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1/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
46
47#include <linux/init.h>
48#include <asm/types.h>
49#include <linux/atomic.h>
50#include <linux/fs.h>
51#include <linux/namei.h>
52#include <linux/mm.h>
53#include <linux/export.h>
54#include <linux/slab.h>
55#include <linux/mount.h>
56#include <linux/socket.h>
57#include <linux/mqueue.h>
58#include <linux/audit.h>
59#include <linux/personality.h>
60#include <linux/time.h>
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/compiler.h>
63#include <asm/unistd.h>
64#include <linux/security.h>
65#include <linux/list.h>
66#include <linux/binfmts.h>
67#include <linux/highmem.h>
68#include <linux/syscalls.h>
69#include <asm/syscall.h>
70#include <linux/capability.h>
71#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72#include <linux/compat.h>
73#include <linux/ctype.h>
74#include <linux/string.h>
75#include <linux/uaccess.h>
76#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
78
79#include "audit.h"
80
81/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
82#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
83#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
84#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
85
86/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
87 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
88#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
89
90/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
91#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
92
93/* number of audit rules */
94int audit_n_rules;
95
96/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
97int audit_signals;
98
99struct audit_aux_data {
100 struct audit_aux_data *next;
101 int type;
102};
103
104#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
105
106/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
107#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
108
109struct audit_aux_data_pids {
110 struct audit_aux_data d;
111 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
116 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
117 int pid_count;
118};
119
120struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
121 struct audit_aux_data d;
122 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
123 unsigned int fcap_ver;
124 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
125 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
126};
127
128struct audit_tree_refs {
129 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
130 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
131};
132
133static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
134{
135 unsigned n;
136 if (unlikely(!ctx))
137 return 0;
138 n = ctx->major;
139
140 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
141 case 0: /* native */
142 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
143 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
144 return 1;
145 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
147 return 1;
148 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
149 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
150 return 1;
151 return 0;
152 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
153 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
154 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
155 return 1;
156 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
158 return 1;
159 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
160 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
161 return 1;
162 return 0;
163 case 2: /* open */
164 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
165 case 3: /* openat */
166 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
167 case 4: /* socketcall */
168 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
169 case 5: /* execve */
170 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
171 default:
172 return 0;
173 }
174}
175
176static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
177{
178 struct audit_names *n;
179 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
180
181 if (unlikely(!ctx))
182 return 0;
183
184 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
185 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
186 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
187 return 1;
188 }
189
190 return 0;
191}
192
193/*
194 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
195 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
196 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
197 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
198 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
199 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
200 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
201 */
202
203static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
204{
205 if (!ctx->prio) {
206 ctx->prio = 1;
207 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
208 }
209}
210
211static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
212{
213 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
214 int left = ctx->tree_count;
215 if (likely(left)) {
216 p->c[--left] = chunk;
217 ctx->tree_count = left;
218 return 1;
219 }
220 if (!p)
221 return 0;
222 p = p->next;
223 if (p) {
224 p->c[30] = chunk;
225 ctx->trees = p;
226 ctx->tree_count = 30;
227 return 1;
228 }
229 return 0;
230}
231
232static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
233{
234 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
235 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
236 if (!ctx->trees) {
237 ctx->trees = p;
238 return 0;
239 }
240 if (p)
241 p->next = ctx->trees;
242 else
243 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
244 ctx->tree_count = 31;
245 return 1;
246}
247
248static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
249 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
250{
251 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
252 int n;
253 if (!p) {
254 /* we started with empty chain */
255 p = ctx->first_trees;
256 count = 31;
257 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
258 if (!p)
259 return;
260 }
261 n = count;
262 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
263 while (n--) {
264 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
265 q->c[n] = NULL;
266 }
267 }
268 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
269 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
270 q->c[n] = NULL;
271 }
272 ctx->trees = p;
273 ctx->tree_count = count;
274}
275
276static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
277{
278 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
279 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
280 q = p->next;
281 kfree(p);
282 }
283}
284
285static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
286{
287 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
288 int n;
289 if (!tree)
290 return 0;
291 /* full ones */
292 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
293 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
294 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
295 return 1;
296 }
297 /* partial */
298 if (p) {
299 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
300 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
301 return 1;
302 }
303 return 0;
304}
305
306static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
307 struct audit_names *name,
308 struct audit_field *f,
309 struct audit_context *ctx)
310{
311 struct audit_names *n;
312 int rc;
313
314 if (name) {
315 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
316 if (rc)
317 return rc;
318 }
319
320 if (ctx) {
321 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
322 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
323 if (rc)
324 return rc;
325 }
326 }
327 return 0;
328}
329
330static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
331 struct audit_names *name,
332 struct audit_field *f,
333 struct audit_context *ctx)
334{
335 struct audit_names *n;
336 int rc;
337
338 if (name) {
339 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
340 if (rc)
341 return rc;
342 }
343
344 if (ctx) {
345 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
346 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
347 if (rc)
348 return rc;
349 }
350 }
351 return 0;
352}
353
354static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
355 const struct cred *cred,
356 struct audit_field *f,
357 struct audit_context *ctx,
358 struct audit_names *name)
359{
360 switch (f->val) {
361 /* process to file object comparisons */
362 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
363 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
364 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
365 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
366 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
367 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
368 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
369 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
370 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
371 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
373 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
375 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
377 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
379 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
380 /* uid comparisons */
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
382 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
383 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
385 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
390 /* auid comparisons */
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
392 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
393 cred->euid);
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
395 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
396 cred->suid);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
399 cred->fsuid);
400 /* euid comparisons */
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* suid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
408 /* gid comparisons */
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
410 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
412 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
414 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
415 /* egid comparisons */
416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
420 /* sgid comparison */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
423 default:
424 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
425 return 0;
426 }
427 return 0;
428}
429
430/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
431/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
432 * otherwise.
433 *
434 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
435 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
436 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
437 */
438static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
439 struct audit_krule *rule,
440 struct audit_context *ctx,
441 struct audit_names *name,
442 enum audit_state *state,
443 bool task_creation)
444{
445 const struct cred *cred;
446 int i, need_sid = 1;
447 u32 sid;
448 unsigned int sessionid;
449
450 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
451
452 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
453 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
454 struct audit_names *n;
455 int result = 0;
456 pid_t pid;
457
458 switch (f->type) {
459 case AUDIT_PID:
460 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
461 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
462 break;
463 case AUDIT_PPID:
464 if (ctx) {
465 if (!ctx->ppid)
466 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
467 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
468 }
469 break;
470 case AUDIT_EXE:
471 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
472 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
473 result = !result;
474 break;
475 case AUDIT_UID:
476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
477 break;
478 case AUDIT_EUID:
479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
480 break;
481 case AUDIT_SUID:
482 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
483 break;
484 case AUDIT_FSUID:
485 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
486 break;
487 case AUDIT_GID:
488 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
489 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
490 if (!result)
491 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
492 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
493 if (result)
494 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
495 }
496 break;
497 case AUDIT_EGID:
498 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
499 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
500 if (!result)
501 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
502 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
503 if (result)
504 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
505 }
506 break;
507 case AUDIT_SGID:
508 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
509 break;
510 case AUDIT_FSGID:
511 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
512 break;
513 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
514 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
515 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
516 break;
517 case AUDIT_PERS:
518 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
519 break;
520 case AUDIT_ARCH:
521 if (ctx)
522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
523 break;
524
525 case AUDIT_EXIT:
526 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
527 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
528 break;
529 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
530 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
531 if (f->val)
532 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
533 else
534 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
535 }
536 break;
537 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
538 if (name) {
539 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
540 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
541 ++result;
542 } else if (ctx) {
543 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
544 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
545 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
546 ++result;
547 break;
548 }
549 }
550 }
551 break;
552 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
553 if (name) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
555 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
556 ++result;
557 } else if (ctx) {
558 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
559 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
560 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
561 ++result;
562 break;
563 }
564 }
565 }
566 break;
567 case AUDIT_INODE:
568 if (name)
569 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
570 else if (ctx) {
571 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
572 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
573 ++result;
574 break;
575 }
576 }
577 }
578 break;
579 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
580 if (name) {
581 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
582 } else if (ctx) {
583 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
584 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
585 ++result;
586 break;
587 }
588 }
589 }
590 break;
591 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
592 if (name) {
593 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
594 } else if (ctx) {
595 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
596 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
597 ++result;
598 break;
599 }
600 }
601 }
602 break;
603 case AUDIT_WATCH:
604 if (name) {
605 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
606 name->ino,
607 name->dev);
608 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
609 result = !result;
610 }
611 break;
612 case AUDIT_DIR:
613 if (ctx) {
614 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
615 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
616 result = !result;
617 }
618 break;
619 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
620 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
621 f->op, f->uid);
622 break;
623 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
624 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
625 break;
626 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
627 if (ctx->sockaddr)
628 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
629 f->op, f->val);
630 break;
631 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
632 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
633 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
634 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
635 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
636 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
637 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
638 match for now to avoid losing information that
639 may be wanted. An error message will also be
640 logged upon error */
641 if (f->lsm_rule) {
642 if (need_sid) {
643 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
644 need_sid = 0;
645 }
646 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
647 f->op,
648 f->lsm_rule);
649 }
650 break;
651 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
652 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
653 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
654 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
655 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
656 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
657 also applies here */
658 if (f->lsm_rule) {
659 /* Find files that match */
660 if (name) {
661 result = security_audit_rule_match(
662 name->osid,
663 f->type,
664 f->op,
665 f->lsm_rule);
666 } else if (ctx) {
667 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
668 if (security_audit_rule_match(
669 n->osid,
670 f->type,
671 f->op,
672 f->lsm_rule)) {
673 ++result;
674 break;
675 }
676 }
677 }
678 /* Find ipc objects that match */
679 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
680 break;
681 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
682 f->type, f->op,
683 f->lsm_rule))
684 ++result;
685 }
686 break;
687 case AUDIT_ARG0:
688 case AUDIT_ARG1:
689 case AUDIT_ARG2:
690 case AUDIT_ARG3:
691 if (ctx)
692 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
693 break;
694 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
695 /* ignore this field for filtering */
696 result = 1;
697 break;
698 case AUDIT_PERM:
699 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
700 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
701 result = !result;
702 break;
703 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
704 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
705 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
706 result = !result;
707 break;
708 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
709 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
710 break;
711 }
712 if (!result)
713 return 0;
714 }
715
716 if (ctx) {
717 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
718 return 0;
719 if (rule->filterkey) {
720 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
721 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
722 }
723 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
724 }
725 switch (rule->action) {
726 case AUDIT_NEVER:
727 *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
728 break;
729 case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
730 *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
731 break;
732 }
733 return 1;
734}
735
736/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
737 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
738 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
739 */
740static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
741{
742 struct audit_entry *e;
743 enum audit_state state;
744
745 rcu_read_lock();
746 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
747 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
748 &state, true)) {
749 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
750 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
751 rcu_read_unlock();
752 return state;
753 }
754 }
755 rcu_read_unlock();
756 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
757}
758
759static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
760{
761 int word, bit;
762
763 if (val > 0xffffffff)
764 return false;
765
766 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
767 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
768 return false;
769
770 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
771
772 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
773}
774
775/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
776 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
