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1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2/*
3 * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
4 *
5 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
6 * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
7 */
8
9#include <linux/tcp.h>
10#include <linux/slab.h>
11#include <linux/random.h>
12#include <linux/siphash.h>
13#include <linux/kernel.h>
14#include <linux/export.h>
15#include <net/secure_seq.h>
16#include <net/tcp.h>
17#include <net/route.h>
18
19static siphash_key_t syncookie_secret[2] __read_mostly;
20
21#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
22#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
23
24/* TCP Timestamp: 6 lowest bits of timestamp sent in the cookie SYN-ACK
25 * stores TCP options:
26 *
27 * MSB LSB
28 * | 31 ... 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 2 1 0 |
29 * | Timestamp | ECN | SACK | WScale |
30 *
31 * When we receive a valid cookie-ACK, we look at the echoed tsval (if
32 * any) to figure out which TCP options we should use for the rebuilt
33 * connection.
34 *
35 * A WScale setting of '0xf' (which is an invalid scaling value)
36 * means that original syn did not include the TCP window scaling option.
37 */
38#define TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK 0xf
39#define TS_OPT_SACK BIT(4)
40#define TS_OPT_ECN BIT(5)
41/* There is no TS_OPT_TIMESTAMP:
42 * if ACK contains timestamp option, we already know it was
43 * requested/supported by the syn/synack exchange.
44 */
45#define TSBITS 6
46#define TSMASK (((__u32)1 << TSBITS) - 1)
47
48static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
49 u32 count, int c)
50{
51 net_get_random_once(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
52 return siphash_4u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr,
53 (__force u32)sport << 16 | (__force u32)dport,
54 count, &syncookie_secret[c]);
55}
56
57
58/*
59 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode
60 * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be
61 * sent in the syn-ack.
62 * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we
63 * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp.
64 */
65u64 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req)
66{
67 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
68 u32 ts, ts_now = tcp_time_stamp_raw();
69 u32 options = 0;
70
71 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
72
73 options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK;
74 if (ireq->sack_ok)
75 options |= TS_OPT_SACK;
76 if (ireq->ecn_ok)
77 options |= TS_OPT_ECN;
78
79 ts = ts_now & ~TSMASK;
80 ts |= options;
81 if (ts > ts_now) {
82 ts >>= TSBITS;
83 ts--;
84 ts <<= TSBITS;
85 ts |= options;
86 }
87 return (u64)ts * (NSEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ);
88}
89
90
91static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
92 __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data)
93{
94 /*
95 * Compute the secure sequence number.
96 * The output should be:
97 * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
98 * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
99 * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
100 * minute by 1.
101 * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
102 * MSS into the second hash value.
103 */
104 u32 count = tcp_cookie_time();
105 return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
106 sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
107 ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
108 & COOKIEMASK));
109}
110
111/*
112 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
113 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
114 * range. This must be checked by the caller.
115 *
116 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be less than
117 * MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE minutes in the past.
118 * The return value (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
119 */
120static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
121 __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq)
122{
123 u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time();
124
125 /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
126 cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
127
128 /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
129 diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS);
130 if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE)
131 return (__u32)-1;
132
133 return (cookie -
134 cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
135 & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
136}
137
138/*
139 * MSS Values are chosen based on the 2011 paper
140 * 'An Analysis of TCP Maximum Segement Sizes' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson.
141 * Values ..
142 * .. lower than 536 are rare (< 0.2%)
143 * .. between 537 and 1299 account for less than < 1.5% of observed values
144 * .. in the 1300-1349 range account for about 15 to 20% of observed mss values
145 * .. exceeding 1460 are very rare (< 0.04%)
146 *
147 * 1460 is the single most frequently announced mss value (30 to 46% depending
148 * on monitor location). Table must be sorted.
