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1/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
46
47#include <linux/init.h>
48#include <asm/types.h>
49#include <linux/atomic.h>
50#include <linux/fs.h>
51#include <linux/namei.h>
52#include <linux/mm.h>
53#include <linux/export.h>
54#include <linux/slab.h>
55#include <linux/mount.h>
56#include <linux/socket.h>
57#include <linux/mqueue.h>
58#include <linux/audit.h>
59#include <linux/personality.h>
60#include <linux/time.h>
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/compiler.h>
63#include <asm/unistd.h>
64#include <linux/security.h>
65#include <linux/list.h>
66#include <linux/binfmts.h>
67#include <linux/highmem.h>
68#include <linux/syscalls.h>
69#include <asm/syscall.h>
70#include <linux/capability.h>
71#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72#include <linux/compat.h>
73#include <linux/ctype.h>
74#include <linux/string.h>
75#include <linux/uaccess.h>
76#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
78#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
79
80#include "audit.h"
81
82/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
83#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
84#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
85#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
86
87/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
88 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
89#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90
91/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
92#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
93
94/* number of audit rules */
95int audit_n_rules;
96
97/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
98int audit_signals;
99
100struct audit_aux_data {
101 struct audit_aux_data *next;
102 int type;
103};
104
105#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
106
107/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
108#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
109
110struct audit_aux_data_pids {
111 struct audit_aux_data d;
112 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
116 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
117 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
118 int pid_count;
119};
120
121struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
122 struct audit_aux_data d;
123 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
124 unsigned int fcap_ver;
125 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
126 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
127};
128
129struct audit_tree_refs {
130 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
131 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
132};
133
134struct audit_nfcfgop_tab {
135 enum audit_nfcfgop op;
136 const char *s;
137};
138
139static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
140 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "xt_register" },
141 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "xt_replace" },
142 { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "xt_unregister" },
143 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_table" },
144 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_table" },
145 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER, "nft_register_chain" },
146 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_chain" },
147 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER, "nft_register_rule" },
148 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_rule" },
149 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER, "nft_register_set" },
150 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_set" },
151 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER, "nft_register_setelem" },
152 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_setelem" },
153 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, "nft_register_gen" },
154 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER, "nft_register_obj" },
155 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_obj" },
156 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET, "nft_reset_obj" },
157 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_flowtable" },
158 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_flowtable" },
159 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID, "nft_invalid" },
160};
161
162static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
163{
164 unsigned n;
165 if (unlikely(!ctx))
166 return 0;
167 n = ctx->major;
168
169 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
170 case 0: /* native */
171 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
172 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
173 return 1;
174 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
175 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
176 return 1;
177 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
178 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
179 return 1;
180 return 0;
181 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
182 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
183 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
184 return 1;
185 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
186 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
187 return 1;
188 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
189 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
190 return 1;
191 return 0;
192 case 2: /* open */
193 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
194 case 3: /* openat */
195 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
196 case 4: /* socketcall */
197 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
198 case 5: /* execve */
199 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
200 default:
201 return 0;
202 }
203}
204
205static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
206{
207 struct audit_names *n;
208 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
209
210 if (unlikely(!ctx))
211 return 0;
212
213 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
214 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
215 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
216 return 1;
217 }
218
219 return 0;
220}
221
222/*
223 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
224 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
225 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
226 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
227 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
228 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
229 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
230 */
231
232static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
233{
234 if (!ctx->prio) {
235 ctx->prio = 1;
236 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
237 }
238}
239
240static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
241{
242 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
243 int left = ctx->tree_count;
244 if (likely(left)) {
245 p->c[--left] = chunk;
246 ctx->tree_count = left;
247 return 1;
248 }
249 if (!p)
250 return 0;
251 p = p->next;
252 if (p) {
253 p->c[30] = chunk;
254 ctx->trees = p;
255 ctx->tree_count = 30;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 return 0;
259}
260
261static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
262{
263 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
264 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
265 if (!ctx->trees) {
266 ctx->trees = p;
267 return 0;
268 }
269 if (p)
270 p->next = ctx->trees;
271 else
272 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
273 ctx->tree_count = 31;
274 return 1;
275}
276
277static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
278 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
279{
280 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
281 int n;
282 if (!p) {
283 /* we started with empty chain */
284 p = ctx->first_trees;
285 count = 31;
286 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
287 if (!p)
288 return;
289 }
290 n = count;
291 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
292 while (n--) {
293 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
294 q->c[n] = NULL;
295 }
296 }
297 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
298 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
299 q->c[n] = NULL;
300 }
301 ctx->trees = p;
302 ctx->tree_count = count;
303}
304
305static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
306{
307 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
308 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
309 q = p->next;
310 kfree(p);
311 }
312}
313
314static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
315{
316 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
317 int n;
318 if (!tree)
319 return 0;
320 /* full ones */
321 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
322 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
323 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
324 return 1;
325 }
326 /* partial */
327 if (p) {
328 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
329 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
330 return 1;
331 }
332 return 0;
333}
334
335static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
336 struct audit_names *name,
337 struct audit_field *f,
338 struct audit_context *ctx)
339{
340 struct audit_names *n;
341 int rc;
342
343 if (name) {
344 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
345 if (rc)
346 return rc;
347 }
348
349 if (ctx) {
350 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
351 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
352 if (rc)
353 return rc;
354 }
355 }
356 return 0;
357}
358
359static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
360 struct audit_names *name,
361 struct audit_field *f,
362 struct audit_context *ctx)
363{
364 struct audit_names *n;
365 int rc;
366
367 if (name) {
368 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
369 if (rc)
370 return rc;
371 }
372
373 if (ctx) {
374 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
375 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
376 if (rc)
377 return rc;
378 }
379 }
380 return 0;
381}
382
383static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
384 const struct cred *cred,
385 struct audit_field *f,
386 struct audit_context *ctx,
387 struct audit_names *name)
388{
389 switch (f->val) {
390 /* process to file object comparisons */
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
392 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
393 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
394 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
396 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
398 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
400 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
402 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
404 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
405 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
406 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
408 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
409 /* uid comparisons */
410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
411 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
412 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
414 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
415 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
416 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
418 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
419 /* auid comparisons */
420 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
421 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
422 cred->euid);
423 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
424 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
425 cred->suid);
426 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
427 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
428 cred->fsuid);
429 /* euid comparisons */
430 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
431 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
432 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
433 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
434 /* suid comparisons */
435 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
436 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
437 /* gid comparisons */
438 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
439 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
440 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
441 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
442 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
443 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
444 /* egid comparisons */
445 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
446 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
447 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
448 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
449 /* sgid comparison */
450 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
451 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
452 default:
453 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
454 return 0;
455 }
456 return 0;
457}
458
459/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
460/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
461 * otherwise.
462 *
463 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
464 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
465 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
466 */
467static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
468 struct audit_krule *rule,
469 struct audit_context *ctx,
470 struct audit_names *name,
471 enum audit_state *state,
472 bool task_creation)
473{
474 const struct cred *cred;
475 int i, need_sid = 1;
476 u32 sid;
477 unsigned int sessionid;
478
479 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
480
481 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
482 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
483 struct audit_names *n;
484 int result = 0;
485 pid_t pid;
486
487 switch (f->type) {
488 case AUDIT_PID:
489 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
490 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
491 break;
492 case AUDIT_PPID:
493 if (ctx) {
494 if (!ctx->ppid)
495 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
496 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
497 }
498 break;
499 case AUDIT_EXE:
500 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
501 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
502 result = !result;
503 break;
504 case AUDIT_UID:
505 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
506 break;
507 case AUDIT_EUID:
508 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
509 break;
510 case AUDIT_SUID:
511 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
512 break;
513 case AUDIT_FSUID:
514 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
515 break;
516 case AUDIT_GID:
517 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
518 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
519 if (!result)
520 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
521 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
522 if (result)
523 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
524 }
525 break;
526 case AUDIT_EGID:
527 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
528 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
529 if (!result)
530 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
531 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
532 if (result)
533 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
534 }
535 break;
536 case AUDIT_SGID:
537 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
538 break;
539 case AUDIT_FSGID:
540 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
541 break;
542 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
543 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
544 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
545 break;
546 case AUDIT_PERS:
547 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
548 break;
549 case AUDIT_ARCH:
550 if (ctx)
551 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
552 break;
553
554 case AUDIT_EXIT:
555 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
556 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
557 break;
558 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
559 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
