Loading...
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors:
8 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
9 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
13 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
15 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
16 */
17
18#include <linux/xattr.h>
19#include <linux/pagemap.h>
20#include <linux/mount.h>
21#include <linux/stat.h>
22#include <linux/kd.h>
23#include <asm/ioctls.h>
24#include <linux/ip.h>
25#include <linux/tcp.h>
26#include <linux/udp.h>
27#include <linux/dccp.h>
28#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
29#include <linux/slab.h>
30#include <linux/mutex.h>
31#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
32#include <net/ip.h>
33#include <net/ipv6.h>
34#include <linux/audit.h>
35#include <linux/magic.h>
36#include <linux/dcache.h>
37#include <linux/personality.h>
38#include <linux/msg.h>
39#include <linux/shm.h>
40#include <uapi/linux/shm.h>
41#include <linux/binfmts.h>
42#include <linux/parser.h>
43#include <linux/fs_context.h>
44#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
45#include <linux/watch_queue.h>
46#include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h>
47#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
48#include "smack.h"
49
50#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
51#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
52
53#define SMK_CONNECTING 0
54#define SMK_RECEIVING 1
55#define SMK_SENDING 2
56
57/*
58 * Smack uses multiple xattrs.
59 * SMACK64 - for access control,
60 * SMACK64TRANSMUTE - label initialization,
61 * Not saved on files - SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT,
62 * Must be set explicitly - SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP
63 */
64#define SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 2
65
66#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
67static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
68static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
69#endif
70struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
71int smack_enabled __initdata;
72
73#define A(s) {"smack"#s, sizeof("smack"#s) - 1, Opt_##s}
74static struct {
75 const char *name;
76 int len;
77 int opt;
78} smk_mount_opts[] = {
79 {"smackfsdef", sizeof("smackfsdef") - 1, Opt_fsdefault},
80 A(fsdefault), A(fsfloor), A(fshat), A(fsroot), A(fstransmute)
81};
82#undef A
83
84static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
85{
86 int i;
87
88 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smk_mount_opts); i++) {
89 size_t len = smk_mount_opts[i].len;
90 if (len > l || memcmp(s, smk_mount_opts[i].name, len))
91 continue;
92 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
93 continue;
94 *arg = s + len + 1;
95 return smk_mount_opts[i].opt;
96 }
97 return Opt_error;
98}
99
100#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
101static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
102 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
103 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
104 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
105 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
106};
107
108static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
109{
110 int i = 0;
111
112 if (mode & MAY_READ)
113 s[i++] = 'r';
114 if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
115 s[i++] = 'w';
116 if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
117 s[i++] = 'x';
118 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
119 s[i++] = 'a';
120 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
121 s[i++] = 't';
122 if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
123 s[i++] = 'l';
124 if (i == 0)
125 s[i++] = '-';
126 s[i] = '\0';
127}
128#endif
129
130#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
131static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
132 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
133{
134 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
135
136 if (rc <= 0)
137 return rc;
138 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
139 rc = 0;
140
141 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
142 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
143 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
144 return 0;
145}
146#else
147#define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
148#endif
149
150#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
151static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
152 int mode, int rc)
153{
154 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
155 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
156
157 if (rc <= 0)
158 return rc;
159 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
160 rc = 0;
161
162 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
163 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
164 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
165 acc, current->comm, note);
166 return 0;
167}
168#else
169#define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
170#endif
171
172#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
173static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
174{
175 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
176 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct_obj(otp);
177 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
178
179 if (rc <= 0)
180 return rc;
181 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
182 rc = 0;
183
184 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
185 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
186 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
187 current->comm, otp->comm);
188 return 0;
189}
190#else
191#define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
192#endif
193
194#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
195static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
196{
197 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
198 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
199 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
200
201 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
202 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
203 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
204
205 if (rc <= 0)
206 return rc;
207 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
208 rc = 0;
209 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
210 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
211 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
212
213 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
214
215 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
216 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
217 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
218 return 0;
219}
220#else
221#define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
222#endif
223
224#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
225static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
226{
227 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
228 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
229 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
230 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
231 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
232
233 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
234 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
236
237 if (rc <= 0)
238 return rc;
239 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
240 rc = 0;
241
242 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
243 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
244 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
245 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
246 current->comm);
247 return 0;
248}
249#else
250#define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
251#endif
252
253#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
254static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
255 int mode, int rc)
256{
257 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
258 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
259 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
260 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
261 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
262
263 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
264 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
265 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
266
267 if (rc <= 0)
268 return rc;
269 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
270 rc = 0;
271
272 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
273 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
274 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
275 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
276 current->comm);
277 return 0;
278}
279#else
280#define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
281#endif
282
283/**
284 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
285 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
286 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
287 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
288 *
289 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
290 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
291 */
292static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
293 struct dentry *dp)
294{
295 int rc;
296 char *buffer;
297 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
298
299 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
300 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
301
302 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS);
303 if (buffer == NULL)
304 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
305
306 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
307 if (rc < 0)
308 skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
309 else if (rc == 0)
310 skp = NULL;
311 else
312 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
313
314 kfree(buffer);
315
316 return skp;
317}
318
319/**
320 * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
321 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
322 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
323 *
324 */
325static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
326{
327 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
328
329 isp->smk_inode = skp;
330 isp->smk_flags = 0;
331}
332
333/**
334 * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
335 * @tsp: blob to initialize
336 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
337 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
338 *
339 */
340static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
341 struct smack_known *forked)
342{
343 tsp->smk_task = task;
344 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
345 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
346 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
347 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
348}
349
350/**
351 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
352 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
353 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
354 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
355 *
356 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
357 */
358static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
359 gfp_t gfp)
360{
361 struct smack_rule *nrp;
362 struct smack_rule *orp;
363 int rc = 0;
364
365 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
366 nrp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_rule_cache, gfp);
367 if (nrp == NULL) {
368 rc = -ENOMEM;
369 break;
370 }
371 *nrp = *orp;
372 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
373 }
374 return rc;
375}
376
377/**
378 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
379 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
380 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
381 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
382 *
383 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
384 */
385static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
386 gfp_t gfp)
387{
388 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
389 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
390
391 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
392 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
393 if (nklep == NULL) {
394 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
395 return -ENOMEM;
396 }
397 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
398 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
399 }
400
401 return 0;
402}
403
404/**
405 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
406 * @mode: input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
407 *
408 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
409 */
410static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
411{
412 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
413 return MAY_READWRITE;
414 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
415 return MAY_READ;
416
417 return 0;
418}
419
420/**
421 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
422 * @tracer: tracer process
423 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
424 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
425 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
426 *
427 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
428 */
429static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
430 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
431 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
432{
433 int rc;
434 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
435 struct task_smack *tsp;
436 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
437 const struct cred *tracercred;
438
439 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
440 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
441 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
442 saip = &ad;
443 }
444
445 rcu_read_lock();
446 tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
447 tsp = smack_cred(tracercred);
448 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
449
450 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
451 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
452 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
453 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
454 rc = 0;
455 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
456 rc = -EACCES;
457 else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
458 rc = 0;
459 else
460 rc = -EACCES;
461
462 if (saip)
463 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
464 tracee_known->smk_known,
465 0, rc, saip);
466
467 rcu_read_unlock();
468 return rc;
469 }
470
471 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
472 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
473
474 rcu_read_unlock();
475 return rc;
476}
477
478/*
479 * LSM hooks.
480 * We he, that is fun!
481 */
482
483/**
484 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
485 * @ctp: child task pointer
486 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
487 *
488 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
489 *
490 * Do the capability checks.
491 */
492static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
493{
494 struct smack_known *skp;
495
496 skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(ctp);
497
498 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
499}
500
501/**
502 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
503 * @ptp: parent task pointer
504 *
505 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
506 *
507 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
508 */
509static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
510{
511 struct smack_known *skp;
512
513 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
514
515 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
516}
517
518/**
519 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
520 * @typefrom_file: unused
521 *
522 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
523 */
524static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
525{
526 int rc = 0;
527 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
528
529 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
530 return 0;
531
532 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
533 rc = -EACCES;
534
535 return rc;
536}
537
538/*
539 * Superblock Hooks.
540 */
541
542/**
543 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
544 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
545 *
546 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
547 */
548static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
549{
550 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
551
552 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
553 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
554 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
555 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
556 /*
557 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
558 */
559
560 return 0;
561}
562
563struct smack_mnt_opts {
564 const char *fsdefault;
565 const char *fsfloor;
566 const char *fshat;
567 const char *fsroot;
568 const char *fstransmute;
569};
570
571static void smack_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
572{
573 kfree(mnt_opts);
574}
575
576static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
577{
578 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
579 struct smack_known *skp;
580
581 if (!opts) {
582 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
583 if (!opts)
584 return -ENOMEM;
585 *mnt_opts = opts;
586 }
587 if (!s)
588 return -ENOMEM;
589
590 skp = smk_import_entry(s, 0);
591 if (IS_ERR(skp))
592 return PTR_ERR(skp);
593
594 switch (token) {
595 case Opt_fsdefault:
596 if (opts->fsdefault)
597 goto out_opt_err;
598 opts->fsdefault = skp->smk_known;
599 break;
600 case Opt_fsfloor:
601 if (opts->fsfloor)
602 goto out_opt_err;
603 opts->fsfloor = skp->smk_known;
604 break;
605 case Opt_fshat:
606 if (opts->fshat)
607 goto out_opt_err;
608 opts->fshat = skp->smk_known;
609 break;
610 case Opt_fsroot:
611 if (opts->fsroot)
612 goto out_opt_err;
613 opts->fsroot = skp->smk_known;
614 break;
615 case Opt_fstransmute:
616 if (opts->fstransmute)
617 goto out_opt_err;
618 opts->fstransmute = skp->smk_known;
619 break;
620 }
621 return 0;
622
623out_opt_err:
624 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
625 return -EINVAL;
626}
627
628/**
629 * smack_fs_context_submount - Initialise security data for a filesystem context
630 * @fc: The filesystem context.
631 * @reference: reference superblock
632 *
633 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
634 */
635static int smack_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
636 struct super_block *reference)
637{
638 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
639 struct smack_mnt_opts *ctx;
640 struct inode_smack *isp;
641
642 ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
643 if (!ctx)
644 return -ENOMEM;
645 fc->security = ctx;
646
647 sbsp = smack_superblock(reference);
648 isp = smack_inode(reference->s_root->d_inode);
649
650 if (sbsp->smk_default) {
651 ctx->fsdefault = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_default->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
652 if (!ctx->fsdefault)
653 return -ENOMEM;
654 }
655
656 if (sbsp->smk_floor) {
657 ctx->fsfloor = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_floor->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
658 if (!ctx->fsfloor)
659 return -ENOMEM;
660 }
661
662 if (sbsp->smk_hat) {
663 ctx->fshat = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_hat->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
664 if (!ctx->fshat)
665 return -ENOMEM;
666 }
667
668 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
669 if (sbsp->smk_root) {
670 ctx->fstransmute = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_root->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
671 if (!ctx->fstransmute)
672 return -ENOMEM;
673 }
674 }
675 return 0;
676}
677
678/**
679 * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
680 * @fc: The new filesystem context.
681 * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
682 *
683 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
684 */
685static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
686 struct fs_context *src_fc)
687{
688 struct smack_mnt_opts *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
689
690 if (!src)
691 return 0;
692
693 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
694 if (!fc->security)
695 return -ENOMEM;
696
697 dst = fc->security;
698 dst->fsdefault = src->fsdefault;
699 dst->fsfloor = src->fsfloor;
700 dst->fshat = src->fshat;
701 dst->fsroot = src->fsroot;
702 dst->fstransmute = src->fstransmute;
703
704 return 0;
705}
706
707static const struct fs_parameter_spec smack_fs_parameters[] = {
708 fsparam_string("smackfsdef", Opt_fsdefault),
709 fsparam_string("smackfsdefault", Opt_fsdefault),
710 fsparam_string("smackfsfloor", Opt_fsfloor),
711 fsparam_string("smackfshat", Opt_fshat),
712 fsparam_string("smackfsroot", Opt_fsroot),
713 fsparam_string("smackfstransmute", Opt_fstransmute),
714 {}
715};
716
717/**
718 * smack_fs_context_parse_param - Parse a single mount parameter
719 * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
720 * @param: The parameter.
721 *
722 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOPARAM to pass the parameter on or anything else on
723 * error.
724 */
725static int smack_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
726 struct fs_parameter *param)
727{
728 struct fs_parse_result result;
729 int opt, rc;
730
731 opt = fs_parse(fc, smack_fs_parameters, param, &result);
732 if (opt < 0)
733 return opt;
734
735 rc = smack_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
736 if (!rc)
737 param->string = NULL;
738 return rc;
739}
740
741static int smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
742{
743 char *from = options, *to = options;
744 bool first = true;
745
746 while (1) {
747 char *next = strchr(from, ',');
748 int token, len, rc;
749 char *arg = NULL;
750
751 if (next)
752 len = next - from;
753 else
754 len = strlen(from);
755
756 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
757 if (token != Opt_error) {
758 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, from + len - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
759 rc = smack_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
760 kfree(arg);
761 if (unlikely(rc)) {
762 if (*mnt_opts)
763 smack_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
764 *mnt_opts = NULL;
765 return rc;
766 }
767 } else {
768 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
769 from--;
770 len++;
771 }
772 if (to != from)
773 memmove(to, from, len);
774 to += len;
775 first = false;
776 }
777 if (!from[len])
778 break;
779 from += len + 1;
780 }
781 *to = '\0';
782 return 0;
783}
784
785/**
786 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
787 * @sb: the file system superblock
788 * @mnt_opts: Smack mount options
789 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
790 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
791 *
792 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
793 *
794 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
795 * labels.
796 */
797static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
798 void *mnt_opts,
799 unsigned long kern_flags,
800 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
801{
802 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
803 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
804 struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
805 struct inode_smack *isp;
806 struct smack_known *skp;
807 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
808 bool transmute = false;
809
810 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
811 return 0;
812
813 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
814 /*
815 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
816 */
817 if (opts)
818 return -EPERM;
819 /*
820 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
821 */
822 skp = smk_of_current();
823 sp->smk_root = skp;
824 sp->smk_default = skp;
825 /*
826 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
827 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
828 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
829 */
830 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
831 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
832 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
833 transmute = true;
834 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
835 }
836 }
837
838 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
839
840 if (opts) {
841 if (opts->fsdefault) {
842 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsdefault, 0);
843 if (IS_ERR(skp))
844 return PTR_ERR(skp);
845 sp->smk_default = skp;
846 }
847 if (opts->fsfloor) {
848 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsfloor, 0);
849 if (IS_ERR(skp))
850 return PTR_ERR(skp);
851 sp->smk_floor = skp;
852 }
853 if (opts->fshat) {
854 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fshat, 0);
855 if (IS_ERR(skp))
856 return PTR_ERR(skp);
857 sp->smk_hat = skp;
858 }
859 if (opts->fsroot) {
860 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsroot, 0);
861 if (IS_ERR(skp))
862 return PTR_ERR(skp);
863 sp->smk_root = skp;
864 }
865 if (opts->fstransmute) {
866 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fstransmute, 0);
867 if (IS_ERR(skp))
868 return PTR_ERR(skp);
869 sp->smk_root = skp;
870 transmute = true;
871 }
872 }
873
874 /*
875 * Initialize the root inode.
876 */
877 init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
878
879 if (transmute) {
880 isp = smack_inode(inode);
881 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
882 }
883
884 return 0;
885}
886
887/**
888 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
889 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
890 *
891 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
892 * and error code otherwise
893 */
894static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
895{
896 struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
897 int rc;
898 struct smk_audit_info ad;
899
900 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
901 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
902
903 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
904 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
905 return rc;
906}
907
908/*
909 * BPRM hooks
910 */
911
912/**
913 * smack_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update bprm->cred if needed for exec
914 * @bprm: the exec information
915 *
916 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
917 */
918static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
919{
920 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
921 struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
922 struct inode_smack *isp;
923 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
924 int rc;
925
926 isp = smack_inode(inode);
927 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
928 return 0;
929
930 sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
931 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
932 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
933 return 0;
934
935 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
936 struct task_struct *tracer;
937 rc = 0;
938
939 rcu_read_lock();
940 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
941 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
942 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
943 isp->smk_task,
944 PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
945 __func__);
946 rcu_read_unlock();
947
948 if (rc != 0)
949 return rc;
950 }
951 if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
952 return -EPERM;
953
954 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
955 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
956
957 /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
958 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
959 bprm->secureexec = 1;
960
961 return 0;
962}
963
964/*
965 * Inode hooks
966 */
967
968/**
969 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
970 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
971 *
972 * Returns 0
973 */
974static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
975{
976 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
977
978 init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
979 return 0;
980}
981
982/**
983 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
984 * @inode: the newly created inode
985 * @dir: containing directory object
986 * @qstr: unused
987 * @xattrs: where to put the attributes
988 * @xattr_count: current number of LSM-provided xattrs (updated)
989 *
990 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
991 */
992static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
993 const struct qstr *qstr,
994 struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
995{
996 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
997 struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
998 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
999 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1000 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1001 struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
1002 int may;
1003
1004 /*
1005 * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
1006 * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
1007 */
1008 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) {
1009 rcu_read_lock();
1010 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1011 &skp->smk_rules);
1012 rcu_read_unlock();
1013 }
1014
1015 /*
1016 * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
1017 * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
1018 * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
1019 * Mark the inode as changed.
1020 */
1021 if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) ||
1022 (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1023 smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
1024 struct xattr *xattr_transmute;
1025
1026 /*
1027 * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
1028 * should have overridden the current cred, so the
1029 * inode label was already set correctly in
1030 * smack_inode_alloc_security().
