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1/*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15#include <linux/errno.h>
16#include <linux/fdtable.h>
17#include <linux/file.h>
18#include <linux/mount.h>
19#include <linux/syscalls.h>
20#include <linux/tracehook.h>
21#include <linux/personality.h>
22
23#include "include/audit.h"
24#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
25#include "include/context.h"
26#include "include/domain.h"
27#include "include/file.h"
28#include "include/ipc.h"
29#include "include/match.h"
30#include "include/path.h"
31#include "include/policy.h"
32
33/**
34 * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table
35 * @domain: the domain table to free (MAYBE NULL)
36 */
37void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
38{
39 int i;
40 if (domain) {
41 if (!domain->table)
42 return;
43
44 for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
45 kzfree(domain->table[i]);
46 kzfree(domain->table);
47 domain->table = NULL;
48 }
49}
50
51/**
52 * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
53 * @to_profile: profile to change to (NOT NULL)
54 *
55 * Check if current is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
56 * to trace the new domain
57 *
58 * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
59 */
60static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_profile *to_profile)
61{
62 struct task_struct *tracer;
63 struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
64 int error = 0;
65
66 rcu_read_lock();
67 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
68 if (tracer)
69 /* released below */
70 tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
71
72 /* not ptraced */
73 if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
74 goto out;
75
76 error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
77
78out:
79 rcu_read_unlock();
80 aa_put_profile(tracerp);
81
82 return error;
83}
84
85/**
86 * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile
87 * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL)
88 * @ns: the namespace being switched to (NOT NULL)
89 * @name: the name of the profile to change to (NOT NULL)
90 * @request: requested perms
91 * @start: state to start matching in
92 *
93 * Returns: permission set
94 */
95static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
96 struct aa_namespace *ns,
97 const char *name, u32 request,
98 unsigned int start)
99{
100 struct file_perms perms;
101 struct path_cond cond = { };
102 unsigned int state;
103
104 if (unconfined(profile)) {
105 perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
106 perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0;
107 return perms;
108 } else if (!profile->file.dfa) {
109 return nullperms;
110 } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) {
111 /* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */
112 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms);
113 if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request)
114 return perms;
115 }
116
117 /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
118 state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name);
119 state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
120 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
121
122 return perms;
123}
124
125/**
126 * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match
127 * @name - to match against (NOT NULL)
128 * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL)
129 *
130 * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching
131 * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses
132 * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest
133 * xmatch_len are preferred.
134 *
135 * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held
136 *
137 * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
138 */
139static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
140 struct list_head *head)
141{
142 int len = 0;
143 struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
144
145 list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) {
146 if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL)
147 continue;
148 if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) {
149 unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
150 DFA_START, name);
151 u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
152 /* any accepting state means a valid match. */
153 if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
154 candidate = profile;
155 len = profile->xmatch_len;
156 }
157 } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
158 /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
159 return profile;
160 }
161
162 return candidate;
163}
164
165/**
166 * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
167 * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL)
168 * @list: list to search (NOT NULL)
169 * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL)
170 *
171 * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
172 */
173static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_namespace *ns,
174 struct list_head *list, const char *name)
175{
176 struct aa_profile *profile;
177
178 rcu_read_lock();
179 profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list));
180 rcu_read_unlock();
181
182 return profile;
183}
184
185/**
186 * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names
187 * @fqname: the fqname name to split (NOT NULL)
188 * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists (NOT NULL)
189 *
190 * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname. It finds the
191 * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a :
192 * if a namespace is specified. This is done so the xtable is constant and
193 * isn't re-split on every lookup.
194 *
195 * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace
196 * is specified the profile name termination must be present. This results
197 * in the following possible encodings:
198 * profile_name\0
199 * :ns_name\0profile_name\0
200 * :ns_name\0\0
201 *
202 * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table
203 *
204 * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL
205 */
206static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name)
207{
208 const char *name;
209
210 if (fqname[0] == ':') {
211 /* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators
212 * in the string. They are verified at load time by
213 * by unpack_trans_table
214 */
215 *ns_name = fqname + 1; /* skip : */
216 name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1;
217 if (!*name)
218 name = NULL;
219 } else {
220 *ns_name = NULL;
221 name = fqname;
222 }
223
224 return name;
225}
226
227static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
228{
229 return NULL;
230}
231
232/**
233 * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table
234 * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
235 * @xindex: index into x transition table
236 *
237 * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
238 */
239static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
240{
241 struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
242 struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
243 u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
244 int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
245 const char *name;
246
247 /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */
248 for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name;
249 name = next_name(xtype, name)) {
250 struct aa_namespace *new_ns;
251 const char *xname = NULL;
252
253 new_ns = NULL;
254 if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
255 /* release by caller */
256 new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name);
257 continue;
258 } else if (*name == ':') {
259 /* switching namespace */
260 const char *ns_name;
261 xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name);
262 if (!xname)
263 /* no name so use profile name */
264 xname = profile->base.hname;
265 if (*ns_name == '@') {
266 /* TODO: variable support */
267 ;
268 }
269 /* released below */
270 new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns, ns_name);
271 if (!new_ns)
272 continue;
273 } else if (*name == '@') {
274 /* TODO: variable support */
275 continue;
276 } else {
277 /* basic namespace lookup */
278 xname = name;
279 }
280
281 /* released by caller */
282 new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname);
283 aa_put_namespace(new_ns);
284 }
285
286 /* released by caller */
287 return new_profile;
288}
289
290/**
291 * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex
292 * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
293 * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
294 * @xindex: index into x transition table
295 *
296 * find profile for a transition index
297 *
298 * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available
299 */
300static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
301 const char *name, u32 xindex)
302{
303 struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
304 struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
305 u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
306
307 switch (xtype) {
308 case AA_X_NONE:
309 /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */
310 return NULL;
311 case AA_X_NAME:
312 if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
313 /* released by caller */
314 new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles,
315 name);
316 else
317 /* released by caller */
318 new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles,
319 name);
320 break;
321 case AA_X_TABLE:
322 /* released by caller */
323 new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex);
324 break;
325 }
326
327 /* released by caller */
328 return new_profile;
329}
330
331/**
332 * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct
333 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
334 *
335 * Returns: %0 or error on failure
336 */
337int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
338{
339 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
340 struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL;
341 struct aa_namespace *ns;
342 char *buffer = NULL;
343 unsigned int state;
344 struct file_perms perms = {};
345 struct path_cond cond = {
346 file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid,
347 file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
348 };
349 const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
350 int error = 0;
351
352 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
353 return 0;
354
355 cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
356 BUG_ON(!cxt);
357
358 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
359 /*
360 * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement
361 * can change the namespace
362 */
363 ns = profile->ns;
364 state = profile->file.start;
365
366 /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
367 error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
368 &name, &info);
369 if (error) {
370 if (unconfined(profile) ||
371 (profile->flags & PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR))
372 error = 0;
373 name = bprm->filename;
374 goto audit;
375 }
376
377 /* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other
378 * x transitions.
