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v6.2
  1Overview
  2========
  3
  4For general security related questions of perf_event_open() syscall usage,
  5performance monitoring and observability operations by Perf see here:
  6https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
  7
  8Enabling LSM based mandatory access control (MAC) to perf_event_open() syscall
  9==============================================================================
 10
 11LSM hooks for mandatory access control for perf_event_open() syscall can be
 12used starting from Linux v5.3. Below are the steps to extend Fedora (v31) with
 13Targeted policy with perf_event_open() access control capabilities:
 14
 151. Download selinux-policy SRPM package (e.g. selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm on FC31)
 16   and install it so rpmbuild directory would exist in the current working directory:
 17
 18   # rpm -Uhv selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm
 19
 202. Get into rpmbuild/SPECS directory and unpack the source code:
 21
 22   # rpmbuild -bp selinux-policy.spec
 23
 243. Place patch below at rpmbuild/BUILD/selinux-policy-b86eaaf4dbcf2d51dd4432df7185c0eaf3cbcc02
 25   directory and apply it:
 26
 27   # patch -p1 < selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch
 28   patching file policy/flask/access_vectors
 29   patching file policy/flask/security_classes
 30   # cat selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch
 31diff -Nura a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors
 32--- a/policy/flask/access_vectors	2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300
 33+++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors	2020-02-28 23:37:25.000000000 +0300
 34@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@
 35 	wake_alarm
 36 	block_suspend
 37 	audit_read
 38+	perfmon
 39 }
 40 
 41 #
 42@@ -1099,3 +1100,15 @@
 43 
 44 class xdp_socket
 45 inherits socket
 46+
 47+class perf_event
 48+{
 49+	open
 50+	cpu
 51+	kernel
 52+	tracepoint
 53+	read
 54+	write
 55+}
 56+
 57+
 58diff -Nura a/policy/flask/security_classes b/policy/flask/security_classes
 59--- a/policy/flask/security_classes	2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300
 60+++ b/policy/flask/security_classes	2020-02-28 21:35:17.000000000 +0300
 61@@ -200,4 +200,6 @@
 62 
 63 class xdp_socket
 64 
 65+class perf_event
 66+
 67 # FLASK
 68
 694. Get into rpmbuild/SPECS directory and build policy packages from patched sources:
 70
 71   # rpmbuild --noclean --noprep -ba selinux-policy.spec
 72
 73   so you have this:
 74
 75   # ls -alh rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/
 76   total 33M
 77   drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 .
 78   drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 ..
 79   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 112K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 80   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 1.2M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-devel-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 81   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 2.3M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-doc-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 82   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root  12M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-minimum-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 83   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 4.5M Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-mls-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 84   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 111K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-sandbox-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 85   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root  14M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-targeted-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 86
 875. Install SELinux packages from Fedora repo, if not already done so, and
 88   update with the patched rpms above:
 89
 90   # rpm -Uhv rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/selinux-policy-*
 91
 926. Enable SELinux Permissive mode for Targeted policy, if not already done so:
 93
 94   # cat /etc/selinux/config
 95
 96   # This file controls the state of SELinux on the system.
 97   # SELINUX= can take one of these three values:
 98   #     enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced.
 99   #     permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing.
100   #     disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded.
101   SELINUX=permissive
102   # SELINUXTYPE= can take one of these three values:
103   #     targeted - Targeted processes are protected,
104   #     minimum - Modification of targeted policy. Only selected processes are protected.
105   #     mls - Multi Level Security protection.