1031 */
1032 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted)
1033 isp = issp->smk_inode = dsp;
1034
1035 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1036 xattr_transmute = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs,
1037 xattr_count);
1038 if (xattr_transmute) {
1039 xattr_transmute->value = kmemdup(TRANS_TRUE,
1040 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
1041 GFP_NOFS);
1042 if (!xattr_transmute->value)
1043 return -ENOMEM;
1044
1045 xattr_transmute->value_len = TRANS_TRUE_SIZE;
1046 xattr_transmute->name = XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE;
1047 }
1048 }
1049
1050 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
1051
1052 if (xattr) {
1053 xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1054 if (!xattr->value)
1055 return -ENOMEM;
1056
1057 xattr->value_len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1058 xattr->name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1059 }
1060
1061 return 0;
1062}
1063
1064/**
1065 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1066 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1067 * @dir: unused
1068 * @new_dentry: the new object
1069 *
1070 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1071 */
1072static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1073 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1074{
1075 struct smack_known *isp;
1076 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1077 int rc;
1078
1079 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1080 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1081
1082 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1083 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1084 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1085
1086 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1087 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1088 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1089 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1090 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1091 }
1092
1093 return rc;
1094}
1095
1096/**
1097 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1098 * @dir: containing directory object
1099 * @dentry: file to unlink
1100 *
1101 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1102 * and the object, error code otherwise
1103 */
1104static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1105{
1106 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1107 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1108 int rc;
1109
1110 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1111 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1112
1113 /*
1114 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1115 */
1116 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1117 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1118 if (rc == 0) {
1119 /*
1120 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1121 */
1122 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1123 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1124 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1125 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1126 }
1127 return rc;
1128}
1129
1130/**
1131 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1132 * @dir: containing directory object
1133 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1134 *
1135 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1136 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1137 */
1138static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1139{
1140 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1141 int rc;
1142
1143 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1144 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1145
1146 /*
1147 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1148 */
1149 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1150 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1151 if (rc == 0) {
1152 /*
1153 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1154 */
1155 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1156 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1157 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1158 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1159 }
1160
1161 return rc;
1162}
1163
1164/**
1165 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1166 * @old_inode: unused
1167 * @old_dentry: the old object
1168 * @new_inode: unused
1169 * @new_dentry: the new object
1170 *
1171 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1172 * new directories.
1173 *
1174 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1175 */
1176static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1177 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1178 struct inode *new_inode,
1179 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1180{
1181 int rc;
1182 struct smack_known *isp;
1183 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1184
1185 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1186 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1187
1188 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1189 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1190 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1191
1192 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1193 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1194 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1195 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1196 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1197 }
1198 return rc;
1199}
1200
1201/**
1202 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1203 * @inode: the inode in question
1204 * @mask: the access requested
1205 *
1206 * This is the important Smack hook.
1207 *
1208 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1209 */
1210static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1211{
1212 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1213 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1214 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1215 int rc;
1216
1217 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1218 /*
1219 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1220 */
1221 if (mask == 0)
1222 return 0;
1223
1224 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1225 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1226 return -EACCES;
1227 }
1228
1229 /* May be droppable after audit */
1230 if (no_block)
1231 return -ECHILD;
1232 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1233 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1234 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1235 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1236 return rc;
1237}
1238
1239/**
1240 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1241 * @idmap: idmap of the mount
1242 * @dentry: the object
1243 * @iattr: for the force flag
1244 *
1245 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1246 */
1247static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
1248 struct iattr *iattr)
1249{
1250 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1251 int rc;
1252
1253 /*
1254 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1255 */
1256 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1257 return 0;
1258 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1259 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1260
1261 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1262 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1263 return rc;
1264}
1265
1266/**
1267 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1268 * @path: path to extract the info from
1269 *
1270 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1271 */
1272static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1273{
1274 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1275 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1276 int rc;
1277
1278 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1279 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1280 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1281 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1282 return rc;
1283}
1284
1285/**
1286 * smack_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks?
1287 * @name: name of the xattr
1288 *
1289 * Returns 1 to indicate that Smack "owns" the access control rights to xattrs
1290 * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional
1291 * capability based access controls on this xattr. Returns 0 to indicate that
1292 * Smack does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is
1293 * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability
1294 * based controls.
1295 */
1296static int smack_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name)
1297{
1298 if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, strlen(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX)))
1299 return 0;
1300
1301 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1302 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1303 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1304 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1305 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0 ||
1306 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1307 return 1;
1308
1309 return 0;
1310}
1311
1312/**
1313 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1314 * @idmap: idmap of the mount
1315 * @dentry: the object
1316 * @name: name of the attribute
1317 * @value: value of the attribute
1318 * @size: size of the value
1319 * @flags: unused
1320 *
1321 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1322 *
1323 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1324 */
1325static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1326 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1327 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1328{
1329 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1330 struct smack_known *skp;
1331 int check_priv = 0;
1332 int check_import = 0;
1333 int check_star = 0;
1334 int rc = 0;
1335
1336 /*
1337 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1338 */
1339 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1340 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1341 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1342 check_priv = 1;
1343 check_import = 1;
1344 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1345 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1346 check_priv = 1;
1347 check_import = 1;
1348 check_star = 1;
1349 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1350 check_priv = 1;
1351 if (!S_ISDIR(d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_mode) ||
1352 size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1353 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1354 rc = -EINVAL;
1355 }
1356
1357 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1358 rc = -EPERM;
1359
1360 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1361 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1362 if (IS_ERR(skp))
1363 rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1364 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1365 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1366 rc = -EINVAL;
1367 }
1368
1369 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1370 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1371
1372 if (rc == 0) {
1373 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1374 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1375 }
1376
1377 return rc;
1378}
1379
1380/**
1381 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1382 * @dentry: object
1383 * @name: attribute name
1384 * @value: attribute value
1385 * @size: attribute size
1386 * @flags: unused
1387 *
1388 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1389 * in the master label list.
1390 */
1391static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1392 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1393{
1394 struct smack_known *skp;
1395 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1396
1397 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1398 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1399 return;
1400 }
1401
1402 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1403 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1404 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1405 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1406 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1407 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1408 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1409 isp->smk_task = skp;
1410 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1411 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1412 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1413 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1414 }
1415
1416 return;
1417}
1418
1419/**
1420 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1421 * @dentry: the object
1422 * @name: unused
1423 *
1424 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1425 */
1426static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1427{
1428 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1429 int rc;
1430
1431 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1432 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1433
1434 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1435 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1436 return rc;
1437}
1438
1439/**
1440 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1441 * @idmap: idmap of the mount
1442 * @dentry: the object
1443 * @name: name of the attribute
1444 *
1445 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1446 *
1447 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1448 */
1449static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1450 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1451{
1452 struct inode_smack *isp;
1453 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1454 int rc = 0;
1455
1456 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1457 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1458 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1459 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1460 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1461 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1462 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1463 rc = -EPERM;
1464 }
1465
1466 if (rc != 0)
1467 return rc;
1468
1469 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1470 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1471
1472 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1473 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1474 if (rc != 0)
1475 return rc;
1476
1477 isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1478 /*
1479 * Don't do anything special for these.
1480 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1481 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1482 */
1483 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1484 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1485 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
1486
1487 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1488 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1489 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1490 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1491 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1492 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1493 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1494
1495 return 0;
1496}
1497
1498/**
1499 * smack_inode_set_acl - Smack check for setting posix acls
1500 * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
1501 * @dentry: the object
1502 * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
1503 * @kacl: the posix acls
1504 *
1505 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1506 */
1507static int smack_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1508 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
1509 struct posix_acl *kacl)
1510{
1511 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1512 int rc;
1513
1514 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1515 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1516
1517 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1518 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1519 return rc;
1520}
1521
1522/**
1523 * smack_inode_get_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
1524 * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
1525 * @dentry: the object
1526 * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
1527 *
1528 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1529 */
1530static int smack_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1531 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
1532{
1533 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1534 int rc;
1535
1536 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1537 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1538
1539 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1540 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1541 return rc;
1542}
1543
1544/**
1545 * smack_inode_remove_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
1546 * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
1547 * @dentry: the object
1548 * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
1549 *
1550 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1551 */
1552static int smack_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1553 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
1554{
1555 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1556 int rc;
1557
1558 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1559 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1560
1561 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1562 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1563 return rc;
1564}
1565
1566/**
1567 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1568 * @idmap: idmap of the mount
1569 * @inode: the object
1570 * @name: attribute name
1571 * @buffer: where to put the result
1572 * @alloc: duplicate memory
1573 *
1574 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1575 */
1576static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1577 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
1578 void **buffer, bool alloc)
1579{
1580 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1581 struct socket *sock;
1582 struct super_block *sbp;
1583 struct inode *ip = inode;
1584 struct smack_known *isp;
1585 struct inode_smack *ispp;
1586 size_t label_len;
1587 char *label = NULL;
1588
1589 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1590 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1591 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1592 ispp = smack_inode(inode);
1593 if (ispp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE)
1594 label = TRANS_TRUE;
1595 else
1596 label = "";
1597 } else {
1598 /*
1599 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1600 */
1601 sbp = ip->i_sb;
1602 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1603 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1604
1605 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1606 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1607 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1608
1609 ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
1610
1611 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1612 isp = ssp->smk_in;
1613 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1614 isp = ssp->smk_out;
1615 else
1616 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1617 }
1618
1619 if (!label)
1620 label = isp->smk_known;
1621
1622 label_len = strlen(label);
1623
1624 if (alloc) {
1625 *buffer = kstrdup(label, GFP_KERNEL);
1626 if (*buffer == NULL)
1627 return -ENOMEM;
1628 }
1629
1630 return label_len;
1631}
1632
1633
1634/**
1635 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1636 * @inode: the object
1637 * @buffer: where they go
1638 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1639 */
1640static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1641 size_t buffer_size)
1642{
1643 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1644
1645 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1646 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1647
1648 return len;
1649}
1650
1651/**
1652 * smack_inode_getlsmprop - Extract inode's security id
1653 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1654 * @prop: where result will be saved
1655 */
1656static void smack_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop)
1657{
1658 prop->smack.skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1659}
1660
1661/*
1662 * File Hooks
1663 */
1664
1665/*
1666 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1667 *
1668 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1669 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1670 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1671 *
1672 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1673 * label changing that SELinux does.
1674 */
1675
1676/**
1677 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1678 * @file: the object
1679 *
1680 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1681 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1682 *
1683 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1684 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1685 *
1686 * Returns 0
1687 */
1688static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1689{
1690 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1691
1692 *blob = smk_of_current();
1693 return 0;
1694}
1695
1696/**
1697 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1698 * @file: the object
1699 * @cmd: what to do
1700 * @arg: unused
1701 *
1702 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1703 *
1704 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1705 */
1706static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1707 unsigned long arg)
1708{
1709 int rc = 0;
1710 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1711 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1712
1713 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1714 return 0;
1715
1716 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1717 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1718
1719 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1720 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1721 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1722 }
1723
1724 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1725 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1726 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1727 }
1728
1729 return rc;
1730}
1731
1732/**
1733 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1734 * @file: the object
1735 * @cmd: unused
1736 *
1737 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1738 */
1739static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1740{
1741 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1742 int rc;
1743 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1744
1745 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1746 return 0;
1747
1748 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1749 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1750 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1751 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1752 return rc;
1753}
1754
1755/**
1756 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1757 * @file: the object
1758 * @cmd: what action to check
1759 * @arg: unused
1760 *
1761 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1762 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1763 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1764 *
1765 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1766 */
1767static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1768 unsigned long arg)
1769{
1770 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1771 int rc = 0;
1772 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1773
1774 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1775 return 0;
1776
1777 switch (cmd) {
1778 case F_GETLK:
1779 break;
1780 case F_SETLK:
1781 case F_SETLKW:
1782 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1783 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1784 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1785 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1786 break;
1787 case F_SETOWN:
1788 case F_SETSIG:
1789 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1790 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1791 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1792 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1793 break;
1794 default:
1795 break;
1796 }
1797
1798 return rc;
1799}
1800
1801/**
1802 * smack_mmap_file - Check permissions for a mmap operation.
1803 * @file: contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1804 * @reqprot: contains the protection requested by the application.
1805 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1806 * @flags: contains the operational flags.
1807 *
1808 * The @file may be NULL, e.g. if mapping anonymous memory.
1809 *
1810 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1811 */
1812static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1813 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1814 unsigned long flags)
1815{
1816 struct smack_known *skp;
1817 struct smack_known *mkp;
1818 struct smack_rule *srp;
1819 struct task_smack *tsp;
1820 struct smack_known *okp;
1821 struct inode_smack *isp;
1822 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1823 int may;
1824 int mmay;
1825 int tmay;
1826 int rc;
1827
1828 if (file == NULL)
1829 return 0;
1830
1831 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
1832 return 0;
1833
1834 isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
1835 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1836 return 0;
1837 sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
1838 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1839 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1840 return -EACCES;
1841 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1842
1843 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1844 skp = smk_of_current();
1845 rc = 0;
1846
1847 rcu_read_lock();
1848 /*
1849 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1850 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1851 * to that rule's object label.
1852 */
1853 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1854 okp = srp->smk_object;
1855 /*
1856 * Matching labels always allows access.
1857 */
1858 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1859 continue;
1860 /*
1861 * If there is a matching local rule take
1862 * that into account as well.
1863 */
1864 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1865 okp->smk_known,
1866 &tsp->smk_rules);
1867 if (may == -ENOENT)
1868 may = srp->smk_access;
1869 else
1870 may &= srp->smk_access;
1871 /*
1872 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1873 * possibly have less access.
1874 */
1875 if (may == 0)
1876 continue;
1877
1878 /*
1879 * Fetch the global list entry.
1880 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1881 * can't have as much access as current.
1882 */
1883 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1884 &mkp->smk_rules);
1885 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1886 rc = -EACCES;
1887 break;
1888 }
1889 /*
1890 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1891 * potential access, too.
1892 */
1893 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1894 &tsp->smk_rules);
1895 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1896 mmay &= tmay;
1897
1898 /*
1899 * If there is any access available to current that is
1900 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1901 * deny access.
1902 */
1903 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1904 rc = -EACCES;
1905 break;
1906 }
1907 }
1908
1909 rcu_read_unlock();
1910
1911 return rc;
1912}
1913
1914/**
1915 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1916 * @file: object in question
1917 *
1918 */
1919static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1920{
1921 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1922
1923 *blob = smk_of_current();
1924}
1925
1926/**
1927 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1928 * @tsk: The target task
1929 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1930 * @signum: unused
1931 *
1932 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1933 *
1934 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1935 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1936 */
1937static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1938 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1939{
1940 struct smack_known **blob;
1941 struct smack_known *skp;
1942 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
1943 const struct cred *tcred;
1944 struct file *file;
1945 int rc;
1946 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1947
1948 /*
1949 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1950 */
1951 file = fown->file;
1952
1953 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1954 blob = smack_file(file);
1955 skp = *blob;
1956 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1957 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1958
1959 rcu_read_lock();
1960 tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
1961 if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
1962 rc = 0;
1963 rcu_read_unlock();
1964
1965 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1966 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1967 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1968 return rc;
1969}
1970
1971/**
1972 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1973 * @file: the object
1974 *
1975 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1976 */
1977static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1978{
1979 int rc;
1980 int may = 0;
1981 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1982 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1983 struct socket *sock;
1984 struct task_smack *tsp;
1985 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1986
1987 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1988 return 0;
1989
1990 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1991 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1992
1993 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
1994 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1995 ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
1996 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1997 /*
1998 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1999 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
2000 * write to the receiving process don't accept
2001 * the passed socket.
2002 */
2003 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2004 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
2005 if (rc < 0)
2006 return rc;
2007 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2008 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
2009 return rc;
2010 }
2011 /*
2012 * This code relies on bitmasks.
2013 */
2014 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2015 may = MAY_READ;
2016 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
2017 may |= MAY_WRITE;
2018
2019 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
2020 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
2021 return rc;
2022}
2023
2024/**
2025 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
2026 * @file: the object
2027 *
2028 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
2029 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
2030 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
2031 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
2032 *
2033 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
2034 */
2035static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
2036{
2037 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
2038 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2039 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2040 int rc;
2041
2042 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
2043 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
2044 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
2045 rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
2046
2047 return rc;
2048}
2049
2050/*
2051 * Task hooks
2052 */
2053
2054/**
2055 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
2056 * @cred: the new credentials
2057 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2058 *
2059 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
2060 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
2061 * complete without error.
2062 */
2063static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
2064{
2065 init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
2066 return 0;
2067}
2068
2069
2070/**
2071 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
2072 * @cred: the credentials in question
2073 *
2074 */
2075static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
2076{
2077 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
2078 struct smack_rule *rp;
2079 struct list_head *l;
2080 struct list_head *n;
2081
2082 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
2083
2084 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
2085 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
2086 list_del(&rp->list);
2087 kmem_cache_free(smack_rule_cache, rp);
2088 }
2089}
2090
2091/**
2092 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
2093 * @new: the new credentials
2094 * @old: the original credentials
2095 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2096 *
2097 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
2098 */
2099static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2100 gfp_t gfp)
2101{
2102 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
2103 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
2104 int rc;
2105
2106 init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
2107
2108 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2109 if (rc != 0)
2110 return rc;
2111
2112 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2113 gfp);
2114 return rc;
2115}
2116
2117/**
2118 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2119 * @new: the new credentials
2120 * @old: the original credentials
2121 *
2122 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2123 */
2124static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2125{
2126 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
2127 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
2128
2129 init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
2130}
2131
2132/**
2133 * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure
2134 * @cred: the object creds
2135 * @secid: where to put the result
2136 *
2137 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2138 */
2139static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
2140{
2141 struct smack_known *skp;
2142
2143 rcu_read_lock();
2144 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
2145 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2146 rcu_read_unlock();
2147}
2148
2149/**
2150 * smack_cred_getlsmprop - get the Smack label for a creds structure
2151 * @cred: the object creds
2152 * @prop: where to put the data
2153 *
2154 * Sets the Smack part of the ref
2155 */
2156static void smack_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *cred,
2157 struct lsm_prop *prop)
2158{
2159 rcu_read_lock();
2160 prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
2161 rcu_read_unlock();
2162}
2163
2164/**
2165 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2166 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2167 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2168 *
2169 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2170 */
2171static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2172{
2173 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
2174
2175 new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
2176 return 0;
2177}
2178
2179/**
2180 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2181 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2182 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2183 *
2184 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2185 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2186 */
2187static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2188 struct inode *inode)
2189{
2190 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2191 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
2192
2193 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2194 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2195 return 0;
2196}
2197
2198/**
2199 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2200 * @p: the task object
2201 * @access: the access requested
2202 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2203 *
2204 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2205 */
2206static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2207 const char *caller)
2208{
2209 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2210 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
2211 int rc;
2212
2213 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2214 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2215 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2216 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2217 return rc;
2218}
2219
2220/**
2221 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2222 * @p: the task object
2223 * @pgid: unused
2224 *
2225 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2226 */
2227static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2228{
2229 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2230}
2231
2232/**
2233 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2234 * @p: the object task
2235 *
2236 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2237 */
2238static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2239{
2240 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2241}
2242
2243/**
2244 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2245 * @p: the object task
2246 *
2247 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2248 */
2249static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2250{
2251 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2252}
2253
2254/**
2255 * smack_current_getlsmprop_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
2256 * @prop: where to put the result
2257 *
2258 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label.
2259 */
2260static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
2261{
2262 prop->smack.skp = smk_of_current();
2263}
2264
2265/**
2266 * smack_task_getlsmprop_obj - get the objective data of the task
2267 * @p: the task
2268 * @prop: where to put the result
2269 *
2270 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label.
