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1/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
46
47#include <linux/init.h>
48#include <asm/types.h>
49#include <linux/atomic.h>
50#include <linux/fs.h>
51#include <linux/namei.h>
52#include <linux/mm.h>
53#include <linux/export.h>
54#include <linux/slab.h>
55#include <linux/mount.h>
56#include <linux/socket.h>
57#include <linux/mqueue.h>
58#include <linux/audit.h>
59#include <linux/personality.h>
60#include <linux/time.h>
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/compiler.h>
63#include <asm/unistd.h>
64#include <linux/security.h>
65#include <linux/list.h>
66#include <linux/binfmts.h>
67#include <linux/highmem.h>
68#include <linux/syscalls.h>
69#include <asm/syscall.h>
70#include <linux/capability.h>
71#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72#include <linux/compat.h>
73#include <linux/ctype.h>
74#include <linux/string.h>
75#include <linux/uaccess.h>
76#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
78
79#include "audit.h"
80
81/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
82#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
83#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
84#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
85
86/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
87 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
88#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
89
90/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
91#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
92
93/* number of audit rules */
94int audit_n_rules;
95
96/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
97int audit_signals;
98
99struct audit_aux_data {
100 struct audit_aux_data *next;
101 int type;
102};
103
104#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
105
106/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
107#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
108
109struct audit_aux_data_pids {
110 struct audit_aux_data d;
111 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
116 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
117 int pid_count;
118};
119
120struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
121 struct audit_aux_data d;
122 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
123 unsigned int fcap_ver;
124 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
125 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
126};
127
128struct audit_tree_refs {
129 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
130 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
131};
132
133static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
134{
135 unsigned n;
136 if (unlikely(!ctx))
137 return 0;
138 n = ctx->major;
139
140 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
141 case 0: /* native */
142 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
143 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
144 return 1;
145 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
147 return 1;
148 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
149 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
150 return 1;
151 return 0;
152 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
153 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
154 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
155 return 1;
156 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
158 return 1;
159 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
160 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
161 return 1;
162 return 0;
163 case 2: /* open */
164 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
165 case 3: /* openat */
166 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
167 case 4: /* socketcall */
168 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
169 case 5: /* execve */
170 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
171 default:
172 return 0;
173 }
174}
175
176static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
177{
178 struct audit_names *n;
179 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
180
181 if (unlikely(!ctx))
182 return 0;
183
184 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
185 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
186 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
187 return 1;
188 }
189
190 return 0;
191}
192
193/*
194 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
195 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
196 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
197 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
198 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
199 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
200 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
201 */
202
203static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
204{
205 if (!ctx->prio) {
206 ctx->prio = 1;
207 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
208 }
209}
210
211static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
212{
213 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
214 int left = ctx->tree_count;
215 if (likely(left)) {
216 p->c[--left] = chunk;
217 ctx->tree_count = left;
218 return 1;
219 }
220 if (!p)
221 return 0;
222 p = p->next;
223 if (p) {
224 p->c[30] = chunk;
225 ctx->trees = p;
226 ctx->tree_count = 30;
227 return 1;
228 }
229 return 0;
230}
231
232static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
233{
234 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
235 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
236 if (!ctx->trees) {
237 ctx->trees = p;
238 return 0;
239 }
240 if (p)
241 p->next = ctx->trees;
242 else
243 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
244 ctx->tree_count = 31;
245 return 1;
246}
247
248static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
249 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
250{
251 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
252 int n;
253 if (!p) {
254 /* we started with empty chain */
255 p = ctx->first_trees;
256 count = 31;
257 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
258 if (!p)
259 return;
260 }
261 n = count;
262 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
263 while (n--) {
264 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
265 q->c[n] = NULL;
266 }
267 }
268 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
269 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
270 q->c[n] = NULL;
271 }
272 ctx->trees = p;
273 ctx->tree_count = count;
274}
275
276static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
277{
278 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
279 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
280 q = p->next;
281 kfree(p);
282 }
283}
284
285static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
286{
287 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
288 int n;
289 if (!tree)
290 return 0;
291 /* full ones */
292 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
293 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
294 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
295 return 1;
296 }
297 /* partial */
298 if (p) {
299 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
300 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
301 return 1;
302 }
303 return 0;
304}
305
306static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
307 struct audit_names *name,
308 struct audit_field *f,
309 struct audit_context *ctx)
310{
311 struct audit_names *n;
312 int rc;
313
314 if (name) {
315 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
316 if (rc)
317 return rc;
318 }
319
320 if (ctx) {
321 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
322 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
323 if (rc)
324 return rc;
325 }
326 }
327 return 0;
328}
329
330static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
331 struct audit_names *name,
332 struct audit_field *f,
333 struct audit_context *ctx)
334{
335 struct audit_names *n;
336 int rc;
337
338 if (name) {
339 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
340 if (rc)
341 return rc;
342 }
343
344 if (ctx) {
345 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
346 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
347 if (rc)
348 return rc;
349 }
350 }
351 return 0;
352}
353
354static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
355 const struct cred *cred,
356 struct audit_field *f,
357 struct audit_context *ctx,
358 struct audit_names *name)
359{
360 switch (f->val) {
361 /* process to file object comparisons */
362 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
363 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
364 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
365 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
366 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
367 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
368 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
369 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
370 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
371 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
373 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
375 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
377 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
379 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
380 /* uid comparisons */
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
382 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
383 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
385 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
390 /* auid comparisons */
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
392 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
393 cred->euid);
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
395 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
396 cred->suid);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
399 cred->fsuid);
400 /* euid comparisons */
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* suid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
408 /* gid comparisons */
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
410 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
412 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
414 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
415 /* egid comparisons */
416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
420 /* sgid comparison */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
423 default:
424 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
425 return 0;
426 }
427 return 0;
428}
429
430/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
431/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
432 * otherwise.
433 *
434 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
435 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
436 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
437 */
438static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
439 struct audit_krule *rule,
440 struct audit_context *ctx,
441 struct audit_names *name,
442 enum audit_state *state,
443 bool task_creation)
444{
445 const struct cred *cred;
446 int i, need_sid = 1;
447 u32 sid;
448 unsigned int sessionid;
449
450 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
451
452 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
453 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
454 struct audit_names *n;
455 int result = 0;
456 pid_t pid;
457
458 switch (f->type) {
459 case AUDIT_PID:
460 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
461 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
462 break;
463 case AUDIT_PPID:
464 if (ctx) {
465 if (!ctx->ppid)
466 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
467 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
468 }
469 break;
470 case AUDIT_EXE:
471 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
472 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
473 result = !result;
474 break;
475 case AUDIT_UID:
476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
477 break;
478 case AUDIT_EUID:
479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
480 break;
481 case AUDIT_SUID:
482 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
483 break;
484 case AUDIT_FSUID:
485 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
486 break;
487 case AUDIT_GID:
488 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
489 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
490 if (!result)
491 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
492 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
493 if (result)
494 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
495 }
496 break;
497 case AUDIT_EGID:
498 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
499 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
500 if (!result)
501 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
502 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
503 if (result)
504 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
505 }
506 break;
507 case AUDIT_SGID:
508 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
509 break;
510 case AUDIT_FSGID:
511 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
512 break;
513 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
514 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
515 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
516 break;
517 case AUDIT_PERS:
518 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
519 break;
520 case AUDIT_ARCH:
521 if (ctx)
522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
523 break;
524
525 case AUDIT_EXIT:
526 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
527 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
528 break;
529 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
530 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
531 if (f->val)
532 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
533 else
534 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
535 }
536 break;
537 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
538 if (name) {
539 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
540 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
541 ++result;
542 } else if (ctx) {
543 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
544 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
545 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
546 ++result;
547 break;
548 }
549 }
550 }
551 break;
552 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
553 if (name) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
555 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
556 ++result;
557 } else if (ctx) {
558 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
559 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
560 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
561 ++result;
562 break;
563 }
564 }
565 }
566 break;
567 case AUDIT_INODE:
568 if (name)
569 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
570 else if (ctx) {
571 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
572 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
573 ++result;
574 break;
575 }
576 }
577 }
578 break;
579 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
580 if (name) {
581 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
582 } else if (ctx) {
583 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
584 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
585 ++result;
586 break;
587 }
588 }
589 }
590 break;
591 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
592 if (name) {
593 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
594 } else if (ctx) {
595 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
596 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
597 ++result;
598 break;
599 }
600 }
601 }
602 break;
603 case AUDIT_WATCH:
604 if (name) {
605 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
606 name->ino,
607 name->dev);
608 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
609 result = !result;
610 }
611 break;
612 case AUDIT_DIR:
613 if (ctx) {
614 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
615 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
616 result = !result;
617 }
618 break;
619 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
620 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
621 f->op, f->uid);
622 break;
623 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
624 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
625 break;
626 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
627 if (ctx->sockaddr)
628 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
629 f->op, f->val);
630 break;
631 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
632 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
633 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
634 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
635 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
636 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
637 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
638 match for now to avoid losing information that
639 may be wanted. An error message will also be
640 logged upon error */
641 if (f->lsm_rule) {
642 if (need_sid) {
643 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
644 need_sid = 0;
645 }
646 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
647 f->op,
648 f->lsm_rule);
649 }
650 break;
651 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
652 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
653 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
654 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
655 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
656 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
657 also applies here */
658 if (f->lsm_rule) {
659 /* Find files that match */
660 if (name) {
661 result = security_audit_rule_match(
662 name->osid,
663 f->type,
664 f->op,
665 f->lsm_rule);
666 } else if (ctx) {
667 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
668 if (security_audit_rule_match(
669 n->osid,
670 f->type,
671 f->op,
672 f->lsm_rule)) {
673 ++result;
674 break;
675 }
676 }
677 }
678 /* Find ipc objects that match */
679 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
680 break;
681 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
682 f->type, f->op,
683 f->lsm_rule))
684 ++result;
685 }
686 break;
687 case AUDIT_ARG0:
688 case AUDIT_ARG1:
689 case AUDIT_ARG2:
690 case AUDIT_ARG3:
691 if (ctx)
692 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
693 break;
694 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
695 /* ignore this field for filtering */
696 result = 1;
697 break;
698 case AUDIT_PERM:
699 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
700 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
701 result = !result;
702 break;
703 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
704 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
705 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
706 result = !result;
707 break;
708 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
709 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
710 break;
711 }
712 if (!result)
713 return 0;
714 }
715
716 if (ctx) {
717 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
718 return 0;
719 if (rule->filterkey) {
720 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
721 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
722 }
723 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
724 }
725 switch (rule->action) {
726 case AUDIT_NEVER:
727 *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
728 break;
729 case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
730 *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
731 break;
732 }
733 return 1;
734}
735
736/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
737 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
738 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
739 */
740static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
741{
742 struct audit_entry *e;
743 enum audit_state state;
744
745 rcu_read_lock();
746 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
747 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
748 &state, true)) {
749 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
750 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
751 rcu_read_unlock();
752 return state;
753 }
754 }
755 rcu_read_unlock();
756 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
757}
758
759static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
760{
761 int word, bit;
762
763 if (val > 0xffffffff)
764 return false;
765
766 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
767 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
768 return false;
769
770 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
771
772 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
773}
774
775/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
776 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
