Loading...
1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
21 *
22 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
23 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
24 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
25 */
26
27#include <linux/init.h>
28#include <linux/kd.h>
29#include <linux/kernel.h>
30#include <linux/tracehook.h>
31#include <linux/errno.h>
32#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
33#include <linux/sched/task.h>
34#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
35#include <linux/xattr.h>
36#include <linux/capability.h>
37#include <linux/unistd.h>
38#include <linux/mm.h>
39#include <linux/mman.h>
40#include <linux/slab.h>
41#include <linux/pagemap.h>
42#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
43#include <linux/swap.h>
44#include <linux/spinlock.h>
45#include <linux/syscalls.h>
46#include <linux/dcache.h>
47#include <linux/file.h>
48#include <linux/fdtable.h>
49#include <linux/namei.h>
50#include <linux/mount.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53#include <linux/tty.h>
54#include <net/icmp.h>
55#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58#include <net/net_namespace.h>
59#include <net/netlabel.h>
60#include <linux/uaccess.h>
61#include <asm/ioctls.h>
62#include <linux/atomic.h>
63#include <linux/bitops.h>
64#include <linux/interrupt.h>
65#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66#include <net/netlink.h>
67#include <linux/tcp.h>
68#include <linux/udp.h>
69#include <linux/dccp.h>
70#include <linux/sctp.h>
71#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72#include <linux/quota.h>
73#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75#include <linux/parser.h>
76#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
77#include <net/ipv6.h>
78#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79#include <linux/personality.h>
80#include <linux/audit.h>
81#include <linux/string.h>
82#include <linux/selinux.h>
83#include <linux/mutex.h>
84#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
85#include <linux/syslog.h>
86#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
87#include <linux/export.h>
88#include <linux/msg.h>
89#include <linux/shm.h>
90#include <linux/bpf.h>
91
92#include "avc.h"
93#include "objsec.h"
94#include "netif.h"
95#include "netnode.h"
96#include "netport.h"
97#include "ibpkey.h"
98#include "xfrm.h"
99#include "netlabel.h"
100#include "audit.h"
101#include "avc_ss.h"
102
103struct selinux_state selinux_state;
104
105/* SECMARK reference count */
106static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
107
108#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
109static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
110
111static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
112{
113 unsigned long enforcing;
114 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
115 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
116 return 1;
117}
118__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
119#else
120#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
121#endif
122
123#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
124int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
125
126static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
127{
128 unsigned long enabled;
129 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
130 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
131 return 1;
132}
133__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
134#else
135int selinux_enabled = 1;
136#endif
137
138static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
139 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
140
141static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
142{
143 unsigned long checkreqprot;
144
145 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
146 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
147 return 1;
148}
149__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
150
151static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
152static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
153
154/**
155 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
156 *
157 * Description:
158 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
159 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
160 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
161 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
162 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
163 *
164 */
165static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
166{
167 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
168 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
169}
170
171/**
172 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
173 *
174 * Description:
175 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
176 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
177 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
178 * is always considered enabled.
179 *
180 */
181static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
182{
183 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
184 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
185}
186
187static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
188{
189 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
190 sel_netif_flush();
191 sel_netnode_flush();
192 sel_netport_flush();
193 synchronize_net();
194 }
195 return 0;
196}
197
198static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
199{
200 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
201 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
202 call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
203 }
204
205 return 0;
206}
207
208/*
209 * initialise the security for the init task
210 */
211static void cred_init_security(void)
212{
213 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
215
216 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
217 if (!tsec)
218 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
219
220 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
221 cred->security = tsec;
222}
223
224/*
225 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
226 */
227static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
228{
229 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
230
231 tsec = cred->security;
232 return tsec->sid;
233}
234
235/*
236 * get the objective security ID of a task
237 */
238static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
239{
240 u32 sid;
241
242 rcu_read_lock();
243 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
244 rcu_read_unlock();
245 return sid;
246}
247
248/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
249
250static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
251{
252 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
253 u32 sid = current_sid();
254
255 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
256 if (!isec)
257 return -ENOMEM;
258
259 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
260 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
261 isec->inode = inode;
262 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
263 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
264 isec->task_sid = sid;
265 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
266 inode->i_security = isec;
267
268 return 0;
269}
270
271static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
272
273/*
274 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
275 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
276 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
277 * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
278 * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
279 */
280static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
281 struct dentry *opt_dentry,
282 bool may_sleep)
283{
284 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
285
286 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
287
288 if (selinux_state.initialized &&
289 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
290 if (!may_sleep)
291 return -ECHILD;
292
293 /*
294 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
295 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
296 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
297 */
298 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, opt_dentry);
299 }
300 return 0;
301}
302
303static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
304{
305 return inode->i_security;
306}
307
308static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
309{
310 int error;
311
312 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
313 if (error)
314 return ERR_PTR(error);
315 return inode->i_security;
316}
317
318/*
319 * Get the security label of an inode.
320 */
321static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
322{
323 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
324 return inode->i_security;
325}
326
327static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
328{
329 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
330
331 return inode->i_security;
332}
333
334/*
335 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
336 */
337static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
338{
339 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
340
341 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
342 return inode->i_security;
343}
344
345static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
346{
347 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
348
349 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
350 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
351}
352
353static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
354{
355 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
357
358 /*
359 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
360 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
361 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
362 *
363 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
364 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
365 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
366 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
367 */
368 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
369 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
370 list_del_init(&isec->list);
371 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
372 }
373
374 /*
375 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
376 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
377 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
378 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
379 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
380 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
381 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
382 */
383 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
384}
385
386static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
387{
388 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
389 u32 sid = current_sid();
390
391 fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
392 if (!fsec)
393 return -ENOMEM;
394
395 fsec->sid = sid;
396 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
397 file->f_security = fsec;
398
399 return 0;
400}
401
402static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
403{
404 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
405 file->f_security = NULL;
406 kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
407}
408
409static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
410{
411 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
412
413 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
414 if (!sbsec)
415 return -ENOMEM;
416
417 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
418 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
419 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
420 sbsec->sb = sb;
421 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
422 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
423 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
424 sb->s_security = sbsec;
425
426 return 0;
427}
428
429static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
430{
431 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
432 sb->s_security = NULL;
433 kfree(sbsec);
434}
435
436static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
437{
438 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
439}
440
441enum {
442 Opt_error = -1,
443 Opt_context = 1,
444 Opt_fscontext = 2,
445 Opt_defcontext = 3,
446 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
447 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
448 Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
449};
450
451#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
452
453static const match_table_t tokens = {
454 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
455 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
456 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
457 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
458 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
459 {Opt_error, NULL},
460};
461
462#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
463
464static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
465 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
466 const struct cred *cred)
467{
468 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
469 int rc;
470
471 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
472 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
473 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
474 if (rc)
475 return rc;
476
477 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
478 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
479 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
480 return rc;
481}
482
483static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
484 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
485 const struct cred *cred)
486{
487 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
488 int rc;
489 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
490 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
491 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
492 if (rc)
493 return rc;
494
495 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
496 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
497 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
498 return rc;
499}
500
501static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
502{
503 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
504
505 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
506 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
507 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
508 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
509 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
510 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
511 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
512 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
513 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
514 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
515 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
516 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
517 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
518}
519
520static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
521{
522 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
523 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
524 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
525 int rc = 0;
526
527 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
528 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
529 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
530 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
531 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
532 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
533 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
534 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
535 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
536 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
537 goto out;
538 }
539
540 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
541 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
542 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
543 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
544 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
545 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
546 else
547 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
548 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
549 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
550 goto out;
551 }
552 }
553
554 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
555
556 /*
557 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
558 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
559 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
560 */
561 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
562 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
563 else
564 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
565
566 /* Initialize the root inode. */
567 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
568
569 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
570 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
571 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
572 populates itself. */
573 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
574next_inode:
575 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
576 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
577 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
578 struct inode_security_struct, list);
579 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
580 list_del_init(&isec->list);
581 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
582 inode = igrab(inode);
583 if (inode) {
584 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
585 inode_doinit(inode);
586 iput(inode);
587 }
588 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
589 goto next_inode;
590 }
591 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
592out:
593 return rc;
594}
595
596/*
597 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
598 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
599 * mount options, or whatever.
600 */
601static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
602 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
603{
604 int rc = 0, i;
605 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
606 char *context = NULL;
607 u32 len;
608 char tmp;
609
610 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
611
612 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
613 return -EINVAL;
614
615 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
616 return -EINVAL;
617
618 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
619 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
620
621 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
622 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
623 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
624 if (tmp & 0x01)
625 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
626 tmp >>= 1;
627 }
628 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
629 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
630 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
631
632 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
633 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
634 rc = -ENOMEM;
635 goto out_free;
636 }
637
638 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
639 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
640 rc = -ENOMEM;
641 goto out_free;
642 }
643
644 i = 0;
645 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
646 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid,
647 &context, &len);
648 if (rc)
649 goto out_free;
650 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
651 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
652 }
653 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
654 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
655 sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
656 &context, &len);
657 if (rc)
658 goto out_free;
659 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
660 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
661 }
662 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
663 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
664 &context, &len);
665 if (rc)
666 goto out_free;
667 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
668 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
669 }
670 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
671 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
672 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
673
674 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
675 &context, &len);
676 if (rc)
677 goto out_free;
678 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
679 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
680 }
681 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
682 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
683 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
684 }
685
686 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
687
688 return 0;
689
690out_free:
691 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
692 return rc;
693}
694
695static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
696 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
697{
698 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
699
700 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
701 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
702 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
703 (old_sid != new_sid))
704 return 1;
705
706 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
707 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
708 */
709 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
710 if (mnt_flags & flag)
711 return 1;
712 return 0;
713}
714
715/*
716 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
717 * labeling information.
718 */
719static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
720 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
721 unsigned long kern_flags,
722 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
723{
724 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
725 int rc = 0, i;
726 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
727 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
728 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
729 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
730 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
731 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
732 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
733 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
734 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
735
736 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
737
738 if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
739 if (!num_opts) {
740 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
741 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
742 server is ready to handle calls. */
743 goto out;
744 }
745 rc = -EINVAL;
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
747 "before the security server is initialized\n");
748 goto out;
749 }
750 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
751 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
752 * place the results is not allowed */
753 rc = -EINVAL;
754 goto out;
755 }
756
757 /*
758 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
759 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
760 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
761 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
762 *
763 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
764 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
765 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
766 * will be used for both mounts)
767 */
768 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
769 && (num_opts == 0))
770 goto out;
771
772 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
773
774 /*
775 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
776 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
777 * than once with different security options.
778 */
779 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
780 u32 sid;
781
782 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
783 continue;
784 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
785 mount_options[i], &sid,
786 GFP_KERNEL);
787 if (rc) {
788 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
789 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
790 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
791 goto out;
792 }
793 switch (flags[i]) {
794 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
795 fscontext_sid = sid;
796
797 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
798 fscontext_sid))
799 goto out_double_mount;
800
801 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
802 break;
803 case CONTEXT_MNT:
804 context_sid = sid;
805
806 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
807 context_sid))
808 goto out_double_mount;
809
810 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
811 break;
812 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
813 rootcontext_sid = sid;
814
815 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
816 rootcontext_sid))
817 goto out_double_mount;
818
819 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
820
821 break;
822 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
823 defcontext_sid = sid;
824
825 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
826 defcontext_sid))
827 goto out_double_mount;
828
829 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
830
831 break;
832 default:
833 rc = -EINVAL;
834 goto out;
835 }
836 }
837
838 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
839 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
840 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
841 goto out_double_mount;
842 rc = 0;
843 goto out;
844 }
845
846 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
847 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
848
849 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
850 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
851 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
852 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
853 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
854 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
855 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
856
857 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
858 /*
859 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
860 * filesystem type.
861 */
862 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
863 if (rc) {
864 printk(KERN_WARNING
865 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
866 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
867 goto out;
868 }
869 }
870
871 /*
872 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
873 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
874 * line and security labels must be ignored.
875 */
876 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
877 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
878 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
879 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
880 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
881 defcontext_sid) {
882 rc = -EACCES;
883 goto out;
884 }
885 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
886 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
887 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
888 current_sid(),
889 current_sid(),
890 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
891 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
892 if (rc)
893 goto out;
894 }
895 goto out_set_opts;
896 }
897
898 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
899 if (fscontext_sid) {
900 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
901 if (rc)
902 goto out;
903
904 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
905 }
906
907 /*
908 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
909 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
910 * the superblock context if not already set.
911 */
912 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
913 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
914 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
915 }
916
917 if (context_sid) {
918 if (!fscontext_sid) {
919 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
920 cred);
921 if (rc)
922 goto out;
923 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
924 } else {
925 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
926 cred);
927 if (rc)
928 goto out;
929 }
930 if (!rootcontext_sid)
931 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
932
933 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
934 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
935 }
936
937 if (rootcontext_sid) {
938 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
939 cred);
940 if (rc)
941 goto out;
942
943 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
944 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
945 }
946
947 if (defcontext_sid) {
948 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
949 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
950 rc = -EINVAL;
951 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
952 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
953 goto out;
954 }
955
956 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
957 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
958 sbsec, cred);
959 if (rc)
960 goto out;
961 }
962
963 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
964 }
965
966out_set_opts:
967 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
968out:
969 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
970 return rc;
971out_double_mount:
972 rc = -EINVAL;
973 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
974 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
975 goto out;
976}
977
978static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
979 const struct super_block *newsb)
980{
981 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
982 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
983 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
984 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
985
986 if (oldflags != newflags)
987 goto mismatch;
988 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
989 goto mismatch;
990 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
991 goto mismatch;
992 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
993 goto mismatch;
994 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
995 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
996 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
997 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
998 goto mismatch;
999 }
1000 return 0;
1001mismatch:
1002 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
1003 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
1004 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
1005 return -EBUSY;
1006}
1007
1008static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
1009 struct super_block *newsb,
1010 unsigned long kern_flags,
1011 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
1012{
1013 int rc = 0;
1014 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
1015 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
1016
1017 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
1018 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
1019 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
1020
1021 /*
1022 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
1023 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
1024 */
1025 if (!selinux_state.initialized)
1026 return 0;
1027
1028 /*
1029 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
1030 * place the results is not allowed.
1031 */
1032 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
1033 return -EINVAL;
1034
1035 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
1036 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
1037
1038 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
1039 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
1040 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
1041
1042 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
1043
1044 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
1045
1046 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
1047 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
1048 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
1049
1050 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
1051 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
1052 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
1053 if (rc)
1054 goto out;
1055 }
1056
1057 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
1058 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
1059 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
1060 }
1061
1062 if (set_context) {
1063 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1064
1065 if (!set_fscontext)
1066 newsbsec->sid = sid;
1067 if (!set_rootcontext) {
1068 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
1069 newisec->sid = sid;
1070 }
1071 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
1072 }
1073 if (set_rootcontext) {
1074 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
1075 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
1076
1077 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
1078 }
1079
1080 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
1081out:
1082 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
1083 return rc;
1084}
1085
1086static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
1087 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1088{
1089 char *p;
1090 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
1091 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
1092 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
1093
1094 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
1095
1096 /* Standard string-based options. */
1097 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
1098 int token;
1099 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
1100
1101 if (!*p)
1102 continue;
1103
1104 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
1105
1106 switch (token) {
1107 case Opt_context:
1108 if (context || defcontext) {
1109 rc = -EINVAL;
1110 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1111 goto out_err;
1112 }
1113 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1114 if (!context) {
1115 rc = -ENOMEM;
1116 goto out_err;
1117 }
1118 break;
1119
1120 case Opt_fscontext:
1121 if (fscontext) {
1122 rc = -EINVAL;
1123 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1124 goto out_err;
1125 }
1126 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1127 if (!fscontext) {
1128 rc = -ENOMEM;
1129 goto out_err;
1130 }
1131 break;
1132
1133 case Opt_rootcontext:
1134 if (rootcontext) {
1135 rc = -EINVAL;
1136 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1137 goto out_err;
1138 }
1139 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1140 if (!rootcontext) {
1141 rc = -ENOMEM;
1142 goto out_err;
1143 }
1144 break;
1145
1146 case Opt_defcontext:
1147 if (context || defcontext) {
1148 rc = -EINVAL;
1149 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1150 goto out_err;
1151 }
1152 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1153 if (!defcontext) {
1154 rc = -ENOMEM;
1155 goto out_err;
1156 }
1157 break;
1158 case Opt_labelsupport:
1159 break;
1160 default:
1161 rc = -EINVAL;
1162 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1163 goto out_err;
1164
1165 }
1166 }
1167
1168 rc = -ENOMEM;
1169 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
1170 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1171 goto out_err;
1172
1173 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
1174 GFP_KERNEL);
1175 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
1176 goto out_err;
1177
1178 if (fscontext) {
1179 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1180 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1181 }
1182 if (context) {
1183 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1184 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1185 }
1186 if (rootcontext) {
1187 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1188 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1189 }
1190 if (defcontext) {
1191 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1192 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1193 }
1194
1195 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1196 return 0;
1197
1198out_err:
1199 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
1200 kfree(context);
1201 kfree(defcontext);
1202 kfree(fscontext);
1203 kfree(rootcontext);
1204 return rc;
1205}
1206/*
1207 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1208 */
1209static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1210{
1211 int rc = 0;
1212 char *options = data;
1213 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1214
1215 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1216
1217 if (!data)
1218 goto out;
1219
1220 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1221
1222 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1223 if (rc)
1224 goto out_err;
1225
1226out:
1227 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1228
1229out_err:
1230 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1231 return rc;
1232}
1233
1234static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1235 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1236{
1237 int i;
1238 char *prefix;
1239
1240 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1241 char *has_comma;
1242
1243 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1244 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1245 else
1246 has_comma = NULL;
1247
1248 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1249 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1250 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1251 break;
1252 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1253 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1254 break;
1255 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1256 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1257 break;
1258 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1259 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1260 break;
1261 case SBLABEL_MNT:
1262 seq_putc(m, ',');
1263 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1264 continue;
1265 default:
1266 BUG();
1267 return;
1268 };
1269 /* we need a comma before each option */
1270 seq_putc(m, ',');
1271 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1272 if (has_comma)
1273 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1274 seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
1275 if (has_comma)
1276 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1277 }
1278}
1279
1280static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1281{
1282 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1283 int rc;
1284
1285 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1286 if (rc) {
1287 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1288 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1289 rc = 0;
1290 return rc;
1291 }
1292
1293 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1294
1295 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1296
1297 return rc;
1298}
1299
1300static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1301{
1302 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1303 case S_IFSOCK:
1304 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1305 case S_IFLNK:
1306 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1307 case S_IFREG:
1308 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1309 case S_IFBLK:
1310 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1311 case S_IFDIR:
1312 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1313 case S_IFCHR:
1314 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1315 case S_IFIFO:
1316 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1317
1318 }
1319
1320 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1321}
1322
1323static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1324{
1325 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1326}
1327
1328static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1329{
1330 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1331}
1332
1333static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1334{
1335 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1336
1337 switch (family) {
1338 case PF_UNIX:
1339 switch (type) {
1340 case SOCK_STREAM:
1341 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1342 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1343 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1344 case SOCK_RAW:
1345 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1346 }
1347 break;
1348 case PF_INET:
1349 case PF_INET6:
1350 switch (type) {
1351 case SOCK_STREAM:
1352 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1353 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1354 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1355 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1356 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1357 else
1358 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1359 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1360 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1361 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1362 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1363 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1364 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1365 else
1366 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1367 case SOCK_DCCP:
1368 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1369 default:
1370 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1371 }
1372 break;
1373 case PF_NETLINK:
1374 switch (protocol) {
1375 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1376 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1377 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1378 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1379 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1380 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1381 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1382 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1383 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1384 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1385 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1386 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1387 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1388 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1389 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1390 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1391 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1392 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1393 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1394 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1395 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1396 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1397 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1398 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1399 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1400 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1401 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1402 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1403 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1404 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1405 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1406 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1407 default:
1408 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1409 }
1410 case PF_PACKET:
1411 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1412 case PF_KEY:
1413 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1414 case PF_APPLETALK:
1415 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1416 }
1417
1418 if (extsockclass) {
1419 switch (family) {
1420 case PF_AX25:
1421 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1422 case PF_IPX:
1423 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1424 case PF_NETROM:
1425 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1426 case PF_ATMPVC:
1427 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1428 case PF_X25:
1429 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1430 case PF_ROSE:
1431 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1432 case PF_DECnet:
1433 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1434 case PF_ATMSVC:
1435 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1436 case PF_RDS:
1437 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1438 case PF_IRDA:
1439 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1440 case PF_PPPOX:
1441 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1442 case PF_LLC:
1443 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1444 case PF_CAN:
1445 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1446 case PF_TIPC:
1447 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1448 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1449 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1450 case PF_IUCV:
1451 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1452 case PF_RXRPC:
1453 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1454 case PF_ISDN:
1455 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1456 case PF_PHONET:
1457 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1458 case PF_IEEE802154:
1459 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1460 case PF_CAIF:
1461 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1462 case PF_ALG:
1463 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1464 case PF_NFC:
1465 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1466 case PF_VSOCK:
1467 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1468 case PF_KCM:
1469 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1470 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1471 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1472 case PF_SMC:
1473 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1474#if PF_MAX > 44
1475#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1476#endif
1477 }
1478 }
1479
1480 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1481}
1482
1483static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1484 u16 tclass,
1485 u16 flags,
1486 u32 *sid)
1487{
1488 int rc;
1489 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1490 char *buffer, *path;
1491
1492 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1493 if (!buffer)
1494 return -ENOMEM;
1495
1496 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1497 if (IS_ERR(path))
1498 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1499 else {
1500 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1501 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1502 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1503 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1504 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1505 path[1] = '/';
1506 path++;
1507 }
1508 }
1509 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1510 path, tclass, sid);
1511 }
1512 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1513 return rc;
1514}
1515
1516/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1517static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1518{
1519 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1520 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1521 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1522 u16 sclass;
1523 struct dentry *dentry;
1524#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1525 char *context = NULL;
1526 unsigned len = 0;
1527 int rc = 0;
1528
1529 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1530 return 0;
1531
1532 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1533 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1534 goto out_unlock;
1535
1536 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1537 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1538
1539 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1540 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1541 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1542 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1543 server is ready to handle calls. */
1544 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1545 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1546 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1547 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1548 goto out_unlock;
1549 }
1550
1551 sclass = isec->sclass;
1552 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1553 sid = isec->sid;
1554 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1555 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1556
1557 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1558 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1559 break;
1560 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1561 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1562 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1563 break;
1564 }
1565 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1566 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1567 if (opt_dentry) {
1568 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1569 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1570 } else {
1571 /*
1572 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1573 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1574 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1575 * two, depending upon that...
1576 */
1577 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1578 if (!dentry)
1579 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1580 }
1581 if (!dentry) {
1582 /*
1583 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1584 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1585 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1586 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1587 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1588 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1589 * be used again by userspace.
1590 */
1591 goto out;
1592 }
1593
1594 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1595 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1596 if (!context) {
1597 rc = -ENOMEM;
1598 dput(dentry);
1599 goto out;
1600 }
1601 context[len] = '\0';
1602 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1603 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1604 kfree(context);
1605
1606 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1607 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1608 if (rc < 0) {
1609 dput(dentry);
1610 goto out;
1611 }
1612 len = rc;
1613 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1614 if (!context) {
1615 rc = -ENOMEM;
1616 dput(dentry);
1617 goto out;
1618 }
1619 context[len] = '\0';
1620 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1621 }
1622 dput(dentry);
1623 if (rc < 0) {
1624 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1625 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1626 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1627 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1628 kfree(context);
1629 goto out;
1630 }
1631 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1632 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1633 rc = 0;
1634 } else {
1635 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
1636 context, rc, &sid,
1637 sbsec->def_sid,
1638 GFP_NOFS);
1639 if (rc) {
1640 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1641 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1642
1643 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1644 if (printk_ratelimit())
1645 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1646 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1647 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1648 } else {
1649 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1650 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1651 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1652 }
1653 kfree(context);
1654 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1655 rc = 0;
1656 break;
1657 }
1658 }
1659 kfree(context);
1660 break;
1661 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1662 sid = task_sid;
1663 break;
1664 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1665 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1666 sid = sbsec->sid;
1667
1668 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1669 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1670 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1671 if (rc)
1672 goto out;
1673 break;
1674 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1675 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1676 break;
1677 default:
1678 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1679 sid = sbsec->sid;
1680
1681 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1682 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1683 * procfs inodes */
1684 if (opt_dentry) {
1685 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1686 * d_splice_alias. */
1687 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1688 } else {
1689 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1690 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1691 * a connected one, so try that first.
1692 */
1693 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1694 if (!dentry)
1695 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1696 }
1697 /*
1698 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1699 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1700 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1701 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1702 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1703 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1704 * could be used again by userspace.