560 if (f->val)
561 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
562 else
563 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
564 }
565 break;
566 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
567 if (name) {
568 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
569 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
570 ++result;
571 } else if (ctx) {
572 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
573 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
574 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
575 ++result;
576 break;
577 }
578 }
579 }
580 break;
581 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
582 if (name) {
583 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
584 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
585 ++result;
586 } else if (ctx) {
587 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
588 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
589 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
590 ++result;
591 break;
592 }
593 }
594 }
595 break;
596 case AUDIT_INODE:
597 if (name)
598 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
599 else if (ctx) {
600 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
601 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
602 ++result;
603 break;
604 }
605 }
606 }
607 break;
608 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
609 if (name) {
610 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
611 } else if (ctx) {
612 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
613 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
614 ++result;
615 break;
616 }
617 }
618 }
619 break;
620 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
621 if (name) {
622 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
623 } else if (ctx) {
624 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
625 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
626 ++result;
627 break;
628 }
629 }
630 }
631 break;
632 case AUDIT_WATCH:
633 if (name) {
634 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
635 name->ino,
636 name->dev);
637 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
638 result = !result;
639 }
640 break;
641 case AUDIT_DIR:
642 if (ctx) {
643 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
644 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
645 result = !result;
646 }
647 break;
648 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
649 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
650 f->op, f->uid);
651 break;
652 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
653 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
654 break;
655 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
656 if (ctx->sockaddr)
657 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
658 f->op, f->val);
659 break;
660 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
661 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
662 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
663 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
664 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
665 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
666 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
667 match for now to avoid losing information that
668 may be wanted. An error message will also be
669 logged upon error */
670 if (f->lsm_rule) {
671 if (need_sid) {
672 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
673 need_sid = 0;
674 }
675 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
676 f->op,
677 f->lsm_rule);
678 }
679 break;
680 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
681 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
682 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
683 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
684 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
685 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
686 also applies here */
687 if (f->lsm_rule) {
688 /* Find files that match */
689 if (name) {
690 result = security_audit_rule_match(
691 name->osid,
692 f->type,
693 f->op,
694 f->lsm_rule);
695 } else if (ctx) {
696 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
697 if (security_audit_rule_match(
698 n->osid,
699 f->type,
700 f->op,
701 f->lsm_rule)) {
702 ++result;
703 break;
704 }
705 }
706 }
707 /* Find ipc objects that match */
708 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
709 break;
710 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
711 f->type, f->op,
712 f->lsm_rule))
713 ++result;
714 }
715 break;
716 case AUDIT_ARG0:
717 case AUDIT_ARG1:
718 case AUDIT_ARG2:
719 case AUDIT_ARG3:
720 if (ctx)
721 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
722 break;
723 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
724 /* ignore this field for filtering */
725 result = 1;
726 break;
727 case AUDIT_PERM:
728 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
729 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
730 result = !result;
731 break;
732 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
733 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
734 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
735 result = !result;
736 break;
737 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
738 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
739 break;
740 }
741 if (!result)
742 return 0;
743 }
744
745 if (ctx) {
746 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
747 return 0;
748 if (rule->filterkey) {
749 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
750 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
751 }
752 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
753 }
754 switch (rule->action) {
755 case AUDIT_NEVER:
756 *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
757 break;
758 case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
759 *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
760 break;
761 }
762 return 1;
763}
764
765/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
766 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
767 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
768 */
769static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
770{
771 struct audit_entry *e;
772 enum audit_state state;
773
774 rcu_read_lock();
775 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
776 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
777 &state, true)) {
778 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
779 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
780 rcu_read_unlock();
781 return state;
782 }
783 }
784 rcu_read_unlock();
785 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
786}
787
788static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
789{
790 int word, bit;
791
792 if (val > 0xffffffff)
793 return false;
794
795 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
796 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
797 return false;
798
799 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
800
801 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
802}
803
804/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
805 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
806 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
807 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
808 */
809static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
810 struct audit_context *ctx,
811 struct list_head *list)
812{
813 struct audit_entry *e;
814 enum audit_state state;
815
816 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
817 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
818
819 rcu_read_lock();
820 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
821 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
822 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
823 &state, false)) {
824 rcu_read_unlock();
825 ctx->current_state = state;
826 return state;
827 }
828 }
829 rcu_read_unlock();
830 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
831}
832
833/*
834 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
835 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
836 */
837static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
838 struct audit_names *n,
839 struct audit_context *ctx) {
840 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
841 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
842 struct audit_entry *e;
843 enum audit_state state;
844
845 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
846 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
847 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
848 ctx->current_state = state;
849 return 1;
850 }
851 }
852 return 0;
853}
854
855/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
856 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
857 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
858 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
859 */
860void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
861{
862 struct audit_names *n;
863
864 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
865 return;
866
867 rcu_read_lock();
868
869 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
870 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
871 break;
872 }
873 rcu_read_unlock();
874}
875
876static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
877{
878 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
879 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
880 context->proctitle.len = 0;
881}
882
883static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
884{
885 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
886 kfree(context->module.name);
887 context->module.name = NULL;
888 }
889}
890static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
891{
892 struct audit_names *n, *next;
893
894 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
895 list_del(&n->list);
896 if (n->name)
897 putname(n->name);
898 if (n->should_free)
899 kfree(n);
900 }
901 context->name_count = 0;
902 path_put(&context->pwd);
903 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
904 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
905}
906
907static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
908{
909 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
910
911 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
912 context->aux = aux->next;
913 kfree(aux);
914 }
915 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
916 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
917 kfree(aux);
918 }
919}
920
921static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
922{
923 struct audit_context *context;
924
925 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
926 if (!context)
927 return NULL;
928 context->state = state;
929 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
930 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
931 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
932 return context;
933}
934
935/**
936 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
937 * @tsk: task
938 *
939 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
940 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
941 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
942 * needed.
943 */
944int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
945{
946 struct audit_context *context;
947 enum audit_state state;
948 char *key = NULL;
949
950 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
951 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
952
953 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
954 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
955 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
956 return 0;
957 }
958
959 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
960 kfree(key);
961 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
962 return -ENOMEM;
963 }
964 context->filterkey = key;
965
966 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
967 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
968 return 0;
969}
970
971static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
972{
973 audit_free_module(context);
974 audit_free_names(context);
975 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
976 free_tree_refs(context);
977 audit_free_aux(context);
978 kfree(context->filterkey);
979 kfree(context->sockaddr);
980 audit_proctitle_free(context);
981 kfree(context);
982}
983
984static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
985 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
986 u32 sid, char *comm)
987{
988 struct audit_buffer *ab;
989 char *ctx = NULL;
990 u32 len;
991 int rc = 0;
992
993 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
994 if (!ab)
995 return rc;
996
997 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
998 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
999 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
1000 if (sid) {
1001 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1002 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1003 rc = 1;
1004 } else {
1005 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1006 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1007 }
1008 }
1009 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1010 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1011 audit_log_end(ab);
1012
1013 return rc;
1014}
1015
1016static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1017 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1018{
1019 long len_max;
1020 long len_rem;
1021 long len_full;
1022 long len_buf;
1023 long len_abuf = 0;
1024 long len_tmp;
1025 bool require_data;
1026 bool encode;
1027 unsigned int iter;
1028 unsigned int arg;
1029 char *buf_head;
1030 char *buf;
1031 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1032
1033 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1034 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1035 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1036 char abuf[96];
1037
1038 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1039 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1040 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1041 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1042 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1043 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1044
1045 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1046 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1047 if (!buf_head) {
1048 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1049 return;
1050 }
1051 buf = buf_head;
1052
1053 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1054
1055 len_rem = len_max;
1056 len_buf = 0;
1057 len_full = 0;
1058 require_data = true;
1059 encode = false;
1060 iter = 0;
1061 arg = 0;
1062 do {
1063 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1064 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1065 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1066 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1067 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1068 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1069 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1070 if (len_full == 0)
1071 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1072
1073 /* read more data from userspace */
1074 if (require_data) {
1075 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1076 if (buf != buf_head) {
1077 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1078 buf = buf_head;
1079 }
1080
1081 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1082 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1083 len_max - len_buf);
1084 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1085 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1086 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1087 goto out;
1088 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1089 /* buffer is not large enough */
1090 require_data = true;
1091 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1092 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1093 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1094 * consistent record encoding */
1095 encode = true;
1096 len_full = len_full * 2;
1097 p += len_tmp;
1098 } else {
1099 require_data = false;
1100 if (!encode)
1101 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1102 buf, len_tmp);
1103 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1104 if (len_full < len_max)
1105 len_full = (encode ?
