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1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
4 *
5 * Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
6 * Copyright © 2022-2023 Microsoft Corporation
7 */
8
9#include <linux/in.h>
10#include <linux/net.h>
11#include <linux/socket.h>
12#include <net/ipv6.h>
13
14#include "common.h"
15#include "cred.h"
16#include "limits.h"
17#include "net.h"
18#include "ruleset.h"
19
20int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
21 const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights)
22{
23 int err;
24 const struct landlock_id id = {
25 .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port),
26 .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
27 };
28
29 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
30
31 /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
32 access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
33 ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
34
35 mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
36 err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
37 mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
38
39 return err;
40}
41
42static access_mask_t
43get_raw_handled_net_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
44{
45 access_mask_t access_dom = 0;
46 size_t layer_level;
47
48 for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++)
49 access_dom |= landlock_get_net_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
50 return access_dom;
51}
52
53static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
54{
55 const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
56 landlock_get_current_domain();
57
58 if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_net_accesses(dom))
59 return NULL;
60
61 return dom;
62}
63
64static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
65 struct sockaddr *const address,
66 const int addrlen,
67 const access_mask_t access_request)
68{
69 __be16 port;
70 layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
71 const struct landlock_rule *rule;
72 access_mask_t handled_access;
73 struct landlock_id id = {
74 .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
75 };
76 const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain();
77
78 if (!dom)
79 return 0;
80 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
81 return -EACCES;
82
83 /* Checks if it's a (potential) TCP socket. */
84 if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
85 return 0;
86
87 /* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */
88 if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family))
89 return -EINVAL;
90
91 switch (address->sa_family) {
92 case AF_UNSPEC:
93 case AF_INET:
94 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
95 return -EINVAL;
96 port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
97 break;
98
99#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
100 case AF_INET6:
101 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
102 return -EINVAL;
103 port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
104 break;
105#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
106
107 default:
108 return 0;
109 }
110
111 /* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */
112 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
113 /*
114 * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
115 * association, which have the same effect as closing the
116 * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
117 * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
118 * connections is always allowed.
119 *
120 * For a TCP access control system, this request is legitimate.
121 * Let the network stack handle potential inconsistencies and
122 * return -EINVAL if needed.
123 */
124 if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
125 return 0;
126
127 /*
128 * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
129 * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
130 * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
131 * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
132 * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
133 *
134 * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle these
135 * checks, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
136 * consistency thanks to kselftest.
137 */
138 if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
139 /* addrlen has already been checked for AF_UNSPEC. */
140 const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
141 (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
142
143 if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_INET)
144 return -EINVAL;
145
146 if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
147 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
148 }
149 } else {
150 /*
151 * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return
152 * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL. Valid sa_family changes are
153 * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC.
154 *
155 * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this
156 * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test
157 * consistency thanks to kselftest.
158 */
159 if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family)
160 return -EINVAL;
161 }
162
163 id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
164 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
165
166 rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id);
167 handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
168 dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
169 if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, &layer_masks,
170 ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
171 return 0;
172
173 return -EACCES;
174}
175
176static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
177 struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen)
178{
179 return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
180 LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
181}
182
183static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock,
184 struct sockaddr *const address,
185 const int addrlen)
186{
187 return current_check_access_socket(sock, address, addrlen,
188 LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
189}
190
191static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
194};
195
196__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
197{
198 security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
199 &landlock_lsmid);
200}