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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * AMD SVM-SEV Host Support. * * Copyright (C) 2023 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. * * Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> * */ #include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/mm_types.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/iommu.h> #include <linux/amd-iommu.h> #include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/svm.h> #include <asm/smp.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/cpuid.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/iommu.h> /* * The RMP entry format is not architectural. The format is defined in PPR * Family 19h Model 01h, Rev B1 processor. */ struct rmpentry { union { struct { u64 assigned : 1, pagesize : 1, immutable : 1, rsvd1 : 9, gpa : 39, asid : 10, vmsa : 1, validated : 1, rsvd2 : 1; }; u64 lo; }; u64 hi; } __packed; /* * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the * bookkeeping, the range needs to be added during the RMP entry lookup. */ #define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ 0x4000 /* Mask to apply to a PFN to get the first PFN of a 2MB page */ #define PFN_PMD_MASK GENMASK_ULL(63, PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size; static struct rmpentry *rmptable __ro_after_init; static u64 rmptable_max_pfn __ro_after_init; static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock); static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages; #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt static int __mfd_enable(unsigned int cpu) { u64 val; if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) return 0; rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM; wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); return 0; } static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg) { __mfd_enable(smp_processor_id()); } static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu) { u64 val; if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) return 0; rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN; val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN; wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); return 0; } static __init void snp_enable(void *arg) { __snp_enable(smp_processor_id()); } #define RMP_ADDR_MASK GENMASK_ULL(51, 13) bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { u64 max_rmp_pfn, calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end; rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base); rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end); if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) { pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n"); return false; } if (rmp_base > rmp_end) { pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); return false; } rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1; /* * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to * address the whole RAM, including the bookkeeping area. The RMP itself * must also be covered. */ max_rmp_pfn = max_pfn; if (PHYS_PFN(rmp_end) > max_pfn) max_rmp_pfn = PHYS_PFN(rmp_end); calc_rmp_sz = (max_rmp_pfn << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) { pr_err("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n", calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz); return false; } probed_rmp_base = rmp_base; probed_rmp_size = rmp_sz; pr_info("RMP table physical range [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size - 1); return true; } static void __init __snp_fixup_e820_tables(u64 pa) { if (IS_ALIGNED(pa, PMD_SIZE)) return; /* * Handle cases where the RMP table placement by the BIOS is not * 2M aligned and the kexec kernel could try to allocate * from within that chunk which then causes a fatal RMP fault. * * The e820_table needs to be updated as it is converted to * kernel memory resources and used by KEXEC_FILE_LOAD syscall * to load kexec segments. * * The e820_table_firmware needs to be updated as it is exposed * to sysfs and used by the KEXEC_LOAD syscall to load kexec * segments. * * The e820_table_kexec needs to be updated as it passed to * the kexec-ed kernel. */ pa = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, PMD_SIZE); if (e820__mapped_any(pa, pa + PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { pr_info("Reserving start/end of RMP table on a 2MB boundary [0x%016llx]\n", pa); e820__range_update(pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); e820__range_update_table(e820_table_kexec, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); e820__range_update_table(e820_table_firmware, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); } } void __init snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) { __snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base); __snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size); } /* * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP * firmware ABI spec. */ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) { void *rmptable_start; u64 rmptable_size; u64 val; if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) return 0; if (!amd_iommu_snp_en) goto nosnp; if (!probed_rmp_size) goto nosnp; rmptable_start = memremap(probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size, MEMREMAP_WB); if (!rmptable_start) { pr_err("Failed to map RMP table\n"); return 1; } /* * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of * kexec boot. */ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN) goto skip_enable; memset(rmptable_start, 0, probed_rmp_size); /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */ wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); /* MtrrFixDramModEn must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */ on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1); on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1); skip_enable: rmptable_start += RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; rmptable_size = probed_rmp_size - RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; rmptable = (struct rmpentry *)rmptable_start; rmptable_max_pfn = rmptable_size / sizeof(struct rmpentry) - 1; cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL); /* * Setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to 'true' to ensure that SNP panic * notifier is invoked to do SNP IOMMU shutdown before kdump. */ crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true; return 0; nosnp: cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); return -ENOSYS; } /* * This must be called after the IOMMU has been initialized. */ device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init); static struct rmpentry *get_rmpentry(u64 pfn) { if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pfn > rmptable_max_pfn)) return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); return &rmptable[pfn]; } static struct rmpentry *__snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, int *level) { struct rmpentry *large_entry, *entry; if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); entry = get_rmpentry(pfn); if (IS_ERR(entry)) return entry; /* * Find the authoritative RMP entry for a PFN. This can be either a 4K * RMP entry or a special large RMP entry that is authoritative for a * whole 2M area. */ large_entry = get_rmpentry(pfn & PFN_PMD_MASK); if (IS_ERR(large_entry)) return large_entry; *level = RMP_TO_PG_LEVEL(large_entry->pagesize); return entry; } int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { struct rmpentry *e; e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, level); if (IS_ERR(e)) return PTR_ERR(e); *assigned = !!e->assigned; return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_lookup_rmpentry); /* * Dump the raw RMP entry for a particular PFN. These bits are documented in the * PPR for a particular CPU model and provide useful information about how a * particular PFN is being utilized by the kernel/firmware at the time certain * unexpected events occur, such as RMP faults. */ static void dump_rmpentry(u64 pfn) { u64 pfn_i, pfn_end; struct rmpentry *e; int level; e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &level); if (IS_ERR(e)) { pr_err("Failed to read RMP entry for PFN 0x%llx, error %ld\n", pfn, PTR_ERR(e)); return; } if (e->assigned) { pr_info("PFN 0x%llx, RMP entry: [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", pfn, e->lo, e->hi); return; } /* * If the RMP entry for a particular PFN is not in an assigned state, * then it is sometimes useful to get an idea of whether or not any RMP * entries for other PFNs within the same 2MB region are assigned, since * those too can affect the ability to access a particular PFN in * certain situations, such as when the PFN is being accessed via a 2MB * mapping in the host page table. */ pfn_i = ALIGN_DOWN(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD); pfn_end = pfn_i + PTRS_PER_PMD; pr_info("PFN 0x%llx unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x%llx - 0x%llx]\n", pfn, pfn_i, pfn_end); while (pfn_i < pfn_end) { e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn_i, &level); if (IS_ERR(e)) { pr_err("Error %ld reading RMP entry for PFN 0x%llx\n", PTR_ERR(e), pfn_i); pfn_i++; continue; } if (e->lo || e->hi) pr_info("PFN: 0x%llx, [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", pfn_i, e->lo, e->hi); pfn_i++; } } void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long hva) { unsigned long paddr; unsigned int level; pgd_t *pgd; pte_t *pte; pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); pgd += pgd_index(hva); pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, hva, &level); if (!pte) { pr_err("Can't dump RMP entry for HVA %lx: no PTE/PFN found\n", hva); return; } paddr = PFN_PHYS(pte_pfn(*pte)) | (hva & ~page_level_mask(level)); dump_rmpentry(PHYS_PFN(paddr)); } /* * PSMASH a 2MB aligned page into 4K pages in the RMP table while preserving the * Validated bit. */ int psmash(u64 pfn) { unsigned long paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; int ret; if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) return -ENODEV; if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) return -EINVAL; /* Binutils version 2.36 supports the PSMASH mnemonic. */ asm volatile(".byte 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x01, 0xFF" : "=a" (ret) : "a" (paddr) : "memory", "cc"); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(psmash); /* * If the kernel uses a 2MB or larger directmap mapping to write to an address, * and that mapping contains any 4KB pages that are set to private in the RMP * table, an RMP #PF will trigger and cause a host crash. Hypervisor code that * owns the PFNs being transitioned will never attempt such a write, but other * kernel tasks writing to other PFNs in the range may trigger these checks * inadvertently due a large directmap mapping that happens to overlap such a * PFN. * * Prevent