1106 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1107 p += len_tmp + 1;
1108 }
1109 len_buf += len_tmp;
1110 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1111
1112 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1113 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1114 }
1115
1116 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1117 if (len_buf >= 0) {
1118 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1119 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1120 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1121 * a new buffer */
1122 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1123 len_rem = len_max;
1124 audit_log_end(*ab);
1125 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1126 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1127 if (!*ab)
1128 goto out;
1129 }
1130
1131 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1132 len_tmp = 0;
1133 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1134 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1135 if (iter == 0) {
1136 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1137 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1138 " a%d_len=%lu",
1139 arg, len_full);
1140 }
1141 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1142 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1143 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1144 } else
1145 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1146 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1147 " a%d=", arg);
1148 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1149 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1150
1151 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1152 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1153 len_rem -= len_tmp;
1154 len_tmp = len_buf;
1155 if (encode) {
1156 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1157 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1158 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1159 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1160 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1161 } else {
1162 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1163 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1164 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1165 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1166 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1167 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1168 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1169 }
1170 len_buf -= len_tmp;
1171 buf += len_tmp;
1172 }
1173
1174 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1175 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1176 arg++;
1177 iter = 0;
1178 len_full = 0;
1179 require_data = true;
1180 encode = false;
1181 }
1182 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1183
1184 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1185
1186out:
1187 kfree(buf_head);
1188}
1189
1190static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1191 kernel_cap_t *cap)
1192{
1193 int i;
1194
1195 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1196 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1197 return;
1198 }
1199 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1200 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
1201 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1202}
1203
1204static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1205{
1206 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1207 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1208 return;
1209 }
1210 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1211 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1212 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1213 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1214 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1215}
1216
1217static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1218{
1219 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1220 int i;
1221
1222 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1223 if (!ab)
1224 return;
1225
1226 switch (context->type) {
1227 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1228 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1229 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1230 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1231 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1232 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1233 break; }
1234 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1235 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1236
1237 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1238 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1239 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1240 context->ipc.mode);
1241 if (osid) {
1242 char *ctx = NULL;
1243 u32 len;
1244 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1245 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1246 *call_panic = 1;
1247 } else {
1248 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1249 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1250 }
1251 }
1252 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1253 audit_log_end(ab);
1254 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1255 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1256 if (unlikely(!ab))
1257 return;
1258 audit_log_format(ab,
1259 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1260 context->ipc.qbytes,
1261 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1262 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1263 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1264 }
1265 break; }
1266 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1267 audit_log_format(ab,
1268 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1269 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1270 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1271 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1272 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1273 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1274 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1275 break;
1276 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1277 audit_log_format(ab,
1278 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1279 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1280 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1281 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1282 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1283 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1284 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1285 break;
1286 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1287 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1288 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1289 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1290 break;
1291 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1292 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1293 audit_log_format(ab,
1294 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1295 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1296 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1297 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1298 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1299 break; }
1300 case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1301 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1302 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1303 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1304 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1305 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1306 break;
1307 case AUDIT_MMAP:
1308 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1309 context->mmap.flags);
1310 break;
1311 case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1312 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1313 break;
1314 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1315 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1316 if (context->module.name) {
1317 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1318 } else
1319 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1320
1321 break;
1322 }
1323 audit_log_end(ab);
1324}
1325
1326static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1327{
1328 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1329 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1330 end--;
1331
1332 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1333 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1334 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1335 return len;
1336}
1337
1338/*
1339 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1340 * @context: audit_context for the task
1341 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1342 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1343 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1344 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1345 */
1346static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1347 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1348{
1349 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1350
1351 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1352 if (!ab)
1353 return;
1354
1355 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1356
1357 if (path)
1358 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1359 else if (n->name) {
1360 switch (n->name_len) {
1361 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1362 /* log the full path */
1363 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1364 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1365 break;
1366 case 0:
1367 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1368 * directory component is the cwd
1369 */
1370 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1371 break;
1372 default:
1373 /* log the name's directory component */
1374 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1375 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1376 n->name_len);
1377 }
1378 } else
1379 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1380
1381 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1382 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1383 n->ino,
1384 MAJOR(n->dev),
1385 MINOR(n->dev),
1386 n->mode,
1387 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1388 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1389 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1390 MINOR(n->rdev));
1391 if (n->osid != 0) {
1392 char *ctx = NULL;
1393 u32 len;
1394
1395 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1396 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1397 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1398 if (call_panic)
1399 *call_panic = 2;
1400 } else {
1401 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1402 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1403 }
1404 }
1405
1406 /* log the audit_names record type */
1407 switch (n->type) {
1408 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1409 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1410 break;
1411 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1412 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1413 break;
1414 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1415 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1416 break;
1417 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1418 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1419 break;
1420 default:
1421 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1422 break;
1423 }
1424
1425 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1426 audit_log_end(ab);
1427}
1428
1429static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1430{
1431 int res;
1432 char *buf;
1433 char *msg = "(null)";
1434 int len = strlen(msg);
1435 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1436 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1437
1438 if (!context || context->dummy)
1439 return;
1440
1441 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1442 if (!ab)
1443 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1444
1445 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1446
1447 /* Not cached */
1448 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1449 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1450 if (!buf)
1451 goto out;
1452 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1453 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1454 if (res == 0) {
1455 kfree(buf);
1456 goto out;
1457 }
1458 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1459 if (res == 0) {
1460 kfree(buf);
1461 goto out;
1462 }
1463 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1464 context->proctitle.len = res;
1465 }
1466 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1467 len = context->proctitle.len;
1468out:
1469 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1470 audit_log_end(ab);
1471}
1472
1473static void audit_log_exit(void)
1474{
1475 int i, call_panic = 0;
1476 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1477 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1478 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1479 struct audit_names *n;
1480
1481 context->personality = current->personality;
1482
1483 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1484 if (!ab)
1485 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1486 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1487 context->arch, context->major);
1488 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1489 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1490 if (context->return_valid)
1491 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1492 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1493 context->return_code);
1494
1495 audit_log_format(ab,
1496 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1497 context->argv[0],
1498 context->argv[1],
1499 context->argv[2],
1500 context->argv[3],
1501 context->name_count);
1502
1503 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1504 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1505 audit_log_end(ab);
1506
1507 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1508
1509 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1510 if (!ab)
1511 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1512
1513 switch (aux->type) {
1514
1515 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1516 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1517 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1518 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1519 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1520 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1521 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1522 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1523 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1524 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1525 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1526 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1527 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1528 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1529 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1530 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1531 axs->fcap.rootid));
1532 break; }
1533
1534 }
1535 audit_log_end(ab);
1536 }
1537
1538 if (context->type)
1539 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1540
1541 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1542 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1543 if (ab) {
1544 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1545 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1546 audit_log_end(ab);
1547 }
1548 }
1549
1550 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1551 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1552 if (ab) {
1553 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1554 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1555 context->sockaddr_len);
1556 audit_log_end(ab);
1557 }
1558 }
1559
1560 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1561 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1562
1563 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1564 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1565 axs->target_auid[i],
1566 axs->target_uid[i],
1567 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1568 axs->target_sid[i],
1569 axs->target_comm[i]))
1570 call_panic = 1;
1571 }
1572
1573 if (context->target_pid &&
1574 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1575 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1576 context->target_sessionid,
1577 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1578 call_panic = 1;
1579
1580 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1581 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1582 if (ab) {
1583 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1584 audit_log_end(ab);
1585 }
1586 }
1587
1588 i = 0;
1589 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1590 if (n->hidden)
1591 continue;
1592 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1593 }
1594
1595 audit_log_proctitle();
1596
1597 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1598 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1599 if (ab)
1600 audit_log_end(ab);
1601 if (call_panic)
1602 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1603}
1604
1605/**
1606 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1607 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1608 *
1609 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1610 */
1611void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1612{
1613 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1614
1615 if (!context)
1616 return;
1617
1618 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1619 audit_kill_trees(context);
1620
1621 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1622 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1623 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1624 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1625 */
1626 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1627 context->return_valid = 0;
1628 context->return_code = 0;
1629
1630 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
1631 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1632 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1633 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1634 audit_log_exit();
1635 }
1636
1637 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1638 audit_free_context(context);
1639}
1640
1641/**
1642 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1643 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1644 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1645 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1646 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1647 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1648 *
1649 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1650 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1651 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1652 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1653 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1654 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1655 * be written).
1656 */
1657void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1658 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1659{
1660 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1661 enum audit_state state;
1662
1663 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1664 return;
1665
1666 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1667
1668 state = context->state;
1669 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1670 return;
1671
1672 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1673 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1674 context->prio = 0;
1675 if (auditd_test_task(current))
1676 return;
1677 }
1678
1679 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
1680 context->major = major;
1681 context->argv[0] = a1;
1682 context->argv[1] = a2;
1683 context->argv[2] = a3;
1684 context->argv[3] = a4;
1685 context->serial = 0;
1686 context->in_syscall = 1;
1687 context->current_state = state;
1688 context->ppid = 0;
1689 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
1690}
1691
1692/**
1693 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1694 * @success: success value of the syscall
1695 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1696 *
1697 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1698 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1699 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1700 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1701 * free the names stored from getname().
1702 */
1703void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1704{
1705 struct audit_context *context;
1706
1707 context = audit_context();
1708 if (!context)
1709 return;
1710
1711 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1712 audit_kill_trees(context);
1713
1714 if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1715 if (success)
1716 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1717 else
1718 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1719
1720 /*
1721 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1722 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1723 * arch specific signal handlers
1724 *
1725 * This is actually a test for:
1726 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1727 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1728 *
1729 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1730 */
1731 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1732 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1733 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1734 context->return_code = -EINTR;
1735 else
1736 context->return_code = return_code;
1737
1738 audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
1739 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1740 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
1741 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1742 audit_log_exit();
1743 }
1744
1745 context->in_syscall = 0;
1746 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1747
1748 audit_free_module(context);
1749 audit_free_names(context);
1750 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1751 audit_free_aux(context);
1752 context->aux = NULL;
1753 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1754 context->target_pid = 0;
1755 context->target_sid = 0;
1756 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1757 context->type = 0;
1758 context->fds[0] = -1;
1759 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1760 kfree(context->filterkey);
1761 context->filterkey = NULL;
1762 }
1763}
1764
1765static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1766{
1767 struct audit_context *context;
1768 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1769 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1770 int count;
1771 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
1772 return;
1773 context = audit_context();
1774 p = context->trees;
1775 count = context->tree_count;
1776 rcu_read_lock();
1777 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1778 rcu_read_unlock();
1779 if (!chunk)
1780 return;
1781 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1782 return;
1783 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1784 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1785 audit_set_auditable(context);
1786 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1787 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1788 return;
1789 }
1790 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1791}
1792
1793static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1794{
1795 struct audit_context *context;
1796 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1797 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1798 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1799 unsigned long seq;
1800 int count;
1801
1802 context = audit_context();
1803 p = context->trees;
1804 count = context->tree_count;
1805retry:
1806 drop = NULL;
1807 d = dentry;
1808 rcu_read_lock();
1809 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1810 for(;;) {
1811 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1812 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
1813 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1814 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1815 if (chunk) {
1816 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1817 drop = chunk;
1818 break;
1819 }
1820 }
1821 }
1822 parent = d->d_parent;
1823 if (parent == d)
1824 break;
1825 d = parent;
1826 }
1827 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1828 rcu_read_unlock();
1829 if (!drop) {
1830 /* just a race with rename */
1831 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1832 goto retry;
1833 }
1834 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1835 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1836 /* OK, got more space */
1837 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1838 goto retry;
1839 }
1840 /* too bad */
1841 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1842 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1843 audit_set_auditable(context);
1844 return;
1845 }
1846 rcu_read_unlock();
1847}
1848
1849static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1850 unsigned char type)
1851{
1852 struct audit_names *aname;
1853
1854 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1855 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1856 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1857 } else {
1858 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1859 if (!aname)