777 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
778 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
779 */
780static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
781 struct audit_context *ctx,
782 struct list_head *list)
783{
784 struct audit_entry *e;
785 enum audit_state state;
786
787 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
788 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
789
790 rcu_read_lock();
791 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
792 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
793 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
794 &state, false)) {
795 rcu_read_unlock();
796 ctx->current_state = state;
797 return state;
798 }
799 }
800 rcu_read_unlock();
801 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
802}
803
804/*
805 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
806 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
807 */
808static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
809 struct audit_names *n,
810 struct audit_context *ctx) {
811 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
812 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
813 struct audit_entry *e;
814 enum audit_state state;
815
816 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
817 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
818 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
819 ctx->current_state = state;
820 return 1;
821 }
822 }
823 return 0;
824}
825
826/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
827 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
828 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
829 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
830 */
831void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
832{
833 struct audit_names *n;
834
835 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
836 return;
837
838 rcu_read_lock();
839
840 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
841 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
842 break;
843 }
844 rcu_read_unlock();
845}
846
847static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
848{
849 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
850 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
851 context->proctitle.len = 0;
852}
853
854static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
855{
856 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
857 kfree(context->module.name);
858 context->module.name = NULL;
859 }
860}
861static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
862{
863 struct audit_names *n, *next;
864
865 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
866 list_del(&n->list);
867 if (n->name)
868 putname(n->name);
869 if (n->should_free)
870 kfree(n);
871 }
872 context->name_count = 0;
873 path_put(&context->pwd);
874 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
875 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
876}
877
878static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
879{
880 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
881
882 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
883 context->aux = aux->next;
884 kfree(aux);
885 }
886 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
887 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
888 kfree(aux);
889 }
890}
891
892static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
893{
894 struct audit_context *context;
895
896 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
897 if (!context)
898 return NULL;
899 context->state = state;
900 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
901 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
902 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
903 return context;
904}
905
906/**
907 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
908 * @tsk: task
909 *
910 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
911 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
912 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
913 * needed.
914 */
915int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
916{
917 struct audit_context *context;
918 enum audit_state state;
919 char *key = NULL;
920
921 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
922 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
923
924 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
925 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
926 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
927 return 0;
928 }
929
930 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
931 kfree(key);
932 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
933 return -ENOMEM;
934 }
935 context->filterkey = key;
936
937 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
938 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
939 return 0;
940}
941
942static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
943{
944 audit_free_module(context);
945 audit_free_names(context);
946 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
947 free_tree_refs(context);
948 audit_free_aux(context);
949 kfree(context->filterkey);
950 kfree(context->sockaddr);
951 audit_proctitle_free(context);
952 kfree(context);
953}
954
955static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
956 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
957 u32 sid, char *comm)
958{
959 struct audit_buffer *ab;
960 char *ctx = NULL;
961 u32 len;
962 int rc = 0;
963
964 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
965 if (!ab)
966 return rc;
967
968 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
969 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
970 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
971 if (sid) {
972 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
973 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
974 rc = 1;
975 } else {
976 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
977 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
978 }
979 }
980 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
981 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
982 audit_log_end(ab);
983
984 return rc;
985}
986
987static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
988 struct audit_buffer **ab)
989{
990 long len_max;
991 long len_rem;
992 long len_full;
993 long len_buf;
994 long len_abuf = 0;
995 long len_tmp;
996 bool require_data;
997 bool encode;
998 unsigned int iter;
999 unsigned int arg;
1000 char *buf_head;
1001 char *buf;
1002 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1003
1004 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1005 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1006 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1007 char abuf[96];
1008
1009 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1010 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1011 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1012 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1013 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1014 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1015
1016 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1017 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1018 if (!buf_head) {
1019 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1020 return;
1021 }
1022 buf = buf_head;
1023
1024 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1025
1026 len_rem = len_max;
1027 len_buf = 0;
1028 len_full = 0;
1029 require_data = true;
1030 encode = false;
1031 iter = 0;
1032 arg = 0;
1033 do {
1034 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1035 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1036 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1037 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1038 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1039 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1040 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1041 if (len_full == 0)
1042 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1043
1044 /* read more data from userspace */
1045 if (require_data) {
1046 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1047 if (buf != buf_head) {
1048 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1049 buf = buf_head;
1050 }
1051
1052 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1053 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1054 len_max - len_buf);
1055 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1056 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1057 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1058 goto out;
1059 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1060 /* buffer is not large enough */
1061 require_data = true;
1062 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1063 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1064 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1065 * consistent record encoding */
1066 encode = true;
1067 len_full = len_full * 2;
1068 p += len_tmp;
1069 } else {
1070 require_data = false;
1071 if (!encode)
1072 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1073 buf, len_tmp);
1074 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1075 if (len_full < len_max)
1076 len_full = (encode ?
1077 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1078 p += len_tmp + 1;
1079 }
1080 len_buf += len_tmp;
1081 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1082
1083 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1084 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1085 }
1086
1087 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1088 if (len_buf >= 0) {
1089 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1090 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1091 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1092 * a new buffer */
1093 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1094 len_rem = len_max;
1095 audit_log_end(*ab);
1096 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1097 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1098 if (!*ab)
1099 goto out;
1100 }
1101
1102 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1103 len_tmp = 0;
1104 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1105 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1106 if (iter == 0) {
1107 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1108 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1109 " a%d_len=%lu",
1110 arg, len_full);
1111 }
1112 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1113 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1114 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1115 } else
1116 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1117 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1118 " a%d=", arg);
1119 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1120 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1121
1122 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1123 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1124 len_rem -= len_tmp;
1125 len_tmp = len_buf;
1126 if (encode) {
1127 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1128 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1129 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1130 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1131 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1132 } else {
1133 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1134 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1135 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1136 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1137 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1138 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1139 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1140 }
1141 len_buf -= len_tmp;
1142 buf += len_tmp;
1143 }
1144
1145 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1146 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1147 arg++;
1148 iter = 0;
1149 len_full = 0;
1150 require_data = true;
1151 encode = false;
1152 }
1153 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1154
1155 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1156
1157out:
1158 kfree(buf_head);
1159}
1160
1161static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1162 kernel_cap_t *cap)
1163{
1164 int i;
1165
1166 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1167 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1168 return;
1169 }
1170 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1171 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
1172 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1173}
1174
1175static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1176{
1177 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1178 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1179 return;
1180 }
1181 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1182 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1183 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1184 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1185 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1186}
1187
1188static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1189{
1190 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1191 int i;
1192
1193 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1194 if (!ab)
1195 return;
1196
1197 switch (context->type) {
1198 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1199 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1200 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1201 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1202 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1203 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1204 break; }
1205 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1206 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1207
1208 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1209 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1210 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1211 context->ipc.mode);
1212 if (osid) {
1213 char *ctx = NULL;
1214 u32 len;
1215 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1216 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1217 *call_panic = 1;
1218 } else {
1219 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1220 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1221 }
1222 }
1223 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1224 audit_log_end(ab);
1225 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1226 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1227 if (unlikely(!ab))
1228 return;
1229 audit_log_format(ab,
1230 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1231 context->ipc.qbytes,
1232 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1233 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1234 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1235 }
1236 break; }
1237 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1238 audit_log_format(ab,
1239 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1240 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1241 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1242 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1243 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1244 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1245 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1246 break;
1247 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1248 audit_log_format(ab,
1249 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1250 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1251 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1252 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1253 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1254 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1255 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1256 break;
1257 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1258 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1259 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1260 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1261 break;
1262 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1263 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1264 audit_log_format(ab,
1265 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1266 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1267 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1268 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1269 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1270 break; }
1271 case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1272 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1273 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1274 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1275 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1276 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1277 break;
1278 case AUDIT_MMAP:
1279 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1280 context->mmap.flags);
1281 break;
1282 case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1283 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1284 break;
1285 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1286 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1287 if (context->module.name) {
1288 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1289 } else
1290 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1291
1292 break;
1293 }
1294 audit_log_end(ab);
1295}
1296
1297static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1298{
1299 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1300 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1301 end--;
1302
1303 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1304 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1305 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1306 return len;
1307}
1308
1309/*
1310 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1311 * @context: audit_context for the task
1312 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1313 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1314 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1315 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1316 */
1317static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1318 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1319{
1320 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1321
1322 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1323 if (!ab)
1324 return;
1325
1326 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1327
1328 if (path)
1329 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1330 else if (n->name) {
1331 switch (n->name_len) {
1332 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1333 /* log the full path */
1334 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1335 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1336 break;
1337 case 0:
1338 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1339 * directory component is the cwd
1340 */
1341 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1342 break;
1343 default:
1344 /* log the name's directory component */
1345 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1346 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1347 n->name_len);
1348 }
1349 } else
1350 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1351
1352 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1353 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1354 n->ino,
1355 MAJOR(n->dev),
1356 MINOR(n->dev),
1357 n->mode,
1358 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1359 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1360 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1361 MINOR(n->rdev));
1362 if (n->osid != 0) {
1363 char *ctx = NULL;
1364 u32 len;
1365
1366 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1367 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1368 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1369 if (call_panic)
1370 *call_panic = 2;
1371 } else {
1372 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1373 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1374 }
1375 }
1376
1377 /* log the audit_names record type */
1378 switch (n->type) {
1379 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1380 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1381 break;
1382 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1383 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1384 break;
1385 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1386 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1387 break;
1388 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1389 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1390 break;
1391 default:
1392 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1393 break;
1394 }
1395
1396 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1397 audit_log_end(ab);
1398}
1399
1400static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1401{
1402 int res;
1403 char *buf;
1404 char *msg = "(null)";