106   SELINUXTYPE=targeted
107
1087. Enable filesystem SELinux labeling at the next reboot:
109
110   # touch /.autorelabel
111
1128. Reboot machine and it will label filesystems and load Targeted policy into the kernel;
113
1149. Login and check that dmesg output doesn't mention that perf_event class is unknown to SELinux subsystem;
115
11610. Check that SELinux is enabled and in Permissive mode
117
118    # getenforce
119    Permissive
120
12111. Turn SELinux into Enforcing mode:
122
123    # setenforce 1
124    # getenforce
125    Enforcing
126
127Opening access to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora with SELinux
128==================================================================
129
130Access to performance monitoring and observability operations by Perf
131can be limited for superuser or CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged
132processes. MAC policy settings (e.g. SELinux) can be loaded into the kernel
133and prevent unauthorized access to perf_event_open() syscall. In such case
134Perf tool provides a message similar to the one below:
135
136   # perf stat
137   Error:
138   Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.
139   Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance
140   monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records for
141   more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
142   Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open
143   access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
144   without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN Linux capability.
145   perf_event_paranoid setting is -1:
146     -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
147         Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
148   >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
149   >= 1: Disallow CPU event access
150   >= 2: Disallow kernel profiling
151   To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it
152   in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)
153
154To make sure that access is limited by MAC policy settings inspect system
155audit records using journalctl command or /var/log/audit/audit.log so the
156output would contain AVC denied records related to perf_event:
157
158   # journalctl --reverse --no-pager | grep perf_event
159
160   python3[1318099]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t.
161                                         If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default.
162   setroubleshoot[1318099]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 4595ce5b-e58f-462c-9d86-3bc2074935de
163   audit[1318098]: AVC avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1318098 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0
164
165In order to open access to perf_event_open() syscall MAC policy settings can
166require to be extended. On SELinux system this can be done by loading a special
167policy module extending base policy settings. Perf related policy module can
168be generated using the system audit records about blocking perf_event access.
169Run the command below to generate my-perf.te policy extension file with
170perf_event related rules:
171
172   # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf && cat my-perf.te
173
174   module my-perf 1.0;
175
176   require {
177        type unconfined_t;
178        class perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write };
179   }
180
181   #============= unconfined_t ==============
182   allow unconfined_t self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write };
183
184Now compile, pack and load my-perf.pp extension module into the kernel:
185
186   # checkmodule -M -m -o my-perf.mod my-perf.te
187   # semodule_package -o my-perf.pp -m my-perf.mod
188   # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp
189
190After all those taken steps above access to perf_event_open() syscall should
191now be allowed by the policy settings. Check access running Perf like this:
192
193   # perf stat
194   ^C
195   Performance counter stats for 'system wide':
196
197         36,387.41 msec cpu-clock                 #    7.999 CPUs utilized
198             2,629      context-switches          #    0.072 K/sec
199                57      cpu-migrations            #    0.002 K/sec
200                 1      page-faults               #    0.000 K/sec
201       263,721,559      cycles                    #    0.007 GHz
202       175,746,713      instructions              #    0.67  insn per cycle
203        19,628,798      branches                  #    0.539 M/sec
204         1,259,201      branch-misses             #    6.42% of all branches
205
206       4.549061439 seconds time elapsed
207
208The generated perf-event.pp related policy extension module can be removed
209from the kernel using this command:
210
211   # semodule -X 300 -r my-perf
212
213Alternatively the module can be temporarily disabled and enabled back using
214these two commands:
215
216   # semodule -d my-perf
217   # semodule -e my-perf
218
219If something went wrong
220=======================
221
222To turn SELinux into Permissive mode:
223   # setenforce 0
224
225To fully disable SELinux during kernel boot [3] set kernel command line parameter selinux=0
226
227To remove SELinux labeling from local filesystems:
228   # find / -mount -print0 | xargs -0 setfattr -h -x security.selinux