1705 */
1706 if (!dentry)
1707 goto out;
1708 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1709 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1710 dput(dentry);
1711 if (rc)
1712 goto out;
1713 }
1714 break;
1715 }
1716
1717out:
1718 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1719 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1720 if (!sid || rc) {
1721 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1722 goto out_unlock;
1723 }
1724
1725 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1726 isec->sid = sid;
1727 }
1728
1729out_unlock:
1730 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1731 return rc;
1732}
1733
1734/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1735static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1736{
1737 u32 perm = 0;
1738
1739 switch (sig) {
1740 case SIGCHLD:
1741 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1742 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1743 break;
1744 case SIGKILL:
1745 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1746 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1747 break;
1748 case SIGSTOP:
1749 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1750 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1751 break;
1752 default:
1753 /* All other signals. */
1754 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1755 break;
1756 }
1757
1758 return perm;
1759}
1760
1761#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1762#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1763#endif
1764
1765/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1766static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1767 int cap, int audit, bool initns)
1768{
1769 struct common_audit_data ad;
1770 struct av_decision avd;
1771 u16 sclass;
1772 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1773 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1774 int rc;
1775
1776 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1777 ad.u.cap = cap;
1778
1779 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1780 case 0:
1781 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1782 break;
1783 case 1:
1784 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1785 break;
1786 default:
1787 printk(KERN_ERR
1788 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1789 BUG();
1790 return -EINVAL;
1791 }
1792
1793 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1794 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1795 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1796 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1797 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1798 if (rc2)
1799 return rc2;
1800 }
1801 return rc;
1802}
1803
1804/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1805 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1806 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1807static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1808 struct inode *inode,
1809 u32 perms,
1810 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1811{
1812 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1813 u32 sid;
1814
1815 validate_creds(cred);
1816
1817 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1818 return 0;
1819
1820 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1821 isec = inode->i_security;
1822
1823 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1824 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1825}
1826
1827/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1828 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1829 pathname if needed. */
1830static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1831 struct dentry *dentry,
1832 u32 av)
1833{
1834 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1835 struct common_audit_data ad;
1836
1837 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1838 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1839 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1840 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1841}
1842
1843/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1844 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1845 pathname if needed. */
1846static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1847 const struct path *path,
1848 u32 av)
1849{
1850 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1851 struct common_audit_data ad;
1852
1853 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1854 ad.u.path = *path;
1855 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1856 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1857}
1858
1859/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1860static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1861 struct file *file,
1862 u32 av)
1863{
1864 struct common_audit_data ad;
1865
1866 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1867 ad.u.file = file;
1868 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1869}
1870
1871#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1872static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1873#endif
1874
1875/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1876 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1877 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1878 check a particular permission to the file.
1879 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1880 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1881 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1882 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1883static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1884 struct file *file,
1885 u32 av)
1886{
1887 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1888 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1889 struct common_audit_data ad;
1890 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1891 int rc;
1892
1893 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1894 ad.u.file = file;
1895
1896 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1897 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1898 sid, fsec->sid,
1899 SECCLASS_FD,
1900 FD__USE,
1901 &ad);
1902 if (rc)
1903 goto out;
1904 }
1905
1906#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1907 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1908 if (rc)
1909 return rc;
1910#endif
1911
1912 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1913 rc = 0;
1914 if (av)
1915 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1916
1917out:
1918 return rc;
1919}
1920
1921/*
1922 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1923 */
1924static int
1925selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1926 struct inode *dir,
1927 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1928 u32 *_new_isid)
1929{
1930 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1931
1932 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1933 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1934 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1935 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1936 tsec->create_sid) {
1937 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1938 } else {
1939 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1940 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1941 dsec->sid, tclass,
1942 name, _new_isid);
1943 }
1944
1945 return 0;
1946}
1947
1948/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1949static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1950 struct dentry *dentry,
1951 u16 tclass)
1952{
1953 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1954 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1955 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1956 u32 sid, newsid;
1957 struct common_audit_data ad;
1958 int rc;
1959
1960 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1961 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1962
1963 sid = tsec->sid;
1964
1965 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1966 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1967
1968 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1969 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1970 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1971 &ad);
1972 if (rc)
1973 return rc;
1974
1975 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
1976 &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
1977 if (rc)
1978 return rc;
1979
1980 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1981 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1982 if (rc)
1983 return rc;
1984
1985 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1986 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1987 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1988 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1989}
1990
1991#define MAY_LINK 0
1992#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1993#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1994
1995/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1996static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1997 struct dentry *dentry,
1998 int kind)
1999
2000{
2001 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
2002 struct common_audit_data ad;
2003 u32 sid = current_sid();
2004 u32 av;
2005 int rc;
2006
2007 dsec = inode_security(dir);
2008 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2009
2010 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2011 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2012
2013 av = DIR__SEARCH;
2014 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
2015 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2016 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
2017 if (rc)
2018 return rc;
2019
2020 switch (kind) {
2021 case MAY_LINK:
2022 av = FILE__LINK;
2023 break;
2024 case MAY_UNLINK:
2025 av = FILE__UNLINK;
2026 break;
2027 case MAY_RMDIR:
2028 av = DIR__RMDIR;
2029 break;
2030 default:
2031 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
2032 __func__, kind);
2033 return 0;
2034 }
2035
2036 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2037 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
2038 return rc;
2039}
2040
2041static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
2042 struct dentry *old_dentry,
2043 struct inode *new_dir,
2044 struct dentry *new_dentry)
2045{
2046 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
2047 struct common_audit_data ad;
2048 u32 sid = current_sid();
2049 u32 av;
2050 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
2051 int rc;
2052
2053 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
2054 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
2055 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
2056 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
2057
2058 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2059
2060 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
2061 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2062 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
2063 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
2064 if (rc)
2065 return rc;
2066 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2067 sid, old_isec->sid,
2068 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
2069 if (rc)
2070 return rc;
2071 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
2072 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2073 sid, old_isec->sid,
2074 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
2075 if (rc)
2076 return rc;
2077 }
2078
2079 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
2080 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
2081 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
2082 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
2083 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2084 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
2085 if (rc)
2086 return rc;
2087 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
2088 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
2089 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
2090 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2091 sid, new_isec->sid,
2092 new_isec->sclass,
2093 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
2094 if (rc)
2095 return rc;
2096 }
2097
2098 return 0;
2099}
2100
2101/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
2102static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
2103 struct super_block *sb,
2104 u32 perms,
2105 struct common_audit_data *ad)
2106{
2107 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2108 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2109
2110 sbsec = sb->s_security;
2111 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2112 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
2113}
2114
2115/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
2116static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
2117{
2118 u32 av = 0;
2119
2120 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
2121 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2122 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2123 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2124 av |= FILE__READ;
2125
2126 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
2127 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2128 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2129 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2130
2131 } else {
2132 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2133 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
2134 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2135 av |= DIR__WRITE;
2136 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2137 av |= DIR__READ;
2138 }
2139
2140 return av;
2141}
2142
2143/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2144static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2145{
2146 u32 av = 0;
2147
2148 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2149 av |= FILE__READ;
2150 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2151 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2152 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2153 else
2154 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2155 }
2156 if (!av) {
2157 /*
2158 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2159 */
2160 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2161 }
2162
2163 return av;
2164}
2165
2166/*
2167 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2168 * open permission.
2169 */
2170static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2171{
2172 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2173 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2174
2175 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2176 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2177 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2178
2179 return av;
2180}
2181
2182/* Hook functions begin here. */
2183
2184static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2185{
2186 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2187 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2188
2189 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2190 mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2191 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2192}
2193
2194static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2195 struct task_struct *to)
2196{
2197 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2198 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2199 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2200 int rc;
2201
2202 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2203 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2204 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2205 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2206 if (rc)
2207 return rc;
2208 }
2209
2210 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2211 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2212 NULL);
2213}
2214
2215static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2216 struct task_struct *to)
2217{
2218 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2219 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2220
2221 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2222 fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2223 NULL);
2224}
2225
2226static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2227 struct task_struct *to,
2228 struct file *file)
2229{
2230 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2231 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2232 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2233 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2234 struct common_audit_data ad;
2235 int rc;
2236
2237 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2238 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2239
2240 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2241 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2242 sid, fsec->sid,
2243 SECCLASS_FD,
2244 FD__USE,
2245 &ad);
2246 if (rc)
2247 return rc;
2248 }
2249
2250#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2251 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2252 if (rc)
2253 return rc;
2254#endif
2255
2256 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2257 return 0;
2258
2259 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2260 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2261 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2262 &ad);
2263}
2264
2265static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2266 unsigned int mode)
2267{
2268 u32 sid = current_sid();
2269 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2270
2271 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2272 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2273 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2274
2275 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2276 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2277}
2278
2279static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2280{
2281 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2282 task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2283 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2284}
2285
2286static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2287 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2288{
2289 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2290 current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2291 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2292}
2293
2294static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2295 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2296 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2297 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2298{
2299 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2300 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2301 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2302}
2303
2304/*
2305 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2306 * which was removed).
2307 *
2308 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2309 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2310 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2311 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2312 */
2313
2314static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2315 int cap, int audit)
2316{
2317 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
2318}
2319
2320static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2321{
2322 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2323 int rc = 0;
2324
2325 if (!sb)
2326 return 0;
2327
2328 switch (cmds) {
2329 case Q_SYNC:
2330 case Q_QUOTAON:
2331 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2332 case Q_SETINFO:
2333 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2334 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2335 break;
2336 case Q_GETFMT:
2337 case Q_GETINFO:
2338 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2339 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2340 break;
2341 default:
2342 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2343 break;
2344 }
2345 return rc;
2346}
2347
2348static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2349{
2350 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2351
2352 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2353}
2354
2355static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2356{
2357 switch (type) {
2358 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2359 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2360 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2361 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2362 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2363 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2364 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2365 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2366 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2367 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2368 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2369 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2370 NULL);
2371 }
2372 /* All other syslog types */
2373 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2374 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2375 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2376}
2377
2378/*
2379 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2380 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2381 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2382 *
2383 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2384 * processes that allocate mappings.
2385 */
2386static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2387{
2388 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2389
2390 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2391 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
2392 if (rc == 0)
2393 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2394
2395 return cap_sys_admin;
2396}
2397
2398/* binprm security operations */
2399
2400static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2401{
2402 u32 sid = 0;
2403 struct task_struct *tracer;
2404
2405 rcu_read_lock();
2406 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2407 if (tracer)
2408 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2409 rcu_read_unlock();
2410
2411 return sid;
2412}
2413
2414static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2415 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2416 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2417{
2418 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2419 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2420 int rc;
2421 u32 av;
2422
2423 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2424 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2425
2426 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2427 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2428
2429 /*
2430 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2431 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2432 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2433 * the old and new contexts.
2434 */
2435 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2436 av = 0;
2437 if (nnp)
2438 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2439 if (nosuid)
2440 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2441 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2442 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2443 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2444 if (!rc)
2445 return 0;
2446 }
2447
2448 /*
2449 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2450 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2451 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2452 */
2453 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2454 new_tsec->sid);
2455 if (!rc)
2456 return 0;
2457
2458 /*
2459 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2460 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2461 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2462 */
2463 if (nnp)
2464 return -EPERM;
2465 return -EACCES;
2466}
2467
2468static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2469{
2470 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2471 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2472 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2473 struct common_audit_data ad;
2474 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2475 int rc;
2476
2477 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2478 * the script interpreter */
2479 if (bprm->called_set_creds)
2480 return 0;
2481
2482 old_tsec = current_security();
2483 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2484 isec = inode_security(inode);
2485
2486 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2487 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2488 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2489
2490 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2491 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2492 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2493 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2494
2495 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2496 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2497 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2498 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2499
2500 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2501 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2502 if (rc)
2503 return rc;
2504 } else {
2505 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2506 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2507 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2508 &new_tsec->sid);
2509 if (rc)
2510 return rc;
2511
2512 /*
2513 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2514 * transition.
2515 */
2516 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2517 if (rc)
2518 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2519 }
2520
2521 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2522 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2523
2524 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2525 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2526 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2527 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2528 if (rc)
2529 return rc;
2530 } else {
2531 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2532 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2533 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2534 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2535 if (rc)
2536 return rc;
2537
2538 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2539 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2540 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2541 if (rc)
2542 return rc;
2543
2544 /* Check for shared state */
2545 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2546 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2547 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2548 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2549 NULL);
2550 if (rc)
2551 return -EPERM;
2552 }
2553
2554 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2555 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2556 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2557 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2558 if (ptsid != 0) {
2559 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2560 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2561 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2562 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2563 if (rc)
2564 return -EPERM;
2565 }
2566 }
2567
2568 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2569 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2570
2571 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2572 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2573 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2574 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2575 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2576 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2577 NULL);
2578 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2579 }
2580
2581 return 0;
2582}
2583
2584static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2585{
2586 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2587}
2588
2589/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2590static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2591 struct files_struct *files)
2592{
2593 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2594 struct tty_struct *tty;
2595 int drop_tty = 0;
2596 unsigned n;
2597
2598 tty = get_current_tty();
2599 if (tty) {
2600 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2601 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2602 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2603
2604 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2605 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2606 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2607 open file may belong to another process and we are
2608 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2609 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2610 struct tty_file_private, list);
2611 file = file_priv->file;
2612 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2613 drop_tty = 1;
2614 }
2615 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2616 tty_kref_put(tty);
2617 }
2618 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2619 if (drop_tty)
2620 no_tty();
2621
2622 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2623 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2624 if (!n) /* none found? */
2625 return;
2626
2627 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2628 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2629 devnull = NULL;
2630 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2631 do {
2632 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2633 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2634 if (devnull)
2635 fput(devnull);
2636}
2637
2638/*
2639 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2640 */
2641static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2642{
2643 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2644 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2645 int rc, i;
2646
2647 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2648 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2649 return;
2650
2651 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2652 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2653
2654 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2655 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2656
2657 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2658 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2659 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2660 *
2661 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2662 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2663 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2664 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2665 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2666 */
2667 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2668 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2669 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2670 if (rc) {
2671 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2672 task_lock(current);
2673 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2674 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2675 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2676 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2677 }
2678 task_unlock(current);
2679 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2680 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2681 }
2682}
2683
2684/*
2685 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2686 * due to exec
2687 */
2688static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2689{
2690 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2691 struct itimerval itimer;
2692 u32 osid, sid;
2693 int rc, i;
2694
2695 osid = tsec->osid;
2696 sid = tsec->sid;
2697
2698 if (sid == osid)
2699 return;
2700
2701 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2702 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2703 * flush and unblock signals.
2704 *
2705 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2706 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2707 */
2708 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2709 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2710 if (rc) {
2711 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
2712 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2713 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2714 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2715 }
2716 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2717 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2718 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2719 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2720 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2721 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2722 recalc_sigpending();
2723 }
2724 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2725 }
2726
2727 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2728 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2729 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2730 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2731 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2732}
2733
2734/* superblock security operations */
2735
2736static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2737{
2738 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2739}
2740
2741static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2742{
2743 superblock_free_security(sb);
2744}
2745
2746static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2747{
2748 if (plen > olen)
2749 return 0;
2750
2751 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2752}
2753
2754static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2755{
2756 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2757 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2758 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2759 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2760 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2761}
2762
2763static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2764{
2765 if (!*first) {
2766 **to = ',';
2767 *to += 1;
2768 } else
2769 *first = 0;
2770 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2771 *to += len;
2772}
2773
2774static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2775 int len)
2776{
2777 int current_size = 0;
2778
2779 if (!*first) {
2780 **to = '|';
2781 *to += 1;
2782 } else
2783 *first = 0;
2784
2785 while (current_size < len) {
2786 if (*from != '"') {
2787 **to = *from;
2788 *to += 1;
2789 }
2790 from += 1;
2791 current_size += 1;
2792 }
2793}
2794
2795static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2796{
2797 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2798 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2799 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2800 int open_quote = 0;
2801
2802 in_curr = orig;
2803 sec_curr = copy;
2804
2805 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2806 if (!nosec) {
2807 rc = -ENOMEM;
2808 goto out;
2809 }
2810
2811 nosec_save = nosec;
2812 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2813 in_save = in_end = orig;
2814
2815 do {
2816 if (*in_end == '"')
2817 open_quote = !open_quote;
2818 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2819 *in_end == '\0') {
2820 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2821
2822 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2823 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2824 else
2825 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2826
2827 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2828 }
2829 } while (*in_end++);
2830
2831 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2832 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2833out:
2834 return rc;
2835}
2836
2837static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2838{
2839 int rc, i, *flags;
2840 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2841 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2842 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2843
2844 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2845 return 0;
2846
2847 if (!data)
2848 return 0;
2849
2850 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2851 return 0;
2852
2853 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2854 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2855 if (!secdata)
2856 return -ENOMEM;
2857 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2858 if (rc)
2859 goto out_free_secdata;
2860
2861 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2862 if (rc)
2863 goto out_free_secdata;
2864
2865 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2866 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2867
2868 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2869 u32 sid;
2870
2871 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2872 continue;
2873 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
2874 mount_options[i], &sid,
2875 GFP_KERNEL);
2876 if (rc) {
2877 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2878 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2879 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2880 goto out_free_opts;
2881 }
2882 rc = -EINVAL;
2883 switch (flags[i]) {
2884 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2885 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2886 goto out_bad_option;
2887 break;
2888 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2889 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2890 goto out_bad_option;
2891 break;
2892 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2893 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2894 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2895
2896 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2897 goto out_bad_option;
2898 break;
2899 }
2900 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2901 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2902 goto out_bad_option;
2903 break;
2904 default:
2905 goto out_free_opts;
2906 }
2907 }
2908
2909 rc = 0;
2910out_free_opts:
2911 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2912out_free_secdata:
2913 free_secdata(secdata);
2914 return rc;
2915out_bad_option:
2916 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2917 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2918 sb->s_type->name);
2919 goto out_free_opts;
2920}
2921
2922static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2923{
2924 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2925 struct common_audit_data ad;
2926 int rc;
2927
2928 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2929 if (rc)
2930 return rc;
2931
2932 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2933 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2934 return 0;
2935
2936 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2937 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2938 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2939}
2940
2941static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2942{
2943 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2944 struct common_audit_data ad;
2945
2946 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2947 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2948 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2949}
2950
2951static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2952 const struct path *path,
2953 const char *type,
2954 unsigned long flags,
2955 void *data)
2956{
2957 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2958
2959 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2960 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2961 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2962 else
2963 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2964}
2965
2966static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2967{
2968 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2969
2970 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2971 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2972}
2973
2974/* inode security operations */
2975
2976static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2977{
2978 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2979}
2980
2981static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2982{
2983 inode_free_security(inode);
2984}
2985
2986static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2987 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2988 u32 *ctxlen)
2989{
2990 u32 newsid;
2991 int rc;
2992
2993 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
2994 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2995 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2996 &newsid);
2997 if (rc)
2998 return rc;
2999
3000 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
3001 ctxlen);
3002}
3003
3004static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
3005 struct qstr *name,
3006 const struct cred *old,
3007 struct cred *new)
3008{
3009 u32 newsid;
3010 int rc;
3011 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3012
3013 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
3014 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
3015 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
3016 &newsid);
3017 if (rc)
3018 return rc;
3019
3020 tsec = new->security;
3021 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
3022 return 0;
3023}
3024
3025static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
3026 const struct qstr *qstr,
3027 const char **name,
3028 void **value, size_t *len)
3029{
3030 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3031 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3032 u32 newsid, clen;
3033 int rc;
3034 char *context;
3035
3036 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
3037
3038 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3039
3040 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
3041 dir, qstr,
3042 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
3043 &newsid);
3044 if (rc)
3045 return rc;
3046
3047 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
3048 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
3049 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3050 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3051 isec->sid = newsid;
3052 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3053 }
3054
3055 if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3056 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3057
3058 if (name)
3059 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
3060
3061 if (value && len) {
3062 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3063 &context, &clen);
3064 if (rc)
3065 return rc;
3066 *value = context;
3067 *len = clen;
3068 }
3069
3070 return 0;
3071}
3072
3073static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3074{
3075 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3076}
3077
3078static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3079{
3080 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3081}
3082
3083static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3084{
3085 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3086}
3087
3088static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3089{
3090 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3091}
3092
3093static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3094{
3095 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3096}
3097
3098static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3099{
3100 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3101}
3102
3103static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3104{
3105 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3106}
3107
3108static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3109 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3110{
3111 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3112}
3113
3114static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3115{
3116 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3117
3118 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3119}
3120
3121static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3122 bool rcu)
3123{
3124 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3125 struct common_audit_data ad;
3126 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3127 u32 sid;
3128
3129 validate_creds(cred);
3130
3131 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3132 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3133 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3134 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3135 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3136 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3137
3138 return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
3139 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
3140 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
3141}
3142
3143static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3144 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3145 int result,
3146 unsigned flags)
3147{
3148 struct common_audit_data ad;
3149 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3150 int rc;
3151
3152 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3153 ad.u.inode = inode;
3154
3155 rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3156 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3157 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
3158 if (rc)
3159 return rc;
3160 return 0;
3161}
3162
3163static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3164{
3165 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3166 u32 perms;
3167 bool from_access;
3168 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3169 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3170 u32 sid;
3171 struct av_decision avd;
3172 int rc, rc2;
3173 u32 audited, denied;
3174
3175 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3176 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3177
3178 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3179 if (!mask)
3180 return 0;
3181
3182 validate_creds(cred);
3183
3184 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3185 return 0;
3186
3187 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3188
3189 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3190 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
3191 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3192 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3193
3194 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3195 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
3196 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3197 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3198 &denied);
3199 if (likely(!audited))
3200 return rc;
3201
3202 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
3203 if (rc2)
3204 return rc2;
3205 return rc;
3206}
3207
3208static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3209{
3210 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3211 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3212 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3213 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3214
3215 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3216 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3217 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3218 ATTR_FORCE);
3219 if (!ia_valid)
3220 return 0;
3221 }
3222
3223 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3224 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3225 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3226
3227 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3228 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3229 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3230 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3231 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3232
3233 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3234}
3235
3236static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3237{
3238 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3239}
3240
3241static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3242{
3243 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3244 int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
3245
3246 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
3247 return false;
3248 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
3249 return false;
3250 return true;
3251}
3252
3253static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3254 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3255{
3256 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3257 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3258 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3259 struct common_audit_data ad;
3260 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3261 int rc = 0;
3262
3263 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3264 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3265 if (rc)
3266 return rc;
3267
3268 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3269 ordinary setattr permission. */
3270 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3271 }
3272
3273 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3274 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3275 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3276
3277 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3278 return -EPERM;
3279
3280 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3281 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3282
3283 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3284 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3285 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3286 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3287 if (rc)
3288 return rc;
3289
3290 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3291 GFP_KERNEL);
3292 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3293 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3294 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3295 size_t audit_size;
3296
3297 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3298 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3299 if (value) {
3300 const char *str = value;
3301
3302 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3303 audit_size = size - 1;
3304 else
3305 audit_size = size;
3306 } else {
3307 audit_size = 0;
3308 }
3309 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3310 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3311 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3312 audit_log_end(ab);
3313
3314 return rc;
3315 }
3316 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3317 size, &newsid);
3318 }
3319 if (rc)
3320 return rc;
3321
3322 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3323 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3324 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3325 if (rc)
3326 return rc;
3327
3328 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3329 sid, isec->sclass);
3330 if (rc)
3331 return rc;
3332
3333 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3334 newsid,
3335 sbsec->sid,
3336 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3337 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3338 &ad);
3339}
3340
3341static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3342 const void *value, size_t size,
3343 int flags)
3344{
3345 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3346 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3347 u32 newsid;
3348 int rc;
3349
3350 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3351 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3352 return;
3353 }
3354
3355 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3356 &newsid);
3357 if (rc) {
3358 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3359 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3360 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3361 return;
3362 }
3363
3364 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3365 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3366 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3367 isec->sid = newsid;
3368 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3369 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3370
3371 return;
3372}
3373
3374static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3375{
3376 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3377
3378 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3379}
3380
3381static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3382{
3383 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3384
3385 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3386}
3387
3388static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3389{
3390 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3391 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
3392 if (rc)
3393 return rc;
3394
3395 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3396 ordinary setattr permission. */
3397 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3398 }
3399
3400 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3401 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3402 return -EACCES;
3403}
3404
3405/*
3406 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3407 *
3408 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3409 */
3410static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3411{
3412 u32 size;
3413 int error;
3414 char *context = NULL;
3415 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3416
3417 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3418 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3419
3420 /*
3421 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3422 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3423 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3424 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3425 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3426 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3427 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3428 */
3429 isec = inode_security(inode);
3430 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3431 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3432 isec->sid, &context,
3433 &size);
3434 else
3435 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3436 &context, &size);
3437 if (error)
3438 return error;
3439 error = size;
3440 if (alloc) {
3441 *buffer = context;
3442 goto out_nofree;
3443 }
3444 kfree(context);
3445out_nofree:
3446 return error;
3447}
3448
3449static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3450 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3451{
3452 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3453 u32 newsid;
3454 int rc;
3455
3456 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3457 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3458
3459 if (!value || !size)
3460 return -EACCES;
3461
3462 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3463 GFP_KERNEL);
3464 if (rc)
3465 return rc;
3466
3467 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3468 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3469 isec->sid = newsid;
3470 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3471 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3472 return 0;
3473}
3474
3475static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3476{
3477 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3478 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3479 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3480 return len;
3481}
3482
3483static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3484{
3485 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3486 *secid = isec->sid;
3487}
3488
3489static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3490{
3491 u32 sid;
3492 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3493 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3494
3495 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3496 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3497 if (!new_creds)
3498 return -ENOMEM;
3499 }
3500
3501 tsec = new_creds->security;
3502 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3503 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3504 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3505 *new = new_creds;
3506 return 0;
3507}
3508
3509static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3510{
3511 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3512 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3513 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3514 */
3515 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3516 return 1; /* Discard */
3517 /*
3518 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3519 * by selinux.
3520 */
3521 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3522}
3523
3524/* file security operations */
3525
3526static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3527{
3528 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3529 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3530
3531 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3532 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3533 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3534
3535 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3536 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3537}
3538
3539static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3540{
3541 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3542 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3543 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3544 u32 sid = current_sid();
3545
3546 if (!mask)
3547 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3548 return 0;
3549
3550 isec = inode_security(inode);
3551 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3552 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3553 /* No change since file_open check. */
3554 return 0;
3555
3556 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3557}
3558
3559static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3560{
3561 return file_alloc_security(file);
3562}
3563
3564static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3565{
3566 file_free_security(file);
3567}
3568
3569/*
3570 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3571 * operation to an inode.