1405 int len = strlen(msg);
1406 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1407 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1408
1409 if (!context || context->dummy)
1410 return;
1411
1412 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1413 if (!ab)
1414 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1415
1416 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1417
1418 /* Not cached */
1419 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1420 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1421 if (!buf)
1422 goto out;
1423 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1424 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1425 if (res == 0) {
1426 kfree(buf);
1427 goto out;
1428 }
1429 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1430 if (res == 0) {
1431 kfree(buf);
1432 goto out;
1433 }
1434 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1435 context->proctitle.len = res;
1436 }
1437 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1438 len = context->proctitle.len;
1439out:
1440 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1441 audit_log_end(ab);
1442}
1443
1444static void audit_log_exit(void)
1445{
1446 int i, call_panic = 0;
1447 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1448 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1449 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1450 struct audit_names *n;
1451
1452 context->personality = current->personality;
1453
1454 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1455 if (!ab)
1456 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1457 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1458 context->arch, context->major);
1459 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1460 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1461 if (context->return_valid)
1462 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1463 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1464 context->return_code);
1465
1466 audit_log_format(ab,
1467 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1468 context->argv[0],
1469 context->argv[1],
1470 context->argv[2],
1471 context->argv[3],
1472 context->name_count);
1473
1474 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1475 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1476 audit_log_end(ab);
1477
1478 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1479
1480 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1481 if (!ab)
1482 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1483
1484 switch (aux->type) {
1485
1486 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1487 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1488 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1489 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1490 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1491 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1492 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1493 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1494 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1495 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1496 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1497 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1498 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1499 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1500 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1501 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1502 axs->fcap.rootid));
1503 break; }
1504
1505 }
1506 audit_log_end(ab);
1507 }
1508
1509 if (context->type)
1510 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1511
1512 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1513 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1514 if (ab) {
1515 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1516 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1517 audit_log_end(ab);
1518 }
1519 }
1520
1521 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1522 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1523 if (ab) {
1524 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1525 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1526 context->sockaddr_len);
1527 audit_log_end(ab);
1528 }
1529 }
1530
1531 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1532 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1533
1534 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1535 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1536 axs->target_auid[i],
1537 axs->target_uid[i],
1538 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1539 axs->target_sid[i],
1540 axs->target_comm[i]))
1541 call_panic = 1;
1542 }
1543
1544 if (context->target_pid &&
1545 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1546 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1547 context->target_sessionid,
1548 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1549 call_panic = 1;
1550
1551 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1552 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1553 if (ab) {
1554 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1555 audit_log_end(ab);
1556 }
1557 }
1558
1559 i = 0;
1560 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1561 if (n->hidden)
1562 continue;
1563 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1564 }
1565
1566 audit_log_proctitle();
1567
1568 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1569 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1570 if (ab)
1571 audit_log_end(ab);
1572 if (call_panic)
1573 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1574}
1575
1576/**
1577 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1578 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1579 *
1580 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1581 */
1582void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1583{
1584 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1585
1586 if (!context)
1587 return;
1588
1589 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1590 audit_kill_trees(context);
1591
1592 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1593 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1594 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1595 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1596 */
1597 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1598 context->return_valid = 0;
1599 context->return_code = 0;
1600
1601 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
1602 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1603 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1604 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1605 audit_log_exit();
1606 }
1607
1608 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1609 audit_free_context(context);
1610}
1611
1612/**
1613 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1614 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1615 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1616 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1617 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1618 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1619 *
1620 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1621 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1622 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1623 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1624 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1625 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1626 * be written).
1627 */
1628void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1629 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1630{
1631 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1632 enum audit_state state;
1633
1634 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1635 return;
1636
1637 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1638
1639 state = context->state;
1640 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1641 return;
1642
1643 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1644 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1645 context->prio = 0;
1646 if (auditd_test_task(current))
1647 return;
1648 }
1649
1650 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
1651 context->major = major;
1652 context->argv[0] = a1;
1653 context->argv[1] = a2;
1654 context->argv[2] = a3;
1655 context->argv[3] = a4;
1656 context->serial = 0;
1657 context->in_syscall = 1;
1658 context->current_state = state;
1659 context->ppid = 0;
1660 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
1661}
1662
1663/**
1664 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1665 * @success: success value of the syscall
1666 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1667 *
1668 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1669 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1670 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1671 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1672 * free the names stored from getname().
1673 */
1674void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1675{
1676 struct audit_context *context;
1677
1678 context = audit_context();
1679 if (!context)
1680 return;
1681
1682 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1683 audit_kill_trees(context);
1684
1685 if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1686 if (success)
1687 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1688 else
1689 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1690
1691 /*
1692 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1693 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1694 * arch specific signal handlers
1695 *
1696 * This is actually a test for:
1697 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1698 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1699 *
1700 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1701 */
1702 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1703 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1704 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1705 context->return_code = -EINTR;
1706 else
1707 context->return_code = return_code;
1708
1709 audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
1710 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1711 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
1712 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1713 audit_log_exit();
1714 }
1715
1716 context->in_syscall = 0;
1717 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1718
1719 audit_free_module(context);
1720 audit_free_names(context);
1721 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1722 audit_free_aux(context);
1723 context->aux = NULL;
1724 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1725 context->target_pid = 0;
1726 context->target_sid = 0;
1727 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1728 context->type = 0;
1729 context->fds[0] = -1;
1730 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1731 kfree(context->filterkey);
1732 context->filterkey = NULL;
1733 }
1734}
1735
1736static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1737{
1738 struct audit_context *context;
1739 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1740 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1741 int count;
1742 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
1743 return;
1744 context = audit_context();
1745 p = context->trees;
1746 count = context->tree_count;
1747 rcu_read_lock();
1748 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1749 rcu_read_unlock();
1750 if (!chunk)
1751 return;
1752 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1753 return;
1754 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1755 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1756 audit_set_auditable(context);
1757 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1758 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1759 return;
1760 }
1761 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1762}
1763
1764static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1765{
1766 struct audit_context *context;
1767 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1768 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1769 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1770 unsigned long seq;
1771 int count;
1772
1773 context = audit_context();
1774 p = context->trees;
1775 count = context->tree_count;
1776retry:
1777 drop = NULL;
1778 d = dentry;
1779 rcu_read_lock();
1780 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1781 for(;;) {
1782 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1783 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
1784 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1785 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1786 if (chunk) {
1787 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1788 drop = chunk;
1789 break;
1790 }
1791 }
1792 }
1793 parent = d->d_parent;
1794 if (parent == d)
1795 break;
1796 d = parent;
1797 }
1798 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1799 rcu_read_unlock();
1800 if (!drop) {
1801 /* just a race with rename */
1802 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1803 goto retry;
1804 }
1805 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1806 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1807 /* OK, got more space */
1808 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1809 goto retry;
1810 }
1811 /* too bad */
1812 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1813 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1814 audit_set_auditable(context);
1815 return;
1816 }
1817 rcu_read_unlock();
1818}
1819
1820static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1821 unsigned char type)
1822{
1823 struct audit_names *aname;
1824
1825 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1826 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1827 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1828 } else {
1829 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1830 if (!aname)
1831 return NULL;
1832 aname->should_free = true;
1833 }
1834
1835 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1836 aname->type = type;
1837 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1838
1839 context->name_count++;
1840 return aname;
1841}
1842
1843/**
1844 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1845 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1846 *
1847 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1848 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1849 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1850 */
1851struct filename *
1852__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1853{
1854 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1855 struct audit_names *n;
1856
1857 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1858 if (!n->name)
1859 continue;
1860 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1861 n->name->refcnt++;
1862 return n->name;
1863 }
1864 }
1865 return NULL;
1866}
1867
1868/**
1869 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1870 * @name: name to add
1871 *
1872 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1873 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1874 */
1875void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1876{
1877 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1878 struct audit_names *n;
1879
1880 if (!context->in_syscall)
1881 return;
1882
1883 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1884 if (!n)
1885 return;
1886
1887 n->name = name;
1888 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1889 name->aname = n;
1890 name->refcnt++;
1891
1892 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1893 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1894}
1895
1896static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
1897 const struct dentry *dentry)
1898{
1899 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1900 int rc;
1901
1902 if (!dentry)
1903 return 0;
1904
1905 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1906 if (rc)
1907 return rc;
1908
1909 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1910 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1911 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1912 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
1913 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
1914 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1915
1916 return 0;
1917}
1918
1919/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1920static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
1921 const struct dentry *dentry,
1922 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
1923{
1924 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1925 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1926 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1927 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1928 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1929 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1930 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1931 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
1932 name->fcap_ver = -1;
1933 return;
1934 }
1935 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1936}
1937
1938/**
1939 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1940 * @name: name being audited
1941 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1942 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1943 */
1944void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1945 unsigned int flags)
1946{
1947 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1948 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1949 struct audit_names *n;
1950 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1951 struct audit_entry *e;
1952 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
1953 int i;
1954
1955 if (!context->in_syscall)
1956 return;
1957
1958 rcu_read_lock();
1959 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
1960 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1961 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1962
1963 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
1964 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
1965 f->op, f->val)
1966 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
1967 rcu_read_unlock();
1968 return;
1969 }
1970 }
1971 }
1972 rcu_read_unlock();
1973
1974 if (!name)
1975 goto out_alloc;
1976
1977 /*
1978 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1979 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1980 */
1981 n = name->aname;
1982 if (n) {
1983 if (parent) {
1984 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1985 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1986 goto out;
1987 } else {
1988 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1989 goto out;
1990 }
1991 }
1992
1993 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1994 if (n->ino) {
1995 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1996 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
1997 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
1998 continue;
1999 } else if (n->name) {
2000 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2001 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2002 continue;
2003 } else
2004 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2005 continue;
2006
2007 /* match the correct record type */
2008 if (parent) {
2009 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2010 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2011 goto out;
2012 } else {
2013 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2014 goto out;
2015 }
2016 }
2017
2018out_alloc:
2019 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2020 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2021 if (!n)
2022 return;
2023 if (name) {
2024 n->name = name;
2025 name->refcnt++;
2026 }
2027
2028out:
2029 if (parent) {
2030 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2031 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2032 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2033 n->hidden = true;
2034 } else {
2035 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2036 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2037 }
2038 handle_path(dentry);
2039 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2040}
2041
2042void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2043{
2044 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2045}
2046
2047/**
2048 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2049 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2050 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2051 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2052 *
2053 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2054 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2055 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2056 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2057 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2058 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2059 * unsuccessful attempts.