2271 */
2272static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
2273 struct lsm_prop *prop)
2274{
2275 prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
2276}
2277
2278/**
2279 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2280 * @p: the task object
2281 * @nice: unused
2282 *
2283 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2284 */
2285static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2286{
2287 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2288}
2289
2290/**
2291 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2292 * @p: the task object
2293 * @ioprio: unused
2294 *
2295 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2296 */
2297static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2298{
2299 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2300}
2301
2302/**
2303 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2304 * @p: the task object
2305 *
2306 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2307 */
2308static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2309{
2310 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2311}
2312
2313/**
2314 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2315 * @p: the task object
2316 *
2317 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2318 */
2319static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2320{
2321 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2322}
2323
2324/**
2325 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2326 * @p: the task object
2327 *
2328 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2329 */
2330static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2331{
2332 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2333}
2334
2335/**
2336 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2337 * @p: the task object
2338 *
2339 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2340 */
2341static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2342{
2343 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2344}
2345
2346/**
2347 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2348 * @p: the task object
2349 * @info: unused
2350 * @sig: unused
2351 * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
2352 *
2353 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2354 *
2355 */
2356static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
2357 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
2358{
2359 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2360 struct smack_known *skp;
2361 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
2362 int rc;
2363
2364 if (!sig)
2365 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2366
2367 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2368 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2369 /*
2370 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2371 * can write the receiver.
2372 */
2373 if (cred == NULL) {
2374 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2375 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2376 return rc;
2377 }
2378 /*
2379 * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
2380 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2381 * we can't take privilege into account.
2382 */
2383 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
2384 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2385 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2386 return rc;
2387}
2388
2389/**
2390 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2391 * @p: task to copy from
2392 * @inode: inode to copy to
2393 *
2394 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2395 */
2396static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2397{
2398 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2399 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
2400
2401 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2402 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2403}
2404
2405/*
2406 * Socket hooks.
2407 */
2408
2409/**
2410 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2411 * @sk: the socket
2412 * @family: unused
2413 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2414 *
2415 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2416 *
2417 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2418 */
2419static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2420{
2421 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2422 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
2423
2424 /*
2425 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2426 */
2427 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2428 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2429 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2430 } else {
2431 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2432 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2433 }
2434 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2435
2436 return 0;
2437}
2438
2439#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2440/**
2441 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2442 * @sk: the socket
2443 *
2444 * Clears the blob pointer
2445 */
2446static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2447{
2448 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2449
2450 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2451 rcu_read_lock();
2452 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2453 if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
2454 continue;
2455 spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
2456 break;
2457 }
2458 rcu_read_unlock();
2459 }
2460}
2461#endif
2462
2463/**
2464 * smack_sk_clone_security - Copy security context
2465 * @sk: the old socket
2466 * @newsk: the new socket
2467 *
2468 * Copy the security context of the old socket pointer to the cloned
2469 */
2470static void smack_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
2471{
2472 struct socket_smack *ssp_old = smack_sock(sk);
2473 struct socket_smack *ssp_new = smack_sock(newsk);
2474
2475 *ssp_new = *ssp_old;
2476}
2477
2478/**
2479* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2480* @sip: the object end
2481*
2482* looks for host based access restrictions
2483*
2484* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2485* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2486* taken before calling this function.
2487*
2488* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2489*/
2490static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2491{
2492 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2493 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2494
2495 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2496 return NULL;
2497
2498 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2499 /*
2500 * we break after finding the first match because
2501 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2502 * so we have found the most specific match
2503 */
2504 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2505 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2506 return snp->smk_label;
2507
2508 return NULL;
2509}
2510
2511/*
2512 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2513 * @sip: the address
2514 *
2515 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2516 */
2517static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2518{
2519 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2520 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2521
2522 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2523 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2524 return true;
2525 return false;
2526}
2527
2528/**
2529* smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2530* @sip: the object end
2531*
2532* looks for host based access restrictions
2533*
2534* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2535* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2536* taken before calling this function.
2537*
2538* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2539*/
2540static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2541{
2542 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2543 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2544 int i;
2545 int found = 0;
2546
2547 /*
2548 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2549 */
2550 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2551 return NULL;
2552
2553 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2554 /*
2555 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2556 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2557 */
2558 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2559 continue;
2560 /*
2561 * we break after finding the first match because
2562 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2563 * so we have found the most specific match
2564 */
2565 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2566 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2567 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2568 found = 0;
2569 break;
2570 }
2571 }
2572 if (found)
2573 return snp->smk_label;
2574 }
2575
2576 return NULL;
2577}
2578
2579/**
2580 * smack_netlbl_add - Set the secattr on a socket
2581 * @sk: the socket
2582 *
2583 * Attach the outbound smack value (smk_out) to the socket.
2584 *
2585 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2586 */
2587static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
2588{
2589 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
2590 struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
2591 int rc;
2592
2593 local_bh_disable();
2594 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2595
2596 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel,
2597 netlbl_sk_lock_check(sk));
2598 switch (rc) {
2599 case 0:
2600 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_LABELED;
2601 break;
2602 case -EDESTADDRREQ:
2603 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_REQSKB;
2604 rc = 0;
2605 break;
2606 }
2607
2608 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2609 local_bh_enable();
2610
2611 return rc;
2612}
2613
2614/**
2615 * smack_netlbl_delete - Remove the secattr from a socket
2616 * @sk: the socket
2617 *
2618 * Remove the outbound smack value from a socket
2619 */
2620static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
2621{
2622 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
2623
2624 /*
2625 * Take the label off the socket if one is set.
2626 */
2627 if (ssp->smk_state != SMK_NETLBL_LABELED)
2628 return;
2629
2630 local_bh_disable();
2631 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2632 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2633 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2634 local_bh_enable();
2635 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_UNLABELED;
2636}
2637
2638/**
2639 * smk_ipv4_check - Perform IPv4 host access checks
2640 * @sk: the socket
2641 * @sap: the destination address
2642 *
2643 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2644 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2645 *
2646 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2647 *
2648 */
2649static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2650{
2651 struct smack_known *skp;
2652 int rc = 0;
2653 struct smack_known *hkp;
2654 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
2655 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2656
2657 rcu_read_lock();
2658 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2659 if (hkp != NULL) {
2660#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2661 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2662
2663 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2664 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2665 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2666 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2667#endif
2668 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2669 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2670 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2671 /*
2672 * Clear the socket netlabel if it's set.
2673 */
2674 if (!rc)
2675 smack_netlbl_delete(sk);
2676 }
2677 rcu_read_unlock();
2678
2679 return rc;
2680}
2681
2682/**
2683 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2684 * @subject: subject Smack label
2685 * @object: object Smack label
2686 * @address: address
2687 * @act: the action being taken
2688 *
2689 * Check an IPv6 access
2690 */
2691static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2692 struct smack_known *object,
2693 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2694{
2695#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2696 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2697#endif
2698 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2699 int rc;
2700
2701#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2702 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2703 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2704 ad.a.u.net->dport = address->sin6_port;
2705 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2706 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2707 else
2708 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2709#endif
2710 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2711 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2712 return rc;
2713}
2714
2715#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2716/**
2717 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2718 * @sock: socket
2719 * @address: address
2720 *
2721 * Create or update the port list entry
2722 */
2723static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2724{
2725 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2726 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2727 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
2728 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2729 unsigned short port = 0;
2730
2731 if (address == NULL) {
2732 /*
2733 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2734 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2735 * as well.
2736 */
2737 rcu_read_lock();
2738 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2739 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2740 continue;
2741 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2742 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2743 rcu_read_unlock();
2744 return;
2745 }
2746 /*
2747 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2748 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2749 */
2750 rcu_read_unlock();
2751 return;
2752 }
2753
2754 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2755 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2756 /*
2757 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2758 */
2759 if (port == 0)
2760 return;
2761
2762 /*
2763 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2764 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2765 */
2766 rcu_read_lock();
2767 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2768 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
2769 continue;
2770 if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
2771 rcu_read_unlock();
2772 return;
2773 }
2774 spp->smk_port = port;
2775 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2776 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2777 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2778 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2779 rcu_read_unlock();
2780 return;
2781 }
2782 rcu_read_unlock();
2783 /*
2784 * A new port entry is required.
2785 */
2786 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2787 if (spp == NULL)
2788 return;
2789
2790 spp->smk_port = port;
2791 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2792 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2793 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2794 spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
2795 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2796
2797 mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2798 list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2799 mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2800 return;
2801}
2802
2803/**
2804 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2805 * @sk: socket
2806 * @address: address
2807 * @act: the action being taken
2808 *
2809 * Create or update the port list entry
2810 */
2811static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2812 int act)
2813{
2814 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2815 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
2816 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2817 unsigned short port;
2818 struct smack_known *object;
2819
2820 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2821 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2822 object = ssp->smk_in;
2823 } else {
2824 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2825 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2826 }
2827
2828 /*
2829 * The other end is a single label host.
2830 */
2831 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2832 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2833 if (skp == NULL)
2834 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2835 if (object == NULL)
2836 object = smack_net_ambient;
2837
2838 /*
2839 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2840 */
2841 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2842 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2843
2844 /*
2845 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2846 */
2847 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2848 return 0;
2849
2850 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2851 rcu_read_lock();
2852 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2853 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
2854 continue;
2855 object = spp->smk_in;
2856 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2857 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2858 break;
2859 }
2860 rcu_read_unlock();
2861
2862 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2863}
2864#endif
2865
2866/**
2867 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2868 * @inode: the object
2869 * @name: attribute name
2870 * @value: attribute value
2871 * @size: size of the attribute
2872 * @flags: unused
2873 *
2874 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2875 *
2876 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2877 */
2878static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2879 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2880{
2881 struct smack_known *skp;
2882 struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
2883 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2884 struct socket *sock;
2885 int rc = 0;
2886
2887 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2888 return -EINVAL;
2889
2890 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) {
2891 if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
2892 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
2893 return -EINVAL;
2894
2895 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
2896 return 0;
2897 }
2898
2899 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2900 if (IS_ERR(skp))
2901 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2902
2903 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2904 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2905 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2906 return 0;
2907 }
2908 /*
2909 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2910 */
2911 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2912 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2913
2914 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2915 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2916 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2917
2918 ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
2919
2920 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2921 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2922 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2923 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2924 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2925 rc = smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
2926 if (rc != 0)
2927 printk(KERN_WARNING
2928 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2929 __func__, -rc);
2930 }
2931 } else
2932 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2933
2934#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2935 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2936 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2937#endif
2938
2939 return 0;
2940}
2941
2942/**
2943 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2944 * @sock: the socket
2945 * @family: protocol family
2946 * @type: unused
2947 * @protocol: unused
2948 * @kern: unused
2949 *
2950 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2951 *
2952 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2953 */
2954static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2955 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2956{
2957 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2958
2959 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2960 return 0;
2961
2962 /*
2963 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2964 */
2965 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2966 ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
2967 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2968 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2969 }
2970
2971 if (family != PF_INET)
2972 return 0;
2973 /*
2974 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2975 */
2976 return smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
2977}
2978
2979/**
2980 * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
2981 * @socka: one socket
2982 * @sockb: another socket
2983 *
2984 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
2985 *
2986 * Returns 0
2987 */
2988static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
2989 struct socket *sockb)
2990{
2991 struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
2992 struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
2993
2994 asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
2995 bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
2996
2997 return 0;
2998}
2999
3000#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3001/**
3002 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
3003 * @sock: the socket
3004 * @address: the port address
3005 * @addrlen: size of the address
3006 *
3007 * Records the label bound to a port.
3008 *
3009 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
3010 */
3011static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
3012 int addrlen)
3013{
3014 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
3015 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
3016 address->sa_family != AF_INET6)
3017 return -EINVAL;
3018 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
3019 }
3020 return 0;
3021}
3022#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
3023
3024/**
3025 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
3026 * @sock: the socket
3027 * @sap: the other end
3028 * @addrlen: size of sap
3029 *
3030 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
3031 *
3032 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
3033 */
3034static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
3035 int addrlen)
3036{
3037 int rc = 0;
3038
3039 if (sock->sk == NULL)
3040 return 0;
3041 if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
3042 (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
3043 return 0;
3044 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
3045 return 0;
3046 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && sap->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
3047 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
3048 struct smack_known *rsp = NULL;
3049
3050 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3051 return 0;
3052 if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
3053 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
3054 if (rsp != NULL) {
3055 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
3056
3057 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
3058 SMK_CONNECTING);
3059 }
3060#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3061 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
3062#endif
3063
3064 return rc;
3065 }
3066 if (sap->sa_family != AF_INET || addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3067 return 0;
3068 rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
3069 return rc;
3070}
3071
3072/**
3073 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
3074 * @flags: the S_ value
3075 *
3076 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
3077 */
3078static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
3079{
3080 int may = 0;
3081
3082 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
3083 may |= MAY_READ;
3084 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
3085 may |= MAY_WRITE;
3086 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
3087 may |= MAY_EXEC;
3088
3089 return may;
3090}
3091
3092/**
3093 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
3094 * @msg: the object
3095 *
3096 * Returns 0
3097 */
3098static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3099{
3100 struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);
3101
3102 *blob = smk_of_current();
3103 return 0;
3104}
3105
3106/**
3107 * smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
3108 * @isp: the object
3109 *
3110 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3111 */
3112static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
3113{
3114 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
3115
3116 return *blob;
3117}
3118
3119/**
3120 * smack_ipc_alloc_security - Set the security blob for ipc
3121 * @isp: the object
3122 *
3123 * Returns 0
3124 */
3125static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
3126{
3127 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
3128
3129 *blob = smk_of_current();
3130 return 0;
3131}
3132
3133/**
3134 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
3135 * @isp : the object
3136 * @access : access requested
3137 *
3138 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3139 */
3140static int smk_curacc_shm(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3141{
3142 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3143 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3144 int rc;
3145
3146#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3147 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3148 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3149#endif
3150 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3151 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
3152 return rc;
3153}
3154
3155/**
3156 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
3157 * @isp: the object
3158 * @shmflg: access requested
3159 *
3160 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3161 */
3162static int smack_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int shmflg)
3163{
3164 int may;
3165
3166 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3167 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3168}
3169
3170/**
3171 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
3172 * @isp: the object
3173 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3174 *
3175 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3176 */
3177static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3178{
3179 int may;
3180
3181 switch (cmd) {
3182 case IPC_STAT:
3183 case SHM_STAT:
3184 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
3185 may = MAY_READ;
3186 break;
3187 case IPC_SET:
3188 case SHM_LOCK:
3189 case SHM_UNLOCK:
3190 case IPC_RMID:
3191 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3192 break;
3193 case IPC_INFO:
3194 case SHM_INFO:
3195 /*
3196 * System level information.
3197 */
3198 return 0;
3199 default:
3200 return -EINVAL;
3201 }
3202 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3203}
3204
3205/**
3206 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3207 * @isp: the object
3208 * @shmaddr: unused
3209 * @shmflg: access requested
3210 *
3211 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3212 */
3213static int smack_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, char __user *shmaddr,
3214 int shmflg)
3215{
3216 int may;
3217
3218 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3219 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3220}
3221
3222/**
3223 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3224 * @isp : the object
3225 * @access : access requested
3226 *
3227 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3228 */
3229static int smk_curacc_sem(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3230{
3231 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3232 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3233 int rc;
3234
3235#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3236 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3237 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3238#endif
3239 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3240 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3241 return rc;
3242}
3243
3244/**
3245 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3246 * @isp: the object
3247 * @semflg: access requested
3248 *
3249 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3250 */
3251static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg)
3252{
3253 int may;
3254
3255 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3256 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3257}
3258
3259/**
3260 * smack_sem_semctl - Smack access check for sem
3261 * @isp: the object
3262 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3263 *
3264 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3265 */
3266static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3267{
3268 int may;
3269
3270 switch (cmd) {
3271 case GETPID:
3272 case GETNCNT:
3273 case GETZCNT:
3274 case GETVAL:
3275 case GETALL:
3276 case IPC_STAT:
3277 case SEM_STAT:
3278 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
3279 may = MAY_READ;
3280 break;
3281 case SETVAL:
3282 case SETALL:
3283 case IPC_RMID:
3284 case IPC_SET:
3285 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3286 break;
3287 case IPC_INFO:
3288 case SEM_INFO:
3289 /*
3290 * System level information
3291 */
3292 return 0;
3293 default:
3294 return -EINVAL;
3295 }
3296
3297 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3298}
3299
3300/**
3301 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3302 * @isp: the object
3303 * @sops: unused
3304 * @nsops: unused
3305 * @alter: unused
3306 *
3307 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3308 *
3309 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3310 */
3311static int smack_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct sembuf *sops,
3312 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3313{
3314 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3315}
3316
3317/**
3318 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3319 * @isp : the msq
3320 * @access : access requested
3321 *
3322 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3323 */
3324static int smk_curacc_msq(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3325{
3326 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3327 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3328 int rc;
3329
3330#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3331 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3332 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3333#endif
3334 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3335 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3336 return rc;
3337}
3338
3339/**
3340 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3341 * @isp: the object
3342 * @msqflg: access requested
3343 *
3344 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3345 */
3346static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int msqflg)
3347{
3348 int may;
3349
3350 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3351 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3352}
3353
3354/**
3355 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3356 * @isp: the object
3357 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3358 *
3359 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3360 */
3361static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3362{
3363 int may;
3364
3365 switch (cmd) {
3366 case IPC_STAT:
3367 case MSG_STAT:
3368 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
3369 may = MAY_READ;
3370 break;
3371 case IPC_SET:
3372 case IPC_RMID:
3373 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3374 break;
3375 case IPC_INFO:
3376 case MSG_INFO:
3377 /*
3378 * System level information
3379 */
3380 return 0;
3381 default:
3382 return -EINVAL;
3383 }
3384
3385 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3386}
3387
3388/**
3389 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3390 * @isp: the object
3391 * @msg: unused
3392 * @msqflg: access requested
3393 *
3394 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3395 */
3396static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
3397 int msqflg)
3398{
3399 int may;
3400
3401 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3402 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3403}
3404
3405/**
3406 * smack_msg_queue_msgrcv - Smack access check for msg_queue
3407 * @isp: the object
3408 * @msg: unused
3409 * @target: unused
3410 * @type: unused
3411 * @mode: unused
3412 *
3413 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3414 */
3415static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp,
3416 struct msg_msg *msg,
3417 struct task_struct *target, long type,
3418 int mode)
3419{
3420 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3421}
3422
3423/**
3424 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3425 * @ipp: the object permissions
3426 * @flag: access requested
3427 *
3428 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3429 */
3430static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3431{
3432 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3433 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3434 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3435 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3436 int rc;
3437
3438#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3439 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3440 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3441#endif
3442 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3443 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3444 return rc;
3445}
3446
3447/**
3448 * smack_ipc_getlsmprop - Extract smack security data
3449 * @ipp: the object permissions
3450 * @prop: where result will be saved
3451 */
3452static void smack_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct lsm_prop *prop)
3453{
3454 struct smack_known **iskpp = smack_ipc(ipp);
3455
3456 prop->smack.skp = *iskpp;
3457}
3458
3459/**
3460 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3461 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3462 * @inode: the object
3463 *
3464 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3465 */
3466static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3467{
3468 struct super_block *sbp;
3469 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3470 struct inode_smack *isp;
3471 struct smack_known *skp;
3472 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3473 struct smack_known *final;
3474 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3475 int transflag = 0;
3476 int rc;
3477 struct dentry *dp;
3478
3479 if (inode == NULL)
3480 return;
3481
3482 isp = smack_inode(inode);
3483
3484 /*
3485 * If the inode is already instantiated
3486 * take the quick way out
3487 */
3488 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3489 return;
3490
3491 sbp = inode->i_sb;
3492 sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
3493 /*
3494 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3495 * if there's no label on the file.