777 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
778 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
779 */
780static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
781 struct audit_context *ctx,
782 struct list_head *list)
783{
784 struct audit_entry *e;
785 enum audit_state state;
786
787 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
788 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
789
790 rcu_read_lock();
791 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
792 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
793 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
794 &state, false)) {
795 rcu_read_unlock();
796 ctx->current_state = state;
797 return state;
798 }
799 }
800 rcu_read_unlock();
801 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
802}
803
804/*
805 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
806 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
807 */
808static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
809 struct audit_names *n,
810 struct audit_context *ctx) {
811 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
812 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
813 struct audit_entry *e;
814 enum audit_state state;
815
816 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
817 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
818 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
819 ctx->current_state = state;
820 return 1;
821 }
822 }
823 return 0;
824}
825
826/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
827 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
828 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
829 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
830 */
831void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
832{
833 struct audit_names *n;
834
835 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
836 return;
837
838 rcu_read_lock();
839
840 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
841 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
842 break;
843 }
844 rcu_read_unlock();
845}
846
847static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
848{
849 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
850 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
851 context->proctitle.len = 0;
852}
853
854static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
855{
856 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
857 kfree(context->module.name);
858 context->module.name = NULL;
859 }
860}
861static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
862{
863 struct audit_names *n, *next;
864
865 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
866 list_del(&n->list);
867 if (n->name)
868 putname(n->name);
869 if (n->should_free)
870 kfree(n);
871 }
872 context->name_count = 0;
873 path_put(&context->pwd);
874 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
875 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
876}
877
878static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
879{
880 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
881
882 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
883 context->aux = aux->next;
884 kfree(aux);
885 }
886 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
887 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
888 kfree(aux);
889 }
890}
891
892static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
893{
894 struct audit_context *context;
895
896 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
897 if (!context)
898 return NULL;
899 context->state = state;
900 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
901 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
902 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
903 return context;
904}
905
906/**
907 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
908 * @tsk: task
909 *
910 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
911 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
912 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
913 * needed.
914 */
915int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
916{
917 struct audit_context *context;
918 enum audit_state state;
919 char *key = NULL;
920
921 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
922 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
923
924 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
925 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
926 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
927 return 0;
928 }
929
930 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
931 kfree(key);
932 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
933 return -ENOMEM;
934 }
935 context->filterkey = key;
936
937 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
938 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
939 return 0;
940}
941
942static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
943{
944 audit_free_module(context);
945 audit_free_names(context);
946 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
947 free_tree_refs(context);
948 audit_free_aux(context);
949 kfree(context->filterkey);
950 kfree(context->sockaddr);
951 audit_proctitle_free(context);
952 kfree(context);
953}
954
955static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
956 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
957 u32 sid, char *comm)
958{
959 struct audit_buffer *ab;
960 char *ctx = NULL;
961 u32 len;
962 int rc = 0;
963
964 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
965 if (!ab)
966 return rc;
967
968 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
969 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
970 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
971 if (sid) {
972 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
973 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
974 rc = 1;
975 } else {
976 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
977 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
978 }
979 }
980 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
981 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
982 audit_log_end(ab);
983
984 return rc;
985}
986
987static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
988 struct audit_buffer **ab)
989{
990 long len_max;
991 long len_rem;
992 long len_full;
993 long len_buf;
994 long len_abuf = 0;
995 long len_tmp;
996 bool require_data;
997 bool encode;
998 unsigned int iter;
999 unsigned int arg;
1000 char *buf_head;
1001 char *buf;
1002 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1003
1004 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1005 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1006 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1007 char abuf[96];
1008
1009 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1010 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1011 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1012 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1013 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1014 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1015
1016 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1017 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1018 if (!buf_head) {
1019 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1020 return;
1021 }
1022 buf = buf_head;
1023
1024 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1025
1026 len_rem = len_max;
1027 len_buf = 0;
1028 len_full = 0;
1029 require_data = true;
1030 encode = false;
1031 iter = 0;
1032 arg = 0;
1033 do {
1034 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1035 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1036 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1037 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1038 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1039 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1040 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1041 if (len_full == 0)
1042 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1043
1044 /* read more data from userspace */
1045 if (require_data) {
1046 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1047 if (buf != buf_head) {
1048 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1049 buf = buf_head;
1050 }
1051
1052 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1053 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1054 len_max - len_buf);
1055 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1056 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1057 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1058 goto out;
1059 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1060 /* buffer is not large enough */
1061 require_data = true;
1062 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1063 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1064 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1065 * consistent record encoding */
1066 encode = true;
1067 len_full = len_full * 2;
1068 p += len_tmp;
1069 } else {
1070 require_data = false;
1071 if (!encode)
1072 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1073 buf, len_tmp);
1074 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1075 if (len_full < len_max)
1076 len_full = (encode ?
1077 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1078 p += len_tmp + 1;
1079 }
1080 len_buf += len_tmp;
1081 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1082
1083 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1084 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1085 }
1086
1087 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1088 if (len_buf >= 0) {
1089 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1090 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1091 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1092 * a new buffer */
1093 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1094 len_rem = len_max;
1095 audit_log_end(*ab);
1096 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1097 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1098 if (!*ab)
1099 goto out;
1100 }
1101
1102 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1103 len_tmp = 0;
1104 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1105 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1106 if (iter == 0) {
1107 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1108 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1109 " a%d_len=%lu",
1110 arg, len_full);
1111 }
1112 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1113 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1114 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1115 } else
1116 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1117 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1118 " a%d=", arg);
1119 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1120 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1121
1122 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1123 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1124 len_rem -= len_tmp;
1125 len_tmp = len_buf;
1126 if (encode) {
1127 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1128 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1129 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1130 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1131 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1132 } else {
1133 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1134 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1135 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1136 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1137 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1138 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1139 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1140 }
1141 len_buf -= len_tmp;
1142 buf += len_tmp;
1143 }
1144
1145 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1146 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1147 arg++;
1148 iter = 0;
1149 len_full = 0;
1150 require_data = true;
1151 encode = false;
1152 }
1153 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1154
1155 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1156
1157out:
1158 kfree(buf_head);
1159}
1160
1161static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1162 kernel_cap_t *cap)
1163{
1164 int i;
1165
1166 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1167 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1168 return;
1169 }
1170 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1171 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
1172 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1173}
1174
1175static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1176{
1177 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1178 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1179 return;
1180 }
1181 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1182 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1183 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1184 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1185 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1186}
1187
1188static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1189{
1190 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1191 int i;
1192
1193 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1194 if (!ab)
1195 return;
1196
1197 switch (context->type) {
1198 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1199 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1200 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1201 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1202 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1203 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1204 break; }
1205 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1206 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1207
1208 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1209 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1210 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1211 context->ipc.mode);
1212 if (osid) {
1213 char *ctx = NULL;
1214 u32 len;
1215 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1216 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1217 *call_panic = 1;
1218 } else {
1219 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1220 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1221 }
1222 }
1223 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1224 audit_log_end(ab);
1225 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1226 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1227 if (unlikely(!ab))
1228 return;
1229 audit_log_format(ab,
1230 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1231 context->ipc.qbytes,
1232 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1233 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1234 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1235 }
1236 break; }
1237 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1238 audit_log_format(ab,
1239 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1240 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1241 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1242 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1243 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1244 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1245 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1246 break;
1247 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1248 audit_log_format(ab,
1249 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1250 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1251 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1252 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1253 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1254 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1255 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1256 break;
1257 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1258 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1259 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1260 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1261 break;
1262 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1263 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1264 audit_log_format(ab,
1265 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1266 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1267 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1268 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1269 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1270 break; }
1271 case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1272 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1273 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1274 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1275 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1276 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1277 break;
1278 case AUDIT_MMAP:
1279 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1280 context->mmap.flags);
1281 break;
1282 case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1283 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1284 break;
1285 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1286 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1287 if (context->module.name) {
1288 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1289 } else
1290 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1291
1292 break;
1293 }
1294 audit_log_end(ab);
1295}
1296
1297static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1298{
1299 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1300 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1301 end--;
1302
1303 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1304 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1305 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1306 return len;
1307}
1308
1309/*
1310 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1311 * @context: audit_context for the task
1312 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1313 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1314 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1315 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1316 */
1317static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1318 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1319{
1320 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1321
1322 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1323 if (!ab)
1324 return;
1325
1326 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1327
1328 if (path)
1329 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1330 else if (n->name) {
1331 switch (n->name_len) {
1332 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1333 /* log the full path */
1334 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1335 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1336 break;
1337 case 0:
1338 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1339 * directory component is the cwd
1340 */
1341 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1342 break;
1343 default:
1344 /* log the name's directory component */
1345 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1346 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1347 n->name_len);
1348 }
1349 } else
1350 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1351
1352 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1353 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1354 n->ino,
1355 MAJOR(n->dev),
1356 MINOR(n->dev),
1357 n->mode,
1358 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1359 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1360 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1361 MINOR(n->rdev));
1362 if (n->osid != 0) {
1363 char *ctx = NULL;
1364 u32 len;
1365
1366 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1367 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1368 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1369 if (call_panic)
1370 *call_panic = 2;
1371 } else {
1372 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1373 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1374 }
1375 }
1376
1377 /* log the audit_names record type */
1378 switch (n->type) {
1379 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1380 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1381 break;
1382 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1383 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1384 break;
1385 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1386 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1387 break;
1388 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1389 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1390 break;
1391 default:
1392 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1393 break;
1394 }
1395
1396 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1397 audit_log_end(ab);
1398}
1399
1400static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1401{
1402 int res;
1403 char *buf;
1404 char *msg = "(null)";
