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1/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
46
47#include <linux/init.h>
48#include <asm/types.h>
49#include <linux/atomic.h>
50#include <linux/fs.h>
51#include <linux/namei.h>
52#include <linux/mm.h>
53#include <linux/export.h>
54#include <linux/slab.h>
55#include <linux/mount.h>
56#include <linux/socket.h>
57#include <linux/mqueue.h>
58#include <linux/audit.h>
59#include <linux/personality.h>
60#include <linux/time.h>
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/compiler.h>
63#include <asm/unistd.h>
64#include <linux/security.h>
65#include <linux/list.h>
66#include <linux/binfmts.h>
67#include <linux/highmem.h>
68#include <linux/syscalls.h>
69#include <asm/syscall.h>
70#include <linux/capability.h>
71#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72#include <linux/compat.h>
73#include <linux/ctype.h>
74#include <linux/string.h>
75#include <linux/uaccess.h>
76#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
78
79#include "audit.h"
80
81/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
82#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
83#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
84#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
85
86/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
87 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
88#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
89
90/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
91#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
92
93/* number of audit rules */
94int audit_n_rules;
95
96/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
97int audit_signals;
98
99struct audit_aux_data {
100 struct audit_aux_data *next;
101 int type;
102};
103
104#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
105
106/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
107#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
108
109struct audit_aux_data_pids {
110 struct audit_aux_data d;
111 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
116 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
117 int pid_count;
118};
119
120struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
121 struct audit_aux_data d;
122 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
123 unsigned int fcap_ver;
124 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
125 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
126};
127
128struct audit_tree_refs {
129 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
130 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
131};
132
133static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
134{
135 unsigned n;
136 if (unlikely(!ctx))
137 return 0;
138 n = ctx->major;
139
140 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
141 case 0: /* native */
142 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
143 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
144 return 1;
145 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
147 return 1;
148 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
149 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
150 return 1;
151 return 0;
152 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
153 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
154 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
155 return 1;
156 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
158 return 1;
159 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
160 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
161 return 1;
162 return 0;
163 case 2: /* open */
164 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
165 case 3: /* openat */
166 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
167 case 4: /* socketcall */
168 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
169 case 5: /* execve */
170 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
171 default:
172 return 0;
173 }
174}
175
176static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
177{
178 struct audit_names *n;
179 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
180
181 if (unlikely(!ctx))
182 return 0;
183
184 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
185 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
186 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
187 return 1;
188 }
189
190 return 0;
191}
192
193/*
194 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
195 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
196 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
197 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
198 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
199 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
200 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
201 */
202
203static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
204{
205 if (!ctx->prio) {
206 ctx->prio = 1;
207 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
208 }
209}
210
211static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
212{
213 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
214 int left = ctx->tree_count;
215 if (likely(left)) {
216 p->c[--left] = chunk;
217 ctx->tree_count = left;
218 return 1;
219 }
220 if (!p)
221 return 0;
222 p = p->next;
223 if (p) {
224 p->c[30] = chunk;
225 ctx->trees = p;
226 ctx->tree_count = 30;
227 return 1;
228 }
229 return 0;
230}
231
232static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
233{
234 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
235 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
236 if (!ctx->trees) {
237 ctx->trees = p;
238 return 0;
239 }
240 if (p)
241 p->next = ctx->trees;
242 else
243 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
244 ctx->tree_count = 31;
245 return 1;
246}
247
248static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
249 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
250{
251 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
252 int n;
253 if (!p) {
254 /* we started with empty chain */
255 p = ctx->first_trees;
256 count = 31;
257 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
258 if (!p)
259 return;
260 }
261 n = count;
262 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
263 while (n--) {
264 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
265 q->c[n] = NULL;
266 }
267 }
268 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
269 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
270 q->c[n] = NULL;
271 }
272 ctx->trees = p;
273 ctx->tree_count = count;
274}
275
276static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
277{
278 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
279 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
280 q = p->next;
281 kfree(p);
282 }
283}
284
285static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
286{
287 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
288 int n;
289 if (!tree)
290 return 0;
291 /* full ones */
292 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
293 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
294 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
295 return 1;
296 }
297 /* partial */
298 if (p) {
299 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
300 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
301 return 1;
302 }
303 return 0;
304}
305
306static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
307 struct audit_names *name,
308 struct audit_field *f,
309 struct audit_context *ctx)
310{
311 struct audit_names *n;
312 int rc;
313
314 if (name) {
315 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
316 if (rc)
317 return rc;
318 }
319
320 if (ctx) {
321 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
322 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
323 if (rc)
324 return rc;
325 }
326 }
327 return 0;
328}
329
330static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
331 struct audit_names *name,
332 struct audit_field *f,
333 struct audit_context *ctx)
334{
335 struct audit_names *n;
336 int rc;
337
338 if (name) {
339 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
340 if (rc)
341 return rc;
342 }
343
344 if (ctx) {
345 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
346 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
347 if (rc)
348 return rc;
349 }
350 }
351 return 0;
352}
353
354static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
355 const struct cred *cred,
356 struct audit_field *f,
357 struct audit_context *ctx,
358 struct audit_names *name)
359{
360 switch (f->val) {
361 /* process to file object comparisons */
362 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
363 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
364 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
365 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
366 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
367 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
368 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
369 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
370 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
371 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
373 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
375 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
377 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
379 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
380 /* uid comparisons */
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
382 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
383 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
385 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
390 /* auid comparisons */
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
392 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
393 cred->euid);
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
395 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
396 cred->suid);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
399 cred->fsuid);
400 /* euid comparisons */
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* suid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
408 /* gid comparisons */
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
410 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
412 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
414 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
415 /* egid comparisons */
416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
420 /* sgid comparison */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
423 default:
424 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
425 return 0;
426 }
427 return 0;
428}
429
430/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
431/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
432 * otherwise.
433 *
434 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
435 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
436 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
437 */
438static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
439 struct audit_krule *rule,
440 struct audit_context *ctx,
441 struct audit_names *name,
442 enum audit_state *state,
443 bool task_creation)
444{
445 const struct cred *cred;
446 int i, need_sid = 1;
447 u32 sid;
448 unsigned int sessionid;
449
450 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
451
452 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
453 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
454 struct audit_names *n;
455 int result = 0;
456 pid_t pid;
457
458 switch (f->type) {
459 case AUDIT_PID:
460 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
461 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
462 break;
463 case AUDIT_PPID:
464 if (ctx) {
465 if (!ctx->ppid)
466 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
467 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
468 }
469 break;
470 case AUDIT_EXE:
471 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
472 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
473 result = !result;
474 break;
475 case AUDIT_UID:
476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
477 break;
478 case AUDIT_EUID:
479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
480 break;
481 case AUDIT_SUID:
482 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
483 break;
484 case AUDIT_FSUID:
485 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
486 break;
487 case AUDIT_GID:
488 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
489 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
490 if (!result)
491 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
492 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
493 if (result)
494 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
495 }
496 break;
497 case AUDIT_EGID:
498 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
499 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
500 if (!result)
501 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
502 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
503 if (result)
504 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
505 }
506 break;
507 case AUDIT_SGID:
508 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
509 break;
510 case AUDIT_FSGID:
511 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
512 break;
513 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
514 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
515 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
516 break;
517 case AUDIT_PERS:
518 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
519 break;
520 case AUDIT_ARCH:
521 if (ctx)
522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
523 break;
524
525 case AUDIT_EXIT:
526 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
527 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
528 break;
529 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
530 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
531 if (f->val)
532 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
533 else
534 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
535 }
536 break;
537 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
538 if (name) {
539 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
540 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
541 ++result;
542 } else if (ctx) {
543 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
544 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
545 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
546 ++result;
547 break;
548 }
549 }
550 }
551 break;
552 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
553 if (name) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
555 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
556 ++result;
557 } else if (ctx) {
558 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
559 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
560 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
561 ++result;
562 break;
563 }
564 }
565 }
566 break;
567 case AUDIT_INODE:
568 if (name)
569 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
570 else if (ctx) {
571 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
572 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
573 ++result;
574 break;
575 }
576 }
577 }
578 break;
579 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
580 if (name) {
581 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
582 } else if (ctx) {
583 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
584 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
585 ++result;
586 break;
587 }
588 }
589 }
590 break;
591 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
592 if (name) {
593 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
594 } else if (ctx) {
595 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
596 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
597 ++result;
598 break;
599 }
600 }
601 }
602 break;
603 case AUDIT_WATCH:
604 if (name) {
605 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
606 name->ino,
607 name->dev);
608 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
609 result = !result;
610 }
611 break;
612 case AUDIT_DIR:
613 if (ctx) {
614 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
615 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
616 result = !result;
617 }
618 break;
619 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
620 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
621 f->op, f->uid);
622 break;
623 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
624 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
625 break;
626 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
627 if (ctx->sockaddr)
628 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
629 f->op, f->val);
630 break;
631 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
632 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
633 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
634 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
635 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
636 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
637 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
638 match for now to avoid losing information that
639 may be wanted. An error message will also be
640 logged upon error */
641 if (f->lsm_rule) {
642 if (need_sid) {
643 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
644 need_sid = 0;
645 }
646 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
647 f->op,
648 f->lsm_rule);
649 }
650 break;
651 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
652 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
653 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
654 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
655 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
656 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
657 also applies here */
658 if (f->lsm_rule) {
659 /* Find files that match */
660 if (name) {
661 result = security_audit_rule_match(
662 name->osid,
663 f->type,
664 f->op,
665 f->lsm_rule);
666 } else if (ctx) {
667 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
668 if (security_audit_rule_match(
669 n->osid,
670 f->type,
671 f->op,
672 f->lsm_rule)) {
673 ++result;
674 break;
675 }
676 }
677 }
678 /* Find ipc objects that match */
679 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
680 break;
681 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
682 f->type, f->op,
683 f->lsm_rule))
684 ++result;
685 }
686 break;
687 case AUDIT_ARG0:
688 case AUDIT_ARG1:
689 case AUDIT_ARG2:
690 case AUDIT_ARG3:
691 if (ctx)
692 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
693 break;
694 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
695 /* ignore this field for filtering */
696 result = 1;
697 break;
698 case AUDIT_PERM:
699 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
700 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
701 result = !result;
702 break;
703 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
704 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
705 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
706 result = !result;
707 break;
708 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
709 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
710 break;
711 }
712 if (!result)
713 return 0;
714 }
715
716 if (ctx) {
717 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
718 return 0;
719 if (rule->filterkey) {
720 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
721 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
722 }
723 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
724 }
725 switch (rule->action) {
726 case AUDIT_NEVER:
727 *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
728 break;
729 case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
730 *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
731 break;
732 }
733 return 1;
734}
735
736/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
737 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
738 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
739 */
740static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
741{
742 struct audit_entry *e;
743 enum audit_state state;
744
745 rcu_read_lock();
746 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
747 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
748 &state, true)) {
749 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
750 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
751 rcu_read_unlock();
752 return state;
753 }
754 }
755 rcu_read_unlock();
756 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
757}
758
759static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
760{
761 int word, bit;
762
763 if (val > 0xffffffff)
764 return false;
765
766 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
767 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
768 return false;
769
770 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
771
772 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
773}
774
775/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
776 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
777 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
778 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
779 */
780static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
781 struct audit_context *ctx,
782 struct list_head *list)
783{
784 struct audit_entry *e;
785 enum audit_state state;
786
787 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
788 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
789
790 rcu_read_lock();
791 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
792 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
793 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
794 &state, false)) {
795 rcu_read_unlock();
796 ctx->current_state = state;
797 return state;
798 }
799 }
800 rcu_read_unlock();
801 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
802}
803
804/*
805 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
806 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
807 */
808static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
809 struct audit_names *n,
810 struct audit_context *ctx) {
811 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
812 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
813 struct audit_entry *e;
814 enum audit_state state;
815
816 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
817 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
818 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
819 ctx->current_state = state;
820 return 1;
821 }
822 }
823 return 0;
824}
825
826/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
827 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
828 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
829 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
830 */
831void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
832{
833 struct audit_names *n;
834
835 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
836 return;
837
838 rcu_read_lock();
839
840 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
841 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
842 break;
843 }
844 rcu_read_unlock();
845}
846
847static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
848{
849 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
850 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
851 context->proctitle.len = 0;
852}
853
854static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
855{
856 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
857 kfree(context->module.name);
858 context->module.name = NULL;
859 }
860}
861static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
862{
863 struct audit_names *n, *next;
864
865 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
866 list_del(&n->list);
867 if (n->name)
868 putname(n->name);
869 if (n->should_free)
870 kfree(n);
871 }
872 context->name_count = 0;
873 path_put(&context->pwd);
874 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
875 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
876}
877
878static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
879{
880 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
881
882 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
883 context->aux = aux->next;
884 kfree(aux);
885 }
886 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
887 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
888 kfree(aux);
889 }
890}
891
892static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
893{
894 struct audit_context *context;
895
896 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
897 if (!context)
898 return NULL;
899 context->state = state;
900 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
901 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
902 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
903 return context;
904}
905
906/**
907 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
908 * @tsk: task
909 *
910 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
911 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
912 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
913 * needed.
