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v6.13.7
  1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
  2/*
  3 * AppArmor security module
  4 *
  5 * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
  6 *
  7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
  8 * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
  9 */
 10
 11#include "include/apparmor.h"
 12#include "include/audit.h"
 13#include "include/cred.h"
 14#include "include/label.h"
 15#include "include/net.h"
 16#include "include/policy.h"
 17#include "include/secid.h"
 18
 19#include "net_names.h"
 20
 21
 22struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 23	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
 24	{ }
 25};
 26
 27static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
 28	"unknown",
 29	"send",
 30	"receive",
 31	"unknown",
 32
 33	"create",
 34	"shutdown",
 35	"connect",
 36	"unknown",
 37
 38	"setattr",
 39	"getattr",
 40	"setcred",
 41	"getcred",
 42
 43	"chmod",
 44	"chown",
 45	"chgrp",
 46	"lock",
 47
 48	"mmap",
 49	"mprot",
 50	"unknown",
 51	"unknown",
 52
 53	"accept",
 54	"bind",
 55	"listen",
 56	"unknown",
 57
 58	"setopt",
 59	"getopt",
 60	"unknown",
 61	"unknown",
 62
 63	"unknown",
 64	"unknown",
 65	"unknown",
 66	"unknown",
 67};
 68
 69
 70/* audit callback for net specific fields */
 71void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 72{
 73	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 74	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
 75
 76	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
 77		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
 78				 address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
 79	else
 80		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
 81				 sa->u.net->family);
 82	if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type])
 83		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
 84				 sock_type_names[ad->net.type]);
 85	else
 86		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
 87				 ad->net.type);
 88	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", ad->net.protocol);
 89
 90	if (ad->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
 91		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
 92		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, NULL, 0,
 93				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 94
 95		if (ad->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
 96			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
 97			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, NULL, 0,
 98					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 99		}
100	}
101	if (ad->peer) {
102		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
103		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
104				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
105	}
106}
107
108/* Generic af perm */
109int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
110		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family,
111		       int type)
112{
113	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
114						    typeof(*rules), list);
115	struct aa_perms perms = { };
116	aa_state_t state;
117	__be16 buffer[2];
118
119	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
120	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
121
122	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
123		return 0;
124	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
125	if (!state)
126		return 0;
127
128	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
129	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
130	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
131				 4);
132	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
133	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
134
135	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
136}
137
138int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
139	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
140{
141	struct aa_profile *profile;
142	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
143
144	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
145			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family,
146					   type));
147}
148
149static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
150			    struct aa_label *label,
151			    const char *op, u32 request,
152			    struct sock *sk)
153{
154	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
155	int error = 0;
156
157	AA_BUG(!label);
158	AA_BUG(!sk);
159
160	if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
161		struct aa_profile *profile;
162		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
163
164		ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
165		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
166			    aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk));
167	}
168
169	return error;
170}
171
172int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
173{
174	struct aa_label *label;
175	int error;
176
177	AA_BUG(!sk);
178	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
179
180	/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
181	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
182	error = aa_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sk);
183	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
184
185	return error;
186}
187
188
189int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
190		      const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
191{
192	AA_BUG(!label);
193	AA_BUG(!sock);
194	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
195
196	return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
197}
198
199#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
200static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
201{
202	struct aa_label *label;
203
204	if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
205		secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
206		return 0;
207	}
208
209	label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
210				    secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
211				    GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
212
213	if (IS_ERR(label))
214		return PTR_ERR(label);
215
216	secmark->secid = label->secid;
217
218	return 0;
219}
220
221static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
222			   struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
223{
224	int i, ret;
225	struct aa_perms perms = { };
226	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
227						    typeof(*rules), list);
228
229	if (rules->secmark_count == 0)
230		return 0;
231
232	for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) {
233		if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) {
234			ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&rules->secmark[i]);
235			if (ret)
236				return ret;
237		}
238
239		if (rules->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
240		    rules->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
241			if (rules->secmark[i].deny)
242				perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
243			else
244				perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
245
246			if (rules->secmark[i].audit)
247				perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
248		}
249	}
250
251	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
252
253	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
254}
255
256int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
257			   u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
258{
259	struct aa_profile *profile;
260	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
261
262	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
263				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
264						    &ad));
265}
266#endif
v6.2
  1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
  2/*
  3 * AppArmor security module
  4 *
  5 * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
  6 *
  7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
  8 * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
  9 */
 10
 11#include "include/apparmor.h"
 12#include "include/audit.h"
 13#include "include/cred.h"
 14#include "include/label.h"
 15#include "include/net.h"
 16#include "include/policy.h"
 17#include "include/secid.h"
 18
 19#include "net_names.h"
 20
 21
 22struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 23	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
 24	{ }
 25};
 26
 27static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
 28	"unknown",
 29	"send",
 30	"receive",
 31	"unknown",
 32
 33	"create",
 34	"shutdown",
 35	"connect",
 36	"unknown",
 37
 38	"setattr",
 39	"getattr",
 40	"setcred",
 41	"getcred",
 42
 43	"chmod",
 44	"chown",
 45	"chgrp",
 46	"lock",
 47
 48	"mmap",
 49	"mprot",
 50	"unknown",
 51	"unknown",
 52
 53	"accept",
 54	"bind",
 55	"listen",
 56	"unknown",
 57
 58	"setopt",
 59	"getopt",
 60	"unknown",
 61	"unknown",
 62
 63	"unknown",
 64	"unknown",
 65	"unknown",
 66	"unknown",
 67};
 68
 69
 70/* audit callback for net specific fields */
 71void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 72{
 73	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 
 74
 75	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
 76		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
 77				 address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
 78	else
 79		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
 80				 sa->u.net->family);
 81	if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
 82		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
 83				 sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
 84	else
 85		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
 86				 aad(sa)->net.type);
 87	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
 88
 89	if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
 90		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
 91		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
 92				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 93
 94		if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
 95			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
 96			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
 97					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 98		}
 99	}
100	if (aad(sa)->peer) {
101		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
102		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
103				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
104	}
105}
106
107/* Generic af perm */
108int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
109		       u32 request, u16 family, int type)
 