1405 int len = strlen(msg);
1406 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1407 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1408
1409 if (!context || context->dummy)
1410 return;
1411
1412 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1413 if (!ab)
1414 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1415
1416 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1417
1418 /* Not cached */
1419 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1420 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1421 if (!buf)
1422 goto out;
1423 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1424 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1425 if (res == 0) {
1426 kfree(buf);
1427 goto out;
1428 }
1429 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1430 if (res == 0) {
1431 kfree(buf);
1432 goto out;
1433 }
1434 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1435 context->proctitle.len = res;
1436 }
1437 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1438 len = context->proctitle.len;
1439out:
1440 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1441 audit_log_end(ab);
1442}
1443
1444static void audit_log_exit(void)
1445{
1446 int i, call_panic = 0;
1447 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1448 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1449 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1450 struct audit_names *n;
1451
1452 context->personality = current->personality;
1453
1454 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1455 if (!ab)
1456 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1457 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1458 context->arch, context->major);
1459 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1460 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1461 if (context->return_valid)
1462 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1463 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1464 context->return_code);
1465
1466 audit_log_format(ab,
1467 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1468 context->argv[0],
1469 context->argv[1],
1470 context->argv[2],
1471 context->argv[3],
1472 context->name_count);
1473
1474 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1475 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1476 audit_log_end(ab);
1477
1478 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1479
1480 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1481 if (!ab)
1482 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1483
1484 switch (aux->type) {
1485
1486 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1487 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1488 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1489 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1490 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1491 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1492 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1493 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1494 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1495 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1496 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1497 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1498 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1499 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1500 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1501 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1502 axs->fcap.rootid));
1503 break; }
1504
1505 }
1506 audit_log_end(ab);
1507 }
1508
1509 if (context->type)
1510 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1511
1512 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1513 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1514 if (ab) {
1515 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1516 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1517 audit_log_end(ab);
1518 }
1519 }
1520
1521 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1522 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1523 if (ab) {
1524 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1525 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1526 context->sockaddr_len);
1527 audit_log_end(ab);
1528 }
1529 }
1530
1531 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1532 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1533
1534 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1535 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1536 axs->target_auid[i],
1537 axs->target_uid[i],
1538 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1539 axs->target_sid[i],
1540 axs->target_comm[i]))
1541 call_panic = 1;
1542 }
1543
1544 if (context->target_pid &&
1545 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1546 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1547 context->target_sessionid,
1548 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1549 call_panic = 1;
1550
1551 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1552 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1553 if (ab) {
1554 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1555 audit_log_end(ab);
1556 }
1557 }
1558
1559 i = 0;
1560 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1561 if (n->hidden)
1562 continue;
1563 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1564 }
1565
1566 audit_log_proctitle();
1567
1568 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1569 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1570 if (ab)
1571 audit_log_end(ab);
1572 if (call_panic)
1573 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1574}
1575
1576/**
1577 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1578 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1579 *
1580 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1581 */
1582void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1583{
1584 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1585
1586 if (!context)
1587 return;
1588
1589 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1590 audit_kill_trees(context);
1591
1592 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1593 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1594 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1595 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1596 */
1597 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1598 context->return_valid = 0;
1599 context->return_code = 0;
1600
1601 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context,
1602 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1603 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1604 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1605 audit_log_exit();
1606 }
1607
1608 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1609 audit_free_context(context);
1610}
1611
1612/**
1613 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1614 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1615 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1616 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1617 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1618 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1619 *
1620 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1621 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1622 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1623 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1624 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1625 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1626 * be written).
1627 */
1628void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1629 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1630{
1631 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1632 enum audit_state state;
1633
1634 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1635 return;
1636
1637 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1638
1639 state = context->state;
1640 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1641 return;
1642
1643 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1644 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1645 context->prio = 0;
1646 if (auditd_test_task(current))
1647 return;
1648 }
1649
1650 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
1651 context->major = major;
1652 context->argv[0] = a1;
1653 context->argv[1] = a2;
1654 context->argv[2] = a3;
1655 context->argv[3] = a4;
1656 context->serial = 0;
1657 context->in_syscall = 1;
1658 context->current_state = state;
1659 context->ppid = 0;
1660 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
1661}
1662
1663/**
1664 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1665 * @success: success value of the syscall
1666 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1667 *
1668 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1669 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1670 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1671 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1672 * free the names stored from getname().
1673 */
1674void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1675{
1676 struct audit_context *context;
1677
1678 context = audit_context();
1679 if (!context)
1680 return;
1681
1682 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1683 audit_kill_trees(context);
1684
1685 if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1686 if (success)
1687 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1688 else
1689 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1690
1691 /*
1692 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1693 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1694 * arch specific signal handlers
1695 *
1696 * This is actually a test for:
1697 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1698 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1699 *
1700 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1701 */
1702 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1703 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1704 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1705 context->return_code = -EINTR;
1706 else
1707 context->return_code = return_code;
1708
1709 audit_filter_syscall(current, context,
1710 &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
1711 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
1712 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1713 audit_log_exit();
1714 }
1715
1716 context->in_syscall = 0;
1717 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1718
1719 audit_free_module(context);
1720 audit_free_names(context);
1721 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1722 audit_free_aux(context);
1723 context->aux = NULL;
1724 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1725 context->target_pid = 0;
1726 context->target_sid = 0;
1727 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1728 context->type = 0;
1729 context->fds[0] = -1;
1730 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1731 kfree(context->filterkey);
1732 context->filterkey = NULL;
1733 }
1734}
1735
1736static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1737{
1738 struct audit_context *context;
1739 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1740 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1741 int count;
1742 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
1743 return;
1744 context = audit_context();
1745 p = context->trees;
1746 count = context->tree_count;
1747 rcu_read_lock();
1748 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1749 rcu_read_unlock();
1750 if (!chunk)
1751 return;
1752 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1753 return;
1754 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1755 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1756 audit_set_auditable(context);
1757 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1758 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1759 return;
1760 }
1761 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1762}
1763
1764static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1765{
1766 struct audit_context *context;
1767 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1768 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1769 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1770 unsigned long seq;
1771 int count;
1772
1773 context = audit_context();
1774 p = context->trees;
1775 count = context->tree_count;
1776retry:
1777 drop = NULL;
1778 d = dentry;
1779 rcu_read_lock();
1780 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1781 for(;;) {
1782 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1783 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
1784 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1785 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1786 if (chunk) {
1787 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1788 drop = chunk;
1789 break;
1790 }
1791 }
1792 }
1793 parent = d->d_parent;
1794 if (parent == d)
1795 break;
1796 d = parent;
1797 }
1798 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1799 rcu_read_unlock();
1800 if (!drop) {
1801 /* just a race with rename */
1802 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1803 goto retry;
1804 }
1805 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1806 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1807 /* OK, got more space */
1808 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1809 goto retry;
1810 }
1811 /* too bad */
1812 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1813 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1814 audit_set_auditable(context);
1815 return;
1816 }
1817 rcu_read_unlock();
1818}
1819
1820static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1821 unsigned char type)
1822{
1823 struct audit_names *aname;
1824
1825 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1826 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1827 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1828 } else {
1829 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1830 if (!aname)
1831 return NULL;
1832 aname->should_free = true;
1833 }
1834
1835 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1836 aname->type = type;
1837 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1838
1839 context->name_count++;
1840 return aname;
1841}
1842
1843/**
1844 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1845 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1846 *
1847 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1848 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1849 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1850 */
1851struct filename *
1852__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1853{
1854 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1855 struct audit_names *n;
1856
1857 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1858 if (!n->name)
1859 continue;
1860 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1861 n->name->refcnt++;
1862 return n->name;
1863 }
1864 }
1865 return NULL;
1866}
1867
1868/**
1869 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1870 * @name: name to add
1871 *
1872 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1873 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1874 */
1875void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1876{
1877 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1878 struct audit_names *n;
1879
1880 if (!context->in_syscall)
1881 return;
1882
1883 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1884 if (!n)
1885 return;
1886
1887 n->name = name;
1888 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1889 name->aname = n;
1890 name->refcnt++;
1891
1892 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1893 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1894}
1895
1896static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
1897 const struct dentry *dentry)
1898{
1899 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1900 int rc;
1901
1902 if (!dentry)
1903 return 0;
1904
1905 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1906 if (rc)
1907 return rc;
1908
1909 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1910 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1911 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1912 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
1913 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
1914 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1915
1916 return 0;
1917}
1918
1919/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1920static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
1921 const struct dentry *dentry,
1922 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
1923{
1924 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1925 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1926 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1927 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1928 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1929 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1930 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1931 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
1932 name->fcap_ver = -1;
1933 return;
1934 }
1935 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1936}
1937
1938/**
1939 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1940 * @name: name being audited
1941 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1942 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1943 */
1944void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1945 unsigned int flags)
1946{
1947 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1948 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1949 struct audit_names *n;
1950 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1951 struct audit_entry *e;
1952 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
1953 int i;
1954
1955 if (!context->in_syscall)
1956 return;
1957
1958 rcu_read_lock();
1959 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
1960 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1961 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1962
1963 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
1964 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
1965 f->op, f->val)
1966 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
1967 rcu_read_unlock();
1968 return;
1969 }
1970 }
1971 }
1972 rcu_read_unlock();
1973
1974 if (!name)
1975 goto out_alloc;
1976
1977 /*
1978 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1979 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1980 */
1981 n = name->aname;
1982 if (n) {
1983 if (parent) {
1984 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1985 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1986 goto out;
1987 } else {
1988 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1989 goto out;
1990 }
1991 }
1992
1993 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1994 if (n->ino) {
1995 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1996 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
1997 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
1998 continue;
1999 } else if (n->name) {
2000 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2001 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2002 continue;
2003 } else
2004 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2005 continue;
2006
2007 /* match the correct record type */
2008 if (parent) {
2009 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2010 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2011 goto out;
2012 } else {
2013 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2014 goto out;
2015 }
2016 }
2017
2018out_alloc:
2019 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2020 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2021 if (!n)
2022 return;
2023 if (name) {
2024 n->name = name;
2025 name->refcnt++;
2026 }
2027
2028out:
2029 if (parent) {
2030 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2031 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2032 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2033 n->hidden = true;
2034 } else {
2035 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2036 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2037 }
2038 handle_path(dentry);
2039 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2040}
2041
2042void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2043{
2044 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2045}
2046
2047/**
2048 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2049 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2050 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2051 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2052 *
2053 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2054 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2055 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2056 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2057 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2058 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2059 * unsuccessful attempts.