3572 */
3573static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3574 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3575{
3576 struct common_audit_data ad;
3577 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3578 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3579 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3580 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3581 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3582 int rc;
3583 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3584 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3585
3586 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3587 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3588 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3589 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3590
3591 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3592 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3593 ssid, fsec->sid,
3594 SECCLASS_FD,
3595 FD__USE,
3596 &ad);
3597 if (rc)
3598 goto out;
3599 }
3600
3601 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3602 return 0;
3603
3604 isec = inode_security(inode);
3605 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3606 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3607 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3608out:
3609 return rc;
3610}
3611
3612static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3613 unsigned long arg)
3614{
3615 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3616 int error = 0;
3617
3618 switch (cmd) {
3619 case FIONREAD:
3620 /* fall through */
3621 case FIBMAP:
3622 /* fall through */
3623 case FIGETBSZ:
3624 /* fall through */
3625 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3626 /* fall through */
3627 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3628 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3629 break;
3630
3631 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3632 /* fall through */
3633 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3634 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3635 break;
3636
3637 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3638 case FIONBIO:
3639 /* fall through */
3640 case FIOASYNC:
3641 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3642 break;
3643
3644 case KDSKBENT:
3645 case KDSKBSENT:
3646 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3647 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
3648 break;
3649
3650 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3651 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3652 */
3653 default:
3654 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3655 }
3656 return error;
3657}
3658
3659static int default_noexec;
3660
3661static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3662{
3663 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3664 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3665 int rc = 0;
3666
3667 if (default_noexec &&
3668 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3669 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3670 /*
3671 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3672 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3673 * This has an additional check.
3674 */
3675 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3676 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3677 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3678 if (rc)
3679 goto error;
3680 }
3681
3682 if (file) {
3683 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3684 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3685
3686 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3687 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3688 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3689
3690 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3691 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3692
3693 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3694 }
3695
3696error:
3697 return rc;
3698}
3699
3700static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3701{
3702 int rc = 0;
3703
3704 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3705 u32 sid = current_sid();
3706 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3707 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3708 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3709 }
3710
3711 return rc;
3712}
3713
3714static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3715 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3716{
3717 struct common_audit_data ad;
3718 int rc;
3719
3720 if (file) {
3721 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3722 ad.u.file = file;
3723 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3724 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3725 if (rc)
3726 return rc;
3727 }
3728
3729 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3730 prot = reqprot;
3731
3732 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3733 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3734}
3735
3736static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3737 unsigned long reqprot,
3738 unsigned long prot)
3739{
3740 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3741 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3742
3743 if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
3744 prot = reqprot;
3745
3746 if (default_noexec &&
3747 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3748 int rc = 0;
3749 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3750 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3751 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3752 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3753 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3754 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3755 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3756 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3757 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3758 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3759 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3760 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3761 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3762 /*
3763 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3764 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3765 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3766 * modified content. This typically should only
3767 * occur for text relocations.
3768 */
3769 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3770 }
3771 if (rc)
3772 return rc;
3773 }
3774
3775 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3776}
3777
3778static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3779{
3780 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3781
3782 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3783}
3784
3785static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3786 unsigned long arg)
3787{
3788 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3789 int err = 0;
3790
3791 switch (cmd) {
3792 case F_SETFL:
3793 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3794 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3795 break;
3796 }
3797 /* fall through */
3798 case F_SETOWN:
3799 case F_SETSIG:
3800 case F_GETFL:
3801 case F_GETOWN:
3802 case F_GETSIG:
3803 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3804 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3805 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3806 break;
3807 case F_GETLK:
3808 case F_SETLK:
3809 case F_SETLKW:
3810 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3811 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3812 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3813#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3814 case F_GETLK64:
3815 case F_SETLK64:
3816 case F_SETLKW64:
3817#endif
3818 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3819 break;
3820 }
3821
3822 return err;
3823}
3824
3825static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3826{
3827 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3828
3829 fsec = file->f_security;
3830 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3831}
3832
3833static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3834 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3835{
3836 struct file *file;
3837 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3838 u32 perm;
3839 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3840
3841 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3842 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3843
3844 fsec = file->f_security;
3845
3846 if (!signum)
3847 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3848 else
3849 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3850
3851 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3852 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3853 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3854}
3855
3856static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3857{
3858 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3859
3860 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3861}
3862
3863static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3864{
3865 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3866 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3867
3868 fsec = file->f_security;
3869 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3870 /*
3871 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3872 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3873 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3874 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3875 * struct as its SID.
3876 */
3877 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3878 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
3879 /*
3880 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3881 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3882 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3883 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3884 * new inode label or new policy.
3885 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3886 */
3887 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3888}
3889
3890/* task security operations */
3891
3892static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3893 unsigned long clone_flags)
3894{
3895 u32 sid = current_sid();
3896
3897 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3898 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3899}
3900
3901/*
3902 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3903 */
3904static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3905{
3906 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3907
3908 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3909 if (!tsec)
3910 return -ENOMEM;
3911
3912 cred->security = tsec;
3913 return 0;
3914}
3915
3916/*
3917 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3918 */
3919static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3920{
3921 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3922
3923 /*
3924 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3925 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3926 */
3927 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3928 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3929 kfree(tsec);
3930}
3931
3932/*
3933 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3934 */
3935static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3936 gfp_t gfp)
3937{
3938 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3939 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3940
3941 old_tsec = old->security;
3942
3943 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3944 if (!tsec)
3945 return -ENOMEM;
3946
3947 new->security = tsec;
3948 return 0;
3949}
3950
3951/*
3952 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3953 */
3954static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3955{
3956 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3957 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3958
3959 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3960}
3961
3962static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3963{
3964 *secid = cred_sid(c);
3965}
3966
3967/*
3968 * set the security data for a kernel service
3969 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3970 */
3971static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3972{
3973 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3974 u32 sid = current_sid();
3975 int ret;
3976
3977 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3978 sid, secid,
3979 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3980 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3981 NULL);
3982 if (ret == 0) {
3983 tsec->sid = secid;
3984 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3985 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3986 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3987 }
3988 return ret;
3989}
3990
3991/*
3992 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3993 * objective context of the specified inode
3994 */
3995static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3996{
3997 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3998 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3999 u32 sid = current_sid();
4000 int ret;
4001
4002 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4003 sid, isec->sid,
4004 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4005 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4006 NULL);
4007
4008 if (ret == 0)
4009 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4010 return ret;
4011}
4012
4013static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4014{
4015 struct common_audit_data ad;
4016
4017 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4018 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4019
4020 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4021 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4022 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4023}
4024
4025static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4026{
4027 struct common_audit_data ad;
4028 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4029 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4030 u32 sid = current_sid();
4031 int rc;
4032
4033 /* init_module */
4034 if (file == NULL)
4035 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4036 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4037 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4038
4039 /* finit_module */
4040
4041 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4042 ad.u.file = file;
4043
4044 fsec = file->f_security;
4045 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4046 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4047 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4048 if (rc)
4049 return rc;
4050 }
4051
4052 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4053 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4054 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4055 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4056}
4057
4058static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4059 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
4060{
4061 int rc = 0;
4062
4063 switch (id) {
4064 case READING_MODULE:
4065 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
4066 break;
4067 default:
4068 break;
4069 }
4070
4071 return rc;
4072}
4073
4074static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4075{
4076 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4077 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4078 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4079}
4080
4081static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4082{
4083 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4084 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4085 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4086}
4087
4088static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4089{
4090 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4091 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4092 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4093}
4094
4095static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4096{
4097 *secid = task_sid(p);
4098}
4099
4100static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4101{
4102 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4103 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4104 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4105}
4106
4107static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4108{
4109 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4110 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4111 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4112}
4113
4114static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4115{
4116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4117 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4118 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4119}
4120
4121static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4122 unsigned int flags)
4123{
4124 u32 av = 0;
4125
4126 if (!flags)
4127 return 0;
4128 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4129 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4130 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4131 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4132 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4133 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4134 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4135}
4136
4137static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4138 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4139{
4140 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4141
4142 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4143 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4144 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4145 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4146 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4147 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4148 current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4149 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4150
4151 return 0;
4152}
4153
4154static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4155{
4156 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4157 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4158 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4159}
4160
4161static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4162{
4163 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4164 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4165 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4166}
4167
4168static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4169{
4170 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4171 current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4172 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4173}
4174
4175static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
4176 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4177{
4178 u32 secid;
4179 u32 perm;
4180
4181 if (!sig)
4182 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4183 else
4184 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4185 if (!cred)
4186 secid = current_sid();
4187 else
4188 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4189 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4190 secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4191}
4192
4193static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4194 struct inode *inode)
4195{
4196 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
4197 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4198
4199 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4200 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4201 isec->sid = sid;
4202 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4203 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4204}
4205
4206/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4207static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4208 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4209{
4210 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4211 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4212
4213 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4214 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4215 if (ih == NULL)
4216 goto out;
4217
4218 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4219 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4220 goto out;
4221
4222 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4223 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4224 ret = 0;
4225
4226 if (proto)
4227 *proto = ih->protocol;
4228
4229 switch (ih->protocol) {
4230 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4231 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4232
4233 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4234 break;
4235
4236 offset += ihlen;
4237 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4238 if (th == NULL)
4239 break;
4240
4241 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4242 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4243 break;
4244 }
4245
4246 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4247 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4248
4249 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4250 break;
4251
4252 offset += ihlen;
4253 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4254 if (uh == NULL)
4255 break;
4256
4257 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4258 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4259 break;
4260 }
4261
4262 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4263 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4264
4265 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4266 break;
4267
4268 offset += ihlen;
4269 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4270 if (dh == NULL)
4271 break;
4272
4273 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4274 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4275 break;
4276 }
4277
4278#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4279 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4280 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4281
4282 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4283 break;
4284
4285 offset += ihlen;
4286 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4287 if (sh == NULL)
4288 break;
4289
4290 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4291 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4292 break;
4293 }
4294#endif
4295 default:
4296 break;
4297 }
4298out:
4299 return ret;
4300}
4301
4302#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4303
4304/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4305static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4306 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4307{
4308 u8 nexthdr;
4309 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4310 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4311 __be16 frag_off;
4312
4313 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4314 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4315 if (ip6 == NULL)
4316 goto out;
4317
4318 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4319 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4320 ret = 0;
4321
4322 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4323 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4324 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4325 if (offset < 0)
4326 goto out;
4327
4328 if (proto)
4329 *proto = nexthdr;
4330
4331 switch (nexthdr) {
4332 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4333 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4334
4335 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4336 if (th == NULL)
4337 break;
4338
4339 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4340 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4341 break;
4342 }
4343
4344 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4345 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4346
4347 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4348 if (uh == NULL)
4349 break;
4350
4351 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4352 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4353 break;
4354 }
4355
4356 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4357 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4358
4359 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4360 if (dh == NULL)
4361 break;
4362
4363 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4364 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4365 break;
4366 }
4367
4368#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4369 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4370 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4371
4372 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4373 if (sh == NULL)
4374 break;
4375
4376 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4377 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4378 break;
4379 }
4380#endif
4381 /* includes fragments */
4382 default:
4383 break;
4384 }
4385out:
4386 return ret;
4387}
4388
4389#endif /* IPV6 */
4390
4391static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4392 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4393{
4394 char *addrp;
4395 int ret;
4396
4397 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4398 case PF_INET:
4399 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4400 if (ret)
4401 goto parse_error;
4402 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4403 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4404 goto okay;
4405
4406#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4407 case PF_INET6:
4408 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4409 if (ret)
4410 goto parse_error;
4411 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4412 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4413 goto okay;
4414#endif /* IPV6 */
4415 default:
4416 addrp = NULL;
4417 goto okay;
4418 }
4419
4420parse_error:
4421 printk(KERN_WARNING
4422 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4423 " unable to parse packet\n");
4424 return ret;
4425
4426okay:
4427 if (_addrp)
4428 *_addrp = addrp;
4429 return 0;
4430}
4431
4432/**
4433 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4434 * @skb: the packet
4435 * @family: protocol family
4436 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4437 *
4438 * Description:
4439 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4440 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4441 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4442 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4443 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4444 * peer labels.
4445 *
4446 */
4447static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4448{
4449 int err;
4450 u32 xfrm_sid;
4451 u32 nlbl_sid;
4452 u32 nlbl_type;
4453
4454 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4455 if (unlikely(err))
4456 return -EACCES;
4457 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4458 if (unlikely(err))
4459 return -EACCES;
4460
4461 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4462 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4463 if (unlikely(err)) {
4464 printk(KERN_WARNING
4465 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4466 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4467 return -EACCES;
4468 }
4469
4470 return 0;
4471}
4472
4473/**
4474 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4475 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4476 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4477 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4478 *
4479 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4480 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4481 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4482 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4483 *
4484 */
4485static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4486{
4487 int err = 0;
4488
4489 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4490 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4491 conn_sid);
4492 else
4493 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4494
4495 return err;
4496}
4497
4498/* socket security operations */
4499
4500static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4501 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4502{
4503 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4504 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4505 return 0;
4506 }
4507
4508 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4509 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4510}
4511
4512static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4513{
4514 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4515 struct common_audit_data ad;
4516 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4517
4518 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4519 return 0;
4520
4521 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4522 ad.u.net = &net;
4523 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4524
4525 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4526 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4527 &ad);
4528}
4529
4530static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4531 int protocol, int kern)
4532{
4533 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4534 u32 newsid;
4535 u16 secclass;
4536 int rc;
4537
4538 if (kern)
4539 return 0;
4540
4541 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4542 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4543 if (rc)
4544 return rc;
4545
4546 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4547 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4548}
4549
4550static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4551 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4552{
4553 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4554 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4555 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4556 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4557 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4558 int err = 0;
4559
4560 if (!kern) {
4561 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4562 if (err)
4563 return err;
4564 }
4565
4566 isec->sclass = sclass;
4567 isec->sid = sid;
4568 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4569
4570 if (sock->sk) {
4571 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4572 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4573 sksec->sid = sid;
4574 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4575 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4576 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4577
4578 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4579 }
4580
4581 return err;
4582}
4583
4584/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4585 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4586 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4587
4588static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4589{
4590 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4591 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4592 u16 family;
4593 int err;
4594
4595 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4596 if (err)
4597 goto out;
4598
4599 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4600 family = sk->sk_family;
4601 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4602 char *addrp;
4603 struct common_audit_data ad;
4604 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4605 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4606 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4607 u16 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4608 unsigned short snum;
4609 u32 sid, node_perm;
4610
4611 /*
4612 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4613 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4614 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4615 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4616 */
4617 switch (family_sa) {
4618 case AF_UNSPEC:
4619 case AF_INET:
4620 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4621 return -EINVAL;
4622 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4623 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4624 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4625 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4626 */
4627 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4628 goto err_af;
4629 family_sa = AF_INET;
4630 }
4631 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4632 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4633 break;
4634 case AF_INET6:
4635 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4636 return -EINVAL;
4637 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4638 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4639 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4640 break;
4641 default:
4642 goto err_af;
4643 }
4644
4645 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4646 ad.u.net = &net;
4647 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4648 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4649
4650 if (snum) {
4651 int low, high;
4652
4653 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4654
4655 if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
4656 snum > high) {
4657 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4658 snum, &sid);
4659 if (err)
4660 goto out;
4661 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4662 sksec->sid, sid,
4663 sksec->sclass,
4664 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4665 if (err)
4666 goto out;
4667 }
4668 }
4669
4670 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4671 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4672 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4673 break;
4674
4675 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4676 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4677 break;
4678
4679 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4680 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4681 break;
4682
4683 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4684 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4685 break;
4686
4687 default:
4688 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4689 break;
4690 }
4691
4692 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4693 if (err)
4694 goto out;
4695
4696 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4697 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4698 else
4699 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4700
4701 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4702 sksec->sid, sid,
4703 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4704 if (err)
4705 goto out;
4706 }
4707out:
4708 return err;
4709err_af:
4710 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4711 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4712 return -EINVAL;
4713 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4714}
4715
4716/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4717 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
4718 */
4719static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4720 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4721{
4722 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4723 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4724 int err;
4725
4726 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4727 if (err)
4728 return err;
4729
4730 /*
4731 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4732 * for the port.
4733 */
4734 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4735 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4736 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4737 struct common_audit_data ad;
4738 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4739 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4740 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4741 unsigned short snum;
4742 u32 sid, perm;
4743
4744 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4745 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4746 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4747 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4748 */
4749 switch (address->sa_family) {
4750 case AF_INET:
4751 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4752 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4753 return -EINVAL;
4754 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4755 break;
4756 case AF_INET6:
4757 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4758 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4759 return -EINVAL;
4760 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4761 break;
4762 default:
4763 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4764 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4765 */
4766 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4767 return -EINVAL;
4768 else
4769 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4770 }
4771
4772 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4773 if (err)
4774 return err;
4775
4776 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4777 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4778 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4779 break;
4780 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4781 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4782 break;
4783 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4784 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4785 break;
4786 }
4787
4788 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4789 ad.u.net = &net;
4790 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4791 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4792 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4793 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4794 if (err)
4795 return err;
4796 }
4797
4798 return 0;
4799}
4800
4801/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4802static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4803 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4804{
4805 int err;
4806 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4807
4808 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4809 if (err)
4810 return err;
4811
4812 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4813}
4814
4815static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4816{
4817 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4818}
4819
4820static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4821{
4822 int err;
4823 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4824 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4825 u16 sclass;
4826 u32 sid;
4827
4828 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4829 if (err)
4830 return err;
4831
4832 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4833 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4834 sclass = isec->sclass;
4835 sid = isec->sid;
4836 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4837
4838 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4839 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4840 newisec->sid = sid;
4841 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4842
4843 return 0;
4844}
4845
4846static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4847 int size)
4848{
4849 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4850}
4851
4852static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4853 int size, int flags)
4854{
4855 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4856}
4857
4858static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4859{
4860 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4861}
4862
4863static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4864{
4865 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4866}
4867
4868static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4869{
4870 int err;
4871
4872 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4873 if (err)
4874 return err;
4875
4876 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4877}
4878
4879static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4880 int optname)
4881{
4882 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4883}
4884
4885static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4886{
4887 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4888}
4889
4890static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4891 struct sock *other,
4892 struct sock *newsk)
4893{
4894 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4895 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4896 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4897 struct common_audit_data ad;
4898 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4899 int err;
4900
4901 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4902 ad.u.net = &net;
4903 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4904
4905 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4906 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4907 sksec_other->sclass,
4908 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4909 if (err)
4910 return err;
4911
4912 /* server child socket */
4913 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4914 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
4915 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4916 if (err)
4917 return err;
4918
4919 /* connecting socket */
4920 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4921
4922 return 0;
4923}
4924
4925static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4926 struct socket *other)
4927{
4928 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4929 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4930 struct common_audit_data ad;
4931 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4932
4933 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4934 ad.u.net = &net;
4935 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4936
4937 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4938 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4939 &ad);
4940}
4941
4942static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4943 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4944 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4945{
4946 int err;
4947 u32 if_sid;
4948 u32 node_sid;
4949
4950 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4951 if (err)
4952 return err;
4953 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4954 peer_sid, if_sid,
4955 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4956 if (err)
4957 return err;
4958
4959 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4960 if (err)
4961 return err;
4962 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4963 peer_sid, node_sid,
4964 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4965}
4966
4967static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4968 u16 family)
4969{
4970 int err = 0;
4971 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4972 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4973 struct common_audit_data ad;
4974 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4975 char *addrp;
4976
4977 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4978 ad.u.net = &net;
4979 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4980 ad.u.net->family = family;
4981 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4982 if (err)
4983 return err;
4984
4985 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4986 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4987 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4988 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4989 if (err)
4990 return err;
4991 }
4992
4993 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4994 if (err)
4995 return err;
4996 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4997
4998 return err;
4999}
5000
5001static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5002{
5003 int err;
5004 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5005 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5006 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5007 struct common_audit_data ad;
5008 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5009 char *addrp;
5010 u8 secmark_active;
5011 u8 peerlbl_active;
5012
5013 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5014 return 0;
5015
5016 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5017 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5018 family = PF_INET;
5019
5020 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5021 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5022 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5023 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5024 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5025 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5026
5027 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5028 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5029 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5030 return 0;
5031
5032 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5033 ad.u.net = &net;
5034 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5035 ad.u.net->family = family;
5036 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5037 if (err)
5038 return err;
5039
5040 if (peerlbl_active) {
5041 u32 peer_sid;
5042
5043 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5044 if (err)
5045 return err;
5046 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5047 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5048 if (err) {
5049 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5050 return err;
5051 }
5052 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5053 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5054 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5055 if (err) {
5056 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5057 return err;
5058 }
5059 }
5060
5061 if (secmark_active) {
5062 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5063 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5064 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5065 if (err)
5066 return err;
5067 }
5068
5069 return err;
5070}
5071
5072static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5073 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5074{
5075 int err = 0;
5076 char *scontext;
5077 u32 scontext_len;
5078 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5079 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5080
5081 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5082 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5083 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5084 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5085 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5086 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5087
5088 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5089 &scontext_len);
5090 if (err)
5091 return err;
5092
5093 if (scontext_len > len) {
5094 err = -ERANGE;
5095 goto out_len;
5096 }
5097
5098 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5099 err = -EFAULT;
5100
5101out_len:
5102 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5103 err = -EFAULT;
5104 kfree(scontext);
5105 return err;
5106}
5107
5108static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5109{
5110 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5111 u16 family;
5112 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5113
5114 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5115 family = PF_INET;
5116 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5117 family = PF_INET6;
5118 else if (sock)
5119 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5120 else
5121 goto out;
5122
5123 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5124 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5125 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5126 } else if (skb)
5127 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5128
5129out:
5130 *secid = peer_secid;
5131 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5132 return -EINVAL;
5133 return 0;
5134}
5135
5136static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5137{
5138 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5139
5140 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5141 if (!sksec)
5142 return -ENOMEM;
5143
5144 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5145 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5146 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5147 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5148 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5149
5150 return 0;
5151}
5152
5153static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5154{
5155 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5156
5157 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5158 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5159 kfree(sksec);
5160}
5161
5162static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5163{
5164 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5165 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5166
5167 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5168 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5169 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5170
5171 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5172}
5173
5174static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5175{
5176 if (!sk)
5177 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5178 else {
5179 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5180
5181 *secid = sksec->sid;
5182 }
5183}
5184
5185static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5186{
5187 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5188 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5189 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5190
5191 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5192 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5193 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5194 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5195}
5196
5197/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5198 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5199 * already present).
5200 */
5201static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5202 struct sk_buff *skb)
5203{
5204 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5205 struct common_audit_data ad;
5206 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5207 u8 peerlbl_active;
5208 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5209 u32 conn_sid;
5210 int err = 0;
5211
5212 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5213 return 0;
5214
5215 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5216
5217 if (peerlbl_active) {
5218 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5219 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5220 */
5221 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5222 &peer_sid);
5223 if (err)
5224 return err;
5225
5226 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5227 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5228 }
5229
5230 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5231 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5232
5233 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5234 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5235 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5236 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5237 */
5238 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5239 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5240 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5241 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5242 */
5243 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5244 ad.u.net = &net;
5245 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5246 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5247 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5248 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5249 if (err)
5250 return err;
5251 }
5252
5253 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5254 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5255 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5256 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5257 * plug this into the new socket.
5258 */
5259 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5260 if (err)
5261 return err;
5262
5263 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5264 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5265
5266 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5267 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5268}
5269
5270/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5271 * based on their @optname.
5272 */
5273static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5274 struct sockaddr *address,
5275 int addrlen)
5276{
5277 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5278 void *addr_buf;
5279 struct sockaddr *addr;
5280 struct socket *sock;
5281
5282 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5283 return 0;
5284
5285 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5286 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5287 addr_buf = address;
5288
5289 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5290 addr = addr_buf;
5291 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5292 case AF_UNSPEC:
5293 case AF_INET:
5294 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5295 break;
5296 case AF_INET6:
5297 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5298 break;
5299 default:
5300 return -EINVAL;
5301 }
5302
5303 err = -EINVAL;
5304 switch (optname) {
5305 /* Bind checks */
5306 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5307 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5308 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5309 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5310 break;
5311 /* Connect checks */
5312 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5313 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5314 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5315 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5316 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5317 if (err)
5318 return err;
5319
5320 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5321 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5322 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
5323 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5324 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5325 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5326 * primary address is selected.
5327 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5328 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5329 * selinux_socket_connect().
5330 */
5331 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5332 break;
5333 }
5334
5335 if (err)
5336 return err;
5337
5338 addr_buf += len;
5339 walk_size += len;
5340 }
5341
5342 return 0;
5343}
5344
5345/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5346static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5347 struct sock *newsk)
5348{
5349 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5350 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5351
5352 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5353 * the non-sctp clone version.
