1156 }
1157 break;
1158 case Opt_labelsupport:
1159 break;
1160 default:
1161 rc = -EINVAL;
1162 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1163 goto out_err;
1164
1165 }
1166 }
1167
1168 rc = -ENOMEM;
1169 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
1170 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1171 goto out_err;
1172
1173 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
1174 GFP_KERNEL);
1175 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
1176 goto out_err;
1177
1178 if (fscontext) {
1179 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1180 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1181 }
1182 if (context) {
1183 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1184 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1185 }
1186 if (rootcontext) {
1187 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1188 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1189 }
1190 if (defcontext) {
1191 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1192 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1193 }
1194
1195 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1196 return 0;
1197
1198out_err:
1199 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
1200 kfree(context);
1201 kfree(defcontext);
1202 kfree(fscontext);
1203 kfree(rootcontext);
1204 return rc;
1205}
1206/*
1207 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1208 */
1209static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1210{
1211 int rc = 0;
1212 char *options = data;
1213 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1214
1215 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1216
1217 if (!data)
1218 goto out;
1219
1220 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1221
1222 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1223 if (rc)
1224 goto out_err;
1225
1226out:
1227 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1228
1229out_err:
1230 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1231 return rc;
1232}
1233
1234static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1235 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1236{
1237 int i;
1238 char *prefix;
1239
1240 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1241 char *has_comma;
1242
1243 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1244 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1245 else
1246 has_comma = NULL;
1247
1248 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1249 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1250 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1251 break;
1252 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1253 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1254 break;
1255 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1256 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1257 break;
1258 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1259 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1260 break;
1261 case SBLABEL_MNT:
1262 seq_putc(m, ',');
1263 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1264 continue;
1265 default:
1266 BUG();
1267 return;
1268 };
1269 /* we need a comma before each option */
1270 seq_putc(m, ',');
1271 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1272 if (has_comma)
1273 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1274 seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
1275 if (has_comma)
1276 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1277 }
1278}
1279
1280static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1281{
1282 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1283 int rc;
1284
1285 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1286 if (rc) {
1287 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1288 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1289 rc = 0;
1290 return rc;
1291 }
1292
1293 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1294
1295 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1296
1297 return rc;
1298}
1299
1300static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1301{
1302 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1303 case S_IFSOCK:
1304 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1305 case S_IFLNK:
1306 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1307 case S_IFREG:
1308 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1309 case S_IFBLK:
1310 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1311 case S_IFDIR:
1312 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1313 case S_IFCHR:
1314 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1315 case S_IFIFO:
1316 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1317
1318 }
1319
1320 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1321}
1322
1323static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1324{
1325 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1326}
1327
1328static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1329{
1330 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1331}
1332
1333static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1334{
1335 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1336
1337 switch (family) {
1338 case PF_UNIX:
1339 switch (type) {
1340 case SOCK_STREAM:
1341 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1342 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1343 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1344 case SOCK_RAW:
1345 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1346 }
1347 break;
1348 case PF_INET:
1349 case PF_INET6:
1350 switch (type) {
1351 case SOCK_STREAM:
1352 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1353 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1354 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1355 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1356 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1357 else
1358 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1359 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1360 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1361 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1362 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1363 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1364 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1365 else
1366 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1367 case SOCK_DCCP:
1368 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1369 default:
1370 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1371 }
1372 break;
1373 case PF_NETLINK:
1374 switch (protocol) {
1375 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1376 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1377 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1378 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1379 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1380 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1381 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1382 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1383 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1384 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1385 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1386 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1387 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1388 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1389 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1390 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1391 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1392 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1393 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1394 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1395 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1396 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1397 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1398 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1399 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1400 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1401 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1402 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1403 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1404 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1405 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1406 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1407 default:
1408 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1409 }
1410 case PF_PACKET:
1411 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1412 case PF_KEY:
1413 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1414 case PF_APPLETALK:
1415 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1416 }
1417
1418 if (extsockclass) {
1419 switch (family) {
1420 case PF_AX25:
1421 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1422 case PF_IPX:
1423 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1424 case PF_NETROM:
1425 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1426 case PF_ATMPVC:
1427 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1428 case PF_X25:
1429 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1430 case PF_ROSE:
1431 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1432 case PF_DECnet:
1433 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1434 case PF_ATMSVC:
1435 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1436 case PF_RDS:
1437 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1438 case PF_IRDA:
1439 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1440 case PF_PPPOX:
1441 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1442 case PF_LLC:
1443 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1444 case PF_CAN:
1445 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1446 case PF_TIPC:
1447 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1448 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1449 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1450 case PF_IUCV:
1451 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1452 case PF_RXRPC:
1453 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1454 case PF_ISDN:
1455 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1456 case PF_PHONET:
1457 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1458 case PF_IEEE802154:
1459 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1460 case PF_CAIF:
1461 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1462 case PF_ALG:
1463 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1464 case PF_NFC:
1465 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1466 case PF_VSOCK:
1467 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1468 case PF_KCM:
1469 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1470 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1471 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1472 case PF_SMC:
1473 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1474#if PF_MAX > 44
1475#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1476#endif
1477 }
1478 }
1479
1480 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1481}
1482
1483static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1484 u16 tclass,
1485 u16 flags,
1486 u32 *sid)
1487{
1488 int rc;
1489 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1490 char *buffer, *path;
1491
1492 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1493 if (!buffer)
1494 return -ENOMEM;
1495
1496 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1497 if (IS_ERR(path))
1498 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1499 else {
1500 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1501 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1502 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1503 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1504 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1505 path[1] = '/';
1506 path++;
1507 }
1508 }
1509 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1510 path, tclass, sid);
1511 }
1512 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1513 return rc;
1514}
1515
1516/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1517static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1518{
1519 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1520 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1521 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1522 u16 sclass;
1523 struct dentry *dentry;
1524#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1525 char *context = NULL;
1526 unsigned len = 0;
1527 int rc = 0;
1528
1529 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1530 return 0;
1531
1532 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1533 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1534 goto out_unlock;
1535
1536 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1537 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1538
1539 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1540 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1541 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1542 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1543 server is ready to handle calls. */
1544 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1545 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1546 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1547 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1548 goto out_unlock;
1549 }
1550
1551 sclass = isec->sclass;
1552 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1553 sid = isec->sid;
1554 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1555 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1556
1557 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1558 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1559 break;
1560 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1561 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1562 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1563 break;
1564 }
1565 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1566 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1567 if (opt_dentry) {
1568 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1569 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1570 } else {
1571 /*
1572 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1573 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1574 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1575 * two, depending upon that...
1576 */
1577 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1578 if (!dentry)
1579 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1580 }
1581 if (!dentry) {
1582 /*
1583 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1584 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1585 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1586 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1587 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1588 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1589 * be used again by userspace.
1590 */
1591 goto out;
1592 }
1593
1594 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1595 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1596 if (!context) {
1597 rc = -ENOMEM;
1598 dput(dentry);
1599 goto out;
1600 }
1601 context[len] = '\0';
1602 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1603 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1604 kfree(context);
1605
1606 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1607 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1608 if (rc < 0) {
1609 dput(dentry);
1610 goto out;
1611 }
1612 len = rc;
1613 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1614 if (!context) {
1615 rc = -ENOMEM;
1616 dput(dentry);
1617 goto out;
1618 }
1619 context[len] = '\0';
1620 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1621 }
1622 dput(dentry);
1623 if (rc < 0) {
1624 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1625 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1626 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1627 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1628 kfree(context);
1629 goto out;
1630 }
1631 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1632 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1633 rc = 0;
1634 } else {
1635 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
1636 context, rc, &sid,
1637 sbsec->def_sid,
1638 GFP_NOFS);
1639 if (rc) {
1640 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1641 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1642
1643 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1644 if (printk_ratelimit())
1645 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1646 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1647 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1648 } else {
1649 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1650 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1651 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1652 }
1653 kfree(context);
1654 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1655 rc = 0;
1656 break;
1657 }
1658 }
1659 kfree(context);
1660 break;
1661 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1662 sid = task_sid;
1663 break;
1664 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1665 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1666 sid = sbsec->sid;
1667
1668 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1669 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1670 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1671 if (rc)
1672 goto out;
1673 break;
1674 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1675 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1676 break;
1677 default:
1678 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1679 sid = sbsec->sid;
1680
1681 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1682 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1683 * procfs inodes */
1684 if (opt_dentry) {
1685 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1686 * d_splice_alias. */
1687 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1688 } else {
1689 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1690 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1691 * a connected one, so try that first.
1692 */
1693 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1694 if (!dentry)
1695 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1696 }
1697 /*
1698 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1699 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1700 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1701 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1702 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1703 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1704 * could be used again by userspace.
1705 */
1706 if (!dentry)
1707 goto out;
1708 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1709 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1710 dput(dentry);
1711 if (rc)
1712 goto out;
1713 }
1714 break;
1715 }
1716
1717out:
1718 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1719 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1720 if (!sid || rc) {
1721 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1722 goto out_unlock;
1723 }
1724
1725 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1726 isec->sid = sid;
1727 }
1728
1729out_unlock:
1730 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1731 return rc;
1732}
1733
1734/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1735static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1736{
1737 u32 perm = 0;
1738
1739 switch (sig) {
1740 case SIGCHLD:
1741 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1742 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1743 break;
1744 case SIGKILL:
1745 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1746 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1747 break;
1748 case SIGSTOP:
1749 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1750 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1751 break;
1752 default:
1753 /* All other signals. */
1754 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1755 break;
1756 }
1757
1758 return perm;
1759}
1760
1761#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1762#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1763#endif
1764
1765/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1766static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1767 int cap, int audit, bool initns)
1768{
1769 struct common_audit_data ad;
1770 struct av_decision avd;
1771 u16 sclass;
1772 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1773 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1774 int rc;
1775
1776 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1777 ad.u.cap = cap;
1778
1779 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1780 case 0:
1781 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1782 break;
1783 case 1:
1784 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1785 break;
1786 default:
1787 printk(KERN_ERR
1788 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1789 BUG();
1790 return -EINVAL;
1791 }
1792
1793 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1794 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1795 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1796 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1797 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1798 if (rc2)
1799 return rc2;
1800 }
1801 return rc;
1802}
1803
1804/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1805 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1806 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1807static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1808 struct inode *inode,
1809 u32 perms,
1810 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1811{
1812 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1813 u32 sid;
1814
1815 validate_creds(cred);
1816
1817 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1818 return 0;
1819
1820 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1821 isec = inode->i_security;
1822
1823 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1824 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1825}
1826
1827/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1828 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1829 pathname if needed. */
1830static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1831 struct dentry *dentry,
1832 u32 av)
1833{
1834 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1835 struct common_audit_data ad;
1836
1837 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1838 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1839 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1840 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1841}
1842
1843/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1844 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1845 pathname if needed. */
1846static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1847 const struct path *path,
1848 u32 av)
1849{
1850 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1851 struct common_audit_data ad;
1852
1853 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1854 ad.u.path = *path;
1855 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1856 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1857}
1858
1859/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1860static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1861 struct file *file,
1862 u32 av)
1863{
1864 struct common_audit_data ad;
1865
1866 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1867 ad.u.file = file;
1868 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1869}
1870
1871#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1872static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1873#endif
1874
1875/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1876 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1877 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1878 check a particular permission to the file.
1879 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1880 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1881 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1882 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1883static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1884 struct file *file,
1885 u32 av)
1886{
1887 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1888 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1889 struct common_audit_data ad;
1890 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1891 int rc;
1892
1893 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1894 ad.u.file = file;
1895
1896 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1897 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1898 sid, fsec->sid,
1899 SECCLASS_FD,
1900 FD__USE,
1901 &ad);
1902 if (rc)
1903 goto out;
1904 }
1905
1906#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1907 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1908 if (rc)
1909 return rc;
1910#endif
1911
1912 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1913 rc = 0;
1914 if (av)
1915 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1916
1917out:
1918 return rc;
1919}
1920
1921/*
1922 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1923 */
1924static int
1925selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1926 struct inode *dir,
1927 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1928 u32 *_new_isid)
1929{
1930 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1931
1932 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1933 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1934 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1935 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1936 tsec->create_sid) {
1937 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1938 } else {
1939 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1940 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1941 dsec->sid, tclass,
1942 name, _new_isid);
1943 }
1944
1945 return 0;
1946}
1947
1948/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1949static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1950 struct dentry *dentry,
1951 u16 tclass)
1952{
1953 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1954 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1955 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1956 u32 sid, newsid;
1957 struct common_audit_data ad;
1958 int rc;
1959
1960 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1961 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1962
1963 sid = tsec->sid;
1964
1965 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1966 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1967
1968 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1969 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1970 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1971 &ad);
1972 if (rc)
1973 return rc;
1974
1975 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
1976 &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
1977 if (rc)
1978 return rc;
1979
1980 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1981 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1982 if (rc)
1983 return rc;
1984
1985 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1986 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1987 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1988 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1989}
1990
1991#define MAY_LINK 0
1992#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1993#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1994
1995/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1996static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1997 struct dentry *dentry,
1998 int kind)
1999
2000{
2001 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
2002 struct common_audit_data ad;
2003 u32 sid = current_sid();
2004 u32 av;
2005 int rc;
2006
2007 dsec = inode_security(dir);
2008 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2009
2010 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2011 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2012
2013 av = DIR__SEARCH;
2014 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
2015 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2016 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
2017 if (rc)
2018 return rc;
2019
2020 switch (kind) {
2021 case MAY_LINK:
2022 av = FILE__LINK;
2023 break;
2024 case MAY_UNLINK:
2025 av = FILE__UNLINK;
2026 break;
2027 case MAY_RMDIR:
2028 av = DIR__RMDIR;
2029 break;
2030 default:
2031 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
2032 __func__, kind);
2033 return 0;
2034 }
2035
2036 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2037 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
2038 return rc;
2039}
2040
2041static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
2042 struct dentry *old_dentry,
2043 struct inode *new_dir,
2044 struct dentry *new_dentry)
2045{
2046 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
2047 struct common_audit_data ad;
2048 u32 sid = current_sid();
2049 u32 av;
2050 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
2051 int rc;
2052
2053 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
2054 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
2055 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
2056 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
2057
2058 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2059
2060 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
2061 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2062 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
2063 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
2064 if (rc)
2065 return rc;
2066 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2067 sid, old_isec->sid,
2068 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
2069 if (rc)
2070 return rc;
2071 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
2072 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2073 sid, old_isec->sid,
2074 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
2075 if (rc)
2076 return rc;
2077 }
2078
2079 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
2080 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
2081 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
2082 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
2083 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2084 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
2085 if (rc)
2086 return rc;
2087 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
2088 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
2089 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
2090 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2091 sid, new_isec->sid,
2092 new_isec->sclass,
2093 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
2094 if (rc)
2095 return rc;
2096 }
2097
2098 return 0;
2099}
2100
2101/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
2102static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
2103 struct super_block *sb,
2104 u32 perms,
2105 struct common_audit_data *ad)
2106{
2107 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2108 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2109
2110 sbsec = sb->s_security;
2111 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2112 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
2113}
2114
2115/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
2116static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
2117{
2118 u32 av = 0;
2119
2120 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
2121 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2122 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2123 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2124 av |= FILE__READ;
2125
2126 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
2127 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2128 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2129 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2130
2131 } else {
2132 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2133 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
2134 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2135 av |= DIR__WRITE;
2136 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2137 av |= DIR__READ;
2138 }
2139
2140 return av;
2141}
2142
2143/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2144static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2145{
2146 u32 av = 0;
2147
2148 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2149 av |= FILE__READ;
2150 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2151 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2152 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2153 else
2154 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2155 }
2156 if (!av) {
2157 /*
2158 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2159 */
2160 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2161 }
2162
2163 return av;
2164}
2165
2166/*
2167 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2168 * open permission.
2169 */
2170static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2171{
2172 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2173 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2174
2175 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2176 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2177 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2178
2179 return av;
2180}
2181
2182/* Hook functions begin here. */
2183
2184static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2185{
2186 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2187 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2188
2189 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2190 mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2191 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2192}
2193
2194static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2195 struct task_struct *to)
2196{
2197 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2198 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2199 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2200 int rc;
2201
2202 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2203 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2204 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2205 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2206 if (rc)
2207 return rc;
2208 }
2209
2210 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2211 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2212 NULL);
2213}
2214
2215static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2216 struct task_struct *to)
2217{
2218 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2219 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2220
2221 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2222 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2223 NULL);
2224}
2225
2226static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2227 struct task_struct *to,
2228 struct file *file)
2229{
2230 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2231 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2232 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2233 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2234 struct common_audit_data ad;
2235 int rc;
2236
2237 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2238 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2239
2240 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2241 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2242 sid, fsec->sid,
2243 SECCLASS_FD,
2244 FD__USE,
2245 &ad);
2246 if (rc)
2247 return rc;
2248 }
2249
2250#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2251 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2252 if (rc)
2253 return rc;
2254#endif
2255
2256 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2257 return 0;
2258
2259 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2260 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2261 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2262 &ad);
2263}
2264
2265static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2266 unsigned int mode)
2267{
2268 u32 sid = current_sid();
2269 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2270
2271 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2272 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2273 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2274
2275 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2276 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2277}
2278
2279static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2280{
2281 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2282 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2283 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2284}
2285
2286static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2287 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2288{
2289 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2290 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2291 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2292}
2293
2294static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2295 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2296 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2297 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2298{
2299 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2300 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2301 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2302}
2303
2304/*
2305 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2306 * which was removed).
2307 *
2308 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2309 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2310 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2311 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2312 */
2313
2314static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2315 int cap, int audit)
2316{
2317 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
2318}
2319
2320static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2321{
2322 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2323 int rc = 0;
2324
2325 if (!sb)
2326 return 0;
2327
2328 switch (cmds) {
2329 case Q_SYNC:
2330 case Q_QUOTAON:
2331 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2332 case Q_SETINFO:
2333 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2334 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2335 break;
2336 case Q_GETFMT:
2337 case Q_GETINFO:
2338 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2339 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2340 break;
2341 default:
2342 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2343 break;
2344 }
2345 return rc;
2346}
2347
2348static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2349{
2350 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2351
2352 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2353}
2354
2355static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2356{
2357 switch (type) {
2358 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2359 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2360 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2361 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2362 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2363 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2364 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2365 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2366 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2367 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2368 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2369 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2370 NULL);
2371 }
2372 /* All other syslog types */
2373 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2374 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2375 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2376}
2377
2378/*
2379 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2380 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2381 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2382 *
2383 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2384 * processes that allocate mappings.
2385 */
2386static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2387{
2388 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2389
2390 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2391 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
2392 if (rc == 0)
2393 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2394
2395 return cap_sys_admin;
2396}
2397
2398/* binprm security operations */
2399
2400static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2401{
2402 u32 sid = 0;
2403 struct task_struct *tracer;
2404
2405 rcu_read_lock();
2406 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2407 if (tracer)
2408 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2409 rcu_read_unlock();
2410
2411 return sid;
2412}
2413
2414static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2415 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2416 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2417{
2418 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2419 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2420 int rc;
2421 u32 av;
2422
2423 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2424 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2425
2426 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2427 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2428
2429 /*
2430 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2431 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2432 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2433 * the old and new contexts.
2434 */
2435 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2436 av = 0;
2437 if (nnp)
2438 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2439 if (nosuid)
2440 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2441 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2442 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2443 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2444 if (!rc)
2445 return 0;
2446 }
2447
2448 /*
2449 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2450 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2451 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2452 */
2453 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2454 new_tsec->sid);
2455 if (!rc)
2456 return 0;
2457
2458 /*
2459 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2460 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2461 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2462 */
2463 if (nnp)
2464 return -EPERM;
2465 return -EACCES;
2466}
2467
2468static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2469{
2470 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2471 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2472 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2473 struct common_audit_data ad;
2474 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2475 int rc;
2476
2477 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2478 * the script interpreter */
2479 if (bprm->called_set_creds)
2480 return 0;
2481
2482 old_tsec = current_security();
2483 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2484 isec = inode_security(inode);
2485
2486 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2487 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2488 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2489
2490 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2491 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2492 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2493 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2494
2495 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2496 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2497 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2498 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2499
2500 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2501 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2502 if (rc)
2503 return rc;
2504 } else {
2505 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2506 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2507 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2508 &new_tsec->sid);
2509 if (rc)
2510 return rc;
2511
2512 /*
2513 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2514 * transition.
2515 */
2516 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2517 if (rc)
2518 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2519 }
2520
2521 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2522 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2523
2524 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2525 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2526 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2527 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2528 if (rc)
2529 return rc;
2530 } else {
2531 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2532 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2533 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2534 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2535 if (rc)
2536 return rc;
2537
2538 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2539 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2540 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2541 if (rc)
2542 return rc;
2543
2544 /* Check for shared state */
2545 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2546 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2547 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2548 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2549 NULL);
2550 if (rc)
2551 return -EPERM;
2552 }
2553
2554 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2555 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2556 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2557 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2558 if (ptsid != 0) {
2559 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2560 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2561 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2562 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2563 if (rc)
2564 return -EPERM;
2565 }
2566 }
2567
2568 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2569 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2570
2571 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2572 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2573 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2574 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2575 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2576 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2577 NULL);
2578 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2579 }
2580
2581 return 0;
2582}
2583
2584static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2585{
2586 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2587}
2588
2589/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2590static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2591 struct files_struct *files)
2592{
2593 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2594 struct tty_struct *tty;
2595 int drop_tty = 0;
2596 unsigned n;
2597
2598 tty = get_current_tty();
2599 if (tty) {
2600 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2601 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2602 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2603
2604 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2605 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2606 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2607 open file may belong to another process and we are
2608 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2609 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2610 struct tty_file_private, list);
2611 file = file_priv->file;
2612 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2613 drop_tty = 1;
2614 }
2615 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2616 tty_kref_put(tty);
2617 }
2618 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2619 if (drop_tty)
2620 no_tty();
2621
2622 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2623 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2624 if (!n) /* none found? */
2625 return;
2626
2627 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2628 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2629 devnull = NULL;
2630 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2631 do {
2632 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2633 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2634 if (devnull)
2635 fput(devnull);
2636}
2637
2638/*
2639 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2640 */
2641static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2642{
2643 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2644 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2645 int rc, i;
2646
2647 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2648 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2649 return;
2650
2651 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2652 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2653
2654 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2655 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2656
2657 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2658 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2659 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2660 *
2661 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2662 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2663 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2664 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2665 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2666 */
2667 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2668 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2669 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2670 if (rc) {
2671 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2672 task_lock(current);
2673 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2674 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2675 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2676 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2677 }
2678 task_unlock(current);
2679 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2680 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2681 }
2682}
2683
2684/*
2685 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2686 * due to exec
2687 */
2688static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2689{
2690 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2691 struct itimerval itimer;
2692 u32 osid, sid;
2693 int rc, i;
2694
2695 osid = tsec->osid;
2696 sid = tsec->sid;
2697
2698 if (sid == osid)
2699 return;
2700
2701 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2702 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2703 * flush and unblock signals.