3496 */
3497 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3498
3499 /*
3500 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3501 * may be in the process of initialization.
3502 * If that is the case use the root value out
3503 * of the superblock.
3504 */
3505 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3506 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3507 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3508 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3509 /*
3510 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3511 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3512 * options.
3513 */
3514 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3515 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3516 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3517 break;
3518 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3519 /*
3520 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3521 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3522 */
3523 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3524 break;
3525 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3526 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3527 break;
3528 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3529 /*
3530 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3531 * structures associated with the task involved.
3532 */
3533 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
3534 break;
3535 default:
3536 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3537 break;
3538 }
3539 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3540 return;
3541 }
3542
3543 /*
3544 * This is pretty hackish.
3545 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3546 * file system specific code, but it does help
3547 * with keeping it simple.
3548 */
3549 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3550 case SMACK_MAGIC:
3551 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3552 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3553 /*
3554 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3555 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3556 * extended attributes.
3557 *
3558 * Cgroupfs is special
3559 */
3560 final = &smack_known_star;
3561 break;
3562 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3563 /*
3564 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3565 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3566 * pty with respect.
3567 */
3568 final = ckp;
3569 break;
3570 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3571 /*
3572 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3573 * The superblock default suffices.
3574 */
3575 break;
3576 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3577 /*
3578 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3579 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3580 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3581 */
3582 final = &smack_known_star;
3583 /*
3584 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3585 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3586 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3587 * superblock default.
3588 */
3589 fallthrough;
3590 default:
3591 /*
3592 * This isn't an understood special case.
3593 * Get the value from the xattr.
3594 */
3595
3596 /*
3597 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3598 */
3599 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3600 final = &smack_known_star;
3601 break;
3602 }
3603 /*
3604 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3605 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3606 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3607 * does not match that assigned.
3608 */
3609 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3610 break;
3611 /*
3612 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3613 */
3614 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3615 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3616 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3617 final = skp;
3618
3619 /*
3620 * Transmuting directory
3621 */
3622 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3623 /*
3624 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3625 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3626 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3627 * and mark the inode.
3628 *
3629 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3630 * directory mark the inode.
3631 */
3632 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3633 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3634 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3635 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3636 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3637 rc = -EINVAL;
3638 if (rc >= 0)
3639 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3640 }
3641 /*
3642 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3643 */
3644 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3645 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3646 skp == &smack_known_web)
3647 skp = NULL;
3648 isp->smk_task = skp;
3649
3650 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3651 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3652 skp == &smack_known_web)
3653 skp = NULL;
3654 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3655
3656 dput(dp);
3657 break;
3658 }
3659
3660 if (final == NULL)
3661 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3662 else
3663 isp->smk_inode = final;
3664
3665 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3666
3667 return;
3668}
3669
3670/**
3671 * smack_getselfattr - Smack current process attribute
3672 * @attr: which attribute to fetch
3673 * @ctx: buffer to receive the result
3674 * @size: available size in, actual size out
3675 * @flags: unused
3676 *
3677 * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
3678 * attribute.
3679 *
3680 * Returns the number of attributes on success, an error code otherwise.
3681 * There will only ever be one attribute.
3682 */
3683static int smack_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
3684 u32 *size, u32 flags)
3685{
3686 int rc;
3687 struct smack_known *skp;
3688
3689 if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
3690 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3691
3692 skp = smk_of_current();
3693 rc = lsm_fill_user_ctx(ctx, size,
3694 skp->smk_known, strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1,
3695 LSM_ID_SMACK, 0);
3696 return (!rc ? 1 : rc);
3697}
3698
3699/**
3700 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3701 * @p: the object task
3702 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3703 * @value: where to put the result
3704 *
3705 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3706 *
3707 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3708 */
3709static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *name, char **value)
3710{
3711 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
3712 char *cp;
3713 int slen;
3714
3715 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3716 return -EINVAL;
3717
3718 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3719 if (cp == NULL)
3720 return -ENOMEM;
3721
3722 slen = strlen(cp);
3723 *value = cp;
3724 return slen;
3725}
3726
3727/**
3728 * do_setattr - Smack process attribute setting
3729 * @attr: the ID of the attribute
3730 * @value: the value to set
3731 * @size: the size of the value
3732 *
3733 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3734 * is permitted and only with privilege
3735 *
3736 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3737 */
3738static int do_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
3739{
3740 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
3741 struct cred *new;
3742 struct smack_known *skp;
3743 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3744 int rc;
3745
3746 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3747 return -EPERM;
3748
3749 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3750 return -EINVAL;
3751
3752 if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
3753 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3754
3755 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3756 if (IS_ERR(skp))
3757 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3758
3759 /*
3760 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
3761 * and the star ("*") label.
3762 */
3763 if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
3764 return -EINVAL;
3765
3766 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3767 rc = -EPERM;
3768 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3769 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3770 rc = 0;
3771 break;
3772 }
3773 if (rc)
3774 return rc;
3775 }
3776
3777 new = prepare_creds();
3778 if (new == NULL)
3779 return -ENOMEM;
3780
3781 tsp = smack_cred(new);
3782 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3783 /*
3784 * process can change its label only once
3785 */
3786 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3787
3788 commit_creds(new);
3789 return size;
3790}
3791
3792/**
3793 * smack_setselfattr - Set a Smack process attribute
3794 * @attr: which attribute to set
3795 * @ctx: buffer containing the data
3796 * @size: size of @ctx
3797 * @flags: unused
3798 *
3799 * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
3800 * attribute.
3801 *
3802 * Returns 0 on success, an error code otherwise.
3803 */
3804static int smack_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
3805 u32 size, u32 flags)
3806{
3807 int rc;
3808
3809 rc = do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
3810 if (rc > 0)
3811 return 0;
3812 return rc;
3813}
3814
3815/**
3816 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3817 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3818 * @value: the value to set
3819 * @size: the size of the value
3820 *
3821 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3822 * is permitted and only with privilege
3823 *
3824 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3825 */
3826static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
3827{
3828 int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
3829
3830 if (attr != LSM_ATTR_UNDEF)
3831 return do_setattr(attr, value, size);
3832 return -EINVAL;
3833}
3834
3835/**
3836 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3837 * @sock: one sock
3838 * @other: the other sock
3839 * @newsk: unused
3840 *
3841 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3842 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3843 */
3844static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3845 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3846{
3847 struct smack_known *skp;
3848 struct smack_known *okp;
3849 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
3850 struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
3851 struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
3852 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3853 int rc = 0;
3854#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3855 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3856#endif
3857
3858 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3859 skp = ssp->smk_out;
3860 okp = osp->smk_in;
3861#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3862 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3863 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3864#endif
3865 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3866 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3867 if (rc == 0) {
3868 okp = osp->smk_out;
3869 skp = ssp->smk_in;
3870 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3871 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3872 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3873 }
3874 }
3875
3876 if (rc == 0) {
3877 /*
3878 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3879 */
3880 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3881 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3882
3883 /*
3884 * new/child/established socket must inherit listening socket labels
3885 */
3886 nsp->smk_out = osp->smk_out;
3887 nsp->smk_in = osp->smk_in;
3888 }
3889
3890 return rc;
3891}
3892
3893/**
3894 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3895 * @sock: one socket
3896 * @other: the other socket
3897 *
3898 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3899 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3900 */
3901static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3902{
3903 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
3904 struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
3905 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3906 int rc;
3907
3908#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3909 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3910
3911 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3912 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3913#endif
3914
3915 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3916 return 0;
3917
3918 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3919 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3920 return rc;
3921}
3922
3923/**
3924 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3925 * @sock: the socket
3926 * @msg: the message
3927 * @size: the size of the message
3928 *
3929 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3930 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3931 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3932 */
3933static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3934 int size)
3935{
3936 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3937#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3938 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3939#endif
3940#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3941 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
3942 struct smack_known *rsp;
3943#endif
3944 int rc = 0;
3945
3946 /*
3947 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3948 */
3949 if (sip == NULL)
3950 return 0;
3951
3952 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3953 case AF_INET:
3954 if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) ||
3955 sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
3956 return -EINVAL;
3957 rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, sip);
3958 break;
3959#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3960 case AF_INET6:
3961 if (msg->msg_namelen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
3962 sap->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
3963 return -EINVAL;
3964#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3965 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3966 if (rsp != NULL)
3967 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3968 SMK_CONNECTING);
3969#endif
3970#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3971 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3972#endif
3973#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
3974 break;
3975 }
3976 return rc;
3977}
3978
3979/**
3980 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3981 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3982 * @ssp: socket security information
3983 *
3984 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3985 */
3986static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3987 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3988{
3989 struct smack_known *skp;
3990 int found = 0;
3991 int acat;
3992 int kcat;
3993
3994 /*
3995 * Netlabel found it in the cache.
3996 */
3997 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
3998 return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
3999
4000 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
4001 /*
4002 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
4003 */
4004 return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
4005
4006 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
4007 /*
4008 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
4009 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
4010 * behaving the way we expect it to.
4011 *
4012 * Look it up in the label table
4013 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
4014 * for the packet fall back on the network
4015 * ambient value.
4016 */
4017 rcu_read_lock();
4018 list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
4019 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
4020 continue;
4021 /*
4022 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
4023 */
4024 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
4025 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
4026 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
4027 found = 1;
4028 break;
4029 }
4030 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
4031 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
4032 acat + 1);
4033 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
4034 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
4035 kcat + 1);
4036 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
4037 break;
4038 }
4039 if (acat == kcat) {
4040 found = 1;
4041 break;
4042 }
4043 }
4044 rcu_read_unlock();
4045
4046 if (found)
4047 return skp;
4048
4049 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
4050 return &smack_known_web;
4051 return &smack_known_star;
4052 }
4053 /*
4054 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
4055 * for the packet fall back on the network
4056 * ambient value.
4057 */
4058 return smack_net_ambient;
4059}
4060
4061#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4062static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
4063{
4064 u8 nexthdr;
4065 int offset;
4066 int proto = -EINVAL;
4067 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
4068 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
4069 __be16 frag_off;
4070 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4071 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4072 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4073
4074 sip->sin6_port = 0;
4075
4076 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4077 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4078 if (ip6 == NULL)
4079 return -EINVAL;
4080 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
4081
4082 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4083 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4084 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4085 if (offset < 0)
4086 return -EINVAL;
4087
4088 proto = nexthdr;
4089 switch (proto) {
4090 case IPPROTO_TCP:
4091 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4092 if (th != NULL)
4093 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
4094 break;
4095 case IPPROTO_UDP:
4096 case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
4097 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4098 if (uh != NULL)
4099 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
4100 break;
4101 case IPPROTO_DCCP:
4102 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4103 if (dh != NULL)
4104 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
4105 break;
4106 }
4107 return proto;
4108}
4109#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4110
4111/**
4112 * smack_from_skb - Smack data from the secmark in an skb
4113 * @skb: packet
4114 *
4115 * Returns smack_known of the secmark or NULL if that won't work.
4116 */
4117#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
4118static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
4119{
4120 if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
4121 return NULL;
4122
4123 return smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4124}
4125#else
4126static inline struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
4127{
4128 return NULL;
4129}
4130#endif
4131
4132/**
4133 * smack_from_netlbl - Smack data from the IP options in an skb
4134 * @sk: socket data came in on
4135 * @family: address family
4136 * @skb: packet
4137 *
4138 * Find the Smack label in the IP options. If it hasn't been
4139 * added to the netlabel cache, add it here.
4140 *
4141 * Returns smack_known of the IP options or NULL if that won't work.
4142 */
4143static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
4144 struct sk_buff *skb)
4145{
4146 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4147 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4148 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
4149
4150 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4151
4152 if (sk)
4153 ssp = smack_sock(sk);
4154
4155 if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
4156 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4157 if (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE)
4158 netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4159 }
4160
4161 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4162
4163 return skp;
4164}
4165
4166/**
4167 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
4168 * @sk: socket
4169 * @skb: packet
4170 *
4171 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
4172 */
4173static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4174{
4175 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
4176 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
4177 int rc = 0;
4178 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4179 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4180#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4181 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4182#endif
4183#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4184 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
4185 int proto;
4186
4187 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4188 family = PF_INET;
4189#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4190
4191 switch (family) {
4192 case PF_INET:
4193 /*
4194 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4195 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4196 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4197 */
4198 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4199 if (skp == NULL) {
4200 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4201 if (skp == NULL)
4202 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4203 }
4204
4205#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4206 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4207 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4208 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4209 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4210#endif
4211 /*
4212 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
4213 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
4214 * This is the simplist possible security model
4215 * for networking.
4216 */
4217 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4218 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4219 MAY_WRITE, rc);
4220 if (rc != 0)
4221 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
4222 break;
4223#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4224 case PF_INET6:
4225 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4226 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
4227 proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)
4228 break;
4229#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4230 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4231 if (skp == NULL) {
4232 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(&sadd))
4233 break;
4234 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4235 if (skp == NULL)
4236 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4237 }
4238#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4239 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4240 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4241 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4242 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4243#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4244 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4245 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4246 MAY_WRITE, rc);
4247#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4248#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4249 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4250#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4251 if (rc != 0)
4252 icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
4253 ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0);
4254 break;
4255#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4256 }
4257
4258 return rc;
4259}
4260
4261/**
4262 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4263 * @sock: the socket
4264 * @optval: user's destination
4265 * @optlen: size thereof
4266 * @len: max thereof
4267 *
4268 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4269 */
4270static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4271 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
4272 unsigned int len)
4273{
4274 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4275 char *rcp = "";
4276 u32 slen = 1;
4277 int rc = 0;
4278
4279 ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
4280 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4281 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4282 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4283 }
4284 if (slen > len) {
4285 rc = -ERANGE;
4286 goto out_len;
4287 }
4288
4289 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, rcp, slen))
4290 rc = -EFAULT;
4291out_len:
4292 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
4293 rc = -EFAULT;
4294 return rc;
4295}
4296
4297
4298/**
4299 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4300 * @sock: the peer socket
4301 * @skb: packet data
4302 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4303 *
4304 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4305 */
4306static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4307 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4308
4309{
4310 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4311 struct smack_known *skp;
4312 struct sock *sk = NULL;
4313 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4314 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4315
4316 if (skb != NULL) {
4317 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4318 family = PF_INET;
4319#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4320 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4321 family = PF_INET6;
4322#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4323 }
4324 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4325 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4326
4327 switch (family) {
4328 case PF_UNIX:
4329 ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
4330 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4331 break;
4332 case PF_INET:
4333 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4334 if (skp) {
4335 s = skp->smk_secid;
4336 break;
4337 }
4338 /*
4339 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4340 */
4341 if (sock != NULL)
4342 sk = sock->sk;
4343 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4344 if (skp != NULL)
4345 s = skp->smk_secid;
4346 break;
4347 case PF_INET6:
4348#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4349 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4350 if (skp)
4351 s = skp->smk_secid;
4352#endif
4353 break;
4354 }
4355 *secid = s;
4356 if (s == 0)
4357 return -EINVAL;
4358 return 0;
4359}
4360
4361/**
4362 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4363 * @sk: child sock
4364 * @parent: parent socket
4365 *
4366 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4367 * is creating the new socket.
4368 */
4369static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4370{
4371 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4372 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4373
4374 if (sk == NULL ||
4375 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4376 return;
4377
4378 ssp = smack_sock(sk);
4379 ssp->smk_in = skp;
4380 ssp->smk_out = skp;
4381 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4382}
4383
4384/**
4385 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4386 * @sk: socket involved
4387 * @skb: packet
4388 * @req: unused
4389 *
4390 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4391 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4392 */
4393static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4394 struct request_sock *req)
4395{
4396 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4397 struct smack_known *skp;
4398 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
4399 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4400 struct iphdr *hdr;
4401 struct smack_known *hskp;
4402 int rc;
4403 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4404#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4405 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4406#endif
4407
4408#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4409 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4410 /*
4411 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4412 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4413 * processing on IPv6.
4414 */
4415 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4416 family = PF_INET;
4417 else
4418 return 0;
4419 }
4420#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4421
4422 /*
4423 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4424 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4425 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4426 */
4427 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4428 if (skp == NULL) {
4429 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4430 if (skp == NULL)
4431 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4432 }
4433
4434#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4435 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4436 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4437 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4438 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4439#endif
4440 /*
4441 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4442 * here. Read access is not required.
4443 */
4444 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4445 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4446 if (rc != 0)
4447 return rc;
4448
4449 /*
4450 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4451 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4452 */
4453 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4454
4455 /*
4456 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4457 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4458 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4459 */
4460 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4461 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4462 rcu_read_lock();
4463 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4464 rcu_read_unlock();
4465
4466 if (hskp == NULL)
4467 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &ssp->smk_out->smk_netlabel);
4468 else
4469 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4470
4471 return rc;
4472}
4473
4474/**
4475 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4476 * @sk: the new socket
4477 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4478 *
4479 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4480 */
4481static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4482 const struct request_sock *req)
4483{
4484 struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
4485 struct smack_known *skp;
4486
4487 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4488 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4489 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4490 } else
4491 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4492}
4493
4494/*
4495 * Key management security hooks
4496 *
4497 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4498 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4499 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4500 */
4501#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4502
4503/**
4504 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4505 * @key: object
4506 * @cred: the credentials to use
4507 * @flags: unused
4508 *
4509 * No allocation required
4510 *
4511 * Returns 0
4512 */
4513static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4514 unsigned long flags)
4515{
4516 struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
4517 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4518
4519 *blob = skp;
4520 return 0;
4521}
4522
4523/**
4524 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4525 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4526 * @cred: the credentials to use
4527 * @need_perm: requested key permission
4528 *
4529 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4530 * an error code otherwise
4531 */
4532static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4533 const struct cred *cred,
4534 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
4535{
4536 struct smack_known **blob;
4537 struct smack_known *skp;
4538 struct key *keyp;
4539 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4540 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4541 int request = 0;
4542 int rc;
4543
4544 /*
4545 * Validate requested permissions
4546 */
4547 switch (need_perm) {
4548 case KEY_NEED_READ:
4549 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
4550 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
4551 request |= MAY_READ;
4552 break;
4553 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
4554 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
4555 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
4556 request |= MAY_WRITE;
4557 break;
4558 case KEY_NEED_UNSPECIFIED:
4559 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
4560 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
4561 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
4562 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
4563 return 0;
4564 default:
4565 return -EINVAL;
4566 }
4567
4568 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4569 if (keyp == NULL)
4570 return -EINVAL;
4571 /*
4572 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4573 * it may do so.