5354 */
5355 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5356 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5357
5358 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5359 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5360 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5361 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5362}
5363
5364static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5365 struct request_sock *req)
5366{
5367 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5368 int err;
5369 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5370 u32 connsid;
5371 u32 peersid;
5372
5373 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5374 if (err)
5375 return err;
5376 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5377 if (err)
5378 return err;
5379 req->secid = connsid;
5380 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5381
5382 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5383}
5384
5385static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5386 const struct request_sock *req)
5387{
5388 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5389
5390 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5391 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5392 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5393 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5394 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5395 time it will have been created and available. */
5396
5397 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5398 * thread with access to newsksec */
5399 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5400}
5401
5402static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5403{
5404 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5405 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5406
5407 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5408 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5409 family = PF_INET;
5410
5411 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5412}
5413
5414static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5415{
5416 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5417 u32 tsid;
5418
5419 __tsec = current_security();
5420 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5421
5422 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5423 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5424 NULL);
5425}
5426
5427static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5428{
5429 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5430}
5431
5432static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5433{
5434 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5435}
5436
5437static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5438 struct flowi *fl)
5439{
5440 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5441}
5442
5443static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5444{
5445 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5446
5447 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5448 if (!tunsec)
5449 return -ENOMEM;
5450 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5451
5452 *security = tunsec;
5453 return 0;
5454}
5455
5456static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5457{
5458 kfree(security);
5459}
5460
5461static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5462{
5463 u32 sid = current_sid();
5464
5465 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5466 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5467 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5468 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5469 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5470 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5471
5472 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5473 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5474 NULL);
5475}
5476
5477static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5478{
5479 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5480
5481 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5482 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5483 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5484}
5485
5486static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5487{
5488 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5489 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5490
5491 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5492 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5493 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5494 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5495 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5496 * protocols were being used */
5497
5498 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5499 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5500
5501 return 0;
5502}
5503
5504static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5505{
5506 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5507 u32 sid = current_sid();
5508 int err;
5509
5510 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5511 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5512 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5513 if (err)
5514 return err;
5515 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5516 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5517 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5518 if (err)
5519 return err;
5520 tunsec->sid = sid;
5521
5522 return 0;
5523}
5524
5525static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5526{
5527 int err = 0;
5528 u32 perm;
5529 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5530 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5531
5532 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
5533 err = -EINVAL;
5534 goto out;
5535 }
5536 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
5537
5538 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5539 if (err) {
5540 if (err == -EINVAL) {
5541 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5542 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5543 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
5544 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5545 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
5546 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5547 if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
5548 security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
5549 err = 0;
5550 }
5551
5552 /* Ignore */
5553 if (err == -ENOENT)
5554 err = 0;
5555 goto out;
5556 }
5557
5558 err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5559out:
5560 return err;
5561}
5562
5563#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5564
5565static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5566 const struct net_device *indev,
5567 u16 family)
5568{
5569 int err;
5570 char *addrp;
5571 u32 peer_sid;
5572 struct common_audit_data ad;
5573 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5574 u8 secmark_active;
5575 u8 netlbl_active;
5576 u8 peerlbl_active;
5577
5578 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5579 return NF_ACCEPT;
5580
5581 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5582 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5583 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5584 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5585 return NF_ACCEPT;
5586
5587 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5588 return NF_DROP;
5589
5590 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5591 ad.u.net = &net;
5592 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5593 ad.u.net->family = family;
5594 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5595 return NF_DROP;
5596
5597 if (peerlbl_active) {
5598 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5599 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5600 if (err) {
5601 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5602 return NF_DROP;
5603 }
5604 }
5605
5606 if (secmark_active)
5607 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5608 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5609 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5610 return NF_DROP;
5611
5612 if (netlbl_active)
5613 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5614 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5615 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5616 * protection */
5617 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5618 return NF_DROP;
5619
5620 return NF_ACCEPT;
5621}
5622
5623static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5624 struct sk_buff *skb,
5625 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5626{
5627 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5628}
5629
5630#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5631static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5632 struct sk_buff *skb,
5633 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5634{
5635 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5636}
5637#endif /* IPV6 */
5638
5639static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5640 u16 family)
5641{
5642 struct sock *sk;
5643 u32 sid;
5644
5645 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5646 return NF_ACCEPT;
5647
5648 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5649 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5650 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5651 sk = skb->sk;
5652 if (sk) {
5653 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5654
5655 if (sk_listener(sk))
5656 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5657 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5658 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5659 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5660 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5661 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5662 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5663 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5664 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5665 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5666 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5667 * best we can do. */
5668 return NF_ACCEPT;
5669
5670 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5671 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5672 sid = sksec->sid;
5673 } else
5674 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5675 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5676 return NF_DROP;
5677
5678 return NF_ACCEPT;
5679}
5680
5681static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5682 struct sk_buff *skb,
5683 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5684{
5685 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5686}
5687
5688#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5689static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5690 struct sk_buff *skb,
5691 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5692{
5693 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5694}
5695#endif /* IPV6 */
5696
5697static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5698 int ifindex,
5699 u16 family)
5700{
5701 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5702 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5703 struct common_audit_data ad;
5704 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5705 char *addrp;
5706 u8 proto;
5707
5708 if (sk == NULL)
5709 return NF_ACCEPT;
5710 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5711
5712 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5713 ad.u.net = &net;
5714 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5715 ad.u.net->family = family;
5716 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5717 return NF_DROP;
5718
5719 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5720 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5721 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5722 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5723 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5724
5725 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5726 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5727
5728 return NF_ACCEPT;
5729}
5730
5731static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5732 const struct net_device *outdev,
5733 u16 family)
5734{
5735 u32 secmark_perm;
5736 u32 peer_sid;
5737 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5738 struct sock *sk;
5739 struct common_audit_data ad;
5740 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5741 char *addrp;
5742 u8 secmark_active;
5743 u8 peerlbl_active;
5744
5745 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5746 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5747 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5748 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5749 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5750 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5751
5752 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5753 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5754 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5755 return NF_ACCEPT;
5756
5757 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5758
5759#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5760 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5761 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5762 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5763 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5764 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5765 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5766 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5767 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5768 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5769 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5770 * connection. */
5771 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5772 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5773 return NF_ACCEPT;
5774#endif
5775
5776 if (sk == NULL) {
5777 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5778 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5779 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5780 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5781 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5782 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5783 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5784 return NF_DROP;
5785 } else {
5786 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5787 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5788 }
5789 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5790 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5791 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5792 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5793 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5794 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5795 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5796 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5797 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5798 * for similar problems. */
5799 u32 skb_sid;
5800 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5801
5802 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5803 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5804 return NF_DROP;
5805 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5806 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5807 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5808 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5809 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5810 * pass the packet. */
5811 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5812 switch (family) {
5813 case PF_INET:
5814 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5815 return NF_ACCEPT;
5816 break;
5817 case PF_INET6:
5818 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5819 return NF_ACCEPT;
5820 break;
5821 default:
5822 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5823 }
5824 }
5825 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5826 return NF_DROP;
5827 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5828 } else {
5829 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5830 * associated socket. */
5831 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5832 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5833 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5834 }
5835
5836 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5837 ad.u.net = &net;
5838 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5839 ad.u.net->family = family;
5840 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5841 return NF_DROP;
5842
5843 if (secmark_active)
5844 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5845 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5846 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5847 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5848
5849 if (peerlbl_active) {
5850 u32 if_sid;
5851 u32 node_sid;
5852
5853 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5854 return NF_DROP;
5855 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5856 peer_sid, if_sid,
5857 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5858 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5859
5860 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5861 return NF_DROP;
5862 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5863 peer_sid, node_sid,
5864 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5865 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5866 }
5867
5868 return NF_ACCEPT;
5869}
5870
5871static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5872 struct sk_buff *skb,
5873 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5874{
5875 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5876}
5877
5878#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5879static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5880 struct sk_buff *skb,
5881 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5882{
5883 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5884}
5885#endif /* IPV6 */
5886
5887#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5888
5889static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5890{
5891 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5892}
5893
5894static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5895 u16 sclass)
5896{
5897 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5898
5899 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5900 if (!isec)
5901 return -ENOMEM;
5902
5903 isec->sclass = sclass;
5904 isec->sid = current_sid();
5905 perm->security = isec;
5906
5907 return 0;
5908}
5909
5910static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5911{
5912 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5913 perm->security = NULL;
5914 kfree(isec);
5915}
5916
5917static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5918{
5919 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5920
5921 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5922 if (!msec)
5923 return -ENOMEM;
5924
5925 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5926 msg->security = msec;
5927
5928 return 0;
5929}
5930
5931static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5932{
5933 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5934
5935 msg->security = NULL;
5936 kfree(msec);
5937}
5938
5939static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5940 u32 perms)
5941{
5942 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5943 struct common_audit_data ad;
5944 u32 sid = current_sid();
5945
5946 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5947
5948 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5949 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5950
5951 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5952 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5953}
5954
5955static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5956{
5957 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5958}
5959
5960static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5961{
5962 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5963}
5964
5965/* message queue security operations */
5966static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5967{
5968 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5969 struct common_audit_data ad;
5970 u32 sid = current_sid();
5971 int rc;
5972
5973 rc = ipc_alloc_security(msq, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5974 if (rc)
5975 return rc;
5976
5977 isec = msq->security;
5978
5979 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5980 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5981
5982 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5983 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5984 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5985 if (rc) {
5986 ipc_free_security(msq);
5987 return rc;
5988 }
5989 return 0;
5990}
5991
5992static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5993{
5994 ipc_free_security(msq);
5995}
5996
5997static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5998{
5999 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6000 struct common_audit_data ad;
6001 u32 sid = current_sid();
6002
6003 isec = msq->security;
6004
6005 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6006 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6007
6008 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6009 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6010 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6011}
6012
6013static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6014{
6015 int err;
6016 int perms;
6017
6018 switch (cmd) {
6019 case IPC_INFO:
6020 case MSG_INFO:
6021 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6022 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6023 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6024 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6025 case IPC_STAT:
6026 case MSG_STAT:
6027 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6028 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6029 break;
6030 case IPC_SET:
6031 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6032 break;
6033 case IPC_RMID:
6034 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6035 break;
6036 default:
6037 return 0;
6038 }
6039
6040 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6041 return err;
6042}
6043
6044static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6045{
6046 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6047 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6048 struct common_audit_data ad;
6049 u32 sid = current_sid();
6050 int rc;
6051
6052 isec = msq->security;
6053 msec = msg->security;
6054
6055 /*
6056 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6057 */
6058 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6059 /*
6060 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6061 * message queue this message will be stored in
6062 */
6063 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6064 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6065 if (rc)
6066 return rc;
6067 }
6068
6069 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6070 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6071
6072 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6073 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6074 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6075 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6076 if (!rc)
6077 /* Can this process send the message */
6078 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6079 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6080 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6081 if (!rc)
6082 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6083 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6084 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6085 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6086
6087 return rc;
6088}
6089
6090static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6091 struct task_struct *target,
6092 long type, int mode)
6093{
6094 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6095 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6096 struct common_audit_data ad;
6097 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
6098 int rc;
6099
6100 isec = msq->security;
6101 msec = msg->security;
6102
6103 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6104 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6105
6106 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6107 sid, isec->sid,
6108 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6109 if (!rc)
6110 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6111 sid, msec->sid,
6112 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6113 return rc;
6114}
6115
6116/* Shared Memory security operations */
6117static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6118{
6119 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6120 struct common_audit_data ad;
6121 u32 sid = current_sid();
6122 int rc;
6123
6124 rc = ipc_alloc_security(shp, SECCLASS_SHM);
6125 if (rc)
6126 return rc;
6127
6128 isec = shp->security;
6129
6130 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6131 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6132
6133 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6134 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6135 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6136 if (rc) {
6137 ipc_free_security(shp);
6138 return rc;
6139 }
6140 return 0;
6141}
6142
6143static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6144{
6145 ipc_free_security(shp);
6146}
6147
6148static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6149{
6150 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6151 struct common_audit_data ad;
6152 u32 sid = current_sid();
6153
6154 isec = shp->security;
6155
6156 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6157 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6158
6159 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6160 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6161 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6162}
6163
6164/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6165static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6166{
6167 int perms;
6168 int err;
6169
6170 switch (cmd) {
6171 case IPC_INFO:
6172 case SHM_INFO:
6173 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6174 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6175 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6176 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6177 case IPC_STAT:
6178 case SHM_STAT:
6179 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6180 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6181 break;
6182 case IPC_SET:
6183 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6184 break;
6185 case SHM_LOCK:
6186 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6187 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6188 break;
6189 case IPC_RMID:
6190 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6191 break;
6192 default:
6193 return 0;
6194 }
6195
6196 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6197 return err;
6198}
6199
6200static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6201 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6202{
6203 u32 perms;
6204
6205 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6206 perms = SHM__READ;
6207 else
6208 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6209
6210 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6211}
6212
6213/* Semaphore security operations */
6214static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6215{
6216 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6217 struct common_audit_data ad;
6218 u32 sid = current_sid();
6219 int rc;
6220
6221 rc = ipc_alloc_security(sma, SECCLASS_SEM);
6222 if (rc)
6223 return rc;
6224
6225 isec = sma->security;
6226
6227 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6228 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6229
6230 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6231 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6232 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6233 if (rc) {
6234 ipc_free_security(sma);
6235 return rc;
6236 }
6237 return 0;
6238}
6239
6240static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6241{
6242 ipc_free_security(sma);
6243}
6244
6245static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6246{
6247 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6248 struct common_audit_data ad;
6249 u32 sid = current_sid();
6250
6251 isec = sma->security;
6252
6253 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6254 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6255
6256 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6257 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6258 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6259}
6260
6261/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6262static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6263{
6264 int err;
6265 u32 perms;
6266
6267 switch (cmd) {
6268 case IPC_INFO:
6269 case SEM_INFO:
6270 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6271 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6272 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6273 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6274 case GETPID:
6275 case GETNCNT:
6276 case GETZCNT:
6277 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6278 break;
6279 case GETVAL:
6280 case GETALL:
6281 perms = SEM__READ;
6282 break;
6283 case SETVAL:
6284 case SETALL:
6285 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6286 break;
6287 case IPC_RMID:
6288 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6289 break;
6290 case IPC_SET:
6291 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6292 break;
6293 case IPC_STAT:
6294 case SEM_STAT:
6295 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6296 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6297 break;
6298 default:
6299 return 0;
6300 }
6301
6302 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6303 return err;
6304}
6305
6306static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6307 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6308{
6309 u32 perms;
6310
6311 if (alter)
6312 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6313 else
6314 perms = SEM__READ;
6315
6316 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6317}
6318
6319static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6320{
6321 u32 av = 0;
6322
6323 av = 0;
6324 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6325 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6326 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6327 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6328
6329 if (av == 0)
6330 return 0;
6331
6332 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6333}
6334
6335static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6336{
6337 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
6338 *secid = isec->sid;
6339}
6340
6341static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6342{
6343 if (inode)
6344 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6345}
6346
6347static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6348 char *name, char **value)
6349{
6350 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6351 u32 sid;
6352 int error;
6353 unsigned len;
6354
6355 rcu_read_lock();
6356 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
6357
6358 if (current != p) {
6359 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6360 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6361 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6362 if (error)
6363 goto bad;
6364 }
6365
6366 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6367 sid = __tsec->sid;
6368 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6369 sid = __tsec->osid;
6370 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6371 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6372 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6373 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6374 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6375 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6376 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6377 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6378 else {
6379 error = -EINVAL;
6380 goto bad;
6381 }
6382 rcu_read_unlock();
6383
6384 if (!sid)
6385 return 0;
6386
6387 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6388 if (error)
6389 return error;
6390 return len;
6391
6392bad:
6393 rcu_read_unlock();
6394 return error;
6395}
6396
6397static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6398{
6399 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6400 struct cred *new;
6401 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6402 int error;
6403 char *str = value;
6404
6405 /*
6406 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6407 */
6408 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6409 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6410 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6411 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6412 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6413 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6414 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6415 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6416 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6417 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6418 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6419 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6420 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6421 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6422 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6423 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6424 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6425 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6426 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6427 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6428 else
6429 error = -EINVAL;
6430 if (error)
6431 return error;
6432
6433 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6434 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6435 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6436 str[size-1] = 0;
6437 size--;
6438 }
6439 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6440 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6441 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6442 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6443 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6444 size_t audit_size;
6445
6446 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6447 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6448 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6449 audit_size = size - 1;
6450 else
6451 audit_size = size;
6452 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6453 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6454 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6455 audit_log_end(ab);
6456
6457 return error;
6458 }
6459 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6460 &selinux_state,
6461 value, size, &sid);
6462 }
6463 if (error)
6464 return error;
6465 }
6466
6467 new = prepare_creds();
6468 if (!new)
6469 return -ENOMEM;
6470
6471 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6472 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6473 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6474 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
6475 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6476 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6477 tsec = new->security;
6478 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6479 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6480 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6481 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6482 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6483 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6484 mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
6485 NULL);
6486 if (error)
6487 goto abort_change;
6488 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6489 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6490 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6491 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6492 error = -EINVAL;
6493 if (sid == 0)
6494 goto abort_change;
6495
6496 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6497 error = -EPERM;
6498 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6499 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6500 tsec->sid, sid);
6501 if (error)
6502 goto abort_change;
6503 }
6504
6505 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6506 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6507 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6508 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6509 if (error)
6510 goto abort_change;
6511
6512 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6513 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6514 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6515 if (ptsid != 0) {
6516 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6517 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6518 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6519 if (error)
6520 goto abort_change;
6521 }
6522
6523 tsec->sid = sid;
6524 } else {
6525 error = -EINVAL;
6526 goto abort_change;
6527 }
6528
6529 commit_creds(new);
6530 return size;
6531
6532abort_change:
6533 abort_creds(new);
6534 return error;
6535}
6536
6537static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6538{
6539 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6540}
6541
6542static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6543{
6544 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6545 secdata, seclen);
6546}
6547
6548static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6549{
6550 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6551 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6552}
6553
6554static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6555{
6556 kfree(secdata);
6557}
6558
6559static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6560{
6561 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
6562
6563 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6564 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6565 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6566}
6567
6568/*
6569 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6570 */
6571static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6572{
6573 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6574}
6575
6576/*
6577 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6578 */
6579static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6580{
6581 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6582}
6583
6584static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6585{
6586 int len = 0;
6587 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6588 ctx, true);
6589 if (len < 0)
6590 return len;
6591 *ctxlen = len;
6592 return 0;
6593}
6594#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6595
6596static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6597 unsigned long flags)
6598{
6599 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6600 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6601
6602 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6603 if (!ksec)
6604 return -ENOMEM;
6605
6606 tsec = cred->security;
6607 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6608 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6609 else
6610 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6611
6612 k->security = ksec;
6613 return 0;
6614}
6615
6616static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6617{
6618 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6619
6620 k->security = NULL;
6621 kfree(ksec);
6622}
6623
6624static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6625 const struct cred *cred,
6626 unsigned perm)
6627{
6628 struct key *key;
6629 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6630 u32 sid;
6631
6632 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
6633 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
6634 appear to be created. */
6635 if (perm == 0)
6636 return 0;
6637
6638 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6639
6640 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6641 ksec = key->security;
6642
6643 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6644 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6645}
6646
6647static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6648{
6649 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6650 char *context = NULL;
6651 unsigned len;
6652 int rc;
6653
6654 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6655 &context, &len);
6656 if (!rc)
6657 rc = len;
6658 *_buffer = context;
6659 return rc;
6660}
6661#endif
6662
6663#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6664static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6665{
6666 struct common_audit_data ad;
6667 int err;
6668 u32 sid = 0;
6669 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6670 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6671
6672 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6673 if (err)
6674 return err;
6675
6676 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6677 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6678 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6679 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6680 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6681 sec->sid, sid,
6682 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6683 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6684}
6685
6686static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6687 u8 port_num)
6688{
6689 struct common_audit_data ad;
6690 int err;
6691 u32 sid = 0;
6692 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6693 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6694
6695 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6696 &sid);
6697
6698 if (err)
6699 return err;
6700
6701 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6702 strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6703 ibendport.port = port_num;
6704 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6705 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6706 sec->sid, sid,
6707 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6708 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6709}
6710
6711static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6712{
6713 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6714
6715 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6716 if (!sec)
6717 return -ENOMEM;
6718 sec->sid = current_sid();
6719
6720 *ib_sec = sec;
6721 return 0;
6722}
6723
6724static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6725{
6726 kfree(ib_sec);
6727}
6728#endif
6729
6730#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6731static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6732 unsigned int size)
6733{
6734 u32 sid = current_sid();
6735 int ret;
6736
6737 switch (cmd) {
6738 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6739 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6740 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6741 NULL);
6742 break;
6743 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6744 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6745 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6746 NULL);
6747 break;
6748 default:
6749 ret = 0;
6750 break;
6751 }
6752
6753 return ret;
6754}
6755
6756static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6757{
6758 u32 av = 0;
6759
6760 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6761 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6762 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6763 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6764 return av;
6765}
6766
6767/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6768 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6769 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6770 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6771 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6772 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6773 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6774 */
6775static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6776{
6777 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6778 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6779 struct bpf_map *map;
6780 int ret;
6781
6782 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6783 map = file->private_data;
6784 bpfsec = map->security;
6785 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6786 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6787 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6788 if (ret)
6789 return ret;
6790 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6791 prog = file->private_data;
6792 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6793 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6794 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6795 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6796 if (ret)
6797 return ret;
6798 }
6799 return 0;
6800}
6801
6802static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6803{
6804 u32 sid = current_sid();
6805 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6806
6807 bpfsec = map->security;
6808 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6809 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6810 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6811}
6812
6813static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6814{
6815 u32 sid = current_sid();
6816 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6817
6818 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6819 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6820 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6821 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6822}
6823
6824static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6825{
6826 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6827
6828 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6829 if (!bpfsec)
6830 return -ENOMEM;
6831
6832 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6833 map->security = bpfsec;
6834
6835 return 0;
6836}
6837
6838static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6839{
6840 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6841
6842 map->security = NULL;
6843 kfree(bpfsec);
6844}
6845
6846static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6847{
6848 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6849
6850 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6851 if (!bpfsec)
6852 return -ENOMEM;
6853
6854 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6855 aux->security = bpfsec;
6856
6857 return 0;
6858}
6859
6860static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6861{
6862 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6863
6864 aux->security = NULL;
6865 kfree(bpfsec);
6866}
6867#endif
6868
6869static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6870 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6874
6875 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6876 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6877 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6878 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6882 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6884
6885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6886
6887 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
6888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6889 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6890
6891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
6892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
6894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
6903
6904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6906
6907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
6908 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6911 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6913 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6915 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6918 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
6919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
6920 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
6921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
6922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
6923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
6924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
6925 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
6926 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
6927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
6928 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
6929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
6930 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
6931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
6932 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
6933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
6934
6935 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
6936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
6937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
6938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
6939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
6940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
6941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
6942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
6943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
6944 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
6945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
6946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
6947
6948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
6949
6950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
6951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
6952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
6953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
6954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
6955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
6956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
6957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
6958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
6959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
6960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
6961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
6962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
6963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
6964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
6966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
6968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
6972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
6974
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
6976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
6977
6978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
6980
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
6982 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
6984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
6987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
6988
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
6990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
6993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
6994
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
6997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7000
7001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7002
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7005
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7014
7015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7017
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7033 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7056#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7059 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7062#endif
7063#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7070 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7075 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7077#endif
7078
7079#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7084#endif
7085
7086#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7091#endif
7092
7093#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7101#endif
7102};
7103
7104static __init int selinux_init(void)
7105{
7106 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
7107 selinux_enabled = 0;
7108 return 0;
7109 }
7110
7111 if (!selinux_enabled) {
7112 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
7113 return 0;
7114 }
7115
7116 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7117
7118 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7119 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7120 selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
7121 selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
7122 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7123
7124 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7125 cred_init_security();
7126
7127 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7128
7129 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
7130 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
7131 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
7132 file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
7133 sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
7134 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
7135 avc_init();
7136
7137 avtab_cache_init();
7138
7139 ebitmap_cache_init();
7140
7141 hashtab_cache_init();
7142
7143 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7144
7145 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7146 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7147
7148 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7149 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7150
7151 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7152 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7153 else
7154 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7155
7156 return 0;
7157}
7158
7159static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7160{
7161 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
7162}
7163
7164void selinux_complete_init(void)
7165{
7166 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7167
7168 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7169 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7170 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7171}
7172
7173/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7174 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7175security_initcall(selinux_init);
7176
7177#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7178
7179static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7180 {
7181 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7182 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7183 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7184 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7185 },
7186 {
7187 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7188 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7189 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7190 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7191 },
7192 {
7193 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7194 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7195 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7196 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7197 },
7198#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7199 {
7200 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7201 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7202 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7203 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7204 },
7205 {
7206 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7207 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7208 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7209 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7210 },
7211 {
7212 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7213 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7214 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7215 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7216 },
7217#endif /* IPV6 */
7218};
7219
7220static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7221{
7222 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7223 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7224}
7225
7226static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7227{
7228 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7229 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7230}
7231
7232static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7233 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7234 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7235};
7236
7237static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7238{
7239 int err;
7240
7241 if (!selinux_enabled)
7242 return 0;
7243
7244 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7245
7246 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7247 if (err)
7248 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7249
7250 return 0;
7251}
7252__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7253
7254#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7255static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7256{
7257 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7258
7259 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7260}
7261#endif
7262
7263#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7264
7265#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7266#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7267#endif
7268
7269#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7270
7271#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7272int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7273{
7274 if (state->initialized) {
7275 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7276 return -EINVAL;
7277 }
7278
7279 if (state->disabled) {
7280 /* Only do this once. */
7281 return -EINVAL;
7282 }
7283
7284 state->disabled = 1;
7285
7286 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7287
7288 selinux_enabled = 0;
7289
7290 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7291
7292 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7293 avc_disable();
7294
7295 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
7296 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7297
7298 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7299 exit_sel_fs();
7300
7301 return 0;
7302}
7303#endif
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
22 */
23
24#include <linux/init.h>
25#include <linux/kd.h>
26#include <linux/kernel.h>
27#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28#include <linux/tracehook.h>
29#include <linux/errno.h>
30#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
31#include <linux/sched/task.h>
32#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33#include <linux/xattr.h>
34#include <linux/capability.h>
35#include <linux/unistd.h>
36#include <linux/mm.h>
37#include <linux/mman.h>
38#include <linux/slab.h>
39#include <linux/pagemap.h>
40#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41#include <linux/swap.h>
42#include <linux/spinlock.h>
43#include <linux/syscalls.h>
44#include <linux/dcache.h>
45#include <linux/file.h>
46#include <linux/fdtable.h>
47#include <linux/namei.h>
48#include <linux/mount.h>
49#include <linux/fs_context.h>
50#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
51#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53#include <linux/tty.h>
54#include <net/icmp.h>
55#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58#include <net/net_namespace.h>
59#include <net/netlabel.h>
60#include <linux/uaccess.h>
61#include <asm/ioctls.h>
62#include <linux/atomic.h>
63#include <linux/bitops.h>
64#include <linux/interrupt.h>
65#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66#include <net/netlink.h>
67#include <linux/tcp.h>
68#include <linux/udp.h>
69#include <linux/dccp.h>
70#include <linux/sctp.h>
71#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72#include <linux/quota.h>
73#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75#include <linux/parser.h>
76#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
77#include <net/ipv6.h>
78#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79#include <linux/personality.h>
80#include <linux/audit.h>
81#include <linux/string.h>
82#include <linux/mutex.h>
83#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
84#include <linux/syslog.h>
85#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
86#include <linux/export.h>
87#include <linux/msg.h>
88#include <linux/shm.h>
89#include <linux/bpf.h>
90#include <linux/kernfs.h>
91#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94#include <linux/fanotify.h>
95
96#include "avc.h"
97#include "objsec.h"
98#include "netif.h"
99#include "netnode.h"
100#include "netport.h"
101#include "ibpkey.h"
102#include "xfrm.h"
103#include "netlabel.h"
104#include "audit.h"
105#include "avc_ss.h"
106
107struct selinux_state selinux_state;
108
109/* SECMARK reference count */
110static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
111
112#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
114
115static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
116{
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
120 return 1;
121}
122__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
123#else
124#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
125#endif
126
127int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
130{
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
134 return 1;
135}
136__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
137#endif
138
139static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
141
142static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143{
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
148 if (checkreqprot)
149 pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
150 }
151 return 1;
152}
153__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
154
155/**
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
157 *
158 * Description:
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
164 *
165 */
166static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
167{
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
170}
171
172/**
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
174 *
175 * Description:
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
180 *
181 */
182static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
183{
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
186}
187
188static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
189{
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
191 sel_netif_flush();
192 sel_netnode_flush();
193 sel_netport_flush();
194 synchronize_net();
195 }
196 return 0;
197}
198
199static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
200{
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
202 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
204 }
205
206 return 0;
207}
208
209/*
210 * initialise the security for the init task
211 */
212static void cred_init_security(void)
213{
214 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
216
217 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
219}
220
221/*
222 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
223 */
224static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
225{
226 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
227
228 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
229 return tsec->sid;
230}
231
232/*
233 * get the subjective security ID of a task
234 */
235static inline u32 task_sid_subj(const struct task_struct *task)
236{
237 u32 sid;
238
239 rcu_read_lock();
240 sid = cred_sid(rcu_dereference(task->cred));
241 rcu_read_unlock();
242 return sid;
243}
244
245/*
246 * get the objective security ID of a task
247 */
248static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
249{
250 u32 sid;
251
252 rcu_read_lock();
253 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
254 rcu_read_unlock();
255 return sid;
256}
257
258/*
259 * get the security ID of a task for use with binder
260 */
261static inline u32 task_sid_binder(const struct task_struct *task)
262{
263 /*
264 * In many case where this function is used we should be using the
265 * task's subjective SID, but we can't reliably access the subjective
266 * creds of a task other than our own so we must use the objective
267 * creds/SID, which are safe to access. The downside is that if a task
268 * is temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected here;
269 * however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that case well
270 * anyway.
