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1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2/*
3 * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
4 *
5 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
6 * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
7 */
8
9#include <linux/tcp.h>
10#include <linux/siphash.h>
11#include <linux/kernel.h>
12#include <linux/export.h>
13#include <net/secure_seq.h>
14#include <net/tcp.h>
15#include <net/route.h>
16
17static siphash_aligned_key_t syncookie_secret[2];
18
19#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
20#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
21
22/* TCP Timestamp: 6 lowest bits of timestamp sent in the cookie SYN-ACK
23 * stores TCP options:
24 *
25 * MSB LSB
26 * | 31 ... 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 2 1 0 |
27 * | Timestamp | ECN | SACK | WScale |
28 *
29 * When we receive a valid cookie-ACK, we look at the echoed tsval (if
30 * any) to figure out which TCP options we should use for the rebuilt
31 * connection.
32 *
33 * A WScale setting of '0xf' (which is an invalid scaling value)
34 * means that original syn did not include the TCP window scaling option.
35 */
36#define TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK 0xf
37#define TS_OPT_SACK BIT(4)
38#define TS_OPT_ECN BIT(5)
39/* There is no TS_OPT_TIMESTAMP:
40 * if ACK contains timestamp option, we already know it was
41 * requested/supported by the syn/synack exchange.
42 */
43#define TSBITS 6
44
45static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
46 u32 count, int c)
47{
48 net_get_random_once(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
49 return siphash_4u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr,
50 (__force u32)sport << 16 | (__force u32)dport,
51 count, &syncookie_secret[c]);
52}
53
54/*
55 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode
56 * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be
57 * sent in the syn-ack.
58 * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we
59 * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp.
60 */
61u64 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req, u64 now)
62{
63 const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
64 u64 ts, ts_now = tcp_ns_to_ts(false, now);
65 u32 options = 0;
66
67 options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK;
68 if (ireq->sack_ok)
69 options |= TS_OPT_SACK;
70 if (ireq->ecn_ok)
71 options |= TS_OPT_ECN;
72
73 ts = (ts_now >> TSBITS) << TSBITS;
74 ts |= options;
75 if (ts > ts_now)
76 ts -= (1UL << TSBITS);
77
78 if (tcp_rsk(req)->req_usec_ts)
79 return ts * NSEC_PER_USEC;
80 return ts * NSEC_PER_MSEC;
81}
82
83
84static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
85 __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data)
86{
87 /*
88 * Compute the secure sequence number.
89 * The output should be:
90 * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
91 * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
92 * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
93 * minute by 1.
94 * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
95 * MSS into the second hash value.
96 */
97 u32 count = tcp_cookie_time();
98 return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
99 sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
100 ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
101 & COOKIEMASK));
102}
103
104/*
105 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
106 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
107 * range. This must be checked by the caller.
108 *
109 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be less than
110 * MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE minutes in the past.
111 * The return value (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
112 */
113static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
114 __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq)
115{
116 u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time();
117
118 /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
119 cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
120
121 /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
122 diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS);
123 if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE)
124 return (__u32)-1;
125
126 return (cookie -
127 cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
128 & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
129}
130
131/*
132 * MSS Values are chosen based on the 2011 paper
133 * 'An Analysis of TCP Maximum Segement Sizes' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson.
134 * Values ..
135 * .. lower than 536 are rare (< 0.2%)
136 * .. between 537 and 1299 account for less than < 1.5% of observed values
137 * .. in the 1300-1349 range account for about 15 to 20% of observed mss values
138 * .. exceeding 1460 are very rare (< 0.04%)
139 *
140 * 1460 is the single most frequently announced mss value (30 to 46% depending
141 * on monitor location). Table must be sorted.