4574 */
4575 blob = smack_key(keyp);
4576 skp = *blob;
4577 if (skp == NULL)
4578 return 0;
4579 /*
4580 * This should not occur
4581 */
4582 if (tkp == NULL)
4583 return -EACCES;
4584
4585 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
4586 return 0;
4587
4588#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4589 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4590 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4591 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4592#endif
4593 rc = smk_access(tkp, skp, request, &ad);
4594 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, skp, request, rc);
4595 return rc;
4596}
4597
4598/*
4599 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4600 * @key points to the key to be queried
4601 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4602 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4603 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4604 * an error.
4605 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4606 */
4607static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4608{
4609 struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
4610 struct smack_known *skp = *blob;
4611 size_t length;
4612 char *copy;
4613
4614 if (skp == NULL) {
4615 *_buffer = NULL;
4616 return 0;
4617 }
4618
4619 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4620 if (copy == NULL)
4621 return -ENOMEM;
4622 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4623
4624 *_buffer = copy;
4625 return length;
4626}
4627
4628
4629#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
4630/**
4631 * smack_watch_key - Smack access to watch a key for notifications.
4632 * @key: The key to be watched
4633 *
4634 * Return 0 if the @watch->cred has permission to read from the key object and
4635 * an error otherwise.
4636 */
4637static int smack_watch_key(struct key *key)
4638{
4639 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4640 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_current();
4641 struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
4642 int rc;
4643
4644 /*
4645 * This should not occur
4646 */
4647 if (tkp == NULL)
4648 return -EACCES;
4649
4650 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
4651 return 0;
4652
4653#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4654 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4655 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = key->serial;
4656 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = key->description;
4657#endif
4658 rc = smk_access(tkp, *blob, MAY_READ, &ad);
4659 rc = smk_bu_note("key watch", tkp, *blob, MAY_READ, rc);
4660 return rc;
4661}
4662#endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
4663#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4664
4665#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
4666/**
4667 * smack_post_notification - Smack access to post a notification to a queue
4668 * @w_cred: The credentials of the watcher.
4669 * @cred: The credentials of the event source (may be NULL).
4670 * @n: The notification message to be posted.
4671 */
4672static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
4673 const struct cred *cred,
4674 struct watch_notification *n)
4675{
4676 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4677 struct smack_known *subj, *obj;
4678 int rc;
4679
4680 /* Always let maintenance notifications through. */
4681 if (n->type == WATCH_TYPE_META)
4682 return 0;
4683
4684 if (!cred)
4685 return 0;
4686 subj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4687 obj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(w_cred));
4688
4689 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NOTIFICATION);
4690 rc = smk_access(subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4691 rc = smk_bu_note("notification", subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4692 return rc;
4693}
4694#endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
4695
4696/*
4697 * Smack Audit hooks
4698 *
4699 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4700 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4701 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4702 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4703 *
4704 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4705 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4706 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4707 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4708 */
4709#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4710
4711/**
4712 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4713 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4714 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4715 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4716 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4717 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
4718 *
4719 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4720 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4721 */
4722static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
4723 gfp_t gfp)
4724{
4725 struct smack_known *skp;
4726 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4727 *rule = NULL;
4728
4729 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4730 return -EINVAL;
4731
4732 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4733 return -EINVAL;
4734
4735 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4736 if (IS_ERR(skp))
4737 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4738
4739 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4740
4741 return 0;
4742}
4743
4744/**
4745 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4746 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4747 *
4748 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4749 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4750 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4751 */
4752static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4753{
4754 struct audit_field *f;
4755 int i;
4756
4757 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4758 f = &krule->fields[i];
4759
4760 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4761 return 1;
4762 }
4763
4764 return 0;
4765}
4766
4767/**
4768 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4769 * @prop: security id for identifying the object to test
4770 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4771 * @op: required testing operator
4772 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4773 *
4774 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4775 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4776 */
4777static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
4778 void *vrule)
4779{
4780 struct smack_known *skp = prop->smack.skp;
4781 char *rule = vrule;
4782
4783 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4784 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4785 return -ENOENT;
4786 }
4787
4788 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4789 return 0;
4790
4791 /*
4792 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4793 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4794 * label.
4795 */
4796 if (op == Audit_equal)
4797 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4798 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4799 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4800
4801 return 0;
4802}
4803
4804/*
4805 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4806 * No memory was allocated.
4807 */
4808
4809#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4810
4811/**
4812 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4813 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4814 */
4815static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4816{
4817 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4818}
4819
4820/**
4821 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4822 * @secid: incoming integer
4823 * @secdata: destination
4824 * @seclen: how long it is
4825 *
4826 * Exists for networking code.
4827 */
4828static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4829{
4830 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4831
4832 if (secdata)
4833 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4834 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4835 return 0;
4836}
4837
4838/**
4839 * smack_lsmprop_to_secctx - return the smack label
4840 * @prop: includes incoming Smack data
4841 * @secdata: destination
4842 * @seclen: how long it is
4843 *
4844 * Exists for audit code.
4845 */
4846static int smack_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata,
4847 u32 *seclen)
4848{
4849 struct smack_known *skp = prop->smack.skp;
4850
4851 if (secdata)
4852 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4853 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4854 return 0;
4855}
4856
4857/**
4858 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4859 * @secdata: smack label
4860 * @seclen: how long result is
4861 * @secid: outgoing integer
4862 *
4863 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4864 */
4865static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4866{
4867 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4868
4869 if (skp)
4870 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4871 else
4872 *secid = 0;
4873 return 0;
4874}
4875
4876/*
4877 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4878 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4879 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4880 */
4881
4882static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4883{
4884 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx,
4885 ctxlen, 0);
4886}
4887
4888static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4889{
4890 return __vfs_setxattr_locked(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
4891 ctx, ctxlen, 0, NULL);
4892}
4893
4894static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4895{
4896 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
4897
4898 *ctx = skp->smk_known;
4899 *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4900 return 0;
4901}
4902
4903static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
4904{
4905
4906 struct task_smack *tsp;
4907 struct smack_known *skp;
4908 struct inode_smack *isp;
4909 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
4910
4911 if (new_creds == NULL) {
4912 new_creds = prepare_creds();
4913 if (new_creds == NULL)
4914 return -ENOMEM;
4915 }
4916
4917 tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
4918
4919 /*
4920 * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
4921 */
4922 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry));
4923 skp = isp->smk_inode;
4924 tsp->smk_task = skp;
4925 *new = new_creds;
4926 return 0;
4927}
4928
4929static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name)
4930{
4931 /*
4932 * Return -ECANCELED if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
4933 */
4934 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
4935 return -ECANCELED;
4936
4937 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
4938}
4939
4940static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
4941 struct qstr *name,
4942 const struct cred *old,
4943 struct cred *new)
4944{
4945 struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
4946 struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
4947 struct inode_smack *isp;
4948 int may;
4949
4950 /*
4951 * Use the process credential unless all of
4952 * the transmuting criteria are met
4953 */
4954 ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
4955
4956 /*
4957 * the attribute of the containing directory
4958 */
4959 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
4960
4961 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
4962 rcu_read_lock();
4963 may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known,
4964 isp->smk_inode->smk_known,
4965 &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules);
4966 rcu_read_unlock();
4967
4968 /*
4969 * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
4970 * providing access is transmuting use the containing
4971 * directory label instead of the process label.
4972 */
4973 if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) {
4974 ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
4975 ntsp->smk_transmuted = ntsp->smk_task;
4976 }
4977 }
4978 return 0;
4979}
4980
4981#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
4982/**
4983 * smack_uring_override_creds - Is io_uring cred override allowed?
4984 * @new: the target creds
4985 *
4986 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
4987 * to service an io_uring operation.
4988 */
4989static int smack_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
4990{
4991 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
4992 struct task_smack *nsp = smack_cred(new);
4993
4994 /*
4995 * Allow the degenerate case where the new Smack value is
4996 * the same as the current Smack value.
4997 */
4998 if (tsp->smk_task == nsp->smk_task)
4999 return 0;
5000
5001 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
5002 return 0;
5003
5004 return -EPERM;
5005}
5006
5007/**
5008 * smack_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
5009 *
5010 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
5011 * kernel polling thread.
5012 */
5013static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
5014{
5015 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, current_cred()))
5016 return 0;
5017
5018 return -EPERM;
5019}
5020
5021/**
5022 * smack_uring_cmd - check on file operations for io_uring
5023 * @ioucmd: the command in question
5024 *
5025 * Make a best guess about whether a io_uring "command" should
5026 * be allowed. Use the same logic used for determining if the
5027 * file could be opened for read in the absence of better criteria.
5028 */
5029static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
5030{
5031 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
5032 struct smk_audit_info ad;
5033 struct task_smack *tsp;
5034 struct inode *inode;
5035 int rc;
5036
5037 if (!file)
5038 return -EINVAL;
5039
5040 tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
5041 inode = file_inode(file);
5042
5043 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
5044 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
5045 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
5046 rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
5047
5048 return rc;
5049}
5050
5051#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
5052
5053struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
5054 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
5055 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
5056 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
5057 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
5058 .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
5059 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
5060 .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
5061 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
5062 .lbs_xattr_count = SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
5063};
5064
5065static const struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = {
5066 .name = "smack",
5067 .id = LSM_ID_SMACK,
5068};
5069
5070static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
5071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
5072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
5073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
5074
5075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, smack_fs_context_submount),
5076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
5077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
5078
5079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
5080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
5081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
5082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
5083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
5084
5085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, smack_bprm_creds_for_exec),
5086
5087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
5088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
5089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
5090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
5091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
5092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
5093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
5094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
5095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
5096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, smack_inode_xattr_skipcap),
5097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
5098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
5099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
5100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
5101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, smack_inode_set_acl),
5102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, smack_inode_get_acl),
5103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, smack_inode_remove_acl),
5104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
5105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
5106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
5107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, smack_inode_getlsmprop),
5108
5109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
5110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
5111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, smack_file_ioctl),
5112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
5113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
5114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
5115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
5116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
5117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
5118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
5119
5120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
5121
5122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
5123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
5124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
5125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
5126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
5127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, smack_cred_getlsmprop),
5128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
5129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
5130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
5131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
5132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
5133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, smack_current_getlsmprop_subj),
5134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, smack_task_getlsmprop_obj),
5135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
5136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
5137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
5138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
5139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
5140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
5141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
5142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
5143
5144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
5145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, smack_ipc_getlsmprop),
5146
5147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
5148
5149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
5150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
5151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
5152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
5153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
5154
5155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
5156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
5157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
5158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
5159
5160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
5161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
5162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
5163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
5164
5165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
5166
5167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, smack_getselfattr),
5168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, smack_setselfattr),
5169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
5170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
5171
5172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
5173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
5174
5175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
5176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
5177#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
5178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
5179#endif
5180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
5181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
5182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
5183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
5184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
5185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
5186#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
5187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
5188#endif
5189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, smack_sk_clone_security),
5190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
5191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
5192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
5193
5194 /* key management security hooks */
5195#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
5197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
5198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
5199#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
5200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, smack_watch_key),
5201#endif
5202#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
5203
5204#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
5205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(post_notification, smack_post_notification),
5206#endif
5207
5208 /* Audit hooks */
5209#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
5211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
5212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
5213#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
5214
5215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
5216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
5217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, smack_lsmprop_to_secctx),
5218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
5219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
5220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
5221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
5222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
5223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
5224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
5225#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
5226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
5227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
5228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
5229#endif
5230};
5231
5232
5233static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
5234{
5235 /*
5236 * Initialize rule list locks
5237 */
5238 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
5239 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
5240 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
5241 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
5242 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
5243 /*
5244 * Initialize rule lists
5245 */
5246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
5247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
5248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
5249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
5250 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
5251 /*
5252 * Create the known labels list
5253 */
5254 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
5255 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
5256 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
5257 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
5258 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
5259}
5260
5261/**
5262 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
5263 *
5264 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
5265 */
5266static __init int smack_init(void)
5267{
5268 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
5269 struct task_smack *tsp;
5270
5271 smack_rule_cache = KMEM_CACHE(smack_rule, 0);
5272 if (!smack_rule_cache)
5273 return -ENOMEM;
5274
5275 /*
5276 * Set the security state for the initial task.
5277 */
5278 tsp = smack_cred(cred);
5279 init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
5280
5281 /*
5282 * Register with LSM
5283 */
5284 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
5285 smack_enabled = 1;
5286
5287 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
5288#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
5289 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
5290#endif
5291#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
5292 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
5293#endif
5294#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
5295 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
5296#endif
5297
5298 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
5299 init_smack_known_list();
5300
5301 return 0;
5302}
5303
5304/*
5305 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
5306 * all processes and objects when they are created.
5307 */
5308DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
5309 .name = "smack",
5310 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
5311 .blobs = &smack_blob_sizes,
5312 .init = smack_init,
5313};
1/*
2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors:
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
9 *
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 *
15 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
16 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
17 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
18 */
19
20#include <linux/xattr.h>
21#include <linux/pagemap.h>
22#include <linux/mount.h>
23#include <linux/stat.h>
24#include <linux/kd.h>
25#include <asm/ioctls.h>
26#include <linux/ip.h>
27#include <linux/tcp.h>
28#include <linux/udp.h>
29#include <linux/slab.h>
30#include <linux/mutex.h>
31#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
32#include <net/netlabel.h>
33#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
34#include <linux/audit.h>
35#include <linux/magic.h>
36#include <linux/dcache.h>
37#include "smack.h"
38
39#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
40
41#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
42#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
43
44/**
45 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
46 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
47 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
48 *
49 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
50 * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
51 */
52static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
53{
54 int rc;
55 char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
56
57 if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
58 return NULL;
59
60 rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
61 if (rc < 0)
62 return NULL;
63
64 return smk_import(in, rc);
65}
66
67/**
68 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
69 * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
70 *
71 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
72 */
73struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
74{
75 struct inode_smack *isp;
76
77 isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
78 if (isp == NULL)
79 return NULL;
80
81 isp->smk_inode = smack;
82 isp->smk_flags = 0;
83 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
84
85 return isp;
86}
87
88/**
89 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
90 * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
91 *
92 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
93 */
94static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
95{
96 struct task_smack *tsp;
97
98 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
99 if (tsp == NULL)
100 return NULL;
101
102 tsp->smk_task = task;
103 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
104 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
105 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
106
107 return tsp;
108}
109
110/**
111 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
112 * @nhead - new rules header pointer
113 * @ohead - old rules header pointer
114 *
115 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
116 */
117static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
118 gfp_t gfp)
119{
120 struct smack_rule *nrp;
121 struct smack_rule *orp;
122 int rc = 0;
123
124 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
125
126 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
127 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
128 if (nrp == NULL) {
129 rc = -ENOMEM;
130 break;
131 }
132 *nrp = *orp;
133 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
134 }
135 return rc;
136}
137
138/*
139 * LSM hooks.
140 * We he, that is fun!
141 */
142
143/**
144 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
145 * @ctp: child task pointer
146 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
147 *
148 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
149 *
150 * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
151 */
152static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
153{
154 int rc;
155 struct smk_audit_info ad;
156 char *tsp;
157
158 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
159 if (rc != 0)
160 return rc;
161
162 tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
163 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
164 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
165
166 rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
167 return rc;
168}
169
170/**
171 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
172 * @ptp: parent task pointer
173 *
174 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
175 *
176 * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
177 */
178static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
179{
180 int rc;
181 struct smk_audit_info ad;
182 char *tsp;
183
184 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
185 if (rc != 0)
186 return rc;
187
188 tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
189 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
190 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
191
192 rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
193 return rc;
194}
195
196/**
197 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
198 * @type: message type
199 *
200 * Require that the task has the floor label
201 *
202 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
203 */
204static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
205{
206 int rc = 0;
207 char *sp = smk_of_current();
208
209 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
210 return 0;
211
212 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
213 rc = -EACCES;
214
215 return rc;
216}
217
218
219/*
220 * Superblock Hooks.
221 */
222
223/**
224 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
225 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
226 *
227 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
228 */
229static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
230{
231 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
232
233 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
234
235 if (sbsp == NULL)
236 return -ENOMEM;
237
238 sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
239 sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
240 sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
241 sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
242 sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
243 spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
244
245 sb->s_security = sbsp;
246
247 return 0;
248}
249
250/**
251 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
252 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
253 *
254 */
255static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
256{
257 kfree(sb->s_security);
258 sb->s_security = NULL;
259}
260
261/**
262 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
263 * @orig: where to start
264 * @smackopts: mount options string
265 *
266 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
267 *
268 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
269 * options list.
270 */
271static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
272{
273 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
274
275 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
276 if (otheropts == NULL)
277 return -ENOMEM;
278
279 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
280 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
281 dp = smackopts;
282 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
283 dp = smackopts;
284 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
285 dp = smackopts;
286 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
287 dp = smackopts;
288 else
289 dp = otheropts;
290
291 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
292 if (commap != NULL)
293 *commap = '\0';
294
295 if (*dp != '\0')
296 strcat(dp, ",");
297 strcat(dp, cp);
298 }
299
300 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
301 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
302
303 return 0;
304}
305
306/**
307 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
308 * @sb: the file system superblock
309 * @flags: the mount flags
310 * @data: the smack mount options
311 *
312 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
313 */
314static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
315{
316 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
317 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
318 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
319 struct inode_smack *isp;
320 char *op;
321 char *commap;
322 char *nsp;
323
324 spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
325 if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
326 spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
327 return 0;
328 }
329 sp->smk_initialized = 1;
330 spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
331
332 for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
333 commap = strchr(op, ',');
334 if (commap != NULL)
335 *commap++ = '\0';
336
337 if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
338 op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
339 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
340 if (nsp != NULL)
341 sp->smk_hat = nsp;
342 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
343 op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
344 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
345 if (nsp != NULL)
346 sp->smk_floor = nsp;
347 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
348 strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
349 op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
350 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
351 if (nsp != NULL)
352 sp->smk_default = nsp;
353 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
354 op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
355 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
356 if (nsp != NULL)
357 sp->smk_root = nsp;
358 }
359 }
360
361 /*
362 * Initialize the root inode.