2704 *
2705 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2706 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2707 */
2708 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2709 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2710 if (rc) {
2711 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
2712 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2713 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2714 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2715 }
2716 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2717 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2718 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2719 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2720 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2721 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2722 recalc_sigpending();
2723 }
2724 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2725 }
2726
2727 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2728 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2729 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2730 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2731 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2732}
2733
2734/* superblock security operations */
2735
2736static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2737{
2738 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2739}
2740
2741static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2742{
2743 superblock_free_security(sb);
2744}
2745
2746static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2747{
2748 if (plen > olen)
2749 return 0;
2750
2751 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2752}
2753
2754static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2755{
2756 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2757 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2758 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2759 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2760 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2761}
2762
2763static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2764{
2765 if (!*first) {
2766 **to = ',';
2767 *to += 1;
2768 } else
2769 *first = 0;
2770 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2771 *to += len;
2772}
2773
2774static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2775 int len)
2776{
2777 int current_size = 0;
2778
2779 if (!*first) {
2780 **to = '|';
2781 *to += 1;
2782 } else
2783 *first = 0;
2784
2785 while (current_size < len) {
2786 if (*from != '"') {
2787 **to = *from;
2788 *to += 1;
2789 }
2790 from += 1;
2791 current_size += 1;
2792 }
2793}
2794
2795static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2796{
2797 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2798 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2799 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2800 int open_quote = 0;
2801
2802 in_curr = orig;
2803 sec_curr = copy;
2804
2805 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2806 if (!nosec) {
2807 rc = -ENOMEM;
2808 goto out;
2809 }
2810
2811 nosec_save = nosec;
2812 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2813 in_save = in_end = orig;
2814
2815 do {
2816 if (*in_end == '"')
2817 open_quote = !open_quote;
2818 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2819 *in_end == '\0') {
2820 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2821
2822 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2823 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2824 else
2825 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2826
2827 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2828 }
2829 } while (*in_end++);
2830
2831 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2832 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2833out:
2834 return rc;
2835}
2836
2837static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2838{
2839 int rc, i, *flags;
2840 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2841 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2842 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2843
2844 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2845 return 0;
2846
2847 if (!data)
2848 return 0;
2849
2850 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2851 return 0;
2852
2853 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2854 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2855 if (!secdata)
2856 return -ENOMEM;
2857 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2858 if (rc)
2859 goto out_free_secdata;
2860
2861 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2862 if (rc)
2863 goto out_free_secdata;
2864
2865 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2866 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2867
2868 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2869 u32 sid;
2870
2871 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2872 continue;
2873 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
2874 mount_options[i], &sid,
2875 GFP_KERNEL);
2876 if (rc) {
2877 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2878 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2879 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2880 goto out_free_opts;
2881 }
2882 rc = -EINVAL;
2883 switch (flags[i]) {
2884 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2885 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2886 goto out_bad_option;
2887 break;
2888 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2889 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2890 goto out_bad_option;
2891 break;
2892 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2893 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2894 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2895
2896 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2897 goto out_bad_option;
2898 break;
2899 }
2900 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2901 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2902 goto out_bad_option;
2903 break;
2904 default:
2905 goto out_free_opts;
2906 }
2907 }
2908
2909 rc = 0;
2910out_free_opts:
2911 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2912out_free_secdata:
2913 free_secdata(secdata);
2914 return rc;
2915out_bad_option:
2916 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2917 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2918 sb->s_type->name);
2919 goto out_free_opts;
2920}
2921
2922static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2923{
2924 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2925 struct common_audit_data ad;
2926 int rc;
2927
2928 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2929 if (rc)
2930 return rc;
2931
2932 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2933 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2934 return 0;
2935
2936 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2937 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2938 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2939}
2940
2941static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2942{
2943 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2944 struct common_audit_data ad;
2945
2946 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2947 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2948 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2949}
2950
2951static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2952 const struct path *path,
2953 const char *type,
2954 unsigned long flags,
2955 void *data)
2956{
2957 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2958
2959 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2960 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2961 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2962 else
2963 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2964}
2965
2966static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2967{
2968 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2969
2970 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2971 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2972}
2973
2974/* inode security operations */
2975
2976static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2977{
2978 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2979}
2980
2981static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2982{
2983 inode_free_security(inode);
2984}
2985
2986static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2987 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2988 u32 *ctxlen)
2989{
2990 u32 newsid;
2991 int rc;
2992
2993 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
2994 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2995 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2996 &newsid);
2997 if (rc)
2998 return rc;
2999
3000 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
3001 ctxlen);
3002}
3003
3004static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
3005 struct qstr *name,
3006 const struct cred *old,
3007 struct cred *new)
3008{
3009 u32 newsid;
3010 int rc;
3011 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3012
3013 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
3014 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
3015 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
3016 &newsid);
3017 if (rc)
3018 return rc;
3019
3020 tsec = new->security;
3021 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
3022 return 0;
3023}
3024
3025static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
3026 const struct qstr *qstr,
3027 const char **name,
3028 void **value, size_t *len)
3029{
3030 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3031 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3032 u32 newsid, clen;
3033 int rc;
3034 char *context;
3035
3036 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
3037
3038 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3039
3040 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
3041 dir, qstr,
3042 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
3043 &newsid);
3044 if (rc)
3045 return rc;
3046
3047 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
3048 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
3049 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3050 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3051 isec->sid = newsid;
3052 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3053 }
3054
3055 if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3056 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3057
3058 if (name)
3059 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
3060
3061 if (value && len) {
3062 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3063 &context, &clen);
3064 if (rc)
3065 return rc;
3066 *value = context;
3067 *len = clen;
3068 }
3069
3070 return 0;
3071}
3072
3073static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3074{
3075 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3076}
3077
3078static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3079{
3080 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3081}
3082
3083static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3084{
3085 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3086}
3087
3088static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3089{
3090 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3091}
3092
3093static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3094{
3095 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3096}
3097
3098static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3099{
3100 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3101}
3102
3103static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3104{
3105 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3106}
3107
3108static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3109 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3110{
3111 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3112}
3113
3114static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3115{
3116 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3117
3118 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3119}
3120
3121static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3122 bool rcu)
3123{
3124 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3125 struct common_audit_data ad;
3126 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3127 u32 sid;
3128
3129 validate_creds(cred);
3130
3131 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3132 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3133 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3134 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3135 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3136 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3137
3138 return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
3139 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
3140 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
3141}
3142
3143static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3144 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3145 int result,
3146 unsigned flags)
3147{
3148 struct common_audit_data ad;
3149 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3150 int rc;
3151
3152 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3153 ad.u.inode = inode;
3154
3155 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3156 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3157 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
3158 if (rc)
3159 return rc;
3160 return 0;
3161}
3162
3163static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3164{
3165 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3166 u32 perms;
3167 bool from_access;
3168 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3169 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3170 u32 sid;
3171 struct av_decision avd;
3172 int rc, rc2;
3173 u32 audited, denied;
3174
3175 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3176 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3177
3178 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3179 if (!mask)
3180 return 0;
3181
3182 validate_creds(cred);
3183
3184 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3185 return 0;
3186
3187 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3188
3189 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3190 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
3191 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3192 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3193
3194 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3195 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
3196 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3197 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3198 &denied);
3199 if (likely(!audited))
3200 return rc;
3201
3202 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
3203 if (rc2)
3204 return rc2;
3205 return rc;
3206}
3207
3208static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3209{
3210 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3211 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3212 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3213 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3214
3215 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3216 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3217 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3218 ATTR_FORCE);
3219 if (!ia_valid)
3220 return 0;
3221 }
3222
3223 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3224 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3225 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3226
3227 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3228 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3229 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3230 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3231 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3232
3233 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3234}
3235
3236static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3237{
3238 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3239}
3240
3241static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3242{
3243 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3244 int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
3245
3246 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
3247 return false;
3248 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
3249 return false;
3250 return true;
3251}
3252
3253static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3254 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3255{
3256 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3257 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3258 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3259 struct common_audit_data ad;
3260 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3261 int rc = 0;
3262
3263 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3264 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3265 if (rc)
3266 return rc;
3267
3268 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3269 ordinary setattr permission. */
3270 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3271 }
3272
3273 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3274 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3275 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3276
3277 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3278 return -EPERM;
3279
3280 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3281 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3282
3283 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3284 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3285 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3286 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3287 if (rc)
3288 return rc;
3289
3290 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3291 GFP_KERNEL);
3292 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3293 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3294 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3295 size_t audit_size;
3296
3297 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3298 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3299 if (value) {
3300 const char *str = value;
3301
3302 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3303 audit_size = size - 1;
3304 else
3305 audit_size = size;
3306 } else {
3307 audit_size = 0;
3308 }
3309 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3310 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3311 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3312 audit_log_end(ab);
3313
3314 return rc;
3315 }
3316 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3317 size, &newsid);
3318 }
3319 if (rc)
3320 return rc;
3321
3322 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3323 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3324 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3325 if (rc)
3326 return rc;
3327
3328 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3329 sid, isec->sclass);
3330 if (rc)
3331 return rc;
3332
3333 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3334 newsid,
3335 sbsec->sid,
3336 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3337 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3338 &ad);
3339}
3340
3341static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3342 const void *value, size_t size,
3343 int flags)
3344{
3345 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3346 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3347 u32 newsid;
3348 int rc;
3349
3350 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3351 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3352 return;
3353 }
3354
3355 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3356 &newsid);
3357 if (rc) {
3358 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3359 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3360 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3361 return;
3362 }
3363
3364 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3365 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3366 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3367 isec->sid = newsid;
3368 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3369 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3370
3371 return;
3372}
3373
3374static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3375{
3376 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3377
3378 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3379}
3380
3381static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3382{
3383 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3384
3385 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3386}
3387
3388static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3389{
3390 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3391 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3392 if (rc)
3393 return rc;
3394
3395 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3396 ordinary setattr permission. */
3397 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3398 }
3399
3400 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3401 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3402 return -EACCES;
3403}
3404
3405/*
3406 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3407 *
3408 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3409 */
3410static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3411{
3412 u32 size;
3413 int error;
3414 char *context = NULL;
3415 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3416
3417 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3418 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3419
3420 /*
3421 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3422 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3423 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3424 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3425 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3426 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3427 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3428 */
3429 isec = inode_security(inode);
3430 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3431 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3432 isec->sid, &context,
3433 &size);
3434 else
3435 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3436 &context, &size);
3437 if (error)
3438 return error;
3439 error = size;
3440 if (alloc) {
3441 *buffer = context;
3442 goto out_nofree;
3443 }
3444 kfree(context);
3445out_nofree:
3446 return error;
3447}
3448
3449static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3450 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3451{
3452 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3453 u32 newsid;
3454 int rc;
3455
3456 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3457 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3458
3459 if (!value || !size)
3460 return -EACCES;
3461
3462 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3463 GFP_KERNEL);
3464 if (rc)
3465 return rc;
3466
3467 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3468 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3469 isec->sid = newsid;
3470 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3471 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3472 return 0;
3473}
3474
3475static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3476{
3477 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3478 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3479 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3480 return len;
3481}
3482
3483static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3484{
3485 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3486 *secid = isec->sid;
3487}
3488
3489static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3490{
3491 u32 sid;
3492 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3493 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3494
3495 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3496 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3497 if (!new_creds)
3498 return -ENOMEM;
3499 }
3500
3501 tsec = new_creds->security;
3502 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3503 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3504 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3505 *new = new_creds;
3506 return 0;
3507}
3508
3509static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3510{
3511 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3512 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3513 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3514 */
3515 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3516 return 1; /* Discard */
3517 /*
3518 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3519 * by selinux.
3520 */
3521 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3522}
3523
3524/* file security operations */
3525
3526static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3527{
3528 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3529 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3530
3531 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3532 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3533 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3534
3535 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3536 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3537}
3538
3539static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3540{
3541 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3542 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3543 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3544 u32 sid = current_sid();
3545
3546 if (!mask)
3547 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3548 return 0;
3549
3550 isec = inode_security(inode);
3551 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3552 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3553 /* No change since file_open check. */
3554 return 0;
3555
3556 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3557}
3558
3559static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3560{
3561 return file_alloc_security(file);
3562}
3563
3564static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3565{
3566 file_free_security(file);
3567}
3568
3569/*
3570 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3571 * operation to an inode.
3572 */
3573static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3574 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3575{
3576 struct common_audit_data ad;
3577 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3578 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3579 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3580 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3581 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3582 int rc;
3583 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3584 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3585
3586 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3587 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3588 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3589 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3590
3591 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3592 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3593 ssid, fsec->sid,
3594 SECCLASS_FD,
3595 FD__USE,
3596 &ad);
3597 if (rc)
3598 goto out;
3599 }
3600
3601 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3602 return 0;
3603
3604 isec = inode_security(inode);
3605 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3606 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3607 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3608out:
3609 return rc;
3610}
3611
3612static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3613 unsigned long arg)
3614{
3615 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3616 int error = 0;
3617
3618 switch (cmd) {
3619 case FIONREAD:
3620 /* fall through */
3621 case FIBMAP:
3622 /* fall through */
3623 case FIGETBSZ:
3624 /* fall through */
3625 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3626 /* fall through */
3627 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3628 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3629 break;
3630
3631 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3632 /* fall through */
3633 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3634 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3635 break;
3636
3637 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3638 case FIONBIO:
3639 /* fall through */
3640 case FIOASYNC:
3641 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3642 break;
3643
3644 case KDSKBENT:
3645 case KDSKBSENT:
3646 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3647 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
3648 break;
3649
3650 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3651 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3652 */
3653 default:
3654 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3655 }
3656 return error;
3657}
3658
3659static int default_noexec;
3660
3661static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3662{
3663 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3664 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3665 int rc = 0;
3666
3667 if (default_noexec &&
3668 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3669 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3670 /*
3671 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3672 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3673 * This has an additional check.
3674 */
3675 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3676 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3677 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3678 if (rc)
3679 goto error;
3680 }
3681
3682 if (file) {
3683 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3684 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3685
3686 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3687 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3688 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3689
3690 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3691 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3692
3693 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3694 }
3695
3696error:
3697 return rc;
3698}
3699
3700static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3701{
3702 int rc = 0;
3703
3704 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3705 u32 sid = current_sid();
3706 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3707 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3708 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3709 }
3710
3711 return rc;
3712}
3713
3714static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3715 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3716{
3717 struct common_audit_data ad;
3718 int rc;
3719
3720 if (file) {
3721 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3722 ad.u.file = file;
3723 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3724 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3725 if (rc)
3726 return rc;
3727 }
3728
3729 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3730 prot = reqprot;
3731
3732 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3733 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3734}
3735
3736static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3737 unsigned long reqprot,
3738 unsigned long prot)
3739{
3740 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3741 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3742
3743 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3744 prot = reqprot;
3745
3746 if (default_noexec &&
3747 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3748 int rc = 0;
3749 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3750 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3751 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3752 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3753 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3754 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3755 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3756 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3757 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3758 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3759 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3760 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3761 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3762 /*
3763 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3764 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3765 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3766 * modified content. This typically should only
3767 * occur for text relocations.
3768 */
3769 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3770 }
3771 if (rc)
3772 return rc;
3773 }
3774
3775 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3776}
3777
3778static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3779{
3780 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3781
3782 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3783}
3784
3785static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3786 unsigned long arg)
3787{
3788 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3789 int err = 0;
3790
3791 switch (cmd) {
3792 case F_SETFL:
3793 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3794 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3795 break;
3796 }
3797 /* fall through */
3798 case F_SETOWN:
3799 case F_SETSIG:
3800 case F_GETFL:
3801 case F_GETOWN:
3802 case F_GETSIG:
3803 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3804 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3805 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3806 break;
3807 case F_GETLK:
3808 case F_SETLK:
3809 case F_SETLKW:
3810 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3811 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3812 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3813#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3814 case F_GETLK64:
3815 case F_SETLK64:
3816 case F_SETLKW64:
3817#endif
3818 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3819 break;
3820 }
3821
3822 return err;
3823}
3824
3825static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3826{
3827 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3828
3829 fsec = file->f_security;
3830 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3831}
3832
3833static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3834 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3835{
3836 struct file *file;
3837 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3838 u32 perm;
3839 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3840
3841 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3842 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3843
3844 fsec = file->f_security;
3845
3846 if (!signum)
3847 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3848 else
3849 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3850
3851 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3852 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3853 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3854}
3855
3856static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3857{
3858 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3859
3860 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3861}
3862
3863static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3864{
3865 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3866 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3867
3868 fsec = file->f_security;
3869 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3870 /*
3871 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3872 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3873 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3874 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3875 * struct as its SID.
3876 */
3877 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3878 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3879 /*
3880 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3881 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3882 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3883 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3884 * new inode label or new policy.
3885 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3886 */
3887 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3888}
3889
3890/* task security operations */
3891
3892static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3893 unsigned long clone_flags)
3894{
3895 u32 sid = current_sid();
3896
3897 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3898 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3899}
3900
3901/*
3902 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3903 */
3904static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3905{
3906 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3907
3908 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3909 if (!tsec)
3910 return -ENOMEM;
3911
3912 cred->security = tsec;
3913 return 0;
3914}
3915
3916/*
3917 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3918 */
3919static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3920{
3921 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3922
3923 /*
3924 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3925 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3926 */
3927 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3928 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3929 kfree(tsec);
3930}
3931
3932/*
3933 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3934 */
3935static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3936 gfp_t gfp)
3937{
3938 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3939 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3940
3941 old_tsec = old->security;
3942
3943 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3944 if (!tsec)
3945 return -ENOMEM;
3946
3947 new->security = tsec;
3948 return 0;
3949}
3950
3951/*
3952 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3953 */
3954static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3955{
3956 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3957 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3958
3959 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3960}
3961
3962static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3963{
3964 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3965}
3966
3967/*
3968 * set the security data for a kernel service
3969 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3970 */
3971static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3972{
3973 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3974 u32 sid = current_sid();
3975 int ret;
3976
3977 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3978 sid, secid,
3979 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3980 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3981 NULL);
3982 if (ret == 0) {
3983 tsec->sid = secid;
3984 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3985 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3986 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3987 }
3988 return ret;
3989}
3990
3991/*
3992 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3993 * objective context of the specified inode
3994 */
3995static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3996{
3997 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3998 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3999 u32 sid = current_sid();
4000 int ret;
4001
4002 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4003 sid, isec->sid,
4004 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4005 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4006 NULL);
4007
4008 if (ret == 0)
4009 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4010 return ret;
4011}
4012
4013static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4014{
4015 struct common_audit_data ad;
4016
4017 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4018 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4019
4020 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4021 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4022 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4023}
4024
4025static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4026{
4027 struct common_audit_data ad;
4028 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4029 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4030 u32 sid = current_sid();
4031 int rc;
4032
4033 /* init_module */
4034 if (file == NULL)
4035 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4036 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4037 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4038
4039 /* finit_module */
4040
4041 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4042 ad.u.file = file;
4043
4044 fsec = file->f_security;
4045 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4046 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4047 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4048 if (rc)
4049 return rc;
4050 }
4051
4052 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4053 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4054 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4055 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4056}
4057
4058static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4059 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
4060{
4061 int rc = 0;
4062
4063 switch (id) {
4064 case READING_MODULE:
4065 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
4066 break;
4067 default:
4068 break;
4069 }
4070
4071 return rc;
4072}
4073
4074static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4075{
4076 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4077 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4078 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4079}
4080
4081static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4082{
4083 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4084 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4085 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4086}
4087
4088static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4089{
4090 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4091 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4092 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4093}
4094
4095static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4096{
4097 *secid = task_sid(p);
4098}
4099
4100static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4101{
4102 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4103 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4104 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4105}
4106
4107static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4108{
4109 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4110 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4111 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4112}
4113
4114static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4115{
4116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4117 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4118 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4119}
4120
4121static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4122 unsigned int flags)
4123{
4124 u32 av = 0;
4125
4126 if (!flags)
4127 return 0;
4128 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4129 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4130 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4131 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4132 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4133 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4134 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4135}
4136
4137static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4138 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4139{
4140 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4141
4142 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4143 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4144 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4145 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4146 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4147 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4148 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4149 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4150
4151 return 0;
4152}
4153
4154static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4155{
4156 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4157 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4158 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4159}
4160
4161static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4162{
4163 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4164 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4165 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4166}
4167
4168static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4169{
4170 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4171 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4172 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4173}
4174
4175static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
4176 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4177{
4178 u32 secid;
4179 u32 perm;
4180
4181 if (!sig)
4182 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4183 else
4184 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4185 if (!cred)
4186 secid = current_sid();
4187 else
4188 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4189 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4190 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4191}
4192
4193static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4194 struct inode *inode)
4195{
4196 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
4197 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4198
4199 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4200 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4201 isec->sid = sid;
4202 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4203 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4204}
4205
4206/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4207static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4208 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4209{
4210 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4211 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4212
4213 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4214 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4215 if (ih == NULL)
4216 goto out;
4217
4218 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4219 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4220 goto out;
4221
4222 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4223 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4224 ret = 0;
4225
4226 if (proto)
4227 *proto = ih->protocol;
4228
4229 switch (ih->protocol) {
4230 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4231 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4232
4233 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4234 break;
4235
4236 offset += ihlen;
4237 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4238 if (th == NULL)
4239 break;
4240
4241 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4242 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4243 break;
4244 }
4245
4246 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4247 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4248
4249 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4250 break;
4251
4252 offset += ihlen;
4253 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4254 if (uh == NULL)
4255 break;
4256
4257 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4258 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4259 break;
4260 }
4261
4262 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4263 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4264
4265 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4266 break;
4267
4268 offset += ihlen;
4269 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4270 if (dh == NULL)
4271 break;
4272
4273 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4274 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4275 break;
4276 }
4277
4278#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4279 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4280 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4281
4282 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4283 break;
4284
4285 offset += ihlen;
4286 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4287 if (sh == NULL)
4288 break;
4289
4290 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4291 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4292 break;
4293 }
4294#endif
4295 default:
4296 break;
4297 }
4298out:
4299 return ret;
4300}
4301
4302#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4303
4304/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4305static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4306 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4307{
4308 u8 nexthdr;
4309 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4310 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4311 __be16 frag_off;
4312
4313 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4314 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4315 if (ip6 == NULL)
4316 goto out;
4317
4318 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4319 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4320 ret = 0;
4321
4322 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4323 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4324 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4325 if (offset < 0)
4326 goto out;
4327
4328 if (proto)
4329 *proto = nexthdr;
4330
4331 switch (nexthdr) {
4332 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4333 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4334
4335 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4336 if (th == NULL)
4337 break;
4338
4339 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4340 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4341 break;
4342 }
4343
4344 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4345 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4346
4347 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4348 if (uh == NULL)
4349 break;
4350
4351 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4352 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4353 break;
4354 }
4355
4356 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4357 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4358
4359 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4360 if (dh == NULL)
4361 break;
4362
4363 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4364 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4365 break;
4366 }
4367
4368#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4369 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4370 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4371
4372 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4373 if (sh == NULL)
4374 break;
4375
4376 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4377 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4378 break;
4379 }
4380#endif
4381 /* includes fragments */
4382 default:
4383 break;
4384 }
4385out:
4386 return ret;
4387}
4388
4389#endif /* IPV6 */
4390
4391static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4392 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4393{
4394 char *addrp;
4395 int ret;
4396
4397 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4398 case PF_INET:
4399 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4400 if (ret)
4401 goto parse_error;
4402 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4403 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4404 goto okay;
4405
4406#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4407 case PF_INET6:
4408 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4409 if (ret)
4410 goto parse_error;
4411 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4412 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4413 goto okay;
4414#endif /* IPV6 */
4415 default:
4416 addrp = NULL;
4417 goto okay;
4418 }
4419
4420parse_error:
4421 printk(KERN_WARNING
4422 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4423 " unable to parse packet\n");
4424 return ret;
4425
4426okay:
4427 if (_addrp)
4428 *_addrp = addrp;
4429 return 0;
4430}
4431
4432/**
4433 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4434 * @skb: the packet
4435 * @family: protocol family
4436 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4437 *
4438 * Description:
4439 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4440 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4441 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4442 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4443 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4444 * peer labels.