271 *
272 * If this ever changes and we can safely reference the subjective
273 * creds/SID of another task, this function will make it easier to
274 * identify the various places where we make use of the task SIDs in
275 * the binder code. It is also likely that we will need to adjust
276 * the main drivers/android binder code as well.
277 */
278 return task_sid_obj(task);
279}
280
281static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
282
283/*
284 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
285 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
286 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
287 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
288 */
289static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
290 struct dentry *dentry,
291 bool may_sleep)
292{
293 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
294
295 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
296
297 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
298 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
299 if (!may_sleep)
300 return -ECHILD;
301
302 /*
303 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
304 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
305 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
306 */
307 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
308 }
309 return 0;
310}
311
312static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
313{
314 return selinux_inode(inode);
315}
316
317static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
318{
319 int error;
320
321 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
322 if (error)
323 return ERR_PTR(error);
324 return selinux_inode(inode);
325}
326
327/*
328 * Get the security label of an inode.
329 */
330static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
331{
332 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
333 return selinux_inode(inode);
334}
335
336static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
337{
338 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
339
340 return selinux_inode(inode);
341}
342
343/*
344 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
345 */
346static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
347{
348 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
349
350 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
351 return selinux_inode(inode);
352}
353
354static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
355{
356 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
358
359 if (!isec)
360 return;
361 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
362 /*
363 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
364 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
365 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
366 *
367 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
368 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
369 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
370 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
371 */
372 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
373 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
374 list_del_init(&isec->list);
375 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
376 }
377}
378
379struct selinux_mnt_opts {
380 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
381};
382
383static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
384{
385 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
386 kfree(opts->fscontext);
387 kfree(opts->context);
388 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
389 kfree(opts->defcontext);
390 kfree(opts);
391}
392
393enum {
394 Opt_error = -1,
395 Opt_context = 0,
396 Opt_defcontext = 1,
397 Opt_fscontext = 2,
398 Opt_rootcontext = 3,
399 Opt_seclabel = 4,
400};
401
402#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
403static struct {
404 const char *name;
405 int len;
406 int opt;
407 bool has_arg;
408} tokens[] = {
409 A(context, true),
410 A(fscontext, true),
411 A(defcontext, true),
412 A(rootcontext, true),
413 A(seclabel, false),
414};
415#undef A
416
417static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
418{
419 int i;
420
421 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
422 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
423 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
424 continue;
425 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
426 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
427 continue;
428 *arg = s + len + 1;
429 } else if (len != l)
430 continue;
431 return tokens[i].opt;
432 }
433 return Opt_error;
434}
435
436#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
437
438static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
439 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
440 const struct cred *cred)
441{
442 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
443 int rc;
444
445 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
446 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
447 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
448 if (rc)
449 return rc;
450
451 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
452 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
453 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
454 return rc;
455}
456
457static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
458 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
459 const struct cred *cred)
460{
461 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
462 int rc;
463 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
464 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
465 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
466 if (rc)
467 return rc;
468
469 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
470 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
471 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
472 return rc;
473}
474
475static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
476{
477 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
478 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
479 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
480 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
481 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
482 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
483 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
484 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
485 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
486}
487
488static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
489{
490 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
491
492 /*
493 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
494 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
495 */
496 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
497
498 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
499 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
500 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
501 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
502 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
503 return 1;
504
505 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
506 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
507
508 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
509 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
510 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
511 default:
512 return 0;
513 }
514}
515
516static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
517{
518 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
519 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
520 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
521 u32 sid;
522 int rc;
523
524 /*
525 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
526 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
527 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
528 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
529 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
530 */
531 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
532 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
533 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
534 goto fallback;
535 }
536
537 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
538 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
539 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
540 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
541 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
542 goto fallback;
543 } else {
544 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
545 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
546 return rc;
547 }
548 }
549 return 0;
550
551fallback:
552 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
553 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, "/",
554 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
555 if (rc)
556 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
557
558 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
559 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
560 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
561 sbsec->sid = sid;
562 return 0;
563}
564
565static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
566{
567 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
568 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
569 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
570 int rc = 0;
571
572 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
573 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
574 if (rc)
575 return rc;
576 }
577
578 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
579
580 /*
581 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
582 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
583 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
584 */
585 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
586 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
587 else
588 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
589
590 /* Initialize the root inode. */
591 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
592
593 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
594 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
595 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
596 populates itself. */
597 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
598 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
599 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
600 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
601 struct inode_security_struct, list);
602 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
603 list_del_init(&isec->list);
604 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
605 inode = igrab(inode);
606 if (inode) {
607 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
608 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
609 iput(inode);
610 }
611 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
612 }
613 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
614 return rc;
615}
616
617static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
618 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
619{
620 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
621
622 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
623 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
624 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
625 (old_sid != new_sid))
626 return 1;
627
628 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
629 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
630 */
631 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
632 if (mnt_flags & flag)
633 return 1;
634 return 0;
635}
636
637static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
638{
639 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
640 sid, GFP_KERNEL);
641 if (rc)
642 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
643 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
644 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
645 return rc;
646}
647
648/*
649 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
650 * labeling information.
651 */
652static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
653 void *mnt_opts,
654 unsigned long kern_flags,
655 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
656{
657 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
658 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
659 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
660 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
661 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
662 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
663 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
664 int rc = 0;
665
666 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
667
668 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
669 if (!opts) {
670 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
671 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
672 server is ready to handle calls. */
673 goto out;
674 }
675 rc = -EINVAL;
676 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
677 "before the security server is initialized\n");
678 goto out;
679 }
680 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
681 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
682 * place the results is not allowed */
683 rc = -EINVAL;
684 goto out;
685 }
686
687 /*
688 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
689 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
690 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
691 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
692 *
693 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
694 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
695 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
696 * will be used for both mounts)
697 */
698 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
699 && !opts)
700 goto out;
701
702 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
703
704 /*
705 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
706 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
707 * than once with different security options.
708 */
709 if (opts) {
710 if (opts->fscontext) {
711 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
712 if (rc)
713 goto out;
714 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
715 fscontext_sid))
716 goto out_double_mount;
717 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
718 }
719 if (opts->context) {
720 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
721 if (rc)
722 goto out;
723 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
724 context_sid))
725 goto out_double_mount;
726 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
727 }
728 if (opts->rootcontext) {
729 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
730 if (rc)
731 goto out;
732 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
733 rootcontext_sid))
734 goto out_double_mount;
735 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
736 }
737 if (opts->defcontext) {
738 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
739 if (rc)
740 goto out;
741 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
742 defcontext_sid))
743 goto out_double_mount;
744 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
745 }
746 }
747
748 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
749 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
750 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
751 goto out_double_mount;
752 rc = 0;
753 goto out;
754 }
755
756 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
757 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
758
759 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
760 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
761 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
762 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
763 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
764 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
765
766 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
767 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
768 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
769 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
770
771 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
772 /*
773 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
774 * filesystem type.
775 */
776 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
777 if (rc) {
778 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
779 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
780 goto out;
781 }
782 }
783
784 /*
785 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
786 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
787 * line and security labels must be ignored.
788 */
789 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
790 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
791 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
792 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
793 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
794 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
795 defcontext_sid) {
796 rc = -EACCES;
797 goto out;
798 }
799 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
800 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
801 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
802 current_sid(),
803 current_sid(),
804 SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
805 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
806 if (rc)
807 goto out;
808 }
809 goto out_set_opts;
810 }
811
812 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
813 if (fscontext_sid) {
814 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
815 if (rc)
816 goto out;
817
818 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
819 }
820
821 /*
822 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
823 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
824 * the superblock context if not already set.
825 */
826 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
827 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
828 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
829 }
830
831 if (context_sid) {
832 if (!fscontext_sid) {
833 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
834 cred);
835 if (rc)
836 goto out;
837 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
838 } else {
839 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
840 cred);
841 if (rc)
842 goto out;
843 }
844 if (!rootcontext_sid)
845 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
846
847 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
848 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
849 }
850
851 if (rootcontext_sid) {
852 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
853 cred);
854 if (rc)
855 goto out;
856
857 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
858 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
859 }
860
861 if (defcontext_sid) {
862 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
863 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
864 rc = -EINVAL;
865 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
866 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
867 goto out;
868 }
869
870 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
871 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
872 sbsec, cred);
873 if (rc)
874 goto out;
875 }
876
877 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
878 }
879
880out_set_opts:
881 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
882out:
883 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
884 return rc;
885out_double_mount:
886 rc = -EINVAL;
887 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
888 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
889 sb->s_type->name);
890 goto out;
891}
892
893static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
894 const struct super_block *newsb)
895{
896 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
897 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
898 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
899 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
900
901 if (oldflags != newflags)
902 goto mismatch;
903 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
904 goto mismatch;
905 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
906 goto mismatch;
907 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
908 goto mismatch;
909 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
910 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
911 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
912 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
913 goto mismatch;
914 }
915 return 0;
916mismatch:
917 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
918 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
919 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
920 return -EBUSY;
921}
922
923static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
924 struct super_block *newsb,
925 unsigned long kern_flags,
926 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
927{
928 int rc = 0;
929 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
930 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
931 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
932
933 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
934 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
935 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
936
937 /*
938 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
939 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
940 */
941 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
942 return 0;
943
944 /*
945 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
946 * place the results is not allowed.
947 */
948 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
949 return -EINVAL;
950
951 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
952 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
953
954 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
955 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
956 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
957 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
958 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
959 }
960
961 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
962
963 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
964
965 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
966 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
967 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
968
969 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
970 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
971 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
972 if (rc)
973 goto out;
974 }
975
976 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
977 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
978 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
979 }
980
981 if (set_context) {
982 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
983
984 if (!set_fscontext)
985 newsbsec->sid = sid;
986 if (!set_rootcontext) {
987 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
988 newisec->sid = sid;
989 }
990 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
991 }
992 if (set_rootcontext) {
993 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
994 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
995
996 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
997 }
998
999 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
1000out:
1001 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
1002 return rc;
1003}
1004
1005static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
1006{
1007 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
1008
1009 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
1010 return 0;
1011
1012 if (!opts) {
1013 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1014 if (!opts)
1015 return -ENOMEM;
1016 *mnt_opts = opts;
1017 }
1018 if (!s)
1019 return -ENOMEM;
1020 switch (token) {
1021 case Opt_context:
1022 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1023 goto Einval;
1024 opts->context = s;
1025 break;
1026 case Opt_fscontext:
1027 if (opts->fscontext)
1028 goto Einval;
1029 opts->fscontext = s;
1030 break;
1031 case Opt_rootcontext:
1032 if (opts->rootcontext)
1033 goto Einval;
1034 opts->rootcontext = s;
1035 break;
1036 case Opt_defcontext:
1037 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1038 goto Einval;
1039 opts->defcontext = s;
1040 break;
1041 }
1042 return 0;
1043Einval:
1044 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1045 return -EINVAL;
1046}
1047
1048static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
1049 void **mnt_opts)
1050{
1051 int token = Opt_error;
1052 int rc, i;
1053
1054 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
1055 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
1056 token = tokens[i].opt;
1057 break;
1058 }
1059 }
1060
1061 if (token == Opt_error)
1062 return -EINVAL;
1063
1064 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1065 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1066 if (!val) {
1067 rc = -ENOMEM;
1068 goto free_opt;
1069 }
1070 }
1071 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1072 if (unlikely(rc)) {
1073 kfree(val);
1074 goto free_opt;
1075 }
1076 return rc;
1077
1078free_opt:
1079 if (*mnt_opts) {
1080 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1081 *mnt_opts = NULL;
1082 }
1083 return rc;
1084}
1085
1086static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1087{
1088 char *context = NULL;
1089 u32 len;
1090 int rc;
1091
1092 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1093 &context, &len);
1094 if (!rc) {
1095 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1096
1097 seq_putc(m, '=');
1098 if (has_comma)
1099 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1100 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1101 if (has_comma)
1102 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1103 }
1104 kfree(context);
1105 return rc;
1106}
1107
1108static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1109{
1110 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1111 int rc;
1112
1113 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1114 return 0;
1115
1116 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1117 return 0;
1118
1119 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1120 seq_putc(m, ',');
1121 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1122 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1123 if (rc)
1124 return rc;
1125 }
1126 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1127 seq_putc(m, ',');
1128 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1129 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1130 if (rc)
1131 return rc;
1132 }
1133 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1134 seq_putc(m, ',');
1135 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1136 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1137 if (rc)
1138 return rc;
1139 }
1140 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1141 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1142 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1143 seq_putc(m, ',');
1144 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1145 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1146 if (rc)
1147 return rc;
1148 }
1149 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1150 seq_putc(m, ',');
1151 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1152 }
1153 return 0;
1154}
1155
1156static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1157{
1158 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1159 case S_IFSOCK:
1160 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1161 case S_IFLNK:
1162 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1163 case S_IFREG:
1164 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1165 case S_IFBLK:
1166 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1167 case S_IFDIR:
1168 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1169 case S_IFCHR:
1170 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1171 case S_IFIFO:
1172 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1173
1174 }
1175
1176 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1177}
1178
1179static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1180{
1181 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1182 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1183}
1184
1185static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1186{
1187 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1188}
1189
1190static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1191{
1192 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1193
1194 switch (family) {
1195 case PF_UNIX:
1196 switch (type) {
1197 case SOCK_STREAM:
1198 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1199 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1200 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1201 case SOCK_RAW:
1202 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1203 }
1204 break;
1205 case PF_INET:
1206 case PF_INET6:
1207 switch (type) {
1208 case SOCK_STREAM:
1209 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1210 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1211 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1212 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1213 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1214 else
1215 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1216 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1217 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1218 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1219 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1220 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1221 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1222 else
1223 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1224 case SOCK_DCCP:
1225 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1226 default:
1227 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1228 }
1229 break;
1230 case PF_NETLINK:
1231 switch (protocol) {
1232 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1233 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1234 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1235 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1236 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1237 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1238 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1239 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1240 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1241 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1242 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1243 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1244 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1245 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1246 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1247 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1248 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1249 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1250 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1251 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1252 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1253 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1254 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1255 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1256 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1257 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1258 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1259 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1260 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1261 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1262 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1263 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1264 default:
1265 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1266 }
1267 case PF_PACKET:
1268 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1269 case PF_KEY:
1270 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1271 case PF_APPLETALK:
1272 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1273 }
1274
1275 if (extsockclass) {
1276 switch (family) {
1277 case PF_AX25:
1278 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1279 case PF_IPX:
1280 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1281 case PF_NETROM:
1282 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1283 case PF_ATMPVC:
1284 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1285 case PF_X25:
1286 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1287 case PF_ROSE:
1288 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1289 case PF_DECnet:
1290 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1291 case PF_ATMSVC:
1292 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1293 case PF_RDS:
1294 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1295 case PF_IRDA:
1296 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1297 case PF_PPPOX:
1298 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1299 case PF_LLC:
1300 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1301 case PF_CAN:
1302 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1303 case PF_TIPC:
1304 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1305 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1306 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1307 case PF_IUCV:
1308 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1309 case PF_RXRPC:
1310 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1311 case PF_ISDN:
1312 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1313 case PF_PHONET:
1314 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1315 case PF_IEEE802154:
1316 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1317 case PF_CAIF:
1318 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1319 case PF_ALG:
1320 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1321 case PF_NFC:
1322 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1323 case PF_VSOCK:
1324 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1325 case PF_KCM:
1326 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1327 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1328 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1329 case PF_SMC:
1330 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1331 case PF_XDP:
1332 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1333#if PF_MAX > 45
1334#error New address family defined, please update this function.
1335#endif
1336 }
1337 }
1338
1339 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1340}
1341
1342static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1343 u16 tclass,
1344 u16 flags,
1345 u32 *sid)
1346{
1347 int rc;
1348 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1349 char *buffer, *path;
1350
1351 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1352 if (!buffer)
1353 return -ENOMEM;
1354
1355 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1356 if (IS_ERR(path))
1357 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1358 else {
1359 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1360 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1361 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1362 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1363 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1364 path[1] = '/';
1365 path++;
1366 }
1367 }
1368 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1369 path, tclass, sid);
1370 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1371 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1372 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1373 rc = 0;
1374 }
1375 }
1376 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1377 return rc;
1378}
1379
1380static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1381 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1382{
1383#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1384 char *context;
1385 unsigned int len;
1386 int rc;
1387
1388 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1389 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1390 if (!context)
1391 return -ENOMEM;
1392
1393 context[len] = '\0';
1394 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1395 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1396 kfree(context);
1397
1398 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1399 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1400 if (rc < 0)
1401 return rc;
1402
1403 len = rc;
1404 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1405 if (!context)
1406 return -ENOMEM;
1407
1408 context[len] = '\0';
1409 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1410 context, len);
1411 }
1412 if (rc < 0) {
1413 kfree(context);
1414 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1415 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1416 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1417 return rc;
1418 }
1419 *sid = def_sid;
1420 return 0;
1421 }
1422
1423 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1424 def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1425 if (rc) {
1426 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1427 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1428
1429 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1430 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1431 ino, dev, context);
1432 } else {
1433 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1434 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1435 }
1436 }
1437 kfree(context);
1438 return 0;
1439}
1440
1441/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1442static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1443{
1444 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1445 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1446 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1447 u16 sclass;
1448 struct dentry *dentry;
1449 int rc = 0;
1450
1451 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1452 return 0;
1453
1454 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1455 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1456 goto out_unlock;
1457
1458 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1459 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1460
1461 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1462 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1463 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1464 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1465 server is ready to handle calls. */
1466 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1467 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1468 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1469 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1470 goto out_unlock;
1471 }
1472
1473 sclass = isec->sclass;
1474 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1475 sid = isec->sid;
1476 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1477 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1478
1479 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1480 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1481 break;
1482 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1483 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1484 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1485 break;
1486 }
1487 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1488 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1489 if (opt_dentry) {
1490 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1491 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1492 } else {
1493 /*
1494 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1495 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1496 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1497 * two, depending upon that...
1498 */
1499 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1500 if (!dentry)
1501 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1502 }
1503 if (!dentry) {
1504 /*
1505 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1506 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1507 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1508 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1509 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1510 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1511 * be used again by userspace.
1512 */
1513 goto out_invalid;
1514 }
1515
1516 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1517 &sid);
1518 dput(dentry);
1519 if (rc)
1520 goto out;
1521 break;
1522 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1523 sid = task_sid;
1524 break;
1525 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1526 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1527 sid = sbsec->sid;
1528
1529 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1530 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1531 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1532 if (rc)
1533 goto out;
1534 break;
1535 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1536 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1537 break;
1538 default:
1539 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1540 sid = sbsec->sid;
1541
1542 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1543 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1544 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1545 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1546 * procfs inodes */
1547 if (opt_dentry) {
1548 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1549 * d_splice_alias. */
1550 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1551 } else {
1552 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1553 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1554 * a connected one, so try that first.
1555 */
1556 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1557 if (!dentry)
1558 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1559 }
1560 /*
1561 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1562 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1563 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1564 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1565 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1566 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1567 * could be used again by userspace.
1568 */
1569 if (!dentry)
1570 goto out_invalid;
1571 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1572 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1573 if (rc) {
1574 dput(dentry);
1575 goto out;
1576 }
1577
1578 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1579 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1580 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1581 sid, &sid);
1582 if (rc) {
1583 dput(dentry);
1584 goto out;
1585 }
1586 }
1587 dput(dentry);
1588 }
1589 break;
1590 }
1591
1592out:
1593 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1594 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1595 if (rc) {
1596 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1597 goto out_unlock;
1598 }
1599 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1600 isec->sid = sid;
1601 }
1602
1603out_unlock:
1604 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1605 return rc;
1606
1607out_invalid:
1608 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1609 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1610 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1611 isec->sid = sid;
1612 }
1613 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1614 return 0;
1615}
1616
1617/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1618static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1619{
1620 u32 perm = 0;
1621
1622 switch (sig) {
1623 case SIGCHLD:
1624 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1625 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1626 break;
1627 case SIGKILL:
1628 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1629 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1630 break;
1631 case SIGSTOP:
1632 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1633 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1634 break;
1635 default:
1636 /* All other signals. */
1637 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1638 break;
1639 }
1640
1641 return perm;
1642}
1643
1644#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1645#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1646#endif
1647
1648/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1649static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1650 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1651{
1652 struct common_audit_data ad;
1653 struct av_decision avd;
1654 u16 sclass;
1655 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1656 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1657 int rc;
1658
1659 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1660 ad.u.cap = cap;
1661
1662 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1663 case 0:
1664 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1665 break;
1666 case 1:
1667 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1668 break;
1669 default:
1670 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1671 BUG();
1672 return -EINVAL;
1673 }
1674
1675 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1676 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1677 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1678 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1679 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1680 if (rc2)
1681 return rc2;
1682 }
1683 return rc;
1684}
1685
1686/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1687 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1688 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1689static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1690 struct inode *inode,
1691 u32 perms,
1692 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1693{
1694 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1695 u32 sid;
1696
1697 validate_creds(cred);
1698
1699 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1700 return 0;
1701
1702 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1703 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1704
1705 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1706 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1707}
1708
1709/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1710 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1711 pathname if needed. */
1712static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1713 struct dentry *dentry,
1714 u32 av)
1715{
1716 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1717 struct common_audit_data ad;
1718
1719 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1720 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1721 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1722 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1723}
1724
1725/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1726 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1727 pathname if needed. */
1728static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1729 const struct path *path,
1730 u32 av)
1731{
1732 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1733 struct common_audit_data ad;
1734
1735 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1736 ad.u.path = *path;
1737 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1738 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1739}
1740
1741/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1742static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1743 struct file *file,
1744 u32 av)
1745{
1746 struct common_audit_data ad;
1747
1748 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1749 ad.u.file = file;
1750 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1751}
1752
1753#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1754static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1755#endif
1756
1757/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1758 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1759 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1760 check a particular permission to the file.