914 */
915int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
916{
917 struct audit_context *context;
918 enum audit_state state;
919 char *key = NULL;
920
921 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
922 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
923
924 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
925 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
926 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
927 return 0;
928 }
929
930 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
931 kfree(key);
932 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
933 return -ENOMEM;
934 }
935 context->filterkey = key;
936
937 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
938 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
939 return 0;
940}
941
942static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
943{
944 audit_free_module(context);
945 audit_free_names(context);
946 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
947 free_tree_refs(context);
948 audit_free_aux(context);
949 kfree(context->filterkey);
950 kfree(context->sockaddr);
951 audit_proctitle_free(context);
952 kfree(context);
953}
954
955static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
956 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
957 u32 sid, char *comm)
958{
959 struct audit_buffer *ab;
960 char *ctx = NULL;
961 u32 len;
962 int rc = 0;
963
964 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
965 if (!ab)
966 return rc;
967
968 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
969 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
970 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
971 if (sid) {
972 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
973 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
974 rc = 1;
975 } else {
976 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
977 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
978 }
979 }
980 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
981 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
982 audit_log_end(ab);
983
984 return rc;
985}
986
987static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
988 struct audit_buffer **ab)
989{
990 long len_max;
991 long len_rem;
992 long len_full;
993 long len_buf;
994 long len_abuf = 0;
995 long len_tmp;
996 bool require_data;
997 bool encode;
998 unsigned int iter;
999 unsigned int arg;
1000 char *buf_head;
1001 char *buf;
1002 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1003
1004 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1005 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1006 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1007 char abuf[96];
1008
1009 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1010 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1011 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1012 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1013 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1014 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1015
1016 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1017 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1018 if (!buf_head) {
1019 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1020 return;
1021 }
1022 buf = buf_head;
1023
1024 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1025
1026 len_rem = len_max;
1027 len_buf = 0;
1028 len_full = 0;
1029 require_data = true;
1030 encode = false;
1031 iter = 0;
1032 arg = 0;
1033 do {
1034 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1035 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1036 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1037 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1038 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1039 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1040 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1041 if (len_full == 0)
1042 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1043
1044 /* read more data from userspace */
1045 if (require_data) {
1046 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1047 if (buf != buf_head) {
1048 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1049 buf = buf_head;
1050 }
1051
1052 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1053 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1054 len_max - len_buf);
1055 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1056 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1057 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1058 goto out;
1059 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1060 /* buffer is not large enough */
1061 require_data = true;
1062 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1063 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1064 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1065 * consistent record encoding */
1066 encode = true;
1067 len_full = len_full * 2;
1068 p += len_tmp;
1069 } else {
1070 require_data = false;
1071 if (!encode)
1072 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1073 buf, len_tmp);
1074 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1075 if (len_full < len_max)
1076 len_full = (encode ?
1077 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1078 p += len_tmp + 1;
1079 }
1080 len_buf += len_tmp;
1081 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1082
1083 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1084 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1085 }
1086
1087 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1088 if (len_buf >= 0) {
1089 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1090 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1091 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1092 * a new buffer */
1093 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1094 len_rem = len_max;
1095 audit_log_end(*ab);
1096 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1097 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1098 if (!*ab)
1099 goto out;
1100 }
1101
1102 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1103 len_tmp = 0;
1104 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1105 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1106 if (iter == 0) {
1107 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1108 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1109 " a%d_len=%lu",
1110 arg, len_full);
1111 }
1112 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1113 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1114 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1115 } else
1116 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1117 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1118 " a%d=", arg);
1119 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1120 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1121
1122 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1123 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1124 len_rem -= len_tmp;
1125 len_tmp = len_buf;
1126 if (encode) {
1127 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1128 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1129 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1130 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1131 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1132 } else {
1133 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1134 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1135 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1136 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1137 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1138 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1139 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1140 }
1141 len_buf -= len_tmp;
1142 buf += len_tmp;
1143 }
1144
1145 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1146 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1147 arg++;
1148 iter = 0;
1149 len_full = 0;
1150 require_data = true;
1151 encode = false;
1152 }
1153 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1154
1155 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1156
1157out:
1158 kfree(buf_head);
1159}
1160
1161static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1162 kernel_cap_t *cap)
1163{
1164 int i;
1165
1166 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1167 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1168 return;
1169 }
1170 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1171 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
1172 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1173}
1174
1175static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1176{
1177 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1178 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1179 return;
1180 }
1181 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1182 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1183 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1184 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1185 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1186}
1187
1188static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1189{
1190 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1191 int i;
1192
1193 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1194 if (!ab)
1195 return;
1196
1197 switch (context->type) {
1198 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1199 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1200 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1201 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1202 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1203 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1204 break; }
1205 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1206 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1207
1208 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1209 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1210 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1211 context->ipc.mode);
1212 if (osid) {
1213 char *ctx = NULL;
1214 u32 len;
1215 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1216 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1217 *call_panic = 1;
1218 } else {
1219 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1220 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1221 }
1222 }
1223 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1224 audit_log_end(ab);
1225 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1226 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1227 if (unlikely(!ab))
1228 return;
1229 audit_log_format(ab,
1230 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1231 context->ipc.qbytes,
1232 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1233 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1234 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1235 }
1236 break; }
1237 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1238 audit_log_format(ab,
1239 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1240 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1241 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1242 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1243 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1244 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1245 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1246 break;
1247 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1248 audit_log_format(ab,
1249 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1250 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1251 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1252 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1253 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1254 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1255 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1256 break;
1257 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1258 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1259 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1260 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1261 break;
1262 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1263 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1264 audit_log_format(ab,
1265 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1266 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1267 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1268 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1269 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1270 break; }
1271 case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1272 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1273 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1274 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1275 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1276 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1277 break;
1278 case AUDIT_MMAP:
1279 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1280 context->mmap.flags);
1281 break;
1282 case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1283 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1284 break;
1285 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1286 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1287 if (context->module.name) {
1288 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1289 } else
1290 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1291
1292 break;
1293 }
1294 audit_log_end(ab);
1295}
1296
1297static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1298{
1299 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1300 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1301 end--;
1302
1303 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1304 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1305 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1306 return len;
1307}
1308
1309/*
1310 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1311 * @context: audit_context for the task
1312 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1313 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1314 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1315 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1316 */
1317static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1318 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1319{
1320 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1321
1322 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1323 if (!ab)
1324 return;
1325
1326 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1327
1328 if (path)
1329 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1330 else if (n->name) {
1331 switch (n->name_len) {
1332 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1333 /* log the full path */
1334 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1335 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1336 break;
1337 case 0:
1338 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1339 * directory component is the cwd
1340 */
1341 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1342 break;
1343 default:
1344 /* log the name's directory component */
1345 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1346 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1347 n->name_len);
1348 }
1349 } else
1350 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1351
1352 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1353 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1354 n->ino,
1355 MAJOR(n->dev),
1356 MINOR(n->dev),
1357 n->mode,
1358 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1359 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1360 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1361 MINOR(n->rdev));
1362 if (n->osid != 0) {
1363 char *ctx = NULL;
1364 u32 len;
1365
1366 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1367 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1368 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1369 if (call_panic)
1370 *call_panic = 2;
1371 } else {
1372 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1373 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1374 }
1375 }
1376
1377 /* log the audit_names record type */
1378 switch (n->type) {
1379 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1380 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1381 break;
1382 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1383 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1384 break;
1385 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1386 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1387 break;
1388 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1389 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1390 break;
1391 default:
1392 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1393 break;
1394 }
1395
1396 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1397 audit_log_end(ab);
1398}
1399
1400static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1401{
1402 int res;
1403 char *buf;
1404 char *msg = "(null)";
1405 int len = strlen(msg);
1406 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1407 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1408
1409 if (!context || context->dummy)
1410 return;
1411
1412 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1413 if (!ab)
1414 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1415
1416 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1417
1418 /* Not cached */
1419 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1420 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1421 if (!buf)
1422 goto out;
1423 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1424 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1425 if (res == 0) {
1426 kfree(buf);
1427 goto out;
1428 }
1429 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1430 if (res == 0) {
1431 kfree(buf);
1432 goto out;
1433 }
1434 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1435 context->proctitle.len = res;
1436 }
1437 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1438 len = context->proctitle.len;
1439out:
1440 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1441 audit_log_end(ab);
1442}
1443
1444static void audit_log_exit(void)
1445{
1446 int i, call_panic = 0;
1447 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1448 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1449 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1450 struct audit_names *n;
1451
1452 context->personality = current->personality;
1453
1454 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1455 if (!ab)
1456 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1457 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1458 context->arch, context->major);
1459 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1460 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1461 if (context->return_valid)
1462 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1463 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1464 context->return_code);
1465
1466 audit_log_format(ab,
1467 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1468 context->argv[0],
1469 context->argv[1],
1470 context->argv[2],
1471 context->argv[3],
1472 context->name_count);
1473
1474 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1475 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1476 audit_log_end(ab);
1477
1478 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1479
1480 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1481 if (!ab)
1482 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1483
1484 switch (aux->type) {
1485
1486 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1487 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1488 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1489 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1490 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1491 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1492 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1493 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1494 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1495 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1496 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1497 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1498 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1499 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1500 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1501 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1502 axs->fcap.rootid));
1503 break; }
1504
1505 }
1506 audit_log_end(ab);
1507 }
1508
1509 if (context->type)
1510 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1511
1512 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1513 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1514 if (ab) {
1515 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1516 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1517 audit_log_end(ab);
1518 }
1519 }
1520
1521 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1522 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1523 if (ab) {
1524 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1525 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1526 context->sockaddr_len);
1527 audit_log_end(ab);
1528 }
1529 }
1530
1531 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1532 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1533
1534 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1535 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1536 axs->target_auid[i],
1537 axs->target_uid[i],
1538 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1539 axs->target_sid[i],
1540 axs->target_comm[i]))
1541 call_panic = 1;
1542 }
1543
1544 if (context->target_pid &&
1545 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1546 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1547 context->target_sessionid,
1548 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1549 call_panic = 1;
1550
1551 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1552 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1553 if (ab) {
1554 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1555 audit_log_end(ab);
1556 }
1557 }
1558
1559 i = 0;
1560 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1561 if (n->hidden)
1562 continue;
1563 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1564 }
1565
1566 audit_log_proctitle();
1567
1568 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1569 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1570 if (ab)
1571 audit_log_end(ab);
1572 if (call_panic)
1573 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1574}
1575
1576/**
1577 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1578 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1579 *
1580 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1581 */
1582void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1583{
1584 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1585
1586 if (!context)
1587 return;
1588
1589 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1590 audit_kill_trees(context);
1591
1592 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1593 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1594 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1595 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1596 */
1597 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1598 context->return_valid = 0;
1599 context->return_code = 0;
1600
1601 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
1602 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1603 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1604 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1605 audit_log_exit();
1606 }
1607
1608 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1609 audit_free_context(context);
1610}
1611
1612/**
1613 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1614 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1615 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1616 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1617 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1618 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1619 *
1620 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1621 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1622 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1623 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1624 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1625 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1626 * be written).