379 */
380 if (unconfined(profile)) {
381 /* unconfined task */
382 if (cxt->onexec)
383 /* change_profile on exec already been granted */
384 new_profile = aa_get_profile(cxt->onexec);
385 else
386 new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
387 if (!new_profile)
388 goto cleanup;
389 /*
390 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
391 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
392 * in a further reduction of permissions.
393 */
394 goto apply;
395 }
396
397 /* find exec permissions for name */
398 state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
399 if (cxt->onexec) {
400 struct file_perms cp;
401 info = "change_profile onexec";
402 if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
403 goto audit;
404
405 /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec.
406 * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
407 * exec\0change_profile
408 */
409 state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
410 cp = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->onexec->ns,
411 cxt->onexec->base.name,
412 AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state);
413
414 if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
415 goto audit;
416 new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
417 goto apply;
418 }
419
420 if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
421 /* exec permission determine how to transition */
422 new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex);
423 if (!new_profile) {
424 if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
425 /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do
426 * use the newest version, which was picked
427 * up above when getting profile
428 */
429 info = "ix fallback";
430 new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
431 goto x_clear;
432 } else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
433 new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined);
434 info = "ux fallback";
435 } else {
436 error = -ENOENT;
437 info = "profile not found";
438 /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
439 perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
440 }
441 }
442 } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
443 /* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */
444 new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
445 if (!new_profile) {
446 error = -ENOMEM;
447 info = "could not create null profile";
448 } else {
449 error = -EACCES;
450 target = new_profile->base.hname;
451 }
452 perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
453 } else
454 /* fail exec */
455 error = -EACCES;
456
457 /*
458 * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then
459 * fail the exec.
460 */
461 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
462 aa_put_profile(new_profile);
463 error = -EPERM;
464 goto cleanup;
465 }
466
467 if (!new_profile)
468 goto audit;
469
470 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
471 /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
472 ;
473 }
474
475 if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
476 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile);
477 if (error) {
478 aa_put_profile(new_profile);
479 goto audit;
480 }
481 }
482
483 /* Determine if secure exec is needed.
484 * Can be at this point for the following reasons:
485 * 1. unconfined switching to confined
486 * 2. confined switching to different confinement
487 * 3. confined switching to unconfined
488 *
489 * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
490 * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
491 *
492 * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
493 * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
494 */
495 if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
496 AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n",
497 name, new_profile->base.hname);
498 bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
499 }
500apply:
501 target = new_profile->base.hname;
502 /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
503 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
504
505x_clear:
506 aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
507 /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */
508 cxt->profile = new_profile;
509
510 /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
511 aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
512
513audit:
514 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
515 name, target, cond.uid, info, error);
516
517cleanup:
518 aa_put_profile(profile);
519 kfree(buffer);
520
521 return error;
522}
523
524/**
525 * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
526 * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL)
527 *
528 * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
529 */
530int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
531{
532 /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
533 * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
534 */
535 if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
536 return 1;
537
538 return 0;
539}
540
541/**
542 * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
543 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
544 */
545void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
546{
547 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
548 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
549
550 /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
551 if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
552 (unconfined(new_cxt->profile)))
553 return;
554
555 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
556
557 /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */
558 __aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->profile);
559}
560
561/**
562 * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
563 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
564 */
565void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
566{
567 /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
568 return;
569}
570
571/*
572 * Functions for self directed profile change
573 */
574
575/**
576 * new_compound_name - create an hname with @n2 appended to @n1
577 * @n1: base of hname (NOT NULL)
578 * @n2: name to append (NOT NULL)
579 *
580 * Returns: new name or NULL on error
581 */
582static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2)
583{
584 char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL);
585 if (name)
586 sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2);
587 return name;
588}
589
590/**
591 * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
592 * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0)
593 * @count: number of hat names in @hats
594 * @token: magic value to validate the hat change
595 * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
596 *
597 * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store
598 * the @hat_magic in the current task context. If the count == 0 and the
599 * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the
600 * top level profile.
601 *
602 * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
603 */
604int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
605{
606 const struct cred *cred;
607 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
608 struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL;
609 char *name = NULL;
610 int i;
611 struct file_perms perms = {};
612 const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
613 int error = 0;
614
615 /*
616 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs.
617 * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
618 * available.
619 */
620 if (task_no_new_privs(current))
621 return -EPERM;
622
623 /* released below */
624 cred = get_current_cred();
625 cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
626 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
627 previous_profile = cxt->previous;
628
629 if (unconfined(profile)) {
630 info = "unconfined";
631 error = -EPERM;
632 goto audit;
633 }
634
635 if (count) {
636 /* attempting to change into a new hat or switch to a sibling */
637 struct aa_profile *root;
638 if (PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile))
639 root = aa_get_profile_rcu(&profile->parent);
640 else
641 root = aa_get_profile(profile);
642
643 /* find first matching hat */
644 for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++)
645 /* released below */
646 hat = aa_find_child(root, hats[i]);
647 if (!hat) {
648 if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(root) || permtest) {
649 if (list_empty(&root->base.profiles))
650 error = -ECHILD;
651 else
652 error = -ENOENT;
653 aa_put_profile(root);
654 goto out;
655 }
656
657 /*
658 * In complain mode and failed to match any hats.
659 * Audit the failure is based off of the first hat
660 * supplied. This is done due how userspace
661 * interacts with change_hat.