4445 *
4446 */
4447static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4448{
4449 int err;
4450 u32 xfrm_sid;
4451 u32 nlbl_sid;
4452 u32 nlbl_type;
4453
4454 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4455 if (unlikely(err))
4456 return -EACCES;
4457 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4458 if (unlikely(err))
4459 return -EACCES;
4460
4461 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4462 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4463 if (unlikely(err)) {
4464 printk(KERN_WARNING
4465 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4466 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4467 return -EACCES;
4468 }
4469
4470 return 0;
4471}
4472
4473/**
4474 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4475 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4476 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4477 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4478 *
4479 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4480 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4481 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4482 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4483 *
4484 */
4485static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4486{
4487 int err = 0;
4488
4489 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4490 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4491 conn_sid);
4492 else
4493 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4494
4495 return err;
4496}
4497
4498/* socket security operations */
4499
4500static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4501 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4502{
4503 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4504 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4505 return 0;
4506 }
4507
4508 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4509 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4510}
4511
4512static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4513{
4514 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4515 struct common_audit_data ad;
4516 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4517
4518 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4519 return 0;
4520
4521 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4522 ad.u.net = &net;
4523 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4524
4525 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4526 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4527 &ad);
4528}
4529
4530static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4531 int protocol, int kern)
4532{
4533 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4534 u32 newsid;
4535 u16 secclass;
4536 int rc;
4537
4538 if (kern)
4539 return 0;
4540
4541 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4542 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4543 if (rc)
4544 return rc;
4545
4546 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4547 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4548}
4549
4550static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4551 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4552{
4553 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4554 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4555 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4556 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4557 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4558 int err = 0;
4559
4560 if (!kern) {
4561 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4562 if (err)
4563 return err;
4564 }
4565
4566 isec->sclass = sclass;
4567 isec->sid = sid;
4568 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4569
4570 if (sock->sk) {
4571 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4572 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4573 sksec->sid = sid;
4574 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4575 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4576 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4577
4578 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4579 }
4580
4581 return err;
4582}
4583
4584/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4585 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4586 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4587
4588static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4589{
4590 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4591 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4592 u16 family;
4593 int err;
4594
4595 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4596 if (err)
4597 goto out;
4598
4599 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4600 family = sk->sk_family;
4601 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4602 char *addrp;
4603 struct common_audit_data ad;
4604 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4605 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4606 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4607 u16 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4608 unsigned short snum;
4609 u32 sid, node_perm;
4610
4611 /*
4612 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4613 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4614 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4615 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4616 */
4617 switch (family_sa) {
4618 case AF_UNSPEC:
4619 case AF_INET:
4620 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4621 return -EINVAL;
4622 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4623 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4624 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4625 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4626 */
4627 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4628 goto err_af;
4629 family_sa = AF_INET;
4630 }
4631 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4632 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4633 break;
4634 case AF_INET6:
4635 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4636 return -EINVAL;
4637 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4638 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4639 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4640 break;
4641 default:
4642 goto err_af;
4643 }
4644
4645 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4646 ad.u.net = &net;
4647 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4648 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4649
4650 if (snum) {
4651 int low, high;
4652
4653 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4654
4655 if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
4656 snum > high) {
4657 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4658 snum, &sid);
4659 if (err)
4660 goto out;
4661 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4662 sksec->sid, sid,
4663 sksec->sclass,
4664 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4665 if (err)
4666 goto out;
4667 }
4668 }
4669
4670 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4671 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4672 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4673 break;
4674
4675 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4676 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4677 break;
4678
4679 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4680 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4681 break;
4682
4683 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4684 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4685 break;
4686
4687 default:
4688 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4689 break;
4690 }
4691
4692 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4693 if (err)
4694 goto out;
4695
4696 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4697 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4698 else
4699 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4700
4701 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4702 sksec->sid, sid,
4703 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4704 if (err)
4705 goto out;
4706 }
4707out:
4708 return err;
4709err_af:
4710 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4711 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4712 return -EINVAL;
4713 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4714}
4715
4716/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4717 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
4718 */
4719static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4720 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4721{
4722 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4723 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4724 int err;
4725
4726 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4727 if (err)
4728 return err;
4729
4730 /*
4731 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4732 * for the port.
4733 */
4734 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4735 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4736 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4737 struct common_audit_data ad;
4738 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4739 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4740 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4741 unsigned short snum;
4742 u32 sid, perm;
4743
4744 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4745 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4746 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4747 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4748 */
4749 switch (address->sa_family) {
4750 case AF_INET:
4751 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4752 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4753 return -EINVAL;
4754 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4755 break;
4756 case AF_INET6:
4757 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4758 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4759 return -EINVAL;
4760 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4761 break;
4762 default:
4763 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4764 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4765 */
4766 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4767 return -EINVAL;
4768 else
4769 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4770 }
4771
4772 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4773 if (err)
4774 return err;
4775
4776 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4777 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4778 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4779 break;
4780 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4781 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4782 break;
4783 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4784 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4785 break;
4786 }
4787
4788 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4789 ad.u.net = &net;
4790 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4791 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4792 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4793 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4794 if (err)
4795 return err;
4796 }
4797
4798 return 0;
4799}
4800
4801/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4802static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4803 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4804{
4805 int err;
4806 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4807
4808 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4809 if (err)
4810 return err;
4811
4812 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4813}
4814
4815static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4816{
4817 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4818}
4819
4820static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4821{
4822 int err;
4823 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4824 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4825 u16 sclass;
4826 u32 sid;
4827
4828 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4829 if (err)
4830 return err;
4831
4832 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4833 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4834 sclass = isec->sclass;
4835 sid = isec->sid;
4836 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4837
4838 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4839 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4840 newisec->sid = sid;
4841 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4842
4843 return 0;
4844}
4845
4846static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4847 int size)
4848{
4849 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4850}
4851
4852static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4853 int size, int flags)
4854{
4855 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4856}
4857
4858static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4859{
4860 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4861}
4862
4863static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4864{
4865 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4866}
4867
4868static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4869{
4870 int err;
4871
4872 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4873 if (err)
4874 return err;
4875
4876 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4877}
4878
4879static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4880 int optname)
4881{
4882 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4883}
4884
4885static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4886{
4887 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4888}
4889
4890static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4891 struct sock *other,
4892 struct sock *newsk)
4893{
4894 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4895 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4896 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4897 struct common_audit_data ad;
4898 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4899 int err;
4900
4901 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4902 ad.u.net = &net;
4903 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4904
4905 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4906 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4907 sksec_other->sclass,
4908 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4909 if (err)
4910 return err;
4911
4912 /* server child socket */
4913 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4914 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4915 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4916 if (err)
4917 return err;
4918
4919 /* connecting socket */
4920 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4921
4922 return 0;
4923}
4924
4925static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4926 struct socket *other)
4927{
4928 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4929 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4930 struct common_audit_data ad;
4931 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4932
4933 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4934 ad.u.net = &net;
4935 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4936
4937 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4938 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4939 &ad);
4940}
4941
4942static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4943 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4944 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4945{
4946 int err;
4947 u32 if_sid;
4948 u32 node_sid;
4949
4950 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4951 if (err)
4952 return err;
4953 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4954 peer_sid, if_sid,
4955 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4956 if (err)
4957 return err;
4958
4959 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4960 if (err)
4961 return err;
4962 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4963 peer_sid, node_sid,
4964 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4965}
4966
4967static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4968 u16 family)
4969{
4970 int err = 0;
4971 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4972 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4973 struct common_audit_data ad;
4974 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4975 char *addrp;
4976
4977 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4978 ad.u.net = &net;
4979 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4980 ad.u.net->family = family;
4981 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4982 if (err)
4983 return err;
4984
4985 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4986 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4987 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4988 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4989 if (err)
4990 return err;
4991 }
4992
4993 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4994 if (err)
4995 return err;
4996 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4997
4998 return err;
4999}
5000
5001static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5002{
5003 int err;
5004 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5005 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5006 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5007 struct common_audit_data ad;
5008 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5009 char *addrp;
5010 u8 secmark_active;
5011 u8 peerlbl_active;
5012
5013 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5014 return 0;
5015
5016 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5017 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5018 family = PF_INET;
5019
5020 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5021 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5022 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5023 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5024 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5025 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5026
5027 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5028 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5029 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5030 return 0;
5031
5032 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5033 ad.u.net = &net;
5034 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5035 ad.u.net->family = family;
5036 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5037 if (err)
5038 return err;
5039
5040 if (peerlbl_active) {
5041 u32 peer_sid;
5042
5043 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5044 if (err)
5045 return err;
5046 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5047 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5048 if (err) {
5049 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5050 return err;
5051 }
5052 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5053 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5054 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5055 if (err) {
5056 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5057 return err;
5058 }
5059 }
5060
5061 if (secmark_active) {
5062 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5063 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5064 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5065 if (err)
5066 return err;
5067 }
5068
5069 return err;
5070}
5071
5072static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5073 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5074{
5075 int err = 0;
5076 char *scontext;
5077 u32 scontext_len;
5078 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5079 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5080
5081 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5082 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5083 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5084 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5085 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5086 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5087
5088 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5089 &scontext_len);
5090 if (err)
5091 return err;
5092
5093 if (scontext_len > len) {
5094 err = -ERANGE;
5095 goto out_len;
5096 }
5097
5098 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5099 err = -EFAULT;
5100
5101out_len:
5102 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5103 err = -EFAULT;
5104 kfree(scontext);
5105 return err;
5106}
5107
5108static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5109{
5110 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5111 u16 family;
5112 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5113
5114 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5115 family = PF_INET;
5116 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5117 family = PF_INET6;
5118 else if (sock)
5119 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5120 else
5121 goto out;
5122
5123 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5124 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5125 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5126 } else if (skb)
5127 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5128
5129out:
5130 *secid = peer_secid;
5131 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5132 return -EINVAL;
5133 return 0;
5134}
5135
5136static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5137{
5138 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5139
5140 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5141 if (!sksec)
5142 return -ENOMEM;
5143
5144 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5145 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5146 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5147 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5148 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5149
5150 return 0;
5151}
5152
5153static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5154{
5155 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5156
5157 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5158 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5159 kfree(sksec);
5160}
5161
5162static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5163{
5164 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5165 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5166
5167 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5168 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5169 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5170
5171 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5172}
5173
5174static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5175{
5176 if (!sk)
5177 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5178 else {
5179 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5180
5181 *secid = sksec->sid;
5182 }
5183}
5184
5185static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5186{
5187 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5188 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5189 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5190
5191 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5192 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5193 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5194 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5195}
5196
5197/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5198 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5199 * already present).
5200 */
5201static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5202 struct sk_buff *skb)
5203{
5204 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5205 struct common_audit_data ad;
5206 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5207 u8 peerlbl_active;
5208 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5209 u32 conn_sid;
5210 int err = 0;
5211
5212 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5213 return 0;
5214
5215 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5216
5217 if (peerlbl_active) {
5218 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5219 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5220 */
5221 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5222 &peer_sid);
5223 if (err)
5224 return err;
5225
5226 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5227 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5228 }
5229
5230 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5231 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5232
5233 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5234 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5235 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5236 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5237 */
5238 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5239 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5240 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5241 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5242 */
5243 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5244 ad.u.net = &net;
5245 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5246 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5247 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5248 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5249 if (err)
5250 return err;
5251 }
5252
5253 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5254 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5255 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5256 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5257 * plug this into the new socket.
5258 */
5259 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5260 if (err)
5261 return err;
5262
5263 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5264 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5265
5266 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5267 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5268}
5269
5270/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5271 * based on their @optname.
5272 */
5273static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5274 struct sockaddr *address,
5275 int addrlen)
5276{
5277 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5278 void *addr_buf;
5279 struct sockaddr *addr;
5280 struct socket *sock;
5281
5282 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5283 return 0;
5284
5285 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5286 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5287 addr_buf = address;
5288
5289 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5290 addr = addr_buf;
5291 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5292 case AF_UNSPEC:
5293 case AF_INET:
5294 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5295 break;
5296 case AF_INET6:
5297 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5298 break;
5299 default:
5300 return -EINVAL;
5301 }
5302
5303 err = -EINVAL;
5304 switch (optname) {
5305 /* Bind checks */
5306 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5307 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5308 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5309 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5310 break;
5311 /* Connect checks */
5312 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5313 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5314 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5315 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5316 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5317 if (err)
5318 return err;
5319
5320 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5321 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5322 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
5323 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5324 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5325 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5326 * primary address is selected.
5327 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5328 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5329 * selinux_socket_connect().
5330 */
5331 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5332 break;
5333 }
5334
5335 if (err)
5336 return err;
5337
5338 addr_buf += len;
5339 walk_size += len;
5340 }
5341
5342 return 0;
5343}
5344
5345/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5346static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5347 struct sock *newsk)
5348{
5349 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5350 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5351
5352 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5353 * the non-sctp clone version.
5354 */
5355 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5356 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5357
5358 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5359 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5360 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5361 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5362}
5363
5364static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5365 struct request_sock *req)
5366{
5367 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5368 int err;
5369 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5370 u32 connsid;
5371 u32 peersid;
5372
5373 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5374 if (err)
5375 return err;
5376 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5377 if (err)
5378 return err;
5379 req->secid = connsid;
5380 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5381
5382 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5383}
5384
5385static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5386 const struct request_sock *req)
5387{
5388 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5389
5390 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5391 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5392 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5393 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5394 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5395 time it will have been created and available. */
5396
5397 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5398 * thread with access to newsksec */
5399 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5400}
5401
5402static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5403{
5404 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5405 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5406
5407 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5408 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5409 family = PF_INET;
5410
5411 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5412}
5413
5414static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5415{
5416 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5417 u32 tsid;
5418
5419 __tsec = current_security();
5420 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5421
5422 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5423 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5424 NULL);
5425}
5426
5427static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5428{
5429 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5430}
5431
5432static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5433{
5434 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5435}
5436
5437static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5438 struct flowi *fl)
5439{
5440 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5441}
5442
5443static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5444{
5445 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5446
5447 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5448 if (!tunsec)
5449 return -ENOMEM;
5450 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5451
5452 *security = tunsec;
5453 return 0;
5454}
5455
5456static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5457{
5458 kfree(security);
5459}
5460
5461static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5462{
5463 u32 sid = current_sid();
5464
5465 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5466 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5467 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5468 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5469 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5470 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5471
5472 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5473 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5474 NULL);
5475}
5476
5477static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5478{
5479 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5480
5481 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5482 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5483 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5484}
5485
5486static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5487{
5488 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5489 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5490
5491 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5492 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5493 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5494 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5495 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5496 * protocols were being used */
5497
5498 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5499 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5500
5501 return 0;
5502}
5503
5504static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5505{
5506 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5507 u32 sid = current_sid();
5508 int err;
5509
5510 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5511 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5512 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5513 if (err)
5514 return err;
5515 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5516 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5517 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5518 if (err)
5519 return err;
5520 tunsec->sid = sid;
5521
5522 return 0;
5523}
5524
5525static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5526{
5527 int err = 0;
5528 u32 perm;
5529 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5530 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5531
5532 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
5533 err = -EINVAL;
5534 goto out;
5535 }
5536 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
5537
5538 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5539 if (err) {
5540 if (err == -EINVAL) {
5541 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5542 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5543 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
5544 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5545 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
5546 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5547 if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
5548 security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5549 err = 0;
5550 }
5551
5552 /* Ignore */
5553 if (err == -ENOENT)
5554 err = 0;
5555 goto out;
5556 }
5557
5558 err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5559out:
5560 return err;
5561}
5562
5563#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5564
5565static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5566 const struct net_device *indev,
5567 u16 family)
5568{
5569 int err;
5570 char *addrp;
5571 u32 peer_sid;
5572 struct common_audit_data ad;
5573 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5574 u8 secmark_active;
5575 u8 netlbl_active;
5576 u8 peerlbl_active;
5577
5578 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5579 return NF_ACCEPT;
5580
5581 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5582 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5583 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5584 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5585 return NF_ACCEPT;
5586
5587 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5588 return NF_DROP;
5589
5590 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5591 ad.u.net = &net;
5592 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5593 ad.u.net->family = family;
5594 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5595 return NF_DROP;
5596
5597 if (peerlbl_active) {
5598 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5599 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5600 if (err) {
5601 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5602 return NF_DROP;
5603 }
5604 }
5605
5606 if (secmark_active)
5607 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5608 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5609 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5610 return NF_DROP;
5611
5612 if (netlbl_active)
5613 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5614 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5615 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5616 * protection */
5617 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5618 return NF_DROP;
5619
5620 return NF_ACCEPT;
5621}
5622
5623static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5624 struct sk_buff *skb,
5625 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5626{
5627 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5628}
5629
5630#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5631static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5632 struct sk_buff *skb,
5633 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5634{
5635 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5636}
5637#endif /* IPV6 */
5638
5639static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5640 u16 family)
5641{
5642 struct sock *sk;
5643 u32 sid;
5644
5645 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5646 return NF_ACCEPT;
5647
5648 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5649 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5650 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5651 sk = skb->sk;
5652 if (sk) {
5653 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5654
5655 if (sk_listener(sk))
5656 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5657 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5658 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5659 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5660 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5661 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5662 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5663 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5664 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5665 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5666 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5667 * best we can do. */
5668 return NF_ACCEPT;
5669
5670 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5671 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5672 sid = sksec->sid;
5673 } else
5674 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5675 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5676 return NF_DROP;
5677
5678 return NF_ACCEPT;
5679}
5680
5681static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5682 struct sk_buff *skb,
5683 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5684{
5685 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5686}
5687
5688#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5689static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5690 struct sk_buff *skb,
5691 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5692{
5693 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5694}
5695#endif /* IPV6 */
5696
5697static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5698 int ifindex,
5699 u16 family)
5700{
5701 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5702 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5703 struct common_audit_data ad;
5704 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5705 char *addrp;
5706 u8 proto;
5707
5708 if (sk == NULL)
5709 return NF_ACCEPT;
5710 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5711
5712 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5713 ad.u.net = &net;
5714 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5715 ad.u.net->family = family;
5716 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5717 return NF_DROP;
5718
5719 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5720 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5721 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5722 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5723 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5724
5725 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5726 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5727
5728 return NF_ACCEPT;
5729}
5730
5731static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5732 const struct net_device *outdev,
5733 u16 family)
5734{
5735 u32 secmark_perm;
5736 u32 peer_sid;
5737 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5738 struct sock *sk;
5739 struct common_audit_data ad;
5740 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5741 char *addrp;
5742 u8 secmark_active;
5743 u8 peerlbl_active;
5744
5745 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5746 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5747 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5748 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5749 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5750 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5751
5752 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5753 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5754 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5755 return NF_ACCEPT;
5756
5757 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5758
5759#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5760 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5761 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5762 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5763 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5764 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5765 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5766 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5767 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5768 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5769 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5770 * connection. */
5771 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5772 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5773 return NF_ACCEPT;
5774#endif
5775
5776 if (sk == NULL) {
5777 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5778 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5779 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5780 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5781 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5782 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5783 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5784 return NF_DROP;
5785 } else {
5786 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5787 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5788 }
5789 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5790 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5791 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5792 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5793 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5794 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5795 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5796 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5797 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5798 * for similar problems. */
5799 u32 skb_sid;
5800 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5801
5802 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5803 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5804 return NF_DROP;
5805 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5806 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5807 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5808 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5809 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5810 * pass the packet. */
5811 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5812 switch (family) {
5813 case PF_INET:
5814 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5815 return NF_ACCEPT;
5816 break;
5817 case PF_INET6:
5818 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5819 return NF_ACCEPT;
5820 break;
5821 default:
5822 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5823 }
5824 }
5825 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5826 return NF_DROP;
5827 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5828 } else {
5829 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5830 * associated socket. */
5831 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5832 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5833 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5834 }
5835
5836 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5837 ad.u.net = &net;
5838 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5839 ad.u.net->family = family;
5840 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5841 return NF_DROP;
5842
5843 if (secmark_active)
5844 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5845 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5846 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5847 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5848
5849 if (peerlbl_active) {
5850 u32 if_sid;
5851 u32 node_sid;
5852
5853 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5854 return NF_DROP;
5855 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5856 peer_sid, if_sid,
5857 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5858 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5859
5860 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5861 return NF_DROP;
5862 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5863 peer_sid, node_sid,
5864 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5865 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5866 }
5867
5868 return NF_ACCEPT;
5869}
5870
5871static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5872 struct sk_buff *skb,
5873 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5874{
5875 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5876}
5877
5878#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5879static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5880 struct sk_buff *skb,
5881 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5882{
5883 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5884}
5885#endif /* IPV6 */
5886
5887#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5888
5889static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5890{
5891 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5892}
5893
5894static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5895 u16 sclass)
5896{
5897 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5898
5899 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5900 if (!isec)
5901 return -ENOMEM;
5902
5903 isec->sclass = sclass;
5904 isec->sid = current_sid();
5905 perm->security = isec;
5906
5907 return 0;
5908}
5909
5910static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5911{
5912 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5913 perm->security = NULL;
5914 kfree(isec);
5915}
5916
5917static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5918{
5919 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5920
5921 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5922 if (!msec)
5923 return -ENOMEM;
5924
5925 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5926 msg->security = msec;
5927
5928 return 0;
5929}
5930
5931static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5932{
5933 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5934
5935 msg->security = NULL;
5936 kfree(msec);
5937}
5938
5939static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5940 u32 perms)
5941{
5942 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5943 struct common_audit_data ad;
5944 u32 sid = current_sid();
5945
5946 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5947
5948 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5949 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5950
5951 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5952 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5953}
5954
5955static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5956{
5957 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5958}
5959
5960static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5961{
5962 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5963}
5964
5965/* message queue security operations */
5966static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5967{
5968 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5969 struct common_audit_data ad;
5970 u32 sid = current_sid();
5971 int rc;
5972
5973 rc = ipc_alloc_security(msq, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5974 if (rc)
5975 return rc;
5976
5977 isec = msq->security;
5978
5979 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5980 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5981
5982 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5983 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5984 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5985 if (rc) {
5986 ipc_free_security(msq);
5987 return rc;
5988 }
5989 return 0;
5990}
5991
5992static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5993{
5994 ipc_free_security(msq);
5995}
5996
5997static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5998{
5999 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6000 struct common_audit_data ad;
6001 u32 sid = current_sid();
6002
6003 isec = msq->security;
6004
6005 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6006 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6007
6008 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6009 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6010 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6011}
6012
6013static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6014{
6015 int err;
6016 int perms;
6017
6018 switch (cmd) {
6019 case IPC_INFO:
6020 case MSG_INFO:
6021 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6022 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6023 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6024 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6025 case IPC_STAT:
6026 case MSG_STAT:
6027 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6028 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6029 break;
6030 case IPC_SET:
6031 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6032 break;
6033 case IPC_RMID:
6034 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6035 break;
6036 default:
6037 return 0;
6038 }
6039
6040 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6041 return err;
6042}
6043
6044static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6045{
6046 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6047 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6048 struct common_audit_data ad;
6049 u32 sid = current_sid();
6050 int rc;
6051
6052 isec = msq->security;
6053 msec = msg->security;
6054
6055 /*
6056 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6057 */
6058 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6059 /*
6060 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6061 * message queue this message will be stored in
6062 */
6063 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6064 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6065 if (rc)
6066 return rc;
6067 }
6068
6069 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6070 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6071
6072 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6073 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6074 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6075 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6076 if (!rc)
6077 /* Can this process send the message */
6078 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6079 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6080 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6081 if (!rc)
6082 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6083 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6084 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6085 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6086
6087 return rc;
6088}
6089
6090static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6091 struct task_struct *target,
6092 long type, int mode)
6093{
6094 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6095 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6096 struct common_audit_data ad;
6097 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6098 int rc;
6099
6100 isec = msq->security;
6101 msec = msg->security;
6102
6103 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6104 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6105
6106 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6107 sid, isec->sid,
6108 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6109 if (!rc)