1860 return NULL;
1861 aname->should_free = true;
1862 }
1863
1864 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1865 aname->type = type;
1866 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1867
1868 context->name_count++;
1869 return aname;
1870}
1871
1872/**
1873 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1874 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1875 *
1876 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1877 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1878 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1879 */
1880struct filename *
1881__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1882{
1883 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1884 struct audit_names *n;
1885
1886 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1887 if (!n->name)
1888 continue;
1889 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1890 n->name->refcnt++;
1891 return n->name;
1892 }
1893 }
1894 return NULL;
1895}
1896
1897inline void _audit_getcwd(struct audit_context *context)
1898{
1899 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1900 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1901}
1902
1903void __audit_getcwd(void)
1904{
1905 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1906
1907 if (context->in_syscall)
1908 _audit_getcwd(context);
1909}
1910
1911/**
1912 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1913 * @name: name to add
1914 *
1915 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1916 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1917 */
1918void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1919{
1920 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1921 struct audit_names *n;
1922
1923 if (!context->in_syscall)
1924 return;
1925
1926 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1927 if (!n)
1928 return;
1929
1930 n->name = name;
1931 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1932 name->aname = n;
1933 name->refcnt++;
1934
1935 _audit_getcwd(context);
1936}
1937
1938static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
1939 const struct dentry *dentry)
1940{
1941 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1942 int rc;
1943
1944 if (!dentry)
1945 return 0;
1946
1947 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1948 if (rc)
1949 return rc;
1950
1951 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1952 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1953 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1954 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
1955 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
1956 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1957
1958 return 0;
1959}
1960
1961/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1962static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
1963 const struct dentry *dentry,
1964 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
1965{
1966 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1967 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1968 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1969 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1970 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1971 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1972 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1973 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
1974 name->fcap_ver = -1;
1975 return;
1976 }
1977 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1978}
1979
1980/**
1981 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1982 * @name: name being audited
1983 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1984 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1985 */
1986void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1987 unsigned int flags)
1988{
1989 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1990 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1991 struct audit_names *n;
1992 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1993 struct audit_entry *e;
1994 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
1995 int i;
1996
1997 if (!context->in_syscall)
1998 return;
1999
2000 rcu_read_lock();
2001 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2002 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2003 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2004
2005 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2006 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
2007 f->op, f->val)
2008 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2009 rcu_read_unlock();
2010 return;
2011 }
2012 }
2013 }
2014 rcu_read_unlock();
2015
2016 if (!name)
2017 goto out_alloc;
2018
2019 /*
2020 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2021 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2022 */
2023 n = name->aname;
2024 if (n) {
2025 if (parent) {
2026 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2027 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2028 goto out;
2029 } else {
2030 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2031 goto out;
2032 }
2033 }
2034
2035 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2036 if (n->ino) {
2037 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2038 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
2039 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
2040 continue;
2041 } else if (n->name) {
2042 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2043 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2044 continue;
2045 } else
2046 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2047 continue;
2048
2049 /* match the correct record type */
2050 if (parent) {
2051 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2052 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2053 goto out;
2054 } else {
2055 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2056 goto out;
2057 }
2058 }
2059
2060out_alloc:
2061 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2062 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2063 if (!n)
2064 return;
2065 if (name) {
2066 n->name = name;
2067 name->refcnt++;
2068 }
2069
2070out:
2071 if (parent) {
2072 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2073 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2074 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2075 n->hidden = true;
2076 } else {
2077 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2078 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2079 }
2080 handle_path(dentry);
2081 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2082}
2083
2084void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2085{
2086 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2087}
2088
2089/**
2090 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2091 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2092 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2093 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2094 *
2095 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2096 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2097 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2098 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2099 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2100 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2101 * unsuccessful attempts.
2102 */
2103void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2104 const struct dentry *dentry,
2105 const unsigned char type)
2106{
2107 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2108 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2109 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2110 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2111 struct audit_entry *e;
2112 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2113 int i;
2114
2115 if (!context->in_syscall)
2116 return;
2117
2118 rcu_read_lock();
2119 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2120 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2121 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2122
2123 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2124 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2125 f->op, f->val)
2126 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2127 rcu_read_unlock();
2128 return;
2129 }
2130 }
2131 }
2132 rcu_read_unlock();
2133
2134 if (inode)
2135 handle_one(inode);
2136
2137 /* look for a parent entry first */
2138 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2139 if (!n->name ||
2140 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2141 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2142 continue;
2143
2144 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2145 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2146 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2147 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2148 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2149 found_parent = n;
2150 break;
2151 }
2152 }
2153
2154 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2155 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2156 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2157 if (!n->name ||
2158 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2159 continue;
2160
2161 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2162 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2163 found_parent ?
2164 found_parent->name_len :
2165 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
2166 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2167 n->type = type;
2168 found_child = n;
2169 break;
2170 }
2171 }
2172
2173 if (!found_parent) {
2174 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2175 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2176 if (!n)
2177 return;
2178 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2179 }
2180
2181 if (!found_child) {
2182 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2183 if (!found_child)
2184 return;
2185
2186 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2187 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2188 * audit_free_names() */
2189 if (found_parent) {
2190 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2191 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2192 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2193 }
2194 }
2195
2196 if (inode)
2197 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2198 else
2199 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2200}
2201EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2202
2203/**
2204 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2205 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2206 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2207 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2208 *
2209 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2210 */
2211int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2212 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2213{
2214 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2215 return 0;
2216 if (!ctx->serial)
2217 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2218 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2219 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2220 *serial = ctx->serial;
2221 if (!ctx->prio) {
2222 ctx->prio = 1;
2223 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2224 }
2225 return 1;
2226}
2227
2228/**
2229 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2230 * @oflag: open flag
2231 * @mode: mode bits
2232 * @attr: queue attributes
2233 *
2234 */
2235void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2236{
2237 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2238
2239 if (attr)
2240 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2241 else
2242 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2243
2244 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2245 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2246
2247 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2248}
2249
2250/**
2251 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2252 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2253 * @msg_len: Message length
2254 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2255 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2256 *
2257 */
2258void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2259 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2260{
2261 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2262 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2263
2264 if (abs_timeout)
2265 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2266 else
2267 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2268
2269 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2270 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2271 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2272
2273 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2274}
2275
2276/**
2277 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2278 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2279 * @notification: Notification event
2280 *
2281 */
2282
2283void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2284{
2285 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2286
2287 if (notification)
2288 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2289 else
2290 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2291
2292 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2293 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2294}
2295
2296/**
2297 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2298 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2299 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2300 *
2301 */
2302void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2303{
2304 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2305 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2306 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2307 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2308}
2309
2310/**
2311 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2312 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2313 *
2314 */
2315void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2316{
2317 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2318 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2319 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2320 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2321 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2322 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2323 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2324}
2325
2326/**
2327 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2328 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2329 * @uid: msgq user id
2330 * @gid: msgq group id
2331 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2332 *
2333 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2334 */
2335void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2336{
2337 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2338
2339 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2340 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2341 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2342 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2343 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2344}
2345
2346void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2347{
2348 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2349
2350 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2351 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2352}
2353
2354
2355/**
2356 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2357 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2358 * @args: args array
2359 *
2360 */
2361int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2362{
2363 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2364
2365 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2366 return -EINVAL;
2367 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2368 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2369 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2370 return 0;
2371}
2372
2373/**
2374 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2375 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2376 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2377 *
2378 */
2379void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2380{
2381 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2382 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2383 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2384}
2385
2386/**
2387 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2388 * @len: data length in user space
2389 * @a: data address in kernel space
2390 *
2391 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2392 */
2393int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2394{
2395 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2396
2397 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2398 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2399 if (!p)
2400 return -ENOMEM;
2401 context->sockaddr = p;
2402 }
2403
2404 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2405 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2406 return 0;
2407}
2408
2409void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2410{
2411 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2412
2413 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2414 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2415 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2416 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2417 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2418 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2419}
2420
2421/**
2422 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2423 * @t: task being signaled
2424 *
2425 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2426 * and uid that is doing that.
2427 */
2428int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2429{
2430 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2431 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2432 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2433
2434 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2435 return 0;
2436
2437 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2438 * in audit_context */
2439 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2440 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2441 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2442 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2443 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2444 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2445 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2446 return 0;
2447 }
2448
2449 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2450 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2451 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2452 if (!axp)
2453 return -ENOMEM;
2454
2455 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2456 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2457 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2458 }
2459 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2460
2461 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2462 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2463 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2464 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2465 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2466 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2467 axp->pid_count++;
2468
2469 return 0;
2470}
2471
2472/**
2473 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2474 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2475 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2476 * @old: the old credentials
2477 *
2478 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2479 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2480 *
2481 * -Eric
2482 */
2483int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2484 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2485{
2486 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2487 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2488 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2489
2490 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2491 if (!ax)
2492 return -ENOMEM;
2493
2494 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2495 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2496 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2497
2498 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2499
2500 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2501 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2502 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2503 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2504 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2505
2506 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2507 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2508 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2509 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2510
2511 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2512 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2513 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2514 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2515 return 0;
2516}
2517
2518/**
2519 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2520 * @new: the new credentials
2521 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2522 *
2523 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2524 * audit system if applicable
2525 */
2526void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2527{
2528 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2529 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2530 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2531 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2532 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2533 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2534 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2535}
2536
2537void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2538{
2539 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2540 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2541 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2542 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2543}
2544
2545void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2546{
2547 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2548
2549 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2550 if (!context->module.name)
2551 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2552 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2553}
2554
2555void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2556{
2557 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2558 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2559}
2560
2561void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2562{
2563 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
2564 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2565 (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
2566}
2567
2568static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
2569 const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
2570{
2571 const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
2572
2573 if (val->newval == val->oldval)
2574 return;
2575
2576 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
2577 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
2578}
2579
2580void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2581{
2582 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
2583 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
2584 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
2585 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
2586 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
2587 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
2588}
2589
2590void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
2591 enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp)
2592{
2593 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2594 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2595
2596 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
2597 if (!ab)
2598 return;
2599 audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
2600 name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
2601
2602 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current));
2603 audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
2604 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
2605 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2606 audit_log_end(ab);
2607}
2608EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
2609
2610static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2611{
2612 kuid_t auid, uid;
2613 kgid_t gid;
2614 unsigned int sessionid;
2615 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2616
2617 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2618 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2619 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2620
2621 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2622 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2623 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2624 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2625 sessionid);
2626 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2627 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2628 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2629 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2630}
2631
2632/**
2633 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2634 * @signr: signal value
2635 *
2636 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2637 * should record the event for investigation.