662 *
663 * TODO: Add logging of all failed hats
664 */
665
666 /* freed below */
667 name = new_compound_name(root->base.hname, hats[0]);
668 aa_put_profile(root);
669 target = name;
670 /* released below */
671 hat = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 1);
672 if (!hat) {
673 info = "failed null profile create";
674 error = -ENOMEM;
675 goto audit;
676 }
677 } else {
678 aa_put_profile(root);
679 target = hat->base.hname;
680 if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) {
681 info = "target not hat";
682 error = -EPERM;
683 goto audit;
684 }
685 }
686
687 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(hat);
688 if (error) {
689 info = "ptraced";
690 error = -EPERM;
691 goto audit;
692 }
693
694 if (!permtest) {
695 error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token);
696 if (error == -EACCES)
697 /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
698 perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
699 else if (name && !error)
700 /* reset error for learning of new hats */
701 error = -ENOENT;
702 }
703 } else if (previous_profile) {
704 /* Return to saved profile. Kill task if restore fails
705 * to avoid brute force attacks
706 */
707 target = previous_profile->base.hname;
708 error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token);
709 perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
710 } else
711 /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
712 goto out;
713
714audit:
715 if (!permtest)
716 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL,
717 OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL,
718 target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
719
720out:
721 aa_put_profile(hat);
722 kfree(name);
723 put_cred(cred);
724
725 return error;
726}
727
728/**
729 * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
730 * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to (MAYBE NULL)
731 * @hname: name of profile to change to (MAYBE NULL)
732 * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec
733 * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
734 *
735 * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way
736 * to change back. If @name isn't specified the current profile name is
737 * used.
738 * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until
739 * the next exec.
740 *
741 * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
742 */
743int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
744 bool permtest)
745{
746 const struct cred *cred;
747 struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
748 struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
749 struct file_perms perms = {};
750 const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
751 int op, error = 0;
752 u32 request;
753
754 if (!hname && !ns_name)
755 return -EINVAL;
756
757 if (onexec) {
758 request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
759 op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC;
760 } else {
761 request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
762 op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
763 }
764
765 cred = get_current_cred();
766 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
767
768 /*
769 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs
770 * and not unconfined.
771 * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when
772 * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction
773 * of permissions.
774 */
775 if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(profile)) {
776 put_cred(cred);
777 return -EPERM;
778 }
779
780 if (ns_name) {
781 /* released below */
782 ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
783 if (!ns) {
784 /* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */
785 name = ns_name;
786 info = "namespace not found";
787 error = -ENOENT;
788 goto audit;
789 }
790 } else
791 /* released below */
792 ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns);
793
794 /* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */
795 if (!hname) {
796 if (unconfined(profile))
797 hname = ns->unconfined->base.hname;
798 else
799 hname = profile->base.hname;
800 }
801
802 perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, hname, request,
803 profile->file.start);
804 if (!(perms.allow & request)) {
805 error = -EACCES;
806 goto audit;
807 }
808
809 /* released below */
810 target = aa_lookup_profile(ns, hname);
811 if (!target) {
812 info = "profile not found";
813 error = -ENOENT;
814 if (permtest || !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
815 goto audit;
816 /* released below */
817 target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
818 if (!target) {
819 info = "failed null profile create";
820 error = -ENOMEM;
821 goto audit;
822 }
823 }
824
825 /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
826 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target);
827 if (error) {
828 info = "ptrace prevents transition";
829 goto audit;
830 }
831
832 if (permtest)
833 goto audit;
834
835 if (onexec)
836 error = aa_set_current_onexec(target);
837 else
838 error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
839
840audit:
841 if (!permtest)
842 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request,
843 name, hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
844
845 aa_put_namespace(ns);
846 aa_put_profile(target);
847 put_cred(cred);
848
849 return error;
850}
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * AppArmor security module
4 *
5 * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions
6 *
7 * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE
8 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
9 */
10
11#include <linux/errno.h>
12#include <linux/fdtable.h>
13#include <linux/fs.h>
14#include <linux/file.h>
15#include <linux/mount.h>
16#include <linux/syscalls.h>
17#include <linux/personality.h>
18#include <linux/xattr.h>
19#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
20
21#include "include/audit.h"
22#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
23#include "include/cred.h"
24#include "include/domain.h"
25#include "include/file.h"
26#include "include/ipc.h"
27#include "include/match.h"
28#include "include/path.h"
29#include "include/policy.h"
30#include "include/policy_ns.h"
31
32/**
33 * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
34 * @to_label: profile to change to (NOT NULL)
35 * @info: message if there is an error
36 *
37 * Check if current is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
38 * to trace the new domain
39 *
40 * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
41 */
42static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label,
43 const char **info)
44{
45 struct task_struct *tracer;
46 struct aa_label *tracerl = NULL;
47 int error = 0;
48
49 rcu_read_lock();
50 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
51 if (tracer)
52 /* released below */
53 tracerl = aa_get_task_label(tracer);
54
55 /* not ptraced */
56 if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl))
57 goto out;
58
59 error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
60
61out:
62 rcu_read_unlock();
63 aa_put_label(tracerl);
64
65 if (error)
66 *info = "ptrace prevents transition";
67 return error;
68}
69
70/**** TODO: dedup to aa_label_match - needs perm and dfa, merging
71 * specifically this is an exact copy of aa_label_match except
72 * aa_compute_perms is replaced with aa_compute_fperms
73 * and policy.dfa with file.dfa
74 ****/
75/* match a profile and its associated ns component if needed
76 * Assumes visibility test has already been done.
77 * If a subns profile is not to be matched should be prescreened with
78 * visibility test.
79 */
80static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
81 struct aa_profile *tp,
82 bool stack, aa_state_t state)
83{
84 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
85 typeof(*rules), list);
86 const char *ns_name;
87
88 if (stack)
89 state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "&");
90 if (profile->ns == tp->ns)
91 return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
92
93 /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
94 ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true);
95 state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
96 state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, ns_name);
97 state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
98 return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
99}
100
101/**
102 * label_compound_match - find perms for full compound label
103 * @profile: profile to find perms for
104 * @label: label to check access permissions for
105 * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
106 * @state: state to start match in
107 * @subns: whether to do permission checks on components in a subns
108 * @request: permissions to request
109 * @perms: perms struct to set
110 *
111 * Returns: 0 on success else ERROR
112 *
113 * For the label A//&B//&C this does the perm match for A//&B//&C
114 * @perms should be preinitialized with allperms OR a previous permission
115 * check to be stacked.