1627 */
1628void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1629 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1630{
1631 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1632 enum audit_state state;
1633
1634 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1635 return;
1636
1637 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1638
1639 state = context->state;
1640 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1641 return;
1642
1643 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1644 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1645 context->prio = 0;
1646 if (auditd_test_task(current))
1647 return;
1648 }
1649
1650 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
1651 context->major = major;
1652 context->argv[0] = a1;
1653 context->argv[1] = a2;
1654 context->argv[2] = a3;
1655 context->argv[3] = a4;
1656 context->serial = 0;
1657 context->in_syscall = 1;
1658 context->current_state = state;
1659 context->ppid = 0;
1660 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
1661}
1662
1663/**
1664 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1665 * @success: success value of the syscall
1666 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1667 *
1668 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1669 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1670 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1671 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1672 * free the names stored from getname().
1673 */
1674void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1675{
1676 struct audit_context *context;
1677
1678 context = audit_context();
1679 if (!context)
1680 return;
1681
1682 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1683 audit_kill_trees(context);
1684
1685 if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1686 if (success)
1687 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1688 else
1689 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1690
1691 /*
1692 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1693 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1694 * arch specific signal handlers
1695 *
1696 * This is actually a test for:
1697 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1698 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1699 *
1700 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1701 */
1702 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1703 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1704 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1705 context->return_code = -EINTR;
1706 else
1707 context->return_code = return_code;
1708
1709 audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
1710 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1711 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
1712 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1713 audit_log_exit();
1714 }
1715
1716 context->in_syscall = 0;
1717 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1718
1719 audit_free_module(context);
1720 audit_free_names(context);
1721 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1722 audit_free_aux(context);
1723 context->aux = NULL;
1724 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1725 context->target_pid = 0;
1726 context->target_sid = 0;
1727 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1728 context->type = 0;
1729 context->fds[0] = -1;
1730 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1731 kfree(context->filterkey);
1732 context->filterkey = NULL;
1733 }
1734}
1735
1736static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1737{
1738 struct audit_context *context;
1739 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1740 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1741 int count;
1742 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
1743 return;
1744 context = audit_context();
1745 p = context->trees;
1746 count = context->tree_count;
1747 rcu_read_lock();
1748 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1749 rcu_read_unlock();
1750 if (!chunk)
1751 return;
1752 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1753 return;
1754 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1755 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1756 audit_set_auditable(context);
1757 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1758 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1759 return;
1760 }
1761 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1762}
1763
1764static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1765{
1766 struct audit_context *context;
1767 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1768 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1769 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1770 unsigned long seq;
1771 int count;
1772
1773 context = audit_context();
1774 p = context->trees;
1775 count = context->tree_count;
1776retry:
1777 drop = NULL;
1778 d = dentry;
1779 rcu_read_lock();
1780 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1781 for(;;) {
1782 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1783 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
1784 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1785 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1786 if (chunk) {
1787 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1788 drop = chunk;
1789 break;
1790 }
1791 }
1792 }
1793 parent = d->d_parent;
1794 if (parent == d)
1795 break;
1796 d = parent;
1797 }
1798 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1799 rcu_read_unlock();
1800 if (!drop) {
1801 /* just a race with rename */
1802 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1803 goto retry;
1804 }
1805 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1806 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1807 /* OK, got more space */
1808 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1809 goto retry;
1810 }
1811 /* too bad */
1812 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1813 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1814 audit_set_auditable(context);
1815 return;
1816 }
1817 rcu_read_unlock();
1818}
1819
1820static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1821 unsigned char type)
1822{
1823 struct audit_names *aname;
1824
1825 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1826 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1827 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1828 } else {
1829 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1830 if (!aname)
1831 return NULL;
1832 aname->should_free = true;
1833 }
1834
1835 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1836 aname->type = type;
1837 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1838
1839 context->name_count++;
1840 return aname;
1841}
1842
1843/**
1844 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1845 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1846 *
1847 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1848 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1849 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1850 */
1851struct filename *
1852__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1853{
1854 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1855 struct audit_names *n;
1856
1857 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1858 if (!n->name)
1859 continue;
1860 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1861 n->name->refcnt++;
1862 return n->name;
1863 }
1864 }
1865 return NULL;
1866}
1867
1868/**
1869 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1870 * @name: name to add
1871 *
1872 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1873 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1874 */
1875void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1876{
1877 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1878 struct audit_names *n;
1879
1880 if (!context->in_syscall)
1881 return;
1882
1883 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1884 if (!n)
1885 return;
1886
1887 n->name = name;
1888 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1889 name->aname = n;
1890 name->refcnt++;
1891
1892 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1893 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1894}
1895
1896static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
1897 const struct dentry *dentry)
1898{
1899 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1900 int rc;
1901
1902 if (!dentry)
1903 return 0;
1904
1905 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1906 if (rc)
1907 return rc;
1908
1909 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1910 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1911 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1912 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
1913 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
1914 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1915
1916 return 0;
1917}
1918
1919/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1920static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
1921 const struct dentry *dentry,
1922 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
1923{
1924 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1925 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1926 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1927 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1928 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1929 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1930 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1931 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
1932 name->fcap_ver = -1;
1933 return;
1934 }
1935 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1936}
1937
1938/**
1939 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1940 * @name: name being audited
1941 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1942 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1943 */
1944void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1945 unsigned int flags)
1946{
1947 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1948 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1949 struct audit_names *n;
1950 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1951 struct audit_entry *e;
1952 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
1953 int i;
1954
1955 if (!context->in_syscall)
1956 return;
1957
1958 rcu_read_lock();
1959 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
1960 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1961 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1962
1963 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
1964 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
1965 f->op, f->val)
1966 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
1967 rcu_read_unlock();
1968 return;
1969 }
1970 }
1971 }
1972 rcu_read_unlock();
1973
1974 if (!name)
1975 goto out_alloc;
1976
1977 /*
1978 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1979 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1980 */
1981 n = name->aname;
1982 if (n) {
1983 if (parent) {
1984 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1985 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1986 goto out;
1987 } else {
1988 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1989 goto out;
1990 }
1991 }
1992
1993 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1994 if (n->ino) {
1995 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1996 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
1997 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
1998 continue;
1999 } else if (n->name) {
2000 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2001 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2002 continue;
2003 } else
2004 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2005 continue;
2006
2007 /* match the correct record type */
2008 if (parent) {
2009 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2010 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2011 goto out;
2012 } else {
2013 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2014 goto out;
2015 }
2016 }
2017
2018out_alloc:
2019 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2020 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2021 if (!n)
2022 return;
2023 if (name) {
2024 n->name = name;
2025 name->refcnt++;
2026 }
2027
2028out:
2029 if (parent) {
2030 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2031 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2032 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2033 n->hidden = true;
2034 } else {
2035 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2036 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2037 }
2038 handle_path(dentry);
2039 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2040}
2041
2042void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2043{
2044 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2045}
2046
2047/**
2048 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2049 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2050 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2051 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2052 *
2053 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2054 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2055 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2056 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2057 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2058 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2059 * unsuccessful attempts.
2060 */
2061void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2062 const struct dentry *dentry,
2063 const unsigned char type)
2064{
2065 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2066 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2067 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2068 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2069 struct audit_entry *e;
2070 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2071 int i;
2072
2073 if (!context->in_syscall)
2074 return;
2075
2076 rcu_read_lock();
2077 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2078 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2079 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2080
2081 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2082 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2083 f->op, f->val)
2084 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2085 rcu_read_unlock();
2086 return;
2087 }
2088 }
2089 }
2090 rcu_read_unlock();
2091
2092 if (inode)
2093 handle_one(inode);
2094
2095 /* look for a parent entry first */
2096 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2097 if (!n->name ||
2098 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2099 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2100 continue;
2101
2102 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2103 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2104 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2105 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2106 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2107 found_parent = n;
2108 break;
2109 }
2110 }
2111
2112 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2113 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2114 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2115 if (!n->name ||
2116 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2117 continue;
2118
2119 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2120 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2121 found_parent ?
2122 found_parent->name_len :
2123 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
2124 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2125 n->type = type;
2126 found_child = n;
2127 break;
2128 }
2129 }
2130
2131 if (!found_parent) {
2132 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2133 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2134 if (!n)
2135 return;
2136 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2137 }
2138
2139 if (!found_child) {
2140 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2141 if (!found_child)
2142 return;
2143
2144 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2145 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2146 * audit_free_names() */
2147 if (found_parent) {
2148 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2149 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2150 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2151 }
2152 }
2153
2154 if (inode)
2155 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2156 else
2157 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2158}
2159EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2160
2161/**
2162 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2163 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2164 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2165 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2166 *
2167 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2168 */
2169int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2170 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2171{
2172 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2173 return 0;
2174 if (!ctx->serial)
2175 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2176 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2177 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2178 *serial = ctx->serial;
2179 if (!ctx->prio) {
2180 ctx->prio = 1;
2181 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2182 }
2183 return 1;
2184}
2185
2186/**
2187 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2188 * @oflag: open flag
2189 * @mode: mode bits
2190 * @attr: queue attributes
2191 *
2192 */
2193void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2194{
2195 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2196
2197 if (attr)
2198 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2199 else
2200 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2201
2202 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2203 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2204
2205 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2206}
2207
2208/**
2209 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2210 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2211 * @msg_len: Message length
2212 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2213 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2214 *
2215 */
2216void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2217 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2218{
2219 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2220 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2221
2222 if (abs_timeout)
2223 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2224 else
2225 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2226
2227 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2228 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2229 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2230
2231 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2232}
2233
2234/**
2235 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2236 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2237 * @notification: Notification event
2238 *
2239 */
2240
2241void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2242{
2243 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2244
2245 if (notification)
2246 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2247 else
2248 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2249
2250 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2251 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2252}
2253
2254/**
2255 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2256 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2257 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2258 *
2259 */
2260void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2261{
2262 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2263 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2264 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2265 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2266}
2267
2268/**
2269 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2270 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2271 *
2272 */
2273void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2274{
2275 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2276 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2277 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2278 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2279 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2280 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2281 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2282}
2283
2284/**
2285 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2286 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2287 * @uid: msgq user id
2288 * @gid: msgq group id
2289 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2290 *
2291 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2292 */
2293void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2294{
2295 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2296
2297 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2298 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2299 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2300 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2301 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2302}
2303
2304void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2305{
2306 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2307
2308 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2309 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2310}
2311
2312
2313/**
2314 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2315 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2316 * @args: args array
2317 *
2318 */
2319int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2320{
2321 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2322
2323 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2324 return -EINVAL;
2325 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2326 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2327 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2328 return 0;
2329}
2330
2331/**
2332 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2333 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2334 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2335 *
2336 */
2337void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2338{
2339 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2340 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2341 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2342}
2343
2344/**
2345 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2346 * @len: data length in user space
2347 * @a: data address in kernel space
2348 *
2349 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2350 */
2351int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2352{
2353 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2354
2355 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2356 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2357 if (!p)
2358 return -ENOMEM;
2359 context->sockaddr = p;
2360 }
2361
2362 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2363 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2364 return 0;
2365}
2366
2367void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2368{
2369 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2370
2371 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2372 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2373 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2374 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2375 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2376 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2377}
2378
2379/**
2380 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2381 * @t: task being signaled
2382 *
2383 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2384 * and uid that is doing that.