6110 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6111 sid, msec->sid,
6112 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6113 return rc;
6114}
6115
6116/* Shared Memory security operations */
6117static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6118{
6119 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6120 struct common_audit_data ad;
6121 u32 sid = current_sid();
6122 int rc;
6123
6124 rc = ipc_alloc_security(shp, SECCLASS_SHM);
6125 if (rc)
6126 return rc;
6127
6128 isec = shp->security;
6129
6130 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6131 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6132
6133 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6134 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6135 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6136 if (rc) {
6137 ipc_free_security(shp);
6138 return rc;
6139 }
6140 return 0;
6141}
6142
6143static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6144{
6145 ipc_free_security(shp);
6146}
6147
6148static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6149{
6150 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6151 struct common_audit_data ad;
6152 u32 sid = current_sid();
6153
6154 isec = shp->security;
6155
6156 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6157 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6158
6159 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6160 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6161 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6162}
6163
6164/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6165static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6166{
6167 int perms;
6168 int err;
6169
6170 switch (cmd) {
6171 case IPC_INFO:
6172 case SHM_INFO:
6173 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6174 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6175 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6176 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6177 case IPC_STAT:
6178 case SHM_STAT:
6179 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6180 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6181 break;
6182 case IPC_SET:
6183 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6184 break;
6185 case SHM_LOCK:
6186 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6187 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6188 break;
6189 case IPC_RMID:
6190 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6191 break;
6192 default:
6193 return 0;
6194 }
6195
6196 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6197 return err;
6198}
6199
6200static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6201 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6202{
6203 u32 perms;
6204
6205 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6206 perms = SHM__READ;
6207 else
6208 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6209
6210 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6211}
6212
6213/* Semaphore security operations */
6214static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6215{
6216 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6217 struct common_audit_data ad;
6218 u32 sid = current_sid();
6219 int rc;
6220
6221 rc = ipc_alloc_security(sma, SECCLASS_SEM);
6222 if (rc)
6223 return rc;
6224
6225 isec = sma->security;
6226
6227 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6228 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6229
6230 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6231 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6232 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6233 if (rc) {
6234 ipc_free_security(sma);
6235 return rc;
6236 }
6237 return 0;
6238}
6239
6240static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6241{
6242 ipc_free_security(sma);
6243}
6244
6245static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6246{
6247 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6248 struct common_audit_data ad;
6249 u32 sid = current_sid();
6250
6251 isec = sma->security;
6252
6253 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6254 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6255
6256 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6257 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6258 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6259}
6260
6261/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6262static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6263{
6264 int err;
6265 u32 perms;
6266
6267 switch (cmd) {
6268 case IPC_INFO:
6269 case SEM_INFO:
6270 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6271 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6272 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6273 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6274 case GETPID:
6275 case GETNCNT:
6276 case GETZCNT:
6277 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6278 break;
6279 case GETVAL:
6280 case GETALL:
6281 perms = SEM__READ;
6282 break;
6283 case SETVAL:
6284 case SETALL:
6285 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6286 break;
6287 case IPC_RMID:
6288 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6289 break;
6290 case IPC_SET:
6291 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6292 break;
6293 case IPC_STAT:
6294 case SEM_STAT:
6295 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6296 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6297 break;
6298 default:
6299 return 0;
6300 }
6301
6302 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6303 return err;
6304}
6305
6306static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6307 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6308{
6309 u32 perms;
6310
6311 if (alter)
6312 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6313 else
6314 perms = SEM__READ;
6315
6316 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6317}
6318
6319static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6320{
6321 u32 av = 0;
6322
6323 av = 0;
6324 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6325 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6326 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6327 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6328
6329 if (av == 0)
6330 return 0;
6331
6332 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6333}
6334
6335static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6336{
6337 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
6338 *secid = isec->sid;
6339}
6340
6341static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6342{
6343 if (inode)
6344 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6345}
6346
6347static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6348 char *name, char **value)
6349{
6350 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6351 u32 sid;
6352 int error;
6353 unsigned len;
6354
6355 rcu_read_lock();
6356 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
6357
6358 if (current != p) {
6359 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6360 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6361 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6362 if (error)
6363 goto bad;
6364 }
6365
6366 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6367 sid = __tsec->sid;
6368 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6369 sid = __tsec->osid;
6370 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6371 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6372 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6373 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6374 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6375 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6376 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6377 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6378 else {
6379 error = -EINVAL;
6380 goto bad;
6381 }
6382 rcu_read_unlock();
6383
6384 if (!sid)
6385 return 0;
6386
6387 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6388 if (error)
6389 return error;
6390 return len;
6391
6392bad:
6393 rcu_read_unlock();
6394 return error;
6395}
6396
6397static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6398{
6399 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6400 struct cred *new;
6401 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6402 int error;
6403 char *str = value;
6404
6405 /*
6406 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6407 */
6408 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6409 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6410 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6411 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6412 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6413 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6414 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6415 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6416 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6417 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6418 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6419 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6420 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6421 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6422 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6423 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6424 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6425 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6426 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6427 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6428 else
6429 error = -EINVAL;
6430 if (error)
6431 return error;
6432
6433 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6434 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6435 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6436 str[size-1] = 0;
6437 size--;
6438 }
6439 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6440 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6441 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6442 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6443 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6444 size_t audit_size;
6445
6446 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6447 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6448 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6449 audit_size = size - 1;
6450 else
6451 audit_size = size;
6452 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6453 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6454 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6455 audit_log_end(ab);
6456
6457 return error;
6458 }
6459 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6460 &selinux_state,
6461 value, size, &sid);
6462 }
6463 if (error)
6464 return error;
6465 }
6466
6467 new = prepare_creds();
6468 if (!new)
6469 return -ENOMEM;
6470
6471 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6472 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6473 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6474 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
6475 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6476 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6477 tsec = new->security;
6478 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6479 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6480 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6481 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6482 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6483 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6484 mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
6485 NULL);
6486 if (error)
6487 goto abort_change;
6488 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6489 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6490 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6491 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6492 error = -EINVAL;
6493 if (sid == 0)
6494 goto abort_change;
6495
6496 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6497 error = -EPERM;
6498 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6499 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6500 tsec->sid, sid);
6501 if (error)
6502 goto abort_change;
6503 }
6504
6505 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6506 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6507 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6508 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6509 if (error)
6510 goto abort_change;
6511
6512 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6513 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6514 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6515 if (ptsid != 0) {
6516 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6517 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6518 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6519 if (error)
6520 goto abort_change;
6521 }
6522
6523 tsec->sid = sid;
6524 } else {
6525 error = -EINVAL;
6526 goto abort_change;
6527 }
6528
6529 commit_creds(new);
6530 return size;
6531
6532abort_change:
6533 abort_creds(new);
6534 return error;
6535}
6536
6537static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6538{
6539 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6540}
6541
6542static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6543{
6544 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6545 secdata, seclen);
6546}
6547
6548static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6549{
6550 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6551 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6552}
6553
6554static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6555{
6556 kfree(secdata);
6557}
6558
6559static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6560{
6561 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
6562
6563 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6564 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6565 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6566}
6567
6568/*
6569 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6570 */
6571static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6572{
6573 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6574}
6575
6576/*
6577 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6578 */
6579static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6580{
6581 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6582}
6583
6584static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6585{
6586 int len = 0;
6587 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6588 ctx, true);
6589 if (len < 0)
6590 return len;
6591 *ctxlen = len;
6592 return 0;
6593}
6594#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6595
6596static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6597 unsigned long flags)
6598{
6599 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6600 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6601
6602 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6603 if (!ksec)
6604 return -ENOMEM;
6605
6606 tsec = cred->security;
6607 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6608 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6609 else
6610 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6611
6612 k->security = ksec;
6613 return 0;
6614}
6615
6616static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6617{
6618 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6619
6620 k->security = NULL;
6621 kfree(ksec);
6622}
6623
6624static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6625 const struct cred *cred,
6626 unsigned perm)
6627{
6628 struct key *key;
6629 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6630 u32 sid;
6631
6632 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
6633 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
6634 appear to be created. */
6635 if (perm == 0)
6636 return 0;
6637
6638 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6639
6640 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6641 ksec = key->security;
6642
6643 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6644 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6645}
6646
6647static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6648{
6649 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6650 char *context = NULL;
6651 unsigned len;
6652 int rc;
6653
6654 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6655 &context, &len);
6656 if (!rc)
6657 rc = len;
6658 *_buffer = context;
6659 return rc;
6660}
6661#endif
6662
6663#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6664static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6665{
6666 struct common_audit_data ad;
6667 int err;
6668 u32 sid = 0;
6669 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6670 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6671
6672 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6673 if (err)
6674 return err;
6675
6676 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6677 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6678 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6679 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6680 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6681 sec->sid, sid,
6682 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6683 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6684}
6685
6686static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6687 u8 port_num)
6688{
6689 struct common_audit_data ad;
6690 int err;
6691 u32 sid = 0;
6692 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6693 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6694
6695 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6696 &sid);
6697
6698 if (err)
6699 return err;
6700
6701 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6702 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6703 ibendport.port = port_num;
6704 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6705 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6706 sec->sid, sid,
6707 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6708 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6709}
6710
6711static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6712{
6713 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6714
6715 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6716 if (!sec)
6717 return -ENOMEM;
6718 sec->sid = current_sid();
6719
6720 *ib_sec = sec;
6721 return 0;
6722}
6723
6724static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6725{
6726 kfree(ib_sec);
6727}
6728#endif
6729
6730#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6731static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6732 unsigned int size)
6733{
6734 u32 sid = current_sid();
6735 int ret;
6736
6737 switch (cmd) {
6738 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6739 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6740 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6741 NULL);
6742 break;
6743 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6744 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6745 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6746 NULL);
6747 break;
6748 default:
6749 ret = 0;
6750 break;
6751 }
6752
6753 return ret;
6754}
6755
6756static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6757{
6758 u32 av = 0;
6759
6760 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6761 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6762 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6763 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6764 return av;
6765}
6766
6767/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6768 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6769 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6770 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6771 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6772 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6773 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6774 */
6775static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6776{
6777 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6778 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6779 struct bpf_map *map;
6780 int ret;
6781
6782 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6783 map = file->private_data;
6784 bpfsec = map->security;
6785 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6786 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6787 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6788 if (ret)
6789 return ret;
6790 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6791 prog = file->private_data;
6792 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6793 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6794 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6795 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6796 if (ret)
6797 return ret;
6798 }
6799 return 0;
6800}
6801
6802static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6803{
6804 u32 sid = current_sid();
6805 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6806
6807 bpfsec = map->security;
6808 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6809 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6810 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6811}
6812
6813static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6814{
6815 u32 sid = current_sid();
6816 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6817
6818 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6819 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6820 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6821 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6822}
6823
6824static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6825{
6826 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6827
6828 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6829 if (!bpfsec)
6830 return -ENOMEM;
6831
6832 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6833 map->security = bpfsec;
6834
6835 return 0;
6836}
6837
6838static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6839{
6840 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6841
6842 map->security = NULL;
6843 kfree(bpfsec);
6844}
6845
6846static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6847{
6848 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6849
6850 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6851 if (!bpfsec)
6852 return -ENOMEM;
6853
6854 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6855 aux->security = bpfsec;
6856
6857 return 0;
6858}
6859
6860static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6861{
6862 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6863
6864 aux->security = NULL;
6865 kfree(bpfsec);
6866}
6867#endif
6868
6869static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6870 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6874
6875 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6876 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6877 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6878 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6882 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6884
6885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6886
6887 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
6888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6889 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6890
6891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
6892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
6894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
6903
6904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6906
6907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
6908 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6911 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6913 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6915 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6918 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
6919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
6920 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
6921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
6922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
6923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
6924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
6925 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
6926 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
6927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
6928 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
6929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
6930 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
6931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
6932 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
6933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
6934
6935 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
6936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
6937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
6938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
6939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
6940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
6941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
6942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
6943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
6944 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
6945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
6946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
6947
6948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
6949
6950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
6951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
6952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
6953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
6954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
6955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
6956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
6957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
6958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
6959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
6960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
6961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
6964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
6966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
6968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
6972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
6974
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
6976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
6977
6978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
6980
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
6982 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
6984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
6987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
6988
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
6990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
6993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
6994
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7000
7001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7002
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7005
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7014
7015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7017
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7033 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7056#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7059 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7062#endif
7063#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7070 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7075 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7077#endif
7078
7079#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7084#endif
7085
7086#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7091#endif
7092
7093#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7101#endif
7102};
7103
7104static __init int selinux_init(void)
7105{
7106 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
7107 selinux_enabled = 0;
7108 return 0;
7109 }
7110
7111 if (!selinux_enabled) {
7112 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
7113 return 0;
7114 }
7115
7116 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7117
7118 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7119 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7120 selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
7121 selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
7122 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7123
7124 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7125 cred_init_security();
7126
7127 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7128
7129 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
7130 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
7131 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
7132 file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
7133 sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
7134 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
7135 avc_init();
7136
7137 avtab_cache_init();
7138
7139 ebitmap_cache_init();
7140
7141 hashtab_cache_init();
7142
7143 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7144
7145 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7146 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7147
7148 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7149 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7150
7151 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7152 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7153 else
7154 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7155
7156 return 0;
7157}
7158
7159static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7160{
7161 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
7162}
7163
7164void selinux_complete_init(void)
7165{
7166 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7167
7168 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7169 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7170 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7171}
7172
7173/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7174 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7175security_initcall(selinux_init);
7176
7177#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7178
7179static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7180 {
7181 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7182 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7183 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7184 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7185 },
7186 {
7187 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7188 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7189 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7190 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7191 },
7192 {
7193 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7194 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7195 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7196 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7197 },
7198#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7199 {
7200 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7201 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7202 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7203 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7204 },
7205 {
7206 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7207 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7208 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7209 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7210 },
7211 {
7212 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7213 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7214 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7215 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7216 },
7217#endif /* IPV6 */
7218};
7219
7220static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7221{
7222 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7223 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7224}
7225
7226static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7227{
7228 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7229 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7230}
7231
7232static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7233 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7234 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7235};
7236
7237static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7238{
7239 int err;
7240
7241 if (!selinux_enabled)
7242 return 0;
7243
7244 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7245
7246 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7247 if (err)
7248 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7249
7250 return 0;
7251}
7252__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7253
7254#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7255static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7256{
7257 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7258
7259 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7260}
7261#endif
7262
7263#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7264
7265#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7266#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7267#endif
7268
7269#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7270
7271#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7272int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7273{
7274 if (state->initialized) {
7275 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7276 return -EINVAL;
7277 }
7278
7279 if (state->disabled) {
7280 /* Only do this once. */
7281 return -EINVAL;
7282 }
7283
7284 state->disabled = 1;
7285
7286 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7287
7288 selinux_enabled = 0;
7289
7290 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7291
7292 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7293 avc_disable();
7294
7295 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
7296 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7297
7298 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7299 exit_sel_fs();
7300
7301 return 0;
7302}
7303#endif
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/tracehook.h>
28#include <linux/errno.h>
29#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30#include <linux/sched/task.h>
31#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32#include <linux/xattr.h>
33#include <linux/capability.h>
34#include <linux/unistd.h>
35#include <linux/mm.h>
36#include <linux/mman.h>
37#include <linux/slab.h>
38#include <linux/pagemap.h>
39#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40#include <linux/swap.h>
41#include <linux/spinlock.h>
42#include <linux/syscalls.h>
43#include <linux/dcache.h>
44#include <linux/file.h>
45#include <linux/fdtable.h>
46#include <linux/namei.h>
47#include <linux/mount.h>
48#include <linux/fs_context.h>
49#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52#include <linux/tty.h>
53#include <net/icmp.h>
54#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57#include <net/net_namespace.h>
58#include <net/netlabel.h>
59#include <linux/uaccess.h>
60#include <asm/ioctls.h>
61#include <linux/atomic.h>
62#include <linux/bitops.h>
63#include <linux/interrupt.h>
64#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65#include <net/netlink.h>
66#include <linux/tcp.h>
67#include <linux/udp.h>
68#include <linux/dccp.h>
69#include <linux/sctp.h>
70#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71#include <linux/quota.h>
72#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <linux/parser.h>
75#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
76#include <net/ipv6.h>
77#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78#include <linux/personality.h>
79#include <linux/audit.h>
80#include <linux/string.h>
81#include <linux/mutex.h>
82#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83#include <linux/syslog.h>
84#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85#include <linux/export.h>
86#include <linux/msg.h>
87#include <linux/shm.h>
88#include <linux/bpf.h>
89#include <linux/kernfs.h>
90#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
91#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
92#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
93#include <linux/fanotify.h>
94
95#include "avc.h"
96#include "objsec.h"
97#include "netif.h"
98#include "netnode.h"
99#include "netport.h"
100#include "ibpkey.h"
101#include "xfrm.h"
102#include "netlabel.h"
103#include "audit.h"
104#include "avc_ss.h"
105
106struct selinux_state selinux_state;
107
108/* SECMARK reference count */
109static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
110
111#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
112static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
113
114static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
115{
116 unsigned long enforcing;
117 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
118 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
119 return 1;
120}
121__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
122#else
123#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
124#endif
125
126int selinux_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
127#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
128static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
129{
130 unsigned long enabled;
131 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
132 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
133 return 1;
134}
135__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
136#endif
137
138static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
139 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
140
141static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
142{
143 unsigned long checkreqprot;
144
145 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
146 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
147 return 1;
148}
149__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
150
151/**
152 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
153 *
154 * Description:
155 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
156 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
157 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
158 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
159 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
160 *
161 */
162static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
163{
164 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
165 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
166}
167
168/**
169 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
170 *
171 * Description:
172 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
173 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
174 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
175 * is always considered enabled.
176 *
177 */
178static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
179{
180 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
181 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
182}
183
184static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
185{
186 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
187 sel_netif_flush();
188 sel_netnode_flush();
189 sel_netport_flush();
190 synchronize_net();
191 }
192 return 0;
193}
194
195static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
196{
197 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
198 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
199 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
200 }
201
202 return 0;
203}
204
205/*
206 * initialise the security for the init task
207 */
208static void cred_init_security(void)
209{
210 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
211 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
212
213 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
214 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
215}
216
217/*
218 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
219 */
220static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
221{
222 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
223
224 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
225 return tsec->sid;
226}
227
228/*
229 * get the objective security ID of a task
230 */
231static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
232{
233 u32 sid;
234
235 rcu_read_lock();
236 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
237 rcu_read_unlock();
238 return sid;
239}
240
241/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
242
243static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
244{
245 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
246 u32 sid = current_sid();
247
248 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
250 isec->inode = inode;
251 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
253 isec->task_sid = sid;
254 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
255
256 return 0;
257}
258
259static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
260
261/*
262 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
263 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
264 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
265 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
266 */
267static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
268 struct dentry *dentry,
269 bool may_sleep)
270{
271 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
272
273 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
274
275 if (selinux_state.initialized &&
276 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
277 if (!may_sleep)
278 return -ECHILD;
279
280 /*
281 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
282 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
283 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
284 */
285 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
286 }
287 return 0;
288}
289
290static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
291{
292 return selinux_inode(inode);
293}
294
295static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
296{
297 int error;
298
299 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
300 if (error)
301 return ERR_PTR(error);
302 return selinux_inode(inode);
303}
304
305/*
306 * Get the security label of an inode.
307 */
308static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
309{
310 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
311 return selinux_inode(inode);
312}
313
314static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
315{
316 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
317
318 return selinux_inode(inode);
319}
320
321/*
322 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
323 */
324static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
325{
326 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
327
328 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
329 return selinux_inode(inode);
330}
331
332static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
333{
334 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
335 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
336
337 if (!isec)
338 return;
339 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
340 /*
341 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
342 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
343 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
344 *
345 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
346 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
347 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
348 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
349 */
350 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
351 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
352 list_del_init(&isec->list);
353 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
354 }
355}
356
357static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
358{
359 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
360 u32 sid = current_sid();
361
362 fsec->sid = sid;
363 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
364
365 return 0;
366}
367
368static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
369{
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
371
372 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
373 if (!sbsec)
374 return -ENOMEM;
375
376 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
377 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
378 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
379 sbsec->sb = sb;
380 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
381 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
382 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
383 sb->s_security = sbsec;
384
385 return 0;
386}
387
388static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
389{
390 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
391 sb->s_security = NULL;
392 kfree(sbsec);
393}
394
395struct selinux_mnt_opts {
396 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
397};
398
399static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
400{
401 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
402 kfree(opts->fscontext);
403 kfree(opts->context);
404 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
405 kfree(opts->defcontext);
406 kfree(opts);
407}
408
409static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
410{
411 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
412}
413
414enum {
415 Opt_error = -1,
416 Opt_context = 0,
417 Opt_defcontext = 1,
418 Opt_fscontext = 2,
419 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
420 Opt_seclabel = 4,
421};
422
423#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
424static struct {
425 const char *name;
426 int len;
427 int opt;
428 bool has_arg;
429} tokens[] = {
430 A(context, true),
431 A(fscontext, true),
432 A(defcontext, true),
433 A(rootcontext, true),
434 A(seclabel, false),
435};
436#undef A
437
438static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
439{
440 int i;
441
442 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
443 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
444 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
445 continue;
446 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
447 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
448 continue;
449 *arg = s + len + 1;
450 } else if (len != l)
451 continue;
452 return tokens[i].opt;
453 }
454 return Opt_error;
455}
456
457#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
458
459static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
460 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
461 const struct cred *cred)
462{
463 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
464 int rc;
465
466 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
467 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
468 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
469 if (rc)
470 return rc;
471
472 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
473 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
474 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
475 return rc;
476}
477
478static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
479 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
480 const struct cred *cred)
481{
482 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
483 int rc;
484 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
485 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
486 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
487 if (rc)
488 return rc;
489
490 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
491 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
492 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
493 return rc;
494}
495
496static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
497{
498 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
499 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
500 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
501 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
502 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
503 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
504 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
505 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
506 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
507}
508
509static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
510{
511 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
512
513 /*
514 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
515 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
516 */
517 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
518
519 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
520 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
521 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
522 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
523 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
524 return 1;
525
526 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
527 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
528
529 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
530 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
531 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
532 default:
533 return 0;
534 }
535}
536
537static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
538{
539 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
540 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
541 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
542 int rc = 0;
543
544 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
545 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
546 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
547 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
548 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
549 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
550 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
551 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
552 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
553 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
554 goto out;
555 }
556
557 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
558 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
559 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
560 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
561 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
562 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
563 else
564 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
565 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
566 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
567 goto out;
568 }
569 }
570
571 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
572
573 /*
574 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
575 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
576 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
577 */
578 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
579 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
580 else
581 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
582
583 /* Initialize the root inode. */
584 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
585
586 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
587 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
588 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
589 populates itself. */
590 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
591 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
592 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
593 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
594 struct inode_security_struct, list);
595 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
596 list_del_init(&isec->list);
597 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
598 inode = igrab(inode);
599 if (inode) {
600 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
601 inode_doinit(inode);
602 iput(inode);
603 }
604 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
605 }
606 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
607out:
608 return rc;
609}
610
611static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
612 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
613{
614 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
615
616 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
617 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
618 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
619 (old_sid != new_sid))
620 return 1;
621
622 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
623 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
624 */
625 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
626 if (mnt_flags & flag)
627 return 1;
628 return 0;
629}
630
631static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
632{
633 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
634 sid, GFP_KERNEL);
635 if (rc)
636 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
637 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
638 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
639 return rc;
640}
641
642/*
643 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
644 * labeling information.