2638 */
2639void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2640{
2641 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2642
2643 if (!audit_enabled)
2644 return;
2645
2646 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2647 return;
2648
2649 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2650 if (unlikely(!ab))
2651 return;
2652 audit_log_task(ab);
2653 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2654 audit_log_end(ab);
2655}
2656
2657/**
2658 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2659 * @syscall: syscall number
2660 * @signr: signal value
2661 * @code: the seccomp action
2662 *
2663 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2664 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2665 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2666 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2667 * audit is not in use.
2668 */
2669void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2670{
2671 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2672
2673 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2674 if (unlikely(!ab))
2675 return;
2676 audit_log_task(ab);
2677 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2678 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2679 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2680 audit_log_end(ab);
2681}
2682
2683void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2684 int res)
2685{
2686 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2687
2688 if (!audit_enabled)
2689 return;
2690
2691 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2692 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2693 if (unlikely(!ab))
2694 return;
2695
2696 audit_log_format(ab,
2697 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2698 names, old_names, res);
2699 audit_log_end(ab);
2700}
2701
2702struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2703{
2704 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2705 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2706 return NULL;
2707 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2708}
1/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
46
47#include <linux/init.h>
48#include <asm/types.h>
49#include <linux/atomic.h>
50#include <linux/fs.h>
51#include <linux/namei.h>
52#include <linux/mm.h>
53#include <linux/export.h>
54#include <linux/slab.h>
55#include <linux/mount.h>
56#include <linux/socket.h>
57#include <linux/mqueue.h>
58#include <linux/audit.h>
59#include <linux/personality.h>
60#include <linux/time.h>
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/compiler.h>
63#include <asm/unistd.h>
64#include <linux/security.h>
65#include <linux/list.h>
66#include <linux/tty.h>
67#include <linux/binfmts.h>
68#include <linux/highmem.h>
69#include <linux/syscalls.h>
70#include <linux/capability.h>
71#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72#include <linux/compat.h>
73#include <linux/ctype.h>
74
75#include "audit.h"
76
77/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
78#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
79#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
80#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
81
82/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
83#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
84
85/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
86#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
87
88/* number of audit rules */
89int audit_n_rules;
90
91/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
92int audit_signals;
93
94struct audit_aux_data {
95 struct audit_aux_data *next;
96 int type;
97};
98
99#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
100
101/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
102#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
103
104struct audit_aux_data_pids {
105 struct audit_aux_data d;
106 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
107 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
108 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
109 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
110 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
111 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
112 int pid_count;
113};
114
115struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
116 struct audit_aux_data d;
117 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
118 unsigned int fcap_ver;
119 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
120 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
121};
122
123struct audit_tree_refs {
124 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
125 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
126};
127
128static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
129{
130 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
131 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
132 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
133 return n & mask;
134}
135
136static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
137{
138 unsigned n;
139 if (unlikely(!ctx))
140 return 0;
141 n = ctx->major;
142
143 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
144 case 0: /* native */
145 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
147 return 1;
148 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
149 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
150 return 1;
151 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
152 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
153 return 1;
154 return 0;
155 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
156 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
158 return 1;
159 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
160 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
161 return 1;
162 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
163 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
164 return 1;
165 return 0;
166 case 2: /* open */
167 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
168 case 3: /* openat */
169 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
170 case 4: /* socketcall */
171 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
172 case 5: /* execve */
173 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
174 default:
175 return 0;
176 }
177}
178
179static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
180{
181 struct audit_names *n;
182 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
183
184 if (unlikely(!ctx))
185 return 0;
186
187 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
188 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
189 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
190 return 1;
191 }
192
193 return 0;
194}
195
196/*
197 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
198 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
199 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
200 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
201 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
202 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
203 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
204 */
205
206#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
207static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
208{
209 if (!ctx->prio) {
210 ctx->prio = 1;
211 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
212 }
213}
214
215static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
216{
217 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
218 int left = ctx->tree_count;
219 if (likely(left)) {
220 p->c[--left] = chunk;
221 ctx->tree_count = left;
222 return 1;
223 }
224 if (!p)
225 return 0;
226 p = p->next;
227 if (p) {
228 p->c[30] = chunk;
229 ctx->trees = p;
230 ctx->tree_count = 30;
231 return 1;
232 }
233 return 0;
234}
235
236static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
237{
238 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
239 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
240 if (!ctx->trees) {
241 ctx->trees = p;
242 return 0;
243 }
244 if (p)
245 p->next = ctx->trees;
246 else
247 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
248 ctx->tree_count = 31;
249 return 1;
250}
251#endif
252
253static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
254 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
255{
256#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
257 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
258 int n;
259 if (!p) {
260 /* we started with empty chain */
261 p = ctx->first_trees;
262 count = 31;
263 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
264 if (!p)
265 return;
266 }
267 n = count;
268 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
269 while (n--) {
270 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
271 q->c[n] = NULL;
272 }
273 }
274 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
275 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
276 q->c[n] = NULL;
277 }
278 ctx->trees = p;
279 ctx->tree_count = count;
280#endif
281}
282
283static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
284{
285 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
286 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
287 q = p->next;
288 kfree(p);
289 }
290}
291
292static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
293{
294#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
295 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
296 int n;
297 if (!tree)
298 return 0;
299 /* full ones */
300 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
301 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
302 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
303 return 1;
304 }
305 /* partial */
306 if (p) {
307 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
308 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
309 return 1;
310 }
311#endif
312 return 0;
313}
314
315static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
316 struct audit_names *name,
317 struct audit_field *f,
318 struct audit_context *ctx)
319{
320 struct audit_names *n;
321 int rc;
322
323 if (name) {
324 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
325 if (rc)
326 return rc;
327 }
328
329 if (ctx) {
330 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
331 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
332 if (rc)
333 return rc;
334 }
335 }
336 return 0;
337}
338
339static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
340 struct audit_names *name,
341 struct audit_field *f,
342 struct audit_context *ctx)
343{
344 struct audit_names *n;
345 int rc;
346
347 if (name) {
348 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
349 if (rc)
350 return rc;
351 }
352
353 if (ctx) {
354 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
355 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
356 if (rc)
357 return rc;
358 }
359 }
360 return 0;
361}
362
363static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
364 const struct cred *cred,
365 struct audit_field *f,
366 struct audit_context *ctx,
367 struct audit_names *name)
368{
369 switch (f->val) {
370 /* process to file object comparisons */
371 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
372 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
373 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
374 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
375 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
376 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
377 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
378 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
379 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
380 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
382 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
383 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
384 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
385 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
386 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
387 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
388 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
389 /* uid comparisons */
390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
391 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
392 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
393 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
395 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
396 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
397 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
398 /* auid comparisons */
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
400 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* euid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
408 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
409 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
410 /* suid comparisons */
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
412 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
413 /* gid comparisons */
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
415 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
420 /* egid comparisons */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
423 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
424 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
425 /* sgid comparison */
426 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
427 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
428 default:
429 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
430 return 0;
431 }
432 return 0;
433}
434
435/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
436/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
437 * otherwise.