2385 */
2386int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2387{
2388 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2389 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2390 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2391
2392 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2393 return 0;
2394
2395 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2396 * in audit_context */
2397 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2398 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2399 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2400 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2401 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2402 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2403 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2404 return 0;
2405 }
2406
2407 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2408 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2409 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2410 if (!axp)
2411 return -ENOMEM;
2412
2413 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2414 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2415 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2416 }
2417 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2418
2419 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2420 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2421 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2422 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2423 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2424 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2425 axp->pid_count++;
2426
2427 return 0;
2428}
2429
2430/**
2431 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2432 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2433 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2434 * @old: the old credentials
2435 *
2436 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2437 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2438 *
2439 * -Eric
2440 */
2441int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2442 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2443{
2444 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2445 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2446 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2447
2448 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2449 if (!ax)
2450 return -ENOMEM;
2451
2452 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2453 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2454 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2455
2456 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2457
2458 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2459 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2460 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2461 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2462 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2463
2464 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2465 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2466 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2467 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2468
2469 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2470 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2471 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2472 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2473 return 0;
2474}
2475
2476/**
2477 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2478 * @new: the new credentials
2479 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2480 *
2481 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2482 * audit system if applicable
2483 */
2484void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2485{
2486 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2487 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2488 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2489 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2490 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2491 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2492 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2493}
2494
2495void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2496{
2497 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2498 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2499 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2500 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2501}
2502
2503void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2504{
2505 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2506
2507 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2508 if (!context->module.name)
2509 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2510 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2511}
2512
2513void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2514{
2515 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2516 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2517}
2518
2519void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2520{
2521 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
2522 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2523 (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
2524}
2525
2526static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
2527 const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
2528{
2529 const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
2530
2531 if (val->newval == val->oldval)
2532 return;
2533
2534 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
2535 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
2536}
2537
2538void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2539{
2540 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
2541 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
2542 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
2543 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
2544 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
2545 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
2546}
2547
2548static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2549{
2550 kuid_t auid, uid;
2551 kgid_t gid;
2552 unsigned int sessionid;
2553 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2554
2555 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2556 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2557 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2558
2559 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2560 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2561 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2562 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2563 sessionid);
2564 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2565 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2566 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2567 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2568}
2569
2570/**
2571 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2572 * @signr: signal value
2573 *
2574 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2575 * should record the event for investigation.
2576 */
2577void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2578{
2579 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2580
2581 if (!audit_enabled)
2582 return;
2583
2584 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2585 return;
2586
2587 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2588 if (unlikely(!ab))
2589 return;
2590 audit_log_task(ab);
2591 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2592 audit_log_end(ab);
2593}
2594
2595/**
2596 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2597 * @syscall: syscall number
2598 * @signr: signal value
2599 * @code: the seccomp action
2600 *
2601 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2602 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2603 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2604 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2605 * audit is not in use.
2606 */
2607void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2608{
2609 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2610
2611 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2612 if (unlikely(!ab))
2613 return;
2614 audit_log_task(ab);
2615 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2616 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2617 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2618 audit_log_end(ab);
2619}
2620
2621void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2622 int res)
2623{
2624 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2625
2626 if (!audit_enabled)
2627 return;
2628
2629 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2630 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2631 if (unlikely(!ab))
2632 return;
2633
2634 audit_log_format(ab,
2635 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2636 names, old_names, res);
2637 audit_log_end(ab);
2638}
2639
2640struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2641{
2642 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2643 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2644 return NULL;
2645 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2646}
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
3 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 *
5 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
6 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
7 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
8 * All Rights Reserved.
9 *
10 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
11 *
12 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
13 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
14 *
15 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
16 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
17 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
18 *
19 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
20 * 2006.
21 *
22 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
23 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
24 *
25 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
26 * filesystem information.
27 *
28 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
29 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
30 */
31
32#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
33
34#include <linux/init.h>
35#include <asm/types.h>
36#include <linux/atomic.h>
37#include <linux/fs.h>
38#include <linux/namei.h>
39#include <linux/mm.h>
40#include <linux/export.h>
41#include <linux/slab.h>
42#include <linux/mount.h>
43#include <linux/socket.h>
44#include <linux/mqueue.h>
45#include <linux/audit.h>
46#include <linux/personality.h>
47#include <linux/time.h>
48#include <linux/netlink.h>
49#include <linux/compiler.h>
50#include <asm/unistd.h>
51#include <linux/security.h>
52#include <linux/list.h>
53#include <linux/binfmts.h>
54#include <linux/highmem.h>
55#include <linux/syscalls.h>
56#include <asm/syscall.h>
57#include <linux/capability.h>
58#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
59#include <linux/compat.h>
60#include <linux/ctype.h>
61#include <linux/string.h>
62#include <linux/uaccess.h>
63#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
64#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
65#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
66#include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how
67
68#include "audit.h"
69
70/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
71#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
72#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
73#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
74
75/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
76 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
77#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
78
79/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
80#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
81
82/* number of audit rules */
83int audit_n_rules;
84
85/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
86int audit_signals;
87
88struct audit_aux_data {
89 struct audit_aux_data *next;
90 int type;
91};
92
93/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
94#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
95
96struct audit_aux_data_pids {
97 struct audit_aux_data d;
98 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
99 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
100 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
101 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
102 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
103 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
104 int pid_count;
105};
106
107struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
108 struct audit_aux_data d;
109 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
110 unsigned int fcap_ver;
111 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
112 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
113};
114
115struct audit_tree_refs {
116 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
117 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
118};
119
120struct audit_nfcfgop_tab {
121 enum audit_nfcfgop op;
122 const char *s;
123};
124
125static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
126 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "xt_register" },
127 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "xt_replace" },
128 { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "xt_unregister" },
129 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_table" },
130 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_table" },
131 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER, "nft_register_chain" },
132 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_chain" },
133 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER, "nft_register_rule" },
134 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_rule" },
135 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER, "nft_register_set" },
136 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_set" },
137 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER, "nft_register_setelem" },
138 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_setelem" },
139 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, "nft_register_gen" },
140 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER, "nft_register_obj" },
141 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_obj" },
142 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET, "nft_reset_obj" },
143 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_flowtable" },
144 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_flowtable" },
145 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID, "nft_invalid" },
146};
147
148static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
149{
150 unsigned n;
151
152 if (unlikely(!ctx))
153 return 0;
154 n = ctx->major;
155
156 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
157 case AUDITSC_NATIVE:
158 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
159 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
160 return 1;
161 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
162 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
163 return 1;
164 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
165 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
166 return 1;
167 return 0;
168 case AUDITSC_COMPAT: /* 32bit on biarch */
169 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
170 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
171 return 1;
172 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
173 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
174 return 1;
175 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
176 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
177 return 1;
178 return 0;
179 case AUDITSC_OPEN:
180 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
181 case AUDITSC_OPENAT:
182 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
183 case AUDITSC_SOCKETCALL:
184 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
185 case AUDITSC_EXECVE:
186 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
187 case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
188 return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)ctx->openat2.flags);
189 default:
190 return 0;
191 }
192}
193
194static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
195{
196 struct audit_names *n;
197 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
198
199 if (unlikely(!ctx))
200 return 0;
201
202 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
203 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
204 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
205 return 1;
206 }
207
208 return 0;
209}
210
211/*
212 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
213 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
214 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
215 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
216 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
217 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
218 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
219 */
220
221static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
222{
223 if (!ctx->prio) {
224 ctx->prio = 1;
225 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
226 }
227}
228
229static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
230{
231 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
232 int left = ctx->tree_count;
233
234 if (likely(left)) {
235 p->c[--left] = chunk;
236 ctx->tree_count = left;
237 return 1;
238 }
239 if (!p)
240 return 0;
241 p = p->next;
242 if (p) {
243 p->c[30] = chunk;
244 ctx->trees = p;
245 ctx->tree_count = 30;
246 return 1;
247 }
248 return 0;
249}
250
251static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
252{
253 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
254
255 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
256 if (!ctx->trees) {
257 ctx->trees = p;
258 return 0;
259 }
260 if (p)
261 p->next = ctx->trees;
262 else
263 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
264 ctx->tree_count = 31;
265 return 1;
266}
267
268static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
269 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
270{
271 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
272 int n;
273
274 if (!p) {
275 /* we started with empty chain */
276 p = ctx->first_trees;
277 count = 31;
278 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
279 if (!p)
280 return;
281 }
282 n = count;
283 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
284 while (n--) {
285 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
286 q->c[n] = NULL;
287 }
288 }
289 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
290 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
291 q->c[n] = NULL;
292 }
293 ctx->trees = p;
294 ctx->tree_count = count;
295}
296
297static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
298{
299 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
300
301 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
302 q = p->next;
303 kfree(p);
304 }
305}
306
307static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
308{
309 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
310 int n;
311
312 if (!tree)
313 return 0;
314 /* full ones */
315 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
316 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
317 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
318 return 1;
319 }
320 /* partial */
321 if (p) {
322 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
323 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
324 return 1;
325 }
326 return 0;
327}
328
329static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
330 struct audit_names *name,
331 struct audit_field *f,
332 struct audit_context *ctx)
333{
334 struct audit_names *n;
335 int rc;
336
337 if (name) {
338 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
339 if (rc)
340 return rc;
341 }
342
343 if (ctx) {
344 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
345 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
346 if (rc)
347 return rc;
348 }
349 }
350 return 0;
351}
352
353static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
354 struct audit_names *name,
355 struct audit_field *f,
356 struct audit_context *ctx)
357{
358 struct audit_names *n;
359 int rc;
360
361 if (name) {
362 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
363 if (rc)
364 return rc;
365 }
366
367 if (ctx) {
368 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
369 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
370 if (rc)
371 return rc;
372 }
373 }
374 return 0;
375}
376
377static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
378 const struct cred *cred,
379 struct audit_field *f,
380 struct audit_context *ctx,
381 struct audit_names *name)
382{
383 switch (f->val) {
384 /* process to file object comparisons */
385 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
386 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
387 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
388 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
389 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
390 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
392 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
393 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
394 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
396 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
398 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
400 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
402 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
403 /* uid comparisons */
404 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
405 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
406 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
408 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
410 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
412 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
413 /* auid comparisons */
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
415 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
416 cred->euid);
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
418 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
419 cred->suid);
420 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
421 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
422 cred->fsuid);
423 /* euid comparisons */
424 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
425 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
426 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
427 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
428 /* suid comparisons */
429 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
430 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
431 /* gid comparisons */
432 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
433 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
434 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
435 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
436 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
437 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
438 /* egid comparisons */
439 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
440 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
441 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
442 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
443 /* sgid comparison */
444 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
445 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
446 default:
447 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
448 return 0;
449 }
450 return 0;
451}
452
453/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
454/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
455 * otherwise.