645 */
646static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
647 void *mnt_opts,
648 unsigned long kern_flags,
649 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
650{
651 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
652 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
653 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
654 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
655 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
656 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
657 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
658 int rc = 0;
659
660 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
661
662 if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
663 if (!opts) {
664 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
665 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
666 server is ready to handle calls. */
667 goto out;
668 }
669 rc = -EINVAL;
670 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
671 "before the security server is initialized\n");
672 goto out;
673 }
674 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
675 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
676 * place the results is not allowed */
677 rc = -EINVAL;
678 goto out;
679 }
680
681 /*
682 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
683 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
684 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
685 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
686 *
687 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
688 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
689 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
690 * will be used for both mounts)
691 */
692 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
693 && !opts)
694 goto out;
695
696 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
697
698 /*
699 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
700 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
701 * than once with different security options.
702 */
703 if (opts) {
704 if (opts->fscontext) {
705 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
706 if (rc)
707 goto out;
708 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
709 fscontext_sid))
710 goto out_double_mount;
711 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
712 }
713 if (opts->context) {
714 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
715 if (rc)
716 goto out;
717 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
718 context_sid))
719 goto out_double_mount;
720 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
721 }
722 if (opts->rootcontext) {
723 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
724 if (rc)
725 goto out;
726 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
727 rootcontext_sid))
728 goto out_double_mount;
729 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
730 }
731 if (opts->defcontext) {
732 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
733 if (rc)
734 goto out;
735 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
736 defcontext_sid))
737 goto out_double_mount;
738 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
739 }
740 }
741
742 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
743 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
744 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
745 goto out_double_mount;
746 rc = 0;
747 goto out;
748 }
749
750 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
751 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
752
753 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
754 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
755 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
756 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
757
758 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
759 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
760 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
761 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
762
763 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
764 /*
765 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
766 * filesystem type.
767 */
768 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
769 if (rc) {
770 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
771 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
772 goto out;
773 }
774 }
775
776 /*
777 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
778 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
779 * line and security labels must be ignored.
780 */
781 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
782 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
783 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
784 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
785 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
786 defcontext_sid) {
787 rc = -EACCES;
788 goto out;
789 }
790 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
791 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
792 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
793 current_sid(),
794 current_sid(),
795 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
796 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
797 if (rc)
798 goto out;
799 }
800 goto out_set_opts;
801 }
802
803 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
804 if (fscontext_sid) {
805 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
806 if (rc)
807 goto out;
808
809 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
810 }
811
812 /*
813 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
814 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
815 * the superblock context if not already set.
816 */
817 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
818 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
819 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
820 }
821
822 if (context_sid) {
823 if (!fscontext_sid) {
824 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
825 cred);
826 if (rc)
827 goto out;
828 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
829 } else {
830 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
831 cred);
832 if (rc)
833 goto out;
834 }
835 if (!rootcontext_sid)
836 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
837
838 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
839 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
840 }
841
842 if (rootcontext_sid) {
843 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
844 cred);
845 if (rc)
846 goto out;
847
848 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
849 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
850 }
851
852 if (defcontext_sid) {
853 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
854 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
855 rc = -EINVAL;
856 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
857 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
858 goto out;
859 }
860
861 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
862 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
863 sbsec, cred);
864 if (rc)
865 goto out;
866 }
867
868 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
869 }
870
871out_set_opts:
872 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
873out:
874 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
875 return rc;
876out_double_mount:
877 rc = -EINVAL;
878 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
879 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
880 sb->s_type->name);
881 goto out;
882}
883
884static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
885 const struct super_block *newsb)
886{
887 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
888 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
889 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
890 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
891
892 if (oldflags != newflags)
893 goto mismatch;
894 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
895 goto mismatch;
896 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
897 goto mismatch;
898 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
899 goto mismatch;
900 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
901 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
902 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
903 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
904 goto mismatch;
905 }
906 return 0;
907mismatch:
908 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
909 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
910 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
911 return -EBUSY;
912}
913
914static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
915 struct super_block *newsb,
916 unsigned long kern_flags,
917 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
918{
919 int rc = 0;
920 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
921 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
922
923 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
924 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
925 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
926
927 /*
928 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
929 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
930 */
931 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
932 return 0;
933
934 /*
935 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
936 * place the results is not allowed.
937 */
938 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
939 return -EINVAL;
940
941 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
942 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
943
944 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
945 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
946 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
947 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
948 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
949 }
950
951 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
952
953 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
954
955 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
956 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
957 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
958
959 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
960 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
961 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
962 if (rc)
963 goto out;
964 }
965
966 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
967 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
968 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
969 }
970
971 if (set_context) {
972 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
973
974 if (!set_fscontext)
975 newsbsec->sid = sid;
976 if (!set_rootcontext) {
977 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
978 newisec->sid = sid;
979 }
980 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
981 }
982 if (set_rootcontext) {
983 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
984 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
985
986 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
987 }
988
989 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
990out:
991 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
992 return rc;
993}
994
995static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
996{
997 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
998
999 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
1000 return 0;
1001
1002 if (!opts) {
1003 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1004 if (!opts)
1005 return -ENOMEM;
1006 *mnt_opts = opts;
1007 }
1008 if (!s)
1009 return -ENOMEM;
1010 switch (token) {
1011 case Opt_context:
1012 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1013 goto Einval;
1014 opts->context = s;
1015 break;
1016 case Opt_fscontext:
1017 if (opts->fscontext)
1018 goto Einval;
1019 opts->fscontext = s;
1020 break;
1021 case Opt_rootcontext:
1022 if (opts->rootcontext)
1023 goto Einval;
1024 opts->rootcontext = s;
1025 break;
1026 case Opt_defcontext:
1027 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1028 goto Einval;
1029 opts->defcontext = s;
1030 break;
1031 }
1032 return 0;
1033Einval:
1034 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1035 return -EINVAL;
1036}
1037
1038static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
1039 void **mnt_opts)
1040{
1041 int token = Opt_error;
1042 int rc, i;
1043
1044 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
1045 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
1046 token = tokens[i].opt;
1047 break;
1048 }
1049 }
1050
1051 if (token == Opt_error)
1052 return -EINVAL;
1053
1054 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1055 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1056 if (!val) {
1057 rc = -ENOMEM;
1058 goto free_opt;
1059 }
1060 }
1061 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1062 if (unlikely(rc)) {
1063 kfree(val);
1064 goto free_opt;
1065 }
1066 return rc;
1067
1068free_opt:
1069 if (*mnt_opts) {
1070 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1071 *mnt_opts = NULL;
1072 }
1073 return rc;
1074}
1075
1076static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1077{
1078 char *context = NULL;
1079 u32 len;
1080 int rc;
1081
1082 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1083 &context, &len);
1084 if (!rc) {
1085 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1086
1087 seq_putc(m, '=');
1088 if (has_comma)
1089 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1090 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1091 if (has_comma)
1092 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1093 }
1094 kfree(context);
1095 return rc;
1096}
1097
1098static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1099{
1100 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
1101 int rc;
1102
1103 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1104 return 0;
1105
1106 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
1107 return 0;
1108
1109 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1110 seq_putc(m, ',');
1111 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1112 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1113 if (rc)
1114 return rc;
1115 }
1116 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1117 seq_putc(m, ',');
1118 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1119 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1120 if (rc)
1121 return rc;
1122 }
1123 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1124 seq_putc(m, ',');
1125 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1126 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1127 if (rc)
1128 return rc;
1129 }
1130 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1131 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
1132 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1133 seq_putc(m, ',');
1134 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1135 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1136 if (rc)
1137 return rc;
1138 }
1139 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1140 seq_putc(m, ',');
1141 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1142 }
1143 return 0;
1144}
1145
1146static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1147{
1148 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1149 case S_IFSOCK:
1150 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1151 case S_IFLNK:
1152 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1153 case S_IFREG:
1154 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1155 case S_IFBLK:
1156 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1157 case S_IFDIR:
1158 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1159 case S_IFCHR:
1160 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1161 case S_IFIFO:
1162 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1163
1164 }
1165
1166 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1167}
1168
1169static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1170{
1171 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1172}
1173
1174static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1175{
1176 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1177}
1178
1179static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1180{
1181 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1182
1183 switch (family) {
1184 case PF_UNIX:
1185 switch (type) {
1186 case SOCK_STREAM:
1187 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1188 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1189 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1190 case SOCK_RAW:
1191 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1192 }
1193 break;
1194 case PF_INET:
1195 case PF_INET6:
1196 switch (type) {
1197 case SOCK_STREAM:
1198 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1199 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1200 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1201 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1202 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1203 else
1204 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1205 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1206 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1207 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1208 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1209 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1210 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1211 else
1212 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1213 case SOCK_DCCP:
1214 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1215 default:
1216 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1217 }
1218 break;
1219 case PF_NETLINK:
1220 switch (protocol) {
1221 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1223 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1225 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1226 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1227 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1228 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1229 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1230 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1231 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1232 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1233 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1234 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1235 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1236 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1237 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1238 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1239 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1240 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1241 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1242 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1243 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1244 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1245 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1246 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1247 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1248 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1249 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1250 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1251 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1252 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1253 default:
1254 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1255 }
1256 case PF_PACKET:
1257 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1258 case PF_KEY:
1259 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1260 case PF_APPLETALK:
1261 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1262 }
1263
1264 if (extsockclass) {
1265 switch (family) {
1266 case PF_AX25:
1267 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1268 case PF_IPX:
1269 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1270 case PF_NETROM:
1271 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1272 case PF_ATMPVC:
1273 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1274 case PF_X25:
1275 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1276 case PF_ROSE:
1277 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1278 case PF_DECnet:
1279 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1280 case PF_ATMSVC:
1281 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1282 case PF_RDS:
1283 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1284 case PF_IRDA:
1285 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1286 case PF_PPPOX:
1287 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1288 case PF_LLC:
1289 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1290 case PF_CAN:
1291 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1292 case PF_TIPC:
1293 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1294 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1295 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1296 case PF_IUCV:
1297 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1298 case PF_RXRPC:
1299 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1300 case PF_ISDN:
1301 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1302 case PF_PHONET:
1303 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1304 case PF_IEEE802154:
1305 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1306 case PF_CAIF:
1307 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1308 case PF_ALG:
1309 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1310 case PF_NFC:
1311 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1312 case PF_VSOCK:
1313 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1314 case PF_KCM:
1315 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1316 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1317 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1318 case PF_SMC:
1319 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1320 case PF_XDP:
1321 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1322#if PF_MAX > 45
1323#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1324#endif
1325 }
1326 }
1327
1328 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1329}
1330
1331static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1332 u16 tclass,
1333 u16 flags,
1334 u32 *sid)
1335{
1336 int rc;
1337 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1338 char *buffer, *path;
1339
1340 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1341 if (!buffer)
1342 return -ENOMEM;
1343
1344 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1345 if (IS_ERR(path))
1346 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1347 else {
1348 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1349 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1350 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1351 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1352 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1353 path[1] = '/';
1354 path++;
1355 }
1356 }
1357 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1358 path, tclass, sid);
1359 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1360 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1361 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1362 rc = 0;
1363 }
1364 }
1365 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1366 return rc;
1367}
1368
1369static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1370 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1371{
1372#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1373 char *context;
1374 unsigned int len;
1375 int rc;
1376
1377 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1378 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1379 if (!context)
1380 return -ENOMEM;
1381
1382 context[len] = '\0';
1383 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1384 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1385 kfree(context);
1386
1387 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1388 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1389 if (rc < 0)
1390 return rc;
1391
1392 len = rc;
1393 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1394 if (!context)
1395 return -ENOMEM;
1396
1397 context[len] = '\0';
1398 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1399 context, len);
1400 }
1401 if (rc < 0) {
1402 kfree(context);
1403 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1404 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1405 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1406 return rc;
1407 }
1408 *sid = def_sid;
1409 return 0;
1410 }
1411
1412 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1413 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1414 if (rc) {
1415 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1416 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1417
1418 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1419 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1420 ino, dev, context);
1421 } else {
1422 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1423 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1424 }
1425 }
1426 kfree(context);
1427 return 0;
1428}
1429
1430/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1431static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1432{
1433 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1434 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1435 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1436 u16 sclass;
1437 struct dentry *dentry;
1438 int rc = 0;
1439
1440 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1441 return 0;
1442
1443 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1444 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1445 goto out_unlock;
1446
1447 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1448 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1449
1450 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1451 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1452 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1453 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1454 server is ready to handle calls. */
1455 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1456 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1457 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1458 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1459 goto out_unlock;
1460 }
1461
1462 sclass = isec->sclass;
1463 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1464 sid = isec->sid;
1465 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1466 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1467
1468 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1469 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1470 break;
1471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1472 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1473 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1474 break;
1475 }
1476 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1477 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1478 if (opt_dentry) {
1479 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1480 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1481 } else {
1482 /*
1483 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1484 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1485 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1486 * two, depending upon that...
1487 */
1488 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1489 if (!dentry)
1490 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1491 }
1492 if (!dentry) {
1493 /*
1494 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1495 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1496 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1497 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1498 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1499 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1500 * be used again by userspace.
1501 */
1502 goto out;
1503 }
1504
1505 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1506 &sid);
1507 dput(dentry);
1508 if (rc)
1509 goto out;
1510 break;
1511 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1512 sid = task_sid;
1513 break;
1514 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1515 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1516 sid = sbsec->sid;
1517
1518 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1519 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1520 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1521 if (rc)
1522 goto out;
1523 break;
1524 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1525 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1526 break;
1527 default:
1528 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1529 sid = sbsec->sid;
1530
1531 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1532 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1533 * procfs inodes */
1534 if (opt_dentry) {
1535 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1536 * d_splice_alias. */
1537 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1538 } else {
1539 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1540 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1541 * a connected one, so try that first.
1542 */
1543 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1544 if (!dentry)
1545 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1546 }
1547 /*
1548 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1549 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1550 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1551 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1552 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1553 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1554 * could be used again by userspace.
1555 */
1556 if (!dentry)
1557 goto out;
1558 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1559 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1560 if (rc) {
1561 dput(dentry);
1562 goto out;
1563 }
1564
1565 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1566 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1567 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1568 sid, &sid);
1569 if (rc) {
1570 dput(dentry);
1571 goto out;
1572 }
1573 }
1574 dput(dentry);
1575 }
1576 break;
1577 }
1578
1579out:
1580 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1581 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1582 if (!sid || rc) {
1583 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1584 goto out_unlock;
1585 }
1586
1587 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1588 isec->sid = sid;
1589 }
1590
1591out_unlock:
1592 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1593 return rc;
1594}
1595
1596/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1597static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1598{
1599 u32 perm = 0;
1600
1601 switch (sig) {
1602 case SIGCHLD:
1603 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1604 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1605 break;
1606 case SIGKILL:
1607 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1608 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1609 break;
1610 case SIGSTOP:
1611 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1612 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1613 break;
1614 default:
1615 /* All other signals. */
1616 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1617 break;
1618 }
1619
1620 return perm;
1621}
1622
1623#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1624#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1625#endif
1626
1627/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1628static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1629 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1630{
1631 struct common_audit_data ad;
1632 struct av_decision avd;
1633 u16 sclass;
1634 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1635 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1636 int rc;
1637
1638 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1639 ad.u.cap = cap;
1640
1641 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1642 case 0:
1643 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1644 break;
1645 case 1:
1646 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1647 break;
1648 default:
1649 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1650 BUG();
1651 return -EINVAL;
1652 }
1653
1654 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1655 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1656 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1657 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1658 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1659 if (rc2)
1660 return rc2;
1661 }
1662 return rc;
1663}
1664
1665/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1666 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1667 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1668static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1669 struct inode *inode,
1670 u32 perms,
1671 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1672{
1673 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1674 u32 sid;
1675
1676 validate_creds(cred);
1677
1678 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1679 return 0;
1680
1681 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1682 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1683
1684 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1685 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1686}
1687
1688/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1689 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1690 pathname if needed. */
1691static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1692 struct dentry *dentry,
1693 u32 av)
1694{
1695 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1696 struct common_audit_data ad;
1697
1698 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1699 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1700 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1701 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1702}
1703
1704/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1705 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1706 pathname if needed. */
1707static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1708 const struct path *path,
1709 u32 av)
1710{
1711 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1712 struct common_audit_data ad;
1713
1714 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1715 ad.u.path = *path;
1716 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1717 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1718}
1719
1720/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1721static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1722 struct file *file,
1723 u32 av)
1724{
1725 struct common_audit_data ad;
1726
1727 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1728 ad.u.file = file;
1729 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1730}
1731
1732#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1733static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1734#endif
1735
1736/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1737 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1738 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1739 check a particular permission to the file.
1740 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1741 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1742 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1743 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1744static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct file *file,
1746 u32 av)
1747{
1748 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1749 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1750 struct common_audit_data ad;
1751 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 int rc;
1753
1754 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1755 ad.u.file = file;
1756
1757 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1758 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1759 sid, fsec->sid,
1760 SECCLASS_FD,
1761 FD__USE,
1762 &ad);
1763 if (rc)
1764 goto out;
1765 }
1766
1767#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1768 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1769 if (rc)
1770 return rc;
1771#endif
1772
1773 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1774 rc = 0;
1775 if (av)
1776 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1777
1778out:
1779 return rc;
1780}
1781
1782/*
1783 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1784 */
1785static int
1786selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1787 struct inode *dir,
1788 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1789 u32 *_new_isid)
1790{
1791 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1792
1793 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1794 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1795 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1796 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1797 tsec->create_sid) {
1798 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1799 } else {
1800 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1801 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1802 dsec->sid, tclass,
1803 name, _new_isid);
1804 }
1805
1806 return 0;
1807}
1808
1809/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1810static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1811 struct dentry *dentry,
1812 u16 tclass)
1813{
1814 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1815 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1816 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1817 u32 sid, newsid;
1818 struct common_audit_data ad;
1819 int rc;
1820
1821 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1822 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1823
1824 sid = tsec->sid;
1825
1826 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1827 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1828
1829 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1830 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1831 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1832 &ad);
1833 if (rc)
1834 return rc;
1835
1836 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), dir,
1837 &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
1838 if (rc)
1839 return rc;
1840
1841 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1842 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1843 if (rc)
1844 return rc;
1845
1846 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1847 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1848 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1849 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1850}
1851
1852#define MAY_LINK 0
1853#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1854#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1855
1856/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1857static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1858 struct dentry *dentry,
1859 int kind)
1860
1861{
1862 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1863 struct common_audit_data ad;
1864 u32 sid = current_sid();
1865 u32 av;
1866 int rc;
1867
1868 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1869 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1870
1871 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1872 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1873
1874 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1875 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1876 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1877 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1878 if (rc)
1879 return rc;
1880
1881 switch (kind) {
1882 case MAY_LINK:
1883 av = FILE__LINK;
1884 break;
1885 case MAY_UNLINK:
1886 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1887 break;
1888 case MAY_RMDIR:
1889 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1890 break;
1891 default:
1892 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1893 __func__, kind);
1894 return 0;
1895 }
1896
1897 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1898 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1899 return rc;
1900}
1901
1902static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1903 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1904 struct inode *new_dir,
1905 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1906{
1907 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1908 struct common_audit_data ad;
1909 u32 sid = current_sid();
1910 u32 av;
1911 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1912 int rc;
1913
1914 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1915 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1916 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1917 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1918
1919 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1920
1921 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1922 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1923 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1924 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1925 if (rc)
1926 return rc;
1927 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1928 sid, old_isec->sid,
1929 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1930 if (rc)
1931 return rc;
1932 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1933 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1934 sid, old_isec->sid,
1935 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1936 if (rc)
1937 return rc;
1938 }
1939
1940 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1941 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1942 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1943 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1944 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1945 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1946 if (rc)
1947 return rc;
1948 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1949 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1950 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1951 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1952 sid, new_isec->sid,
1953 new_isec->sclass,
1954 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1955 if (rc)
1956 return rc;
1957 }
1958
1959 return 0;
1960}
1961
1962/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1963static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1964 struct super_block *sb,
1965 u32 perms,
1966 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1967{
1968 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1969 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1970
1971 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1972 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1973 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1974}
1975
1976/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1977static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1978{
1979 u32 av = 0;
1980
1981 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1982 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1983 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1984 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1985 av |= FILE__READ;
1986
1987 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1988 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1989 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1990 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1991
1992 } else {
1993 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1994 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1995 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1996 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1997 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1998 av |= DIR__READ;
1999 }
2000
2001 return av;
2002}
2003
2004/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2005static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2006{
2007 u32 av = 0;
2008
2009 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2010 av |= FILE__READ;
2011 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2012 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2013 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2014 else
2015 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2016 }
2017 if (!av) {
2018 /*
2019 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2020 */
2021 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2022 }
2023
2024 return av;
2025}
2026
2027/*
2028 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2029 * open permission.
2030 */
2031static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2032{
2033 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2034 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2035
2036 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2037 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2038 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2039
2040 return av;
2041}
2042
2043/* Hook functions begin here. */
2044
2045static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2046{
2047 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2048 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2049
2050 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2051 mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2052 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2053}
2054
2055static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2056 struct task_struct *to)
2057{
2058 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2059 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2060 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2061 int rc;
2062
2063 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2064 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2065 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2066 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2067 if (rc)
2068 return rc;
2069 }
2070
2071 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2072 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2073 NULL);
2074}
2075
2076static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2077 struct task_struct *to)
2078{
2079 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2080 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2081
2082 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2083 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2084 NULL);
2085}
2086
2087static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2088 struct task_struct *to,
2089 struct file *file)
2090{
2091 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2092 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2093 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2094 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2095 struct common_audit_data ad;
2096 int rc;
2097
2098 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2099 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2100
2101 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2102 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2103 sid, fsec->sid,
2104 SECCLASS_FD,
2105 FD__USE,
2106 &ad);
2107 if (rc)
2108 return rc;
2109 }
2110
2111#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2112 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2113 if (rc)
2114 return rc;
2115#endif
2116
2117 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2118 return 0;
2119
2120 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2121 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2122 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2123 &ad);
2124}
2125
2126static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2127 unsigned int mode)
2128{
2129 u32 sid = current_sid();
2130 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2131
2132 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2133 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2134 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2135
2136 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2137 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2138}
2139
2140static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2141{
2142 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2143 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2144 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2145}
2146
2147static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2148 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2149{
2150 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2151 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2152 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2153}
2154
2155static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2156 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2157 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2158 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2159{
2160 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2161 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2162 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2163}
2164
2165/*
2166 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2167 * which was removed).