2060 */
2061void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2062 const struct dentry *dentry,
2063 const unsigned char type)
2064{
2065 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2066 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2067 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2068 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2069 struct audit_entry *e;
2070 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2071 int i;
2072
2073 if (!context->in_syscall)
2074 return;
2075
2076 rcu_read_lock();
2077 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2078 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2079 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2080
2081 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2082 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2083 f->op, f->val)
2084 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2085 rcu_read_unlock();
2086 return;
2087 }
2088 }
2089 }
2090 rcu_read_unlock();
2091
2092 if (inode)
2093 handle_one(inode);
2094
2095 /* look for a parent entry first */
2096 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2097 if (!n->name ||
2098 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2099 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2100 continue;
2101
2102 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2103 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2104 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2105 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2106 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2107 found_parent = n;
2108 break;
2109 }
2110 }
2111
2112 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2113 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2114 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2115 if (!n->name ||
2116 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2117 continue;
2118
2119 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2120 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2121 found_parent ?
2122 found_parent->name_len :
2123 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
2124 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2125 n->type = type;
2126 found_child = n;
2127 break;
2128 }
2129 }
2130
2131 if (!found_parent) {
2132 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2133 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2134 if (!n)
2135 return;
2136 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2137 }
2138
2139 if (!found_child) {
2140 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2141 if (!found_child)
2142 return;
2143
2144 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2145 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2146 * audit_free_names() */
2147 if (found_parent) {
2148 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2149 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2150 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2151 }
2152 }
2153
2154 if (inode)
2155 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2156 else
2157 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2158}
2159EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2160
2161/**
2162 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2163 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2164 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2165 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2166 *
2167 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2168 */
2169int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2170 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2171{
2172 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2173 return 0;
2174 if (!ctx->serial)
2175 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2176 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2177 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2178 *serial = ctx->serial;
2179 if (!ctx->prio) {
2180 ctx->prio = 1;
2181 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2182 }
2183 return 1;
2184}
2185
2186/**
2187 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2188 * @oflag: open flag
2189 * @mode: mode bits
2190 * @attr: queue attributes
2191 *
2192 */
2193void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2194{
2195 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2196
2197 if (attr)
2198 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2199 else
2200 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2201
2202 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2203 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2204
2205 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2206}
2207
2208/**
2209 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2210 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2211 * @msg_len: Message length
2212 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2213 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2214 *
2215 */
2216void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2217 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2218{
2219 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2220 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2221
2222 if (abs_timeout)
2223 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2224 else
2225 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2226
2227 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2228 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2229 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2230
2231 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2232}
2233
2234/**
2235 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2236 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2237 * @notification: Notification event
2238 *
2239 */
2240
2241void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2242{
2243 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2244
2245 if (notification)
2246 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2247 else
2248 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2249
2250 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2251 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2252}
2253
2254/**
2255 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2256 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2257 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2258 *
2259 */
2260void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2261{
2262 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2263 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2264 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2265 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2266}
2267
2268/**
2269 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2270 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2271 *
2272 */
2273void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2274{
2275 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2276 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2277 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2278 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2279 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2280 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2281 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2282}
2283
2284/**
2285 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2286 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2287 * @uid: msgq user id
2288 * @gid: msgq group id
2289 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2290 *
2291 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2292 */
2293void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2294{
2295 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2296
2297 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2298 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2299 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2300 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2301 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2302}
2303
2304void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2305{
2306 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2307
2308 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2309 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2310}
2311
2312
2313/**
2314 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2315 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2316 * @args: args array
2317 *
2318 */
2319int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2320{
2321 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2322
2323 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2324 return -EINVAL;
2325 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2326 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2327 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2328 return 0;
2329}
2330
2331/**
2332 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2333 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2334 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2335 *
2336 */
2337void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2338{
2339 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2340 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2341 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2342}
2343
2344/**
2345 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2346 * @len: data length in user space
2347 * @a: data address in kernel space
2348 *
2349 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2350 */
2351int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2352{
2353 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2354
2355 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2356 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2357 if (!p)
2358 return -ENOMEM;
2359 context->sockaddr = p;
2360 }
2361
2362 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2363 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2364 return 0;
2365}
2366
2367void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2368{
2369 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2370
2371 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2372 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2373 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2374 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2375 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2376 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2377}
2378
2379/**
2380 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2381 * @t: task being signaled
2382 *
2383 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2384 * and uid that is doing that.
2385 */
2386int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2387{
2388 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2389 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2390 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2391
2392 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2393 return 0;
2394
2395 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2396 * in audit_context */
2397 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2398 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2399 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2400 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2401 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2402 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2403 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2404 return 0;
2405 }
2406
2407 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2408 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2409 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2410 if (!axp)
2411 return -ENOMEM;
2412
2413 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2414 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2415 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2416 }
2417 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2418
2419 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2420 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2421 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2422 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2423 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2424 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2425 axp->pid_count++;
2426
2427 return 0;
2428}
2429
2430/**
2431 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2432 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2433 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2434 * @old: the old credentials
2435 *
2436 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2437 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2438 *
2439 * -Eric
2440 */
2441int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2442 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2443{
2444 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2445 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2446 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2447
2448 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2449 if (!ax)
2450 return -ENOMEM;
2451
2452 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2453 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2454 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2455
2456 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2457
2458 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2459 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2460 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2461 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2462 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2463
2464 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2465 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2466 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2467 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2468
2469 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2470 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2471 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2472 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2473 return 0;
2474}
2475
2476/**
2477 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2478 * @new: the new credentials
2479 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2480 *
2481 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2482 * audit system if applicable
2483 */
2484void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2485{
2486 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2487 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2488 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2489 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2490 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2491 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2492 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2493}
2494
2495void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2496{
2497 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2498 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2499 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2500 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2501}
2502
2503void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2504{
2505 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2506
2507 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2508 if (!context->module.name)
2509 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2510 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2511}
2512
2513void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2514{
2515 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2516 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2517}
2518
2519void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2520{
2521 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
2522 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2523 (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
2524}
2525
2526static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
2527 const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
2528{
2529 const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
2530
2531 if (val->newval == val->oldval)
2532 return;
2533
2534 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
2535 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
2536}
2537
2538void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2539{
2540 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
2541 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
2542 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
2543 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
2544 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
2545 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
2546}
2547
2548static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2549{
2550 kuid_t auid, uid;
2551 kgid_t gid;
2552 unsigned int sessionid;
2553 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2554
2555 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2556 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2557 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2558
2559 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2560 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2561 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2562 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2563 sessionid);
2564 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2565 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2566 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2567 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2568}
2569
2570/**
2571 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2572 * @signr: signal value
2573 *
2574 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2575 * should record the event for investigation.
2576 */
2577void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2578{
2579 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2580
2581 if (!audit_enabled)
2582 return;
2583
2584 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2585 return;
2586
2587 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2588 if (unlikely(!ab))
2589 return;
2590 audit_log_task(ab);
2591 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2592 audit_log_end(ab);
2593}
2594
2595/**
2596 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2597 * @syscall: syscall number
2598 * @signr: signal value
2599 * @code: the seccomp action
2600 *
2601 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2602 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2603 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2604 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2605 * audit is not in use.