456 *
457 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
458 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
459 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
460 */
461static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
462 struct audit_krule *rule,
463 struct audit_context *ctx,
464 struct audit_names *name,
465 enum audit_state *state,
466 bool task_creation)
467{
468 const struct cred *cred;
469 int i, need_sid = 1;
470 u32 sid;
471 unsigned int sessionid;
472
473 if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
474 return 0;
475
476 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
477
478 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
479 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
480 struct audit_names *n;
481 int result = 0;
482 pid_t pid;
483
484 switch (f->type) {
485 case AUDIT_PID:
486 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
487 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
488 break;
489 case AUDIT_PPID:
490 if (ctx) {
491 if (!ctx->ppid)
492 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
493 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
494 }
495 break;
496 case AUDIT_EXE:
497 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
498 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
499 result = !result;
500 break;
501 case AUDIT_UID:
502 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
503 break;
504 case AUDIT_EUID:
505 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
506 break;
507 case AUDIT_SUID:
508 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
509 break;
510 case AUDIT_FSUID:
511 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
512 break;
513 case AUDIT_GID:
514 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
515 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
516 if (!result)
517 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
518 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
519 if (result)
520 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
521 }
522 break;
523 case AUDIT_EGID:
524 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
525 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
526 if (!result)
527 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
528 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
529 if (result)
530 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
531 }
532 break;
533 case AUDIT_SGID:
534 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
535 break;
536 case AUDIT_FSGID:
537 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
538 break;
539 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
540 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
541 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
542 break;
543 case AUDIT_PERS:
544 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
545 break;
546 case AUDIT_ARCH:
547 if (ctx)
548 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
549 break;
550
551 case AUDIT_EXIT:
552 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
553 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
554 break;
555 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
556 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) {
557 if (f->val)
558 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
559 else
560 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
561 }
562 break;
563 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
564 if (name) {
565 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
566 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
567 ++result;
568 } else if (ctx) {
569 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
570 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
571 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
572 ++result;
573 break;
574 }
575 }
576 }
577 break;
578 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
579 if (name) {
580 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
581 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
582 ++result;
583 } else if (ctx) {
584 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
585 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
586 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
587 ++result;
588 break;
589 }
590 }
591 }
592 break;
593 case AUDIT_INODE:
594 if (name)
595 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
596 else if (ctx) {
597 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
598 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
599 ++result;
600 break;
601 }
602 }
603 }
604 break;
605 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
606 if (name) {
607 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
608 } else if (ctx) {
609 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
610 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
611 ++result;
612 break;
613 }
614 }
615 }
616 break;
617 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
618 if (name) {
619 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
620 } else if (ctx) {
621 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
622 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
623 ++result;
624 break;
625 }
626 }
627 }
628 break;
629 case AUDIT_WATCH:
630 if (name) {
631 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
632 name->ino,
633 name->dev);
634 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
635 result = !result;
636 }
637 break;
638 case AUDIT_DIR:
639 if (ctx) {
640 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
641 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
642 result = !result;
643 }
644 break;
645 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
646 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
647 f->op, f->uid);
648 break;
649 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
650 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
651 break;
652 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
653 if (ctx && ctx->sockaddr)
654 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
655 f->op, f->val);
656 break;
657 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
658 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
659 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
660 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
661 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
662 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
663 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
664 match for now to avoid losing information that
665 may be wanted. An error message will also be
666 logged upon error */
667 if (f->lsm_rule) {
668 if (need_sid) {
669 /* @tsk should always be equal to
670 * @current with the exception of
671 * fork()/copy_process() in which case
672 * the new @tsk creds are still a dup
673 * of @current's creds so we can still
674 * use security_current_getsecid_subj()
675 * here even though it always refs
676 * @current's creds
677 */
678 security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
679 need_sid = 0;
680 }
681 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
682 f->op,
683 f->lsm_rule);
684 }
685 break;
686 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
687 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
688 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
689 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
690 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
691 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
692 also applies here */
693 if (f->lsm_rule) {
694 /* Find files that match */
695 if (name) {
696 result = security_audit_rule_match(
697 name->osid,
698 f->type,
699 f->op,
700 f->lsm_rule);
701 } else if (ctx) {
702 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
703 if (security_audit_rule_match(
704 n->osid,
705 f->type,
706 f->op,
707 f->lsm_rule)) {
708 ++result;
709 break;
710 }
711 }
712 }
713 /* Find ipc objects that match */
714 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
715 break;
716 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
717 f->type, f->op,
718 f->lsm_rule))
719 ++result;
720 }
721 break;
722 case AUDIT_ARG0:
723 case AUDIT_ARG1:
724 case AUDIT_ARG2:
725 case AUDIT_ARG3:
726 if (ctx)
727 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
728 break;
729 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
730 /* ignore this field for filtering */
731 result = 1;
732 break;
733 case AUDIT_PERM:
734 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
735 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
736 result = !result;
737 break;
738 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
739 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
740 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
741 result = !result;
742 break;
743 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
744 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
745 break;
746 }
747 if (!result)
748 return 0;
749 }
750
751 if (ctx) {
752 if (rule->filterkey) {
753 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
754 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
755 }
756 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
757 }
758 switch (rule->action) {
759 case AUDIT_NEVER:
760 *state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
761 break;
762 case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
763 *state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
764 break;
765 }
766 return 1;
767}
768
769/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
770 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
771 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
772 */
773static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
774{
775 struct audit_entry *e;
776 enum audit_state state;
777
778 rcu_read_lock();
779 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
780 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
781 &state, true)) {
782 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
783 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
784 rcu_read_unlock();
785 return state;
786 }
787 }
788 rcu_read_unlock();
789 return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
790}
791
792static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
793{
794 int word, bit;
795
796 if (val > 0xffffffff)
797 return false;
798
799 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
800 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
801 return false;
802
803 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
804
805 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
806}
807
808/**
809 * __audit_filter_op - common filter helper for operations (syscall/uring/etc)
810 * @tsk: associated task
811 * @ctx: audit context
812 * @list: audit filter list
813 * @name: audit_name (can be NULL)
814 * @op: current syscall/uring_op
815 *
816 * Run the udit filters specified in @list against @tsk using @ctx,
817 * @name, and @op, as necessary; the caller is responsible for ensuring
818 * that the call is made while the RCU read lock is held. The @name
819 * parameter can be NULL, but all others must be specified.
820 * Returns 1/true if the filter finds a match, 0/false if none are found.
821 */
822static int __audit_filter_op(struct task_struct *tsk,
823 struct audit_context *ctx,
824 struct list_head *list,
825 struct audit_names *name,
826 unsigned long op)
827{
828 struct audit_entry *e;
829 enum audit_state state;
830
831 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
832 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, op) &&
833 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, name,
834 &state, false)) {
835 ctx->current_state = state;
836 return 1;
837 }
838 }
839 return 0;
840}
841
842/**
843 * audit_filter_uring - apply filters to an io_uring operation
844 * @tsk: associated task
845 * @ctx: audit context
846 */
847static void audit_filter_uring(struct task_struct *tsk,
848 struct audit_context *ctx)
849{
850 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
851 return;
852
853 rcu_read_lock();
854 __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT],
855 NULL, ctx->uring_op);
856 rcu_read_unlock();
857}
858
859/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
860 * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
861 * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
862 * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
863 */
864static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
865 struct audit_context *ctx)
866{
867 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
868 return;
869
870 rcu_read_lock();
871 __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT],
872 NULL, ctx->major);
873 rcu_read_unlock();
874}
875
876/*
877 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
878 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
879 */
880static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
881 struct audit_names *n,
882 struct audit_context *ctx) {
883 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
884 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
885
886 return __audit_filter_op(tsk, ctx, list, n, ctx->major);
887}
888
889/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
890 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
891 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
892 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
893 */
894void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
895{
896 struct audit_names *n;
897
898 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
899 return;
900
901 rcu_read_lock();
902
903 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
904 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
905 break;
906 }
907 rcu_read_unlock();
908}
909
910static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
911{
912 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
913 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
914 context->proctitle.len = 0;
915}
916
917static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
918{
919 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
920 kfree(context->module.name);
921 context->module.name = NULL;
922 }
923}
924static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
925{
926 struct audit_names *n, *next;
927
928 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
929 list_del(&n->list);
930 if (n->name)
931 putname(n->name);
932 if (n->should_free)
933 kfree(n);
934 }
935 context->name_count = 0;
936 path_put(&context->pwd);
937 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
938 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
939}
940
941static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
942{
943 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
944
945 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
946 context->aux = aux->next;
947 kfree(aux);
948 }
949 context->aux = NULL;
950 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
951 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
952 kfree(aux);
953 }
954 context->aux_pids = NULL;
955}
956
957/**
958 * audit_reset_context - reset a audit_context structure
959 * @ctx: the audit_context to reset
960 *
961 * All fields in the audit_context will be reset to an initial state, all
962 * references held by fields will be dropped, and private memory will be
963 * released. When this function returns the audit_context will be suitable
964 * for reuse, so long as the passed context is not NULL or a dummy context.
965 */
966static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
967{
968 if (!ctx)
969 return;
970
971 /* if ctx is non-null, reset the "ctx->context" regardless */
972 ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED;
973 if (ctx->dummy)
974 return;
975
976 /*
977 * NOTE: It shouldn't matter in what order we release the fields, so
978 * release them in the order in which they appear in the struct;
979 * this gives us some hope of quickly making sure we are
980 * resetting the audit_context properly.
981 *
982 * Other things worth mentioning:
983 * - we don't reset "dummy"
984 * - we don't reset "state", we do reset "current_state"
985 * - we preserve "filterkey" if "state" is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
986 * - much of this is likely overkill, but play it safe for now
987 * - we really need to work on improving the audit_context struct
988 */
989
990 ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
991 ctx->serial = 0;
992 ctx->major = 0;
993 ctx->uring_op = 0;
994 ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
995 memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
996 ctx->return_code = 0;
997 ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
998 ctx->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
999 audit_free_names(ctx);
1000 if (ctx->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
1001 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
1002 ctx->filterkey = NULL;
1003 }
1004 audit_free_aux(ctx);
1005 kfree(ctx->sockaddr);
1006 ctx->sockaddr = NULL;
1007 ctx->sockaddr_len = 0;
1008 ctx->ppid = 0;
1009 ctx->uid = ctx->euid = ctx->suid = ctx->fsuid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
1010 ctx->gid = ctx->egid = ctx->sgid = ctx->fsgid = KGIDT_INIT(0);
1011 ctx->personality = 0;
1012 ctx->arch = 0;
1013 ctx->target_pid = 0;
1014 ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
1015 ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
1016 ctx->target_sid = 0;
1017 ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
1018 unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
1019 WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
1020 audit_free_module(ctx);
1021 ctx->fds[0] = -1;
1022 ctx->type = 0; /* reset last for audit_free_*() */
1023}
1024
1025static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
1026{
1027 struct audit_context *context;
1028
1029 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
1030 if (!context)
1031 return NULL;
1032 context->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED;
1033 context->state = state;
1034 context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
1035 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
1036 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
1037 context->fds[0] = -1;
1038 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
1039 return context;
1040}
1041
1042/**
1043 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
1044 * @tsk: task
1045 *
1046 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
1047 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
1048 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
1049 * needed.