142 */
143static __u16 const msstab[] = {
144 536,
145 1300,
146 1440, /* 1440, 1452: PPPoE */
147 1460,
148};
149
150/*
151 * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
152 * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
153 */
154u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
155 u16 *mssp)
156{
157 int mssind;
158 const __u16 mss = *mssp;
159
160 for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--)
161 if (mss >= msstab[mssind])
162 break;
163 *mssp = msstab[mssind];
164
165 return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
166 th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
167 mssind);
168}
169EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence);
170
171__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp)
172{
173 const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
174 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
175
176 return __cookie_v4_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp);
177}
178
179/*
180 * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
181 * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
182 */
183int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th)
184{
185 __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
186 __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
187 __u32 mssind;
188
189 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
190 th->source, th->dest, seq);
191
192 return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
193}
194EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_check);
195
196struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
197 struct request_sock *req,
198 struct dst_entry *dst)
199{
200 struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
201 struct sock *child;
202 bool own_req;
203
204 child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
205 NULL, &own_req);
206 if (child) {
207 refcount_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 1);
208 sock_rps_save_rxhash(child, skb);
209
210 if (rsk_drop_req(req)) {
211 reqsk_put(req);
212 return child;
213 }
214
215 if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child))
216 return child;
217
218 bh_unlock_sock(child);
219 sock_put(child);
220 }
221 __reqsk_free(req);
222
223 return NULL;
224}
225EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_get_cookie_sock);
226
227/*
228 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
229 * additional tcp options in the timestamp.
230 * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo.
231 *
232 * return false if we decode a tcp option that is disabled
233 * on the host.
234 */
235bool cookie_timestamp_decode(const struct net *net,
236 struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt)
237{
238 /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
239 u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr;
240
241 if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) {
242 tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt);
243 return true;
244 }
245
246 if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps))
247 return false;
248
249 tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & TS_OPT_SACK) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0;
250
251 if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack))
252 return false;
253
254 if ((options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK) == TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK)
255 return true; /* no window scaling */
256
257 tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1;
258 tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK;
259
260 return READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling) != 0;
261}
262EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_timestamp_decode);
263
264static int cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
265 struct request_sock *req)
266{
267 struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
268 struct tcp_request_sock *treq = tcp_rsk(req);
269 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
270
271 req->num_retrans = 0;
272
273 ireq->ir_num = ntohs(th->dest);
274 ireq->ir_rmt_port = th->source;
275 ireq->ir_iif = inet_request_bound_dev_if(sk, skb);
276 ireq->ir_mark = inet_request_mark(sk, skb);
277
278 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC))
279 ireq->smc_ok = 0;
280
281 treq->snt_synack = 0;
282 treq->tfo_listener = false;
283 treq->txhash = net_tx_rndhash();
284 treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
285 treq->snt_isn = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
286 treq->syn_tos = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield;
287 treq->req_usec_ts = false;
288
289#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP)
290 treq->is_mptcp = sk_is_mptcp(sk);
291 if (treq->is_mptcp)
292 return mptcp_subflow_init_cookie_req(req, sk, skb);
293#endif
294
295 return 0;
296}
297
298#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF)
299struct request_sock *cookie_bpf_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
300{
301 struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(skb->sk);
302
303 skb->sk = NULL;
304 skb->destructor = NULL;
305
306 if (cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(sk, skb, req)) {
307 reqsk_free(req);
308 req = NULL;
309 }
310
311 return req;
312}
313EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cookie_bpf_check);
314#endif
315
316struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(const struct request_sock_ops *ops,
317 struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
318 struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt,
319 int mss, u32 tsoff)
320{
321 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
322 struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
323 struct request_sock *req;
324
325 if (sk_is_mptcp(sk))
326 req = mptcp_subflow_reqsk_alloc(ops, sk, false);
327 else
328 req = inet_reqsk_alloc(ops, sk, false);
329
330 if (!req)
331 return NULL;
332
333 if (cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(sk, skb, req)) {
334 reqsk_free(req);
335 return NULL;
336 }
337
338 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
339 treq = tcp_rsk(req);
340
341 req->mss = mss;
342 req->ts_recent = tcp_opt->saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt->rcv_tsval : 0;
343
344 ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt->snd_wscale;
345 ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt->saw_tstamp;
346 ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt->sack_ok;
347 ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt->wscale_ok;
348 ireq->ecn_ok = !!(tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TS_OPT_ECN);
349
350 treq->ts_off = tsoff;
351
352 return req;
353}
354EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc);
355
356static struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_check(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
357 struct sk_buff *skb)
358{
359 struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
360 u32 tsoff = 0;
361 int mss;
362
363 if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk))
364 goto out;
365
366 mss = __cookie_v4_check(ip_hdr(skb), tcp_hdr(skb));
367 if (!mss) {
368 __NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
369 goto out;
370 }
371
372 __NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
373
374 /* check for timestamp cookie support */
375 memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
376 tcp_parse_options(net, skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
377
378 if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
379 tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(net,
380 ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
381 ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
382 tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
383 }
384
385 if (!cookie_timestamp_decode(net, &tcp_opt))
386 goto out;
387
388 return cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops, sk, skb,
389 &tcp_opt, mss, tsoff);
390out:
391 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
392}
393
394/* On input, sk is a listener.