363 */
364 isp = inode->i_security;
365 if (isp == NULL)
366 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
367 else
368 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
369
370 return 0;
371}
372
373/**
374 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
375 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
376 *
377 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
378 * and error code otherwise
379 */
380static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
381{
382 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
383 int rc;
384 struct smk_audit_info ad;
385
386 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
387 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
388
389 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
390 return rc;
391}
392
393/**
394 * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
395 * @dev_name: unused
396 * @path: mount point
397 * @type: unused
398 * @flags: unused
399 * @data: unused
400 *
401 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
402 * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
403 */
404static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
405 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
406{
407 struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
408 struct smk_audit_info ad;
409
410 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
411 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
412
413 return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
414}
415
416/**
417 * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting
418 * @mnt: file system to unmount
419 * @flags: unused
420 *
421 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
422 * being unmounted, an error code otherwise.
423 */
424static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
425{
426 struct superblock_smack *sbp;
427 struct smk_audit_info ad;
428 struct path path;
429
430 path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
431 path.mnt = mnt;
432
433 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
434 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
435
436 sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
437 return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
438}
439
440/*
441 * BPRM hooks
442 */
443
444static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
445{
446 struct task_smack *tsp = bprm->cred->security;
447 struct inode_smack *isp;
448 struct dentry *dp;
449 int rc;
450
451 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
452 if (rc != 0)
453 return rc;
454
455 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
456 return 0;
457
458 if (bprm->file == NULL || bprm->file->f_dentry == NULL)
459 return 0;
460
461 dp = bprm->file->f_dentry;
462
463 if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
464 return 0;
465
466 isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
467
468 if (isp->smk_task != NULL)
469 tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
470
471 return 0;
472}
473
474/*
475 * Inode hooks
476 */
477
478/**
479 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
480 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
481 *
482 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
483 */
484static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
485{
486 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
487 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
488 return -ENOMEM;
489 return 0;
490}
491
492/**
493 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
494 * @inode: the inode with a blob
495 *
496 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
497 */
498static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
499{
500 kfree(inode->i_security);
501 inode->i_security = NULL;
502}
503
504/**
505 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
506 * @inode: the inode
507 * @dir: unused
508 * @qstr: unused
509 * @name: where to put the attribute name
510 * @value: where to put the attribute value
511 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
512 *
513 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
514 */
515static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
516 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
517 void **value, size_t *len)
518{
519 char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
520 char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
521 int may;
522
523 if (name) {
524 *name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
525 if (*name == NULL)
526 return -ENOMEM;
527 }
528
529 if (value) {
530 rcu_read_lock();
531 may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp, &smack_rule_list);
532 rcu_read_unlock();
533
534 /*
535 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
536 * the directory requests transmutation then
537 * by all means transmute.
538 */
539 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
540 smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
541 isp = dsp;
542
543 *value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
544 if (*value == NULL)
545 return -ENOMEM;
546 }
547
548 if (len)
549 *len = strlen(isp) + 1;
550
551 return 0;
552}
553
554/**
555 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
556 * @old_dentry: the existing object
557 * @dir: unused
558 * @new_dentry: the new object
559 *
560 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
561 */
562static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
563 struct dentry *new_dentry)
564{
565 char *isp;
566 struct smk_audit_info ad;
567 int rc;
568
569 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
570 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
571
572 isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
573 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
574
575 if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
576 isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
577 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
578 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
579 }
580
581 return rc;
582}
583
584/**
585 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
586 * @dir: containing directory object
587 * @dentry: file to unlink
588 *
589 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
590 * and the object, error code otherwise
591 */
592static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
593{
594 struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
595 struct smk_audit_info ad;
596 int rc;
597
598 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
599 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
600
601 /*
602 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
603 */
604 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
605 if (rc == 0) {
606 /*
607 * You also need write access to the containing directory
608 */
609 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
610 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
611 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
612 }
613 return rc;
614}
615
616/**
617 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
618 * @dir: containing directory object
619 * @dentry: directory to unlink
620 *
621 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
622 * and the directory, error code otherwise
623 */
624static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
625{
626 struct smk_audit_info ad;
627 int rc;
628
629 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
630 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
631
632 /*
633 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
634 */
635 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
636 if (rc == 0) {
637 /*
638 * You also need write access to the containing directory
639 */
640 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
641 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
642 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
643 }
644
645 return rc;
646}
647
648/**
649 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
650 * @old_inode: the old directory
651 * @old_dentry: unused
652 * @new_inode: the new directory
653 * @new_dentry: unused
654 *
655 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
656 * new directories.
657 *
658 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
659 */
660static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
661 struct dentry *old_dentry,
662 struct inode *new_inode,
663 struct dentry *new_dentry)
664{
665 int rc;
666 char *isp;
667 struct smk_audit_info ad;
668
669 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
670 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
671
672 isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
673 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
674
675 if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
676 isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
677 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
678 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
679 }
680 return rc;
681}
682
683/**
684 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
685 * @inode: the inode in question
686 * @mask: the access requested
687 *
688 * This is the important Smack hook.
689 *
690 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
691 */
692static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
693{
694 struct smk_audit_info ad;
695 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
696
697 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
698 /*
699 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
700 */
701 if (mask == 0)
702 return 0;
703
704 /* May be droppable after audit */
705 if (no_block)
706 return -ECHILD;
707 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
708 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
709 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
710}
711
712/**
713 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
714 * @dentry: the object
715 * @iattr: for the force flag
716 *
717 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
718 */
719static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
720{
721 struct smk_audit_info ad;
722 /*
723 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
724 */
725 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
726 return 0;
727 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
728 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
729
730 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
731}
732
733/**
734 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
735 * @mnt: unused
736 * @dentry: the object
737 *
738 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
739 */
740static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
741{
742 struct smk_audit_info ad;
743 struct path path;
744
745 path.dentry = dentry;
746 path.mnt = mnt;
747
748 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
749 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
750 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
751}
752
753/**
754 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
755 * @dentry: the object
756 * @name: name of the attribute
757 * @value: unused
758 * @size: unused
759 * @flags: unused
760 *
761 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
762 *
763 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
764 */
765static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
766 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
767{
768 struct smk_audit_info ad;
769 int rc = 0;
770
771 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
772 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
773 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
774 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
775 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
776 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
777 rc = -EPERM;
778 /*
779 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
780 * post_setxattr
781 */
782 if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
783 smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
784 rc = -EINVAL;
785 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
786 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
787 rc = -EPERM;
788 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
789 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
790 rc = -EINVAL;
791 } else
792 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
793
794 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
795 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
796
797 if (rc == 0)
798 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
799
800 return rc;
801}
802
803/**
804 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
805 * @dentry: object
806 * @name: attribute name
807 * @value: attribute value
808 * @size: attribute size
809 * @flags: unused
810 *
811 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
812 * in the master label list.
813 */
814static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
815 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
816{
817 char *nsp;
818 struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
819
820 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
821 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
822 if (nsp != NULL)
823 isp->smk_inode = nsp;
824 else
825 isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
826 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
827 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
828 if (nsp != NULL)
829 isp->smk_task = nsp;
830 else
831 isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
832 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
833 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
834 if (nsp != NULL)
835 isp->smk_mmap = nsp;
836 else
837 isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
838 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
839 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
840
841 return;
842}
843
844/*
845 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
846 * @dentry: the object
847 * @name: unused
848 *
849 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
850 */
851static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
852{
853 struct smk_audit_info ad;
854
855 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
856 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
857
858 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
859}
860
861/*
862 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
863 * @dentry: the object
864 * @name: name of the attribute
865 *
866 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
867 *
868 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
869 */
870static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
871{
872 struct inode_smack *isp;
873 struct smk_audit_info ad;
874 int rc = 0;
875
876 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
877 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
878 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
879 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
880 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
881 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
882 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
883 rc = -EPERM;
884 } else
885 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
886
887 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
888 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
889 if (rc == 0)
890 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
891
892 if (rc == 0) {
893 isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
894 isp->smk_task = NULL;
895 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
896 }
897
898 return rc;
899}
900
901/**
902 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
903 * @inode: the object
904 * @name: attribute name
905 * @buffer: where to put the result
906 * @alloc: unused
907 *
908 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
909 */
910static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
911 const char *name, void **buffer,
912 bool alloc)
913{
914 struct socket_smack *ssp;
915 struct socket *sock;
916 struct super_block *sbp;
917 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
918 char *isp;
919 int ilen;
920 int rc = 0;
921
922 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
923 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
924 ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
925 *buffer = isp;
926 return ilen;
927 }
928
929 /*
930 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
931 */
932 sbp = ip->i_sb;
933 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
934 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
935
936 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
937 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
938 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
939
940 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
941
942 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
943 isp = ssp->smk_in;
944 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
945 isp = ssp->smk_out;
946 else
947 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
948
949 ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
950 if (rc == 0) {
951 *buffer = isp;
952 rc = ilen;
953 }
954
955 return rc;
956}
957
958
959/**
960 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
961 * @inode: the object
962 * @buffer: where they go
963 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
964 *
965 * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
966 */
967static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
968 size_t buffer_size)
969{
970 int len = strlen(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
971
972 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) {
973 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
974 return len;
975 }
976 return -EINVAL;
977}
978
979/**
980 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
981 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
982 * @secid: where result will be saved
983 */
984static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
985{
986 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
987
988 *secid = smack_to_secid(isp->smk_inode);
989}
990
991/*
992 * File Hooks
993 */
994
995/**
996 * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
997 * @file: unused
998 * @mask: unused
999 *
1000 * Returns 0
1001 *
1002 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1003 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1004 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1005 *
1006 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1007 * label changing that SELinux does.
1008 */
1009static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
1010{
1011 return 0;
1012}
1013
1014/**
1015 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1016 * @file: the object
1017 *
1018 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1019 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1020 *
1021 * Returns 0
1022 */
1023static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1024{
1025 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1026 return 0;
1027}
1028
1029/**
1030 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1031 * @file: the object
1032 *
1033 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1034 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1035 */
1036static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1037{
1038 file->f_security = NULL;
1039}
1040
1041/**
1042 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1043 * @file: the object
1044 * @cmd: what to do
1045 * @arg: unused
1046 *
1047 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1048 *
1049 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1050 */
1051static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1052 unsigned long arg)
1053{
1054 int rc = 0;
1055 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1056
1057 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1058 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1059
1060 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
1061 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1062
1063 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
1064 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
1065
1066 return rc;
1067}
1068
1069/**
1070 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1071 * @file: the object
1072 * @cmd: unused
1073 *
1074 * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
1075 */
1076static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1077{
1078 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1079
1080 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1081 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1082 return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1083}
1084
1085/**
1086 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1087 * @file: the object
1088 * @cmd: what action to check
1089 * @arg: unused
1090 *
1091 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1092 */
1093static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1094 unsigned long arg)
1095{
1096 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1097 int rc;
1098
1099 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1100 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1101
1102 switch (cmd) {
1103 case F_DUPFD:
1104 case F_GETFD:
1105 case F_GETFL:
1106 case F_GETLK:
1107 case F_GETOWN:
1108 case F_GETSIG:
1109 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
1110 break;
1111 case F_SETFD:
1112 case F_SETFL:
1113 case F_SETLK:
1114 case F_SETLKW:
1115 case F_SETOWN:
1116 case F_SETSIG:
1117 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1118 break;
1119 default:
1120 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1121 }
1122
1123 return rc;
1124}
1125
1126/**
1127 * smack_file_mmap :
1128 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1129 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1130 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1131 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1132 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1133 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1134 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1135 */
1136static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
1137 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1138 unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
1139 unsigned long addr_only)
1140{
1141 struct smack_rule *srp;
1142 struct task_smack *tsp;
1143 char *sp;
1144 char *msmack;
1145 char *osmack;
1146 struct inode_smack *isp;
1147 struct dentry *dp;
1148 int may;
1149 int mmay;
1150 int tmay;
1151 int rc;
1152
1153 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
1154 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
1155 if (rc || addr_only)
1156 return rc;
1157
1158 if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
1159 return 0;
1160
1161 dp = file->f_dentry;
1162
1163 if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
1164 return 0;
1165
1166 isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
1167 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1168 return 0;
1169 msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
1170
1171 tsp = current_security();
1172 sp = smk_of_current();
1173 rc = 0;
1174
1175 rcu_read_lock();
1176 /*
1177 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1178 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1179 * to that rule's object label.
1180 *
1181 * Because neither of the labels comes
1182 * from the networking code it is sufficient
1183 * to compare pointers.
1184 */
1185 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
1186 if (srp->smk_subject != sp)
1187 continue;
1188
1189 osmack = srp->smk_object;
1190 /*
1191 * Matching labels always allows access.
1192 */
1193 if (msmack == osmack)
1194 continue;
1195 /*
1196 * If there is a matching local rule take
1197 * that into account as well.
1198 */
1199 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
1200 &tsp->smk_rules);
1201 if (may == -ENOENT)
1202 may = srp->smk_access;
1203 else
1204 may &= srp->smk_access;
1205 /*
1206 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1207 * possibly have less access.
1208 */
1209 if (may == 0)
1210 continue;
1211
1212 /*
1213 * Fetch the global list entry.
1214 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1215 * can't have as much access as current.
1216 */
1217 mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &smack_rule_list);
1218 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1219 rc = -EACCES;
1220 break;
1221 }
1222 /*
1223 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1224 * potential access, too.
1225 */
1226 tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
1227 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1228 mmay &= tmay;
1229
1230 /*
1231 * If there is any access available to current that is
1232 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1233 * deny access.
1234 */
1235 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1236 rc = -EACCES;
1237 break;
1238 }
1239 }
1240
1241 rcu_read_unlock();
1242
1243 return rc;
1244}
1245
1246/**
1247 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1248 * @file: object in question
1249 *
1250 * Returns 0
1251 * Further research may be required on this one.
1252 */
1253static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1254{
1255 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1256 return 0;
1257}
1258
1259/**
1260 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1261 * @tsk: The target task
1262 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1263 * @signum: unused
1264 *
1265 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1266 *
1267 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1268 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1269 */
1270static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1271 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1272{
1273 struct file *file;
1274 int rc;
1275 char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1276 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1277
1278 /*
1279 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1280 */
1281 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1282
1283 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1284 rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1285 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1286 rc = 0;
1287
1288 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1289 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1290 smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1291 return rc;
1292}
1293
1294/**
1295 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1296 * @file: the object
1297 *
1298 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1299 */
1300static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1301{
1302 int may = 0;
1303 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1304
1305 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1306 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1307 /*
1308 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1309 */
1310 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1311 may = MAY_READ;
1312 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1313 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1314
1315 return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
1316}
1317
1318/*
1319 * Task hooks
1320 */
1321
1322/**
1323 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1324 * @new: the new credentials
1325 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1326 *
1327 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1328 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1329 * complete without error.
1330 */
1331static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1332{
1333 struct task_smack *tsp;
1334
1335 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1336 if (tsp == NULL)
1337 return -ENOMEM;
1338
1339 cred->security = tsp;
1340
1341 return 0;
1342}
1343
1344
1345/**
1346 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1347 * @cred: the credentials in question
1348 *
1349 */
1350static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1351{
1352 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1353 struct smack_rule *rp;
1354 struct list_head *l;
1355 struct list_head *n;
1356
1357 if (tsp == NULL)
1358 return;
1359 cred->security = NULL;
1360
1361 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1362 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1363 list_del(&rp->list);
1364 kfree(rp);
1365 }
1366 kfree(tsp);
1367}
1368
1369/**
1370 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1371 * @new: the new credentials
1372 * @old: the original credentials
1373 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1374 *
1375 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1376 */
1377static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1378 gfp_t gfp)
1379{
1380 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1381 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
1382 int rc;
1383
1384 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
1385 if (new_tsp == NULL)
1386 return -ENOMEM;
1387
1388 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
1389 if (rc != 0)
1390 return rc;
1391
1392 new->security = new_tsp;
1393 return 0;
1394}
1395
1396/**
1397 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
1398 * @new: the new credentials
1399 * @old: the original credentials
1400 *
1401 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
1402 */
1403static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1404{
1405 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1406 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
1407
1408 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
1409 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
1410 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
1411 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
1412
1413
1414 /* cbs copy rule list */
1415}
1416
1417/**
1418 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
1419 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
1420 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
1421 *
1422 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
1423 */
1424static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
1425{
1426 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
1427 char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
1428
1429 if (smack == NULL)
1430 return -EINVAL;
1431
1432 new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
1433 return 0;
1434}
1435
1436/**
1437 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
1438 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
1439 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
1440 *
1441 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
1442 * as the objective context of the specified inode
1443 */
1444static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
1445 struct inode *inode)
1446{
1447 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1448 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
1449
1450 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
1451 tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
1452 return 0;
1453}
1454
1455/**
1456 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
1457 * @p: the task object
1458 * @access : the access requested
1459 *
1460 * Return 0 if access is permitted
1461 */
1462static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access)
1463{
1464 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1465
1466 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1467 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1468 return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
1469}
1470
1471/**
1472 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
1473 * @p: the task object
1474 * @pgid: unused
1475 *
1476 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1477 */
1478static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
1479{
1480 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
1481}
1482
1483/**
1484 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
1485 * @p: the object task
1486 *
1487 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
1488 */
1489static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
1490{
1491 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
1492}
1493
1494/**
1495 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
1496 * @p: the object task
1497 *
1498 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
1499 */
1500static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
1501{
1502 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
1503}
1504
1505/**
1506 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
1507 * @p: the object task
1508 * @secid: where to put the result
1509 *
1510 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
1511 */
1512static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
1513{
1514 *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
1515}
1516
1517/**
1518 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
1519 * @p: the task object
1520 * @nice: unused
1521 *
1522 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1523 */
1524static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
1525{
1526 int rc;
1527
1528 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
1529 if (rc == 0)
1530 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
1531 return rc;
1532}
1533
1534/**
1535 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
1536 * @p: the task object
1537 * @ioprio: unused
1538 *
1539 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1540 */
1541static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
1542{
1543 int rc;
1544
1545 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
1546 if (rc == 0)
1547 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
1548 return rc;
1549}
1550
1551/**
1552 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
1553 * @p: the task object
1554 *
1555 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1556 */
1557static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
1558{
1559 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
1560}
1561
1562/**
1563 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
1564 * @p: the task object
1565 * @policy: unused
1566 * @lp: unused
1567 *
1568 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1569 */
1570static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1571{
1572 int rc;
1573
1574 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
1575 if (rc == 0)
1576 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
1577 return rc;
1578}
1579
1580/**
1581 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
1582 * @p: the task object
1583 *
1584 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1585 */
1586static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1587{
1588 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
1589}
1590
1591/**
1592 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
1593 * @p: the task object
1594 *
1595 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1596 */
1597static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
1598{
1599 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
1600}
1601
1602/**
1603 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
1604 * @p: the task object
1605 * @info: unused
1606 * @sig: unused
1607 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
1608 *
1609 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1610 *
1611 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
1612 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
1613 */
1614static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
1615 int sig, u32 secid)
1616{
1617 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1618
1619 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1620 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1621 /*
1622 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
1623 * can write the receiver.