1761 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1762 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1763 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1764 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1765static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1766 struct file *file,
1767 u32 av)
1768{
1769 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1770 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1771 struct common_audit_data ad;
1772 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1773 int rc;
1774
1775 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1776 ad.u.file = file;
1777
1778 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1779 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1780 sid, fsec->sid,
1781 SECCLASS_FD,
1782 FD__USE,
1783 &ad);
1784 if (rc)
1785 goto out;
1786 }
1787
1788#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1789 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1790 if (rc)
1791 return rc;
1792#endif
1793
1794 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1795 rc = 0;
1796 if (av)
1797 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1798
1799out:
1800 return rc;
1801}
1802
1803/*
1804 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1805 */
1806static int
1807selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1808 struct inode *dir,
1809 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1810 u32 *_new_isid)
1811{
1812 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1813 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1814
1815 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1816 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1817 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1818 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1819 tsec->create_sid) {
1820 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1821 } else {
1822 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1823 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1824 dsec->sid, tclass,
1825 name, _new_isid);
1826 }
1827
1828 return 0;
1829}
1830
1831/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1832static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1833 struct dentry *dentry,
1834 u16 tclass)
1835{
1836 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1837 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1838 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1839 u32 sid, newsid;
1840 struct common_audit_data ad;
1841 int rc;
1842
1843 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1844 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1845
1846 sid = tsec->sid;
1847
1848 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1849 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1850
1851 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1852 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1853 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1854 &ad);
1855 if (rc)
1856 return rc;
1857
1858 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1859 &newsid);
1860 if (rc)
1861 return rc;
1862
1863 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1864 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1865 if (rc)
1866 return rc;
1867
1868 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1869 newsid, sbsec->sid,
1870 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1871 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1872}
1873
1874#define MAY_LINK 0
1875#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1876#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1877
1878/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1879static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1880 struct dentry *dentry,
1881 int kind)
1882
1883{
1884 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1885 struct common_audit_data ad;
1886 u32 sid = current_sid();
1887 u32 av;
1888 int rc;
1889
1890 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1891 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1892
1893 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1894 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1895
1896 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1897 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1898 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1899 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1900 if (rc)
1901 return rc;
1902
1903 switch (kind) {
1904 case MAY_LINK:
1905 av = FILE__LINK;
1906 break;
1907 case MAY_UNLINK:
1908 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1909 break;
1910 case MAY_RMDIR:
1911 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1912 break;
1913 default:
1914 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1915 __func__, kind);
1916 return 0;
1917 }
1918
1919 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1920 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1921 return rc;
1922}
1923
1924static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1925 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1926 struct inode *new_dir,
1927 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1928{
1929 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1930 struct common_audit_data ad;
1931 u32 sid = current_sid();
1932 u32 av;
1933 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1934 int rc;
1935
1936 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1937 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1938 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1939 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1940
1941 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1942
1943 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1944 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1945 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1946 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1947 if (rc)
1948 return rc;
1949 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1950 sid, old_isec->sid,
1951 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1952 if (rc)
1953 return rc;
1954 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1955 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1956 sid, old_isec->sid,
1957 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1958 if (rc)
1959 return rc;
1960 }
1961
1962 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1963 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1964 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1965 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1966 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1967 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1968 if (rc)
1969 return rc;
1970 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1971 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1972 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1973 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1974 sid, new_isec->sid,
1975 new_isec->sclass,
1976 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1977 if (rc)
1978 return rc;
1979 }
1980
1981 return 0;
1982}
1983
1984/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1985static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1986 struct super_block *sb,
1987 u32 perms,
1988 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1989{
1990 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1991 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1992
1993 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1994 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1995 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1996}
1997
1998/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1999static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
2000{
2001 u32 av = 0;
2002
2003 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
2004 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2005 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2006 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2007 av |= FILE__READ;
2008
2009 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
2010 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2011 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2012 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2013
2014 } else {
2015 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2016 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
2017 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2018 av |= DIR__WRITE;
2019 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2020 av |= DIR__READ;
2021 }
2022
2023 return av;
2024}
2025
2026/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2027static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2028{
2029 u32 av = 0;
2030
2031 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2032 av |= FILE__READ;
2033 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2034 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2035 av |= FILE__APPEND;
2036 else
2037 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2038 }
2039 if (!av) {
2040 /*
2041 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2042 */
2043 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2044 }
2045
2046 return av;
2047}
2048
2049/*
2050 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
2051 * open permission.
2052 */
2053static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2054{
2055 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2056 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2057
2058 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2059 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2060 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2061
2062 return av;
2063}
2064
2065/* Hook functions begin here. */
2066
2067static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2068{
2069 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2070 current_sid(), task_sid_binder(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2071 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2072}
2073
2074static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2075 struct task_struct *to)
2076{
2077 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2078 u32 fromsid = task_sid_binder(from);
2079 int rc;
2080
2081 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2082 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2083 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2084 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2085 if (rc)
2086 return rc;
2087 }
2088
2089 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, task_sid_binder(to),
2090 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2091}
2092
2093static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2094 struct task_struct *to)
2095{
2096 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2097 task_sid_binder(from), task_sid_binder(to),
2098 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2099 NULL);
2100}
2101
2102static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2103 struct task_struct *to,
2104 struct file *file)
2105{
2106 u32 sid = task_sid_binder(to);
2107 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2108 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2109 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2110 struct common_audit_data ad;
2111 int rc;
2112
2113 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2114 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2115
2116 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2117 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2118 sid, fsec->sid,
2119 SECCLASS_FD,
2120 FD__USE,
2121 &ad);
2122 if (rc)
2123 return rc;
2124 }
2125
2126#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2127 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2128 if (rc)
2129 return rc;
2130#endif
2131
2132 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2133 return 0;
2134
2135 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2136 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2137 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2138 &ad);
2139}
2140
2141static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2142 unsigned int mode)
2143{
2144 u32 sid = current_sid();
2145 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2146
2147 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2148 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2149 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2150
2151 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2152 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2153}
2154
2155static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2156{
2157 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2158 task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2159 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2160}
2161
2162static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2163 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2164{
2165 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2166 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2167 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2168}
2169
2170static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2171 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2172 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2173 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2174{
2175 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2176 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2177 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2178}
2179
2180/*
2181 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2182 * which was removed).
2183 *
2184 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2185 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2186 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2187 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2188 */
2189
2190static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2191 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2192{
2193 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2194}
2195
2196static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2197{
2198 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2199 int rc = 0;
2200
2201 if (!sb)
2202 return 0;
2203
2204 switch (cmds) {
2205 case Q_SYNC:
2206 case Q_QUOTAON:
2207 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2208 case Q_SETINFO:
2209 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2210 case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2211 case Q_XQUOTAON:
2212 case Q_XSETQLIM:
2213 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2214 break;
2215 case Q_GETFMT:
2216 case Q_GETINFO:
2217 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2218 case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2219 case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2220 case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2221 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2222 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2223 break;
2224 default:
2225 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2226 break;
2227 }
2228 return rc;
2229}
2230
2231static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2232{
2233 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2234
2235 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2236}
2237
2238static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2239{
2240 switch (type) {
2241 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2242 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2243 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2244 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2245 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2246 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2247 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2248 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2249 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2250 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2251 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2252 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2253 NULL);
2254 }
2255 /* All other syslog types */
2256 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2257 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2258 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2259}
2260
2261/*
2262 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2263 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2264 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2265 *
2266 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2267 * processes that allocate mappings.
2268 */
2269static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2270{
2271 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2272
2273 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2274 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2275 if (rc == 0)
2276 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2277
2278 return cap_sys_admin;
2279}
2280
2281/* binprm security operations */
2282
2283static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2284{
2285 u32 sid = 0;
2286 struct task_struct *tracer;
2287
2288 rcu_read_lock();
2289 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2290 if (tracer)
2291 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2292 rcu_read_unlock();
2293
2294 return sid;
2295}
2296
2297static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2298 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2299 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2300{
2301 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2302 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2303 int rc;
2304 u32 av;
2305
2306 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2307 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2308
2309 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2310 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2311
2312 /*
2313 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2314 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2315 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2316 * the old and new contexts.
2317 */
2318 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2319 av = 0;
2320 if (nnp)
2321 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2322 if (nosuid)
2323 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2324 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2325 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2326 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2327 if (!rc)
2328 return 0;
2329 }
2330
2331 /*
2332 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2333 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2334 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2335 */
2336 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2337 new_tsec->sid);
2338 if (!rc)
2339 return 0;
2340
2341 /*
2342 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2343 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2344 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2345 */
2346 if (nnp)
2347 return -EPERM;
2348 return -EACCES;
2349}
2350
2351static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2352{
2353 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2354 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2355 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2356 struct common_audit_data ad;
2357 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2358 int rc;
2359
2360 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2361 * the script interpreter */
2362
2363 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2364 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2365 isec = inode_security(inode);
2366
2367 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2368 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2369 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2370
2371 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2372 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2373 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2374 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2375
2376 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2377 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2378 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2379 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2380
2381 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2382 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2383 if (rc)
2384 return rc;
2385 } else {
2386 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2387 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2388 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2389 &new_tsec->sid);
2390 if (rc)
2391 return rc;
2392
2393 /*
2394 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2395 * transition.
2396 */
2397 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2398 if (rc)
2399 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2400 }
2401
2402 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2403 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2404
2405 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2406 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2407 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2408 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2409 if (rc)
2410 return rc;
2411 } else {
2412 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2413 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2414 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2415 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2416 if (rc)
2417 return rc;
2418
2419 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2420 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2421 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2422 if (rc)
2423 return rc;
2424
2425 /* Check for shared state */
2426 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2427 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2428 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2429 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2430 NULL);
2431 if (rc)
2432 return -EPERM;
2433 }
2434
2435 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2436 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2437 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2438 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2439 if (ptsid != 0) {
2440 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2441 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2442 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2443 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2444 if (rc)
2445 return -EPERM;
2446 }
2447 }
2448
2449 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2450 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2451
2452 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2453 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2454 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2455 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2456 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2457 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2458 NULL);
2459 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2460 }
2461
2462 return 0;
2463}
2464
2465static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2466{
2467 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2468}
2469
2470/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2471static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2472 struct files_struct *files)
2473{
2474 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2475 struct tty_struct *tty;
2476 int drop_tty = 0;
2477 unsigned n;
2478
2479 tty = get_current_tty();
2480 if (tty) {
2481 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2482 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2483 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2484
2485 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2486 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2487 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2488 open file may belong to another process and we are
2489 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2490 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2491 struct tty_file_private, list);
2492 file = file_priv->file;
2493 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2494 drop_tty = 1;
2495 }
2496 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2497 tty_kref_put(tty);
2498 }
2499 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2500 if (drop_tty)
2501 no_tty();
2502
2503 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2504 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2505 if (!n) /* none found? */
2506 return;
2507
2508 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2509 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2510 devnull = NULL;
2511 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2512 do {
2513 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2514 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2515 if (devnull)
2516 fput(devnull);
2517}
2518
2519/*
2520 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2521 */
2522static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2523{
2524 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2525 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2526 int rc, i;
2527
2528 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2529 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2530 return;
2531
2532 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2533 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2534
2535 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2536 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2537
2538 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2539 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2540 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2541 *
2542 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2543 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2544 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2545 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2546 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2547 */
2548 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2549 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2550 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2551 if (rc) {
2552 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2553 task_lock(current);
2554 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2555 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2556 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2557 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2558 }
2559 task_unlock(current);
2560 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2561 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2562 }
2563}
2564
2565/*
2566 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2567 * due to exec
2568 */
2569static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2570{
2571 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2572 u32 osid, sid;
2573 int rc;
2574
2575 osid = tsec->osid;
2576 sid = tsec->sid;
2577
2578 if (sid == osid)
2579 return;
2580
2581 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2582 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2583 * flush and unblock signals.
2584 *
2585 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2586 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2587 */
2588 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2589 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2590 if (rc) {
2591 clear_itimer();
2592
2593 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2594 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2595 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2596 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2597 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2598 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2599 recalc_sigpending();
2600 }
2601 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2602 }
2603
2604 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2605 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2606 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2607 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2608 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2609}
2610
2611/* superblock security operations */
2612
2613static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2614{
2615 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2616
2617 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2618 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2619 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2620 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2621 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2622 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2623
2624 return 0;
2625}
2626
2627static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2628{
2629 bool open_quote = false;
2630 int len;
2631 char c;
2632
2633 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2634 if (c == '"')
2635 open_quote = !open_quote;
2636 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2637 break;
2638 }
2639 return len;
2640}
2641
2642static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2643{
2644 char *from = options;
2645 char *to = options;
2646 bool first = true;
2647 int rc;
2648
2649 while (1) {
2650 int len = opt_len(from);
2651 int token;
2652 char *arg = NULL;
2653
2654 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2655
2656 if (token != Opt_error) {
2657 char *p, *q;
2658
2659 /* strip quotes */
2660 if (arg) {
2661 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2662 char c = *p;
2663 if (c != '"')
2664 *q++ = c;
2665 }
2666 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2667 if (!arg) {
2668 rc = -ENOMEM;
2669 goto free_opt;
2670 }
2671 }
2672 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2673 if (unlikely(rc)) {
2674 kfree(arg);
2675 goto free_opt;
2676 }
2677 } else {
2678 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2679 from--;
2680 len++;
2681 }
2682 if (to != from)
2683 memmove(to, from, len);
2684 to += len;
2685 first = false;
2686 }
2687 if (!from[len])
2688 break;
2689 from += len + 1;
2690 }
2691 *to = '\0';
2692 return 0;
2693
2694free_opt:
2695 if (*mnt_opts) {
2696 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2697 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2698 }
2699 return rc;
2700}
2701
2702static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2703{
2704 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2705 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2706 u32 sid;
2707 int rc;
2708
2709 /*
2710 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2711 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2712 */
2713 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2714 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2715
2716 /*
2717 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2718 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2719 */
2720 if (!opts)
2721 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2722
2723 if (opts->fscontext) {
2724 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2725 if (rc)
2726 return 1;
2727 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2728 return 1;
2729 }
2730 if (opts->context) {
2731 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2732 if (rc)
2733 return 1;
2734 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2735 return 1;
2736 }
2737 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2738 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2739
2740 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2741 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2742 if (rc)
2743 return 1;
2744 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2745 return 1;
2746 }
2747 if (opts->defcontext) {
2748 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2749 if (rc)
2750 return 1;
2751 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2752 return 1;
2753 }
2754 return 0;
2755}
2756
2757static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2758{
2759 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2760 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2761 u32 sid;
2762 int rc;
2763
2764 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2765 return 0;
2766
2767 if (!opts)
2768 return 0;
2769
2770 if (opts->fscontext) {
2771 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2772 if (rc)
2773 return rc;
2774 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2775 goto out_bad_option;
2776 }
2777 if (opts->context) {
2778 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2779 if (rc)
2780 return rc;
2781 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2782 goto out_bad_option;
2783 }
2784 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2785 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2786 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2787 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2788 if (rc)
2789 return rc;
2790 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2791 goto out_bad_option;
2792 }
2793 if (opts->defcontext) {
2794 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2795 if (rc)
2796 return rc;
2797 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2798 goto out_bad_option;
2799 }
2800 return 0;
2801
2802out_bad_option:
2803 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2804 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2805 sb->s_type->name);
2806 return -EINVAL;
2807}
2808
2809static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2810{
2811 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2812 struct common_audit_data ad;
2813
2814 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2815 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2816 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2817}
2818
2819static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2820{
2821 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2822 struct common_audit_data ad;
2823
2824 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2825 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2826 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2827}
2828
2829static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2830 const struct path *path,
2831 const char *type,
2832 unsigned long flags,
2833 void *data)
2834{
2835 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2836
2837 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2838 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2839 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2840 else
2841 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2842}
2843
2844static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2845 const struct path *to_path)
2846{
2847 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2848
2849 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2850}
2851
2852static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2853{
2854 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2855
2856 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2857 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2858}
2859
2860static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2861 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2862{
2863 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2864 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2865
2866 if (!src)
2867 return 0;
2868
2869 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2870 if (!fc->security)
2871 return -ENOMEM;
2872
2873 opts = fc->security;
2874
2875 if (src->fscontext) {
2876 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2877 if (!opts->fscontext)
2878 return -ENOMEM;
2879 }
2880 if (src->context) {
2881 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2882 if (!opts->context)
2883 return -ENOMEM;
2884 }
2885 if (src->rootcontext) {
2886 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2887 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2888 return -ENOMEM;
2889 }
2890 if (src->defcontext) {
2891 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2892 if (!opts->defcontext)
2893 return -ENOMEM;
2894 }
2895 return 0;
2896}
2897
2898static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2899 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2900 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2901 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2902 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2903 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2904 {}
2905};
2906
2907static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2908 struct fs_parameter *param)
2909{
2910 struct fs_parse_result result;
2911 int opt, rc;
2912
2913 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2914 if (opt < 0)
2915 return opt;
2916
2917 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2918 if (!rc) {
2919 param->string = NULL;
2920 rc = 1;
2921 }
2922 return rc;
2923}
2924
2925/* inode security operations */
2926
2927static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2928{
2929 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2930 u32 sid = current_sid();
2931
2932 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2933 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2934 isec->inode = inode;
2935 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2936 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2937 isec->task_sid = sid;
2938 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2939
2940 return 0;
2941}
2942
2943static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2944{
2945 inode_free_security(inode);
2946}
2947
2948static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2949 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2950 u32 *ctxlen)
2951{
2952 u32 newsid;
2953 int rc;
2954
2955 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2956 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2957 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2958 &newsid);
2959 if (rc)
2960 return rc;
2961
2962 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2963 ctxlen);
2964}
2965
2966static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2967 struct qstr *name,
2968 const struct cred *old,
2969 struct cred *new)
2970{
2971 u32 newsid;
2972 int rc;
2973 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2974
2975 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2976 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2977 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2978 &newsid);
2979 if (rc)
2980 return rc;
2981
2982 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2983 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2984 return 0;
2985}
2986
2987static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2988 const struct qstr *qstr,
2989 const char **name,
2990 void **value, size_t *len)
2991{
2992 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2993 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2994 u32 newsid, clen;
2995 int rc;
2996 char *context;
2997
2998 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2999
3000 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3001
3002 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
3003 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
3004 &newsid);
3005 if (rc)
3006 return rc;
3007
3008 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
3009 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
3010 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3011 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3012 isec->sid = newsid;
3013 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3014 }
3015
3016 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3017 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3018 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3019
3020 if (name)
3021 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
3022
3023 if (value && len) {
3024 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3025 &context, &clen);
3026 if (rc)
3027 return rc;
3028 *value = context;
3029 *len = clen;
3030 }
3031
3032 return 0;
3033}
3034
3035static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
3036 const struct qstr *name,
3037 const struct inode *context_inode)
3038{
3039 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3040 struct common_audit_data ad;
3041 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3042 int rc;
3043
3044 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
3045 return 0;
3046
3047 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3048
3049 /*
3050 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
3051 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
3052 * untouched.
3053 */
3054
3055 if (context_inode) {
3056 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
3057 selinux_inode(context_inode);
3058 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
3059 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized");
3060 return -EACCES;
3061 }
3062
3063 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
3064 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
3065 } else {
3066 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
3067 rc = security_transition_sid(
3068 &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3069 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
3070 if (rc)
3071 return rc;
3072 }
3073
3074 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3075 /*
3076 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
3077 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
3078 */
3079
3080 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3081 ad.u.inode = inode;
3082
3083 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3084 tsec->sid,
3085 isec->sid,
3086 isec->sclass,
3087 FILE__CREATE,
3088 &ad);
3089}
3090
3091static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3092{
3093 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3094}
3095
3096static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3097{
3098 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3099}
3100
3101static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3102{
3103 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3104}
3105
3106static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3107{
3108 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3109}
3110
3111static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3112{
3113 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3114}
3115
3116static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3117{
3118 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3119}
3120
3121static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3122{
3123 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3124}
3125
3126static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3127 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3128{
3129 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3130}
3131
3132static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3133{
3134 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3135
3136 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3137}
3138
3139static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3140 bool rcu)
3141{
3142 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3143 struct common_audit_data ad;
3144 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3145 u32 sid;
3146
3147 validate_creds(cred);
3148
3149 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3150 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3151 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3152 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3153 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3154 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3155
3156 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3157 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3158}
3159
3160static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3161 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3162 int result)
3163{
3164 struct common_audit_data ad;
3165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3166
3167 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3168 ad.u.inode = inode;
3169
3170 return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3171 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3172 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3173}
3174
3175static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3176{
3177 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3178 u32 perms;
3179 bool from_access;
3180 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3181 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3182 u32 sid;
3183 struct av_decision avd;
3184 int rc, rc2;
3185 u32 audited, denied;
3186
3187 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3188 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3189
3190 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3191 if (!mask)
3192 return 0;
3193
3194 validate_creds(cred);
3195
3196 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3197 return 0;
3198
3199 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3200
3201 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3202 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3203 if (IS_ERR(isec))
3204 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3205
3206 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3207 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3208 &avd);
3209 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3210 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3211 &denied);
3212 if (likely(!audited))
3213 return rc;
3214
3215 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3216 if (rc2)
3217 return rc2;
3218 return rc;
3219}
3220
3221static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3222{
3223 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3224 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3225 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3226 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3227
3228 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3229 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3230 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3231 ATTR_FORCE);
3232 if (!ia_valid)
3233 return 0;
3234 }
3235
3236 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3237 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3238 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3239
3240 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3241 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3242 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3243 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3244 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3245
3246 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3247}
3248
3249static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3250{
3251 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3252}
3253
3254static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3255{
3256 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3257 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3258
3259 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3260 return false;
3261 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3262 return false;
3263 return true;
3264}
3265
3266static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3267 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3268 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3269{
3270 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3271 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3272 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3273 struct common_audit_data ad;
3274 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3275 int rc = 0;
3276
3277 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3278 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3279 if (rc)
3280 return rc;
3281
3282 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3283 ordinary setattr permission. */
3284 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3285 }
3286
3287 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3288 return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3289
3290 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3291 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3292 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3293
3294 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
3295 return -EPERM;
3296
3297 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3298 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3299
3300 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3301 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3302 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3303 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3304 if (rc)
3305 return rc;
3306
3307 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3308 GFP_KERNEL);
3309 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3310 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3311 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3312 size_t audit_size;
3313
3314 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3315 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3316 if (value) {
3317 const char *str = value;
3318
3319 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3320 audit_size = size - 1;
3321 else
3322 audit_size = size;
3323 } else {
3324 audit_size = 0;
3325 }
3326 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3327 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3328 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3329 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3330 audit_log_end(ab);
3331
3332 return rc;
3333 }
3334 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3335 size, &newsid);
3336 }
3337 if (rc)
3338 return rc;
3339
3340 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3341 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3342 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3343 if (rc)
3344 return rc;
3345
3346 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3347 sid, isec->sclass);
3348 if (rc)
3349 return rc;
3350
3351 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3352 newsid,
3353 sbsec->sid,
3354 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3355 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3356 &ad);
3357}
3358
3359static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3360 const void *value, size_t size,
3361 int flags)
3362{
3363 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3364 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3365 u32 newsid;
3366 int rc;
3367
3368 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3369 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3370 return;
3371 }
3372
3373 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3374 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3375 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3376 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3377 * we've since initialized.
3378 */
3379 return;
3380 }
3381
3382 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3383 &newsid);
3384 if (rc) {
3385 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3386 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3387 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3388 return;
3389 }
3390
3391 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3392 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3393 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3394 isec->sid = newsid;
3395 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3396 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3397
3398 return;
3399}
3400
3401static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3402{
3403 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3404
3405 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3406}
3407
3408static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3409{
3410 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3411
3412 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3413}
3414
3415static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3416 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3417{
3418 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3419 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
3420 if (rc)
3421 return rc;
3422
3423 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3424 ordinary setattr permission. */
3425 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3426 }
3427
3428 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3429 return 0;
3430
3431 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3432 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3433 return -EACCES;
3434}
3435
3436static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3437 unsigned int obj_type)
3438{
3439 int ret;
3440 u32 perm;
3441
3442 struct common_audit_data ad;
3443
3444 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3445 ad.u.path = *path;
3446
3447 /*
3448 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3449 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3450 */
3451 switch (obj_type) {
3452 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3453 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3454 break;
3455 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3456 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3457 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3458 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3459 if (ret)
3460 return ret;
3461 break;
3462 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3463 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3464 break;
3465 default:
3466 return -EINVAL;
3467 }
3468
3469 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3470 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3471 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3472
3473 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3474 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3475 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3476
3477 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3478}
3479
3480/*
3481 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3482 *
3483 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3484 */
3485static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3486 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3487 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3488{
3489 u32 size;
3490 int error;
3491 char *context = NULL;
3492 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3493
3494 /*
3495 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3496 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3497 */
3498 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3499 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3500 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3501
3502 /*
3503 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3504 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3505 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3506 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3507 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3508 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3509 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3510 */
3511 isec = inode_security(inode);
3512 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3513 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3514 isec->sid, &context,
3515 &size);
3516 else
3517 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3518 &context, &size);
3519 if (error)
3520 return error;
3521 error = size;
3522 if (alloc) {
3523 *buffer = context;
3524 goto out_nofree;
3525 }
3526 kfree(context);
3527out_nofree:
3528 return error;
3529}
3530
3531static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3532 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3533{
3534 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3535 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3536 u32 newsid;
3537 int rc;
3538
3539 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3540 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3541
3542 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3544 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3545
3546 if (!value || !size)
3547 return -EACCES;
3548
3549 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3550 GFP_KERNEL);
3551 if (rc)
3552 return rc;
3553
3554 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3555 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3556 isec->sid = newsid;
3557 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3558 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3559 return 0;
3560}
3561
3562static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3563{
3564 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3565
3566 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3567 return 0;
3568
3569 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3570 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3571 return len;
3572}
3573
3574static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3575{
3576 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3577 *secid = isec->sid;
3578}
3579
3580static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3581{
3582 u32 sid;
3583 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3584 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3585
3586 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3587 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3588 if (!new_creds)
3589 return -ENOMEM;
3590 }
3591
3592 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3593 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3594 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3595 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3596 *new = new_creds;
3597 return 0;
3598}
3599
3600static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3601{
3602 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3603 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3604 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3605 */
3606 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3607 return 1; /* Discard */
3608 /*
3609 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3610 * by selinux.
3611 */
3612 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3613}
3614
3615/* kernfs node operations */
3616
3617static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3618 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3619{
3620 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3621 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3622 int rc;
3623 char *context;
3624
3625 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3626 if (rc == -ENODATA)
3627 return 0;
3628 else if (rc < 0)
3629 return rc;
3630
3631 clen = (u32)rc;
3632 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3633 if (!context)
3634 return -ENOMEM;
3635
3636 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3637 if (rc < 0) {
3638 kfree(context);
3639 return rc;
3640 }
3641
3642 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3643 GFP_KERNEL);
3644 kfree(context);
3645 if (rc)
3646 return rc;
3647
3648 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3649 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3650 } else {
3651 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3652 struct qstr q;
3653
3654 q.name = kn->name;
3655 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3656
3657 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3658 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3659 &newsid);
3660 if (rc)
3661 return rc;
3662 }
3663
3664 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3665 &context, &clen);
3666 if (rc)
3667 return rc;
3668
3669 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3670 XATTR_CREATE);
3671 kfree(context);
3672 return rc;
3673}
3674
3675
3676/* file security operations */
3677
3678static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3679{
3680 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3681 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3682
3683 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3684 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3685 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3686
3687 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3688 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3689}
3690
3691static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3692{
3693 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3694 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3695 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3696 u32 sid = current_sid();
3697
3698 if (!mask)
3699 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3700 return 0;
3701
3702 isec = inode_security(inode);
3703 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3704 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3705 /* No change since file_open check. */
3706 return 0;
3707
3708 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3709}
3710
3711static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3712{
3713 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3714 u32 sid = current_sid();
3715
3716 fsec->sid = sid;
3717 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3718
3719 return 0;
3720}
3721
3722/*
3723 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3724 * operation to an inode.