110{
111	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
112						    typeof(*rules), list);
113	struct aa_perms perms = { };
114	aa_state_t state;
115	__be16 buffer[2];
116
117	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
118	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
119
120	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
121		return 0;
122	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
123	if (!state)
124		return 0;
125
126	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
127	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
128	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
129				 4);
130	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
131	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
132
133	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
134}
135
136int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
137	       int type, int protocol)
138{
139	struct aa_profile *profile;
140	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
141
142	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
143			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
144					   type));
145}
146
147static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
 
 
148			    struct sock *sk)
149{
150	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
151	int error = 0;
152
153	AA_BUG(!label);
154	AA_BUG(!sk);
155
156	if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
157		struct aa_profile *profile;
158		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
159
 
160		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
161			    aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
162	}
163
164	return error;
165}
166
167int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
168{
169	struct aa_label *label;
170	int error;
171
172	AA_BUG(!sk);
173	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
174
175	/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
176	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
177	error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
178	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
179
180	return error;
181}
182
183
184int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
185		      struct socket *sock)
186{
187	AA_BUG(!label);
188	AA_BUG(!sock);
189	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
190
191	return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
192}
193
194#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
195static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
196{
197	struct aa_label *label;
198
199	if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
200		secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
201		return 0;
202	}
203
204	label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
205				    secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
206				    GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
207
208	if (IS_ERR(label))
209		return PTR_ERR(label);
210
211	secmark->secid = label->secid;
212
213	return 0;
214}
215
216static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
217			   struct common_audit_data *sa)
218{
219	int i, ret;
220	struct aa_perms perms = { };
221	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
222						    typeof(*rules), list);
223
224	if (rules->secmark_count == 0)
225		return 0;
226
227	for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) {
228		if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) {
229			ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&rules->secmark[i]);
230			if (ret)
231				return ret;
232		}
233
234		if (rules->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
235		    rules->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
236			if (rules->secmark[i].deny)
237				perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
238			else
239				perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
240
241			if (rules->secmark[i].audit)
242				perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
243		}
244	}
245
246	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
247
248	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
249}
250
251int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
252			   u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
253{
254	struct aa_profile *profile;
255	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
256
257	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
258				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
259						    &sa));
260}
261#endif