2168 *
2169 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2170 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2171 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2172 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2173 */
2174
2175static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2176 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2177{
2178 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2179}
2180
2181static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2182{
2183 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2184 int rc = 0;
2185
2186 if (!sb)
2187 return 0;
2188
2189 switch (cmds) {
2190 case Q_SYNC:
2191 case Q_QUOTAON:
2192 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2193 case Q_SETINFO:
2194 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2195 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2196 break;
2197 case Q_GETFMT:
2198 case Q_GETINFO:
2199 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2200 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2201 break;
2202 default:
2203 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2204 break;
2205 }
2206 return rc;
2207}
2208
2209static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2210{
2211 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2212
2213 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2214}
2215
2216static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2217{
2218 switch (type) {
2219 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2220 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2221 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2222 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2223 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2224 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2225 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2226 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2227 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2228 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2229 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2230 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2231 NULL);
2232 }
2233 /* All other syslog types */
2234 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2235 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2236 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2237}
2238
2239/*
2240 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2241 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2242 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2243 *
2244 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2245 * processes that allocate mappings.
2246 */
2247static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2248{
2249 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2250
2251 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2252 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2253 if (rc == 0)
2254 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2255
2256 return cap_sys_admin;
2257}
2258
2259/* binprm security operations */
2260
2261static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2262{
2263 u32 sid = 0;
2264 struct task_struct *tracer;
2265
2266 rcu_read_lock();
2267 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2268 if (tracer)
2269 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2270 rcu_read_unlock();
2271
2272 return sid;
2273}
2274
2275static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2276 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2277 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2278{
2279 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2280 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2281 int rc;
2282 u32 av;
2283
2284 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2285 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2286
2287 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2288 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2289
2290 /*
2291 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2292 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2293 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2294 * the old and new contexts.
2295 */
2296 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2297 av = 0;
2298 if (nnp)
2299 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2300 if (nosuid)
2301 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2302 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2303 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2304 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2305 if (!rc)
2306 return 0;
2307 }
2308
2309 /*
2310 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2311 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2312 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2313 */
2314 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2315 new_tsec->sid);
2316 if (!rc)
2317 return 0;
2318
2319 /*
2320 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2321 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2322 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2323 */
2324 if (nnp)
2325 return -EPERM;
2326 return -EACCES;
2327}
2328
2329static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2330{
2331 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2332 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2333 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2334 struct common_audit_data ad;
2335 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2336 int rc;
2337
2338 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2339 * the script interpreter */
2340 if (bprm->called_set_creds)
2341 return 0;
2342
2343 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2344 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2345 isec = inode_security(inode);
2346
2347 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2348 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2349 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2350
2351 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2352 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2353 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2354 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2355
2356 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2357 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2358 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2359 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2360
2361 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2362 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2363 if (rc)
2364 return rc;
2365 } else {
2366 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2367 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2368 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2369 &new_tsec->sid);
2370 if (rc)
2371 return rc;
2372
2373 /*
2374 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2375 * transition.
2376 */
2377 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2378 if (rc)
2379 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2380 }
2381
2382 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2383 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2384
2385 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2386 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2387 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2388 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2389 if (rc)
2390 return rc;
2391 } else {
2392 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2393 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2394 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2395 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2396 if (rc)
2397 return rc;
2398
2399 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2400 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2401 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2402 if (rc)
2403 return rc;
2404
2405 /* Check for shared state */
2406 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2407 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2408 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2409 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2410 NULL);
2411 if (rc)
2412 return -EPERM;
2413 }
2414
2415 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2416 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2417 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2418 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2419 if (ptsid != 0) {
2420 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2421 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2422 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2423 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2424 if (rc)
2425 return -EPERM;
2426 }
2427 }
2428
2429 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2430 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2431
2432 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2433 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2434 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2435 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2436 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2437 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2438 NULL);
2439 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2440 }
2441
2442 return 0;
2443}
2444
2445static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2446{
2447 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2448}
2449
2450/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2451static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2452 struct files_struct *files)
2453{
2454 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2455 struct tty_struct *tty;
2456 int drop_tty = 0;
2457 unsigned n;
2458
2459 tty = get_current_tty();
2460 if (tty) {
2461 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2462 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2463 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2464
2465 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2466 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2467 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2468 open file may belong to another process and we are
2469 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2470 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2471 struct tty_file_private, list);
2472 file = file_priv->file;
2473 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2474 drop_tty = 1;
2475 }
2476 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2477 tty_kref_put(tty);
2478 }
2479 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2480 if (drop_tty)
2481 no_tty();
2482
2483 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2484 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2485 if (!n) /* none found? */
2486 return;
2487
2488 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2489 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2490 devnull = NULL;
2491 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2492 do {
2493 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2494 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2495 if (devnull)
2496 fput(devnull);
2497}
2498
2499/*
2500 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2501 */
2502static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2503{
2504 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2505 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2506 int rc, i;
2507
2508 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2509 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2510 return;
2511
2512 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2513 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2514
2515 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2516 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2517
2518 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2519 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2520 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2521 *
2522 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2523 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2524 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2525 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2526 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2527 */
2528 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2529 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2530 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2531 if (rc) {
2532 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2533 task_lock(current);
2534 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2535 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2536 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2537 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2538 }
2539 task_unlock(current);
2540 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2541 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2542 }
2543}
2544
2545/*
2546 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2547 * due to exec
2548 */
2549static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2550{
2551 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2552 struct itimerval itimer;
2553 u32 osid, sid;
2554 int rc, i;
2555
2556 osid = tsec->osid;
2557 sid = tsec->sid;
2558
2559 if (sid == osid)
2560 return;
2561
2562 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2563 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2564 * flush and unblock signals.
2565 *
2566 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2567 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2568 */
2569 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2570 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2571 if (rc) {
2572 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
2573 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2574 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2575 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2576 }
2577 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2578 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2579 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2580 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2581 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2582 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2583 recalc_sigpending();
2584 }
2585 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2586 }
2587
2588 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2589 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2590 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2591 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2592 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2593}
2594
2595/* superblock security operations */
2596
2597static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2598{
2599 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2600}
2601
2602static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2603{
2604 superblock_free_security(sb);
2605}
2606
2607static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2608{
2609 bool open_quote = false;
2610 int len;
2611 char c;
2612
2613 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2614 if (c == '"')
2615 open_quote = !open_quote;
2616 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2617 break;
2618 }
2619 return len;
2620}
2621
2622static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2623{
2624 char *from = options;
2625 char *to = options;
2626 bool first = true;
2627 int rc;
2628
2629 while (1) {
2630 int len = opt_len(from);
2631 int token;
2632 char *arg = NULL;
2633
2634 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2635
2636 if (token != Opt_error) {
2637 char *p, *q;
2638
2639 /* strip quotes */
2640 if (arg) {
2641 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2642 char c = *p;
2643 if (c != '"')
2644 *q++ = c;
2645 }
2646 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2647 if (!arg) {
2648 rc = -ENOMEM;
2649 goto free_opt;
2650 }
2651 }
2652 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2653 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2654 kfree(arg);
2655 goto free_opt;
2656 }
2657 } else {
2658 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2659 from--;
2660 len++;
2661 }
2662 if (to != from)
2663 memmove(to, from, len);
2664 to += len;
2665 first = false;
2666 }
2667 if (!from[len])
2668 break;
2669 from += len + 1;
2670 }
2671 *to = '\0';
2672 return 0;
2673
2674free_opt:
2675 if (*mnt_opts) {
2676 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2677 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2678 }
2679 return rc;
2680}
2681
2682static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2683{
2684 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2685 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2686 u32 sid;
2687 int rc;
2688
2689 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2690 return 0;
2691
2692 if (!opts)
2693 return 0;
2694
2695 if (opts->fscontext) {
2696 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2697 if (rc)
2698 return rc;
2699 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2700 goto out_bad_option;
2701 }
2702 if (opts->context) {
2703 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2704 if (rc)
2705 return rc;
2706 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2707 goto out_bad_option;
2708 }
2709 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2710 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2711 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2712 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2713 if (rc)
2714 return rc;
2715 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2716 goto out_bad_option;
2717 }
2718 if (opts->defcontext) {
2719 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2720 if (rc)
2721 return rc;
2722 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2723 goto out_bad_option;
2724 }
2725 return 0;
2726
2727out_bad_option:
2728 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2729 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2730 sb->s_type->name);
2731 return -EINVAL;
2732}
2733
2734static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2735{
2736 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2737 struct common_audit_data ad;
2738
2739 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2740 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2741 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2742}
2743
2744static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2745{
2746 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2747 struct common_audit_data ad;
2748
2749 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2750 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2751 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2752}
2753
2754static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2755 const struct path *path,
2756 const char *type,
2757 unsigned long flags,
2758 void *data)
2759{
2760 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2761
2762 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2763 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2764 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2765 else
2766 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2767}
2768
2769static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2770{
2771 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2772
2773 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2774 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2775}
2776
2777static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2778 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2779{
2780 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2781 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2782
2783 if (!src)
2784 return 0;
2785
2786 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2787 if (!fc->security)
2788 return -ENOMEM;
2789
2790 opts = fc->security;
2791
2792 if (src->fscontext) {
2793 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2794 if (!opts->fscontext)
2795 return -ENOMEM;
2796 }
2797 if (src->context) {
2798 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2799 if (!opts->context)
2800 return -ENOMEM;
2801 }
2802 if (src->rootcontext) {
2803 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2804 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2805 return -ENOMEM;
2806 }
2807 if (src->defcontext) {
2808 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2809 if (!opts->defcontext)
2810 return -ENOMEM;
2811 }
2812 return 0;
2813}
2814
2815static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_param_specs[] = {
2816 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2817 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2818 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2819 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2820 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2821 {}
2822};
2823
2824static const struct fs_parameter_description selinux_fs_parameters = {
2825 .name = "SELinux",
2826 .specs = selinux_param_specs,
2827};
2828
2829static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2830 struct fs_parameter *param)
2831{
2832 struct fs_parse_result result;
2833 int opt, rc;
2834
2835 opt = fs_parse(fc, &selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2836 if (opt < 0)
2837 return opt;
2838
2839 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2840 if (!rc) {
2841 param->string = NULL;
2842 rc = 1;
2843 }
2844 return rc;
2845}
2846
2847/* inode security operations */
2848
2849static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2850{
2851 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2852}
2853
2854static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2855{
2856 inode_free_security(inode);
2857}
2858
2859static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2860 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2861 u32 *ctxlen)
2862{
2863 u32 newsid;
2864 int rc;
2865
2866 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2867 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2868 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2869 &newsid);
2870 if (rc)
2871 return rc;
2872
2873 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2874 ctxlen);
2875}
2876
2877static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2878 struct qstr *name,
2879 const struct cred *old,
2880 struct cred *new)
2881{
2882 u32 newsid;
2883 int rc;
2884 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2885
2886 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2887 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2888 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2889 &newsid);
2890 if (rc)
2891 return rc;
2892
2893 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2894 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2895 return 0;
2896}
2897
2898static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2899 const struct qstr *qstr,
2900 const char **name,
2901 void **value, size_t *len)
2902{
2903 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2904 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2905 u32 newsid, clen;
2906 int rc;
2907 char *context;
2908
2909 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2910
2911 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2912
2913 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2914 dir, qstr,
2915 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2916 &newsid);
2917 if (rc)
2918 return rc;
2919
2920 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2921 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2922 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2923 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2924 isec->sid = newsid;
2925 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2926 }
2927
2928 if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2929 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2930
2931 if (name)
2932 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2933
2934 if (value && len) {
2935 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
2936 &context, &clen);
2937 if (rc)
2938 return rc;
2939 *value = context;
2940 *len = clen;
2941 }
2942
2943 return 0;
2944}
2945
2946static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2947{
2948 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2949}
2950
2951static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2952{
2953 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2954}
2955
2956static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2957{
2958 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2959}
2960
2961static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2962{
2963 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2964}
2965
2966static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2967{
2968 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2969}
2970
2971static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2972{
2973 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2974}
2975
2976static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2977{
2978 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2979}
2980
2981static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2982 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2983{
2984 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2985}
2986
2987static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2988{
2989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2990
2991 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2992}
2993
2994static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2995 bool rcu)
2996{
2997 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2998 struct common_audit_data ad;
2999 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3000 u32 sid;
3001
3002 validate_creds(cred);
3003
3004 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3005 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3006 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3007 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3008 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3009 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3010
3011 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3012 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3013}
3014
3015static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3016 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3017 int result,
3018 unsigned flags)
3019{
3020 struct common_audit_data ad;
3021 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3022 int rc;
3023
3024 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3025 ad.u.inode = inode;
3026
3027 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3028 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3029 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
3030 if (rc)
3031 return rc;
3032 return 0;
3033}
3034
3035static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3036{
3037 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3038 u32 perms;
3039 bool from_access;
3040 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3041 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3042 u32 sid;
3043 struct av_decision avd;
3044 int rc, rc2;
3045 u32 audited, denied;
3046
3047 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3048 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3049
3050 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3051 if (!mask)
3052 return 0;
3053
3054 validate_creds(cred);
3055
3056 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3057 return 0;
3058
3059 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3060
3061 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3062 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
3063 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3064 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3065
3066 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3067 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3068 (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
3069 &avd);
3070 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3071 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3072 &denied);
3073 if (likely(!audited))
3074 return rc;
3075
3076 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
3077 if (rc2)
3078 return rc2;
3079 return rc;
3080}
3081
3082static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3083{
3084 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3085 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3086 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3087 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3088
3089 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3090 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3091 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3092 ATTR_FORCE);
3093 if (!ia_valid)
3094 return 0;
3095 }
3096
3097 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3098 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3099 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3100
3101 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3102 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3103 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3104 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3105 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3106
3107 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3108}
3109
3110static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3111{
3112 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3113}
3114
3115static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3116{
3117 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3118 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3119
3120 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3121 return false;
3122 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3123 return false;
3124 return true;
3125}
3126
3127static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3128 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3129{
3130 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3131 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3132 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3133 struct common_audit_data ad;
3134 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3135 int rc = 0;
3136
3137 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3138 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3139 if (rc)
3140 return rc;
3141
3142 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3143 ordinary setattr permission. */
3144 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3145 }
3146
3147 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3148 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3149 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3150
3151 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3152 return -EPERM;
3153
3154 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3155 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3156
3157 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3158 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3159 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3160 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3161 if (rc)
3162 return rc;
3163
3164 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3165 GFP_KERNEL);
3166 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3167 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3168 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3169 size_t audit_size;
3170
3171 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3172 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3173 if (value) {
3174 const char *str = value;
3175
3176 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3177 audit_size = size - 1;
3178 else
3179 audit_size = size;
3180 } else {
3181 audit_size = 0;
3182 }
3183 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3184 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3185 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3186 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3187 audit_log_end(ab);
3188
3189 return rc;
3190 }
3191 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3192 size, &newsid);
3193 }
3194 if (rc)
3195 return rc;
3196
3197 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3198 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3199 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3200 if (rc)
3201 return rc;
3202
3203 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3204 sid, isec->sclass);
3205 if (rc)
3206 return rc;
3207
3208 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3209 newsid,
3210 sbsec->sid,
3211 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3212 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3213 &ad);
3214}
3215
3216static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3217 const void *value, size_t size,
3218 int flags)
3219{
3220 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3221 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3222 u32 newsid;
3223 int rc;
3224
3225 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3226 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3227 return;
3228 }
3229
3230 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3231 &newsid);
3232 if (rc) {
3233 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3234 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3236 return;
3237 }
3238
3239 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3240 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3241 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3242 isec->sid = newsid;
3243 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3244 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3245
3246 return;
3247}
3248
3249static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3250{
3251 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3252
3253 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3254}
3255
3256static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3257{
3258 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3259
3260 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3261}
3262
3263static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3264{
3265 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3266 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3267 if (rc)
3268 return rc;
3269
3270 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3271 ordinary setattr permission. */
3272 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3273 }
3274
3275 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3276 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3277 return -EACCES;
3278}
3279
3280static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3281 unsigned int obj_type)
3282{
3283 int ret;
3284 u32 perm;
3285
3286 struct common_audit_data ad;
3287
3288 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3289 ad.u.path = *path;
3290
3291 /*
3292 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3293 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3294 */
3295 switch (obj_type) {
3296 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3297 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3298 break;
3299 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3300 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3301 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3302 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3303 if (ret)
3304 return ret;
3305 break;
3306 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3307 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3308 break;
3309 default:
3310 return -EINVAL;
3311 }
3312
3313 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3314 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3315 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3316
3317 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3318 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3319 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3320
3321 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3322}
3323
3324/*
3325 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3326 *
3327 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3328 */
3329static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3330{
3331 u32 size;
3332 int error;
3333 char *context = NULL;
3334 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3335
3336 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3337 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3338
3339 /*
3340 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3341 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3342 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3343 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3344 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3345 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3346 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3347 */
3348 isec = inode_security(inode);
3349 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3350 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3351 isec->sid, &context,
3352 &size);
3353 else
3354 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3355 &context, &size);
3356 if (error)
3357 return error;
3358 error = size;
3359 if (alloc) {
3360 *buffer = context;
3361 goto out_nofree;
3362 }
3363 kfree(context);
3364out_nofree:
3365 return error;
3366}
3367
3368static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3369 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3370{
3371 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3372 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3373 u32 newsid;
3374 int rc;
3375
3376 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3377 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3378
3379 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3380 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3381
3382 if (!value || !size)
3383 return -EACCES;
3384
3385 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3386 GFP_KERNEL);
3387 if (rc)
3388 return rc;
3389
3390 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3391 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3392 isec->sid = newsid;
3393 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3394 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3395 return 0;
3396}
3397
3398static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3399{
3400 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3401 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3402 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3403 return len;
3404}
3405
3406static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3407{
3408 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3409 *secid = isec->sid;
3410}
3411
3412static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3413{
3414 u32 sid;
3415 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3416 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3417
3418 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3419 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3420 if (!new_creds)
3421 return -ENOMEM;
3422 }
3423
3424 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3425 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3426 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3427 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3428 *new = new_creds;
3429 return 0;
3430}
3431
3432static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3433{
3434 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3435 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3436 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3437 */
3438 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3439 return 1; /* Discard */
3440 /*
3441 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3442 * by selinux.
3443 */
3444 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3445}
3446
3447/* kernfs node operations */
3448
3449static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3450 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3451{
3452 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3453 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3454 int rc;
3455 char *context;
3456
3457 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3458 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3459 return 0;
3460 else if (rc < 0)
3461 return rc;
3462
3463 clen = (u32)rc;
3464 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3465 if (!context)
3466 return -ENOMEM;
3467
3468 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3469 if (rc < 0) {
3470 kfree(context);
3471 return rc;
3472 }
3473
3474 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3475 GFP_KERNEL);
3476 kfree(context);
3477 if (rc)
3478 return rc;
3479
3480 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3481 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3482 } else {
3483 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3484 struct qstr q;
3485
3486 q.name = kn->name;
3487 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3488
3489 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3490 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3491 &newsid);
3492 if (rc)
3493 return rc;
3494 }
3495
3496 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3497 &context, &clen);
3498 if (rc)
3499 return rc;
3500
3501 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3502 XATTR_CREATE);
3503 kfree(context);
3504 return rc;
3505}
3506
3507
3508/* file security operations */
3509
3510static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3511{
3512 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3513 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3514
3515 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3516 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3517 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3518
3519 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3520 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3521}
3522
3523static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3524{
3525 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3526 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3527 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3528 u32 sid = current_sid();
3529
3530 if (!mask)
3531 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3532 return 0;
3533
3534 isec = inode_security(inode);
3535 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3536 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3537 /* No change since file_open check. */
3538 return 0;
3539
3540 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3541}
3542
3543static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3544{
3545 return file_alloc_security(file);
3546}
3547
3548/*
3549 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3550 * operation to an inode.
3551 */
3552static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3553 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3554{
3555 struct common_audit_data ad;
3556 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3557 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3558 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3559 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3560 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3561 int rc;
3562 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3563 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3564
3565 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3566 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3567 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3568 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3569
3570 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3571 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3572 ssid, fsec->sid,
3573 SECCLASS_FD,
3574 FD__USE,
3575 &ad);
3576 if (rc)
3577 goto out;
3578 }
3579
3580 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3581 return 0;
3582
3583 isec = inode_security(inode);
3584 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3585 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3586 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3587out:
3588 return rc;
3589}
3590
3591static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3592 unsigned long arg)
3593{
3594 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3595 int error = 0;
3596
3597 switch (cmd) {
3598 case FIONREAD:
3599 /* fall through */
3600 case FIBMAP:
3601 /* fall through */
3602 case FIGETBSZ:
3603 /* fall through */
3604 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3605 /* fall through */
3606 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3607 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3608 break;
3609
3610 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3611 /* fall through */
3612 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3613 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3614 break;
3615
3616 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3617 case FIONBIO:
3618 /* fall through */
3619 case FIOASYNC:
3620 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3621 break;
3622
3623 case KDSKBENT:
3624 case KDSKBSENT:
3625 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3626 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3627 break;
3628
3629 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3630 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3631 */
3632 default:
3633 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3634 }
3635 return error;
3636}
3637
3638static int default_noexec;
3639
3640static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3641{
3642 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3643 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3644 int rc = 0;
3645
3646 if (default_noexec &&
3647 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3648 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3649 /*
3650 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3651 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3652 * This has an additional check.
3653 */
3654 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3655 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3656 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3657 if (rc)
3658 goto error;
3659 }
3660
3661 if (file) {
3662 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3663 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3664
3665 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3666 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3667 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3668
3669 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3670 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3671
3672 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3673 }
3674
3675error:
3676 return rc;
3677}
3678
3679static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3680{
3681 int rc = 0;
3682
3683 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3684 u32 sid = current_sid();
3685 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3686 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3687 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3688 }
3689
3690 return rc;
3691}
3692
3693static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3694 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3695{
3696 struct common_audit_data ad;
3697 int rc;
3698
3699 if (file) {
3700 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3701 ad.u.file = file;
3702 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3703 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3704 if (rc)
3705 return rc;
3706 }
3707
3708 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3709 prot = reqprot;
3710
3711 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3712 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3713}
3714
3715static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3716 unsigned long reqprot,
3717 unsigned long prot)
3718{
3719 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3720 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3721
3722 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3723 prot = reqprot;
3724
3725 if (default_noexec &&
3726 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3727 int rc = 0;
3728 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3729 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3730 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3731 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3732 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3733 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3734 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3735 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3736 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3737 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3738 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3739 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3740 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3741 /*
3742 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3743 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3744 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3745 * modified content. This typically should only
3746 * occur for text relocations.