229
230To fully turn SELinux off a machine set SELINUX=disabled at /etc/selinux/config file and reboot;
231
232Links
233=====
234
235[1] https://download-ib01.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/updates/31/Everything/SRPMS/Packages/s/selinux-policy-3.14.4-49.fc31.src.rpm
236[2] https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/11/html/Security-Enhanced_Linux/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Enabling_and_Disabling_SELinux.html
237[3] https://danwalsh.livejournal.com/10972.html
v6.8
  1Overview
  2========
  3
  4For general security related questions of perf_event_open() syscall usage,
  5performance monitoring and observability operations by Perf see here:
  6https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
  7
  8Enabling LSM based mandatory access control (MAC) to perf_event_open() syscall
  9==============================================================================
 10
 11LSM hooks for mandatory access control for perf_event_open() syscall can be
 12used starting from Linux v5.3. Below are the steps to extend Fedora (v31) with
 13Targeted policy with perf_event_open() access control capabilities:
 14
 151. Download selinux-policy SRPM package (e.g. selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm on FC31)
 16   and install it so rpmbuild directory would exist in the current working directory:
 17
 18   # rpm -Uhv selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm
 19
 202. Get into rpmbuild/SPECS directory and unpack the source code:
 21
 22   # rpmbuild -bp selinux-policy.spec
 23
 243. Place patch below at rpmbuild/BUILD/selinux-policy-b86eaaf4dbcf2d51dd4432df7185c0eaf3cbcc02
 25   directory and apply it:
 26
 27   # patch -p1 < selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch
 28   patching file policy/flask/access_vectors
 29   patching file policy/flask/security_classes
 30   # cat selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch
 31diff -Nura a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors
 32--- a/policy/flask/access_vectors	2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300
 33+++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors	2020-02-28 23:37:25.000000000 +0300
 34@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@
 35 	wake_alarm
 36 	block_suspend
 37 	audit_read
 38+	perfmon
 39 }
 40 
 41 #
 42@@ -1099,3 +1100,15 @@
 43 
 44 class xdp_socket
 45 inherits socket
 46+
 47+class perf_event
 48+{
 49+	open
 50+	cpu
 51+	kernel
 52+	tracepoint
 53+	read
 54+	write
 55+}
 56+
 57+
 58diff -Nura a/policy/flask/security_classes b/policy/flask/security_classes
 59--- a/policy/flask/security_classes	2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300
 60+++ b/policy/flask/security_classes	2020-02-28 21:35:17.000000000 +0300
 61@@ -200,4 +200,6 @@
 62 
 63 class xdp_socket
 64 
 65+class perf_event
 66+
 67 # FLASK
 68
 694. Get into rpmbuild/SPECS directory and build policy packages from patched sources:
 70
 71   # rpmbuild --noclean --noprep -ba selinux-policy.spec
 72
 73   so you have this:
 74
 75   # ls -alh rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/
 76   total 33M
 77   drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 .
 78   drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 ..
 79   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 112K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 80   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 1.2M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-devel-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 81   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 2.3M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-doc-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 82   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root  12M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-minimum-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 83   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 4.5M Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-mls-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 84   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 111K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-sandbox-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 85   -rw-r--r--. 1 root root  14M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-targeted-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
 86
 875. Install SELinux packages from Fedora repo, if not already done so, and
 88   update with the patched rpms above:
 89
 90   # rpm -Uhv rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/selinux-policy-*
 91
 926. Enable SELinux Permissive mode for Targeted policy, if not already done so:
 93
 94   # cat /etc/selinux/config
 95
 96   # This file controls the state of SELinux on the system.
 97   # SELINUX= can take one of these three values:
 98   #     enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced.
 99   #     permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing.
100   #     disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded.
101   SELINUX=permissive
102   # SELINUXTYPE= can take one of these three values:
103   #     targeted - Targeted processes are protected,
104   #     minimum - Modification of targeted policy. Only selected processes are protected.
105   #     mls - Multi Level Security protection.