395 * Output is listener if incoming packet would not create a child
396 * NULL if memory could not be allocated.
397 */
398struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
399{
400 struct ip_options *opt = &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4.opt;
401 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
402 struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
403 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
404 struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
405 struct request_sock *req;
406 struct sock *ret = sk;
407 struct flowi4 fl4;
408 struct rtable *rt;
409 __u8 rcv_wscale;
410 int full_space;
411 SKB_DR(reason);
412
413 if (!READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies) ||
414 !th->ack || th->rst)
415 goto out;
416
417 if (cookie_bpf_ok(skb)) {
418 req = cookie_bpf_check(sk, skb);
419 } else {
420 req = cookie_tcp_check(net, sk, skb);
421 if (IS_ERR(req))
422 goto out;
423 }
424 if (!req) {
425 SKB_DR_SET(reason, NO_SOCKET);
426 goto out_drop;
427 }
428
429 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
430
431 sk_rcv_saddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->daddr);
432 sk_daddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
433
434 /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
435 * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
436 */
437 RCU_INIT_POINTER(ireq->ireq_opt, tcp_v4_save_options(net, skb));
438
439 if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
440 SKB_DR_SET(reason, SECURITY_HOOK);
441 goto out_free;
442 }
443
444 tcp_ao_syncookie(sk, skb, req, AF_INET);
445
446 /*
447 * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
448 * window size. We should better make sure that the window size
449 * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
450 * no easy way to do this.
451 */
452 flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ireq->ir_iif, ireq->ir_mark,
453 ip_sock_rt_tos(sk), ip_sock_rt_scope(sk),
454 IPPROTO_TCP, inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
455 opt->srr ? opt->faddr : ireq->ir_rmt_addr,
456 ireq->ir_loc_addr, th->source, th->dest, sk->sk_uid);
457 security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi_common(&fl4));
458 rt = ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
459 if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
460 SKB_DR_SET(reason, IP_OUTNOROUTES);
461 goto out_free;
462 }
463
464 /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
465 req->rsk_window_clamp = READ_ONCE(tp->window_clamp) ? :
466 dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
467 /* limit the window selection if the user enforce a smaller rx buffer */
468 full_space = tcp_full_space(sk);
469 if (sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK &&
470 (req->rsk_window_clamp > full_space || req->rsk_window_clamp == 0))
471 req->rsk_window_clamp = full_space;
472
473 tcp_select_initial_window(sk, full_space, req->mss,
474 &req->rsk_rcv_wnd, &req->rsk_window_clamp,
475 ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
476 dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
477
478 /* req->syncookie is set true only if ACK is validated
479 * by BPF kfunc, then, rcv_wscale is already configured.