3747 */
3748 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3749 }
3750 if (rc)
3751 return rc;
3752 }
3753
3754 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3755}
3756
3757static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3758{
3759 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3760
3761 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3762}
3763
3764static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3765 unsigned long arg)
3766{
3767 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3768 int err = 0;
3769
3770 switch (cmd) {
3771 case F_SETFL:
3772 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3773 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3774 break;
3775 }
3776 /* fall through */
3777 case F_SETOWN:
3778 case F_SETSIG:
3779 case F_GETFL:
3780 case F_GETOWN:
3781 case F_GETSIG:
3782 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3783 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3784 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3785 break;
3786 case F_GETLK:
3787 case F_SETLK:
3788 case F_SETLKW:
3789 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3790 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3791 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3792#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3793 case F_GETLK64:
3794 case F_SETLK64:
3795 case F_SETLKW64:
3796#endif
3797 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3798 break;
3799 }
3800
3801 return err;
3802}
3803
3804static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3805{
3806 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3807
3808 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3809 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3810}
3811
3812static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3813 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3814{
3815 struct file *file;
3816 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3817 u32 perm;
3818 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3819
3820 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3821 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3822
3823 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3824
3825 if (!signum)
3826 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3827 else
3828 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3829
3830 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3831 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3832 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3833}
3834
3835static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3836{
3837 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3838
3839 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3840}
3841
3842static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3843{
3844 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3845 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3846
3847 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3848 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3849 /*
3850 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3851 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3852 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3853 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3854 * struct as its SID.
3855 */
3856 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3857 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3858 /*
3859 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3860 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3861 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3862 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3863 * new inode label or new policy.
3864 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3865 */
3866 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3867}
3868
3869/* task security operations */
3870
3871static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3872 unsigned long clone_flags)
3873{
3874 u32 sid = current_sid();
3875
3876 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3877 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3878}
3879
3880/*
3881 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3882 */
3883static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3884 gfp_t gfp)
3885{
3886 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3887 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3888
3889 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3890 return 0;
3891}
3892
3893/*
3894 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3895 */
3896static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3897{
3898 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3899 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3900
3901 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3902}
3903
3904static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3905{
3906 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3907}
3908
3909/*
3910 * set the security data for a kernel service
3911 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3912 */
3913static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3914{
3915 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3916 u32 sid = current_sid();
3917 int ret;
3918
3919 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3920 sid, secid,
3921 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3922 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3923 NULL);
3924 if (ret == 0) {
3925 tsec->sid = secid;
3926 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3927 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3928 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3929 }
3930 return ret;
3931}
3932
3933/*
3934 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3935 * objective context of the specified inode
3936 */
3937static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3938{
3939 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3940 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3941 u32 sid = current_sid();
3942 int ret;
3943
3944 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3945 sid, isec->sid,
3946 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3947 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3948 NULL);
3949
3950 if (ret == 0)
3951 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3952 return ret;
3953}
3954
3955static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3956{
3957 struct common_audit_data ad;
3958
3959 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3960 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3961
3962 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3963 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3964 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3965}
3966
3967static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
3968{
3969 struct common_audit_data ad;
3970 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3971 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3972 u32 sid = current_sid();
3973 int rc;
3974
3975 /* init_module */
3976 if (file == NULL)
3977 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3978 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3979 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
3980
3981 /* finit_module */
3982
3983 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3984 ad.u.file = file;
3985
3986 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3987 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
3988 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3989 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
3990 if (rc)
3991 return rc;
3992 }
3993
3994 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3995 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3996 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3997 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
3998}
3999
4000static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4001 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
4002{
4003 int rc = 0;
4004
4005 switch (id) {
4006 case READING_MODULE:
4007 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
4008 break;
4009 default:
4010 break;
4011 }
4012
4013 return rc;
4014}
4015
4016static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
4017{
4018 int rc = 0;
4019
4020 switch (id) {
4021 case LOADING_MODULE:
4022 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4023 default:
4024 break;
4025 }
4026
4027 return rc;
4028}
4029
4030static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4031{
4032 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4033 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4034 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4035}
4036
4037static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4038{
4039 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4040 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4041 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4042}
4043
4044static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4045{
4046 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4047 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4048 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4049}
4050
4051static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4052{
4053 *secid = task_sid(p);
4054}
4055
4056static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4057{
4058 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4059 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4060 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4061}
4062
4063static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4064{
4065 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4066 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4067 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4068}
4069
4070static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4071{
4072 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4073 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4074 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4075}
4076
4077static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4078 unsigned int flags)
4079{
4080 u32 av = 0;
4081
4082 if (!flags)
4083 return 0;
4084 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4085 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4086 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4087 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4088 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4089 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4090 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4091}
4092
4093static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4094 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4095{
4096 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4097
4098 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4099 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4100 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4101 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4102 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4104 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4105 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4106
4107 return 0;
4108}
4109
4110static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4111{
4112 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4113 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4114 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4115}
4116
4117static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4118{
4119 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4120 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4121 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4122}
4123
4124static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4125{
4126 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4127 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4128 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4129}
4130
4131static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4132 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4133{
4134 u32 secid;
4135 u32 perm;
4136
4137 if (!sig)
4138 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4139 else
4140 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4141 if (!cred)
4142 secid = current_sid();
4143 else
4144 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4145 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4146 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4147}
4148
4149static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4150 struct inode *inode)
4151{
4152 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4153 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4154
4155 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4156 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4157 isec->sid = sid;
4158 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4159 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4160}
4161
4162/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4163static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4164 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4165{
4166 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4167 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4168
4169 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4170 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4171 if (ih == NULL)
4172 goto out;
4173
4174 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4175 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4176 goto out;
4177
4178 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4179 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4180 ret = 0;
4181
4182 if (proto)
4183 *proto = ih->protocol;
4184
4185 switch (ih->protocol) {
4186 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4187 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4188
4189 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4190 break;
4191
4192 offset += ihlen;
4193 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4194 if (th == NULL)
4195 break;
4196
4197 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4198 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4199 break;
4200 }
4201
4202 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4203 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4204
4205 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4206 break;
4207
4208 offset += ihlen;
4209 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4210 if (uh == NULL)
4211 break;
4212
4213 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4214 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4215 break;
4216 }
4217
4218 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4219 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4220
4221 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4222 break;
4223
4224 offset += ihlen;
4225 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4226 if (dh == NULL)
4227 break;
4228
4229 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4230 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4231 break;
4232 }
4233
4234#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4235 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4236 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4237
4238 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4239 break;
4240
4241 offset += ihlen;
4242 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4243 if (sh == NULL)
4244 break;
4245
4246 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4247 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4248 break;
4249 }
4250#endif
4251 default:
4252 break;
4253 }
4254out:
4255 return ret;
4256}
4257
4258#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4259
4260/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4261static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4262 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4263{
4264 u8 nexthdr;
4265 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4266 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4267 __be16 frag_off;
4268
4269 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4270 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4271 if (ip6 == NULL)
4272 goto out;
4273
4274 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4275 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4276 ret = 0;
4277
4278 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4279 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4280 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4281 if (offset < 0)
4282 goto out;
4283
4284 if (proto)
4285 *proto = nexthdr;
4286
4287 switch (nexthdr) {
4288 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4289 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4290
4291 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4292 if (th == NULL)
4293 break;
4294
4295 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4296 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4297 break;
4298 }
4299
4300 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4301 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4302
4303 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4304 if (uh == NULL)
4305 break;
4306
4307 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4308 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4309 break;
4310 }
4311
4312 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4313 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4314
4315 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4316 if (dh == NULL)
4317 break;
4318
4319 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4320 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4321 break;
4322 }
4323
4324#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4325 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4326 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4327
4328 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4329 if (sh == NULL)
4330 break;
4331
4332 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4333 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4334 break;
4335 }
4336#endif
4337 /* includes fragments */
4338 default:
4339 break;
4340 }
4341out:
4342 return ret;
4343}
4344
4345#endif /* IPV6 */
4346
4347static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4348 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4349{
4350 char *addrp;
4351 int ret;
4352
4353 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4354 case PF_INET:
4355 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4356 if (ret)
4357 goto parse_error;
4358 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4359 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4360 goto okay;
4361
4362#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4363 case PF_INET6:
4364 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4365 if (ret)
4366 goto parse_error;
4367 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4368 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4369 goto okay;
4370#endif /* IPV6 */
4371 default:
4372 addrp = NULL;
4373 goto okay;
4374 }
4375
4376parse_error:
4377 pr_warn(
4378 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4379 " unable to parse packet\n");
4380 return ret;
4381
4382okay:
4383 if (_addrp)
4384 *_addrp = addrp;
4385 return 0;
4386}
4387
4388/**
4389 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4390 * @skb: the packet
4391 * @family: protocol family
4392 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4393 *
4394 * Description:
4395 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4396 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4397 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4398 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4399 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4400 * peer labels.
4401 *
4402 */
4403static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4404{
4405 int err;
4406 u32 xfrm_sid;
4407 u32 nlbl_sid;
4408 u32 nlbl_type;
4409
4410 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4411 if (unlikely(err))
4412 return -EACCES;
4413 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4414 if (unlikely(err))
4415 return -EACCES;
4416
4417 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4418 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4419 if (unlikely(err)) {
4420 pr_warn(
4421 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4422 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4423 return -EACCES;
4424 }
4425
4426 return 0;
4427}
4428
4429/**
4430 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4431 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4432 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4433 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4434 *
4435 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4436 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4437 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4438 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4439 *
4440 */
4441static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4442{
4443 int err = 0;
4444
4445 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4446 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4447 conn_sid);
4448 else
4449 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4450
4451 return err;
4452}
4453
4454/* socket security operations */
4455
4456static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4457 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4458{
4459 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4460 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4461 return 0;
4462 }
4463
4464 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4465 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4466}
4467
4468static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4469{
4470 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4471 struct common_audit_data ad;
4472 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4473
4474 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4475 return 0;
4476
4477 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4478 ad.u.net = &net;
4479 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4480
4481 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4482 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4483 &ad);
4484}
4485
4486static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4487 int protocol, int kern)
4488{
4489 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4490 u32 newsid;
4491 u16 secclass;
4492 int rc;
4493
4494 if (kern)
4495 return 0;
4496
4497 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4498 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4499 if (rc)
4500 return rc;
4501
4502 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4503 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4504}
4505
4506static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4507 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4508{
4509 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4510 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4511 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4512 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4513 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4514 int err = 0;
4515
4516 if (!kern) {
4517 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4518 if (err)
4519 return err;
4520 }
4521
4522 isec->sclass = sclass;
4523 isec->sid = sid;
4524 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4525
4526 if (sock->sk) {
4527 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4528 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4529 sksec->sid = sid;
4530 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4531 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4532 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4533
4534 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4535 }
4536
4537 return err;
4538}
4539
4540static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4541 struct socket *sockb)
4542{
4543 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4544 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4545
4546 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4547 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4548
4549 return 0;
4550}
4551
4552/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4553 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4554 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4555
4556static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4557{
4558 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4559 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4560 u16 family;
4561 int err;
4562
4563 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4564 if (err)
4565 goto out;
4566
4567 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4568 family = sk->sk_family;
4569 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4570 char *addrp;
4571 struct common_audit_data ad;
4572 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4573 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4574 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4575 u16 family_sa;
4576 unsigned short snum;
4577 u32 sid, node_perm;
4578
4579 /*
4580 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4581 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4582 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4583 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4584 */
4585 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4586 return -EINVAL;
4587 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4588 switch (family_sa) {
4589 case AF_UNSPEC:
4590 case AF_INET:
4591 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4592 return -EINVAL;
4593 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4594 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4595 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4596 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4597 */
4598 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4599 goto err_af;
4600 family_sa = AF_INET;
4601 }
4602 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4603 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4604 break;
4605 case AF_INET6:
4606 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4607 return -EINVAL;
4608 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4609 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4610 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4611 break;
4612 default:
4613 goto err_af;
4614 }
4615
4616 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4617 ad.u.net = &net;
4618 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4619 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4620
4621 if (snum) {
4622 int low, high;
4623
4624 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4625
4626 if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
4627 snum > high) {
4628 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4629 snum, &sid);
4630 if (err)
4631 goto out;
4632 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4633 sksec->sid, sid,
4634 sksec->sclass,
4635 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4636 if (err)
4637 goto out;
4638 }
4639 }
4640
4641 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4642 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4643 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4644 break;
4645
4646 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4647 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4648 break;
4649
4650 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4651 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4652 break;
4653
4654 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4655 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4656 break;
4657
4658 default:
4659 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4660 break;
4661 }
4662
4663 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4664 if (err)
4665 goto out;
4666
4667 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4668 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4669 else
4670 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4671
4672 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4673 sksec->sid, sid,
4674 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4675 if (err)
4676 goto out;
4677 }
4678out:
4679 return err;
4680err_af:
4681 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4682 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4683 return -EINVAL;
4684 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4685}
4686
4687/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4688 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4689 */
4690static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4691 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4692{
4693 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4694 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4695 int err;
4696
4697 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4698 if (err)
4699 return err;
4700 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4701 return -EINVAL;
4702
4703 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4704 * way to disconnect the socket
4705 */
4706 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4707 return 0;
4708
4709 /*
4710 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4711 * for the port.
4712 */
4713 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4714 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4715 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4716 struct common_audit_data ad;
4717 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4718 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4719 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4720 unsigned short snum;
4721 u32 sid, perm;
4722
4723 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4724 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4725 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4726 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4727 */
4728 switch (address->sa_family) {
4729 case AF_INET:
4730 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4731 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4732 return -EINVAL;
4733 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4734 break;
4735 case AF_INET6:
4736 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4737 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4738 return -EINVAL;
4739 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4740 break;
4741 default:
4742 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4743 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4744 */
4745 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4746 return -EINVAL;
4747 else
4748 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4749 }
4750
4751 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4752 if (err)
4753 return err;
4754
4755 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4756 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4757 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4758 break;
4759 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4760 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4761 break;
4762 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4763 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4764 break;
4765 }
4766
4767 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4768 ad.u.net = &net;
4769 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4770 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4771 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4772 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4773 if (err)
4774 return err;
4775 }
4776
4777 return 0;
4778}
4779
4780/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4781static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4782 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4783{
4784 int err;
4785 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4786
4787 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4788 if (err)
4789 return err;
4790
4791 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4792}
4793
4794static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4795{
4796 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4797}
4798
4799static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4800{
4801 int err;
4802 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4803 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4804 u16 sclass;
4805 u32 sid;
4806
4807 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4808 if (err)
4809 return err;
4810
4811 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4812 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4813 sclass = isec->sclass;
4814 sid = isec->sid;
4815 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4816
4817 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4818 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4819 newisec->sid = sid;
4820 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4821
4822 return 0;
4823}
4824
4825static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4826 int size)
4827{
4828 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4829}
4830
4831static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4832 int size, int flags)
4833{
4834 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4835}
4836
4837static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4838{
4839 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4840}
4841
4842static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4843{
4844 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4845}
4846
4847static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4848{
4849 int err;
4850
4851 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4852 if (err)
4853 return err;
4854
4855 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4856}
4857
4858static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4859 int optname)
4860{
4861 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4862}
4863
4864static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4865{
4866 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4867}
4868
4869static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4870 struct sock *other,
4871 struct sock *newsk)
4872{
4873 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4874 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4875 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4876 struct common_audit_data ad;
4877 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4878 int err;
4879
4880 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4881 ad.u.net = &net;
4882 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4883
4884 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4885 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4886 sksec_other->sclass,
4887 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4888 if (err)
4889 return err;
4890
4891 /* server child socket */
4892 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4893 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4894 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4895 if (err)
4896 return err;
4897
4898 /* connecting socket */
4899 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4900
4901 return 0;
4902}
4903
4904static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4905 struct socket *other)
4906{
4907 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4908 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4909 struct common_audit_data ad;
4910 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4911
4912 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4913 ad.u.net = &net;
4914 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4915
4916 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4917 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4918 &ad);
4919}
4920
4921static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4922 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4923 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4924{
4925 int err;
4926 u32 if_sid;
4927 u32 node_sid;
4928
4929 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4930 if (err)
4931 return err;
4932 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4933 peer_sid, if_sid,
4934 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4935 if (err)
4936 return err;
4937
4938 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4939 if (err)
4940 return err;
4941 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4942 peer_sid, node_sid,
4943 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4944}
4945
4946static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4947 u16 family)
4948{
4949 int err = 0;
4950 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4951 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4952 struct common_audit_data ad;
4953 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4954 char *addrp;
4955
4956 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4957 ad.u.net = &net;
4958 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4959 ad.u.net->family = family;
4960 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4961 if (err)
4962 return err;
4963
4964 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4965 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4966 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4967 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4968 if (err)
4969 return err;
4970 }
4971
4972 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4973 if (err)
4974 return err;
4975 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4976
4977 return err;
4978}
4979
4980static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4981{
4982 int err;
4983 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4984 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4985 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4986 struct common_audit_data ad;
4987 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4988 char *addrp;
4989 u8 secmark_active;
4990 u8 peerlbl_active;
4991
4992 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4993 return 0;
4994
4995 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4996 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4997 family = PF_INET;
4998
4999 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5000 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5001 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5002 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5003 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5004 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5005
5006 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5007 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5008 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5009 return 0;
5010
5011 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5012 ad.u.net = &net;
5013 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5014 ad.u.net->family = family;
5015 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5016 if (err)
5017 return err;
5018
5019 if (peerlbl_active) {
5020 u32 peer_sid;
5021
5022 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5023 if (err)
5024 return err;
5025 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5026 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5027 if (err) {
5028 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5029 return err;
5030 }
5031 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5032 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5033 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5034 if (err) {
5035 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5036 return err;
5037 }
5038 }
5039
5040 if (secmark_active) {
5041 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5042 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5043 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5044 if (err)
5045 return err;
5046 }
5047
5048 return err;
5049}
5050
5051static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5052 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5053{
5054 int err = 0;
5055 char *scontext;
5056 u32 scontext_len;
5057 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5058 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5059
5060 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5061 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5062 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5063 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5064 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5065 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5066
5067 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5068 &scontext_len);
5069 if (err)
5070 return err;
5071
5072 if (scontext_len > len) {
5073 err = -ERANGE;
5074 goto out_len;
5075 }
5076
5077 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5078 err = -EFAULT;
5079
5080out_len:
5081 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5082 err = -EFAULT;
5083 kfree(scontext);
5084 return err;
5085}
5086
5087static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5088{
5089 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5090 u16 family;
5091 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5092
5093 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5094 family = PF_INET;
5095 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5096 family = PF_INET6;
5097 else if (sock)
5098 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5099 else
5100 goto out;
5101
5102 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5103 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5104 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5105 } else if (skb)
5106 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5107
5108out:
5109 *secid = peer_secid;
5110 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5111 return -EINVAL;
5112 return 0;
5113}
5114
5115static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5116{
5117 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5118
5119 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5120 if (!sksec)
5121 return -ENOMEM;
5122
5123 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5124 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5125 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5126 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5127 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5128
5129 return 0;
5130}
5131
5132static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5133{
5134 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5135
5136 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5137 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5138 kfree(sksec);
5139}
5140
5141static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5142{
5143 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5144 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5145
5146 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5147 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5148 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5149
5150 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5151}
5152
5153static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5154{
5155 if (!sk)
5156 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5157 else {
5158 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5159
5160 *secid = sksec->sid;
5161 }
5162}
5163
5164static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5165{
5166 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5167 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5168 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5169
5170 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5171 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5172 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5173 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5174}
5175
5176/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5177 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5178 * already present).
5179 */
5180static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5181 struct sk_buff *skb)
5182{
5183 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5184 struct common_audit_data ad;
5185 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5186 u8 peerlbl_active;
5187 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5188 u32 conn_sid;
5189 int err = 0;
5190
5191 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5192 return 0;
5193
5194 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5195
5196 if (peerlbl_active) {
5197 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5198 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5199 */
5200 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5201 &peer_sid);
5202 if (err)
5203 return err;
5204
5205 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5206 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5207 }
5208
5209 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5210 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5211
5212 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5213 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5214 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5215 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5216 */
5217 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5218 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5219 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5220 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5221 */
5222 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5223 ad.u.net = &net;
5224 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5225 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5226 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5227 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5228 if (err)
5229 return err;
5230 }
5231
5232 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5233 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5234 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5235 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5236 * plug this into the new socket.
5237 */
5238 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5239 if (err)
5240 return err;
5241
5242 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5243 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5244
5245 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5246 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5247}
5248
5249/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5250 * based on their @optname.
5251 */
5252static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5253 struct sockaddr *address,
5254 int addrlen)
5255{
5256 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5257 void *addr_buf;
5258 struct sockaddr *addr;
5259 struct socket *sock;
5260
5261 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5262 return 0;
5263
5264 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5265 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5266 addr_buf = address;
5267
5268 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5269 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5270 return -EINVAL;
5271
5272 addr = addr_buf;
5273 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5274 case AF_UNSPEC:
5275 case AF_INET:
5276 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5277 break;
5278 case AF_INET6:
5279 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5280 break;
5281 default:
5282 return -EINVAL;
5283 }
5284
5285 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5286 return -EINVAL;
5287
5288 err = -EINVAL;
5289 switch (optname) {
5290 /* Bind checks */
5291 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5292 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5293 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5294 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5295 break;
5296 /* Connect checks */
5297 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5298 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5299 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5300 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5301 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5302 if (err)
5303 return err;
5304
5305 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5306 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5307 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
5308 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5309 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5310 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5311 * primary address is selected.
5312 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5313 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5314 * selinux_socket_connect().
5315 */
5316 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5317 break;
5318 }
5319
5320 if (err)
5321 return err;
5322
5323 addr_buf += len;
5324 walk_size += len;
5325 }
5326
5327 return 0;
5328}
5329
5330/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5331static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5332 struct sock *newsk)
5333{
5334 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5335 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5336
5337 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5338 * the non-sctp clone version.