116 */
117static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
118 struct aa_label *label, bool stack,
119 aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request,
120 struct aa_perms *perms)
121{
122 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
123 typeof(*rules), list);
124 struct aa_profile *tp;
125 struct label_it i;
126 struct path_cond cond = { };
127
128 /* find first subcomponent that is visible */
129 label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
130 if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
131 continue;
132 state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, state);
133 if (!state)
134 goto fail;
135 goto next;
136 }
137
138 /* no component visible */
139 *perms = allperms;
140 return 0;
141
142next:
143 label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
144 if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
145 continue;
146 state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "//&");
147 state = match_component(profile, tp, false, state);
148 if (!state)
149 goto fail;
150 }
151 *perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
152 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms);
153 if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
154 return -EACCES;
155
156 return 0;
157
158fail:
159 *perms = nullperms;
160 return -EACCES;
161}
162
163/**
164 * label_components_match - find perms for all subcomponents of a label
165 * @profile: profile to find perms for
166 * @label: label to check access permissions for
167 * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
168 * @start: state to start match in
169 * @subns: whether to do permission checks on components in a subns
170 * @request: permissions to request
171 * @perms: an initialized perms struct to add accumulation to
172 *
173 * Returns: 0 on success else ERROR
174 *
175 * For the label A//&B//&C this does the perm match for each of A and B and C
176 * @perms should be preinitialized with allperms OR a previous permission
177 * check to be stacked.
178 */
179static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
180 struct aa_label *label, bool stack,
181 aa_state_t start, bool subns, u32 request,
182 struct aa_perms *perms)
183{
184 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
185 typeof(*rules), list);
186 struct aa_profile *tp;
187 struct label_it i;
188 struct aa_perms tmp;
189 struct path_cond cond = { };
190 aa_state_t state = 0;
191
192 /* find first subcomponent to test */
193 label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
194 if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
195 continue;
196 state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start);
197 if (!state)
198 goto fail;
199 goto next;
200 }
201
202 /* no subcomponents visible - no change in perms */
203 return 0;
204
205next:
206 tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
207 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
208 aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
209 label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
210 if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
211 continue;
212 state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start);
213 if (!state)
214 goto fail;
215 tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
216 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
217 aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
218 }
219
220 if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
221 return -EACCES;
222
223 return 0;
224
225fail:
226 *perms = nullperms;
227 return -EACCES;
228}
229
230/**
231 * label_match - do a multi-component label match
232 * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
233 * @label: label to match (NOT NULL)
234 * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
235 * @state: state to start in
236 * @subns: whether to match subns components
237 * @request: permission request
238 * @perms: Returns computed perms (NOT NULL)
239 *
240 * Returns: the state the match finished in, may be the none matching state
241 */
242static int label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
243 bool stack, aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request,
244 struct aa_perms *perms)
245{
246 int error;
247
248 *perms = nullperms;
249 error = label_compound_match(profile, label, stack, state, subns,
250 request, perms);
251 if (!error)
252 return error;
253
254 *perms = allperms;
255 return label_components_match(profile, label, stack, state, subns,
256 request, perms);
257}
258
259/******* end TODO: dedup *****/
260
261/**
262 * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile
263 * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL)
264 * @target: label to transition to (NOT NULL)
265 * @stack: whether this is a stacking request
266 * @request: requested perms
267 * @start: state to start matching in
268 *
269 *
270 * Returns: permission set
271 *
272 * currently only matches full label A//&B//&C or individual components A, B, C
273 * not arbitrary combinations. Eg. A//&B, C
274 */
275static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
276 struct aa_label *target, bool stack,
277 u32 request, aa_state_t start,
278 struct aa_perms *perms)
279{
280 if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
281 perms->allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
282 perms->audit = perms->quiet = perms->kill = 0;
283 return 0;
284 }
285
286 /* TODO: add profile in ns screening */
287 return label_match(profile, target, stack, start, true, request, perms);
288}
289
290/**
291 * aa_xattrs_match - check whether a file matches the xattrs defined in profile
292 * @bprm: binprm struct for the process to validate
293 * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
294 * @state: state to start match in
295 *
296 * Returns: number of extended attributes that matched, or < 0 on error
297 */
298static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
299 struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t state)
300{
301 int i;
302 struct dentry *d;
303 char *value = NULL;
304 struct aa_attachment *attach = &profile->attach;
305 int size, value_size = 0, ret = attach->xattr_count;
306
307 if (!bprm || !attach->xattr_count)
308 return 0;
309 might_sleep();
310
311 /* transition from exec match to xattr set */
312 state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state);
313 d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
314
315 for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++) {
316 size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, d, attach->xattrs[i],
317 &value, value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
318 if (size >= 0) {
319 u32 index, perm;
320
321 /*
322 * Check the xattr presence before value. This ensure
323 * that not present xattr can be distinguished from a 0
324 * length value or rule that matches any value
325 */
326 state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa,
327 state);
328 /* Check xattr value */
329 state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch.dfa, state,
330 value, size);
331 index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state];
332 perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow;
333 if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) {
334 ret = -EINVAL;
335 goto out;
336 }
337 }
338 /* transition to next element */
339 state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state);
340 if (size < 0) {
341 /*
342 * No xattr match, so verify if transition to
343 * next element was valid. IFF so the xattr
344 * was optional.
345 */
346 if (!state) {
347 ret = -EINVAL;
348 goto out;
349 }
350 /* don't count missing optional xattr as matched */
351 ret--;
352 }
353 }
354
355out:
356 kfree(value);
357 return ret;
358}
359
360/**
361 * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
362 * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task
363 * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL)
364 * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL)
365 * @name - to match against (NOT NULL)
366 * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL)
367 *
368 * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching
369 * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses
370 * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest
371 * xmatch_len are preferred.
372 *
373 * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held
374 *
375 * Returns: label or NULL if no match found
376 */
377static struct aa_label *find_attach(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
378 struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *head,
379 const char *name, const char **info)
380{
381 int candidate_len = 0, candidate_xattrs = 0;
382 bool conflict = false;
383 struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
384
385 AA_BUG(!name);
386 AA_BUG(!head);
387
388 rcu_read_lock();
389restart:
390 list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) {
391 struct aa_attachment *attach = &profile->attach;
392
393 if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL &&
394 &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns))
395 continue;
396
397 /* Find the "best" matching profile. Profiles must
398 * match the path and extended attributes (if any)
399 * associated with the file. A more specific path
400 * match will be preferred over a less specific one,
401 * and a match with more matching extended attributes
402 * will be preferred over one with fewer. If the best
403 * match has both the same level of path specificity
404 * and the same number of matching extended attributes
405 * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to
406 * match.