1050 */
1051int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
1052{
1053 struct audit_context *context;
1054 enum audit_state state;
1055 char *key = NULL;
1056
1057 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
1058 return 0;
1059
1060 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
1061 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
1062 clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1063 return 0;
1064 }
1065
1066 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
1067 kfree(key);
1068 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
1069 return -ENOMEM;
1070 }
1071 context->filterkey = key;
1072
1073 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
1074 set_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1075 return 0;
1076}
1077
1078static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
1079{
1080 /* resetting is extra work, but it is likely just noise */
1081 audit_reset_context(context);
1082 audit_proctitle_free(context);
1083 free_tree_refs(context);
1084 kfree(context->filterkey);
1085 kfree(context);
1086}
1087
1088static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
1089 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
1090 u32 sid, char *comm)
1091{
1092 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1093 char *ctx = NULL;
1094 u32 len;
1095 int rc = 0;
1096
1097 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1098 if (!ab)
1099 return rc;
1100
1101 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
1102 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
1103 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
1104 if (sid) {
1105 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1106 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1107 rc = 1;
1108 } else {
1109 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1110 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1111 }
1112 }
1113 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1114 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1115 audit_log_end(ab);
1116
1117 return rc;
1118}
1119
1120static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1121 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1122{
1123 long len_max;
1124 long len_rem;
1125 long len_full;
1126 long len_buf;
1127 long len_abuf = 0;
1128 long len_tmp;
1129 bool require_data;
1130 bool encode;
1131 unsigned int iter;
1132 unsigned int arg;
1133 char *buf_head;
1134 char *buf;
1135 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1136
1137 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1138 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1139 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1140 char abuf[96];
1141
1142 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1143 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1144 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1145 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1146 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1147 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1148
1149 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1150 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1151 if (!buf_head) {
1152 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1153 return;
1154 }
1155 buf = buf_head;
1156
1157 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1158
1159 len_rem = len_max;
1160 len_buf = 0;
1161 len_full = 0;
1162 require_data = true;
1163 encode = false;
1164 iter = 0;
1165 arg = 0;
1166 do {
1167 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1168 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1169 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1170 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1171 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1172 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1173 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1174 if (len_full == 0)
1175 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1176
1177 /* read more data from userspace */
1178 if (require_data) {
1179 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1180 if (buf != buf_head) {
1181 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1182 buf = buf_head;
1183 }
1184
1185 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1186 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1187 len_max - len_buf);
1188 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1189 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1190 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1191 goto out;
1192 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1193 /* buffer is not large enough */
1194 require_data = true;
1195 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1196 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1197 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1198 * consistent record encoding */
1199 encode = true;
1200 len_full = len_full * 2;
1201 p += len_tmp;
1202 } else {
1203 require_data = false;
1204 if (!encode)
1205 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1206 buf, len_tmp);
1207 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1208 if (len_full < len_max)
1209 len_full = (encode ?
1210 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1211 p += len_tmp + 1;
1212 }
1213 len_buf += len_tmp;
1214 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1215
1216 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1217 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1218 }
1219
1220 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1221 if (len_buf >= 0) {
1222 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1223 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1224 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1225 * a new buffer */
1226 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1227 len_rem = len_max;
1228 audit_log_end(*ab);
1229 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1230 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1231 if (!*ab)
1232 goto out;
1233 }
1234
1235 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1236 len_tmp = 0;
1237 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1238 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1239 if (iter == 0) {
1240 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1241 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1242 " a%d_len=%lu",
1243 arg, len_full);
1244 }
1245 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1246 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1247 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1248 } else
1249 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1250 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1251 " a%d=", arg);
1252 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1253 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1254
1255 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1256 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1257 len_rem -= len_tmp;
1258 len_tmp = len_buf;
1259 if (encode) {
1260 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1261 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1262 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1263 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1264 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1265 } else {
1266 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1267 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1268 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1269 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1270 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1271 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1272 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1273 }
1274 len_buf -= len_tmp;
1275 buf += len_tmp;
1276 }
1277
1278 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1279 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1280 arg++;
1281 iter = 0;
1282 len_full = 0;
1283 require_data = true;
1284 encode = false;
1285 }
1286 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1287
1288 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1289
1290out:
1291 kfree(buf_head);
1292}
1293
1294static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1295 kernel_cap_t *cap)
1296{
1297 int i;
1298
1299 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1300 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1301 return;
1302 }
1303 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1304 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
1305 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1306}
1307
1308static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1309{
1310 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1311 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1312 return;
1313 }
1314 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1315 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1316 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1317 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1318 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1319}
1320
1321static void audit_log_time(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab)
1322{
1323 const struct audit_ntp_data *ntp = &context->time.ntp_data;
1324 const struct timespec64 *tk = &context->time.tk_injoffset;
1325 static const char * const ntp_name[] = {
1326 "offset",
1327 "freq",
1328 "status",
1329 "tai",
1330 "tick",
1331 "adjust",
1332 };
1333 int type;
1334
1335 if (context->type == AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL) {
1336 for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++) {
1337 if (ntp->vals[type].newval != ntp->vals[type].oldval) {
1338 if (!*ab) {
1339 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1340 GFP_KERNEL,
1341 AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL);
1342 if (!*ab)
1343 return;
1344 }
1345 audit_log_format(*ab, "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli",
1346 ntp_name[type],
1347 ntp->vals[type].oldval,
1348 ntp->vals[type].newval);
1349 audit_log_end(*ab);
1350 *ab = NULL;
1351 }
1352 }
1353 }
1354 if (tk->tv_sec != 0 || tk->tv_nsec != 0) {
1355 if (!*ab) {
1356 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1357 AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET);
1358 if (!*ab)
1359 return;
1360 }
1361 audit_log_format(*ab, "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
1362 (long long)tk->tv_sec, tk->tv_nsec);
1363 audit_log_end(*ab);
1364 *ab = NULL;
1365 }
1366}
1367
1368static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1369{
1370 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1371 int i;
1372
1373 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1374 if (!ab)
1375 return;
1376
1377 switch (context->type) {
1378 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1379 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1380
1381 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1382 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1383 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1384 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1385 break; }
1386 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1387 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1388
1389 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1390 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1391 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1392 context->ipc.mode);
1393 if (osid) {
1394 char *ctx = NULL;
1395 u32 len;
1396
1397 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1398 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1399 *call_panic = 1;
1400 } else {
1401 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1402 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1403 }
1404 }
1405 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1406 audit_log_end(ab);
1407 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1408 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1409 if (unlikely(!ab))
1410 return;
1411 audit_log_format(ab,
1412 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1413 context->ipc.qbytes,
1414 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1415 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1416 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1417 }
1418 break; }
1419 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1420 audit_log_format(ab,
1421 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1422 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1423 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1424 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1425 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1426 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1427 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1428 break;
1429 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1430 audit_log_format(ab,
1431 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1432 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1433 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1434 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1435 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1436 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1437 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1438 break;
1439 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1440 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1441 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1442 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1443 break;
1444 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1445 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1446
1447 audit_log_format(ab,
1448 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1449 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1450 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1451 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1452 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1453 break; }
1454 case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1455 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1456 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1457 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1458 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1459 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1460 break;
1461 case AUDIT_MMAP:
1462 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1463 context->mmap.flags);
1464 break;
1465 case AUDIT_OPENAT2:
1466 audit_log_format(ab, "oflag=0%llo mode=0%llo resolve=0x%llx",
1467 context->openat2.flags,
1468 context->openat2.mode,
1469 context->openat2.resolve);
1470 break;
1471 case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1472 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1473 break;
1474 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1475 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1476 if (context->module.name) {
1477 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1478 } else
1479 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1480
1481 break;
1482 case AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL:
1483 case AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET:
1484 /* this call deviates from the rest, eating the buffer */
1485 audit_log_time(context, &ab);
1486 break;
1487 }
1488 audit_log_end(ab);
1489}
1490
1491static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1492{
1493 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1494
1495 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1496 end--;
1497
1498 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1499 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1500 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1501 return len;
1502}
1503
1504/*
1505 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1506 * @context: audit_context for the task
1507 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1508 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1509 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1510 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1511 */
1512static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1513 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1514{
1515 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1516
1517 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1518 if (!ab)
1519 return;
1520
1521 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1522
1523 if (path)
1524 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1525 else if (n->name) {
1526 switch (n->name_len) {
1527 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1528 /* log the full path */
1529 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1530 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1531 break;
1532 case 0:
1533 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1534 * directory component is the cwd
1535 */
1536 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt)
1537 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1538 else
1539 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1540 break;
1541 default:
1542 /* log the name's directory component */
1543 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1544 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1545 n->name_len);
1546 }
1547 } else
1548 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1549
1550 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1551 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1552 n->ino,
1553 MAJOR(n->dev),
1554 MINOR(n->dev),
1555 n->mode,
1556 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1557 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1558 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1559 MINOR(n->rdev));
1560 if (n->osid != 0) {
1561 char *ctx = NULL;
1562 u32 len;
1563
1564 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1565 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1566 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1567 if (call_panic)
1568 *call_panic = 2;
1569 } else {
1570 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1571 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1572 }
1573 }
1574
1575 /* log the audit_names record type */
1576 switch (n->type) {
1577 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1578 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1579 break;
1580 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1581 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1582 break;
1583 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1584 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1585 break;
1586 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1587 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1588 break;
1589 default:
1590 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1591 break;
1592 }
1593
1594 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1595 audit_log_end(ab);
1596}
1597
1598static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1599{
1600 int res;
1601 char *buf;
1602 char *msg = "(null)";
1603 int len = strlen(msg);
1604 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1605 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1606
1607 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1608 if (!ab)
1609 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1610
1611 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1612
1613 /* Not cached */
1614 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1615 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1616 if (!buf)
1617 goto out;
1618 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1619 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1620 if (res == 0) {
1621 kfree(buf);
1622 goto out;
1623 }
1624 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1625 if (res == 0) {
1626 kfree(buf);
1627 goto out;
1628 }
1629 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1630 context->proctitle.len = res;
1631 }
1632 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1633 len = context->proctitle.len;
1634out:
1635 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1636 audit_log_end(ab);
1637}
1638
1639/**
1640 * audit_log_uring - generate a AUDIT_URINGOP record
1641 * @ctx: the audit context
1642 */
1643static void audit_log_uring(struct audit_context *ctx)
1644{
1645 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1646 const struct cred *cred;
1647
1648 ab = audit_log_start(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_URINGOP);
1649 if (!ab)
1650 return;
1651 cred = current_cred();
1652 audit_log_format(ab, "uring_op=%d", ctx->uring_op);
1653 if (ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
1654 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1655 (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS ?