2606 */
2607void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2608{
2609 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2610
2611 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2612 if (unlikely(!ab))
2613 return;
2614 audit_log_task(ab);
2615 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2616 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2617 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2618 audit_log_end(ab);
2619}
2620
2621void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2622 int res)
2623{
2624 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2625
2626 if (!audit_enabled)
2627 return;
2628
2629 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2630 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2631 if (unlikely(!ab))
2632 return;
2633
2634 audit_log_format(ab,
2635 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2636 names, old_names, res);
2637 audit_log_end(ab);
2638}
2639
2640struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2641{
2642 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2643 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2644 return NULL;
2645 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2646}
1/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
46
47#include <linux/init.h>
48#include <asm/types.h>
49#include <linux/atomic.h>
50#include <linux/fs.h>
51#include <linux/namei.h>
52#include <linux/mm.h>
53#include <linux/export.h>
54#include <linux/slab.h>
55#include <linux/mount.h>
56#include <linux/socket.h>
57#include <linux/mqueue.h>
58#include <linux/audit.h>
59#include <linux/personality.h>
60#include <linux/time.h>
61#include <linux/netlink.h>
62#include <linux/compiler.h>
63#include <asm/unistd.h>
64#include <linux/security.h>
65#include <linux/list.h>
66#include <linux/binfmts.h>
67#include <linux/highmem.h>
68#include <linux/syscalls.h>
69#include <asm/syscall.h>
70#include <linux/capability.h>
71#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72#include <linux/compat.h>
73#include <linux/ctype.h>
74#include <linux/string.h>
75#include <linux/uaccess.h>
76#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
77#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
78#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
79
80#include "audit.h"
81
82/* flags stating the success for a syscall */
83#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
84#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
85#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
86
87/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
88 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
89#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90
91/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
92#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
93
94/* number of audit rules */
95int audit_n_rules;
96
97/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
98int audit_signals;
99
100struct audit_aux_data {
101 struct audit_aux_data *next;
102 int type;
103};
104
105/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
106#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
107
108struct audit_aux_data_pids {
109 struct audit_aux_data d;
110 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
111 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
116 int pid_count;
117};
118
119struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
120 struct audit_aux_data d;
121 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
122 unsigned int fcap_ver;
123 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
124 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
125};
126
127struct audit_tree_refs {
128 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
129 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
130};
131
132struct audit_nfcfgop_tab {
133 enum audit_nfcfgop op;
134 const char *s;
135};
136
137static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
138 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "xt_register" },
139 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "xt_replace" },
140 { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "xt_unregister" },
141 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_table" },
142 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_table" },
143 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER, "nft_register_chain" },
144 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_chain" },
145 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER, "nft_register_rule" },
146 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_rule" },
147 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER, "nft_register_set" },
148 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_set" },
149 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER, "nft_register_setelem" },
150 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_setelem" },
151 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, "nft_register_gen" },
152 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER, "nft_register_obj" },
153 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_obj" },
154 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET, "nft_reset_obj" },
155 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_flowtable" },
156 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_flowtable" },
157 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID, "nft_invalid" },
158};
159
160static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
161{
162 unsigned n;
163
164 if (unlikely(!ctx))
165 return 0;
166 n = ctx->major;
167
168 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
169 case 0: /* native */
170 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
171 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
172 return 1;
173 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
174 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
175 return 1;
176 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
177 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
178 return 1;
179 return 0;
180 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
181 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
182 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
183 return 1;
184 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
185 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
186 return 1;
187 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
188 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
189 return 1;
190 return 0;
191 case 2: /* open */
192 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
193 case 3: /* openat */
194 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
195 case 4: /* socketcall */
196 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
197 case 5: /* execve */
198 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
199 default:
200 return 0;
201 }
202}
203
204static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
205{
206 struct audit_names *n;
207 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
208
209 if (unlikely(!ctx))
210 return 0;
211
212 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
213 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
214 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
215 return 1;
216 }
217
218 return 0;
219}
220
221/*
222 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
223 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
224 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
225 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
226 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
227 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
228 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
229 */
230
231static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
232{
233 if (!ctx->prio) {
234 ctx->prio = 1;
235 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
236 }
237}
238
239static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
240{
241 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
242 int left = ctx->tree_count;
243
244 if (likely(left)) {
245 p->c[--left] = chunk;
246 ctx->tree_count = left;
247 return 1;
248 }
249 if (!p)
250 return 0;
251 p = p->next;
252 if (p) {
253 p->c[30] = chunk;
254 ctx->trees = p;
255 ctx->tree_count = 30;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 return 0;
259}
260
261static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
262{
263 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
264
265 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
266 if (!ctx->trees) {
267 ctx->trees = p;
268 return 0;
269 }
270 if (p)
271 p->next = ctx->trees;
272 else
273 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
274 ctx->tree_count = 31;
275 return 1;
276}
277
278static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
279 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
280{
281 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
282 int n;
283
284 if (!p) {
285 /* we started with empty chain */
286 p = ctx->first_trees;
287 count = 31;
288 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
289 if (!p)
290 return;
291 }
292 n = count;
293 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
294 while (n--) {
295 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
296 q->c[n] = NULL;
297 }
298 }
299 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
300 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
301 q->c[n] = NULL;
302 }
303 ctx->trees = p;
304 ctx->tree_count = count;
305}
306
307static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
308{
309 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
310
311 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
312 q = p->next;
313 kfree(p);
314 }
315}
316
317static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
318{
319 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
320 int n;
321
322 if (!tree)
323 return 0;
324 /* full ones */
325 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
326 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
327 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
328 return 1;
329 }
330 /* partial */
331 if (p) {
332 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
333 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
334 return 1;
335 }
336 return 0;
337}
338
339static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
340 struct audit_names *name,
341 struct audit_field *f,
342 struct audit_context *ctx)
343{
344 struct audit_names *n;
345 int rc;
346
347 if (name) {
348 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
349 if (rc)
350 return rc;
351 }
352
353 if (ctx) {
354 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
355 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
356 if (rc)
357 return rc;
358 }
359 }
360 return 0;
361}
362
363static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
364 struct audit_names *name,
365 struct audit_field *f,
366 struct audit_context *ctx)
367{
368 struct audit_names *n;
369 int rc;
370
371 if (name) {
372 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
373 if (rc)
374 return rc;
375 }
376
377 if (ctx) {
378 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
379 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
380 if (rc)
381 return rc;
382 }
383 }
384 return 0;
385}
386
387static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
388 const struct cred *cred,
389 struct audit_field *f,
390 struct audit_context *ctx,
391 struct audit_names *name)
392{
393 switch (f->val) {
394 /* process to file object comparisons */
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
396 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
398 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
400 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
402 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
404 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
405 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
406 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
408 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
410 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
412 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
413 /* uid comparisons */
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
415 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
416 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
418 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
419 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
420 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
422 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
423 /* auid comparisons */
424 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
425 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
426 cred->euid);
427 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
428 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
429 cred->suid);
430 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
431 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
432 cred->fsuid);
433 /* euid comparisons */
434 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
435 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
436 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
437 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
438 /* suid comparisons */
439 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
440 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
441 /* gid comparisons */
442 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
443 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
444 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
445 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
446 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
447 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
448 /* egid comparisons */
449 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
450 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
451 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
452 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
453 /* sgid comparison */
454 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
455 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
456 default:
457 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
458 return 0;
459 }
460 return 0;
461}
462
463/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
464/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
465 * otherwise.
466 *
467 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
468 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
469 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
470 */
471static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
472 struct audit_krule *rule,
473 struct audit_context *ctx,
474 struct audit_names *name,
475 enum audit_state *state,
476 bool task_creation)
477{
478 const struct cred *cred;
479 int i, need_sid = 1;
480 u32 sid;
481 unsigned int sessionid;
482
483 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
484
485 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
486 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
487 struct audit_names *n;
488 int result = 0;
489 pid_t pid;
490
491 switch (f->type) {
492 case AUDIT_PID:
493 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
494 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
495 break;
496 case AUDIT_PPID:
497 if (ctx) {
498 if (!ctx->ppid)
499 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
500 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
501 }
502 break;
503 case AUDIT_EXE:
504 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
505 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
506 result = !result;
507 break;
508 case AUDIT_UID:
509 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
510 break;
511 case AUDIT_EUID:
512 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
513 break;
514 case AUDIT_SUID:
515 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
516 break;
517 case AUDIT_FSUID:
518 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
519 break;
520 case AUDIT_GID:
521 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
522 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
523 if (!result)
524 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
525 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
526 if (result)
527 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
528 }
529 break;
530 case AUDIT_EGID:
531 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
532 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
533 if (!result)
534 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
535 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
536 if (result)
537 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
538 }
539 break;
540 case AUDIT_SGID:
541 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
542 break;
543 case AUDIT_FSGID:
544 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
545 break;
546 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
547 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
548 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
549 break;
550 case AUDIT_PERS:
551 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
552 break;
553 case AUDIT_ARCH:
554 if (ctx)
555 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
556 break;
557
558 case AUDIT_EXIT:
559 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
560 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
561 break;
562 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
563 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) {
564 if (f->val)
565 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
566 else
567 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
568 }
569 break;
570 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
571 if (name) {
572 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
573 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
574 ++result;
575 } else if (ctx) {
576 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
577 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
578 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
579 ++result;
580 break;
581 }
582 }
583 }
584 break;
585 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
586 if (name) {
587 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
588 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
589 ++result;
590 } else if (ctx) {
591 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
592 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
593 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
594 ++result;
595 break;
596 }
597 }
598 }
599 break;
600 case AUDIT_INODE:
601 if (name)
602 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
603 else if (ctx) {
604 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
605 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
606 ++result;
607 break;
608 }
609 }
610 }
611 break;
612 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
613 if (name) {
614 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
615 } else if (ctx) {
616 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
617 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
618 ++result;
619 break;
620 }
621 }
622 }
623 break;
624 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
625 if (name) {
626 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
627 } else if (ctx) {
628 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
629 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
630 ++result;
631 break;
632 }
633 }
634 }
635 break;
636 case AUDIT_WATCH:
637 if (name) {
638 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
639 name->ino,
640 name->dev);
641 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
642 result = !result;
643 }
644 break;
645 case AUDIT_DIR:
646 if (ctx) {
647 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
648 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
649 result = !result;
650 }
651 break;
652 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
653 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
654 f->op, f->uid);
655 break;
656 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
657 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
658 break;
659 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
660 if (ctx && ctx->sockaddr)
661 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
662 f->op, f->val);
663 break;
664 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
665 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
666 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
667 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
668 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
669 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
670 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
671 match for now to avoid losing information that
672 may be wanted. An error message will also be
673 logged upon error */
674 if (f->lsm_rule) {
675 if (need_sid) {
676 security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
677 need_sid = 0;
678 }
679 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
680 f->op,
681 f->lsm_rule);
682 }
683 break;
684 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
685 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
686 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
687 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
688 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
689 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
690 also applies here */
691 if (f->lsm_rule) {
692 /* Find files that match */
693 if (name) {
694 result = security_audit_rule_match(
695 name->osid,
696 f->type,
697 f->op,
698 f->lsm_rule);
699 } else if (ctx) {
700 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
701 if (security_audit_rule_match(
702 n->osid,
703 f->type,
704 f->op,
705 f->lsm_rule)) {
706 ++result;
707 break;
708 }
709 }
710 }
711 /* Find ipc objects that match */
712 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
713 break;
714 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
715 f->type, f->op,
716 f->lsm_rule))
717 ++result;
718 }
719 break;
720 case AUDIT_ARG0:
721 case AUDIT_ARG1:
722 case AUDIT_ARG2:
723 case AUDIT_ARG3:
724 if (ctx)
725 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
726 break;
727 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
728 /* ignore this field for filtering */