149 */
150static __u16 const msstab[] = {
151 536,
152 1300,
153 1440, /* 1440, 1452: PPPoE */
154 1460,
155};
156
157/*
158 * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
159 * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
160 */
161u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
162 u16 *mssp)
163{
164 int mssind;
165 const __u16 mss = *mssp;
166
167 for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--)
168 if (mss >= msstab[mssind])
169 break;
170 *mssp = msstab[mssind];
171
172 return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
173 th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
174 mssind);
175}
176EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence);
177
178__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp)
179{
180 const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
181 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
182
183 return __cookie_v4_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp);
184}
185
186/*
187 * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
188 * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
189 */
190int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
191 u32 cookie)
192{
193 __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
194 __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
195 th->source, th->dest, seq);
196
197 return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
198}
199EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_check);
200
201struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
202 struct request_sock *req,
203 struct dst_entry *dst, u32 tsoff)
204{
205 struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
206 struct sock *child;
207 bool own_req;
208
209 child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
210 NULL, &own_req);
211 if (child) {
212 refcount_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 1);
213 tcp_sk(child)->tsoffset = tsoff;
214 sock_rps_save_rxhash(child, skb);
215 if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child))
216 return child;
217
218 bh_unlock_sock(child);
219 sock_put(child);
220 }
221 __reqsk_free(req);
222
223 return NULL;
224}
225EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_get_cookie_sock);
226
227/*
228 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
229 * additional tcp options in the timestamp.
230 * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo.
231 *
232 * return false if we decode a tcp option that is disabled
233 * on the host.
234 */
235bool cookie_timestamp_decode(const struct net *net,
236 struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt)
237{
238 /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
239 u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr;
240
241 if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) {
242 tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt);
243 return true;
244 }
245
246 if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps)
247 return false;
248
249 tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & TS_OPT_SACK) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0;
250
251 if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack)
252 return false;
253
254 if ((options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK) == TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK)
255 return true; /* no window scaling */
256
257 tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1;
258 tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK;
259
260 return net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling != 0;
261}
262EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_timestamp_decode);
263
264bool cookie_ecn_ok(const struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt,
265 const struct net *net, const struct dst_entry *dst)
266{
267 bool ecn_ok = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TS_OPT_ECN;
268
269 if (!ecn_ok)
270 return false;
271
272 if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn)
273 return true;
274
275 return dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_ECN);
276}
277EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_ecn_ok);
278
279/* On input, sk is a listener.
280 * Output is listener if incoming packet would not create a child
281 * NULL if memory could not be allocated.
282 */
283struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
284{
285 struct ip_options *opt = &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4.opt;
286 struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
287 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
288 struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
289 struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
290 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
291 __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
292 struct sock *ret = sk;
293 struct request_sock *req;
294 int mss;
295 struct rtable *rt;
296 __u8 rcv_wscale;
297 struct flowi4 fl4;
298 u32 tsoff = 0;
299
300 if (!sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
301 goto out;
302
303 if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk))
304 goto out;
305
306 mss = __cookie_v4_check(ip_hdr(skb), th, cookie);
307 if (mss == 0) {
308 __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
309 goto out;
310 }
311
312 __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
313
314 /* check for timestamp cookie support */
315 memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
316 tcp_parse_options(sock_net(sk), skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
317
318 if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
319 tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(sock_net(sk),
320 ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
321 ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
322 tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
323 }
324
325 if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(sock_net(sk), &tcp_opt))
326 goto out;
327
328 ret = NULL;
329 req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops, sk, false); /* for safety */
330 if (!req)
331 goto out;
332
333 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
334 treq = tcp_rsk(req);
335 treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
336 treq->snt_isn = cookie;
337 treq->ts_off = 0;
338 treq->txhash = net_tx_rndhash();
339 req->mss = mss;
340 ireq->ir_num = ntohs(th->dest);
341 ireq->ir_rmt_port = th->source;
342 sk_rcv_saddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->daddr);
343 sk_daddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
344 ireq->ir_mark = inet_request_mark(sk, skb);
345 ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale;
346 ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok;
347 ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok;
348 ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
349 req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
350 treq->snt_synack = 0;
351 treq->tfo_listener = false;
352 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC))
353 ireq->smc_ok = 0;
354
355 ireq->ir_iif = inet_request_bound_dev_if(sk, skb);
356
357 /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
358 * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
359 */
360 RCU_INIT_POINTER(ireq->ireq_opt, tcp_v4_save_options(sock_net(sk), skb));
361
362 if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
363 reqsk_free(req);
364 goto out;
365 }
366
367 req->num_retrans = 0;
368
369 /*
370 * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
371 * window size. We should better make sure that the window size
372 * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
373 * no easy way to do this.
