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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* * IPv6 Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel * * Authors: * Glenn Griffin <ggriffin.kernel@gmail.com> * * Based on IPv4 implementation by Andi Kleen * linux/net/ipv4/syncookies.c */ #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/siphash.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <net/secure_seq.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <net/tcp.h> #define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */ #define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1) static siphash_aligned_key_t syncookie6_secret[2]; /* RFC 2460, Section 8.3: * [ipv6 tcp] MSS must be computed as the maximum packet size minus 60 [..] * * Due to IPV6_MIN_MTU=1280 the lowest possible MSS is 1220, which allows * using higher values than ipv4 tcp syncookies. * The other values are chosen based on ethernet (1500 and 9k MTU), plus * one that accounts for common encap (PPPoe) overhead. Table must be sorted. */ static __u16 const msstab[] = { 1280 - 60, /* IPV6_MIN_MTU - 60 */ 1480 - 60, 1500 - 60, 9000 - 60, }; static u32 cookie_hash(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, u32 count, int c) { const struct { struct in6_addr saddr; struct in6_addr daddr; u32 count; __be16 sport; __be16 dport; } __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined = { .saddr = *saddr, .daddr = *daddr, .count = count, .sport = sport, .dport = dport }; net_get_random_once(syncookie6_secret, sizeof(syncookie6_secret)); return siphash(&combined, offsetofend(typeof(combined), dport), &syncookie6_secret[c]); } static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data) { u32 count = tcp_cookie_time(); return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) + ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data) & COOKIEMASK)); } static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq) { __u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time(); cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq; diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS); if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE) return (__u32)-1; return (cookie - cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1)) & COOKIEMASK; } u32 __cookie_v6_init_sequence(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, __u16 *mssp) { int mssind; const __u16 mss = *mssp; for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--) if (mss >= msstab[mssind]) break; *mssp = msstab[mssind]; return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(&iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), mssind); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v6_init_sequence); __u32 cookie_v6_init_sequence(const struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp) { const struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb); const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); return __cookie_v6_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp); } int __cookie_v6_check(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th) { __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1; __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; __u32 mssind; mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, th->source, th->dest, seq); return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v6_check); static struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_check(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt; u32 tsoff = 0; int mss; if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk)) goto out; mss = __cookie_v6_check(ipv6_hdr(skb), tcp_hdr(skb)); if (!mss) { __NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED); goto out; } __NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV); /* check for timestamp cookie support */ memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt)); tcp_parse_options(net, skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL); if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) { tsoff = secure_tcpv6_ts_off(net, ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32, ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32); tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff; } if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(net, &tcp_opt)) goto out; return cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(&tcp6_request_sock_ops, sk, skb, &tcp_opt, mss, tsoff); out: return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct inet_request_sock *ireq; struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct request_sock *req; struct dst_entry *dst; struct sock *ret = sk; __u8 rcv_wscale; int full_space; SKB_DR(reason); if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) || !th->ack || th->rst) goto out; if (cookie_bpf_ok(skb)) { req = cookie_bpf_check(sk, skb); } else { req = cookie_tcp_check(net, sk, skb); if (IS_ERR(req)) goto out; } if (!req) { SKB_DR_SET(reason, NO_SOCKET); goto out_drop; } ireq = inet_rsk(req); ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) { SKB_DR_SET(reason, SECURITY_HOOK); goto out_free; } if (ipv6_opt_accepted(sk, skb, &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h6) || np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo || np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo || np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim || np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim) { refcount_inc(&skb->users); ireq->pktopts = skb; } /* So that link locals have meaning */ if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if && ipv6_addr_type(&ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) ireq->ir_iif = tcp_v6_iif(skb); tcp_ao_syncookie(sk, skb, req, AF_INET6); /* * We need to lookup the dst_entry to get the correct window size. * This is taken from tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock. Somebody please enlighten * me if there is a preferred way. */ { struct in6_addr *final_p, final; struct flowi6 fl6; memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6)); fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP; fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr; final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final); fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr; fl6.flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif; fl6.flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark; fl6.fl6_dport = ireq->ir_rmt_port; fl6.fl6_sport = inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport; fl6.flowi6_uid = sk->sk_uid; security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi_common(&fl6)); dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(net, sk, &fl6, final_p); if (IS_ERR(dst)) { SKB_DR_SET(reason, IP_OUTNOROUTES); goto out_free; } } req->rsk_window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(dst, RTAX_WINDOW); /* limit the window selection if the user enforce a smaller rx buffer */ full_space = tcp_full_space(sk); if (sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK && (req->rsk_window_clamp > full_space || req->rsk_window_clamp == 0)) req->rsk_window_clamp = full_space; tcp_select_initial_window(sk, full_space, req->mss, &req->rsk_rcv_wnd, &req->rsk_window_clamp, ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale, dst_metric(dst, RTAX_INITRWND)); /* req->syncookie is set true only if ACK is validated * by BPF kfunc, then, rcv_wscale is already configured. */ if (!req->syncookie) ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale; ireq->ecn_ok &= cookie_ecn_ok(net, dst); ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, dst); if (!ret) { SKB_DR_SET(reason, NO_SOCKET); goto out_drop; } out: return ret; out_free: reqsk_free(req); out_drop: kfree_skb_reason(skb, reason); return NULL; } |