729 result = 1;
730 break;
731 case AUDIT_PERM:
732 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
733 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
734 result = !result;
735 break;
736 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
737 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
738 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
739 result = !result;
740 break;
741 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
742 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
743 break;
744 }
745 if (!result)
746 return 0;
747 }
748
749 if (ctx) {
750 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
751 return 0;
752 if (rule->filterkey) {
753 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
754 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
755 }
756 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
757 }
758 switch (rule->action) {
759 case AUDIT_NEVER:
760 *state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
761 break;
762 case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
763 *state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
764 break;
765 }
766 return 1;
767}
768
769/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
770 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
771 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
772 */
773static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
774{
775 struct audit_entry *e;
776 enum audit_state state;
777
778 rcu_read_lock();
779 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
780 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
781 &state, true)) {
782 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
783 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
784 rcu_read_unlock();
785 return state;
786 }
787 }
788 rcu_read_unlock();
789 return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
790}
791
792static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
793{
794 int word, bit;
795
796 if (val > 0xffffffff)
797 return false;
798
799 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
800 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
801 return false;
802
803 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
804
805 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
806}
807
808/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
809 * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
810 * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
811 * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
812 */
813static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
814 struct audit_context *ctx)
815{
816 struct audit_entry *e;
817 enum audit_state state;
818
819 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
820 return;
821
822 rcu_read_lock();
823 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT], list) {
824 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
825 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
826 &state, false)) {
827 rcu_read_unlock();
828 ctx->current_state = state;
829 return;
830 }
831 }
832 rcu_read_unlock();
833 return;
834}
835
836/*
837 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
838 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
839 */
840static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
841 struct audit_names *n,
842 struct audit_context *ctx) {
843 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
844 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
845 struct audit_entry *e;
846 enum audit_state state;
847
848 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
849 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
850 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
851 ctx->current_state = state;
852 return 1;
853 }
854 }
855 return 0;
856}
857
858/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
859 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
860 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
861 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
862 */
863void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
864{
865 struct audit_names *n;
866
867 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
868 return;
869
870 rcu_read_lock();
871
872 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
873 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
874 break;
875 }
876 rcu_read_unlock();
877}
878
879static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
880{
881 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
882 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
883 context->proctitle.len = 0;
884}
885
886static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
887{
888 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
889 kfree(context->module.name);
890 context->module.name = NULL;
891 }
892}
893static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
894{
895 struct audit_names *n, *next;
896
897 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
898 list_del(&n->list);
899 if (n->name)
900 putname(n->name);
901 if (n->should_free)
902 kfree(n);
903 }
904 context->name_count = 0;
905 path_put(&context->pwd);
906 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
907 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
908}
909
910static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
911{
912 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
913
914 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
915 context->aux = aux->next;
916 kfree(aux);
917 }
918 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
919 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
920 kfree(aux);
921 }
922}
923
924static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
925{
926 struct audit_context *context;
927
928 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
929 if (!context)
930 return NULL;
931 context->state = state;
932 context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
933 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
934 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
935 context->fds[0] = -1;
936 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
937 return context;
938}
939
940/**
941 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
942 * @tsk: task
943 *
944 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
945 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
946 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
947 * needed.
948 */
949int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
950{
951 struct audit_context *context;
952 enum audit_state state;
953 char *key = NULL;
954
955 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
956 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
957
958 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
959 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
960 clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
961 return 0;
962 }
963
964 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
965 kfree(key);
966 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
967 return -ENOMEM;
968 }
969 context->filterkey = key;
970
971 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
972 set_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
973 return 0;
974}
975
976static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
977{
978 audit_free_module(context);
979 audit_free_names(context);
980 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
981 free_tree_refs(context);
982 audit_free_aux(context);
983 kfree(context->filterkey);
984 kfree(context->sockaddr);
985 audit_proctitle_free(context);
986 kfree(context);
987}
988
989static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
990 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
991 u32 sid, char *comm)
992{
993 struct audit_buffer *ab;
994 char *ctx = NULL;
995 u32 len;
996 int rc = 0;
997
998 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
999 if (!ab)
1000 return rc;
1001
1002 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
1003 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
1004 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
1005 if (sid) {
1006 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1007 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1008 rc = 1;
1009 } else {
1010 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1011 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1012 }
1013 }
1014 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1015 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1016 audit_log_end(ab);
1017
1018 return rc;
1019}
1020
1021static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1022 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1023{
1024 long len_max;
1025 long len_rem;
1026 long len_full;
1027 long len_buf;
1028 long len_abuf = 0;
1029 long len_tmp;
1030 bool require_data;
1031 bool encode;
1032 unsigned int iter;
1033 unsigned int arg;
1034 char *buf_head;
1035 char *buf;
1036 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1037
1038 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1039 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1040 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1041 char abuf[96];
1042
1043 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1044 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1045 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1046 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1047 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1048 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1049
1050 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1051 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1052 if (!buf_head) {
1053 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1054 return;
1055 }
1056 buf = buf_head;
1057
1058 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1059
1060 len_rem = len_max;
1061 len_buf = 0;
1062 len_full = 0;
1063 require_data = true;
1064 encode = false;
1065 iter = 0;
1066 arg = 0;
1067 do {
1068 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1069 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1070 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1071 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1072 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1073 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1074 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1075 if (len_full == 0)
1076 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1077
1078 /* read more data from userspace */
1079 if (require_data) {
1080 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1081 if (buf != buf_head) {
1082 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1083 buf = buf_head;
1084 }
1085
1086 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1087 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1088 len_max - len_buf);
1089 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1090 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1091 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1092 goto out;
1093 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1094 /* buffer is not large enough */
1095 require_data = true;
1096 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1097 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1098 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1099 * consistent record encoding */
1100 encode = true;
1101 len_full = len_full * 2;
1102 p += len_tmp;
1103 } else {
1104 require_data = false;
1105 if (!encode)
1106 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1107 buf, len_tmp);
1108 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1109 if (len_full < len_max)
1110 len_full = (encode ?
1111 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1112 p += len_tmp + 1;
1113 }
1114 len_buf += len_tmp;
1115 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1116
1117 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1118 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1119 }
1120
1121 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1122 if (len_buf >= 0) {
1123 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1124 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1125 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1126 * a new buffer */
1127 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1128 len_rem = len_max;
1129 audit_log_end(*ab);
1130 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1131 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1132 if (!*ab)
1133 goto out;
1134 }
1135
1136 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1137 len_tmp = 0;
1138 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1139 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1140 if (iter == 0) {
1141 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1142 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1143 " a%d_len=%lu",
1144 arg, len_full);
1145 }
1146 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1147 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1148 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1149 } else
1150 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1151 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1152 " a%d=", arg);
1153 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1154 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1155
1156 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1157 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1158 len_rem -= len_tmp;
1159 len_tmp = len_buf;
1160 if (encode) {
1161 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1162 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1163 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1164 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1165 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1166 } else {
1167 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1168 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1169 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1170 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1171 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1172 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1173 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1174 }
1175 len_buf -= len_tmp;
1176 buf += len_tmp;
1177 }
1178
1179 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1180 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1181 arg++;
1182 iter = 0;
1183 len_full = 0;
1184 require_data = true;
1185 encode = false;
1186 }
1187 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1188
1189 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1190
1191out:
1192 kfree(buf_head);
1193}
1194
1195static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1196 kernel_cap_t *cap)
1197{
1198 int i;
1199
1200 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1201 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1202 return;
1203 }
1204 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1205 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i)
1206 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1207}
1208
1209static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1210{
1211 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1212 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1213 return;
1214 }
1215 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1216 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1217 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1218 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1219 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1220}
1221
1222static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1223{
1224 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1225 int i;
1226
1227 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1228 if (!ab)
1229 return;
1230
1231 switch (context->type) {
1232 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1233 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1234
1235 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1236 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1237 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1238 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1239 break; }
1240 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1241 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1242
1243 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1244 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1245 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1246 context->ipc.mode);
1247 if (osid) {
1248 char *ctx = NULL;
1249 u32 len;
1250
1251 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1252 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1253 *call_panic = 1;
1254 } else {
1255 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1256 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1257 }
1258 }
1259 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1260 audit_log_end(ab);
1261 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1262 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1263 if (unlikely(!ab))
1264 return;
1265 audit_log_format(ab,
1266 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1267 context->ipc.qbytes,
1268 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1269 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1270 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1271 }
1272 break; }
1273 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1274 audit_log_format(ab,
1275 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1276 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1277 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1278 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1279 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1280 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1281 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1282 break;
1283 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1284 audit_log_format(ab,
1285 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1286 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1287 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1288 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1289 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1290 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1291 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1292 break;
1293 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1294 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1295 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1296 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1297 break;
1298 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1299 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1300
1301 audit_log_format(ab,
1302 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1303 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1304 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1305 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1306 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1307 break; }
1308 case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1309 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1310 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1311 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1312 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1313 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1314 break;
1315 case AUDIT_MMAP:
1316 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1317 context->mmap.flags);
1318 break;
1319 case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1320 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1321 break;
1322 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1323 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1324 if (context->module.name) {
1325 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1326 } else
1327 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1328
1329 break;
1330 }
1331 audit_log_end(ab);
1332}
1333
1334static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1335{
1336 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1337
1338 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1339 end--;
1340
1341 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1342 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1343 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1344 return len;
1345}
1346
1347/*
1348 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1349 * @context: audit_context for the task
1350 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1351 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1352 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1353 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1354 */
1355static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1356 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1357{
1358 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1359
1360 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1361 if (!ab)
1362 return;
1363
1364 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1365
1366 if (path)
1367 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1368 else if (n->name) {
1369 switch (n->name_len) {
1370 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1371 /* log the full path */
1372 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1373 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1374 break;
1375 case 0:
1376 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1377 * directory component is the cwd
1378 */
1379 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt)
1380 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1381 else
1382 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1383 break;
1384 default:
1385 /* log the name's directory component */
1386 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1387 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1388 n->name_len);
1389 }
1390 } else
1391 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1392
1393 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1394 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1395 n->ino,
1396 MAJOR(n->dev),
1397 MINOR(n->dev),
1398 n->mode,
1399 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1400 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1401 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1402 MINOR(n->rdev));