374 */
375 flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ireq->ir_iif, ireq->ir_mark,
376 RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, IPPROTO_TCP,
377 inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
378 opt->srr ? opt->faddr : ireq->ir_rmt_addr,
379 ireq->ir_loc_addr, th->source, th->dest, sk->sk_uid);
380 security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
381 rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
382 if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
383 reqsk_free(req);
384 goto out;
385 }
386
387 /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
388 req->rsk_window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
389
390 tcp_select_initial_window(sk, tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
391 &req->rsk_rcv_wnd, &req->rsk_window_clamp,
392 ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
393 dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
394
395 ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
396 ireq->ecn_ok = cookie_ecn_ok(&tcp_opt, sock_net(sk), &rt->dst);
397
398 ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst, tsoff);
399 /* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
400 * Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock()
401 */
402 if (ret)
403 inet_sk(ret)->cork.fl.u.ip4 = fl4;
404out: return ret;
405}
1/*
2 * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
3 *
4 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
5 * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
6 *
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
8 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
9 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
10 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
11 */
12
13#include <linux/tcp.h>
14#include <linux/slab.h>
15#include <linux/random.h>
16#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
17#include <linux/kernel.h>
18#include <linux/export.h>
19#include <net/tcp.h>
20#include <net/route.h>
21
22/* Timestamps: lowest bits store TCP options */
23#define TSBITS 6
24#define TSMASK (((__u32)1 << TSBITS) - 1)
25
26extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies;
27
28__u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
29EXPORT_SYMBOL(syncookie_secret);
30
31static __init int init_syncookies(void)
32{
33 get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
34 return 0;
35}
36__initcall(init_syncookies);
37
38#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
39#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
40
41static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS],
42 ipv4_cookie_scratch);
43
44static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
45 u32 count, int c)
46{
47 __u32 *tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch);
48
49 memcpy(tmp + 4, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
50 tmp[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
51 tmp[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
52 tmp[2] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport;
53 tmp[3] = count;
54 sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5);
55
56 return tmp[17];
57}
58
59
60/*
61 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode
62 * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be
63 * sent in the syn-ack.
64 * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we
65 * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp.
66 */
67__u32 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req)
68{
69 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
70 u32 ts, ts_now = tcp_time_stamp;
71 u32 options = 0;
72
73 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
74
75 options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : 0xf;
76 options |= ireq->sack_ok << 4;
77 options |= ireq->ecn_ok << 5;
78
79 ts = ts_now & ~TSMASK;
80 ts |= options;
81 if (ts > ts_now) {
82 ts >>= TSBITS;
83 ts--;
84 ts <<= TSBITS;
85 ts |= options;
86 }
87 return ts;
88}
89
90
91static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
92 __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
93 __u32 data)
94{
95 /*
96 * Compute the secure sequence number.
97 * The output should be:
98 * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
99 * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
100 * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
101 * minute by 1.
102 * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
103 * MSS into the second hash value.
104 */
105
106 return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
107 sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
108 ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
109 & COOKIEMASK));
110}
111
112/*
113 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
114 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
115 * range. This must be checked by the caller.
116 *
117 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
118 * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
119 * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
120 */
121static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
122 __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq,
123 __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
124{
125 __u32 diff;
126
127 /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
128 cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
129
130 /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
131 diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS);
132 if (diff >= maxdiff)
133 return (__u32)-1;
134
135 return (cookie -
136 cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
137 & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
138}
139
140/*
141 * MSS Values are taken from the 2009 paper
142 * 'Measuring TCP Maximum Segment Size' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson:
143 * - values 1440 to 1460 accounted for 80% of observed mss values
144 * - values outside the 536-1460 range are rare (<0.2%).
145 *
146 * Table must be sorted.