407 */
408 if (attach->xmatch.dfa) {
409 unsigned int count;
410 aa_state_t state;
411 u32 index, perm;
412
413 state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch.dfa,
414 attach->xmatch.start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH],
415 name, &count);
416 index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state];
417 perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow;
418 /* any accepting state means a valid match. */
419 if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
420 int ret = 0;
421
422 if (count < candidate_len)
423 continue;
424
425 if (bprm && attach->xattr_count) {
426 long rev = READ_ONCE(ns->revision);
427
428 if (!aa_get_profile_not0(profile))
429 goto restart;
430 rcu_read_unlock();
431 ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile,
432 state);
433 rcu_read_lock();
434 aa_put_profile(profile);
435 if (rev !=
436 READ_ONCE(ns->revision))
437 /* policy changed */
438 goto restart;
439 /*
440 * Fail matching if the xattrs don't
441 * match
442 */
443 if (ret < 0)
444 continue;
445 }
446 /*
447 * TODO: allow for more flexible best match
448 *
449 * The new match isn't more specific
450 * than the current best match
451 */
452 if (count == candidate_len &&
453 ret <= candidate_xattrs) {
454 /* Match is equivalent, so conflict */
455 if (ret == candidate_xattrs)
456 conflict = true;
457 continue;
458 }
459
460 /* Either the same length with more matching
461 * xattrs, or a longer match
462 */
463 candidate = profile;
464 candidate_len = max(count, attach->xmatch_len);
465 candidate_xattrs = ret;
466 conflict = false;
467 }
468 } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name)) {
469 /*
470 * old exact non-re match, without conditionals such
471 * as xattrs. no more searching required
472 */
473 candidate = profile;
474 goto out;
475 }
476 }
477
478 if (!candidate || conflict) {
479 if (conflict)
480 *info = "conflicting profile attachments";
481 rcu_read_unlock();
482 return NULL;
483 }
484
485out:
486 candidate = aa_get_newest_profile(candidate);
487 rcu_read_unlock();
488
489 return &candidate->label;
490}
491
492static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
493{
494 return NULL;
495}
496
497/**
498 * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table
499 * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
500 * @xindex: index into x transition table
501 * @name: returns: name tested to find label (NOT NULL)
502 *
503 * Returns: refcounted label, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
504 */
505struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
506 const char **name)
507{
508 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
509 typeof(*rules), list);
510 struct aa_label *label = NULL;
511 u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
512 int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
513
514 AA_BUG(!name);
515
516 /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */
517 /* TODO: move lookup parsing to unpack time so this is a straight
518 * index into the resultant label
519 */
520 for (*name = rules->file.trans.table[index]; !label && *name;
521 *name = next_name(xtype, *name)) {
522 if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
523 struct aa_profile *new_profile;
524 /* release by caller */
525 new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, *name);
526 if (new_profile)
527 label = &new_profile->label;
528 continue;
529 }
530 label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, *name, GFP_KERNEL,
531 true, false);
532 if (IS_ERR(label))
533 label = NULL;
534 }
535
536 /* released by caller */
537
538 return label;
539}
540
541/**
542 * x_to_label - get target label for a given xindex
543 * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
544 * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task
545 * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
546 * @xindex: index into x transition table
547 * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL)
548 *
549 * find label for a transition index
550 *
551 * Returns: refcounted label or NULL if not found available
552 */
553static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
554 const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
555 const char *name, u32 xindex,
556 const char **lookupname,
557 const char **info)
558{
559 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
560 typeof(*rules), list);
561 struct aa_label *new = NULL;
562 struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns;
563 u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
564 const char *stack = NULL;
565
566 switch (xtype) {
567 case AA_X_NONE:
568 /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */
569 *lookupname = NULL;
570 break;
571 case AA_X_TABLE:
572 /* TODO: fix when perm mapping done at unload */
573 stack = rules->file.trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK];
574 if (*stack != '&') {
575 /* released by caller */
576 new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname);
577 stack = NULL;
578 break;
579 }
580 fallthrough; /* to X_NAME */
581 case AA_X_NAME:
582 if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
583 /* released by caller */
584 new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &profile->base.profiles,
585 name, info);
586 else
587 /* released by caller */
588 new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &ns->base.profiles,
589 name, info);
590 *lookupname = name;
591 break;
592 }
593
594 if (!new) {
595 if (xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
596 /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do
597 * use the newest version
598 */
599 *info = "ix fallback";
600 /* no profile && no error */
601 new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
602 } else if (xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
603 new = aa_get_newest_label(ns_unconfined(profile->ns));
604 *info = "ux fallback";
605 }
606 }
607
608 if (new && stack) {
609 /* base the stack on post domain transition */
610 struct aa_label *base = new;
611
612 new = aa_label_parse(base, stack, GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
613 if (IS_ERR(new))
614 new = NULL;
615 aa_put_label(base);
616 }
617
618 /* released by caller */
619 return new;
620}
621
622static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
623 const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
624 char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
625 bool *secure_exec)
626{
627 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
628 typeof(*rules), list);
629 struct aa_label *new = NULL;
630 const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL;
631 aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
632 struct aa_perms perms = {};
633 bool nonewprivs = false;
634 int error = 0;
635
636 AA_BUG(!profile);
637 AA_BUG(!bprm);
638 AA_BUG(!buffer);
639
640 error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, buffer,
641 &name, &info, profile->disconnected);
642 if (error) {
643 if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
644 (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) {
645 AA_DEBUG("name lookup ix on error");
646 error = 0;
647 new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
648 }
649 name = bprm->filename;
650 goto audit;
651 }
652
653 if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
654 new = find_attach(bprm, profile->ns,
655 &profile->ns->base.profiles, name, &info);
656 if (new) {
657 AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label");
658 return new;
659 }
660 AA_DEBUG("unconfined exec no attachment");
661 return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
662 }
663
664 /* find exec permissions for name */
665 state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, name, cond, &perms);
666 if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
667 /* exec permission determine how to transition */
668 new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target,
669 &info);
670 if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) {
671 /* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */
672 goto audit;
673 } else if (!new) {
674 error = -EACCES;
675 info = "profile transition not found";
676 /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
677 perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
678 }
679 } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
680 /* no exec permission - learning mode */
681 struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
682
683 new_profile = aa_new_learning_profile(profile, false, name,
684 GFP_KERNEL);
685 if (!new_profile) {
686 error = -ENOMEM;
687 info = "could not create null profile";
688 } else {
689 error = -EACCES;
690 new = &new_profile->label;
691 }
692 perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
693 } else
694 /* fail exec */
695 error = -EACCES;
696
697 if (!new)
698 goto audit;
699
700
701 if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
702 if (DEBUG_ON) {
703 dbg_printk("apparmor: scrubbing environment variables"
704 " for %s profile=", name);
705 aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
706 dbg_printk("\n");
707 }
708 *secure_exec = true;
709 }
710
711audit:
712 aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new,
713 cond->uid, info, error);
714 if (!new || nonewprivs) {
715 aa_put_label(new);
716 return ERR_PTR(error);
717 }
718
719 return new;
720}
721
722static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
723 bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
724 char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
725 bool *secure_exec)
726{
727 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
728 typeof(*rules), list);
729 aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
730 struct aa_perms perms = {};
731 const char *xname = NULL, *info = "change_profile onexec";
732 int error = -EACCES;
733
734 AA_BUG(!profile);
735 AA_BUG(!onexec);
736 AA_BUG(!bprm);
737 AA_BUG(!buffer);
738
739 if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
740 /* change_profile on exec already granted */
741 /*
742 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
743 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
744 * in a further reduction of permissions.