3725 */
3726static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3727 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3728{
3729 struct common_audit_data ad;
3730 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3731 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3732 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3733 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3734 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3735 int rc;
3736 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3737 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3738
3739 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3740 ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3741 ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3742 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3743
3744 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3745 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3746 ssid, fsec->sid,
3747 SECCLASS_FD,
3748 FD__USE,
3749 &ad);
3750 if (rc)
3751 goto out;
3752 }
3753
3754 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3755 return 0;
3756
3757 isec = inode_security(inode);
3758 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3759 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3760 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3761out:
3762 return rc;
3763}
3764
3765static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3766 unsigned long arg)
3767{
3768 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3769 int error = 0;
3770
3771 switch (cmd) {
3772 case FIONREAD:
3773 case FIBMAP:
3774 case FIGETBSZ:
3775 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3776 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3777 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3778 break;
3779
3780 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3781 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3782 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3783 break;
3784
3785 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3786 case FIONBIO:
3787 case FIOASYNC:
3788 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3789 break;
3790
3791 case KDSKBENT:
3792 case KDSKBSENT:
3793 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3794 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3795 break;
3796
3797 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3798 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3799 */
3800 default:
3801 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3802 }
3803 return error;
3804}
3805
3806static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3807
3808static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3809{
3810 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3811 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3812 int rc = 0;
3813
3814 if (default_noexec &&
3815 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3816 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3817 /*
3818 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3819 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3820 * This has an additional check.
3821 */
3822 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3823 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3824 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3825 if (rc)
3826 goto error;
3827 }
3828
3829 if (file) {
3830 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3831 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3832
3833 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3834 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3835 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3836
3837 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3838 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3839
3840 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3841 }
3842
3843error:
3844 return rc;
3845}
3846
3847static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3848{
3849 int rc = 0;
3850
3851 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3852 u32 sid = current_sid();
3853 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3854 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3855 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3856 }
3857
3858 return rc;
3859}
3860
3861static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3862 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3863{
3864 struct common_audit_data ad;
3865 int rc;
3866
3867 if (file) {
3868 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3869 ad.u.file = file;
3870 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3871 FILE__MAP, &ad);
3872 if (rc)
3873 return rc;
3874 }
3875
3876 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3877 prot = reqprot;
3878
3879 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3880 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3881}
3882
3883static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3884 unsigned long reqprot,
3885 unsigned long prot)
3886{
3887 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3888 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3889
3890 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3891 prot = reqprot;
3892
3893 if (default_noexec &&
3894 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3895 int rc = 0;
3896 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3897 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3898 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3899 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3900 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3901 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3902 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3903 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3904 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3905 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3906 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3907 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3908 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3909 /*
3910 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3911 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3912 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3913 * modified content. This typically should only
3914 * occur for text relocations.
3915 */
3916 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3917 }
3918 if (rc)
3919 return rc;
3920 }
3921
3922 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3923}
3924
3925static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3926{
3927 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3928
3929 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3930}
3931
3932static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3933 unsigned long arg)
3934{
3935 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3936 int err = 0;
3937
3938 switch (cmd) {
3939 case F_SETFL:
3940 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3941 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3942 break;
3943 }
3944 fallthrough;
3945 case F_SETOWN:
3946 case F_SETSIG:
3947 case F_GETFL:
3948 case F_GETOWN:
3949 case F_GETSIG:
3950 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3951 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3952 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3953 break;
3954 case F_GETLK:
3955 case F_SETLK:
3956 case F_SETLKW:
3957 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3958 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3959 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3960#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3961 case F_GETLK64:
3962 case F_SETLK64:
3963 case F_SETLKW64:
3964#endif
3965 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3966 break;
3967 }
3968
3969 return err;
3970}
3971
3972static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3973{
3974 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3975
3976 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3977 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3978}
3979
3980static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3981 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3982{
3983 struct file *file;
3984 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3985 u32 perm;
3986 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3987
3988 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3989 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3990
3991 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3992
3993 if (!signum)
3994 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3995 else
3996 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3997
3998 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3999 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
4000 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4001}
4002
4003static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
4004{
4005 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
4006
4007 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
4008}
4009
4010static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
4011{
4012 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4013 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4014
4015 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4016 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4017 /*
4018 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
4019 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
4020 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
4021 * Task label is already saved in the file security
4022 * struct as its SID.
4023 */
4024 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
4025 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
4026 /*
4027 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
4028 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
4029 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
4030 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
4031 * new inode label or new policy.
4032 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
4033 */
4034 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
4035}
4036
4037/* task security operations */
4038
4039static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
4040 unsigned long clone_flags)
4041{
4042 u32 sid = current_sid();
4043
4044 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4045 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
4046}
4047
4048/*
4049 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
4050 */
4051static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
4052 gfp_t gfp)
4053{
4054 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4055 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4056
4057 *tsec = *old_tsec;
4058 return 0;
4059}
4060
4061/*
4062 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
4063 */
4064static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
4065{
4066 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4067 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4068
4069 *tsec = *old_tsec;
4070}
4071
4072static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
4073{
4074 *secid = cred_sid(c);
4075}
4076
4077/*
4078 * set the security data for a kernel service
4079 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
4080 */
4081static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
4082{
4083 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4084 u32 sid = current_sid();
4085 int ret;
4086
4087 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4088 sid, secid,
4089 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4090 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
4091 NULL);
4092 if (ret == 0) {
4093 tsec->sid = secid;
4094 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4095 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4096 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4097 }
4098 return ret;
4099}
4100
4101/*
4102 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4103 * objective context of the specified inode
4104 */
4105static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4106{
4107 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4108 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4109 u32 sid = current_sid();
4110 int ret;
4111
4112 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4113 sid, isec->sid,
4114 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4115 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4116 NULL);
4117
4118 if (ret == 0)
4119 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4120 return ret;
4121}
4122
4123static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4124{
4125 struct common_audit_data ad;
4126
4127 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4128 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4129
4130 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4131 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4132 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4133}
4134
4135static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4136{
4137 struct common_audit_data ad;
4138 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4139 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4140 u32 sid = current_sid();
4141 int rc;
4142
4143 /* init_module */
4144 if (file == NULL)
4145 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4146 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4147 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4148
4149 /* finit_module */
4150
4151 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4152 ad.u.file = file;
4153
4154 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4155 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4156 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4157 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4158 if (rc)
4159 return rc;
4160 }
4161
4162 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4163 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4164 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4165 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4166}
4167
4168static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4169 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4170 bool contents)
4171{
4172 int rc = 0;
4173
4174 switch (id) {
4175 case READING_MODULE:
4176 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4177 break;
4178 default:
4179 break;
4180 }
4181
4182 return rc;
4183}
4184
4185static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4186{
4187 int rc = 0;
4188
4189 switch (id) {
4190 case LOADING_MODULE:
4191 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4192 break;
4193 default:
4194 break;
4195 }
4196
4197 return rc;
4198}
4199
4200static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4201{
4202 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4203 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4204 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4205}
4206
4207static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4208{
4209 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4210 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4211 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4212}
4213
4214static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4215{
4216 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4217 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4218 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4219}
4220
4221static void selinux_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4222{
4223 *secid = task_sid_subj(p);
4224}
4225
4226static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4227{
4228 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4229}
4230
4231static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4232{
4233 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4234 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4235 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4236}
4237
4238static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4239{
4240 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4241 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4242 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4243}
4244
4245static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4246{
4247 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4248 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4249 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4250}
4251
4252static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4253 unsigned int flags)
4254{
4255 u32 av = 0;
4256
4257 if (!flags)
4258 return 0;
4259 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4260 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4261 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4262 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4263 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4264 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4265 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4266}
4267
4268static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4269 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4270{
4271 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4272
4273 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4274 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4275 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4276 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4277 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4278 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4279 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4280 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4281
4282 return 0;
4283}
4284
4285static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4286{
4287 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4288 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4289 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4290}
4291
4292static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4293{
4294 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4295 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4296 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4297}
4298
4299static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4300{
4301 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4302 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4303 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4304}
4305
4306static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4307 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4308{
4309 u32 secid;
4310 u32 perm;
4311
4312 if (!sig)
4313 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4314 else
4315 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4316 if (!cred)
4317 secid = current_sid();
4318 else
4319 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4320 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4321 secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4322}
4323
4324static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4325 struct inode *inode)
4326{
4327 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4328 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4329
4330 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4331 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4332 isec->sid = sid;
4333 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4334 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4335}
4336
4337/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4338static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4339 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4340{
4341 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4342 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4343
4344 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4345 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4346 if (ih == NULL)
4347 goto out;
4348
4349 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4350 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4351 goto out;
4352
4353 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4354 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4355 ret = 0;
4356
4357 if (proto)
4358 *proto = ih->protocol;
4359
4360 switch (ih->protocol) {
4361 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4362 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4363
4364 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4365 break;
4366
4367 offset += ihlen;
4368 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4369 if (th == NULL)
4370 break;
4371
4372 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4373 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4374 break;
4375 }
4376
4377 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4378 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4379
4380 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4381 break;
4382
4383 offset += ihlen;
4384 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4385 if (uh == NULL)
4386 break;
4387
4388 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4389 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4390 break;
4391 }
4392
4393 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4394 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4395
4396 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4397 break;
4398
4399 offset += ihlen;
4400 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4401 if (dh == NULL)
4402 break;
4403
4404 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4405 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4406 break;
4407 }
4408
4409#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4410 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4411 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4412
4413 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4414 break;
4415
4416 offset += ihlen;
4417 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4418 if (sh == NULL)
4419 break;
4420
4421 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4422 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4423 break;
4424 }
4425#endif
4426 default:
4427 break;
4428 }
4429out:
4430 return ret;
4431}
4432
4433#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4434
4435/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4436static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4437 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4438{
4439 u8 nexthdr;
4440 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4441 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4442 __be16 frag_off;
4443
4444 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4445 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4446 if (ip6 == NULL)
4447 goto out;
4448
4449 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4450 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4451 ret = 0;
4452
4453 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4454 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4455 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4456 if (offset < 0)
4457 goto out;
4458
4459 if (proto)
4460 *proto = nexthdr;
4461
4462 switch (nexthdr) {
4463 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4464 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4465
4466 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4467 if (th == NULL)
4468 break;
4469
4470 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4471 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4472 break;
4473 }
4474
4475 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4476 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4477
4478 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4479 if (uh == NULL)
4480 break;
4481
4482 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4483 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4484 break;
4485 }
4486
4487 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4488 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4489
4490 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4491 if (dh == NULL)
4492 break;
4493
4494 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4495 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4496 break;
4497 }
4498
4499#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4500 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4501 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4502
4503 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4504 if (sh == NULL)
4505 break;
4506
4507 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4508 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4509 break;
4510 }
4511#endif
4512 /* includes fragments */
4513 default:
4514 break;
4515 }
4516out:
4517 return ret;
4518}
4519
4520#endif /* IPV6 */
4521
4522static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4523 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4524{
4525 char *addrp;
4526 int ret;
4527
4528 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4529 case PF_INET:
4530 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4531 if (ret)
4532 goto parse_error;
4533 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4534 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4535 goto okay;
4536
4537#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4538 case PF_INET6:
4539 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4540 if (ret)
4541 goto parse_error;
4542 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4543 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4544 goto okay;
4545#endif /* IPV6 */
4546 default:
4547 addrp = NULL;
4548 goto okay;
4549 }
4550
4551parse_error:
4552 pr_warn(
4553 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4554 " unable to parse packet\n");
4555 return ret;
4556
4557okay:
4558 if (_addrp)
4559 *_addrp = addrp;
4560 return 0;
4561}
4562
4563/**
4564 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4565 * @skb: the packet
4566 * @family: protocol family
4567 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4568 *
4569 * Description:
4570 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4571 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4572 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4573 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4574 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4575 * peer labels.
4576 *
4577 */
4578static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4579{
4580 int err;
4581 u32 xfrm_sid;
4582 u32 nlbl_sid;
4583 u32 nlbl_type;
4584
4585 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4586 if (unlikely(err))
4587 return -EACCES;
4588 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4589 if (unlikely(err))
4590 return -EACCES;
4591
4592 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4593 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4594 if (unlikely(err)) {
4595 pr_warn(
4596 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4597 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4598 return -EACCES;
4599 }
4600
4601 return 0;
4602}
4603
4604/**
4605 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4606 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4607 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4608 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4609 *
4610 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4611 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4612 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4613 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4614 *
4615 */
4616static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4617{
4618 int err = 0;
4619
4620 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4621 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4622 conn_sid);
4623 else
4624 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4625
4626 return err;
4627}
4628
4629/* socket security operations */
4630
4631static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4632 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4633{
4634 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4635 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4636 return 0;
4637 }
4638
4639 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4640 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4641}
4642
4643static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4644{
4645 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4646 struct common_audit_data ad;
4647 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4648
4649 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4650 return 0;
4651
4652 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4653 ad.u.net = &net;
4654 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4655
4656 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4657 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4658 &ad);
4659}
4660
4661static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4662 int protocol, int kern)
4663{
4664 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4665 u32 newsid;
4666 u16 secclass;
4667 int rc;
4668
4669 if (kern)
4670 return 0;
4671
4672 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4673 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4674 if (rc)
4675 return rc;
4676
4677 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4678 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4679}
4680
4681static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4682 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4683{
4684 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4685 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4686 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4687 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4688 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4689 int err = 0;
4690
4691 if (!kern) {
4692 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4693 if (err)
4694 return err;
4695 }
4696
4697 isec->sclass = sclass;
4698 isec->sid = sid;
4699 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4700
4701 if (sock->sk) {
4702 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4703 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4704 sksec->sid = sid;
4705 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4706 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4707 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4708
4709 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4710 }
4711
4712 return err;
4713}
4714
4715static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4716 struct socket *sockb)
4717{
4718 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4719 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4720
4721 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4722 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4723
4724 return 0;
4725}
4726
4727/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4728 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4729 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4730
4731static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4732{
4733 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4734 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4735 u16 family;
4736 int err;
4737
4738 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4739 if (err)
4740 goto out;
4741
4742 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4743 family = sk->sk_family;
4744 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4745 char *addrp;
4746 struct common_audit_data ad;
4747 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4748 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4749 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4750 u16 family_sa;
4751 unsigned short snum;
4752 u32 sid, node_perm;
4753
4754 /*
4755 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4756 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4757 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4758 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4759 */
4760 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4761 return -EINVAL;
4762 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4763 switch (family_sa) {
4764 case AF_UNSPEC:
4765 case AF_INET:
4766 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4767 return -EINVAL;
4768 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4769 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4770 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4771 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4772 */
4773 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4774 goto err_af;
4775 family_sa = AF_INET;
4776 }
4777 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4778 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4779 break;
4780 case AF_INET6:
4781 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4782 return -EINVAL;
4783 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4784 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4785 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4786 break;
4787 default:
4788 goto err_af;
4789 }
4790
4791 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4792 ad.u.net = &net;
4793 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4794 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4795
4796 if (snum) {
4797 int low, high;
4798
4799 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4800
4801 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4802 snum < low || snum > high) {
4803 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4804 snum, &sid);
4805 if (err)
4806 goto out;
4807 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4808 sksec->sid, sid,
4809 sksec->sclass,
4810 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4811 if (err)
4812 goto out;
4813 }
4814 }
4815
4816 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4817 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4818 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4819 break;
4820
4821 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4822 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4823 break;
4824
4825 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4826 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4827 break;
4828
4829 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4830 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4831 break;
4832
4833 default:
4834 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4835 break;
4836 }
4837
4838 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4839 if (err)
4840 goto out;
4841
4842 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4843 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4844 else
4845 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4846
4847 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4848 sksec->sid, sid,
4849 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4850 if (err)
4851 goto out;
4852 }
4853out:
4854 return err;
4855err_af:
4856 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4857 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4858 return -EINVAL;
4859 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4860}
4861
4862/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4863 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4864 */
4865static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4866 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4867{
4868 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4869 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4870 int err;
4871
4872 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4873 if (err)
4874 return err;
4875 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4876 return -EINVAL;
4877
4878 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4879 * way to disconnect the socket
4880 */
4881 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4882 return 0;
4883
4884 /*
4885 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4886 * for the port.
4887 */
4888 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4889 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4890 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4891 struct common_audit_data ad;
4892 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4893 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4894 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4895 unsigned short snum;
4896 u32 sid, perm;
4897
4898 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4899 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4900 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4901 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4902 */
4903 switch (address->sa_family) {
4904 case AF_INET:
4905 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4906 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4907 return -EINVAL;
4908 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4909 break;
4910 case AF_INET6:
4911 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4912 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4913 return -EINVAL;
4914 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4915 break;
4916 default:
4917 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4918 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4919 */
4920 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4921 return -EINVAL;
4922 else
4923 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4924 }
4925
4926 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4927 if (err)
4928 return err;
4929
4930 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4931 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4932 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4933 break;
4934 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4935 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4936 break;
4937 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4938 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4939 break;
4940 }
4941
4942 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4943 ad.u.net = &net;
4944 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4945 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4946 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4947 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4948 if (err)
4949 return err;
4950 }
4951
4952 return 0;
4953}
4954
4955/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4956static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4957 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4958{
4959 int err;
4960 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4961
4962 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4963 if (err)
4964 return err;
4965
4966 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4967}
4968
4969static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4970{
4971 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4972}
4973
4974static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4975{
4976 int err;
4977 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4978 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4979 u16 sclass;
4980 u32 sid;
4981
4982 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4983 if (err)
4984 return err;
4985
4986 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4987 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4988 sclass = isec->sclass;
4989 sid = isec->sid;
4990 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4991
4992 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4993 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4994 newisec->sid = sid;
4995 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4996
4997 return 0;
4998}
4999
5000static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
5001 int size)
5002{
5003 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
5004}
5005
5006static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
5007 int size, int flags)
5008{
5009 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
5010}
5011
5012static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
5013{
5014 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
5015}
5016
5017static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
5018{
5019 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
5020}
5021
5022static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
5023{
5024 int err;
5025
5026 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
5027 if (err)
5028 return err;
5029
5030 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
5031}
5032
5033static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
5034 int optname)
5035{
5036 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
5037}
5038
5039static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
5040{
5041 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
5042}
5043
5044static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
5045 struct sock *other,
5046 struct sock *newsk)
5047{
5048 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
5049 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
5050 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
5051 struct common_audit_data ad;
5052 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5053 int err;
5054
5055 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5056 ad.u.net = &net;
5057 ad.u.net->sk = other;
5058
5059 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5060 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
5061 sksec_other->sclass,
5062 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
5063 if (err)
5064 return err;
5065
5066 /* server child socket */
5067 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
5068 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
5069 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
5070 if (err)
5071 return err;
5072
5073 /* connecting socket */
5074 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
5075
5076 return 0;
5077}
5078
5079static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
5080 struct socket *other)
5081{
5082 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5083 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
5084 struct common_audit_data ad;
5085 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5086
5087 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5088 ad.u.net = &net;
5089 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
5090
5091 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5092 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5093 &ad);
5094}
5095
5096static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5097 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5098 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5099{
5100 int err;
5101 u32 if_sid;
5102 u32 node_sid;
5103
5104 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5105 if (err)
5106 return err;
5107 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5108 peer_sid, if_sid,
5109 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5110 if (err)
5111 return err;
5112
5113 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5114 if (err)
5115 return err;
5116 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5117 peer_sid, node_sid,
5118 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5119}
5120
5121static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5122 u16 family)
5123{
5124 int err = 0;
5125 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5126 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5127 struct common_audit_data ad;
5128 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5129 char *addrp;
5130
5131 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5132 ad.u.net = &net;
5133 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5134 ad.u.net->family = family;
5135 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5136 if (err)
5137 return err;
5138
5139 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5140 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5141 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5142 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5143 if (err)
5144 return err;
5145 }
5146
5147 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5148 if (err)
5149 return err;
5150 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5151
5152 return err;
5153}
5154
5155static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5156{
5157 int err;
5158 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5159 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5160 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5161 struct common_audit_data ad;
5162 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5163 char *addrp;
5164 u8 secmark_active;
5165 u8 peerlbl_active;
5166
5167 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5168 return 0;
5169
5170 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5171 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5172 family = PF_INET;
5173
5174 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5175 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5176 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5177 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5178 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5179 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5180
5181 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5182 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5183 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5184 return 0;
5185
5186 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5187 ad.u.net = &net;
5188 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5189 ad.u.net->family = family;
5190 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5191 if (err)
5192 return err;
5193
5194 if (peerlbl_active) {
5195 u32 peer_sid;
5196
5197 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5198 if (err)
5199 return err;
5200 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5201 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5202 if (err) {
5203 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5204 return err;
5205 }
5206 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5207 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5208 PEER__RECV, &ad);
5209 if (err) {
5210 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5211 return err;
5212 }
5213 }
5214
5215 if (secmark_active) {
5216 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5217 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5218 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5219 if (err)
5220 return err;
5221 }
5222
5223 return err;
5224}
5225
5226static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5227 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5228{
5229 int err = 0;
5230 char *scontext;
5231 u32 scontext_len;
5232 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5233 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5234
5235 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5236 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5237 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5238 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5239 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5240 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5241
5242 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5243 &scontext_len);
5244 if (err)
5245 return err;
5246
5247 if (scontext_len > len) {
5248 err = -ERANGE;
5249 goto out_len;
5250 }
5251
5252 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5253 err = -EFAULT;
5254
5255out_len:
5256 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5257 err = -EFAULT;
5258 kfree(scontext);
5259 return err;
5260}
5261
5262static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5263{
5264 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5265 u16 family;
5266 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5267
5268 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5269 family = PF_INET;
5270 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5271 family = PF_INET6;
5272 else if (sock)
5273 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5274 else
5275 goto out;
5276
5277 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5278 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5279 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5280 } else if (skb)
5281 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5282
5283out:
5284 *secid = peer_secid;
5285 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5286 return -EINVAL;
5287 return 0;
5288}
5289
5290static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5291{
5292 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5293
5294 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5295 if (!sksec)
5296 return -ENOMEM;
5297
5298 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5299 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5300 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5301 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5302 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5303
5304 return 0;
5305}
5306
5307static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5308{
5309 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5310
5311 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5312 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5313 kfree(sksec);
5314}
5315
5316static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5317{
5318 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5319 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5320
5321 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5322 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5323 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5324
5325 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5326}
5327
5328static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5329{
5330 if (!sk)
5331 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5332 else {
5333 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5334
5335 *secid = sksec->sid;
5336 }
5337}
5338
5339static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5340{
5341 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5342 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5343 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5344
5345 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5346 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5347 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5348 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5349}
5350
5351/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5352 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5353 * already present).
5354 */
5355static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5356 struct sk_buff *skb)
5357{
5358 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5359 struct common_audit_data ad;
5360 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5361 u8 peerlbl_active;
5362 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5363 u32 conn_sid;
5364 int err = 0;
5365
5366 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5367 return 0;
5368
5369 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5370
5371 if (peerlbl_active) {
5372 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5373 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5374 */
5375 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5376 &peer_sid);
5377 if (err)
5378 return err;
5379
5380 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5381 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5382 }
5383
5384 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5385 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5386
5387 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5388 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5389 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5390 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5391 */
5392 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5393 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5394 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5395 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5396 */
5397 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5398 ad.u.net = &net;
5399 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5400 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5401 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5402 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5403 if (err)
5404 return err;
5405 }
5406
5407 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5408 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5409 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5410 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5411 * plug this into the new socket.
5412 */
5413 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5414 if (err)
5415 return err;
5416
5417 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5418 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5419
5420 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5421 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5422}
5423
5424/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5425 * based on their @optname.
5426 */
5427static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5428 struct sockaddr *address,
5429 int addrlen)
5430{
5431 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5432 void *addr_buf;
5433 struct sockaddr *addr;
5434 struct socket *sock;
5435
5436 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5437 return 0;
5438
5439 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5440 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5441 addr_buf = address;
5442
5443 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5444 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5445 return -EINVAL;
5446
5447 addr = addr_buf;
5448 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5449 case AF_UNSPEC:
5450 case AF_INET:
5451 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5452 break;
5453 case AF_INET6:
5454 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5455 break;
5456 default:
5457 return -EINVAL;
5458 }
5459
5460 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5461 return -EINVAL;
5462
5463 err = -EINVAL;
5464 switch (optname) {
5465 /* Bind checks */
5466 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5467 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5468 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5469 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5470 break;
5471 /* Connect checks */
5472 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5473 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5474 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5475 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5476 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5477 if (err)
5478 return err;
5479
5480 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5481 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5482 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5483 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5484 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5485 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5486 * primary address is selected.
5487 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5488 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5489 * selinux_socket_connect().
5490 */
5491 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5492 break;
5493 }
5494
5495 if (err)
5496 return err;
5497
5498 addr_buf += len;
5499 walk_size += len;
5500 }
5501
5502 return 0;
5503}
5504
5505/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5506static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5507 struct sock *newsk)
5508{
5509 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5510 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5511
5512 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5513 * the non-sctp clone version.