106   SELINUXTYPE=targeted
107
1087. Enable filesystem SELinux labeling at the next reboot:
109
110   # touch /.autorelabel
111
1128. Reboot machine and it will label filesystems and load Targeted policy into the kernel;
113
1149. Login and check that dmesg output doesn't mention that perf_event class is unknown to SELinux subsystem;
115
11610. Check that SELinux is enabled and in Permissive mode
117
118    # getenforce
119    Permissive
120
12111. Turn SELinux into Enforcing mode:
122
123    # setenforce 1
124    # getenforce
125    Enforcing
126
127Opening access to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora with SELinux
128==================================================================
129
130Access to performance monitoring and observability operations by Perf
131can be limited for superuser or CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged
132processes. MAC policy settings (e.g. SELinux) can be loaded into the kernel
133and prevent unauthorized access to perf_event_open() syscall. In such case
134Perf tool provides a message similar to the one below:
135
136   # perf stat
137   Error:
138   Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.
139   Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance
140   monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records for
141   more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.
142   Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open
143   access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users
144   without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN Linux capability.
145   perf_event_paranoid setting is -1:
146     -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
147         Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
148   >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
149   >= 1: Disallow CPU event access
150   >= 2: Disallow kernel profiling
151   To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it
152   in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)
153
154To make sure that access is limited by MAC policy settings inspect system
155audit records using journalctl command or /var/log/audit/audit.log so the
156output would contain AVC denied records related to perf_event:
157
158   # journalctl --reverse --no-pager | grep perf_event
159
160   python3[1318099]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t.
161                                         If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default.
162   setroubleshoot[1318099]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 4595ce5b-e58f-462c-9d86-3bc2074935de
163   audit[1318098]: AVC avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=1318098 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0
164
165In order to open access to perf_event_open() syscall MAC policy settings can
166require to be extended. On SELinux system this can be done by loading a special
167policy module extending base policy settings. Perf related policy module can
168be generated using the system audit records about blocking perf_event access.
169Run the command below to generate my-perf.te policy extension file with
170perf_event related rules:
171
172   # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf && cat my-perf.te
173
174   module my-perf 1.0;
175
176   require {
177        type unconfined_t;
178        class perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write };
179   }
180
181   #============= unconfined_t ==============
182   allow unconfined_t self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write };
183
184Now compile, pack and load my-perf.pp extension module into the kernel:
185
186   # checkmodule -M -m -o my-perf.mod my-perf.te
187   # semodule_package -o my-perf.pp -m my-perf.mod
188   # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp
189
190After all those taken steps above access to perf_event_open() syscall should
191now be allowed by the policy settings. Check access running Perf like this:
192
193   # perf stat
194   ^C
195   Performance counter stats for 'system wide':
196
197         36,387.41 msec cpu-clock                 #    7.999 CPUs utilized
198             2,629      context-switches          #    0.072 K/sec
199                57      cpu-migrations            #    0.002 K/sec
200                 1      page-faults               #    0.000 K/sec
201       263,721,559      cycles                    #    0.007 GHz
202       175,746,713      instructions              #    0.67  insn per cycle
203        19,628,798      branches                  #    0.539 M/sec
204         1,259,201      branch-misses             #    6.42% of all branches
205
206       4.549061439 seconds time elapsed
207
208The generated perf-event.pp related policy extension module can be removed
209from the kernel using this command:
210
211   # semodule -X 300 -r my-perf
212
213Alternatively the module can be temporarily disabled and enabled back using
214these two commands:
215
216   # semodule -d my-perf
217   # semodule -e my-perf
218
219If something went wrong
220=======================
221
222To turn SELinux into Permissive mode:
223   # setenforce 0
224
225To fully disable SELinux during kernel boot [3] set kernel command line parameter selinux=0
226
227To remove SELinux labeling from local filesystems:
228   # find / -mount -print0 | xargs -0 setfattr -h -x security.selinux
229
230To fully turn SELinux off a machine set SELINUX=disabled at /etc/selinux/config file and reboot;
231
232Links
233=====
234
235[1] https://download-ib01.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/updates/31/Everything/SRPMS/Packages/s/selinux-policy-3.14.4-49.fc31.src.rpm
236[2] https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/11/html/Security-Enhanced_Linux/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Enabling_and_Disabling_SELinux.html
237[3] https://danwalsh.livejournal.com/10972.html