1403 if (n->osid != 0) {
1404 char *ctx = NULL;
1405 u32 len;
1406
1407 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1408 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1409 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1410 if (call_panic)
1411 *call_panic = 2;
1412 } else {
1413 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1414 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1415 }
1416 }
1417
1418 /* log the audit_names record type */
1419 switch (n->type) {
1420 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1421 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1422 break;
1423 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1424 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1425 break;
1426 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1427 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1428 break;
1429 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1430 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1431 break;
1432 default:
1433 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1434 break;
1435 }
1436
1437 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1438 audit_log_end(ab);
1439}
1440
1441static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1442{
1443 int res;
1444 char *buf;
1445 char *msg = "(null)";
1446 int len = strlen(msg);
1447 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1448 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1449
1450 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1451 if (!ab)
1452 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1453
1454 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1455
1456 /* Not cached */
1457 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1458 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1459 if (!buf)
1460 goto out;
1461 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1462 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1463 if (res == 0) {
1464 kfree(buf);
1465 goto out;
1466 }
1467 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1468 if (res == 0) {
1469 kfree(buf);
1470 goto out;
1471 }
1472 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1473 context->proctitle.len = res;
1474 }
1475 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1476 len = context->proctitle.len;
1477out:
1478 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1479 audit_log_end(ab);
1480}
1481
1482static void audit_log_exit(void)
1483{
1484 int i, call_panic = 0;
1485 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1486 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1487 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1488 struct audit_names *n;
1489
1490 context->personality = current->personality;
1491
1492 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1493 if (!ab)
1494 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1495 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1496 context->arch, context->major);
1497 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1498 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1499 if (context->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
1500 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1501 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1502 context->return_code);
1503
1504 audit_log_format(ab,
1505 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1506 context->argv[0],
1507 context->argv[1],
1508 context->argv[2],
1509 context->argv[3],
1510 context->name_count);
1511
1512 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1513 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1514 audit_log_end(ab);
1515
1516 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1517
1518 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1519 if (!ab)
1520 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1521
1522 switch (aux->type) {
1523
1524 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1525 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1526
1527 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1528 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1529 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1530 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1531 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1532 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1533 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1534 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1535 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1536 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1537 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1538 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1539 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1540 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1541 axs->fcap.rootid));
1542 break; }
1543
1544 }
1545 audit_log_end(ab);
1546 }
1547
1548 if (context->type)
1549 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1550
1551 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1552 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1553 if (ab) {
1554 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1555 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1556 audit_log_end(ab);
1557 }
1558 }
1559
1560 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1561 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1562 if (ab) {
1563 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1564 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1565 context->sockaddr_len);
1566 audit_log_end(ab);
1567 }
1568 }
1569
1570 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1571 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1572
1573 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1574 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1575 axs->target_auid[i],
1576 axs->target_uid[i],
1577 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1578 axs->target_sid[i],
1579 axs->target_comm[i]))
1580 call_panic = 1;
1581 }
1582
1583 if (context->target_pid &&
1584 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1585 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1586 context->target_sessionid,
1587 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1588 call_panic = 1;
1589
1590 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1591 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1592 if (ab) {
1593 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1594 audit_log_end(ab);
1595 }
1596 }
1597
1598 i = 0;
1599 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1600 if (n->hidden)
1601 continue;
1602 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1603 }
1604
1605 audit_log_proctitle();
1606
1607 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1608 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1609 if (ab)
1610 audit_log_end(ab);
1611 if (call_panic)
1612 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1613}
1614
1615/**
1616 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1617 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1618 *
1619 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1620 */
1621void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1622{
1623 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1624
1625 if (!context)
1626 return;
1627
1628 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1629 audit_kill_trees(context);
1630
1631 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1632 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1633 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1634 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1635 */
1636 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1637 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
1638 context->return_code = 0;
1639
1640 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
1641 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1642 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1643 audit_log_exit();
1644 }
1645
1646 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1647 audit_free_context(context);
1648}
1649
1650/**
1651 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1652 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1653 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1654 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1655 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1656 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1657 *
1658 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1659 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1660 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1661 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
1662 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1663 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1664 * be written).
1665 */
1666void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1667 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1668{
1669 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1670 enum audit_state state;
1671
1672 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1673 return;
1674
1675 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1676
1677 state = context->state;
1678 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
1679 return;
1680
1681 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1682 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
1683 context->prio = 0;
1684 if (auditd_test_task(current))
1685 return;
1686 }
1687
1688 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
1689 context->major = major;
1690 context->argv[0] = a1;
1691 context->argv[1] = a2;
1692 context->argv[2] = a3;
1693 context->argv[3] = a4;
1694 context->serial = 0;
1695 context->in_syscall = 1;
1696 context->current_state = state;
1697 context->ppid = 0;
1698 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
1699}
1700
1701/**
1702 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1703 * @success: success value of the syscall
1704 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1705 *
1706 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1707 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
1708 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1709 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1710 * free the names stored from getname().
1711 */
1712void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1713{
1714 struct audit_context *context;
1715
1716 context = audit_context();
1717 if (!context)
1718 return;
1719
1720 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1721 audit_kill_trees(context);
1722
1723 if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
1724 if (success)
1725 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1726 else
1727 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1728
1729 /*
1730 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the
1731 * actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the
1732 * arch specific signal handlers
1733 *
1734 * This is actually a test for:
1735 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1736 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1737 *
1738 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1739 */
1740 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1741 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1742 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1743 context->return_code = -EINTR;
1744 else
1745 context->return_code = return_code;
1746
1747 audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
1748 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
1749 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1750 audit_log_exit();
1751 }
1752
1753 context->in_syscall = 0;
1754 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
1755
1756 audit_free_module(context);
1757 audit_free_names(context);
1758 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1759 audit_free_aux(context);
1760 context->aux = NULL;
1761 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1762 context->target_pid = 0;
1763 context->target_sid = 0;
1764 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1765 context->type = 0;
1766 context->fds[0] = -1;
1767 if (context->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
1768 kfree(context->filterkey);
1769 context->filterkey = NULL;
1770 }
1771}
1772
1773static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1774{
1775 struct audit_context *context;
1776 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1777 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1778 int count;
1779
1780 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
1781 return;
1782 context = audit_context();
1783 p = context->trees;
1784 count = context->tree_count;
1785 rcu_read_lock();
1786 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1787 rcu_read_unlock();
1788 if (!chunk)
1789 return;
1790 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1791 return;
1792 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1793 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1794 audit_set_auditable(context);
1795 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1796 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1797 return;
1798 }
1799 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1800}
1801
1802static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1803{
1804 struct audit_context *context;
1805 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1806 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1807 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1808 unsigned long seq;
1809 int count;
1810
1811 context = audit_context();
1812 p = context->trees;
1813 count = context->tree_count;
1814retry:
1815 drop = NULL;
1816 d = dentry;
1817 rcu_read_lock();
1818 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1819 for(;;) {
1820 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1821
1822 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
1823 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1824
1825 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1826 if (chunk) {
1827 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1828 drop = chunk;
1829 break;
1830 }
1831 }
1832 }
1833 parent = d->d_parent;
1834 if (parent == d)
1835 break;
1836 d = parent;
1837 }
1838 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1839 rcu_read_unlock();
1840 if (!drop) {
1841 /* just a race with rename */
1842 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1843 goto retry;
1844 }
1845 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1846 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1847 /* OK, got more space */
1848 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1849 goto retry;
1850 }
1851 /* too bad */
1852 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1853 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1854 audit_set_auditable(context);
1855 return;
1856 }
1857 rcu_read_unlock();
1858}
1859
1860static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1861 unsigned char type)
1862{
1863 struct audit_names *aname;
1864
1865 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1866 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1867 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1868 } else {
1869 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1870 if (!aname)
1871 return NULL;
1872 aname->should_free = true;
1873 }
1874
1875 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1876 aname->type = type;
1877 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1878
1879 context->name_count++;
1880 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1881 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1882 return aname;
1883}
1884
1885/**
1886 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1887 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1888 *
1889 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1890 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1891 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1892 */
1893struct filename *
1894__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1895{
1896 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1897 struct audit_names *n;
1898
1899 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1900 if (!n->name)
1901 continue;
1902 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1903 n->name->refcnt++;
1904 return n->name;
1905 }
1906 }
1907 return NULL;
1908}
1909
1910/**
1911 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
1912 * @name: name to add
1913 *
1914 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1915 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1916 */
1917void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1918{
1919 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1920 struct audit_names *n;
1921
1922 if (!context->in_syscall)
1923 return;
1924
1925 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1926 if (!n)
1927 return;
1928
1929 n->name = name;
1930 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1931 name->aname = n;
1932 name->refcnt++;
1933}
1934
1935static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
1936 const struct dentry *dentry)
1937{
1938 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1939 int rc;
1940
1941 if (!dentry)
1942 return 0;
1943
1944 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps);
1945 if (rc)
1946 return rc;
1947
1948 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1949 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1950 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1951 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
1952 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
1953 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1954
1955 return 0;
1956}
1957
1958/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1959static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
1960 const struct dentry *dentry,
1961 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
1962{
1963 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1964 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1965 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1966 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1967 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1968 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1969 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1970 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
1971 name->fcap_ver = -1;
1972 return;
1973 }
1974 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1975}
1976
1977/**
1978 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1979 * @name: name being audited
1980 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1981 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1982 */
1983void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1984 unsigned int flags)
1985{
1986 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1987 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1988 struct audit_names *n;
1989 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1990 struct audit_entry *e;
1991 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
1992 int i;
1993
1994 if (!context->in_syscall)
1995 return;
1996
1997 rcu_read_lock();
1998 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
1999 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2000 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2001
2002 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2003 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
2004 f->op, f->val)
2005 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2006 rcu_read_unlock();
2007 return;
2008 }
2009 }
2010 }
2011 rcu_read_unlock();
2012
2013 if (!name)
2014 goto out_alloc;
2015
2016 /*
2017 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2018 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2019 */
2020 n = name->aname;
2021 if (n) {
2022 if (parent) {
2023 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2024 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2025 goto out;
2026 } else {
2027 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2028 goto out;
2029 }
2030 }
2031
2032 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2033 if (n->ino) {
2034 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2035 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
2036 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
2037 continue;
2038 } else if (n->name) {
2039 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2040 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2041 continue;
2042 } else
2043 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2044 continue;
2045
2046 /* match the correct record type */
2047 if (parent) {
2048 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2049 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2050 goto out;
2051 } else {
2052 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2053 goto out;
2054 }
2055 }
2056
2057out_alloc:
2058 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2059 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2060 if (!n)
2061 return;
2062 if (name) {
2063 n->name = name;
2064 name->refcnt++;
2065 }
2066
2067out:
2068 if (parent) {
2069 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2070 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2071 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2072 n->hidden = true;
2073 } else {
2074 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2075 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2076 }
2077 handle_path(dentry);
2078 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2079}
2080
2081void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2082{
2083 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2084}
2085
2086/**
2087 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2088 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2089 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2090 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2091 *
2092 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2093 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2094 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2095 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2096 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2097 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2098 * unsuccessful attempts.