5514 */
5515 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5516 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5517
5518 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5519 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5520 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5521 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5522}
5523
5524static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5525 struct request_sock *req)
5526{
5527 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5528 int err;
5529 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5530 u32 connsid;
5531 u32 peersid;
5532
5533 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5534 if (err)
5535 return err;
5536 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5537 if (err)
5538 return err;
5539 req->secid = connsid;
5540 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5541
5542 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5543}
5544
5545static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5546 const struct request_sock *req)
5547{
5548 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5549
5550 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5551 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5552 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5553 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5554 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5555 time it will have been created and available. */
5556
5557 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5558 * thread with access to newsksec */
5559 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5560}
5561
5562static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5563{
5564 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5565 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5566
5567 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5568 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5569 family = PF_INET;
5570
5571 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5572}
5573
5574static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5575{
5576 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5577 u32 tsid;
5578
5579 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5580 tsid = __tsec->sid;
5581
5582 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5583 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5584 NULL);
5585}
5586
5587static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5588{
5589 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5590}
5591
5592static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5593{
5594 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5595}
5596
5597static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5598 struct flowi_common *flic)
5599{
5600 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5601}
5602
5603static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5604{
5605 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5606
5607 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5608 if (!tunsec)
5609 return -ENOMEM;
5610 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5611
5612 *security = tunsec;
5613 return 0;
5614}
5615
5616static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5617{
5618 kfree(security);
5619}
5620
5621static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5622{
5623 u32 sid = current_sid();
5624
5625 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5626 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5627 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5628 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5629 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5630 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5631
5632 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5633 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5634 NULL);
5635}
5636
5637static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5638{
5639 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5640
5641 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5642 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5643 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5644}
5645
5646static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5647{
5648 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5649 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5650
5651 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5652 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5653 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5654 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5655 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5656 * protocols were being used */
5657
5658 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5659 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5660
5661 return 0;
5662}
5663
5664static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5665{
5666 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5667 u32 sid = current_sid();
5668 int err;
5669
5670 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5671 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5672 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5673 if (err)
5674 return err;
5675 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5676 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5677 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5678 if (err)
5679 return err;
5680 tunsec->sid = sid;
5681
5682 return 0;
5683}
5684
5685#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5686
5687static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5688 const struct net_device *indev,
5689 u16 family)
5690{
5691 int err;
5692 char *addrp;
5693 u32 peer_sid;
5694 struct common_audit_data ad;
5695 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5696 u8 secmark_active;
5697 u8 netlbl_active;
5698 u8 peerlbl_active;
5699
5700 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5701 return NF_ACCEPT;
5702
5703 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5704 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5705 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5706 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5707 return NF_ACCEPT;
5708
5709 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5710 return NF_DROP;
5711
5712 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5713 ad.u.net = &net;
5714 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5715 ad.u.net->family = family;
5716 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5717 return NF_DROP;
5718
5719 if (peerlbl_active) {
5720 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5721 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5722 if (err) {
5723 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5724 return NF_DROP;
5725 }
5726 }
5727
5728 if (secmark_active)
5729 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5730 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5731 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5732 return NF_DROP;
5733
5734 if (netlbl_active)
5735 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5736 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5737 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5738 * protection */
5739 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5740 return NF_DROP;
5741
5742 return NF_ACCEPT;
5743}
5744
5745static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5746 struct sk_buff *skb,
5747 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5748{
5749 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5750}
5751
5752#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5753static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5754 struct sk_buff *skb,
5755 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5756{
5757 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5758}
5759#endif /* IPV6 */
5760
5761static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5762 u16 family)
5763{
5764 struct sock *sk;
5765 u32 sid;
5766
5767 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5768 return NF_ACCEPT;
5769
5770 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5771 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5772 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5773 sk = skb->sk;
5774 if (sk) {
5775 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5776
5777 if (sk_listener(sk))
5778 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5779 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5780 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5781 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5782 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5783 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5784 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5785 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5786 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5787 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5788 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5789 * best we can do. */
5790 return NF_ACCEPT;
5791
5792 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5793 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5794 sid = sksec->sid;
5795 } else
5796 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5797 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5798 return NF_DROP;
5799
5800 return NF_ACCEPT;
5801}
5802
5803static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5804 struct sk_buff *skb,
5805 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5806{
5807 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5808}
5809
5810#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5811static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5812 struct sk_buff *skb,
5813 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5814{
5815 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5816}
5817#endif /* IPV6 */
5818
5819static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5820 int ifindex,
5821 u16 family)
5822{
5823 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5824 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5825 struct common_audit_data ad;
5826 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5827 char *addrp;
5828 u8 proto;
5829
5830 if (sk == NULL)
5831 return NF_ACCEPT;
5832 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5833
5834 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5835 ad.u.net = &net;
5836 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5837 ad.u.net->family = family;
5838 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5839 return NF_DROP;
5840
5841 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5842 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5843 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5844 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5845 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5846
5847 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5848 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5849
5850 return NF_ACCEPT;
5851}
5852
5853static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5854 const struct net_device *outdev,
5855 u16 family)
5856{
5857 u32 secmark_perm;
5858 u32 peer_sid;
5859 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5860 struct sock *sk;
5861 struct common_audit_data ad;
5862 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5863 char *addrp;
5864 u8 secmark_active;
5865 u8 peerlbl_active;
5866
5867 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5868 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5869 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5870 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5871 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5872 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5873
5874 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5875 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5876 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5877 return NF_ACCEPT;
5878
5879 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5880
5881#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5882 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5883 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5884 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5885 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5886 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5887 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5888 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5889 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5890 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5891 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5892 * connection. */
5893 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5894 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5895 return NF_ACCEPT;
5896#endif
5897
5898 if (sk == NULL) {
5899 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5900 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5901 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5902 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5903 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5904 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5905 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5906 return NF_DROP;
5907 } else {
5908 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5909 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5910 }
5911 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5912 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5913 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5914 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5915 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5916 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5917 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5918 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5919 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5920 * for similar problems. */
5921 u32 skb_sid;
5922 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5923
5924 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5925 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5926 return NF_DROP;
5927 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5928 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5929 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5930 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5931 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5932 * pass the packet. */
5933 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5934 switch (family) {
5935 case PF_INET:
5936 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5937 return NF_ACCEPT;
5938 break;
5939 case PF_INET6:
5940 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5941 return NF_ACCEPT;
5942 break;
5943 default:
5944 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5945 }
5946 }
5947 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5948 return NF_DROP;
5949 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5950 } else {
5951 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5952 * associated socket. */
5953 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5954 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5955 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5956 }
5957
5958 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5959 ad.u.net = &net;
5960 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5961 ad.u.net->family = family;
5962 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5963 return NF_DROP;
5964
5965 if (secmark_active)
5966 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5967 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5968 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5969 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5970
5971 if (peerlbl_active) {
5972 u32 if_sid;
5973 u32 node_sid;
5974
5975 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5976 return NF_DROP;
5977 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5978 peer_sid, if_sid,
5979 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5980 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5981
5982 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5983 return NF_DROP;
5984 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5985 peer_sid, node_sid,
5986 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5987 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5988 }
5989
5990 return NF_ACCEPT;
5991}
5992
5993static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5994 struct sk_buff *skb,
5995 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5996{
5997 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5998}
5999
6000#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
6001static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
6002 struct sk_buff *skb,
6003 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
6004{
6005 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
6006}
6007#endif /* IPV6 */
6008
6009#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6010
6011static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
6012{
6013 int rc = 0;
6014 unsigned int msg_len;
6015 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
6016 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
6017 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
6018 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
6019 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
6020 u32 perm;
6021
6022 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
6023 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
6024
6025 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
6026 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
6027 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
6028 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
6029 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
6030 */
6031 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
6032 return 0;
6033
6034 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
6035 if (rc == 0) {
6036 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
6037 if (rc)
6038 return rc;
6039 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
6040 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
6041 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
6042 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
6043 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
6044 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
6045 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
6046 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
6047 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
6048 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
6049 return rc;
6050 rc = 0;
6051 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
6052 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
6053 rc = 0;
6054 } else {
6055 return rc;
6056 }
6057
6058 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
6059 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
6060 if (msg_len >= data_len)
6061 return 0;
6062 data_len -= msg_len;
6063 data += msg_len;
6064 }
6065
6066 return rc;
6067}
6068
6069static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
6070{
6071 isec->sclass = sclass;
6072 isec->sid = current_sid();
6073}
6074
6075static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
6076 u32 perms)
6077{
6078 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6079 struct common_audit_data ad;
6080 u32 sid = current_sid();
6081
6082 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
6083
6084 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6085 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
6086
6087 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6088 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
6089}
6090
6091static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6092{
6093 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6094
6095 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6096 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6097
6098 return 0;
6099}
6100
6101/* message queue security operations */
6102static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6103{
6104 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6105 struct common_audit_data ad;
6106 u32 sid = current_sid();
6107 int rc;
6108
6109 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6110 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6111
6112 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6113 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6114
6115 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6116 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6117 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
6118 return rc;
6119}
6120
6121static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6122{
6123 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6124 struct common_audit_data ad;
6125 u32 sid = current_sid();
6126
6127 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6128
6129 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6130 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6131
6132 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6133 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6134 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6135}
6136
6137static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6138{
6139 int err;
6140 int perms;
6141
6142 switch (cmd) {
6143 case IPC_INFO:
6144 case MSG_INFO:
6145 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6146 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6147 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6148 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6149 case IPC_STAT:
6150 case MSG_STAT:
6151 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6152 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6153 break;
6154 case IPC_SET:
6155 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6156 break;
6157 case IPC_RMID:
6158 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6159 break;
6160 default:
6161 return 0;
6162 }
6163
6164 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6165 return err;
6166}
6167
6168static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6169{
6170 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6171 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6172 struct common_audit_data ad;
6173 u32 sid = current_sid();
6174 int rc;
6175
6176 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6177 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6178
6179 /*
6180 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6181 */
6182 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6183 /*
6184 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6185 * message queue this message will be stored in
6186 */
6187 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6188 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6189 if (rc)
6190 return rc;
6191 }
6192
6193 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6194 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6195
6196 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6197 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6198 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6199 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6200 if (!rc)
6201 /* Can this process send the message */
6202 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6203 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6204 MSG__SEND, &ad);
6205 if (!rc)
6206 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6207 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6208 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6209 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6210
6211 return rc;
6212}
6213
6214static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6215 struct task_struct *target,
6216 long type, int mode)
6217{
6218 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6219 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6220 struct common_audit_data ad;
6221 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6222 int rc;
6223
6224 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6225 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6226
6227 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6228 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6229
6230 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6231 sid, isec->sid,
6232 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6233 if (!rc)
6234 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6235 sid, msec->sid,
6236 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6237 return rc;
6238}
6239
6240/* Shared Memory security operations */
6241static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6242{
6243 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6244 struct common_audit_data ad;
6245 u32 sid = current_sid();
6246 int rc;
6247
6248 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6249 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6250
6251 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6252 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6253
6254 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6255 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6256 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6257 return rc;
6258}
6259
6260static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6261{
6262 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6263 struct common_audit_data ad;
6264 u32 sid = current_sid();
6265
6266 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6267
6268 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6269 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6270
6271 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6272 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6273 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6274}
6275
6276/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6277static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6278{
6279 int perms;
6280 int err;
6281
6282 switch (cmd) {
6283 case IPC_INFO:
6284 case SHM_INFO:
6285 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6286 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6287 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6288 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6289 case IPC_STAT:
6290 case SHM_STAT:
6291 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6292 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6293 break;
6294 case IPC_SET:
6295 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6296 break;
6297 case SHM_LOCK:
6298 case SHM_UNLOCK:
6299 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6300 break;
6301 case IPC_RMID:
6302 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6303 break;
6304 default:
6305 return 0;
6306 }
6307
6308 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6309 return err;
6310}
6311
6312static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6313 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6314{
6315 u32 perms;
6316
6317 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6318 perms = SHM__READ;
6319 else
6320 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6321
6322 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6323}
6324
6325/* Semaphore security operations */
6326static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6327{
6328 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6329 struct common_audit_data ad;
6330 u32 sid = current_sid();
6331 int rc;
6332
6333 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6334 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6335
6336 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6337 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6338
6339 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6340 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6341 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6342 return rc;
6343}
6344
6345static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6346{
6347 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6348 struct common_audit_data ad;
6349 u32 sid = current_sid();
6350
6351 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6352
6353 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6354 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6355
6356 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6357 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6358 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6359}
6360
6361/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6362static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6363{
6364 int err;
6365 u32 perms;
6366
6367 switch (cmd) {
6368 case IPC_INFO:
6369 case SEM_INFO:
6370 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6371 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6372 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6373 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6374 case GETPID:
6375 case GETNCNT:
6376 case GETZCNT:
6377 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6378 break;
6379 case GETVAL:
6380 case GETALL:
6381 perms = SEM__READ;
6382 break;
6383 case SETVAL:
6384 case SETALL:
6385 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6386 break;
6387 case IPC_RMID:
6388 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6389 break;
6390 case IPC_SET:
6391 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6392 break;
6393 case IPC_STAT:
6394 case SEM_STAT:
6395 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6396 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6397 break;
6398 default:
6399 return 0;
6400 }
6401
6402 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6403 return err;
6404}
6405
6406static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6407 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6408{
6409 u32 perms;
6410
6411 if (alter)
6412 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6413 else
6414 perms = SEM__READ;
6415
6416 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6417}
6418
6419static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6420{
6421 u32 av = 0;
6422
6423 av = 0;
6424 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6425 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6426 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6427 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6428
6429 if (av == 0)
6430 return 0;
6431
6432 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6433}
6434
6435static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6436{
6437 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6438 *secid = isec->sid;
6439}
6440
6441static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6442{
6443 if (inode)
6444 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6445}
6446
6447static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6448 char *name, char **value)
6449{
6450 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6451 u32 sid;
6452 int error;
6453 unsigned len;
6454
6455 rcu_read_lock();
6456 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6457
6458 if (current != p) {
6459 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6460 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6461 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6462 if (error)
6463 goto bad;
6464 }
6465
6466 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6467 sid = __tsec->sid;
6468 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6469 sid = __tsec->osid;
6470 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6471 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6472 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6473 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6474 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6475 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6476 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6477 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6478 else {
6479 error = -EINVAL;
6480 goto bad;
6481 }
6482 rcu_read_unlock();
6483
6484 if (!sid)
6485 return 0;
6486
6487 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6488 if (error)
6489 return error;
6490 return len;
6491
6492bad:
6493 rcu_read_unlock();
6494 return error;
6495}
6496
6497static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6498{
6499 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6500 struct cred *new;
6501 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6502 int error;
6503 char *str = value;
6504
6505 /*
6506 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6507 */
6508 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6509 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6510 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6511 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6512 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6513 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6514 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6516 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6517 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6518 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6519 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6520 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6521 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6522 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6523 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6524 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6525 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6526 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6527 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6528 else
6529 error = -EINVAL;
6530 if (error)
6531 return error;
6532
6533 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6534 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6535 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6536 str[size-1] = 0;
6537 size--;
6538 }
6539 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6540 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6541 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6542 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6543 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6544 size_t audit_size;
6545
6546 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6547 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6548 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6549 audit_size = size - 1;
6550 else
6551 audit_size = size;
6552 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6553 GFP_ATOMIC,
6554 AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6555 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6556 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6557 audit_log_end(ab);
6558
6559 return error;
6560 }
6561 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6562 &selinux_state,
6563 value, size, &sid);
6564 }
6565 if (error)
6566 return error;
6567 }
6568
6569 new = prepare_creds();
6570 if (!new)
6571 return -ENOMEM;
6572
6573 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6574 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6575 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6576 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6577 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6578 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6579 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6580 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6581 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6582 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6583 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6584 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6585 if (sid) {
6586 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6587 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6588 if (error)
6589 goto abort_change;
6590 }
6591 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6592 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6593 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6594 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6595 error = -EINVAL;
6596 if (sid == 0)
6597 goto abort_change;
6598
6599 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6600 error = -EPERM;
6601 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6602 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6603 tsec->sid, sid);
6604 if (error)
6605 goto abort_change;
6606 }
6607
6608 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6609 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6610 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6611 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6612 if (error)
6613 goto abort_change;
6614
6615 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6616 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6617 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6618 if (ptsid != 0) {
6619 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6620 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6621 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6622 if (error)
6623 goto abort_change;
6624 }
6625
6626 tsec->sid = sid;
6627 } else {
6628 error = -EINVAL;
6629 goto abort_change;
6630 }
6631
6632 commit_creds(new);
6633 return size;
6634
6635abort_change:
6636 abort_creds(new);
6637 return error;
6638}
6639
6640static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6641{
6642 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6643}
6644
6645static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6646{
6647 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6648 secdata, seclen);
6649}
6650
6651static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6652{
6653 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6654 secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6655}
6656
6657static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6658{
6659 kfree(secdata);
6660}
6661
6662static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6663{
6664 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6665
6666 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6667 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6668 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6669}
6670
6671/*
6672 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6673 */
6674static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6675{
6676 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6677 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6678 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6679 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6680}
6681
6682/*
6683 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6684 */
6685static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6686{
6687 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6688 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6689}
6690
6691static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6692{
6693 int len = 0;
6694 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&init_user_ns, inode,
6695 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6696 if (len < 0)
6697 return len;
6698 *ctxlen = len;
6699 return 0;
6700}
6701#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6702
6703static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6704 unsigned long flags)
6705{
6706 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6707 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6708
6709 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6710 if (!ksec)
6711 return -ENOMEM;
6712
6713 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6714 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6715 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6716 else
6717 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6718
6719 k->security = ksec;
6720 return 0;
6721}
6722
6723static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6724{
6725 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6726
6727 k->security = NULL;
6728 kfree(ksec);
6729}
6730
6731static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6732 const struct cred *cred,
6733 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6734{
6735 struct key *key;
6736 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6737 u32 perm, sid;
6738
6739 switch (need_perm) {
6740 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6741 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6742 break;
6743 case KEY_NEED_READ:
6744 perm = KEY__READ;
6745 break;
6746 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6747 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6748 break;
6749 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6750 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6751 break;
6752 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6753 perm = KEY__LINK;
6754 break;
6755 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6756 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6757 break;
6758 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6759 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6760 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6761 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6762 return 0;
6763 default:
6764 WARN_ON(1);
6765 return -EPERM;
6766
6767 }
6768
6769 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6770 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6771 ksec = key->security;
6772
6773 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6774 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6775}
6776
6777static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6778{
6779 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6780 char *context = NULL;
6781 unsigned len;
6782 int rc;
6783
6784 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6785 &context, &len);
6786 if (!rc)
6787 rc = len;
6788 *_buffer = context;
6789 return rc;
6790}
6791
6792#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6793static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6794{
6795 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6796 u32 sid = current_sid();
6797
6798 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6799 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6800}
6801#endif
6802#endif
6803
6804#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6805static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6806{
6807 struct common_audit_data ad;
6808 int err;
6809 u32 sid = 0;
6810 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6811 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6812
6813 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6814 if (err)
6815 return err;
6816
6817 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6818 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6819 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6820 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6821 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6822 sec->sid, sid,
6823 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6824 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6825}
6826
6827static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6828 u8 port_num)
6829{
6830 struct common_audit_data ad;
6831 int err;
6832 u32 sid = 0;
6833 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6834 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6835
6836 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6837 &sid);
6838
6839 if (err)
6840 return err;
6841
6842 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6843 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6844 ibendport.port = port_num;
6845 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6846 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6847 sec->sid, sid,
6848 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6849 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6850}
6851
6852static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6853{
6854 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6855
6856 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6857 if (!sec)
6858 return -ENOMEM;
6859 sec->sid = current_sid();
6860
6861 *ib_sec = sec;
6862 return 0;
6863}
6864
6865static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6866{
6867 kfree(ib_sec);
6868}
6869#endif
6870
6871#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6872static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6873 unsigned int size)
6874{
6875 u32 sid = current_sid();
6876 int ret;
6877
6878 switch (cmd) {
6879 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6880 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6881 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6882 NULL);
6883 break;
6884 case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6885 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6886 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6887 NULL);
6888 break;
6889 default:
6890 ret = 0;
6891 break;
6892 }
6893
6894 return ret;
6895}
6896
6897static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6898{
6899 u32 av = 0;
6900
6901 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6902 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6903 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6904 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6905 return av;
6906}
6907
6908/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6909 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6910 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6911 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6912 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6913 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6914 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6915 */
6916static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6917{
6918 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6919 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6920 struct bpf_map *map;
6921 int ret;
6922
6923 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6924 map = file->private_data;
6925 bpfsec = map->security;
6926 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6927 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6928 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6929 if (ret)
6930 return ret;
6931 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6932 prog = file->private_data;
6933 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6934 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6935 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6936 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6937 if (ret)
6938 return ret;
6939 }
6940 return 0;
6941}
6942
6943static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6944{
6945 u32 sid = current_sid();
6946 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6947
6948 bpfsec = map->security;
6949 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6950 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6951 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6952}
6953
6954static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6955{
6956 u32 sid = current_sid();
6957 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6958
6959 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6960 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6961 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6962 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6963}
6964
6965static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6966{
6967 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6968
6969 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6970 if (!bpfsec)
6971 return -ENOMEM;
6972
6973 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6974 map->security = bpfsec;
6975
6976 return 0;
6977}
6978
6979static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6980{
6981 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6982
6983 map->security = NULL;
6984 kfree(bpfsec);
6985}
6986
6987static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6988{
6989 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6990
6991 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6992 if (!bpfsec)
6993 return -ENOMEM;
6994
6995 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6996 aux->security = bpfsec;
6997
6998 return 0;
6999}
7000
7001static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
7002{
7003 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
7004
7005 aux->security = NULL;
7006 kfree(bpfsec);
7007}
7008#endif
7009
7010static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
7011{
7012 struct common_audit_data ad;
7013 u32 sid = current_sid();
7014 int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
7015 (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
7016 (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
7017
7018 if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
7019 audit_log(audit_context(),
7020 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
7021 "lockdown_reason=invalid");
7022 return -EINVAL;
7023 }
7024
7025 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
7026 ad.u.reason = what;
7027
7028 if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
7029 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
7030 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
7031 LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
7032 else
7033 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
7034 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
7035 LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
7036}
7037
7038struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7039 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
7040 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
7041 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
7042 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
7043 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
7044 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
7045};
7046
7047#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7048static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
7049{
7050 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
7051
7052 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
7053 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
7054 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
7055 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
7056 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
7057 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
7058 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
7059 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
7060 else
7061 return -EINVAL;
7062
7063 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
7064 requested, NULL);
7065}
7066
7067static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
7068{
7069 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
7070
7071 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
7072 if (!perfsec)
7073 return -ENOMEM;
7074
7075 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
7076 event->security = perfsec;
7077
7078 return 0;
7079}
7080
7081static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
7082{
7083 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7084
7085 event->security = NULL;
7086 kfree(perfsec);
7087}
7088
7089static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
7090{
7091 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7092 u32 sid = current_sid();
7093
7094 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
7095 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
7096}
7097
7098static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
7099{
7100 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7101 u32 sid = current_sid();
7102
7103 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
7104 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
7105}
7106#endif
7107
7108/*
7109 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7110 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7111 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7112 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7113 * hooks),
7114 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7115 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7116 *
7117 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7118 *
7119 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
7120 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
7121 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
7122 */
7123static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7128
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7138
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7140
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7144
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7155
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7157
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7160
7161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7189
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7191
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7203
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7205
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid_subj),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7230
7231 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7233
7234 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7235 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7236 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7237 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7238
7239 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7242
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7244 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7246
7247 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7248
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7251
7252 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7254 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7255 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7256 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7257 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7258
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7261
7262 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7263 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7264 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7267 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7269 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7270 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7271 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7276 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7277 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7278 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7282 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7283 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7284 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7285 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7286 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7290 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7292 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7293 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7294 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7295 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7296 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7299#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7302 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7304#endif
7305#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7308 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7310 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7311 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7312 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7314#endif
7315
7316#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7317 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7318 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7319 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7320#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7321 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7322#endif
7323#endif
7324
7325#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7326 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7327 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7328 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7329#endif
7330
7331#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7332 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7333 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7334 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7335 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7336 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7337#endif
7338
7339#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7340 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7341 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7342 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7343 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7344#endif
7345
7346 LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
7347
7348 /*
7349 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7350 */
7351 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7352 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7353 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7354 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
7355#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7356 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7357#endif
7358
7359 /*
7360 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7361 */
7362 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7363 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7364 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7365 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7366 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7367 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7368 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7369 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7370 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7371 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7372 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7373#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7374 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7375#endif
7376#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7377 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7378 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7379 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7380 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7381#endif
7382#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7383 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7384#endif
7385#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7386 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7387#endif
7388#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7389 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7390 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7391#endif
7392#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7393 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7394#endif
7395};
7396
7397static __init int selinux_init(void)
7398{
7399 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7400
7401 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7402 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7403 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7404 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7405 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7406 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7407
7408 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7409 cred_init_security();
7410
7411 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7412
7413 avc_init();
7414
7415 avtab_cache_init();
7416
7417 ebitmap_cache_init();
7418
7419 hashtab_cache_init();
7420
7421 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7422
7423 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7424 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7425
7426 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7427 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7428
7429 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7430 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7431 else
7432 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7433
7434 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7435
7436 return 0;
7437}
7438
7439static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7440{
7441 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7442}
7443
7444void selinux_complete_init(void)
7445{
7446 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7447
7448 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7449 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7450 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7451}
7452
7453/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7454 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7455DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7456 .name = "selinux",
7457 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7458 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7459 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7460 .init = selinux_init,
7461};
7462
7463#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7464
7465static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7466 {
7467 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7468 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7469 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7470 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7471 },
7472 {
7473 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7474 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7475 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7476 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7477 },
7478 {
7479 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7480 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
7481 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7482 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7483 },
7484#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7485 {
7486 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7487 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7488 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7489 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7490 },
7491 {
7492 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7493 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7494 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7495 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7496 },
7497 {
7498 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7499 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
7500 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7501 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7502 },
7503#endif /* IPV6 */
7504};
7505
7506static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7507{
7508 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7509 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7510}
7511
7512static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7513{
7514 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7515 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7516}
7517
7518static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7519 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7520 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7521};
7522
7523static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7524{
7525 int err;
7526
7527 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7528 return 0;
7529
7530 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7531
7532 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7533 if (err)
7534 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7535
7536 return 0;
7537}
7538__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7539
7540#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7541static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7542{
7543 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7544
7545 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7546}
7547#endif
7548
7549#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7550
7551#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7552#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7553#endif
7554
7555#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7556
7557#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7558int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7559{
7560 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7561 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7562 return -EINVAL;
7563 }
7564
7565 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7566 /* Only do this once. */
7567 return -EINVAL;
7568 }
7569
7570 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7571
7572 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7573
7574 /*
7575 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7576 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7577 * runtime disable.
7578 */
7579 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7580
7581 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7582
7583 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7584 avc_disable();
7585
7586 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
7587 exit_sel_fs();
7588
7589 return 0;
7590}
7591#endif