1656 "yes" : "no"),
1657 ctx->return_code);
1658 audit_log_format(ab,
1659 " items=%d"
1660 " ppid=%d pid=%d uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u suid=%u"
1661 " fsuid=%u egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
1662 ctx->name_count,
1663 task_ppid_nr(current), task_tgid_nr(current),
1664 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
1665 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
1666 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
1667 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
1668 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
1669 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
1670 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
1671 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
1672 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1673 audit_log_key(ab, ctx->filterkey);
1674 audit_log_end(ab);
1675}
1676
1677static void audit_log_exit(void)
1678{
1679 int i, call_panic = 0;
1680 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1681 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1682 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1683 struct audit_names *n;
1684
1685 context->personality = current->personality;
1686
1687 switch (context->context) {
1688 case AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL:
1689 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1690 if (!ab)
1691 return;
1692 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1693 context->arch, context->major);
1694 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1695 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1696 if (context->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
1697 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1698 (context->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS ?
1699 "yes" : "no"),
1700 context->return_code);
1701 audit_log_format(ab,
1702 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1703 context->argv[0],
1704 context->argv[1],
1705 context->argv[2],
1706 context->argv[3],
1707 context->name_count);
1708 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1709 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1710 audit_log_end(ab);
1711 break;
1712 case AUDIT_CTX_URING:
1713 audit_log_uring(context);
1714 break;
1715 default:
1716 BUG();
1717 break;
1718 }
1719
1720 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1721
1722 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1723 if (!ab)
1724 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1725
1726 switch (aux->type) {
1727
1728 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1729 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1730
1731 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1732 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1733 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1734 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1735 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1736 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1737 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1738 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1739 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1740 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1741 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1742 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1743 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1744 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1745 axs->fcap.rootid));
1746 break; }
1747
1748 }
1749 audit_log_end(ab);
1750 }
1751
1752 if (context->type)
1753 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1754
1755 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1756 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1757 if (ab) {
1758 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1759 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1760 audit_log_end(ab);
1761 }
1762 }
1763
1764 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1765 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1766 if (ab) {
1767 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1768 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1769 context->sockaddr_len);
1770 audit_log_end(ab);
1771 }
1772 }
1773
1774 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1775 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1776
1777 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1778 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1779 axs->target_auid[i],
1780 axs->target_uid[i],
1781 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1782 axs->target_sid[i],
1783 axs->target_comm[i]))
1784 call_panic = 1;
1785 }
1786
1787 if (context->target_pid &&
1788 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1789 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1790 context->target_sessionid,
1791 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1792 call_panic = 1;
1793
1794 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1795 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1796 if (ab) {
1797 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1798 audit_log_end(ab);
1799 }
1800 }
1801
1802 i = 0;
1803 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1804 if (n->hidden)
1805 continue;
1806 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1807 }
1808
1809 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
1810 audit_log_proctitle();
1811
1812 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1813 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1814 if (ab)
1815 audit_log_end(ab);
1816 if (call_panic)
1817 audit_panic("error in audit_log_exit()");
1818}
1819
1820/**
1821 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1822 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1823 *
1824 * Called from copy_process, do_exit, and the io_uring code
1825 */
1826void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1827{
1828 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1829
1830 if (!context)
1831 return;
1832
1833 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
1834 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1835 audit_kill_trees(context);
1836
1837 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1838 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1839 * random task_struct that doesn't have any meaningful data we
1840 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1841 */
1842 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy) {
1843 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
1844 context->return_code = 0;
1845 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
1846 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
1847 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1848 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1849 audit_log_exit();
1850 } else if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_URING) {
1851 /* TODO: verify this case is real and valid */
1852 audit_filter_uring(tsk, context);
1853 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1854 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1855 audit_log_uring(context);
1856 }
1857 }
1858
1859 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1860 audit_free_context(context);
1861}
1862
1863/**
1864 * audit_return_fixup - fixup the return codes in the audit_context
1865 * @ctx: the audit_context
1866 * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
1867 * @code: operation return code
1868 *
1869 * We need to fixup the return code in the audit logs if the actual return
1870 * codes are later going to be fixed by the arch specific signal handlers.
1871 */
1872static void audit_return_fixup(struct audit_context *ctx,
1873 int success, long code)
1874{
1875 /*
1876 * This is actually a test for:
1877 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1878 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1879 *
1880 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1881 */
1882 if (unlikely(code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1883 (code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1884 (code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1885 ctx->return_code = -EINTR;
1886 else
1887 ctx->return_code = code;
1888 ctx->return_valid = (success ? AUDITSC_SUCCESS : AUDITSC_FAILURE);
1889}
1890
1891/**
1892 * __audit_uring_entry - prepare the kernel task's audit context for io_uring
1893 * @op: the io_uring opcode
1894 *
1895 * This is similar to audit_syscall_entry() but is intended for use by io_uring
1896 * operations. This function should only ever be called from
1897 * audit_uring_entry() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
1898 * function.
1899 */
1900void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
1901{
1902 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
1903
1904 if (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
1905 return;
1906
1907 /*
1908 * NOTE: It's possible that we can be called from the process' context
1909 * before it returns to userspace, and before audit_syscall_exit()
1910 * is called. In this case there is not much to do, just record
1911 * the io_uring details and return.
1912 */
1913 ctx->uring_op = op;
1914 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
1915 return;
1916
1917 ctx->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1918 if (!ctx->dummy && ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD)
1919 ctx->prio = 0;
1920
1921 ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
1922 ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
1923 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
1924}
1925
1926/**
1927 * __audit_uring_exit - wrap up the kernel task's audit context after io_uring
1928 * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
1929 * @code: operation return code
1930 *
1931 * This is similar to audit_syscall_exit() but is intended for use by io_uring
1932 * operations. This function should only ever be called from
1933 * audit_uring_exit() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
1934 * function.
1935 */
1936void __audit_uring_exit(int success, long code)
1937{
1938 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
1939
1940 if (ctx->dummy) {
1941 if (ctx->context != AUDIT_CTX_URING)
1942 return;
1943 goto out;
1944 }
1945
1946 audit_return_fixup(ctx, success, code);
1947 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
1948 /*
1949 * NOTE: See the note in __audit_uring_entry() about the case
1950 * where we may be called from process context before we
1951 * return to userspace via audit_syscall_exit(). In this
1952 * case we simply emit a URINGOP record and bail, the
1953 * normal syscall exit handling will take care of
1954 * everything else.
1955 * It is also worth mentioning that when we are called,
1956 * the current process creds may differ from the creds
1957 * used during the normal syscall processing; keep that
1958 * in mind if/when we move the record generation code.
1959 */
1960
1961 /*
1962 * We need to filter on the syscall info here to decide if we
1963 * should emit a URINGOP record. I know it seems odd but this
1964 * solves the problem where users have a filter to block *all*
1965 * syscall records in the "exit" filter; we want to preserve
1966 * the behavior here.
1967 */
1968 audit_filter_syscall(current, ctx);
1969 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1970 audit_filter_uring(current, ctx);
1971 audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
1972 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1973 return;
1974
1975 audit_log_uring(ctx);
1976 return;
1977 }
1978
1979 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
1980 if (!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees))
1981 audit_kill_trees(ctx);
1982
1983 /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */
1984 audit_filter_uring(current, ctx);
1985 audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
1986 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1987 goto out;
1988 audit_log_exit();
1989
1990out:
1991 audit_reset_context(ctx);
1992}
1993
1994/**
1995 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1996 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1997 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1998 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1999 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
2000 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
2001 *
2002 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
2003 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
2004 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
2005 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
2006 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
2007 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
2008 * be written).
2009 */
2010void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
2011 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
2012{
2013 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2014 enum audit_state state;
2015
2016 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
2017 return;
2018
2019 WARN_ON(context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED);
2020 WARN_ON(context->name_count);
2021 if (context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED || context->name_count) {
2022 audit_panic("unrecoverable error in audit_syscall_entry()");
2023 return;
2024 }
2025
2026 state = context->state;
2027 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
2028 return;
2029
2030 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
2031 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
2032 context->prio = 0;
2033 if (auditd_test_task(current))
2034 return;
2035 }
2036
2037 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
2038 context->major = major;
2039 context->argv[0] = a1;
2040 context->argv[1] = a2;
2041 context->argv[2] = a3;
2042 context->argv[3] = a4;
2043 context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
2044 context->current_state = state;
2045 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
2046}
2047
2048/**
2049 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
2050 * @success: success value of the syscall
2051 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
2052 *
2053 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
2054 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
2055 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
2056 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
2057 * free the names stored from getname().
2058 */
2059void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
2060{
2061 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2062
2063 if (!context || context->dummy ||
2064 context->context != AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
2065 goto out;
2066
2067 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
2068 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
2069 audit_kill_trees(context);
2070
2071 audit_return_fixup(context, success, return_code);
2072 /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */
2073 audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
2074 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
2075 if (context->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
2076 goto out;
2077
2078 audit_log_exit();
2079
2080out:
2081 audit_reset_context(context);
2082}
2083
2084static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
2085{
2086 struct audit_context *context;
2087 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
2088 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
2089 int count;
2090
2091 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
2092 return;
2093 context = audit_context();
2094 p = context->trees;
2095 count = context->tree_count;
2096 rcu_read_lock();
2097 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
2098 rcu_read_unlock();
2099 if (!chunk)
2100 return;
2101 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
2102 return;
2103 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
2104 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
2105 audit_set_auditable(context);
2106 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
2107 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2108 return;
2109 }
2110 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
2111}
2112
2113static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
2114{
2115 struct audit_context *context;
2116 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
2117 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
2118 struct audit_chunk *drop;
2119 unsigned long seq;
2120 int count;
2121
2122 context = audit_context();
2123 p = context->trees;
2124 count = context->tree_count;
2125retry:
2126 drop = NULL;
2127 d = dentry;
2128 rcu_read_lock();
2129 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
2130 for(;;) {
2131 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
2132
2133 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
2134 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
2135
2136 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
2137 if (chunk) {
2138 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
2139 drop = chunk;
2140 break;
2141 }
2142 }
2143 }
2144 parent = d->d_parent;
2145 if (parent == d)
2146 break;
2147 d = parent;
2148 }
2149 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
2150 rcu_read_unlock();
2151 if (!drop) {
2152 /* just a race with rename */
2153 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2154 goto retry;
2155 }
2156 audit_put_chunk(drop);
2157 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
2158 /* OK, got more space */
2159 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2160 goto retry;
2161 }
2162 /* too bad */
2163 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
2164 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2165 audit_set_auditable(context);
2166 return;
2167 }
2168 rcu_read_unlock();
2169}
2170
2171static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
2172 unsigned char type)
2173{
2174 struct audit_names *aname;
2175
2176 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
2177 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
2178 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
2179 } else {
2180 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
2181 if (!aname)
2182 return NULL;
2183 aname->should_free = true;
2184 }
2185
2186 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2187 aname->type = type;
2188 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
2189
2190 context->name_count++;
2191 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
2192 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
2193 return aname;
2194}
2195
2196/**
2197 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
2198 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
2199 *
2200 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
2201 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
2202 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
2203 */
2204struct filename *
2205__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
2206{
2207 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2208 struct audit_names *n;
2209
2210 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2211 if (!n->name)
2212 continue;
2213 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
2214 n->name->refcnt++;
2215 return n->name;
2216 }
2217 }
2218 return NULL;
2219}
2220
2221/**
2222 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
2223 * @name: name to add
2224 *
2225 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
2226 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
2227 */
2228void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
2229{
2230 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2231 struct audit_names *n;
2232
2233 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2234 return;
2235
2236 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2237 if (!n)
2238 return;
2239
2240 n->name = name;
2241 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2242 name->aname = n;
2243 name->refcnt++;
2244}
2245
2246static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
2247 const struct dentry *dentry)
2248{
2249 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
2250 int rc;
2251
2252 if (!dentry)
2253 return 0;
2254
2255 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps);
2256 if (rc)
2257 return rc;
2258
2259 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
2260 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
2261 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2262 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
2263 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
2264 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2265
2266 return 0;
2267}
2268
2269/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2270static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
2271 const struct dentry *dentry,
2272 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
2273{
2274 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
2275 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
2276 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
2277 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
2278 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
2279 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
2280 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
2281 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
2282 name->fcap_ver = -1;
2283 return;
2284 }
2285 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
2286}
2287
2288/**
2289 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2290 * @name: name being audited
2291 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2292 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
2293 */
2294void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
2295 unsigned int flags)
2296{
2297 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2298 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2299 struct audit_names *n;
2300 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
2301 struct audit_entry *e;
2302 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2303 int i;
2304
2305 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2306 return;
2307
2308 rcu_read_lock();
2309 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2310 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2311 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2312
2313 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2314 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
2315 f->op, f->val)
2316 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2317 rcu_read_unlock();
2318 return;
2319 }
2320 }
2321 }
2322 rcu_read_unlock();
2323
2324 if (!name)
2325 goto out_alloc;
2326
2327 /*
2328 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2329 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2330 */
2331 n = name->aname;
2332 if (n) {
2333 if (parent) {
2334 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2335 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2336 goto out;
2337 } else {
2338 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2339 goto out;
2340 }
2341 }
2342
2343 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2344 if (n->ino) {
2345 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2346 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
2347 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
2348 continue;
2349 } else if (n->name) {
2350 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2351 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2352 continue;
2353 } else
2354 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2355 continue;
2356
2357 /* match the correct record type */
2358 if (parent) {
2359 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2360 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2361 goto out;
2362 } else {
2363 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2364 goto out;
2365 }
2366 }
2367
2368out_alloc:
2369 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2370 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2371 if (!n)
2372 return;
2373 if (name) {
2374 n->name = name;
2375 name->refcnt++;
2376 }
2377
2378out:
2379 if (parent) {
2380 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2381 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2382 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2383 n->hidden = true;
2384 } else {
2385 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2386 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2387 }
2388 handle_path(dentry);
2389 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2390}
2391
2392void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2393{
2394 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2395}
2396
2397/**
2398 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2399 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2400 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2401 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2402 *
2403 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2404 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2405 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2406 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2407 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2408 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2409 * unsuccessful attempts.