438 *
439 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
440 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
441 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
442 */
443static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
444 struct audit_krule *rule,
445 struct audit_context *ctx,
446 struct audit_names *name,
447 enum audit_state *state,
448 bool task_creation)
449{
450 const struct cred *cred;
451 int i, need_sid = 1;
452 u32 sid;
453
454 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
455
456 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
457 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
458 struct audit_names *n;
459 int result = 0;
460 pid_t pid;
461
462 switch (f->type) {
463 case AUDIT_PID:
464 pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
465 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
466 break;
467 case AUDIT_PPID:
468 if (ctx) {
469 if (!ctx->ppid)
470 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
471 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
472 }
473 break;
474 case AUDIT_UID:
475 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
476 break;
477 case AUDIT_EUID:
478 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
479 break;
480 case AUDIT_SUID:
481 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
482 break;
483 case AUDIT_FSUID:
484 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
485 break;
486 case AUDIT_GID:
487 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
488 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
489 if (!result)
490 result = in_group_p(f->gid);
491 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
492 if (result)
493 result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
494 }
495 break;
496 case AUDIT_EGID:
497 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
498 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
499 if (!result)
500 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
501 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
502 if (result)
503 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
504 }
505 break;
506 case AUDIT_SGID:
507 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
508 break;
509 case AUDIT_FSGID:
510 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
511 break;
512 case AUDIT_PERS:
513 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
514 break;
515 case AUDIT_ARCH:
516 if (ctx)
517 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
518 break;
519
520 case AUDIT_EXIT:
521 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
523 break;
524 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
525 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
526 if (f->val)
527 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
528 else
529 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
530 }
531 break;
532 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
533 if (name) {
534 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
535 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
536 ++result;
537 } else if (ctx) {
538 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
539 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
540 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
541 ++result;
542 break;
543 }
544 }
545 }
546 break;
547 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
548 if (name) {
549 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
550 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
551 ++result;
552 } else if (ctx) {
553 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
555 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
556 ++result;
557 break;
558 }
559 }
560 }
561 break;
562 case AUDIT_INODE:
563 if (name)
564 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
565 else if (ctx) {
566 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
567 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
568 ++result;
569 break;
570 }
571 }
572 }
573 break;
574 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
575 if (name) {
576 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
577 } else if (ctx) {
578 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
579 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
580 ++result;
581 break;
582 }
583 }
584 }
585 break;
586 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
587 if (name) {
588 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
589 } else if (ctx) {
590 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
591 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
592 ++result;
593 break;
594 }
595 }
596 }
597 break;
598 case AUDIT_WATCH:
599 if (name)
600 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
601 break;
602 case AUDIT_DIR:
603 if (ctx)
604 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
605 break;
606 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
607 result = 0;
608 if (ctx)
609 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
610 break;
611 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
612 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
613 break;
614 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
615 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
616 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
617 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
618 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
619 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
620 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
621 match for now to avoid losing information that
622 may be wanted. An error message will also be
623 logged upon error */
624 if (f->lsm_rule) {
625 if (need_sid) {
626 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
627 need_sid = 0;
628 }
629 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
630 f->op,
631 f->lsm_rule,
632 ctx);
633 }
634 break;
635 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
636 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
637 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
638 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
639 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
640 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
641 also applies here */
642 if (f->lsm_rule) {
643 /* Find files that match */
644 if (name) {
645 result = security_audit_rule_match(
646 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
647 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
648 } else if (ctx) {
649 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
650 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
651 f->op, f->lsm_rule,
652 ctx)) {
653 ++result;
654 break;
655 }
656 }
657 }
658 /* Find ipc objects that match */
659 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
660 break;
661 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
662 f->type, f->op,
663 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
664 ++result;
665 }
666 break;
667 case AUDIT_ARG0:
668 case AUDIT_ARG1:
669 case AUDIT_ARG2:
670 case AUDIT_ARG3:
671 if (ctx)
672 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
673 break;
674 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
675 /* ignore this field for filtering */
676 result = 1;
677 break;
678 case AUDIT_PERM:
679 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
680 break;
681 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
682 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
683 break;
684 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
685 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
686 break;
687 }
688 if (!result)
689 return 0;
690 }
691
692 if (ctx) {
693 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
694 return 0;
695 if (rule->filterkey) {
696 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
697 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
698 }
699 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
700 }
701 switch (rule->action) {
702 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
703 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
704 }
705 return 1;
706}
707
708/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
709 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
710 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
711 */
712static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
713{
714 struct audit_entry *e;
715 enum audit_state state;
716
717 rcu_read_lock();
718 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
719 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
720 &state, true)) {
721 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
722 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
723 rcu_read_unlock();
724 return state;
725 }
726 }
727 rcu_read_unlock();
728 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
729}
730
731/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
732 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
733 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
734 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
735 */
736static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
737 struct audit_context *ctx,
738 struct list_head *list)
739{
740 struct audit_entry *e;
741 enum audit_state state;
742
743 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
744 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
745
746 rcu_read_lock();
747 if (!list_empty(list)) {
748 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
749 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
750
751 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
752 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
753 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
754 &state, false)) {
755 rcu_read_unlock();
756 ctx->current_state = state;
757 return state;
758 }
759 }
760 }
761 rcu_read_unlock();
762 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
763}
764
765/*
766 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
767 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
768 */
769static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
770 struct audit_names *n,
771 struct audit_context *ctx) {
772 int word, bit;
773 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
774 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
775 struct audit_entry *e;
776 enum audit_state state;
777
778 word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
779 bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
780
781 if (list_empty(list))
782 return 0;
783
784 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
785 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
786 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
787 ctx->current_state = state;
788 return 1;
789 }
790 }
791
792 return 0;
793}
794
795/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
796 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
797 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
798 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
799 */
800void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
801{
802 struct audit_names *n;
803
804 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
805 return;
806
807 rcu_read_lock();
808
809 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
810 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
811 break;
812 }
813 rcu_read_unlock();
814}
815
816/* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
817static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
818 int return_valid,
819 long return_code)
820{
821 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
822
823 if (!context)
824 return NULL;
825 context->return_valid = return_valid;
826
827 /*
828 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
829 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
830 * signal handlers
831 *
832 * This is actually a test for:
833 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
834 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
835 *
836 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
837 */
838 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
839 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
840 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
841 context->return_code = -EINTR;
842 else
843 context->return_code = return_code;
844
845 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
846 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
847 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
848 }
849
850 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
851 return context;
852}
853
854static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
855{
856 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
857 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
858 context->proctitle.len = 0;
859}
860
861static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
862{
863 struct audit_names *n, *next;
864
865#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
866 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
867 int i = 0;
868
869 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
870 " name_count=%d put_count=%d ino_count=%d"
871 " [NOT freeing]\n", __FILE__, __LINE__,
872 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
873 context->name_count, context->put_count,
874 context->ino_count);
875 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
876 pr_err("names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name,
877 n->name->name ?: "(null)");
878 }
879 dump_stack();
880 return;
881 }
882#endif
883#if AUDIT_DEBUG
884 context->put_count = 0;
885 context->ino_count = 0;
886#endif
887
888 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
889 list_del(&n->list);
890 if (n->name && n->name_put)
891 final_putname(n->name);
892 if (n->should_free)
893 kfree(n);
894 }
895 context->name_count = 0;
896 path_put(&context->pwd);
897 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
898 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
899}
900
901static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
902{
903 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
904
905 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
906 context->aux = aux->next;
907 kfree(aux);
908 }
909 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
910 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
911 kfree(aux);
912 }
913}
914
915static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
916{
917 struct audit_context *context;
918
919 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
920 if (!context)
921 return NULL;
922 context->state = state;
923 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
924 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
925 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
926 return context;
927}
928
929/**
930 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
931 * @tsk: task
932 *
933 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
934 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
935 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
936 * needed.
937 */
938int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
939{
940 struct audit_context *context;
941 enum audit_state state;
942 char *key = NULL;
943
944 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
945 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
946
947 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
948 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
949 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
950 return 0;
951 }
952
953 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
954 kfree(key);
955 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
956 return -ENOMEM;
957 }
958 context->filterkey = key;
959
960 tsk->audit_context = context;
961 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
962 return 0;
963}
964
965static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
966{
967 audit_free_names(context);
968 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
969 free_tree_refs(context);
970 audit_free_aux(context);
971 kfree(context->filterkey);
972 kfree(context->sockaddr);
973 audit_proctitle_free(context);
974 kfree(context);
975}
976
977static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
978 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
979 u32 sid, char *comm)
980{
981 struct audit_buffer *ab;
982 char *ctx = NULL;
983 u32 len;
984 int rc = 0;
985
986 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
987 if (!ab)
988 return rc;
989
990 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
991 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
992 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
993 if (sid) {
994 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
995 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
996 rc = 1;
997 } else {
998 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
999 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1000 }
1001 }
1002 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1003 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1004 audit_log_end(ab);
1005
1006 return rc;
1007}
1008
1009/*
1010 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1011 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1012 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1013 *
1014 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1015 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1016 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1017 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1018 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1019 */
1020static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1021 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1022 int arg_num,
1023 size_t *len_sent,
1024 const char __user *p,
1025 char *buf)
1026{
1027 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1028 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1029 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1030 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1031 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1032 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1033 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1034 int ret;
1035
1036 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1037 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1038
1039 /*
1040 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1041 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1042 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1043 * any.
1044 */
1045 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1046 WARN_ON(1);
1047 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1048 return -1;
1049 }
1050
1051 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1052 do {
1053 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1054 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1055 else
1056 to_send = len_left;
1057 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1058 /*
1059 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1060 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1061 * space yet.