745 */
746 return 0;
747 }
748
749 error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, buffer,
750 &xname, &info, profile->disconnected);
751 if (error) {
752 if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
753 (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) {
754 AA_DEBUG("name lookup ix on error");
755 error = 0;
756 }
757 xname = bprm->filename;
758 goto audit;
759 }
760
761 /* find exec permissions for name */
762 state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, xname, cond, &perms);
763 if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) {
764 info = "no change_onexec valid for executable";
765 goto audit;
766 }
767 /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec.
768 * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
769 * exec\0change_profile
770 */
771 state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file.dfa, state);
772 error = change_profile_perms(profile, onexec, stack, AA_MAY_ONEXEC,
773 state, &perms);
774 if (error) {
775 perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
776 goto audit;
777 }
778
779 if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
780 if (DEBUG_ON) {
781 dbg_printk("apparmor: scrubbing environment "
782 "variables for %s label=", xname);
783 aa_label_printk(onexec, GFP_KERNEL);
784 dbg_printk("\n");
785 }
786 *secure_exec = true;
787 }
788
789audit:
790 return aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname,
791 NULL, onexec, cond->uid, info, error);
792}
793
794/* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */
795
796static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
797 struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack,
798 const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
799 char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
800 bool *unsafe)
801{
802 struct aa_profile *profile;
803 struct aa_label *new;
804 int error;
805
806 AA_BUG(!label);
807 AA_BUG(!onexec);
808 AA_BUG(!bprm);
809 AA_BUG(!buffer);
810
811 if (!stack) {
812 error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
813 profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack,
814 bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe));
815 if (error)
816 return ERR_PTR(error);
817 new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
818 aa_get_newest_label(onexec),
819 profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
820 cond, unsafe));
821
822 } else {
823 /* TODO: determine how much we want to loosen this */
824 error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
825 profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, bprm,
826 buffer, cond, unsafe));
827 if (error)
828 return ERR_PTR(error);
829 new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
830 aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec,
831 GFP_KERNEL),
832 profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
833 cond, unsafe));
834 }
835
836 if (new)
837 return new;
838
839 /* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
840 error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
841 aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
842 AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL,
843 onexec, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
844 "failed to build target label", -ENOMEM));
845 return ERR_PTR(error);
846}
847
848/**
849 * apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update the new creds on the bprm struct
850 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
851 *
852 * Returns: %0 or error on failure
853 *
854 * TODO: once the other paths are done see if we can't refactor into a fn
855 */
856int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
857{
858 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
859 struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
860 struct aa_profile *profile;
861 char *buffer = NULL;
862 const char *info = NULL;
863 int error = 0;
864 bool unsafe = false;
865 vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(file_mnt_user_ns(bprm->file),
866 file_inode(bprm->file));
867 struct path_cond cond = {
868 vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
869 file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
870 };
871
872 ctx = task_ctx(current);
873 AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
874 AA_BUG(!ctx);
875
876 label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
877
878 /*
879 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
880 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
881 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
882 *
883 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
884 */
885 if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && !unconfined(label) &&
886 !ctx->nnp)
887 ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
888
889 /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
890 buffer = aa_get_buffer(false);
891 if (!buffer) {
892 error = -ENOMEM;
893 goto done;
894 }
895
896 /* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */
897 if (ctx->onexec)
898 new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
899 bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe);
900 else
901 new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
902 profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
903 &cond, &unsafe));
904
905 AA_BUG(!new);
906 if (IS_ERR(new)) {
907 error = PTR_ERR(new);
908 goto done;
909 } else if (!new) {
910 error = -ENOMEM;
911 goto done;
912 }
913
914 /* Policy has specified a domain transitions. If no_new_privs and
915 * confined ensure the transition is to confinement that is subset
916 * of the confinement when the task entered no new privs.