2410 */
2411void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2412 const struct dentry *dentry,
2413 const unsigned char type)
2414{
2415 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2416 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2417 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2418 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2419 struct audit_entry *e;
2420 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2421 int i;
2422
2423 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2424 return;
2425
2426 rcu_read_lock();
2427 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2428 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2429 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2430
2431 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2432 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2433 f->op, f->val)
2434 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2435 rcu_read_unlock();
2436 return;
2437 }
2438 }
2439 }
2440 rcu_read_unlock();
2441
2442 if (inode)
2443 handle_one(inode);
2444
2445 /* look for a parent entry first */
2446 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2447 if (!n->name ||
2448 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2449 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2450 continue;
2451
2452 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2453 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2454 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2455 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2456 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2457 found_parent = n;
2458 break;
2459 }
2460 }
2461
2462 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2463 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2464 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2465 if (!n->name ||
2466 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2467 continue;
2468
2469 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2470 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2471 found_parent ?
2472 found_parent->name_len :
2473 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
2474 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2475 n->type = type;
2476 found_child = n;
2477 break;
2478 }
2479 }
2480
2481 if (!found_parent) {
2482 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2483 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2484 if (!n)
2485 return;
2486 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2487 }
2488
2489 if (!found_child) {
2490 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2491 if (!found_child)
2492 return;
2493
2494 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2495 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2496 * audit_free_names() */
2497 if (found_parent) {
2498 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2499 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2500 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2501 }
2502 }
2503
2504 if (inode)
2505 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2506 else
2507 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2508}
2509EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2510
2511/**
2512 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2513 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2514 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2515 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2516 *
2517 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2518 */
2519int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2520 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2521{
2522 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2523 return 0;
2524 if (!ctx->serial)
2525 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2526 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2527 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2528 *serial = ctx->serial;
2529 if (!ctx->prio) {
2530 ctx->prio = 1;
2531 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
2532 }
2533 return 1;
2534}
2535
2536/**
2537 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2538 * @oflag: open flag
2539 * @mode: mode bits
2540 * @attr: queue attributes
2541 *
2542 */
2543void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2544{
2545 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2546
2547 if (attr)
2548 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2549 else
2550 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2551
2552 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2553 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2554
2555 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2556}
2557
2558/**
2559 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2560 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2561 * @msg_len: Message length
2562 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2563 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2564 *
2565 */
2566void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2567 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2568{
2569 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2570 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2571
2572 if (abs_timeout)
2573 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2574 else
2575 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2576
2577 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2578 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2579 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2580
2581 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2582}
2583
2584/**
2585 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2586 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2587 * @notification: Notification event
2588 *
2589 */
2590
2591void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2592{
2593 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2594
2595 if (notification)
2596 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2597 else
2598 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2599
2600 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2601 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2602}
2603
2604/**
2605 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2606 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2607 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2608 *
2609 */
2610void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2611{
2612 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2613
2614 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2615 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2616 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2617}
2618
2619/**
2620 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2621 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2622 *
2623 */
2624void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2625{
2626 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2627
2628 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2629 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2630 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2631 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2632 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2633 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2634}
2635
2636/**
2637 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2638 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2639 * @uid: msgq user id
2640 * @gid: msgq group id
2641 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2642 *
2643 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2644 */
2645void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2646{
2647 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2648
2649 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2650 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2651 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2652 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2653 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2654}
2655
2656void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2657{
2658 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2659
2660 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2661 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2662}
2663
2664
2665/**
2666 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2667 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2668 * @args: args array
2669 *
2670 */
2671int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2672{
2673 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2674
2675 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2676 return -EINVAL;
2677 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2678 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2679 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2680 return 0;
2681}
2682
2683/**
2684 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2685 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2686 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2687 *
2688 */
2689void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2690{
2691 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2692
2693 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2694 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2695}
2696
2697/**
2698 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2699 * @len: data length in user space
2700 * @a: data address in kernel space
2701 *
2702 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2703 */
2704int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2705{
2706 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2707
2708 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2709 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2710
2711 if (!p)
2712 return -ENOMEM;
2713 context->sockaddr = p;
2714 }
2715
2716 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2717 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2718 return 0;
2719}
2720
2721void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2722{
2723 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2724
2725 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2726 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2727 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2728 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2729 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
2730 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2731}
2732
2733/**
2734 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2735 * @t: task being signaled
2736 *
2737 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2738 * and uid that is doing that.
2739 */
2740int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2741{
2742 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2743 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2744 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2745
2746 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2747 return 0;
2748
2749 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2750 * in audit_context */
2751 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2752 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2753 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2754 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2755 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2756 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2757 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2758 return 0;
2759 }
2760
2761 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2762 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2763 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2764 if (!axp)
2765 return -ENOMEM;
2766
2767 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2768 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2769 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2770 }
2771 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2772
2773 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2774 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2775 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2776 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2777 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2778 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2779 axp->pid_count++;
2780
2781 return 0;
2782}
2783
2784/**
2785 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2786 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2787 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2788 * @old: the old credentials
2789 *
2790 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2791 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2792 *
2793 * -Eric
2794 */
2795int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2796 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2797{
2798 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2799 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2800 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2801
2802 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2803 if (!ax)
2804 return -ENOMEM;
2805
2806 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2807 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2808 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2809
2810 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns,
2811 bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2812
2813 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2814 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2815 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2816 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2817 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2818
2819 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2820 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2821 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2822 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2823
2824 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2825 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2826 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2827 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2828 return 0;
2829}
2830
2831/**
2832 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2833 * @new: the new credentials
2834 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2835 *
2836 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2837 * audit system if applicable
2838 */
2839void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2840{
2841 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2842
2843 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2844 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2845 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2846 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2847 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2848 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2849}
2850
2851void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2852{
2853 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2854
2855 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2856 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2857 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2858}
2859
2860void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how)
2861{
2862 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2863
2864 context->openat2.flags = how->flags;
2865 context->openat2.mode = how->mode;
2866 context->openat2.resolve = how->resolve;
2867 context->type = AUDIT_OPENAT2;
2868}
2869
2870void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2871{
2872 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2873
2874 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2875 if (!context->module.name)
2876 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2877 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2878}
2879
2880void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2881{
2882 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2883 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2884}
2885
2886void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2887{
2888 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2889
2890 /* only set type if not already set by NTP */
2891 if (!context->type)
2892 context->type = AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET;
2893 memcpy(&context->time.tk_injoffset, &offset, sizeof(offset));
2894}
2895
2896void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2897{
2898 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2899 int type;
2900
2901 for (type = 0; type < AUDIT_NTP_NVALS; type++)
2902 if (ad->vals[type].newval != ad->vals[type].oldval) {
2903 /* unconditionally set type, overwriting TK */
2904 context->type = AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL;
2905 memcpy(&context->time.ntp_data, ad, sizeof(*ad));
2906 break;
2907 }
2908}
2909
2910void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
2911 enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp)
2912{
2913 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2914 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2915
2916 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
2917 if (!ab)
2918 return;
2919 audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
2920 name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
2921
2922 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current));
2923 audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
2924 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
2925 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2926 audit_log_end(ab);
2927}
2928EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
2929
2930static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2931{
2932 kuid_t auid, uid;
2933 kgid_t gid;
2934 unsigned int sessionid;
2935 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2936
2937 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2938 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2939 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2940
2941 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2942 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2943 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2944 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2945 sessionid);
2946 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2947 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2948 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2949 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2950}
2951
2952/**
2953 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2954 * @signr: signal value
2955 *
2956 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2957 * should record the event for investigation.
2958 */
2959void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2960{
2961 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2962
2963 if (!audit_enabled)
2964 return;
2965
2966 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2967 return;
2968
2969 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2970 if (unlikely(!ab))
2971 return;
2972 audit_log_task(ab);
2973 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2974 audit_log_end(ab);
2975}
2976
2977/**
2978 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2979 * @syscall: syscall number
2980 * @signr: signal value
2981 * @code: the seccomp action
2982 *
2983 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2984 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2985 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2986 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2987 * audit is not in use.
2988 */
2989void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2990{
2991 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2992
2993 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2994 if (unlikely(!ab))
2995 return;
2996 audit_log_task(ab);
2997 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2998 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2999 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
3000 audit_log_end(ab);
3001}
3002
3003void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
3004 int res)
3005{
3006 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3007
3008 if (!audit_enabled)
3009 return;
3010
3011 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
3012 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
3013 if (unlikely(!ab))
3014 return;
3015
3016 audit_log_format(ab,
3017 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
3018 names, old_names, res);
3019 audit_log_end(ab);
3020}
3021
3022struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
3023{
3024 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
3025 if (likely(!ctx || ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED))
3026 return NULL;
3027 return &ctx->killed_trees;
3028}