1624 */
1625 if (secid == 0)
1626 return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
1627 &ad);
1628 /*
1629 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
1630 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
1631 * we can't take privilege into account.
1632 */
1633 return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
1634 smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1635}
1636
1637/**
1638 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
1639 * @p: task to wait for
1640 *
1641 * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise
1642 */
1643static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
1644{
1645 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1646 char *sp = smk_of_current();
1647 char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
1648 int rc;
1649
1650 /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
1651 rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1652 if (rc == 0)
1653 goto out_log;
1654
1655 /*
1656 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
1657 * has privilege to perform operations that might
1658 * account for the smack labels having gotten to
1659 * be different in the first place.
1660 *
1661 * This breaks the strict subject/object access
1662 * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
1663 * state into account in the decision as well as
1664 * the smack value.
1665 */
1666 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1667 rc = 0;
1668 /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
1669 out_log:
1670 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1671 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1672 smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1673 return rc;
1674}
1675
1676/**
1677 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
1678 * @p: task to copy from
1679 * @inode: inode to copy to
1680 *
1681 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
1682 */
1683static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
1684{
1685 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1686 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
1687}
1688
1689/*
1690 * Socket hooks.
1691 */
1692
1693/**
1694 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
1695 * @sk: the socket
1696 * @family: unused
1697 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
1698 *
1699 * Assign Smack pointers to current
1700 *
1701 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
1702 */
1703static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1704{
1705 char *csp = smk_of_current();
1706 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1707
1708 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
1709 if (ssp == NULL)
1710 return -ENOMEM;
1711
1712 ssp->smk_in = csp;
1713 ssp->smk_out = csp;
1714 ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
1715
1716 sk->sk_security = ssp;
1717
1718 return 0;
1719}
1720
1721/**
1722 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
1723 * @sk: the socket
1724 *
1725 * Clears the blob pointer
1726 */
1727static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
1728{
1729 kfree(sk->sk_security);
1730}
1731
1732/**
1733* smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
1734* @sip: the object end
1735*
1736* looks for host based access restrictions
1737*
1738* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
1739* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
1740* taken before calling this function.
1741*
1742* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
1743*/
1744static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
1745{
1746 struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
1747 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
1748
1749 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
1750 return NULL;
1751
1752 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list)
1753 /*
1754 * we break after finding the first match because
1755 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
1756 * so we have found the most specific match
1757 */
1758 if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
1759 (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
1760 /* we have found the special CIPSO option */
1761 if (snp->smk_label == smack_cipso_option)
1762 return NULL;
1763 return snp->smk_label;
1764 }
1765
1766 return NULL;
1767}
1768
1769/**
1770 * smack_set_catset - convert a capset to netlabel mls categories
1771 * @catset: the Smack categories
1772 * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
1773 *
1774 * Allocates and fills attr.mls.cat
1775 */
1776static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
1777{
1778 unsigned char *cp;
1779 unsigned char m;
1780 int cat;
1781 int rc;
1782 int byte;
1783
1784 if (!catset)
1785 return;
1786
1787 sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
1788 sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
1789 sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
1790
1791 for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < SMK_LABELLEN; cp++, byte++)
1792 for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
1793 if ((m & *cp) == 0)
1794 continue;
1795 rc = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(sap->attr.mls.cat,
1796 cat, GFP_ATOMIC);
1797 }
1798}
1799
1800/**
1801 * smack_to_secattr - fill a secattr from a smack value
1802 * @smack: the smack value
1803 * @nlsp: where the result goes
1804 *
1805 * Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
1806 * It can be used to effect.
1807 * It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
1808 * Apologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
1809 */
1810static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
1811{
1812 struct smack_cipso cipso;
1813 int rc;
1814
1815 nlsp->domain = smack;
1816 nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
1817
1818 rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
1819 if (rc == 0) {
1820 nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
1821 smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
1822 } else {
1823 nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
1824 smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
1825 }
1826}
1827
1828/**
1829 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
1830 * @sk: the socket
1831 * @labeled: socket label scheme
1832 *
1833 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
1834 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
1835 *
1836 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
1837 */
1838static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
1839{
1840 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
1841 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
1842 int rc = 0;
1843
1844 /*
1845 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
1846 * packet labeling based on the label.
1847 * The case of a single label host is different, because
1848 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
1849 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
1850 * label.
1851 */
1852 local_bh_disable();
1853 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
1854
1855 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
1856 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
1857 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
1858 else {
1859 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
1860 smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
1861 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
1862 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
1863 }
1864
1865 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
1866 local_bh_enable();
1867
1868 return rc;
1869}
1870
1871/**
1872 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
1873 * @sk: the socket
1874 * @sap: the destination address
1875 *
1876 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
1877 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
1878 *
1879 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
1880 *
1881 */
1882static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
1883{
1884 int rc;
1885 int sk_lbl;
1886 char *hostsp;
1887 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
1888 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1889
1890 rcu_read_lock();
1891 hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
1892 if (hostsp != NULL) {
1893 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
1894#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
1895 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
1896 ad.a.u.net.family = sap->sin_family;
1897 ad.a.u.net.dport = sap->sin_port;
1898 ad.a.u.net.v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
1899#endif
1900 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1901 } else {
1902 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
1903 rc = 0;
1904 }
1905 rcu_read_unlock();
1906 if (rc != 0)
1907 return rc;
1908
1909 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
1910}
1911
1912/**
1913 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
1914 * @inode: the object
1915 * @name: attribute name
1916 * @value: attribute value
1917 * @size: size of the attribute
1918 * @flags: unused
1919 *
1920 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
1921 *
1922 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
1923 */
1924static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
1925 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1926{
1927 char *sp;
1928 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
1929 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1930 struct socket *sock;
1931 int rc = 0;
1932
1933 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LABELLEN || size == 0)
1934 return -EACCES;
1935
1936 sp = smk_import(value, size);
1937 if (sp == NULL)
1938 return -EINVAL;
1939
1940 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1941 nsp->smk_inode = sp;
1942 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
1943 return 0;
1944 }
1945 /*
1946 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1947 */
1948 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1949 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1950
1951 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1952 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1953 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1954
1955 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1956
1957 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1958 ssp->smk_in = sp;
1959 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
1960 ssp->smk_out = sp;
1961 if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
1962 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
1963 if (rc != 0)
1964 printk(KERN_WARNING
1965 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
1966 __func__, -rc);
1967 }
1968 } else
1969 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1970
1971 return 0;
1972}
1973
1974/**
1975 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
1976 * @sock: the socket
1977 * @family: protocol family
1978 * @type: unused
1979 * @protocol: unused
1980 * @kern: unused
1981 *
1982 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
1983 *
1984 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
1985 */
1986static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
1987 int type, int protocol, int kern)
1988{
1989 if (family != PF_INET || sock->sk == NULL)
1990 return 0;
1991 /*
1992 * Set the outbound netlbl.
1993 */
1994 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
1995}
1996
1997/**
1998 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
1999 * @sock: the socket
2000 * @sap: the other end
2001 * @addrlen: size of sap
2002 *
2003 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2004 *
2005 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2006 */
2007static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2008 int addrlen)
2009{
2010 if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
2011 return 0;
2012 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2013 return -EINVAL;
2014
2015 return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2016}
2017
2018/**
2019 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2020 * @flags: the S_ value
2021 *
2022 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2023 */
2024static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2025{
2026 int may = 0;
2027
2028 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2029 may |= MAY_READ;
2030 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2031 may |= MAY_WRITE;
2032 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2033 may |= MAY_EXEC;
2034
2035 return may;
2036}
2037
2038/**
2039 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2040 * @msg: the object
2041 *
2042 * Returns 0
2043 */
2044static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2045{
2046 msg->security = smk_of_current();
2047 return 0;
2048}
2049
2050/**
2051 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2052 * @msg: the object
2053 *
2054 * Clears the blob pointer
2055 */
2056static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2057{
2058 msg->security = NULL;
2059}
2060
2061/**
2062 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2063 * @shp: the object
2064 *
2065 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2066 */
2067static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2068{
2069 return (char *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2070}
2071
2072/**
2073 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2074 * @shp: the object
2075 *
2076 * Returns 0
2077 */
2078static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2079{
2080 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2081
2082 isp->security = smk_of_current();
2083 return 0;
2084}
2085
2086/**
2087 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2088 * @shp: the object
2089 *
2090 * Clears the blob pointer
2091 */
2092static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2093{
2094 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2095
2096 isp->security = NULL;
2097}
2098
2099/**
2100 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2101 * @shp : the object
2102 * @access : access requested
2103 *
2104 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2105 */
2106static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2107{
2108 char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2109 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2110
2111#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2112 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2113 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2114#endif
2115 return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2116}
2117
2118/**
2119 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2120 * @shp: the object
2121 * @shmflg: access requested
2122 *
2123 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2124 */
2125static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
2126{
2127 int may;
2128
2129 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2130 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2131}
2132
2133/**
2134 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2135 * @shp: the object
2136 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2137 *
2138 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2139 */
2140static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
2141{
2142 int may;
2143
2144 switch (cmd) {
2145 case IPC_STAT:
2146 case SHM_STAT:
2147 may = MAY_READ;
2148 break;
2149 case IPC_SET:
2150 case SHM_LOCK:
2151 case SHM_UNLOCK:
2152 case IPC_RMID:
2153 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2154 break;
2155 case IPC_INFO:
2156 case SHM_INFO:
2157 /*
2158 * System level information.
2159 */
2160 return 0;
2161 default:
2162 return -EINVAL;
2163 }
2164 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2165}
2166
2167/**
2168 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
2169 * @shp: the object
2170 * @shmaddr: unused
2171 * @shmflg: access requested
2172 *
2173 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2174 */
2175static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
2176 int shmflg)
2177{
2178 int may;
2179
2180 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2181 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2182}
2183
2184/**
2185 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
2186 * @sma: the object
2187 *
2188 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2189 */
2190static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
2191{
2192 return (char *)sma->sem_perm.security;
2193}
2194
2195/**
2196 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
2197 * @sma: the object
2198 *
2199 * Returns 0
2200 */
2201static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
2202{
2203 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
2204
2205 isp->security = smk_of_current();
2206 return 0;
2207}
2208
2209/**
2210 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
2211 * @sma: the object
2212 *
2213 * Clears the blob pointer
2214 */
2215static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
2216{
2217 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
2218
2219 isp->security = NULL;
2220}
2221
2222/**
2223 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
2224 * @sma : the object
2225 * @access : access requested
2226 *
2227 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2228 */
2229static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
2230{
2231 char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
2232 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2233
2234#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2235 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2236 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
2237#endif
2238 return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2239}
2240
2241/**
2242 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
2243 * @sma: the object
2244 * @semflg: access requested
2245 *
2246 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2247 */
2248static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
2249{
2250 int may;
2251
2252 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
2253 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
2254}
2255
2256/**
2257 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
2258 * @sma: the object
2259 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2260 *
2261 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2262 */
2263static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
2264{
2265 int may;
2266
2267 switch (cmd) {
2268 case GETPID:
2269 case GETNCNT:
2270 case GETZCNT:
2271 case GETVAL:
2272 case GETALL:
2273 case IPC_STAT:
2274 case SEM_STAT:
2275 may = MAY_READ;
2276 break;
2277 case SETVAL:
2278 case SETALL:
2279 case IPC_RMID:
2280 case IPC_SET:
2281 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2282 break;
2283 case IPC_INFO:
2284 case SEM_INFO:
2285 /*
2286 * System level information
2287 */
2288 return 0;
2289 default:
2290 return -EINVAL;
2291 }
2292
2293 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
2294}
2295
2296/**
2297 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
2298 * @sma: the object
2299 * @sops: unused
2300 * @nsops: unused
2301 * @alter: unused
2302 *
2303 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
2304 *
2305 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
2306 */
2307static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
2308 unsigned nsops, int alter)
2309{
2310 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
2311}
2312
2313/**
2314 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
2315 * @msq: the object
2316 *
2317 * Returns 0
2318 */
2319static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
2320{
2321 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
2322
2323 kisp->security = smk_of_current();
2324 return 0;
2325}
2326
2327/**
2328 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
2329 * @msq: the object
2330 *
2331 * Clears the blob pointer
2332 */
2333static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
2334{
2335 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
2336
2337 kisp->security = NULL;
2338}
2339
2340/**
2341 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
2342 * @msq: the object
2343 *
2344 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2345 */
2346static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
2347{
2348 return (char *)msq->q_perm.security;
2349}
2350
2351/**
2352 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
2353 * @msq : the msq
2354 * @access : access requested
2355 *
2356 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
2357 */
2358static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
2359{
2360 char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
2361 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2362
2363#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2364 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2365 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
2366#endif
2367 return smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
2368}
2369
2370/**
2371 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
2372 * @msq: the object
2373 * @msqflg: access requested
2374 *
2375 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2376 */
2377static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
2378{
2379 int may;
2380
2381 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
2382 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2383}
2384
2385/**
2386 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
2387 * @msq: the object
2388 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2389 *
2390 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2391 */
2392static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
2393{
2394 int may;
2395
2396 switch (cmd) {
2397 case IPC_STAT:
2398 case MSG_STAT:
2399 may = MAY_READ;
2400 break;
2401 case IPC_SET:
2402 case IPC_RMID:
2403 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2404 break;
2405 case IPC_INFO:
2406 case MSG_INFO:
2407 /*
2408 * System level information
2409 */
2410 return 0;
2411 default:
2412 return -EINVAL;
2413 }
2414
2415 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2416}
2417
2418/**
2419 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
2420 * @msq: the object
2421 * @msg: unused
2422 * @msqflg: access requested
2423 *
2424 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2425 */
2426static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
2427 int msqflg)
2428{
2429 int may;
2430
2431 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
2432 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2433}
2434
2435/**
2436 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
2437 * @msq: the object
2438 * @msg: unused
2439 * @target: unused
2440 * @type: unused
2441 * @mode: unused
2442 *
2443 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
2444 */
2445static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
2446 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
2447{
2448 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
2449}
2450
2451/**
2452 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
2453 * @ipp: the object permissions
2454 * @flag: access requested
2455 *
2456 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
2457 */
2458static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
2459{
2460 char *isp = ipp->security;
2461 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
2462 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2463
2464#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2465 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2466 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
2467#endif
2468 return smk_curacc(isp, may, &ad);
2469}
2470
2471/**
2472 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
2473 * @ipp: the object permissions
2474 * @secid: where result will be saved
2475 */
2476static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
2477{
2478 char *smack = ipp->security;
2479
2480 *secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
2481}
2482
2483/**
2484 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
2485 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
2486 * @inode: the object
2487 *
2488 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
2489 */
2490static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
2491{
2492 struct super_block *sbp;
2493 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
2494 struct inode_smack *isp;
2495 char *csp = smk_of_current();
2496 char *fetched;
2497 char *final;
2498 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
2499 int transflag = 0;
2500 struct dentry *dp;
2501
2502 if (inode == NULL)
2503 return;
2504
2505 isp = inode->i_security;
2506
2507 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
2508 /*
2509 * If the inode is already instantiated
2510 * take the quick way out
2511 */
2512 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
2513 goto unlockandout;
2514
2515 sbp = inode->i_sb;
2516 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
2517 /*
2518 * We're going to use the superblock default label
2519 * if there's no label on the file.
2520 */
2521 final = sbsp->smk_default;
2522
2523 /*
2524 * If this is the root inode the superblock
2525 * may be in the process of initialization.
2526 * If that is the case use the root value out
2527 * of the superblock.
2528 */
2529 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
2530 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
2531 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2532 goto unlockandout;
2533 }
2534
2535 /*
2536 * This is pretty hackish.
2537 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
2538 * file system specific code, but it does help
2539 * with keeping it simple.
2540 */
2541 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
2542 case SMACK_MAGIC:
2543 /*
2544 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
2545 * that the smack file system doesn't do
2546 * extended attributes.
2547 */
2548 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2549 break;
2550 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
2551 /*
2552 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
2553 */
2554 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2555 break;
2556 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
2557 /*
2558 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
2559 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
2560 * pty with respect.
2561 */
2562 final = csp;
2563 break;
2564 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
2565 /*
2566 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
2567 * structures associated with the task involved.
2568 */
2569 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2570 break;
2571 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
2572 /*
2573 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
2574 * The superblock default suffices.
2575 */
2576 break;
2577 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
2578 /*
2579 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
2580 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
2581 * getting recreated on every reboot.
2582 */
2583 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2584 /*
2585 * No break.
2586 *
2587 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
2588 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
2589 * to set mount options simulate setting the
2590 * superblock default.
2591 */
2592 default:
2593 /*
2594 * This isn't an understood special case.
2595 * Get the value from the xattr.
2596 */
2597
2598 /*
2599 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
2600 */
2601 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
2602 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2603 break;
2604 }
2605 /*
2606 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
2607 * Use the aforeapplied default.
2608 * It would be curious if the label of the task
2609 * does not match that assigned.
2610 */
2611 if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
2612 break;
2613 /*
2614 * Get the dentry for xattr.
2615 */
2616 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
2617 fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
2618 if (fetched != NULL) {
2619 final = fetched;
2620 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
2621 trattr[0] = '\0';
2622 inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
2623 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
2624 trattr, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
2625 if (strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
2626 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) == 0)
2627 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
2628 }
2629 }
2630 isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
2631 isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
2632
2633 dput(dp);
2634 break;
2635 }
2636
2637 if (final == NULL)
2638 isp->smk_inode = csp;
2639 else
2640 isp->smk_inode = final;
2641
2642 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
2643
2644unlockandout:
2645 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
2646 return;
2647}
2648
2649/**
2650 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
2651 * @p: the object task
2652 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
2653 * @value: where to put the result
2654 *
2655 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
2656 *
2657 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
2658 */
2659static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
2660{
2661 char *cp;
2662 int slen;
2663
2664 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
2665 return -EINVAL;
2666
2667 cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
2668 if (cp == NULL)
2669 return -ENOMEM;
2670
2671 slen = strlen(cp);
2672 *value = cp;
2673 return slen;
2674}
2675
2676/**
2677 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
2678 * @p: the object task
2679 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
2680 * @value: the value to set
2681 * @size: the size of the value
2682 *
2683 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
2684 * is permitted and only with privilege
2685 *
2686 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
2687 */
2688static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
2689 void *value, size_t size)
2690{
2691 int rc;
2692 struct task_smack *tsp;
2693 struct task_smack *oldtsp;
2694 struct cred *new;
2695 char *newsmack;
2696
2697 /*
2698 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
2699 * and supports no sane use case.