147 */
148static __u16 const msstab[] = {
149 64,
150 512,
151 536,
152 1024,
153 1440,
154 1460,
155 4312,
156 8960,
157};
158
159/*
160 * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
161 * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
162 */
163__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp)
164{
165 const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
166 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
167 int mssind;
168 const __u16 mss = *mssp;
169
170 tcp_synq_overflow(sk);
171
172 for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--)
173 if (mss >= msstab[mssind])
174 break;
175 *mssp = msstab[mssind];
176
177 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESSENT);
178
179 return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
180 th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
181 jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind);
182}
183
184/*
185 * This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
186 * Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
187 * sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
188 * backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
189 */
190#define COUNTER_TRIES 4
191/*
192 * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
193 * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
194 */
195static inline int cookie_check(struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 cookie)
196{
197 const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
198 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
199 __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
200 __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
201 th->source, th->dest, seq,
202 jiffies / (HZ * 60),
203 COUNTER_TRIES);
204
205 return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
206}
207
208static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
209 struct request_sock *req,
210 struct dst_entry *dst)
211{
212 struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
213 struct sock *child;
214
215 child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
216 if (child)
217 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child);
218 else
219 reqsk_free(req);
220
221 return child;
222}
223
224
225/*
226 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
227 * additional tcp options in the timestamp.
228 * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo.
229 *
230 * The lowest 4 bits store snd_wscale.
231 * next 2 bits indicate SACK and ECN support.
232 *
233 * return false if we decode an option that should not be.
234 */
235bool cookie_check_timestamp(struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt, bool *ecn_ok)
236{
237 /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
238 u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TSMASK;
239
240 if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) {
241 tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt);
242 return true;
243 }
244
245 if (!sysctl_tcp_timestamps)
246 return false;
247
248 tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & (1 << 4)) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0;
249 *ecn_ok = (options >> 5) & 1;
250 if (*ecn_ok && !sysctl_tcp_ecn)
251 return false;
252
253 if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !sysctl_tcp_sack)
254 return false;
255
256 if ((options & 0xf) == 0xf)
257 return true; /* no window scaling */
258
259 tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1;
260 tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & 0xf;
261 return sysctl_tcp_window_scaling != 0;
262}
263EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_check_timestamp);
264
265struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
266 struct ip_options *opt)
267{
268 struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
269 const u8 *hash_location;
270 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
271 struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
272 struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
273 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
274 __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
275 struct sock *ret = sk;
276 struct request_sock *req;
277 int mss;
278 struct rtable *rt;
279 __u8 rcv_wscale;
280 bool ecn_ok = false;
281 struct flowi4 fl4;
282
283 if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
284 goto out;
285
286 if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk) ||
287 (mss = cookie_check(skb, cookie)) == 0) {
288 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
289 goto out;
290 }
291
292 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
293
294 /* check for timestamp cookie support */
295 memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
296 tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, &hash_location, 0);
297
298 if (!cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt, &ecn_ok))
299 goto out;
300
301 ret = NULL;
302 req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops); /* for safety */
303 if (!req)
304 goto out;
305
306 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
307 treq = tcp_rsk(req);
308 treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
309 treq->snt_isn = cookie;
310 req->mss = mss;
311 ireq->loc_port = th->dest;
312 ireq->rmt_port = th->source;
313 ireq->loc_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
314 ireq->rmt_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
315 ireq->ecn_ok = ecn_ok;
316 ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale;
317 ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok;
318 ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok;
319 ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
320 req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
321 treq->snt_synack = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr : 0;
322
323 /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
324 * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
325 */
326 if (opt && opt->optlen) {
327 int opt_size = sizeof(struct ip_options_rcu) + opt->optlen;
328
329 ireq->opt = kmalloc(opt_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
330 if (ireq->opt != NULL && ip_options_echo(&ireq->opt->opt, skb)) {
331 kfree(ireq->opt);
332 ireq->opt = NULL;
333 }
334 }
335
336 if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
337 reqsk_free(req);
338 goto out;
339 }
340
341 req->expires = 0UL;
342 req->retrans = 0;
343
344 /*
345 * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
346 * window size. We should better make sure that the window size
347 * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
348 * no easy way to do this.
349 */
350 flowi4_init_output(&fl4, 0, sk->sk_mark, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
351 RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, IPPROTO_TCP,
352 inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
353 (opt && opt->srr) ? opt->faddr : ireq->rmt_addr,
354 ireq->loc_addr, th->source, th->dest);
355 security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
356 rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
357 if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
358 reqsk_free(req);
359 goto out;
360 }
361
362 /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
363 req->window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
364
365 tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
366 &req->rcv_wnd, &req->window_clamp,
367 ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
368 dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
369
370 ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
371
372 ret = get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
373 /* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
374 * Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock()
375 */
376 if (ret)
377 inet_sk(ret)->cork.fl.u.ip4 = fl4;
378out: return ret;
379}