917 *
918 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
919 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
920 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
921 */
922 if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
923 !unconfined(label) &&
924 !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
925 error = -EPERM;
926 info = "no new privs";
927 goto audit;
928 }
929
930 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
931 /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
932 ;
933 }
934
935 if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)) {
936 /* TODO: test needs to be profile of label to new */
937 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
938 if (error)
939 goto audit;
940 }
941
942 if (unsafe) {
943 if (DEBUG_ON) {
944 dbg_printk("scrubbing environment variables for %s "
945 "label=", bprm->filename);
946 aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
947 dbg_printk("\n");
948 }
949 bprm->secureexec = 1;
950 }
951
952 if (label->proxy != new->proxy) {
953 /* when transitioning clear unsafe personality bits */
954 if (DEBUG_ON) {
955 dbg_printk("apparmor: clearing unsafe personality "
956 "bits. %s label=", bprm->filename);
957 aa_label_printk(new, GFP_KERNEL);
958 dbg_printk("\n");
959 }
960 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
961 }
962 aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
963 /* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */
964 set_cred_label(bprm->cred, new);
965
966done:
967 aa_put_label(label);
968 aa_put_buffer(buffer);
969
970 return error;
971
972audit:
973 error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
974 aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
975 bprm->filename, NULL, new,
976 vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), info, error));
977 aa_put_label(new);
978 goto done;
979}
980
981/*
982 * Functions for self directed profile change
983 */
984
985
986/* helper fn for change_hat
987 *
988 * Returns: label for hat transition OR ERR_PTR. Does NOT return NULL
989 */
990static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile,
991 const char *name, bool sibling)
992{
993 struct aa_profile *root, *hat = NULL;
994 const char *info = NULL;
995 int error = 0;
996
997 if (sibling && PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
998 root = aa_get_profile_rcu(&profile->parent);
999 } else if (!sibling && !PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
1000 root = aa_get_profile(profile);
1001 } else {
1002 info = "conflicting target types";
1003 error = -EPERM;
1004 goto audit;
1005 }
1006
1007 hat = aa_find_child(root, name);
1008 if (!hat) {
1009 error = -ENOENT;
1010 if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
1011 hat = aa_new_learning_profile(profile, true, name,
1012 GFP_KERNEL);
1013 if (!hat) {
1014 info = "failed null profile create";
1015 error = -ENOMEM;
1016 }
1017 }
1018 }
1019 aa_put_profile(root);
1020
1021audit:
1022 aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT,
1023 name, hat ? hat->base.hname : NULL,
1024 hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
1025 error);
1026 if (!hat || (error && error != -ENOENT))
1027 return ERR_PTR(error);
1028 /* if hat && error - complain mode, already audited and we adjust for
1029 * complain mode allow by returning hat->label
1030 */
1031 return &hat->label;
1032}
1033
1034/* helper fn for changing into a hat
1035 *
1036 * Returns: label for hat transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
1037 */
1038static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
1039 int count, int flags)
1040{
1041 struct aa_profile *profile, *root, *hat = NULL;
1042 struct aa_label *new;
1043 struct label_it it;
1044 bool sibling = false;
1045 const char *name, *info = NULL;
1046 int i, error;
1047
1048 AA_BUG(!label);
1049 AA_BUG(!hats);
1050 AA_BUG(count < 1);
1051
1052 if (PROFILE_IS_HAT(labels_profile(label)))
1053 sibling = true;
1054
1055 /*find first matching hat */
1056 for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++) {
1057 name = hats[i];
1058 label_for_each_in_ns(it, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
1059 if (sibling && PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
1060 root = aa_get_profile_rcu(&profile->parent);
1061 } else if (!sibling && !PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) {
1062 root = aa_get_profile(profile);
1063 } else { /* conflicting change type */
1064 info = "conflicting targets types";
1065 error = -EPERM;
1066 goto fail;
1067 }
1068 hat = aa_find_child(root, name);
1069 aa_put_profile(root);
1070 if (!hat) {
1071 if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
1072 goto outer_continue;
1073 /* complain mode succeed as if hat */
1074 } else if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) {
1075 info = "target not hat";
1076 error = -EPERM;
1077 aa_put_profile(hat);
1078 goto fail;
1079 }
1080 aa_put_profile(hat);
1081 }
1082 /* found a hat for all profiles in ns */
1083 goto build;
1084outer_continue:
1085 ;
1086 }
1087 /* no hats that match, find appropriate error
1088 *
1089 * In complain mode audit of the failure is based off of the first
1090 * hat supplied. This is done due how userspace interacts with
1091 * change_hat.
1092 */
1093 name = NULL;
1094 label_for_each_in_ns(it, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
1095 if (!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles)) {
1096 info = "hat not found";
1097 error = -ENOENT;
1098 goto fail;
1099 }
1100 }
1101 info = "no hats defined";
1102 error = -ECHILD;
1103
1104fail:
1105 label_for_each_in_ns(it, labels_ns(label), label, profile) {
1106 /*
1107 * no target as it has failed to be found or built
1108 *
1109 * change_hat uses probing and should not log failures
1110 * related to missing hats
1111 */
1112 /* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
1113 if (count > 1 || COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
1114 aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
1115 AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, NULL, NULL,
1116 GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
1117 }
1118 }
1119 return ERR_PTR(error);
1120
1121build:
1122 new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
1123 build_change_hat(profile, name, sibling),
1124 aa_get_label(&profile->label));
1125 if (!new) {
1126 info = "label build failed";
1127 error = -ENOMEM;
1128 goto fail;
1129 } /* else if (IS_ERR) build_change_hat has logged error so return new */
1130
1131 return new;
1132}
1133
1134/**
1135 * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
1136 * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0)
1137 * @count: number of hat names in @hats
1138 * @token: magic value to validate the hat change
1139 * @flags: flags affecting behavior of the change
1140 *
1141 * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
1142 *
1143 * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store
1144 * the @hat_magic in the current task context. If the count == 0 and the
1145 * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the
1146 * top level profile.
1147 *
1148 * change_hat only applies to profiles in the current ns, and each profile
1149 * in the ns must make the same transition otherwise change_hat will fail.
1150 */
1151int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
1152{
1153 const struct cred *cred;
1154 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
1155 struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
1156 struct aa_profile *profile;
1157 struct aa_perms perms = {};
1158 const char *info = NULL;
1159 int error = 0;
1160
1161 /* released below */
1162 cred = get_current_cred();
1163 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
1164 previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
1165
1166 /*
1167 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
1168 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
1169 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
1170 *
1171 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
1172 */
1173 if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
1174 ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
1175
1176 if (unconfined(label)) {
1177 info = "unconfined can not change_hat";
1178 error = -EPERM;
1179 goto fail;
1180 }
1181
1182 if (count) {
1183 new = change_hat(label, hats, count, flags);
1184 AA_BUG(!new);
1185 if (IS_ERR(new)) {
1186 error = PTR_ERR(new);
1187 new = NULL;
1188 /* already audited */
1189 goto out;
1190 }
1191
1192 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
1193 if (error)
1194 goto fail;
1195
1196 /*
1197 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
1198 * reduce restrictions.