1062 */
1063 if (ret) {
1064 WARN_ON(1);
1065 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1066 return -1;
1067 }
1068 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1069 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1070 if (has_cntl) {
1071 /*
1072 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1073 * send half as much in each message
1074 */
1075 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1076 break;
1077 }
1078 len_left -= to_send;
1079 tmp_p += to_send;
1080 } while (len_left > 0);
1081
1082 len_left = len;
1083
1084 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1085 too_long = 1;
1086
1087 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1088 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1089 int room_left;
1090
1091 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1092 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1093 else
1094 to_send = len_left;
1095
1096 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1097 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1098 if (has_cntl)
1099 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1100 else
1101 room_left -= to_send;
1102 if (room_left < 0) {
1103 *len_sent = 0;
1104 audit_log_end(*ab);
1105 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1106 if (!*ab)
1107 return 0;
1108 }
1109
1110 /*
1111 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1112 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1113 */
1114 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1115 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1116 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1117
1118 /*
1119 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1120 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1121 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1122 */
1123 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1124 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1125 else
1126 ret = 0;
1127 if (ret) {
1128 WARN_ON(1);
1129 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1130 return -1;
1131 }
1132 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1133
1134 /* actually log it */
1135 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1136 if (too_long)
1137 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1138 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1139 if (has_cntl)
1140 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1141 else
1142 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1143
1144 p += to_send;
1145 len_left -= to_send;
1146 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1147 if (has_cntl)
1148 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1149 else
1150 *len_sent += to_send;
1151 }
1152 /* include the null we didn't log */
1153 return len + 1;
1154}
1155
1156static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1157 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1158{
1159 int i, len;
1160 size_t len_sent = 0;
1161 const char __user *p;
1162 char *buf;
1163
1164 p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1165
1166 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1167
1168 /*
1169 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1170 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1171 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1172 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1173 */
1174 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1175 if (!buf) {
1176 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1177 return;
1178 }
1179
1180 for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
1181 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1182 &len_sent, p, buf);
1183 if (len <= 0)
1184 break;
1185 p += len;
1186 }
1187 kfree(buf);
1188}
1189
1190static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1191{
1192 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1193 int i;
1194
1195 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1196 if (!ab)
1197 return;
1198
1199 switch (context->type) {
1200 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1201 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1202 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1203 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1204 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1205 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1206 break; }
1207 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1208 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1209
1210 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1211 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1212 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1213 context->ipc.mode);
1214 if (osid) {
1215 char *ctx = NULL;
1216 u32 len;
1217 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1218 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1219 *call_panic = 1;
1220 } else {
1221 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1222 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1223 }
1224 }
1225 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1226 audit_log_end(ab);
1227 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1228 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1229 if (unlikely(!ab))
1230 return;
1231 audit_log_format(ab,
1232 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1233 context->ipc.qbytes,
1234 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1235 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1236 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1237 }
1238 break; }
1239 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1240 audit_log_format(ab,
1241 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1242 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1243 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1244 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1245 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1246 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1247 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1248 break; }
1249 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1250 audit_log_format(ab,
1251 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1252 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1253 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1254 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1255 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1256 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1257 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1258 break; }
1259 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1260 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1261 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1262 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1263 break; }
1264 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1265 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1266 audit_log_format(ab,
1267 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1268 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1269 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1270 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1271 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1272 break; }
1273 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1274 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1275 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1276 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1277 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1278 break; }
1279 case AUDIT_MMAP: {
1280 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1281 context->mmap.flags);
1282 break; }
1283 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1284 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1285 break; }
1286 }
1287 audit_log_end(ab);
1288}
1289
1290static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1291{
1292 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1293 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1294 end--;
1295
1296 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1297 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1298 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1299 return len;
1300}
1301
1302static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
1303 struct audit_context *context)
1304{
1305 int res;
1306 char *buf;
1307 char *msg = "(null)";
1308 int len = strlen(msg);
1309 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1310
1311 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1312 if (!ab)
1313 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1314
1315 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1316
1317 /* Not cached */
1318 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1319 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1320 if (!buf)
1321 goto out;
1322 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1323 res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1324 if (res == 0) {
1325 kfree(buf);
1326 goto out;
1327 }
1328 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1329 if (res == 0) {
1330 kfree(buf);
1331 goto out;
1332 }
1333 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1334 context->proctitle.len = res;
1335 }
1336 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1337 len = context->proctitle.len;
1338out:
1339 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1340 audit_log_end(ab);
1341}
1342
1343static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1344{
1345 int i, call_panic = 0;
1346 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1347 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1348 struct audit_names *n;
1349
1350 /* tsk == current */
1351 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1352
1353 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1354 if (!ab)
1355 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1356 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1357 context->arch, context->major);
1358 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1359 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1360 if (context->return_valid)
1361 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1362 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1363 context->return_code);
1364
1365 audit_log_format(ab,
1366 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1367 context->argv[0],
1368 context->argv[1],
1369 context->argv[2],
1370 context->argv[3],
1371 context->name_count);
1372
1373 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1374 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1375 audit_log_end(ab);
1376
1377 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1378
1379 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1380 if (!ab)
1381 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1382
1383 switch (aux->type) {
1384
1385 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1386 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1387 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1388 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1389 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1390 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1391 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1392 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1393 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1394 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1395 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1396 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1397 break; }
1398
1399 }
1400 audit_log_end(ab);
1401 }
1402
1403 if (context->type)
1404 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1405
1406 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1407 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1408 if (ab) {
1409 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1410 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1411 audit_log_end(ab);
1412 }
1413 }
1414
1415 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1416 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1417 if (ab) {
1418 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1419 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1420 context->sockaddr_len);
1421 audit_log_end(ab);
1422 }
1423 }
1424
1425 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1426 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1427
1428 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1429 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1430 axs->target_auid[i],
1431 axs->target_uid[i],
1432 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1433 axs->target_sid[i],
1434 axs->target_comm[i]))
1435 call_panic = 1;
1436 }
1437
1438 if (context->target_pid &&
1439 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1440 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1441 context->target_sessionid,
1442 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1443 call_panic = 1;
1444
1445 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1446 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1447 if (ab) {
1448 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1449 audit_log_end(ab);
1450 }
1451 }
1452
1453 i = 0;
1454 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1455 if (n->hidden)
1456 continue;
1457 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1458 }
1459
1460 audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
1461
1462 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1463 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1464 if (ab)
1465 audit_log_end(ab);
1466 if (call_panic)
1467 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1468}
1469
1470/**
1471 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1472 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1473 *
1474 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1475 */
1476void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1477{
1478 struct audit_context *context;
1479
1480 context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1481 if (!context)
1482 return;
1483
1484 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1485 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1486 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1487 * in the context of the idle thread */
1488 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1489 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1490 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1491 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1492 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1493
1494 audit_free_context(context);
1495}
1496
1497/**
1498 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1499 * @arch: architecture type
1500 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1501 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1502 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1503 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1504 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1505 *
1506 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1507 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1508 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1509 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1510 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1511 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1512 * be written).
1513 */
1514void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1515 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1516 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1517{
1518 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1519 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1520 enum audit_state state;
1521
1522 if (!context)
1523 return;
1524
1525 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1526
1527 if (!audit_enabled)
1528 return;
1529
1530 context->arch = arch;
1531 context->major = major;
1532 context->argv[0] = a1;
1533 context->argv[1] = a2;
1534 context->argv[2] = a3;
1535 context->argv[3] = a4;
1536
1537 state = context->state;
1538 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1539 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1540 context->prio = 0;
1541 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1542 }
1543 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1544 return;
1545
1546 context->serial = 0;
1547 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1548 context->in_syscall = 1;
1549 context->current_state = state;
1550 context->ppid = 0;
1551}
1552
1553/**
1554 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1555 * @success: success value of the syscall
1556 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1557 *
1558 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1559 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1560 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1561 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1562 * free the names stored from getname().
1563 */
1564void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1565{
1566 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1567 struct audit_context *context;
1568
1569 if (success)
1570 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1571 else
1572 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1573
1574 context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1575 if (!context)
1576 return;
1577
1578 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1579 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1580
1581 context->in_syscall = 0;
1582 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1583
1584 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1585 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1586
1587 audit_free_names(context);
1588 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1589 audit_free_aux(context);
1590 context->aux = NULL;
1591 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1592 context->target_pid = 0;
1593 context->target_sid = 0;
1594 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1595 context->type = 0;
1596 context->fds[0] = -1;
1597 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1598 kfree(context->filterkey);
1599 context->filterkey = NULL;
1600 }
1601 tsk->audit_context = context;
1602}
1603
1604static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1605{
1606#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1607 struct audit_context *context;
1608 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1609 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1610 int count;
1611 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1612 return;
1613 context = current->audit_context;
1614 p = context->trees;
1615 count = context->tree_count;
1616 rcu_read_lock();
1617 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1618 rcu_read_unlock();
1619 if (!chunk)
1620 return;
1621 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1622 return;
1623 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1624 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1625 audit_set_auditable(context);
1626 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1627 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1628 return;
1629 }
1630 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1631#endif
1632}
1633
1634static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1635{
1636#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1637 struct audit_context *context;
1638 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1639 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1640 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1641 unsigned long seq;
1642 int count;
1643
1644 context = current->audit_context;
1645 p = context->trees;
1646 count = context->tree_count;
1647retry:
1648 drop = NULL;
1649 d = dentry;
1650 rcu_read_lock();
1651 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1652 for(;;) {
1653 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1654 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1655 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1656 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1657 if (chunk) {
1658 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1659 drop = chunk;
1660 break;
1661 }
1662 }
1663 }
1664 parent = d->d_parent;
1665 if (parent == d)
1666 break;
1667 d = parent;
1668 }
1669 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1670 rcu_read_unlock();
1671 if (!drop) {
1672 /* just a race with rename */
1673 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1674 goto retry;
1675 }
1676 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1677 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1678 /* OK, got more space */
1679 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1680 goto retry;
1681 }
1682 /* too bad */
1683 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1684 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1685 audit_set_auditable(context);
1686 return;
1687 }
1688 rcu_read_unlock();
1689#endif
1690}
1691
1692static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1693 unsigned char type)
1694{
1695 struct audit_names *aname;
1696
1697 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1698 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1699 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1700 } else {
1701 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1702 if (!aname)
1703 return NULL;
1704 aname->should_free = true;
1705 }
1706
1707 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1708 aname->type = type;
1709 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1710
1711 context->name_count++;
1712#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1713 context->ino_count++;
1714#endif
1715 return aname;
1716}
1717
1718/**
1719 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1720 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1721 *
1722 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1723 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1724 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1725 */
1726struct filename *
1727__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1728{
1729 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1730 struct audit_names *n;
1731
1732 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1733 if (!n->name)
1734 continue;
1735 if (n->name->uptr == uptr)
1736 return n->name;
1737 }
1738 return NULL;
1739}
1740
1741/**
1742 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1743 * @name: name to add
1744 *
1745 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1746 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1747 */
1748void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1749{
1750 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1751 struct audit_names *n;
1752
1753 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1754#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1755 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1756 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1757 dump_stack();
1758#endif
1759 return;
1760 }
1761
1762#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1763 /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1764 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1765#endif
1766
1767 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1768 if (!n)
1769 return;
1770
1771 n->name = name;
1772 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1773 n->name_put = true;
1774 name->aname = n;
1775
1776 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1777 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1778}
1779
1780/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1781 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1782 *
1783 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1784 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1785 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1786 */
1787void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
1788{
1789 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1790
1791 BUG_ON(!context);
1792 if (!name->aname || !context->in_syscall) {
1793#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1794 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
1795 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1796 if (context->name_count) {
1797 struct audit_names *n;
1798 int i = 0;
1799
1800 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1801 pr_err("name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name,
1802 n->name->name ?: "(null)");
1803 }
1804#endif
1805 final_putname(name);
1806 }
1807#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1808 else {
1809 ++context->put_count;
1810 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1811 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d putname(%p)"
1812 " name_count=%d put_count=%d\n",
1813 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1814 context->serial, context->major,
1815 context->in_syscall, name->name,
1816 context->name_count, context->put_count);
1817 dump_stack();
1818 }
1819 }
1820#endif
1821}
1822
1823/**
1824 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1825 * @name: name being audited
1826 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1827 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1828 */
1829void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1830 unsigned int flags)
1831{
1832 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1833 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1834 struct audit_names *n;
1835 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1836
1837 if (!context->in_syscall)
1838 return;
1839
1840 if (!name)
1841 goto out_alloc;
1842
1843#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1844 /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1845 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1846#endif
1847 /*
1848 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1849 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1850 */
1851 n = name->aname;
1852 if (n) {
1853 if (parent) {
1854 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1855 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1856 goto out;
1857 } else {
1858 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1859 goto out;
1860 }
1861 }
1862
1863 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1864 /* does the name pointer match? */
1865 if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name)
1866 continue;
1867
1868 /* match the correct record type */
1869 if (parent) {
1870 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1871 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1872 goto out;
1873 } else {
1874 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1875 goto out;
1876 }
1877 }
1878
1879out_alloc:
1880 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new
1881 * anonymous entry.