2099 */
2100void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2101 const struct dentry *dentry,
2102 const unsigned char type)
2103{
2104 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2105 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2106 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2107 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2108 struct audit_entry *e;
2109 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2110 int i;
2111
2112 if (!context->in_syscall)
2113 return;
2114
2115 rcu_read_lock();
2116 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2117 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2118 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2119
2120 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2121 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2122 f->op, f->val)
2123 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2124 rcu_read_unlock();
2125 return;
2126 }
2127 }
2128 }
2129 rcu_read_unlock();
2130
2131 if (inode)
2132 handle_one(inode);
2133
2134 /* look for a parent entry first */
2135 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2136 if (!n->name ||
2137 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2138 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2139 continue;
2140
2141 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2142 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2143 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2144 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2145 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2146 found_parent = n;
2147 break;
2148 }
2149 }
2150
2151 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2152 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2153 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2154 if (!n->name ||
2155 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2156 continue;
2157
2158 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2159 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2160 found_parent ?
2161 found_parent->name_len :
2162 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
2163 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2164 n->type = type;
2165 found_child = n;
2166 break;
2167 }
2168 }
2169
2170 if (!found_parent) {
2171 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2172 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2173 if (!n)
2174 return;
2175 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2176 }
2177
2178 if (!found_child) {
2179 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2180 if (!found_child)
2181 return;
2182
2183 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2184 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2185 * audit_free_names() */
2186 if (found_parent) {
2187 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2188 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2189 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2190 }
2191 }
2192
2193 if (inode)
2194 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2195 else
2196 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2197}
2198EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2199
2200/**
2201 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2202 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2203 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2204 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2205 *
2206 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2207 */
2208int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2209 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2210{
2211 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2212 return 0;
2213 if (!ctx->serial)
2214 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2215 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2216 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2217 *serial = ctx->serial;
2218 if (!ctx->prio) {
2219 ctx->prio = 1;
2220 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
2221 }
2222 return 1;
2223}
2224
2225/**
2226 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2227 * @oflag: open flag
2228 * @mode: mode bits
2229 * @attr: queue attributes
2230 *
2231 */
2232void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2233{
2234 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2235
2236 if (attr)
2237 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2238 else
2239 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2240
2241 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2242 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2243
2244 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2245}
2246
2247/**
2248 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2249 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2250 * @msg_len: Message length
2251 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2252 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2253 *
2254 */
2255void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2256 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2257{
2258 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2259 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2260
2261 if (abs_timeout)
2262 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2263 else
2264 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2265
2266 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2267 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2268 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2269
2270 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2271}
2272
2273/**
2274 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2275 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2276 * @notification: Notification event
2277 *
2278 */
2279
2280void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2281{
2282 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2283
2284 if (notification)
2285 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2286 else
2287 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2288
2289 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2290 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2291}
2292
2293/**
2294 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2295 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2296 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2297 *
2298 */
2299void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2300{
2301 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2302
2303 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2304 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2305 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2306}
2307
2308/**
2309 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2310 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2311 *
2312 */
2313void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2314{
2315 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2316
2317 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2318 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2319 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2320 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2321 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2322 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2323}
2324
2325/**
2326 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2327 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2328 * @uid: msgq user id
2329 * @gid: msgq group id
2330 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2331 *
2332 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2333 */
2334void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2335{
2336 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2337
2338 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2339 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2340 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2341 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2342 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2343}
2344
2345void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2346{
2347 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2348
2349 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2350 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2351}
2352
2353
2354/**
2355 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2356 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2357 * @args: args array
2358 *
2359 */
2360int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2361{
2362 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2363
2364 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2365 return -EINVAL;
2366 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2367 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2368 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2369 return 0;
2370}
2371
2372/**
2373 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2374 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2375 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2376 *
2377 */
2378void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2379{
2380 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2381
2382 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2383 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2384}
2385
2386/**
2387 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2388 * @len: data length in user space
2389 * @a: data address in kernel space
2390 *
2391 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2392 */
2393int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2394{
2395 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2396
2397 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2398 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2399
2400 if (!p)
2401 return -ENOMEM;
2402 context->sockaddr = p;
2403 }
2404
2405 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2406 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2407 return 0;
2408}
2409
2410void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2411{
2412 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2413
2414 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2415 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2416 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2417 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2418 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
2419 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2420}
2421
2422/**
2423 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2424 * @t: task being signaled
2425 *
2426 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2427 * and uid that is doing that.
2428 */
2429int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2430{
2431 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2432 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2433 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2434
2435 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2436 return 0;
2437
2438 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2439 * in audit_context */
2440 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2441 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2442 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2443 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2444 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2445 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2446 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2447 return 0;
2448 }
2449
2450 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2451 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2452 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2453 if (!axp)
2454 return -ENOMEM;
2455
2456 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2457 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2458 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2459 }
2460 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2461
2462 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2463 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2464 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2465 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2466 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2467 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2468 axp->pid_count++;
2469
2470 return 0;
2471}
2472
2473/**
2474 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2475 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2476 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2477 * @old: the old credentials
2478 *
2479 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2480 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2481 *
2482 * -Eric
2483 */
2484int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2485 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2486{
2487 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2488 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2489 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2490
2491 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2492 if (!ax)
2493 return -ENOMEM;
2494
2495 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2496 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2497 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2498
2499 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns,
2500 bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2501
2502 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2503 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2504 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2505 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2506 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2507
2508 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2509 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2510 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2511 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2512
2513 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2514 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2515 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2516 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2517 return 0;
2518}
2519
2520/**
2521 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2522 * @new: the new credentials
2523 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2524 *
2525 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2526 * audit system if applicable
2527 */
2528void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2529{
2530 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2531
2532 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2533 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2534 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2535 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2536 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2537 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2538}
2539
2540void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2541{
2542 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2543
2544 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2545 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2546 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2547}
2548
2549void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2550{
2551 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2552
2553 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2554 if (!context->module.name)
2555 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2556 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2557}
2558
2559void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2560{
2561 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2562 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2563}
2564
2565void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2566{
2567 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
2568 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2569 (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
2570}
2571
2572static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
2573 const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
2574{
2575 const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
2576
2577 if (val->newval == val->oldval)
2578 return;
2579
2580 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
2581 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
2582}
2583
2584void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2585{
2586 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
2587 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
2588 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
2589 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
2590 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
2591 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
2592}
2593
2594void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
2595 enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp)
2596{
2597 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2598 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2599
2600 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
2601 if (!ab)
2602 return;
2603 audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
2604 name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
2605
2606 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current));
2607 audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
2608 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
2609 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2610 audit_log_end(ab);
2611}
2612EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
2613
2614static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2615{
2616 kuid_t auid, uid;
2617 kgid_t gid;
2618 unsigned int sessionid;
2619 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2620
2621 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2622 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2623 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2624
2625 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2626 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2627 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2628 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2629 sessionid);
2630 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2631 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2632 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2633 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2634}
2635
2636/**
2637 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2638 * @signr: signal value
2639 *
2640 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2641 * should record the event for investigation.
2642 */
2643void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2644{
2645 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2646
2647 if (!audit_enabled)
2648 return;
2649
2650 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2651 return;
2652
2653 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2654 if (unlikely(!ab))
2655 return;
2656 audit_log_task(ab);
2657 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2658 audit_log_end(ab);
2659}
2660
2661/**
2662 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2663 * @syscall: syscall number
2664 * @signr: signal value
2665 * @code: the seccomp action
2666 *
2667 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2668 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2669 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2670 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2671 * audit is not in use.
2672 */
2673void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2674{
2675 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2676
2677 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2678 if (unlikely(!ab))
2679 return;
2680 audit_log_task(ab);
2681 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2682 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2683 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2684 audit_log_end(ab);
2685}
2686
2687void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2688 int res)
2689{
2690 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2691
2692 if (!audit_enabled)
2693 return;
2694
2695 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2696 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2697 if (unlikely(!ab))
2698 return;
2699
2700 audit_log_format(ab,
2701 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2702 names, old_names, res);
2703 audit_log_end(ab);
2704}
2705
2706struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2707{
2708 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2709
2710 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2711 return NULL;
2712 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2713}