480 */
481 if (!req->syncookie)
482 ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
483 ireq->ecn_ok &= cookie_ecn_ok(net, &rt->dst);
484
485 ret = tcp_get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
486 /* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
487 * Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock()
488 */
489 if (!ret) {
490 SKB_DR_SET(reason, NO_SOCKET);
491 goto out_drop;
492 }
493 inet_sk(ret)->cork.fl.u.ip4 = fl4;
494out:
495 return ret;
496out_free:
497 reqsk_free(req);
498out_drop:
499 sk_skb_reason_drop(sk, skb, reason);
500 return NULL;
501}
1/*
2 * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
3 *
4 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
5 * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
6 *
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
8 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
9 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
10 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
11 */
12
13#include <linux/tcp.h>
14#include <linux/slab.h>
15#include <linux/random.h>
16#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
17#include <linux/kernel.h>
18#include <linux/export.h>
19#include <net/tcp.h>
20#include <net/route.h>
21
22/* Timestamps: lowest bits store TCP options */
23#define TSBITS 6
24#define TSMASK (((__u32)1 << TSBITS) - 1)
25
26extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies;
27
28static u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS];
29
30#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
31#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
32
33static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS],
34 ipv4_cookie_scratch);
35
36static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
37 u32 count, int c)
38{
39 __u32 *tmp;
40
41 net_get_random_once(syncookie_secret, sizeof(syncookie_secret));
42
43 tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch);
44 memcpy(tmp + 4, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
45 tmp[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
46 tmp[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
47 tmp[2] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport;
48 tmp[3] = count;
49 sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5);
50
51 return tmp[17];
52}
53
54
55/*
56 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode
57 * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be
58 * sent in the syn-ack.
59 * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we
60 * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp.
61 */
62__u32 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req)
63{
64 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
65 u32 ts, ts_now = tcp_time_stamp;
66 u32 options = 0;
67
68 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
69
70 options = ireq->wscale_ok ? ireq->snd_wscale : 0xf;
71 options |= ireq->sack_ok << 4;
72 options |= ireq->ecn_ok << 5;
73
74 ts = ts_now & ~TSMASK;
75 ts |= options;
76 if (ts > ts_now) {
77 ts >>= TSBITS;
78 ts--;
79 ts <<= TSBITS;
80 ts |= options;
81 }
82 return ts;
83}
84
85
86static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
87 __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data)
88{
89 /*
90 * Compute the secure sequence number.
91 * The output should be:
92 * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
93 * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
94 * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
95 * minute by 1.
96 * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
97 * MSS into the second hash value.
98 */
99 u32 count = tcp_cookie_time();
100 return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
101 sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
102 ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
103 & COOKIEMASK));
104}
105
106/*
107 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
108 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
109 * range. This must be checked by the caller.
110 *
111 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be less than
112 * MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE minutes in the past.
113 * The return value (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
114 */
115static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
116 __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq)
117{
118 u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time();
119
120 /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
121 cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
122
123 /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
124 diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS);
125 if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE)
126 return (__u32)-1;
127
128 return (cookie -
129 cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count - diff, 1))
130 & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
131}
132
133/*
134 * MSS Values are chosen based on the 2011 paper
135 * 'An Analysis of TCP Maximum Segement Sizes' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson.
136 * Values ..
137 * .. lower than 536 are rare (< 0.2%)
138 * .. between 537 and 1299 account for less than < 1.5% of observed values
139 * .. in the 1300-1349 range account for about 15 to 20% of observed mss values
140 * .. exceeding 1460 are very rare (< 0.04%)
141 *
142 * 1460 is the single most frequently announced mss value (30 to 46% depending
143 * on monitor location). Table must be sorted.
144 */
145static __u16 const msstab[] = {
146 536,
147 1300,
148 1440, /* 1440, 1452: PPPoE */
149 1460,
150};
151
152/*
153 * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
154 * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
155 */
156u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
157 u16 *mssp)
158{
159 int mssind;
160 const __u16 mss = *mssp;
161
162 for (mssind = ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) - 1; mssind ; mssind--)
163 if (mss >= msstab[mssind])
164 break;
165 *mssp = msstab[mssind];
166
167 return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
168 th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
169 mssind);
170}
171EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence);
172
173__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp)
174{
175 const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
176 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
177
178 tcp_synq_overflow(sk);
179 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESSENT);
180
181 return __cookie_v4_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp);
182}
183
184/*
185 * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
186 * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
187 */
188int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
189 u32 cookie)
190{
191 __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
192 __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
193 th->source, th->dest, seq);
194
195 return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
196}
197EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_check);
198
199static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
200 struct request_sock *req,
201 struct dst_entry *dst)
202{
203 struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
204 struct sock *child;
205
206 child = icsk->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
207 if (child)
208 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk, req, child);
209 else
210 reqsk_free(req);
211
212 return child;
213}
214
215
216/*
217 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
218 * additional tcp options in the timestamp.