2700 */
2701 if (p != current)
2702 return -EPERM;
2703
2704 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2705 return -EPERM;
2706
2707 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
2708 return -EINVAL;
2709
2710 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
2711 return -EINVAL;
2712
2713 newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
2714 if (newsmack == NULL)
2715 return -EINVAL;
2716
2717 /*
2718 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
2719 */
2720 if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
2721 return -EPERM;
2722
2723 oldtsp = p->cred->security;
2724 new = prepare_creds();
2725 if (new == NULL)
2726 return -ENOMEM;
2727
2728 tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL);
2729 if (tsp == NULL) {
2730 kfree(new);
2731 return -ENOMEM;
2732 }
2733 rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
2734 if (rc != 0)
2735 return rc;
2736
2737 new->security = tsp;
2738 commit_creds(new);
2739 return size;
2740}
2741
2742/**
2743 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
2744 * @sock: one sock
2745 * @other: the other sock
2746 * @newsk: unused
2747 *
2748 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
2749 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
2750 */
2751static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
2752 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
2753{
2754 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
2755 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
2756 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2757 int rc = 0;
2758
2759 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2760 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
2761
2762 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
2763 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2764
2765 return rc;
2766}
2767
2768/**
2769 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
2770 * @sock: one socket
2771 * @other: the other socket
2772 *
2773 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
2774 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
2775 */
2776static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
2777{
2778 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2779 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
2780 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2781 int rc = 0;
2782
2783 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2784 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
2785
2786 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
2787 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2788
2789 return rc;
2790}
2791
2792/**
2793 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
2794 * @sock: the socket
2795 * @msg: the message
2796 * @size: the size of the message
2797 *
2798 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
2799 * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
2800 * label host.
2801 */
2802static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
2803 int size)
2804{
2805 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
2806
2807 /*
2808 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
2809 */
2810 if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
2811 return 0;
2812
2813 return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
2814}
2815
2816
2817/**
2818 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
2819 * @sap: netlabel secattr
2820 * @sip: where to put the result
2821 *
2822 * Copies a smack label into sip
2823 */
2824static void smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, char *sip)
2825{
2826 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
2827 char *sp;
2828 int pcat;
2829
2830 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
2831 /*
2832 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
2833 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
2834 * behaving the way we expect it to.
2835 *
2836 * Get the categories, if any
2837 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
2838 * for the packet fall back on the network
2839 * ambient value.
2840 */
2841 memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
2842 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
2843 for (pcat = -1;;) {
2844 pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
2845 sap->attr.mls.cat, pcat + 1);
2846 if (pcat < 0)
2847 break;
2848 smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
2849 }
2850 /*
2851 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
2852 * we are already done. WeeHee.
2853 */
2854 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
2855 memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
2856 return;
2857 }
2858 /*
2859 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not
2860 * a direct mapping.
2861 */
2862 smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
2863 return;
2864 }
2865 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
2866 /*
2867 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
2868 */
2869 sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
2870 /*
2871 * This has got to be a bug because it is
2872 * impossible to specify a fallback without
2873 * specifying the label, which will ensure
2874 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
2875 * secid is from a fallback.
2876 */
2877 BUG_ON(sp == NULL);
2878 strncpy(sip, sp, SMK_MAXLEN);
2879 return;
2880 }
2881 /*
2882 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
2883 * for the packet fall back on the network
2884 * ambient value.
2885 */
2886 strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
2887 return;
2888}
2889
2890/**
2891 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
2892 * @sk: socket
2893 * @skb: packet
2894 *
2895 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
2896 */
2897static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
2898{
2899 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2900 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2901 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
2902 char *csp;
2903 int rc;
2904 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2905 if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
2906 return 0;
2907
2908 /*
2909 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
2910 */
2911 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2912
2913 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
2914 if (rc == 0) {
2915 smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
2916 csp = smack;
2917 } else
2918 csp = smack_net_ambient;
2919
2920 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2921
2922#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2923 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2924 ad.a.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
2925 ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
2926 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
2927#endif
2928 /*
2929 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
2930 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
2931 * This is the simplist possible security model
2932 * for networking.
2933 */
2934 rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2935 if (rc != 0)
2936 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
2937 return rc;
2938}
2939
2940/**
2941 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
2942 * @sock: the socket
2943 * @optval: user's destination
2944 * @optlen: size thereof
2945 * @len: max thereof
2946 *
2947 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
2948 */
2949static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
2950 char __user *optval,
2951 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
2952{
2953 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2954 int slen;
2955 int rc = 0;
2956
2957 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2958 slen = strlen(ssp->smk_packet) + 1;
2959
2960 if (slen > len)
2961 rc = -ERANGE;
2962 else if (copy_to_user(optval, ssp->smk_packet, slen) != 0)
2963 rc = -EFAULT;
2964
2965 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
2966 rc = -EFAULT;
2967
2968 return rc;
2969}
2970
2971
2972/**
2973 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
2974 * @sock: the peer socket
2975 * @skb: packet data
2976 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
2977 *
2978 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
2979 */
2980static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
2981 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
2982
2983{
2984 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2985 struct socket_smack *sp;
2986 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
2987 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
2988 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
2989 int rc;
2990
2991 if (skb != NULL) {
2992 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
2993 family = PF_INET;
2994 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
2995 family = PF_INET6;
2996 }
2997 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
2998 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
2999
3000 if (family == PF_UNIX) {
3001 sp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3002 s = smack_to_secid(sp->smk_out);
3003 } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3004 /*
3005 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3006 */
3007 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3008 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3009 if (rc == 0) {
3010 smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
3011 s = smack_to_secid(smack);
3012 }
3013 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3014 }
3015 *secid = s;
3016 if (s == 0)
3017 return -EINVAL;
3018 return 0;
3019}
3020
3021/**
3022 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
3023 * @sk: child sock
3024 * @parent: parent socket
3025 *
3026 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
3027 * is creating the new socket.
3028 */
3029static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
3030{
3031 struct socket_smack *ssp;
3032
3033 if (sk == NULL ||
3034 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
3035 return;
3036
3037 ssp = sk->sk_security;
3038 ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
3039 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
3040}
3041
3042/**
3043 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
3044 * @sk: socket involved
3045 * @skb: packet
3046 * @req: unused
3047 *
3048 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
3049 * the socket, otherwise an error code
3050 */
3051static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3052 struct request_sock *req)
3053{
3054 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
3055 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3056 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3057 struct sockaddr_in addr;
3058 struct iphdr *hdr;
3059 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
3060 int rc;
3061 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3062
3063 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3064 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3065 family = PF_INET;
3066
3067 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3068 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3069 if (rc == 0)
3070 smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
3071 else
3072 strncpy(smack, smack_known_huh.smk_known, SMK_MAXLEN);
3073 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3074
3075#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3076 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
3077 ad.a.u.net.family = family;
3078 ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
3079 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3080#endif
3081 /*
3082 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
3083 * here. Read access is not required.
3084 */
3085 rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3086 if (rc != 0)
3087 return rc;
3088
3089 /*
3090 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
3091 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
3092 */
3093 req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
3094
3095 /*
3096 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
3097 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
3098 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
3099 */
3100 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
3101 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
3102 rcu_read_lock();
3103 if (smack_host_label(&addr) == NULL) {
3104 rcu_read_unlock();
3105 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3106 smack_to_secattr(smack, &secattr);
3107 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
3108 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3109 } else {
3110 rcu_read_unlock();
3111 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
3112 }
3113
3114 return rc;
3115}
3116
3117/**
3118 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
3119 * @sk: the new socket
3120 * @req: the connection's request_sock
3121 *
3122 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
3123 */
3124static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
3125 const struct request_sock *req)
3126{
3127 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3128 char *smack;
3129
3130 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
3131 smack = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
3132 strncpy(ssp->smk_packet, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
3133 } else
3134 ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
3135}
3136
3137/*
3138 * Key management security hooks
3139 *
3140 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
3141 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
3142 * If you care about keys please have a look.
3143 */
3144#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
3145
3146/**
3147 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
3148 * @key: object
3149 * @cred: the credentials to use
3150 * @flags: unused
3151 *
3152 * No allocation required
3153 *
3154 * Returns 0
3155 */
3156static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
3157 unsigned long flags)
3158{
3159 key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
3160 return 0;
3161}
3162
3163/**
3164 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
3165 * @key: the object
3166 *
3167 * Clear the blob pointer
3168 */
3169static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
3170{
3171 key->security = NULL;
3172}
3173
3174/*
3175 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
3176 * @key_ref: gets to the object
3177 * @cred: the credentials to use
3178 * @perm: unused
3179 *
3180 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
3181 * an error code otherwise
3182 */
3183static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
3184 const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
3185{
3186 struct key *keyp;
3187 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3188 char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
3189
3190 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
3191 if (keyp == NULL)
3192 return -EINVAL;
3193 /*
3194 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
3195 * it may do so.
3196 */
3197 if (keyp->security == NULL)
3198 return 0;
3199 /*
3200 * This should not occur
3201 */
3202 if (tsp == NULL)
3203 return -EACCES;
3204#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3205 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
3206 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
3207 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
3208#endif
3209 return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
3210 MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
3211}
3212#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
3213
3214/*
3215 * Smack Audit hooks
3216 *
3217 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
3218 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
3219 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
3220 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
3221 *
3222 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
3223 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
3224 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
3225 * model where nearly everything is a label.
3226 */
3227#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3228
3229/**
3230 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
3231 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
3232 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
3233 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
3234 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
3235 *
3236 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
3237 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
3238 */
3239static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3240{
3241 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
3242 *rule = NULL;
3243
3244 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3245 return -EINVAL;
3246
3247 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
3248 return -EINVAL;
3249
3250 *rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
3251
3252 return 0;
3253}
3254
3255/**
3256 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
3257 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
3258 *
3259 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
3260 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
3261 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
3262 */
3263static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
3264{
3265 struct audit_field *f;
3266 int i;
3267
3268 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
3269 f = &krule->fields[i];
3270
3271 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3272 return 1;
3273 }
3274
3275 return 0;
3276}
3277
3278/**
3279 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
3280 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
3281 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
3282 * @op: required testing operator
3283 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
3284 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
3285 *
3286 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
3287 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
3288 */
3289static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3290 struct audit_context *actx)
3291{
3292 char *smack;
3293 char *rule = vrule;
3294
3295 if (!rule) {
3296 audit_log(actx, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3297 "Smack: missing rule\n");
3298 return -ENOENT;
3299 }
3300
3301 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3302 return 0;
3303
3304 smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
3305
3306 /*
3307 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
3308 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
3309 * label.
3310 */
3311 if (op == Audit_equal)
3312 return (rule == smack);
3313 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
3314 return (rule != smack);
3315
3316 return 0;
3317}
3318
3319/**
3320 * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
3321 * @vrule: rule to be freed.
3322 *
3323 * No memory was allocated.
3324 */
3325static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3326{
3327 /* No-op */
3328}
3329
3330#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3331
3332/**
3333 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
3334 * @secid: incoming integer
3335 * @secdata: destination
3336 * @seclen: how long it is
3337 *
3338 * Exists for networking code.
3339 */
3340static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
3341{
3342 char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
3343
3344 if (secdata)
3345 *secdata = sp;
3346 *seclen = strlen(sp);
3347 return 0;
3348}
3349
3350/**
3351 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
3352 * @secdata: smack label
3353 * @seclen: how long result is
3354 * @secid: outgoing integer
3355 *
3356 * Exists for audit and networking code.
3357 */
3358static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
3359{
3360 *secid = smack_to_secid(secdata);
3361 return 0;
3362}
3363
3364/**
3365 * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
3366 * @secdata: unused
3367 * @seclen: unused
3368 *
3369 * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
3370 */
3371static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
3372{
3373}
3374
3375static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
3376{
3377 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
3378}
3379
3380static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
3381{
3382 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
3383}
3384
3385static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
3386{
3387 int len = 0;
3388 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
3389
3390 if (len < 0)
3391 return len;
3392 *ctxlen = len;
3393 return 0;
3394}
3395
3396struct security_operations smack_ops = {
3397 .name = "smack",
3398
3399 .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
3400 .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
3401 .syslog = smack_syslog,
3402
3403 .sb_alloc_security = smack_sb_alloc_security,
3404 .sb_free_security = smack_sb_free_security,
3405 .sb_copy_data = smack_sb_copy_data,
3406 .sb_kern_mount = smack_sb_kern_mount,
3407 .sb_statfs = smack_sb_statfs,
3408 .sb_mount = smack_sb_mount,
3409 .sb_umount = smack_sb_umount,
3410
3411 .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds,
3412
3413 .inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security,
3414 .inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security,
3415 .inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security,
3416 .inode_link = smack_inode_link,
3417 .inode_unlink = smack_inode_unlink,
3418 .inode_rmdir = smack_inode_rmdir,
3419 .inode_rename = smack_inode_rename,
3420 .inode_permission = smack_inode_permission,
3421 .inode_setattr = smack_inode_setattr,
3422 .inode_getattr = smack_inode_getattr,
3423 .inode_setxattr = smack_inode_setxattr,
3424 .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr,
3425 .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr,
3426 .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr,
3427 .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity,
3428 .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity,
3429 .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity,
3430 .inode_getsecid = smack_inode_getsecid,
3431
3432 .file_permission = smack_file_permission,
3433 .file_alloc_security = smack_file_alloc_security,
3434 .file_free_security = smack_file_free_security,
3435 .file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl,
3436 .file_lock = smack_file_lock,
3437 .file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl,
3438 .file_mmap = smack_file_mmap,
3439 .file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner,
3440 .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
3441 .file_receive = smack_file_receive,
3442
3443 .cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank,
3444 .cred_free = smack_cred_free,
3445 .cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare,
3446 .cred_transfer = smack_cred_transfer,
3447 .kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as,
3448 .kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as,
3449 .task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid,
3450 .task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid,
3451 .task_getsid = smack_task_getsid,
3452 .task_getsecid = smack_task_getsecid,
3453 .task_setnice = smack_task_setnice,
3454 .task_setioprio = smack_task_setioprio,
3455 .task_getioprio = smack_task_getioprio,
3456 .task_setscheduler = smack_task_setscheduler,
3457 .task_getscheduler = smack_task_getscheduler,
3458 .task_movememory = smack_task_movememory,
3459 .task_kill = smack_task_kill,
3460 .task_wait = smack_task_wait,
3461 .task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode,
3462
3463 .ipc_permission = smack_ipc_permission,
3464 .ipc_getsecid = smack_ipc_getsecid,
3465
3466 .msg_msg_alloc_security = smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
3467 .msg_msg_free_security = smack_msg_msg_free_security,
3468
3469 .msg_queue_alloc_security = smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
3470 .msg_queue_free_security = smack_msg_queue_free_security,
3471 .msg_queue_associate = smack_msg_queue_associate,
3472 .msg_queue_msgctl = smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
3473 .msg_queue_msgsnd = smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
3474 .msg_queue_msgrcv = smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
3475
3476 .shm_alloc_security = smack_shm_alloc_security,
3477 .shm_free_security = smack_shm_free_security,
3478 .shm_associate = smack_shm_associate,
3479 .shm_shmctl = smack_shm_shmctl,
3480 .shm_shmat = smack_shm_shmat,
3481
3482 .sem_alloc_security = smack_sem_alloc_security,
3483 .sem_free_security = smack_sem_free_security,
3484 .sem_associate = smack_sem_associate,
3485 .sem_semctl = smack_sem_semctl,
3486 .sem_semop = smack_sem_semop,
3487
3488 .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate,
3489
3490 .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr,
3491 .setprocattr = smack_setprocattr,
3492
3493 .unix_stream_connect = smack_unix_stream_connect,
3494 .unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send,
3495
3496 .socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create,
3497 .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect,
3498 .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg,
3499 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
3500 .socket_getpeersec_stream = smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
3501 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
3502 .sk_alloc_security = smack_sk_alloc_security,
3503 .sk_free_security = smack_sk_free_security,
3504 .sock_graft = smack_sock_graft,
3505 .inet_conn_request = smack_inet_conn_request,
3506 .inet_csk_clone = smack_inet_csk_clone,
3507
3508 /* key management security hooks */
3509#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
3510 .key_alloc = smack_key_alloc,
3511 .key_free = smack_key_free,
3512 .key_permission = smack_key_permission,
3513#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
3514
3515 /* Audit hooks */
3516#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3517 .audit_rule_init = smack_audit_rule_init,
3518 .audit_rule_known = smack_audit_rule_known,
3519 .audit_rule_match = smack_audit_rule_match,
3520 .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free,
3521#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3522
3523 .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx,
3524 .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid,
3525 .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx,
3526 .inode_notifysecctx = smack_inode_notifysecctx,
3527 .inode_setsecctx = smack_inode_setsecctx,
3528 .inode_getsecctx = smack_inode_getsecctx,
3529};
3530
3531
3532static __init void init_smack_know_list(void)
3533{
3534 list_add(&smack_known_huh.list, &smack_known_list);
3535 list_add(&smack_known_hat.list, &smack_known_list);
3536 list_add(&smack_known_star.list, &smack_known_list);
3537 list_add(&smack_known_floor.list, &smack_known_list);
3538 list_add(&smack_known_invalid.list, &smack_known_list);
3539 list_add(&smack_known_web.list, &smack_known_list);
3540}
3541
3542/**
3543 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
3544 *
3545 * Returns 0
3546 */
3547static __init int smack_init(void)
3548{
3549 struct cred *cred;
3550 struct task_smack *tsp;
3551
3552 if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
3553 return 0;
3554
3555 tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
3556 smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3557 if (tsp == NULL)
3558 return -ENOMEM;
3559
3560 printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
3561
3562 /*
3563 * Set the security state for the initial task.
3564 */
3565 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
3566 cred->security = tsp;
3567
3568 /* initialize the smack_know_list */
3569 init_smack_know_list();
3570 /*
3571 * Initialize locks
3572 */
3573 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
3574 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
3575 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);
3576 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_cipsolock);
3577 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_cipsolock);
3578
3579 /*
3580 * Register with LSM
3581 */
3582 if (register_security(&smack_ops))
3583 panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
3584
3585 return 0;
3586}
3587
3588/*
3589 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
3590 * all processes and objects when they are created.
3591 */
3592security_initcall(smack_init);