2060 */
2061void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2062 const struct dentry *dentry,
2063 const unsigned char type)
2064{
2065 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2066 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2067 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2068 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2069 struct audit_entry *e;
2070 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2071 int i;
2072
2073 if (!context->in_syscall)
2074 return;
2075
2076 rcu_read_lock();
2077 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2078 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2079 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2080
2081 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2082 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2083 f->op, f->val)
2084 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2085 rcu_read_unlock();
2086 return;
2087 }
2088 }
2089 }
2090 rcu_read_unlock();
2091
2092 if (inode)
2093 handle_one(inode);
2094
2095 /* look for a parent entry first */
2096 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2097 if (!n->name ||
2098 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2099 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2100 continue;
2101
2102 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2103 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2104 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2105 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2106 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2107 found_parent = n;
2108 break;
2109 }
2110 }
2111
2112 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2113 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2114 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2115 if (!n->name ||
2116 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2117 continue;
2118
2119 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2120 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2121 found_parent ?
2122 found_parent->name_len :
2123 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
2124 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2125 n->type = type;
2126 found_child = n;
2127 break;
2128 }
2129 }
2130
2131 if (!found_parent) {
2132 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2133 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2134 if (!n)
2135 return;
2136 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2137 }
2138
2139 if (!found_child) {
2140 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2141 if (!found_child)
2142 return;
2143
2144 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2145 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2146 * audit_free_names() */
2147 if (found_parent) {
2148 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2149 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2150 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2151 }
2152 }
2153
2154 if (inode)
2155 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2156 else
2157 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2158}
2159EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2160
2161/**
2162 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2163 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2164 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2165 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2166 *
2167 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2168 */
2169int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2170 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2171{
2172 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2173 return 0;
2174 if (!ctx->serial)
2175 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2176 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2177 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2178 *serial = ctx->serial;
2179 if (!ctx->prio) {
2180 ctx->prio = 1;
2181 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2182 }
2183 return 1;
2184}
2185
2186/**
2187 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2188 * @oflag: open flag
2189 * @mode: mode bits
2190 * @attr: queue attributes
2191 *
2192 */
2193void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2194{
2195 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2196
2197 if (attr)
2198 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2199 else
2200 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2201
2202 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2203 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2204
2205 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2206}
2207
2208/**
2209 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2210 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2211 * @msg_len: Message length
2212 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2213 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2214 *
2215 */
2216void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2217 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2218{
2219 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2220 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2221
2222 if (abs_timeout)
2223 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2224 else
2225 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2226
2227 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2228 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2229 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2230
2231 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2232}
2233
2234/**
2235 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2236 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2237 * @notification: Notification event
2238 *
2239 */
2240
2241void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2242{
2243 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2244
2245 if (notification)
2246 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2247 else
2248 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2249
2250 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2251 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2252}
2253
2254/**
2255 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2256 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2257 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2258 *
2259 */
2260void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2261{
2262 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2263 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2264 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2265 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2266}
2267
2268/**
2269 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2270 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2271 *
2272 */
2273void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2274{
2275 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2276 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2277 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2278 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2279 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2280 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2281 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2282}
2283
2284/**
2285 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2286 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2287 * @uid: msgq user id
2288 * @gid: msgq group id
2289 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2290 *
2291 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2292 */
2293void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2294{
2295 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2296
2297 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2298 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2299 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2300 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2301 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2302}
2303
2304void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2305{
2306 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2307
2308 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2309 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2310}
2311
2312
2313/**
2314 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2315 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2316 * @args: args array
2317 *
2318 */
2319int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2320{
2321 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2322
2323 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2324 return -EINVAL;
2325 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2326 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2327 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2328 return 0;
2329}
2330
2331/**
2332 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2333 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2334 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2335 *
2336 */
2337void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2338{
2339 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2340 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2341 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2342}
2343
2344/**
2345 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2346 * @len: data length in user space
2347 * @a: data address in kernel space
2348 *
2349 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2350 */
2351int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2352{
2353 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2354
2355 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2356 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2357 if (!p)
2358 return -ENOMEM;
2359 context->sockaddr = p;
2360 }
2361
2362 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2363 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2364 return 0;
2365}
2366
2367void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2368{
2369 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2370
2371 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2372 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2373 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2374 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2375 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2376 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2377}
2378
2379/**
2380 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2381 * @t: task being signaled
2382 *
2383 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2384 * and uid that is doing that.
2385 */
2386int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2387{
2388 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2389 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2390 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2391
2392 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2393 return 0;
2394
2395 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2396 * in audit_context */
2397 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2398 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2399 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2400 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2401 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2402 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2403 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2404 return 0;
2405 }
2406
2407 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2408 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2409 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2410 if (!axp)
2411 return -ENOMEM;
2412
2413 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2414 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2415 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2416 }
2417 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2418
2419 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2420 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2421 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2422 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2423 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2424 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2425 axp->pid_count++;
2426
2427 return 0;
2428}
2429
2430/**
2431 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2432 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2433 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2434 * @old: the old credentials
2435 *
2436 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2437 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2438 *
2439 * -Eric
2440 */
2441int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2442 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2443{
2444 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2445 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2446 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2447
2448 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2449 if (!ax)
2450 return -ENOMEM;
2451
2452 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2453 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2454 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2455
2456 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2457
2458 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2459 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2460 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2461 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2462 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2463
2464 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2465 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2466 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2467 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2468
2469 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2470 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2471 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2472 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2473 return 0;
2474}
2475
2476/**
2477 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2478 * @new: the new credentials
2479 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2480 *
2481 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2482 * audit system if applicable
2483 */
2484void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2485{
2486 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2487 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2488 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2489 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2490 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2491 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2492 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2493}
2494
2495void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2496{
2497 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2498 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2499 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2500 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2501}
2502
2503void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2504{
2505 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2506
2507 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2508 if (!context->module.name)
2509 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2510 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2511}
2512
2513void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2514{
2515 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2516 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2517}
2518
2519void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2520{
2521 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
2522 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2523 (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
2524}
2525
2526static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
2527 const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
2528{
2529 const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
2530
2531 if (val->newval == val->oldval)
2532 return;
2533
2534 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
2535 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
2536}
2537
2538void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2539{
2540 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
2541 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
2542 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
2543 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
2544 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
2545 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
2546}
2547
2548static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2549{
2550 kuid_t auid, uid;
2551 kgid_t gid;
2552 unsigned int sessionid;
2553 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2554
2555 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2556 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2557 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2558
2559 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2560 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2561 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2562 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2563 sessionid);
2564 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2565 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2566 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2567 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2568}
2569
2570/**
2571 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2572 * @signr: signal value
2573 *
2574 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2575 * should record the event for investigation.
2576 */
2577void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2578{
2579 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2580
2581 if (!audit_enabled)
2582 return;
2583
2584 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2585 return;
2586
2587 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2588 if (unlikely(!ab))
2589 return;
2590 audit_log_task(ab);
2591 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2592 audit_log_end(ab);
2593}
2594
2595/**
2596 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2597 * @syscall: syscall number
2598 * @signr: signal value
2599 * @code: the seccomp action
2600 *
2601 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2602 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2603 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2604 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2605 * audit is not in use.