219 * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo.
220 *
221 * The lowest 4 bits store snd_wscale.
222 * next 2 bits indicate SACK and ECN support.
223 *
224 * return false if we decode an option that should not be.
225 */
226bool cookie_check_timestamp(struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt,
227 struct net *net, bool *ecn_ok)
228{
229 /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
230 u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TSMASK;
231
232 if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) {
233 tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt);
234 return true;
235 }
236
237 if (!sysctl_tcp_timestamps)
238 return false;
239
240 tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options & (1 << 4)) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN : 0;
241 *ecn_ok = (options >> 5) & 1;
242 if (*ecn_ok && !net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn)
243 return false;
244
245 if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !sysctl_tcp_sack)
246 return false;
247
248 if ((options & 0xf) == 0xf)
249 return true; /* no window scaling */
250
251 tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1;
252 tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & 0xf;
253 return sysctl_tcp_window_scaling != 0;
254}
255EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_check_timestamp);
256
257struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
258 struct ip_options *opt)
259{
260 struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
261 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
262 struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
263 struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
264 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
265 __u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
266 struct sock *ret = sk;
267 struct request_sock *req;
268 int mss;
269 struct rtable *rt;
270 __u8 rcv_wscale;
271 bool ecn_ok = false;
272 struct flowi4 fl4;
273
274 if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
275 goto out;
276
277 if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk) ||
278 (mss = __cookie_v4_check(ip_hdr(skb), th, cookie)) == 0) {
279 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
280 goto out;
281 }
282
283 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
284
285 /* check for timestamp cookie support */
286 memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
287 tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
288
289 if (!cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt, sock_net(sk), &ecn_ok))
290 goto out;
291
292 ret = NULL;
293 req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops); /* for safety */
294 if (!req)
295 goto out;
296
297 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
298 treq = tcp_rsk(req);
299 treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
300 treq->snt_isn = cookie;
301 req->mss = mss;
302 ireq->ir_num = ntohs(th->dest);
303 ireq->ir_rmt_port = th->source;
304 ireq->ir_loc_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
305 ireq->ir_rmt_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
306 ireq->ecn_ok = ecn_ok;
307 ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale;
308 ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok;
309 ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok;
310 ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
311 req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
312 treq->snt_synack = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr : 0;
313 treq->listener = NULL;
314
315 /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
316 * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
317 */
318 if (opt && opt->optlen) {
319 int opt_size = sizeof(struct ip_options_rcu) + opt->optlen;
320
321 ireq->opt = kmalloc(opt_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
322 if (ireq->opt != NULL && ip_options_echo(&ireq->opt->opt, skb)) {
323 kfree(ireq->opt);
324 ireq->opt = NULL;
325 }
326 }
327
328 if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
329 reqsk_free(req);
330 goto out;
331 }
332
333 req->expires = 0UL;
334 req->num_retrans = 0;
335
336 /*
337 * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
338 * window size. We should better make sure that the window size
339 * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
340 * no easy way to do this.
341 */
342 flowi4_init_output(&fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_mark,
343 RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, IPPROTO_TCP,
344 inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
345 (opt && opt->srr) ? opt->faddr : ireq->ir_rmt_addr,
346 ireq->ir_loc_addr, th->source, th->dest);
347 security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
348 rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
349 if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
350 reqsk_free(req);
351 goto out;
352 }
353
354 /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
355 req->window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
356
357 tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
358 &req->rcv_wnd, &req->window_clamp,
359 ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
360 dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
361
362 ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
363
364 ret = get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
365 /* ip_queue_xmit() depends on our flow being setup
366 * Normal sockets get it right from inet_csk_route_child_sock()
367 */
368 if (ret)
369 inet_sk(ret)->cork.fl.u.ip4 = fl4;
370out: return ret;
371}