this by splitting any 2MB+ mappings that might end up containing a * mix of private/shared PFNs as a result of a subsequent RMPUPDATE for the * PFN/rmp_level passed in. * * Note that there is no attempt here to scan all the RMP entries for the 2MB * physical range, since it would only be worthwhile in determining if a * subsequent RMPUPDATE for a 4KB PFN would result in all the entries being of * the same shared/private state, thus avoiding the need to split the mapping. * But that would mean the entries are currently in a mixed state, and so the * mapping would have already been split as a result of prior transitions. * And since the 4K split is only done if the mapping is 2MB+, and there isn't * currently a mechanism in place to restore 2MB+ mappings, such a check would * not provide any usable benefit. * * More specifics on how these checks are carried out can be found in APM * Volume 2, "RMP and VMPL Access Checks". */ static int adjust_direct_map(u64 pfn, int rmp_level) { unsigned long vaddr; unsigned int level; int npages, ret; pte_t *pte; /* * pfn_to_kaddr() will return a vaddr only within the direct * map range. */ vaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn); /* Only 4KB/2MB RMP entries are supported by current hardware. */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level > PG_LEVEL_2M)) return -EINVAL; if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) return -EINVAL; if (rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M && (!IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD) || !pfn_valid(pfn + PTRS_PER_PMD - 1))) return -EINVAL; /* * If an entire 2MB physical range is being transitioned, then there is * no risk of RMP #PFs due to write accesses from overlapping mappings, * since even accesses from 1GB mappings will be treated as 2MB accesses * as far as RMP table checks are concerned. */ if (rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M) return 0; pte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level); if (!pte || pte_none(*pte)) return 0; if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) return 0; npages = page_level_size(rmp_level) / PAGE_SIZE; ret = set_memory_4k(vaddr, npages); if (ret) pr_warn("Failed to split direct map for PFN 0x%llx, ret: %d\n", pfn, ret); return ret; } /* * It is expected that those operations are seldom enough so that no mutual * exclusion of updaters is needed and thus the overlap error condition below * should happen very rarely and would get resolved relatively quickly by * the firmware. * * If not, one could consider introducing a mutex or so here to sync concurrent * RMP updates and thus diminish the amount of cases where firmware needs to * lock 2M ranges to protect against concurrent updates. * * The optimal solution would be range locking to avoid locking disjoint * regions unnecessarily but there's no support for that yet. */ static int rmpupdate(u64 pfn, struct rmp_state *state) { unsigned long paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; int ret, level; if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) return -ENODEV; level = RMP_TO_PG_LEVEL(state->pagesize); if (adjust_direct_map(pfn, level)) return -EFAULT; do { /* Binutils version 2.36 supports the RMPUPDATE mnemonic. */ asm volatile(".byte 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x01, 0xFE" : "=a" (ret) : "a" (paddr), "c" ((unsigned long)state) : "memory", "cc"); } while (ret == RMPUPDATE_FAIL_OVERLAP); if (ret) { pr_err("RMPUPDATE failed for PFN %llx, pg_level: %d, ret: %d\n", pfn, level, ret); dump_rmpentry(pfn); dump_stack(); return -EFAULT; } return 0; } /* Transition a page to guest-owned/private state in the RMP table. */ int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immutable) { struct rmp_state state; memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state)); state.assigned = 1; state.asid = asid; state.immutable = immutable; state.gpa = gpa; state.pagesize = PG_LEVEL_TO_RMP(level); return rmpupdate(pfn, &state); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_private); /* Transition a page to hypervisor-owned/shared state in the RMP table. */ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { struct rmp_state state; memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state)); state.pagesize = PG_LEVEL_TO_RMP(level); return rmpupdate(pfn, &state); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared); void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) { struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn); pr_warn("Leaking PFN range 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pfn, pfn + npages); spin_lock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock); while (npages--) { /* * Reuse the page's buddy list for chaining into the leaked * pages list. This page should not be on a free list currently * and is also unsafe to be added to a free list. */ if (likely(!PageCompound(page)) || /* * Skip inserting tail pages of compound page as * page->buddy_list of tail pages is not usable. */ (PageHead(page) && compound_nr(page) <= npages)) list_add_tail(&page->buddy_list, &snp_leaked_pages_list); dump_rmpentry(pfn); snp_nr_leaked_pages++; pfn++; page++; } spin_unlock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_leak_pages); void kdump_sev_callback(void) { /* * Do wbinvd() on remote CPUs when SNP is enabled in order to * safely do SNP_SHUTDOWN on the local CPU. */ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) wbinvd(); } |