2606 */
2607void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2608{
2609 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2610
2611 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2612 if (unlikely(!ab))
2613 return;
2614 audit_log_task(ab);
2615 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2616 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2617 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2618 audit_log_end(ab);
2619}
2620
2621void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2622 int res)
2623{
2624 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2625
2626 if (!audit_enabled)
2627 return;
2628
2629 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2630 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2631 if (unlikely(!ab))
2632 return;
2633
2634 audit_log_format(ab,
2635 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2636 names, old_names, res);
2637 audit_log_end(ab);
2638}
2639
2640struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2641{
2642 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2643 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2644 return NULL;
2645 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2646}
1/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
46
47#include <linux/init.h>
48#include <asm/types.h>
49#include <linux/atomic.h>
50#include <linux/fs.h>
51#include <linux/namei.h>
52#include <linux/mm.h>
53#include <linux/export.h>
54#include <linux/slab.h>
55#include <linux/mount.h>
56#include <linux/socket.h>
57#include <linux/mqueue.h>
58#include <linux/audit.h>
59#include <linux/personality.h>
60#include <linux/time.h>
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/compiler.h>
63#include <asm/unistd.h>
64#include <linux/security.h>
65#include <linux/list.h>
66#include <linux/binfmts.h>
67#include <linux/highmem.h>
68#include <linux/syscalls.h>
69#include <asm/syscall.h>
70#include <linux/capability.h>
71#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72#include <linux/compat.h>
73#include <linux/ctype.h>
74#include <linux/string.h>
75#include <linux/uaccess.h>
76#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
78#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
79
80#include "audit.h"
81
82/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
83#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
84#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
85#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
86
87/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
88 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
89#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90
91/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
92#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
93
94/* number of audit rules */
95int audit_n_rules;
96
97/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
98int audit_signals;
99
100struct audit_aux_data {
101 struct audit_aux_data *next;
102 int type;
103};
104
105#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
106
107/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
108#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
109
110struct audit_aux_data_pids {
111 struct audit_aux_data d;
112 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
116 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
117 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
118 int pid_count;
119};
120
121struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
122 struct audit_aux_data d;
123 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
124 unsigned int fcap_ver;
125 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
126 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
127};
128
129struct audit_tree_refs {
130 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
131 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
132};
133
134struct audit_nfcfgop_tab {
135 enum audit_nfcfgop op;
136 const char *s;
137};
138
139static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
140 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "xt_register" },
141 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "xt_replace" },
142 { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "xt_unregister" },
143 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_table" },
144 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_table" },
145 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER, "nft_register_chain" },
146 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_chain" },
147 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER, "nft_register_rule" },
148 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_rule" },
149 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER, "nft_register_set" },
150 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_set" },
151 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER, "nft_register_setelem" },
152 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_setelem" },
153 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, "nft_register_gen" },
154 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER, "nft_register_obj" },
155 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_obj" },
156 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET, "nft_reset_obj" },
157 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_flowtable" },
158 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_flowtable" },
159 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID, "nft_invalid" },
160};
161
162static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
163{
164 unsigned n;
165 if (unlikely(!ctx))
166 return 0;
167 n = ctx->major;
168
169 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
170 case 0: /* native */
171 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
172 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
173 return 1;
174 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
175 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
176 return 1;
177 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
178 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
179 return 1;
180 return 0;
181 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
182 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
183 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
184 return 1;
185 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
186 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
187 return 1;
188 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
189 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
190 return 1;
191 return 0;
192 case 2: /* open */
193 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
194 case 3: /* openat */
195 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
196 case 4: /* socketcall */
197 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
198 case 5: /* execve */
199 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
200 default:
201 return 0;
202 }
203}
204
205static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
206{
207 struct audit_names *n;
208 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
209
210 if (unlikely(!ctx))
211 return 0;
212
213 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
214 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
215 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
216 return 1;
217 }
218
219 return 0;
220}
221
222/*
223 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
224 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
225 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
226 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
227 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
228 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
229 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
230 */
231
232static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
233{
234 if (!ctx->prio) {
235 ctx->prio = 1;
236 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
237 }
238}
239
240static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
241{
242 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
243 int left = ctx->tree_count;
244 if (likely(left)) {
245 p->c[--left] = chunk;
246 ctx->tree_count = left;
247 return 1;
248 }
249 if (!p)
250 return 0;
251 p = p->next;
252 if (p) {
253 p->c[30] = chunk;
254 ctx->trees = p;
255 ctx->tree_count = 30;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 return 0;
259}
260
261static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
262{
263 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
264 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
265 if (!ctx->trees) {
266 ctx->trees = p;
267 return 0;
268 }
269 if (p)
270 p->next = ctx->trees;
271 else
272 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
273 ctx->tree_count = 31;
274 return 1;
275}
276
277static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
278 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
279{
280 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
281 int n;
282 if (!p) {
283 /* we started with empty chain */
284 p = ctx->first_trees;
285 count = 31;
286 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
287 if (!p)
288 return;
289 }
290 n = count;
291 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
292 while (n--) {
293 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
294 q->c[n] = NULL;
295 }
296 }
297 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
298 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
299 q->c[n] = NULL;
300 }
301 ctx->trees = p;
302 ctx->tree_count = count;
303}
304
305static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
306{
307 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
308 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
309 q = p->next;
310 kfree(p);
311 }
312}
313
314static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
315{
316 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
317 int n;
318 if (!tree)
319 return 0;
320 /* full ones */
321 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
322 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
323 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
324 return 1;
325 }
326 /* partial */
327 if (p) {
328 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
329 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
330 return 1;
331 }
332 return 0;
333}
334
335static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
336 struct audit_names *name,
337 struct audit_field *f,
338 struct audit_context *ctx)
339{
340 struct audit_names *n;
341 int rc;
342
343 if (name) {
344 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
345 if (rc)
346 return rc;
347 }
348
349 if (ctx) {
350 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
351 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
352 if (rc)
353 return rc;
354 }
355 }
356 return 0;
357}
358
359static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
360 struct audit_names *name,
361 struct audit_field *f,
362 struct audit_context *ctx)
363{
364 struct audit_names *n;
365 int rc;
366
367 if (name) {
368 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
369 if (rc)
370 return rc;
371 }
372
373 if (ctx) {
374 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
375 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
376 if (rc)
377 return rc;
378 }
379 }
380 return 0;
381}
382
383static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
384 const struct cred *cred,
385 struct audit_field *f,
386 struct audit_context *ctx,
387 struct audit_names *name)
388{
389 switch (f->val) {
390 /* process to file object comparisons */
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
392 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
393 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
394 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
396 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
398 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
400 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
402 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
404 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
405 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
406 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
408 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
409 /* uid comparisons */
410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
411 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
412 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
414 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
415 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
416 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
418 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
419 /* auid comparisons */
420 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
421 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
422 cred->euid);
423 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
424 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
425 cred->suid);
426 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
427 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
428 cred->fsuid);
429 /* euid comparisons */
430 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
431 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
432 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
433 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
434 /* suid comparisons */
435 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
436 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
437 /* gid comparisons */
438 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
439 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
440 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
441 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
442 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
443 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
444 /* egid comparisons */
445 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
446 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
447 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
448 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
449 /* sgid comparison */
450 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
451 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
452 default:
453 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
454 return 0;
455 }
456 return 0;
457}
458
459/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
460/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
461 * otherwise.
462 *
463 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
464 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
465 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
466 */
467static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
468 struct audit_krule *rule,
469 struct audit_context *ctx,
470 struct audit_names *name,
471 enum audit_state *state,
472 bool task_creation)
473{
474 const struct cred *cred;
475 int i, need_sid = 1;
476 u32 sid;
477 unsigned int sessionid;
478
479 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
480
481 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
482 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
483 struct audit_names *n;
484 int result = 0;
485 pid_t pid;
486
487 switch (f->type) {
488 case AUDIT_PID:
489 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
490 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
491 break;
492 case AUDIT_PPID:
493 if (ctx) {
494 if (!ctx->ppid)
495 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
496 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
497 }
498 break;
499 case AUDIT_EXE:
500 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
501 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
502 result = !result;
503 break;
504 case AUDIT_UID:
505 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
506 break;
507 case AUDIT_EUID:
508 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
509 break;
510 case AUDIT_SUID:
511 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
512 break;
513 case AUDIT_FSUID:
514 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
515 break;
516 case AUDIT_GID:
517 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
518 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
519 if (!result)
520 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
521 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
522 if (result)
523 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
524 }
525 break;
526 case AUDIT_EGID:
527 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
528 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
529 if (!result)
530 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
531 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
532 if (result)
533 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
534 }
535 break;
536 case AUDIT_SGID:
537 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
538 break;
539 case AUDIT_FSGID:
540 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
541 break;
542 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
543 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
544 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
545 break;
546 case AUDIT_PERS:
547 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
548 break;
549 case AUDIT_ARCH:
550 if (ctx)
551 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
552 break;
553
554 case AUDIT_EXIT:
555 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
556 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
557 break;
558 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
559 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
560 if (f->val)
561 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
562 else
563 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
564 }
565 break;
566 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
567 if (name) {
568 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
569 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
570 ++result;
571 } else if (ctx) {
572 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
573 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
574 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
575 ++result;
576 break;
577 }
578 }
579 }
580 break;
581 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
582 if (name) {
583 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
584 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
585 ++result;
586 } else if (ctx) {
587 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
588 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
589 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
590 ++result;
591 break;
592 }
593 }
594 }
595 break;
596 case AUDIT_INODE:
597 if (name)
598 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
599 else if (ctx) {
600 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
601 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
602 ++result;
603 break;
604 }
605 }
606 }
607 break;
608 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
609 if (name) {
610 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
611 } else if (ctx) {
612 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
613 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
614 ++result;
615 break;
616 }
617 }
618 }
619 break;
620 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
621 if (name) {
622 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
623 } else if (ctx) {
624 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
625 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
626 ++result;
627 break;
628 }
629 }
630 }
631 break;
632 case AUDIT_WATCH:
633 if (name) {
634 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
635 name->ino,
636 name->dev);
637 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
638 result = !result;
639 }
640 break;
641 case AUDIT_DIR:
642 if (ctx) {
643 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
644 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
645 result = !result;
646 }
647 break;
648 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
649 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
650 f->op, f->uid);
651 break;
652 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
653 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
654 break;
655 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
656 if (ctx->sockaddr)
657 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
658 f->op, f->val);
659 break;
660 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
661 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
662 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
663 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
664 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
665 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
666 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
667 match for now to avoid losing information that
668 may be wanted. An error message will also be
669 logged upon error */
670 if (f->lsm_rule) {
671 if (need_sid) {
672 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
673 need_sid = 0;
674 }
675 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
676 f->op,
677 f->lsm_rule);
678 }
679 break;
680 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
681 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
682 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
683 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
684 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
685 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
686 also applies here */
687 if (f->lsm_rule) {
688 /* Find files that match */
689 if (name) {
690 result = security_audit_rule_match(
691 name->osid,
692 f->type,
693 f->op,
694 f->lsm_rule);
695 } else if (ctx) {
696 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
697 if (security_audit_rule_match(
698 n->osid,
699 f->type,
700 f->op,
701 f->lsm_rule)) {
702 ++result;
703 break;
704 }
705 }
706 }
707 /* Find ipc objects that match */
708 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
709 break;
710 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
711 f->type, f->op,
712 f->lsm_rule))
713 ++result;
714 }
715 break;
716 case AUDIT_ARG0:
717 case AUDIT_ARG1:
718 case AUDIT_ARG2:
719 case AUDIT_ARG3:
720 if (ctx)
721 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
722 break;
723 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