5339 */
5340 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5341 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5342
5343 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5344 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5345 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5346 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5347}
5348
5349static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5350 struct request_sock *req)
5351{
5352 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5353 int err;
5354 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5355 u32 connsid;
5356 u32 peersid;
5357
5358 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5359 if (err)
5360 return err;
5361 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5362 if (err)
5363 return err;
5364 req->secid = connsid;
5365 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5366
5367 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5368}
5369
5370static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5371 const struct request_sock *req)
5372{
5373 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5374
5375 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5376 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5377 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5378 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5379 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5380 time it will have been created and available. */
5381
5382 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5383 * thread with access to newsksec */
5384 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5385}
5386
5387static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5388{
5389 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5390 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5391
5392 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5393 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5394 family = PF_INET;
5395
5396 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5397}
5398
5399static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5400{
5401 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5402 u32 tsid;
5403
5404 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5405 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5406
5407 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5408 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5409 NULL);
5410}
5411
5412static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5413{
5414 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5415}
5416
5417static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5418{
5419 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5420}
5421
5422static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5423 struct flowi *fl)
5424{
5425 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5426}
5427
5428static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5429{
5430 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5431
5432 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5433 if (!tunsec)
5434 return -ENOMEM;
5435 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5436
5437 *security = tunsec;
5438 return 0;
5439}
5440
5441static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5442{
5443 kfree(security);
5444}
5445
5446static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5447{
5448 u32 sid = current_sid();
5449
5450 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5451 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5452 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5453 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5454 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5455 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5456
5457 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5458 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5459 NULL);
5460}
5461
5462static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5463{
5464 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5465
5466 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5467 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5468 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5469}
5470
5471static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5472{
5473 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5474 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5475
5476 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5477 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5478 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5479 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5480 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5481 * protocols were being used */
5482
5483 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5484 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5485
5486 return 0;
5487}
5488
5489static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5490{
5491 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5492 u32 sid = current_sid();
5493 int err;
5494
5495 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5496 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5497 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5498 if (err)
5499 return err;
5500 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5501 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5502 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5503 if (err)
5504 return err;
5505 tunsec->sid = sid;
5506
5507 return 0;
5508}
5509
5510static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5511{
5512 int err = 0;
5513 u32 perm;
5514 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5515 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5516
5517 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
5518 err = -EINVAL;
5519 goto out;
5520 }
5521 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
5522
5523 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5524 if (err) {
5525 if (err == -EINVAL) {
5526 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5527 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5528 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
5529 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5530 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
5531 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5532 if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
5533 security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5534 err = 0;
5535 }
5536
5537 /* Ignore */
5538 if (err == -ENOENT)
5539 err = 0;
5540 goto out;
5541 }
5542
5543 err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5544out:
5545 return err;
5546}
5547
5548#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5549
5550static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5551 const struct net_device *indev,
5552 u16 family)
5553{
5554 int err;
5555 char *addrp;
5556 u32 peer_sid;
5557 struct common_audit_data ad;
5558 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5559 u8 secmark_active;
5560 u8 netlbl_active;
5561 u8 peerlbl_active;
5562
5563 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5564 return NF_ACCEPT;
5565
5566 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5567 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5568 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5569 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5570 return NF_ACCEPT;
5571
5572 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5573 return NF_DROP;
5574
5575 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5576 ad.u.net = &net;
5577 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5578 ad.u.net->family = family;
5579 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5580 return NF_DROP;
5581
5582 if (peerlbl_active) {
5583 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5584 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5585 if (err) {
5586 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5587 return NF_DROP;
5588 }
5589 }
5590
5591 if (secmark_active)
5592 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5593 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5594 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5595 return NF_DROP;
5596
5597 if (netlbl_active)
5598 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5599 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5600 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5601 * protection */
5602 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5603 return NF_DROP;
5604
5605 return NF_ACCEPT;
5606}
5607
5608static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5609 struct sk_buff *skb,
5610 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5611{
5612 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5613}
5614
5615#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5616static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5617 struct sk_buff *skb,
5618 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5619{
5620 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5621}
5622#endif /* IPV6 */
5623
5624static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5625 u16 family)
5626{
5627 struct sock *sk;
5628 u32 sid;
5629
5630 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5631 return NF_ACCEPT;
5632
5633 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5634 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5635 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5636 sk = skb->sk;
5637 if (sk) {
5638 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5639
5640 if (sk_listener(sk))
5641 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5642 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5643 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5644 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5645 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5646 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5647 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5648 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5649 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5650 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5651 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5652 * best we can do. */
5653 return NF_ACCEPT;
5654
5655 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5656 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5657 sid = sksec->sid;
5658 } else
5659 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5660 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5661 return NF_DROP;
5662
5663 return NF_ACCEPT;
5664}
5665
5666static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5667 struct sk_buff *skb,
5668 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5669{
5670 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5671}
5672
5673#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5674static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5675 struct sk_buff *skb,
5676 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5677{
5678 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5679}
5680#endif /* IPV6 */
5681
5682static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5683 int ifindex,
5684 u16 family)
5685{
5686 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5687 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5688 struct common_audit_data ad;
5689 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5690 char *addrp;
5691 u8 proto;
5692
5693 if (sk == NULL)
5694 return NF_ACCEPT;
5695 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5696
5697 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5698 ad.u.net = &net;
5699 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5700 ad.u.net->family = family;
5701 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5702 return NF_DROP;
5703
5704 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5705 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5706 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5707 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5708 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5709
5710 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5711 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5712
5713 return NF_ACCEPT;
5714}
5715
5716static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5717 const struct net_device *outdev,
5718 u16 family)
5719{
5720 u32 secmark_perm;
5721 u32 peer_sid;
5722 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5723 struct sock *sk;
5724 struct common_audit_data ad;
5725 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5726 char *addrp;
5727 u8 secmark_active;
5728 u8 peerlbl_active;
5729
5730 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5731 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5732 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5733 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5734 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5735 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5736
5737 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5738 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5739 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5740 return NF_ACCEPT;
5741
5742 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5743
5744#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5745 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5746 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5747 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5748 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5749 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5750 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5751 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5752 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5753 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5754 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5755 * connection. */
5756 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5757 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5758 return NF_ACCEPT;
5759#endif
5760
5761 if (sk == NULL) {
5762 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5763 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5764 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5765 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5766 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5767 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5768 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5769 return NF_DROP;
5770 } else {
5771 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5772 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5773 }
5774 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5775 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5776 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5777 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5778 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5779 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5780 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5781 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5782 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5783 * for similar problems. */
5784 u32 skb_sid;
5785 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5786
5787 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5788 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5789 return NF_DROP;
5790 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5791 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5792 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5793 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5794 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5795 * pass the packet. */
5796 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5797 switch (family) {
5798 case PF_INET:
5799 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5800 return NF_ACCEPT;
5801 break;
5802 case PF_INET6:
5803 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5804 return NF_ACCEPT;
5805 break;
5806 default:
5807 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5808 }
5809 }
5810 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5811 return NF_DROP;
5812 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5813 } else {
5814 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5815 * associated socket. */
5816 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5817 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5818 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5819 }
5820
5821 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5822 ad.u.net = &net;
5823 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5824 ad.u.net->family = family;
5825 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5826 return NF_DROP;
5827
5828 if (secmark_active)
5829 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5830 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5831 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5832 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5833
5834 if (peerlbl_active) {
5835 u32 if_sid;
5836 u32 node_sid;
5837
5838 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5839 return NF_DROP;
5840 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5841 peer_sid, if_sid,
5842 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5843 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5844
5845 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5846 return NF_DROP;
5847 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5848 peer_sid, node_sid,
5849 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5850 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5851 }
5852
5853 return NF_ACCEPT;
5854}
5855
5856static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5857 struct sk_buff *skb,
5858 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5859{
5860 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5861}
5862
5863#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5864static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5865 struct sk_buff *skb,
5866 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5867{
5868 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5869}
5870#endif /* IPV6 */
5871
5872#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5873
5874static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5875{
5876 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5877}
5878
5879static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5880{
5881 isec->sclass = sclass;
5882 isec->sid = current_sid();
5883}
5884
5885static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5886{
5887 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5888
5889 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5890 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5891
5892 return 0;
5893}
5894
5895static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5896 u32 perms)
5897{
5898 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5899 struct common_audit_data ad;
5900 u32 sid = current_sid();
5901
5902 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5903
5904 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5905 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5906
5907 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5908 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5909}
5910
5911static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5912{
5913 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5914}
5915
5916/* message queue security operations */
5917static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5918{
5919 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5920 struct common_audit_data ad;
5921 u32 sid = current_sid();
5922 int rc;
5923
5924 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5925 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5926
5927 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5928 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5929
5930 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5931 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5932 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5933 return rc;
5934}
5935
5936static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5937{
5938 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5939 struct common_audit_data ad;
5940 u32 sid = current_sid();
5941
5942 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5943
5944 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5945 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5946
5947 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5948 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5949 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5950}
5951
5952static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
5953{
5954 int err;
5955 int perms;
5956
5957 switch (cmd) {
5958 case IPC_INFO:
5959 case MSG_INFO:
5960 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5961 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5962 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5963 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5964 case IPC_STAT:
5965 case MSG_STAT:
5966 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
5967 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5968 break;
5969 case IPC_SET:
5970 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5971 break;
5972 case IPC_RMID:
5973 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5974 break;
5975 default:
5976 return 0;
5977 }
5978
5979 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
5980 return err;
5981}
5982
5983static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5984{
5985 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5986 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5987 struct common_audit_data ad;
5988 u32 sid = current_sid();
5989 int rc;
5990
5991 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5992 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5993
5994 /*
5995 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5996 */
5997 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5998 /*
5999 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6000 * message queue this message will be stored in
6001 */
6002 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6003 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6004 if (rc)
6005 return rc;
6006 }
6007
6008 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6009 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6010
6011 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6012 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6013 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6014 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6015 if (!rc)
6016 /* Can this process send the message */
6017 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6018 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6019 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6020 if (!rc)
6021 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6022 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6023 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6024 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6025
6026 return rc;
6027}
6028
6029static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6030 struct task_struct *target,
6031 long type, int mode)
6032{
6033 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6034 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6035 struct common_audit_data ad;
6036 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6037 int rc;
6038
6039 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6040 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6041
6042 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6043 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6044
6045 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6046 sid, isec->sid,
6047 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6048 if (!rc)
6049 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6050 sid, msec->sid,
6051 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6052 return rc;
6053}
6054
6055/* Shared Memory security operations */
6056static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6057{
6058 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6059 struct common_audit_data ad;
6060 u32 sid = current_sid();
6061 int rc;
6062
6063 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6064 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6065
6066 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6067 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6068
6069 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6070 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6071 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6072 return rc;
6073}
6074
6075static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6076{
6077 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6078 struct common_audit_data ad;
6079 u32 sid = current_sid();
6080
6081 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6082
6083 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6084 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6085
6086 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6087 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6088 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6089}
6090
6091/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6092static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6093{
6094 int perms;
6095 int err;
6096
6097 switch (cmd) {
6098 case IPC_INFO:
6099 case SHM_INFO:
6100 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6101 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6102 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6103 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6104 case IPC_STAT:
6105 case SHM_STAT:
6106 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6107 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6108 break;
6109 case IPC_SET:
6110 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6111 break;
6112 case SHM_LOCK:
6113 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6114 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6115 break;
6116 case IPC_RMID:
6117 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6118 break;
6119 default:
6120 return 0;
6121 }
6122
6123 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6124 return err;
6125}
6126
6127static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6128 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6129{
6130 u32 perms;
6131
6132 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6133 perms = SHM__READ;
6134 else
6135 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6136
6137 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6138}
6139
6140/* Semaphore security operations */
6141static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6142{
6143 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6144 struct common_audit_data ad;
6145 u32 sid = current_sid();
6146 int rc;
6147
6148 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6149 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6150
6151 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6152 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6153
6154 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6155 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6156 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6157 return rc;
6158}
6159
6160static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6161{
6162 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6163 struct common_audit_data ad;
6164 u32 sid = current_sid();
6165
6166 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6167
6168 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6169 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6170
6171 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6172 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6173 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6174}
6175
6176/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6177static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6178{
6179 int err;
6180 u32 perms;
6181
6182 switch (cmd) {
6183 case IPC_INFO:
6184 case SEM_INFO:
6185 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6186 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6187 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6188 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6189 case GETPID:
6190 case GETNCNT:
6191 case GETZCNT:
6192 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6193 break;
6194 case GETVAL:
6195 case GETALL:
6196 perms = SEM__READ;
6197 break;
6198 case SETVAL:
6199 case SETALL:
6200 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6201 break;
6202 case IPC_RMID:
6203 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6204 break;
6205 case IPC_SET:
6206 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6207 break;
6208 case IPC_STAT:
6209 case SEM_STAT:
6210 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6211 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6212 break;
6213 default:
6214 return 0;
6215 }
6216
6217 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6218 return err;
6219}
6220
6221static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6222 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6223{
6224 u32 perms;
6225
6226 if (alter)
6227 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6228 else
6229 perms = SEM__READ;
6230
6231 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6232}
6233
6234static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6235{
6236 u32 av = 0;
6237
6238 av = 0;
6239 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6240 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6241 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6242 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6243
6244 if (av == 0)
6245 return 0;
6246
6247 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6248}
6249
6250static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6251{
6252 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6253 *secid = isec->sid;
6254}
6255
6256static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6257{
6258 if (inode)
6259 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6260}
6261
6262static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6263 char *name, char **value)
6264{
6265 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6266 u32 sid;
6267 int error;
6268 unsigned len;
6269
6270 rcu_read_lock();
6271 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6272
6273 if (current != p) {
6274 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6275 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6276 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6277 if (error)
6278 goto bad;
6279 }
6280
6281 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6282 sid = __tsec->sid;
6283 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6284 sid = __tsec->osid;
6285 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6286 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6287 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6288 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6289 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6290 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6291 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6292 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6293 else {
6294 error = -EINVAL;
6295 goto bad;
6296 }
6297 rcu_read_unlock();
6298
6299 if (!sid)
6300 return 0;
6301
6302 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6303 if (error)
6304 return error;
6305 return len;
6306
6307bad:
6308 rcu_read_unlock();
6309 return error;
6310}
6311
6312static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6313{
6314 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6315 struct cred *new;
6316 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6317 int error;
6318 char *str = value;
6319
6320 /*
6321 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6322 */
6323 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6324 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6325 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6326 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6327 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6328 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6329 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6330 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6331 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6332 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6333 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6334 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6335 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6336 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6337 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6338 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6339 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6340 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6341 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6342 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6343 else
6344 error = -EINVAL;
6345 if (error)
6346 return error;
6347
6348 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6349 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6350 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6351 str[size-1] = 0;
6352 size--;
6353 }
6354 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6355 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6356 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6357 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6358 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6359 size_t audit_size;
6360
6361 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6362 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6363 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6364 audit_size = size - 1;
6365 else
6366 audit_size = size;
6367 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6368 GFP_ATOMIC,
6369 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6370 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6371 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6372 audit_log_end(ab);
6373
6374 return error;
6375 }
6376 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6377 &selinux_state,
6378 value, size, &sid);
6379 }
6380 if (error)
6381 return error;
6382 }
6383
6384 new = prepare_creds();
6385 if (!new)
6386 return -ENOMEM;
6387
6388 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6389 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6390 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6391 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
6392 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6393 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6394 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6395 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6396 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6397 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6398 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6399 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6400 if (sid) {
6401 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6402 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6403 if (error)
6404 goto abort_change;
6405 }
6406 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6407 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6408 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6409 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6410 error = -EINVAL;
6411 if (sid == 0)
6412 goto abort_change;
6413
6414 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6415 error = -EPERM;
6416 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6417 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6418 tsec->sid, sid);
6419 if (error)
6420 goto abort_change;
6421 }
6422
6423 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6424 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6425 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6426 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6427 if (error)
6428 goto abort_change;
6429
6430 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6431 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6432 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6433 if (ptsid != 0) {
6434 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6435 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6436 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6437 if (error)
6438 goto abort_change;
6439 }
6440
6441 tsec->sid = sid;
6442 } else {
6443 error = -EINVAL;
6444 goto abort_change;
6445 }
6446
6447 commit_creds(new);
6448 return size;
6449
6450abort_change:
6451 abort_creds(new);
6452 return error;
6453}
6454
6455static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6456{
6457 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6458}
6459
6460static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6461{
6462 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6463 secdata, seclen);
6464}
6465
6466static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6467{
6468 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6469 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6470}
6471
6472static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6473{
6474 kfree(secdata);
6475}
6476
6477static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6478{
6479 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6480
6481 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6482 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6483 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6484}
6485
6486/*
6487 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6488 */
6489static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6490{
6491 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6492 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6493 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6494 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6495}
6496
6497/*
6498 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6499 */
6500static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6501{
6502 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6503}
6504
6505static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6506{
6507 int len = 0;
6508 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6509 ctx, true);
6510 if (len < 0)
6511 return len;
6512 *ctxlen = len;
6513 return 0;
6514}
6515#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6516
6517static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6518 unsigned long flags)
6519{
6520 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6521 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6522
6523 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6524 if (!ksec)
6525 return -ENOMEM;
6526
6527 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6528 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6529 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6530 else
6531 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6532
6533 k->security = ksec;
6534 return 0;
6535}
6536
6537static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6538{
6539 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6540
6541 k->security = NULL;
6542 kfree(ksec);
6543}
6544
6545static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6546 const struct cred *cred,
6547 unsigned perm)
6548{
6549 struct key *key;
6550 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6551 u32 sid;
6552
6553 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
6554 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
6555 appear to be created. */
6556 if (perm == 0)
6557 return 0;
6558
6559 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6560
6561 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6562 ksec = key->security;
6563
6564 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6565 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6566}
6567
6568static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6569{
6570 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6571 char *context = NULL;
6572 unsigned len;
6573 int rc;
6574
6575 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6576 &context, &len);
6577 if (!rc)
6578 rc = len;
6579 *_buffer = context;
6580 return rc;
6581}
6582#endif
6583
6584#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6585static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6586{
6587 struct common_audit_data ad;
6588 int err;
6589 u32 sid = 0;
6590 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6591 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6592
6593 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6594 if (err)
6595 return err;
6596
6597 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6598 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6599 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6600 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6601 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6602 sec->sid, sid,
6603 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6604 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6605}
6606
6607static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6608 u8 port_num)
6609{
6610 struct common_audit_data ad;
6611 int err;
6612 u32 sid = 0;
6613 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6614 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6615
6616 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6617 &sid);
6618
6619 if (err)
6620 return err;
6621
6622 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6623 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6624 ibendport.port = port_num;
6625 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6626 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6627 sec->sid, sid,
6628 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6629 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6630}
6631
6632static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6633{
6634 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6635
6636 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6637 if (!sec)
6638 return -ENOMEM;
6639 sec->sid = current_sid();
6640
6641 *ib_sec = sec;
6642 return 0;
6643}
6644
6645static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6646{
6647 kfree(ib_sec);
6648}
6649#endif
6650
6651#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6652static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6653 unsigned int size)
6654{
6655 u32 sid = current_sid();
6656 int ret;
6657
6658 switch (cmd) {
6659 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6660 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6661 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6662 NULL);
6663 break;
6664 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6665 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6666 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6667 NULL);
6668 break;
6669 default:
6670 ret = 0;
6671 break;
6672 }
6673
6674 return ret;
6675}
6676
6677static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6678{
6679 u32 av = 0;
6680
6681 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6682 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6683 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6684 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6685 return av;
6686}
6687
6688/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6689 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6690 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6691 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6692 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6693 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6694 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6695 */
6696static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6697{
6698 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6699 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6700 struct bpf_map *map;
6701 int ret;
6702
6703 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6704 map = file->private_data;
6705 bpfsec = map->security;
6706 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6707 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6708 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6709 if (ret)
6710 return ret;
6711 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6712 prog = file->private_data;
6713 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6714 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6715 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6716 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6717 if (ret)
6718 return ret;
6719 }
6720 return 0;
6721}
6722
6723static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6724{
6725 u32 sid = current_sid();
6726 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6727
6728 bpfsec = map->security;
6729 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6730 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6731 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6732}
6733
6734static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6735{
6736 u32 sid = current_sid();
6737 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6738
6739 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6740 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6741 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6742 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6743}
6744
6745static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6746{
6747 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6748
6749 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6750 if (!bpfsec)
6751 return -ENOMEM;
6752
6753 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6754 map->security = bpfsec;
6755
6756 return 0;
6757}
6758
6759static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6760{
6761 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6762
6763 map->security = NULL;
6764 kfree(bpfsec);
6765}
6766
6767static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6768{
6769 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6770
6771 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6772 if (!bpfsec)
6773 return -ENOMEM;
6774
6775 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6776 aux->security = bpfsec;
6777
6778 return 0;
6779}
6780
6781static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6782{
6783 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6784
6785 aux->security = NULL;
6786 kfree(bpfsec);
6787}
6788#endif
6789
6790struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6791 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6792 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6793 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6794 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6795 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6796};
6797
6798static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6799 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6800 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6801 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6802 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6803
6804 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6805 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6806 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6807 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6808 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6809 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6810 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6811 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6812 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6813
6814 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6815
6816 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
6817 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6818 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6819
6820 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
6821 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
6822
6823 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
6824 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6825 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
6826 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
6827 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6828 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6829 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6830 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6831 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6832 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6833 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6834 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6835 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
6836
6837 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6838 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6839
6840 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
6841 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6842 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6843 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6844 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6845 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6846 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6847 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6848 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6849 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6850 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6851 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
6852 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
6853 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
6854 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
6855 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
6856 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
6857 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
6858 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
6859 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
6860 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
6861 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
6862 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
6863 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
6864 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
6865 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
6866 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
6867 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
6868
6869 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
6870
6871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
6872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
6873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
6874 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
6875 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
6876 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
6877 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
6878 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
6879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
6880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
6881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
6882
6883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
6884
6885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
6886 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
6887 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
6888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
6889 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
6890 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
6891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
6892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
6893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
6894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
6895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
6896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
6897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
6898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
6899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
6900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
6901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
6902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
6903 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
6904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
6905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
6906 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
6907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
6908
6909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
6910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
6911
6912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
6913
6914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
6915 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
6916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
6917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
6918 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
6919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
6920
6921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
6922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
6923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
6924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
6925
6926 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
6927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
6928 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
6929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
6930
6931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
6932
6933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
6934 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
6935
6936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
6937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
6938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
6939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
6940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
6941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
6942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
6943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
6944
6945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
6946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
6947
6948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
6949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
6950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
6951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
6952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
6953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
6954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
6955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
6956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
6957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
6958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
6959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
6960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
6961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
6964 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
6966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
6968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
6972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
6974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
6976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
6977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
6978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
6980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
6982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
6984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
6987#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
6990 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
6993#endif
6994#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7001 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7006 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7008#endif
7009
7010#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7015#endif
7016
7017#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7022#endif
7023
7024#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7032#endif
7033};
7034
7035static __init int selinux_init(void)
7036{
7037 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7038
7039 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7040 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7041 selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
7042 selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
7043 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7044
7045 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7046 cred_init_security();
7047
7048 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7049
7050 avc_init();
7051
7052 avtab_cache_init();
7053
7054 ebitmap_cache_init();
7055
7056 hashtab_cache_init();
7057
7058 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7059
7060 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7061 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7062
7063 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7064 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7065
7066 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7067 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7068 else
7069 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7070
7071 fs_validate_description(&selinux_fs_parameters);
7072
7073 return 0;
7074}
7075
7076static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7077{
7078 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7079}
7080
7081void selinux_complete_init(void)
7082{
7083 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7084
7085 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7086 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7087 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7088}
7089
7090/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7091 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7092DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7093 .name = "selinux",
7094 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7095 .enabled = &selinux_enabled,
7096 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7097 .init = selinux_init,
7098};
7099
7100#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7101
7102static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7103 {
7104 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7105 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7106 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7107 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7108 },
7109 {
7110 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7111 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7112 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7113 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7114 },
7115 {
7116 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7117 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7118 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7119 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7120 },
7121#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7122 {
7123 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7124 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7125 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7126 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7127 },
7128 {
7129 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7130 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7131 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7132 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7133 },
7134 {
7135 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7136 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7137 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7138 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7139 },
7140#endif /* IPV6 */
7141};
7142
7143static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7144{
7145 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7146 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7147}
7148
7149static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7150{
7151 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7152 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7153}
7154
7155static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7156 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7157 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7158};
7159
7160static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7161{
7162 int err;
7163
7164 if (!selinux_enabled)
7165 return 0;
7166
7167 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7168
7169 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7170 if (err)
7171 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7172
7173 return 0;
7174}
7175__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7176
7177#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7178static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7179{
7180 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7181
7182 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7183}
7184#endif
7185
7186#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7187
7188#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7189#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7190#endif
7191
7192#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7193
7194#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7195int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7196{
7197 if (state->initialized) {
7198 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7199 return -EINVAL;
7200 }
7201
7202 if (state->disabled) {
7203 /* Only do this once. */
7204 return -EINVAL;
7205 }
7206
7207 state->disabled = 1;
7208
7209 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7210
7211 selinux_enabled = 0;
7212
7213 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7214
7215 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7216 avc_disable();
7217
7218 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
7219 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7220
7221 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7222 exit_sel_fs();
7223
7224 return 0;
7225}
7226#endif