1882 */
1883 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
1884 if (!n)
1885 return;
1886out:
1887 if (parent) {
1888 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1889 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1890 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
1891 n->hidden = true;
1892 } else {
1893 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1894 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
1895 }
1896 handle_path(dentry);
1897 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
1898}
1899
1900/**
1901 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1902 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1903 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1904 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1905 *
1906 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1907 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1908 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1909 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1910 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1911 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1912 * unsuccessful attempts.
1913 */
1914void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
1915 const struct dentry *dentry,
1916 const unsigned char type)
1917{
1918 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1919 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1920 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
1921 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1922
1923 if (!context->in_syscall)
1924 return;
1925
1926 if (inode)
1927 handle_one(inode);
1928
1929 /* look for a parent entry first */
1930 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1931 if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1932 continue;
1933
1934 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1935 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
1936 found_parent = n;
1937 break;
1938 }
1939 }
1940
1941 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1942 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1943 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1944 if (!n->name || n->type != type)
1945 continue;
1946
1947 /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */
1948 if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name))
1949 continue;
1950
1951 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
1952 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
1953 found_parent ?
1954 found_parent->name_len :
1955 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
1956 found_child = n;
1957 break;
1958 }
1959 }
1960
1961 if (!found_parent) {
1962 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1963 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
1964 if (!n)
1965 return;
1966 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
1967 }
1968
1969 if (!found_child) {
1970 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
1971 if (!found_child)
1972 return;
1973
1974 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1975 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1976 * audit_free_names() */
1977 if (found_parent) {
1978 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
1979 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1980 /* don't call __putname() */
1981 found_child->name_put = false;
1982 }
1983 }
1984 if (inode)
1985 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
1986 else
1987 found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1988}
1989EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1990
1991/**
1992 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1993 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1994 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1995 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1996 *
1997 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1998 */
1999int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2000 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2001{
2002 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2003 return 0;
2004 if (!ctx->serial)
2005 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2006 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2007 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2008 *serial = ctx->serial;
2009 if (!ctx->prio) {
2010 ctx->prio = 1;
2011 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2012 }
2013 return 1;
2014}
2015
2016/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2017static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2018
2019static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
2020{
2021 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
2022 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
2023 return 0;
2024 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
2025 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
2026 return -EPERM;
2027 /* it is set, you need permission */
2028 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
2029 return -EPERM;
2030 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
2031 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
2032 return -EPERM;
2033 return 0;
2034}
2035
2036static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
2037 unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
2038 int rc)
2039{
2040 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2041 uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
2042
2043 if (!audit_enabled)
2044 return;
2045
2046 uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
2047 oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
2048 loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
2049
2050 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2051 if (!ab)
2052 return;
2053 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid);
2054 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2055 audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
2056 oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
2057 audit_log_end(ab);
2058}
2059
2060/**
2061 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2062 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2063 *
2064 * Returns 0.
2065 *
2066 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2067 */
2068int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
2069{
2070 struct task_struct *task = current;
2071 unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1;
2072 kuid_t oldloginuid;
2073 int rc;
2074
2075 oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2076 oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2077
2078 rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
2079 if (rc)
2080 goto out;
2081
2082 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2083 if (uid_valid(loginuid))
2084 sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2085
2086 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2087 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2088out:
2089 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
2090 return rc;
2091}
2092
2093/**
2094 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2095 * @oflag: open flag
2096 * @mode: mode bits
2097 * @attr: queue attributes
2098 *
2099 */
2100void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2101{
2102 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2103
2104 if (attr)
2105 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2106 else
2107 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2108
2109 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2110 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2111
2112 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2113}
2114
2115/**
2116 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2117 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2118 * @msg_len: Message length
2119 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2120 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2121 *
2122 */
2123void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2124 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2125{
2126 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2127 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2128
2129 if (abs_timeout)
2130 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2131 else
2132 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2133
2134 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2135 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2136 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2137
2138 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2139}
2140
2141/**
2142 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2143 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2144 * @notification: Notification event
2145 *
2146 */
2147
2148void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2149{
2150 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2151
2152 if (notification)
2153 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2154 else
2155 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2156
2157 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2158 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2159}
2160
2161/**
2162 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2163 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2164 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2165 *
2166 */
2167void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2168{
2169 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2170 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2171 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2172 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2173}
2174
2175/**
2176 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2177 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2178 *
2179 */
2180void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2181{
2182 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2183 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2184 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2185 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2186 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2187 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2188 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2189}
2190
2191/**
2192 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2193 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2194 * @uid: msgq user id
2195 * @gid: msgq group id
2196 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2197 *
2198 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2199 */
2200void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2201{
2202 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2203
2204 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2205 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2206 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2207 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2208 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2209}
2210
2211void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2212{
2213 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2214
2215 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2216 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2217}
2218
2219
2220/**
2221 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2222 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2223 * @args: args array
2224 *
2225 */
2226int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2227{
2228 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2229
2230 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2231 return -EINVAL;
2232 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2233 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2234 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2235 return 0;
2236}
2237
2238/**
2239 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2240 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2241 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2242 *
2243 */
2244void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2245{
2246 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2247 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2248 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2249}
2250
2251/**
2252 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2253 * @len: data length in user space
2254 * @a: data address in kernel space
2255 *
2256 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2257 */
2258int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2259{
2260 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2261
2262 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2263 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2264 if (!p)
2265 return -ENOMEM;
2266 context->sockaddr = p;
2267 }
2268
2269 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2270 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2271 return 0;
2272}
2273
2274void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2275{
2276 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2277
2278 context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t);
2279 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2280 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2281 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2282 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2283 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2284}
2285
2286/**
2287 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2288 * @sig: signal value
2289 * @t: task being signaled
2290 *
2291 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2292 * and uid that is doing that.
2293 */
2294int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2295{
2296 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2297 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2298 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2299 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2300
2301 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2302 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2303 audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
2304 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2305 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2306 else
2307 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2308 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2309 }
2310 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2311 return 0;
2312 }
2313
2314 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2315 * in audit_context */
2316 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2317 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2318 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2319 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2320 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2321 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2322 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2323 return 0;
2324 }
2325
2326 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2327 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2328 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2329 if (!axp)
2330 return -ENOMEM;
2331
2332 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2333 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2334 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2335 }
2336 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2337
2338 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2339 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2340 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2341 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2342 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2343 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2344 axp->pid_count++;
2345
2346 return 0;
2347}
2348
2349/**
2350 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2351 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2352 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2353 * @old: the old credentials
2354 *
2355 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2356 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2357 *
2358 * -Eric
2359 */
2360int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2361 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2362{
2363 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2364 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2365 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2366 struct dentry *dentry;
2367
2368 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2369 if (!ax)
2370 return -ENOMEM;
2371
2372 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2373 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2374 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2375
2376 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2377 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2378 dput(dentry);
2379
2380 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2381 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2382 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2383 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2384
2385 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2386 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2387 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2388
2389 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2390 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2391 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2392 return 0;
2393}
2394
2395/**
2396 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2397 * @new: the new credentials
2398 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2399 *
2400 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2401 * audit system if applicable
2402 */
2403void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2404{
2405 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2406 context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current);
2407 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2408 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2409 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2410 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2411}
2412
2413void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2414{
2415 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2416 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2417 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2418 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2419}
2420
2421static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2422{
2423 kuid_t auid, uid;
2424 kgid_t gid;
2425 unsigned int sessionid;
2426 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
2427
2428 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2429 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2430 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2431
2432 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2433 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2434 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2435 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2436 sessionid);
2437 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2438 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
2439 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2440 if (mm) {
2441 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2442 if (mm->exe_file)
2443 audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
2444 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2445 } else
2446 audit_log_format(ab, " exe=(null)");
2447}
2448
2449/**
2450 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2451 * @signr: signal value
2452 *
2453 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2454 * should record the event for investigation.
2455 */
2456void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2457{
2458 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2459
2460 if (!audit_enabled)
2461 return;
2462
2463 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2464 return;
2465
2466 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2467 if (unlikely(!ab))
2468 return;
2469 audit_log_task(ab);
2470 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2471 audit_log_end(ab);
2472}
2473
2474void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2475{
2476 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2477
2478 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2479 if (unlikely(!ab))
2480 return;
2481 audit_log_task(ab);
2482 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2483 audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
2484 audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2485 audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
2486 audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
2487 audit_log_end(ab);
2488}
2489
2490struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2491{
2492 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2493 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2494 return NULL;
2495 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2496}