724 /* ignore this field for filtering */
725 result = 1;
726 break;
727 case AUDIT_PERM:
728 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
729 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
730 result = !result;
731 break;
732 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
733 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
734 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
735 result = !result;
736 break;
737 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
738 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
739 break;
740 }
741 if (!result)
742 return 0;
743 }
744
745 if (ctx) {
746 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
747 return 0;
748 if (rule->filterkey) {
749 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
750 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
751 }
752 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
753 }
754 switch (rule->action) {
755 case AUDIT_NEVER:
756 *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
757 break;
758 case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
759 *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
760 break;
761 }
762 return 1;
763}
764
765/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
766 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
767 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
768 */
769static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
770{
771 struct audit_entry *e;
772 enum audit_state state;
773
774 rcu_read_lock();
775 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
776 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
777 &state, true)) {
778 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
779 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
780 rcu_read_unlock();
781 return state;
782 }
783 }
784 rcu_read_unlock();
785 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
786}
787
788static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
789{
790 int word, bit;
791
792 if (val > 0xffffffff)
793 return false;
794
795 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
796 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
797 return false;
798
799 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
800
801 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
802}
803
804/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
805 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
806 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
807 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
808 */
809static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
810 struct audit_context *ctx,
811 struct list_head *list)
812{
813 struct audit_entry *e;
814 enum audit_state state;
815
816 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
817 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
818
819 rcu_read_lock();
820 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
821 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
822 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
823 &state, false)) {
824 rcu_read_unlock();
825 ctx->current_state = state;
826 return state;
827 }
828 }
829 rcu_read_unlock();
830 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
831}
832
833/*
834 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
835 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
836 */
837static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
838 struct audit_names *n,
839 struct audit_context *ctx) {
840 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
841 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
842 struct audit_entry *e;
843 enum audit_state state;
844
845 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
846 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
847 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
848 ctx->current_state = state;
849 return 1;
850 }
851 }
852 return 0;
853}
854
855/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
856 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
857 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
858 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
859 */
860void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
861{
862 struct audit_names *n;
863
864 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
865 return;
866
867 rcu_read_lock();
868
869 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
870 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
871 break;
872 }
873 rcu_read_unlock();
874}
875
876static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
877{
878 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
879 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
880 context->proctitle.len = 0;
881}
882
883static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
884{
885 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
886 kfree(context->module.name);
887 context->module.name = NULL;
888 }
889}
890static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
891{
892 struct audit_names *n, *next;
893
894 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
895 list_del(&n->list);
896 if (n->name)
897 putname(n->name);
898 if (n->should_free)
899 kfree(n);
900 }
901 context->name_count = 0;
902 path_put(&context->pwd);
903 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
904 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
905}
906
907static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
908{
909 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
910
911 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
912 context->aux = aux->next;
913 kfree(aux);
914 }
915 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
916 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
917 kfree(aux);
918 }
919}
920
921static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
922{
923 struct audit_context *context;
924
925 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
926 if (!context)
927 return NULL;
928 context->state = state;
929 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
930 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
931 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
932 return context;
933}
934
935/**
936 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
937 * @tsk: task
938 *
939 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
940 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
941 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
942 * needed.
943 */
944int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
945{
946 struct audit_context *context;
947 enum audit_state state;
948 char *key = NULL;
949
950 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
951 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
952
953 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
954 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
955 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
956 return 0;
957 }
958
959 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
960 kfree(key);
961 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
962 return -ENOMEM;
963 }
964 context->filterkey = key;
965
966 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
967 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
968 return 0;
969}
970
971static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
972{
973 audit_free_module(context);
974 audit_free_names(context);
975 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
976 free_tree_refs(context);
977 audit_free_aux(context);
978 kfree(context->filterkey);
979 kfree(context->sockaddr);
980 audit_proctitle_free(context);
981 kfree(context);
982}
983
984static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
985 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
986 u32 sid, char *comm)
987{
988 struct audit_buffer *ab;
989 char *ctx = NULL;
990 u32 len;
991 int rc = 0;
992
993 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
994 if (!ab)
995 return rc;
996
997 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
998 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
999 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
1000 if (sid) {
1001 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1002 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1003 rc = 1;
1004 } else {
1005 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1006 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1007 }
1008 }
1009 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1010 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1011 audit_log_end(ab);
1012
1013 return rc;
1014}
1015
1016static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1017 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1018{
1019 long len_max;
1020 long len_rem;
1021 long len_full;
1022 long len_buf;
1023 long len_abuf = 0;
1024 long len_tmp;
1025 bool require_data;
1026 bool encode;
1027 unsigned int iter;
1028 unsigned int arg;
1029 char *buf_head;
1030 char *buf;
1031 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1032
1033 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1034 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1035 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1036 char abuf[96];
1037
1038 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1039 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1040 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1041 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1042 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1043 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1044
1045 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1046 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1047 if (!buf_head) {
1048 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1049 return;
1050 }
1051 buf = buf_head;
1052
1053 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1054
1055 len_rem = len_max;
1056 len_buf = 0;
1057 len_full = 0;
1058 require_data = true;
1059 encode = false;
1060 iter = 0;
1061 arg = 0;
1062 do {
1063 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1064 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1065 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1066 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1067 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1068 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1069 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1070 if (len_full == 0)
1071 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1072
1073 /* read more data from userspace */
1074 if (require_data) {
1075 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1076 if (buf != buf_head) {
1077 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1078 buf = buf_head;
1079 }
1080
1081 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1082 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1083 len_max - len_buf);
1084 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1085 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1086 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1087 goto out;
1088 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1089 /* buffer is not large enough */
1090 require_data = true;
1091 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1092 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1093 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1094 * consistent record encoding */
1095 encode = true;
1096 len_full = len_full * 2;
1097 p += len_tmp;
1098 } else {
1099 require_data = false;
1100 if (!encode)
1101 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1102 buf, len_tmp);
1103 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1104 if (len_full < len_max)
1105 len_full = (encode ?
1106 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1107 p += len_tmp + 1;
1108 }
1109 len_buf += len_tmp;
1110 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1111
1112 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1113 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1114 }
1115
1116 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1117 if (len_buf >= 0) {
1118 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1119 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1120 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1121 * a new buffer */
1122 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1123 len_rem = len_max;
1124 audit_log_end(*ab);
1125 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1126 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1127 if (!*ab)
1128 goto out;
1129 }
1130
1131 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1132 len_tmp = 0;
1133 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1134 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1135 if (iter == 0) {
1136 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1137 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1138 " a%d_len=%lu",
1139 arg, len_full);
1140 }
1141 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1142 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1143 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1144 } else
1145 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1146 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1147 " a%d=", arg);
1148 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1149 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1150
1151 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1152 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1153 len_rem -= len_tmp;
1154 len_tmp = len_buf;
1155 if (encode) {
1156 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1157 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1158 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1159 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1160 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1161 } else {
1162 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1163 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1164 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1165 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1166 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1167 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1168 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1169 }
1170 len_buf -= len_tmp;
1171 buf += len_tmp;
1172 }
1173
1174 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1175 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1176 arg++;
1177 iter = 0;
1178 len_full = 0;
1179 require_data = true;
1180 encode = false;
1181 }
1182 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1183
1184 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1185
1186out:
1187 kfree(buf_head);
1188}
1189
1190static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1191 kernel_cap_t *cap)
1192{
1193 int i;
1194
1195 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1196 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1197 return;
1198 }
1199 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1200 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
1201 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1202}
1203
1204static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1205{
1206 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1207 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1208 return;
1209 }
1210 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1211 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1212 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1213 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1214 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1215}
1216
1217static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1218{
1219 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1220 int i;
1221
1222 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1223 if (!ab)
1224 return;
1225
1226 switch (context->type) {
1227 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1228 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1229 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1230 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1231 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1232 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1233 break; }
1234 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1235 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1236
1237 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1238 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1239 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1240 context->ipc.mode);
1241 if (osid) {
1242 char *ctx = NULL;
1243 u32 len;
1244 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1245 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1246 *call_panic = 1;
1247 } else {
1248 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1249 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1250 }
1251 }
1252 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1253 audit_log_end(ab);
1254 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1255 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1256 if (unlikely(!ab))
1257 return;
1258 audit_log_format(ab,
1259 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1260 context->ipc.qbytes,
1261 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1262 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1263 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1264 }
1265 break; }
1266 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1267 audit_log_format(ab,
1268 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1269 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1270 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1271 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1272 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1273 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1274 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1275 break;
1276 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1277 audit_log_format(ab,
1278 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1279 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1280 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1281 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1282 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1283 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1284 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1285 break;
1286 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1287 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1288 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1289 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1290 break;
1291 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1292 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1293 audit_log_format(ab,
1294 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1295 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1296 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1297 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1298 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1299 break; }
1300 case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1301 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1302 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1303 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1304 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1305 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1306 break;
1307 case AUDIT_MMAP:
1308 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1309 context->mmap.flags);
1310 break;
1311 case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1312 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1313 break;
1314 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1315 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1316 if (context->module.name) {
1317 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1318 } else
1319 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1320
1321 break;
1322 }
1323 audit_log_end(ab);
1324}
1325
1326static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1327{
1328 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1329 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1330 end--;
1331
1332 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1333 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1334 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1335 return len;
1336}
1337
1338/*
1339 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1340 * @context: audit_context for the task
1341 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1342 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1343 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1344 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1345 */
1346static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1347 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1348{
1349 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1350
1351 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1352 if (!ab)
1353 return;
1354
1355 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1356
1357 if (path)
1358 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1359 else if (n->name) {
1360 switch (n->name_len) {
1361 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1362 /* log the full path */
1363 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1364 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1365 break;
1366 case 0:
1367 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1368 * directory component is the cwd
1369 */
1370 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1371 break;
1372 default:
1373 /* log the name's directory component */
1374 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1375 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1376 n->name_len);
1377 }
1378 } else
1379 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1380
1381 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1382 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1383 n->ino,
1384 MAJOR(n->dev),
1385 MINOR(n->dev),
1386 n->mode,
1387 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1388 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1389 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1390 MINOR(n->rdev));
1391 if (n->osid != 0) {
1392 char *ctx = NULL;
1393 u32 len;
1394
1395 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1396 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1397 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1398 if (call_panic)
1399 *call_panic = 2;
1400 } else {
1401 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1402 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1403 }
1404 }
1405
1406 /* log the audit_names record type */
1407 switch (n->type) {
1408 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1409 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1410 break;
1411 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1412 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1413 break;
1414 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1415 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1416 break;
1417 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1418 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1419 break;
1420 default:
1421 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1422 break;
1423 }
1424
1425 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1426 audit_log_end(ab);
1427}
1428
1429static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1430{
1431 int res;
1432 char *buf;
1433 char *msg = "(null)";
1434 int len = strlen(msg);
1435 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1436 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1437
1438 if (!context || context->dummy)
1439 return;
1440
1441 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1442 if (!ab)
1443 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1444
1445 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1446
1447 /* Not cached */
1448 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1449 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1450 if (!buf)
1451 goto out;
1452 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1453 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1454 if (res == 0) {
1455 kfree(buf);
1456 goto out;
1457 }
1458 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1459 if (res == 0) {
1460 kfree(buf);
1461 goto out;
1462 }
1463 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1464 context->proctitle.len = res;
1465 }
1466 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1467 len = context->proctitle.len;
1468out:
1469 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1470 audit_log_end(ab);
1471}
1472
1473static void audit_log_exit(void)
1474{
1475 int i, call_panic = 0;
1476 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1477 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1478 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1479 struct audit_names *n;
1480
1481 context->personality = current->personality;
1482
1483 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1484 if (!ab)
1485 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1486 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1487 context->arch, context->major);
1488 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1489 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1490 if (context->return_valid)
1491 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1492 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1493 context->return_code);
1494
1495 audit_log_format(ab,
1496 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1497 context->argv[0],
1498 context->argv[1],
1499 context->argv[2],
1500 context->argv[3],
1501 context->name_count);
1502
1503 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1504 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1505 audit_log_end(ab);
1506
1507 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1508
1509 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1510 if (!ab)
1511 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1512
1513 switch (aux->type) {
1514
1515 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1516 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1517 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1518 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1519 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1520 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1521 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1522 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1523 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1524 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1525 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1526 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1527 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1528 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1529 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1530 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1531 axs->fcap.rootid));
1532 break; }
1533
1534 }
1535 audit_log_end(ab);
1536 }
1537
1538 if (context->type)
1539 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1540
1541 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1542 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1543 if (ab) {
1544 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1545 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1546 audit_log_end(ab);
1547 }
1548 }
1549
1550 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1551 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1552 if (ab) {
1553 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1554 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1555 context->sockaddr_len);
1556 audit_log_end(ab);
1557 }
1558 }
1559
1560 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1561 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1562
1563 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1564 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1565 axs->target_auid[i],
1566 axs->target_uid[i],
1567 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1568 axs->target_sid[i],
1569 axs->target_comm[i]))
1570 call_panic = 1;
1571 }
1572
1573 if (context->target_pid &&
1574 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1575 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1576 context->target_sessionid,
1577 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1578 call_panic = 1;
1579
1580 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1581 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1582 if (ab) {
1583 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1584 audit_log_end(ab);
1585 }
1586 }
1587
1588 i = 0;
1589 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1590 if (n->hidden)
1591 continue;
1592 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1593 }
1594
1595 audit_log_proctitle();
1596
1597 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1598 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1599 if (ab)
1600 audit_log_end(ab);
1601 if (call_panic)
1602 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1603}
1604
1605/**
1606 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1607 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1608 *
1609 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1610 */
1611void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1612{
1613 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1614
1615 if (!context)
1616 return;
1617
1618 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1619 audit_kill_trees(context);
1620
1621 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1622 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1623 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1624 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1625 */
1626 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1627 context->return_valid = 0;
1628 context->return_code = 0;
1629
1630 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
1631 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1632 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1633 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1634 audit_log_exit();
1635 }
1636
1637 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1638 audit_free_context(context);
1639}
1640
1641/**
1642 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1643 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1644 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1645 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1646 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1647 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1648 *
1649 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1650 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1651 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1652 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1653 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1654 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1655 * be written).
1656 */
1657void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1658 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1659{
1660 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1661 enum audit_state state;
1662
1663 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1664 return;
1665
1666 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1667
1668 state = context->state;
1669 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1670 return;
1671
1672 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1673 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1674 context->prio = 0;
1675 if (auditd_test_task(current))
1676 return;
1677 }
1678
1679 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
1680 context->major = major;
1681 context->argv[0] = a1;
1682 context->argv[1] = a2;
1683 context->argv[2] = a3;
1684 context->argv[3] = a4;
1685 context->serial = 0;
1686 context->in_syscall = 1;
1687 context->current_state = state;
1688 context->ppid = 0;
1689 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
1690}
1691
1692/**
1693 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1694 * @success: success value of the syscall
1695 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1696 *
1697 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1698 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1699 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1700 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1701 * free the names stored from getname().
1702 */
1703void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1704{
1705 struct audit_context *context;
1706
1707 context = audit_context();
1708 if (!context)
1709 return;
1710
1711 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1712 audit_kill_trees(context);
1713
1714 if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1715 if (success)
1716 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1717 else
1718 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1719
1720 /*
1721 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1722 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1723 * arch specific signal handlers
1724 *
1725 * This is actually a test for:
1726 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1727 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1728 *
1729 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1730 */
1731 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1732 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1733 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1734 context->return_code = -EINTR;
1735 else
1736 context->return_code = return_code;
1737
1738 audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
1739 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1740 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
1741 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1742 audit_log_exit();
1743 }
1744
1745 context->in_syscall = 0;
1746 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1747
1748 audit_free_module(context);
1749 audit_free_names(context);
1750 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1751 audit_free_aux(context);
1752 context->aux = NULL;
1753 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1754 context->target_pid = 0;
1755 context->target_sid = 0;
1756 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1757 context->type = 0;
1758 context->fds[0] = -1;
1759 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1760 kfree(context->filterkey);
1761 context->filterkey = NULL;
1762 }
1763}
1764
1765static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1766{
1767 struct audit_context *context;
1768 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1769 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1770 int count;
1771 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
1772 return;
1773 context = audit_context();
1774 p = context->trees;
1775 count = context->tree_count;
1776 rcu_read_lock();
1777 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1778 rcu_read_unlock();
1779 if (!chunk)
1780 return;
1781 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1782 return;
1783 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1784 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1785 audit_set_auditable(context);
1786 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1787 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1788 return;
1789 }
1790 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1791}
1792
1793static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1794{
1795 struct audit_context *context;
1796 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1797 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1798 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1799 unsigned long seq;
1800 int count;
1801
1802 context = audit_context();
1803 p = context->trees;
1804 count = context->tree_count;
1805retry:
1806 drop = NULL;
1807 d = dentry;
1808 rcu_read_lock();
1809 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1810 for(;;) {
1811 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1812 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
1813 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1814 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1815 if (chunk) {
1816 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1817 drop = chunk;
1818 break;
1819 }
1820 }
1821 }
1822 parent = d->d_parent;
1823 if (parent == d)
1824 break;
1825 d = parent;
1826 }
1827 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1828 rcu_read_unlock();
1829 if (!drop) {
1830 /* just a race with rename */
1831 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1832 goto retry;
1833 }
1834 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1835 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1836 /* OK, got more space */
1837 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1838 goto retry;
1839 }
1840 /* too bad */
1841 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1842 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1843 audit_set_auditable(context);
1844 return;
1845 }
1846 rcu_read_unlock();
1847}
1848
1849static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1850 unsigned char type)
1851{
1852 struct audit_names *aname;
1853
1854 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1855 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1856 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1857 } else {
1858 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1859 if (!aname)
1860 return NULL;
1861 aname->should_free = true;
1862 }
1863
1864 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1865 aname->type = type;
1866 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1867
1868 context->name_count++;
1869 return aname;
1870}
1871
1872/**
1873 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1874 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1875 *
1876 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1877 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1878 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1879 */
1880struct filename *
1881__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1882{
1883 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1884 struct audit_names *n;
1885
1886 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1887 if (!n->name)
1888 continue;
1889 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1890 n->name->refcnt++;
1891 return n->name;
1892 }
1893 }
1894 return NULL;
1895}
1896
1897inline void _audit_getcwd(struct audit_context *context)
1898{
1899 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1900 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1901}
1902
1903void __audit_getcwd(void)
1904{
1905 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1906
1907 if (context->in_syscall)
1908 _audit_getcwd(context);
1909}
1910
1911/**
1912 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1913 * @name: name to add
1914 *
1915 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1916 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1917 */
1918void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1919{
1920 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1921 struct audit_names *n;
1922
1923 if (!context->in_syscall)
1924 return;
1925
1926 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1927 if (!n)
1928 return;
1929
1930 n->name = name;
1931 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1932 name->aname = n;
1933 name->refcnt++;
1934
1935 _audit_getcwd(context);
1936}
1937
1938static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
1939 const struct dentry *dentry)
1940{
1941 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1942 int rc;
1943
1944 if (!dentry)
1945 return 0;
1946
1947 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1948 if (rc)
1949 return rc;
1950
1951 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1952 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1953 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1954 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
1955 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
1956 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1957
1958 return 0;
1959}
1960
1961/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1962static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
1963 const struct dentry *dentry,
1964 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
1965{
1966 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1967 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1968 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1969 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1970 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1971 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1972 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1973 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
1974 name->fcap_ver = -1;
1975 return;
1976 }
1977 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1978}
1979
1980/**
1981 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1982 * @name: name being audited
1983 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1984 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1985 */
1986void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1987 unsigned int flags)
1988{
1989 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1990 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1991 struct audit_names *n;
1992 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1993 struct audit_entry *e;
1994 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
1995 int i;
1996
1997 if (!context->in_syscall)
1998 return;
1999
2000 rcu_read_lock();
2001 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2002 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2003 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2004
2005 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2006 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
2007 f->op, f->val)
2008 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2009 rcu_read_unlock();
2010 return;
2011 }
2012 }
2013 }
2014 rcu_read_unlock();
2015
2016 if (!name)
2017 goto out_alloc;
2018
2019 /*
2020 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2021 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2022 */
2023 n = name->aname;
2024 if (n) {
2025 if (parent) {
2026 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2027 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2028 goto out;
2029 } else {
2030 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2031 goto out;
2032 }
2033 }
2034
2035 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2036 if (n->ino) {
2037 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2038 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
2039 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
2040 continue;
2041 } else if (n->name) {
2042 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2043 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2044 continue;
2045 } else
2046 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2047 continue;
2048
2049 /* match the correct record type */
2050 if (parent) {
2051 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2052 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2053 goto out;
2054 } else {
2055 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2056 goto out;
2057 }
2058 }
2059
2060out_alloc:
2061 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2062 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2063 if (!n)
2064 return;
2065 if (name) {
2066 n->name = name;
2067 name->refcnt++;
2068 }
2069
2070out:
2071 if (parent) {
2072 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2073 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2074 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2075 n->hidden = true;
2076 } else {
2077 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2078 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2079 }
2080 handle_path(dentry);
2081 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2082}
2083
2084void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2085{
2086 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2087}
2088
2089/**
2090 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2091 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2092 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2093 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2094 *
2095 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2096 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2097 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2098 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2099 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2100 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2101 * unsuccessful attempts.
2102 */
2103void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2104 const struct dentry *dentry,
2105 const unsigned char type)
2106{
2107 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2108 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2109 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2110 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2111 struct audit_entry *e;
2112 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2113 int i;
2114
2115 if (!context->in_syscall)
2116 return;
2117
2118 rcu_read_lock();
2119 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2120 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2121 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2122
2123 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2124 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2125 f->op, f->val)
2126 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2127 rcu_read_unlock();
2128 return;
2129 }
2130 }
2131 }
2132 rcu_read_unlock();
2133
2134 if (inode)
2135 handle_one(inode);
2136
2137 /* look for a parent entry first */
2138 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2139 if (!n->name ||
2140 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2141 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2142 continue;
2143
2144 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2145 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2146 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2147 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2148 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2149 found_parent = n;
2150 break;
2151 }
2152 }
2153
2154 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2155 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2156 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2157 if (!n->name ||
2158 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2159 continue;
2160
2161 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2162 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2163 found_parent ?
2164 found_parent->name_len :
2165 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
2166 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2167 n->type = type;
2168 found_child = n;
2169 break;
2170 }
2171 }
2172
2173 if (!found_parent) {
2174 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2175 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2176 if (!n)
2177 return;
2178 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2179 }
2180
2181 if (!found_child) {
2182 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2183 if (!found_child)
2184 return;
2185
2186 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2187 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2188 * audit_free_names() */
2189 if (found_parent) {
2190 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2191 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2192 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2193 }
2194 }
2195
2196 if (inode)
2197 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2198 else
2199 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2200}
2201EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2202
2203/**
2204 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2205 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2206 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2207 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2208 *
2209 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2210 */
2211int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2212 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2213{
2214 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2215 return 0;
2216 if (!ctx->serial)
2217 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2218 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2219 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2220 *serial = ctx->serial;
2221 if (!ctx->prio) {
2222 ctx->prio = 1;
2223 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2224 }
2225 return 1;
2226}
2227
2228/**
2229 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2230 * @oflag: open flag
2231 * @mode: mode bits
2232 * @attr: queue attributes
2233 *
2234 */
2235void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2236{
2237 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2238
2239 if (attr)
2240 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2241 else
2242 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2243
2244 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2245 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2246
2247 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2248}
2249
2250/**
2251 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2252 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2253 * @msg_len: Message length
2254 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2255 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2256 *
2257 */
2258void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2259 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2260{
2261 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2262 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2263
2264 if (abs_timeout)
2265 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2266 else
2267 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2268
2269 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2270 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2271 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2272
2273 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2274}
2275
2276/**
2277 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2278 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2279 * @notification: Notification event
2280 *
2281 */
2282
2283void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2284{
2285 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2286
2287 if (notification)
2288 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2289 else
2290 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2291
2292 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2293 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2294}
2295
2296/**
2297 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2298 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2299 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2300 *
2301 */
2302void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2303{
2304 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2305 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2306 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2307 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2308}
2309
2310/**
2311 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2312 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2313 *
2314 */
2315void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2316{
2317 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2318 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2319 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2320 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2321 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2322 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2323 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2324}
2325
2326/**
2327 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2328 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2329 * @uid: msgq user id
2330 * @gid: msgq group id
2331 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2332 *
2333 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2334 */
2335void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2336{
2337 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2338
2339 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2340 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2341 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2342 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2343 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2344}
2345
2346void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2347{
2348 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2349
2350 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2351 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2352}
2353
2354
2355/**
2356 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2357 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2358 * @args: args array
2359 *
2360 */
2361int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2362{
2363 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2364
2365 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2366 return -EINVAL;
2367 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2368 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2369 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2370 return 0;
2371}
2372
2373/**
2374 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2375 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2376 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2377 *
2378 */
2379void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2380{
2381 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2382 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2383 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2384}
2385
2386/**
2387 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2388 * @len: data length in user space
2389 * @a: data address in kernel space
2390 *
2391 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2392 */
2393int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2394{
2395 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2396
2397 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2398 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2399 if (!p)
2400 return -ENOMEM;
2401 context->sockaddr = p;
2402 }
2403
2404 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2405 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2406 return 0;
2407}
2408
2409void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2410{
2411 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2412
2413 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2414 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2415 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2416 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2417 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2418 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2419}
2420
2421/**
2422 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2423 * @t: task being signaled
2424 *
2425 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2426 * and uid that is doing that.
2427 */
2428int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2429{
2430 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2431 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2432 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2433
2434 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2435 return 0;
2436
2437 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2438 * in audit_context */
2439 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2440 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2441 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2442 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2443 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2444 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2445 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2446 return 0;
2447 }
2448
2449 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2450 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2451 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2452 if (!axp)
2453 return -ENOMEM;
2454
2455 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2456 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2457 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2458 }
2459 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2460
2461 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2462 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2463 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2464 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2465 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2466 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2467 axp->pid_count++;
2468
2469 return 0;
2470}
2471
2472/**
2473 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2474 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2475 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2476 * @old: the old credentials
2477 *
2478 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2479 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2480 *
2481 * -Eric
2482 */
2483int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2484 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2485{
2486 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2487 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2488 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2489
2490 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2491 if (!ax)
2492 return -ENOMEM;
2493
2494 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2495 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2496 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2497
2498 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2499
2500 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2501 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2502 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2503 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2504 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2505
2506 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2507 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2508 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2509 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2510
2511 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2512 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2513 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2514 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2515 return 0;
2516}
2517
2518/**
2519 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2520 * @new: the new credentials
2521 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2522 *
2523 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2524 * audit system if applicable
2525 */
2526void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2527{
2528 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2529 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2530 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2531 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2532 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2533 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2534 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2535}
2536
2537void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2538{
2539 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2540 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2541 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2542 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2543}
2544
2545void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2546{
2547 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2548
2549 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2550 if (!context->module.name)
2551 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2552 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2553}
2554
2555void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2556{
2557 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2558 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2559}
2560
2561void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2562{
2563 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
2564 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2565 (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
2566}
2567
2568static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
2569 const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
2570{
2571 const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
2572
2573 if (val->newval == val->oldval)
2574 return;
2575
2576 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
2577 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
2578}
2579
2580void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2581{
2582 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
2583 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
2584 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
2585 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
2586 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
2587 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
2588}
2589
2590void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
2591 enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp)
2592{
2593 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2594 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2595
2596 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
2597 if (!ab)
2598 return;
2599 audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
2600 name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
2601
2602 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current));
2603 audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
2604 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
2605 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2606 audit_log_end(ab);
2607}
2608EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
2609
2610static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2611{
2612 kuid_t auid, uid;
2613 kgid_t gid;
2614 unsigned int sessionid;
2615 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2616
2617 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2618 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2619 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2620
2621 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2622 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2623 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2624 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2625 sessionid);
2626 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2627 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2628 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2629 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2630}
2631
2632/**
2633 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2634 * @signr: signal value
2635 *
2636 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2637 * should record the event for investigation.
2638 */
2639void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2640{
2641 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2642
2643 if (!audit_enabled)
2644 return;
2645
2646 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2647 return;
2648
2649 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2650 if (unlikely(!ab))
2651 return;
2652 audit_log_task(ab);
2653 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2654 audit_log_end(ab);
2655}
2656
2657/**
2658 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2659 * @syscall: syscall number
2660 * @signr: signal value
2661 * @code: the seccomp action
2662 *
2663 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2664 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2665 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2666 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2667 * audit is not in use.
2668 */
2669void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2670{
2671 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2672
2673 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2674 if (unlikely(!ab))
2675 return;
2676 audit_log_task(ab);
2677 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2678 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2679 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2680 audit_log_end(ab);
2681}
2682
2683void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2684 int res)
2685{
2686 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2687
2688 if (!audit_enabled)
2689 return;
2690
2691 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2692 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2693 if (unlikely(!ab))
2694 return;
2695
2696 audit_log_format(ab,
2697 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2698 names, old_names, res);
2699 audit_log_end(ab);
2700}
2701
2702struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2703{
2704 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2705 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2706 return NULL;
2707 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2708}