1199 */
1200 if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
1201 !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
1202 /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
1203 AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
1204 error = -EPERM;
1205 goto out;
1206 }
1207
1208 if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)
1209 goto out;
1210
1211 target = new;
1212 error = aa_set_current_hat(new, token);
1213 if (error == -EACCES)
1214 /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
1215 goto kill;
1216 } else if (previous && !(flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)) {
1217 /*
1218 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
1219 * reduce restrictions.
1220 */
1221 if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
1222 !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) {
1223 /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
1224 AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
1225 error = -EPERM;
1226 goto out;
1227 }
1228
1229 /* Return to saved label. Kill task if restore fails
1230 * to avoid brute force attacks
1231 */
1232 target = previous;
1233 error = aa_restore_previous_label(token);
1234 if (error) {
1235 if (error == -EACCES)
1236 goto kill;
1237 goto fail;
1238 }
1239 } /* else ignore @flags && restores when there is no saved profile */
1240
1241out:
1242 aa_put_label(new);
1243 aa_put_label(previous);
1244 aa_put_label(label);
1245 put_cred(cred);
1246
1247 return error;
1248
1249kill:
1250 info = "failed token match";
1251 perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
1252
1253fail:
1254 fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
1255 aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
1256 AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, NULL, target,
1257 GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
1258
1259 goto out;
1260}
1261
1262
1263static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
1264 struct aa_profile *profile,
1265 struct aa_label *target, bool stack,
1266 u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
1267{
1268 struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
1269 typeof(*rules), list);
1270 const char *info = NULL;
1271 int error = 0;
1272
1273 if (!error)
1274 error = change_profile_perms(profile, target, stack, request,
1275 rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
1276 perms);
1277 if (error)
1278 error = aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name,
1279 NULL, target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
1280 error);
1281
1282 return error;
1283}
1284
1285/**
1286 * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
1287 * @fqname: name of profile may include namespace (NOT NULL)
1288 * @flags: flags affecting change behavior
1289 *
1290 * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way
1291 * to change back. If @name isn't specified the current profile name is
1292 * used.
1293 * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until
1294 * the next exec.
1295 *
1296 * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
1297 */
1298int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
1299{
1300 struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
1301 struct aa_profile *profile;
1302 struct aa_perms perms = {};
1303 const char *info = NULL;
1304 const char *auditname = fqname; /* retain leading & if stack */
1305 bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK;
1306 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
1307 int error = 0;
1308 char *op;
1309 u32 request;
1310
1311 label = aa_get_current_label();
1312
1313 /*
1314 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
1315 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
1316 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
1317 *
1318 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
1319 */
1320 if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
1321 ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
1322
1323 if (!fqname || !*fqname) {
1324 aa_put_label(label);
1325 AA_DEBUG("no profile name");
1326 return -EINVAL;
1327 }
1328
1329 if (flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC) {
1330 request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
1331 if (stack)
1332 op = OP_STACK_ONEXEC;
1333 else
1334 op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC;
1335 } else {
1336 request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
1337 if (stack)
1338 op = OP_STACK;
1339 else
1340 op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
1341 }
1342
1343 if (*fqname == '&') {
1344 stack = true;
1345 /* don't have label_parse() do stacking */
1346 fqname++;
1347 }
1348 target = aa_label_parse(label, fqname, GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
1349 if (IS_ERR(target)) {
1350 struct aa_profile *tprofile;
1351
1352 info = "label not found";
1353 error = PTR_ERR(target);
1354 target = NULL;
1355 /*
1356 * TODO: fixme using labels_profile is not right - do profile
1357 * per complain profile
1358 */
1359 if ((flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST) ||
1360 !COMPLAIN_MODE(labels_profile(label)))
1361 goto audit;
1362 /* released below */
1363 tprofile = aa_new_learning_profile(labels_profile(label), false,
1364 fqname, GFP_KERNEL);
1365 if (!tprofile) {
1366 info = "failed null profile create";
1367 error = -ENOMEM;
1368 goto audit;
1369 }
1370 target = &tprofile->label;
1371 goto check;
1372 }
1373
1374 /*
1375 * self directed transitions only apply to current policy ns
1376 * TODO: currently requiring perms for stacking and straight change
1377 * stacking doesn't strictly need this. Determine how much
1378 * we want to loosen this restriction for stacking
1379 *
1380 * if (!stack) {
1381 */
1382 error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
1383 change_profile_perms_wrapper(op, auditname,
1384 profile, target, stack,
1385 request, &perms));
1386 if (error)
1387 /* auditing done in change_profile_perms_wrapper */
1388 goto out;
1389
1390 /* } */
1391
1392check:
1393 /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
1394 error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target, &info);
1395 if (error && !fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
1396 COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)))
1397 goto audit;
1398
1399 /* TODO: add permission check to allow this
1400 * if ((flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC) && !current_is_single_threaded()) {
1401 * info = "not a single threaded task";
1402 * error = -EACCES;
1403 * goto audit;
1404 * }
1405 */
1406 if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)
1407 goto out;
1408
1409 /* stacking is always a subset, so only check the nonstack case */
1410 if (!stack) {
1411 new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
1412 aa_get_label(target),
1413 aa_get_label(&profile->label));
1414 /*
1415 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
1416 * reduce restrictions.
1417 */
1418 if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
1419 !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
1420 /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
1421 AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
1422 error = -EPERM;
1423 goto out;
1424 }
1425 }
1426
1427 if (!(flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC)) {
1428 /* only transition profiles in the current ns */
1429 if (stack)
1430 new = aa_label_merge(label, target, GFP_KERNEL);
1431 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new)) {
1432 info = "failed to build target label";
1433 if (!new)
1434 error = -ENOMEM;
1435 else
1436 error = PTR_ERR(new);
1437 new = NULL;
1438 perms.allow = 0;
1439 goto audit;
1440 }
1441 error = aa_replace_current_label(new);
1442 } else {
1443 if (new) {
1444 aa_put_label(new);
1445 new = NULL;
1446 }
1447
1448 /* full transition will be built in exec path */
1449 error = aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack);
1450 }
1451
1452audit:
1453 error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
1454 aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, auditname,
1455 NULL, new ? new : target,
1456 GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
1457
1458out:
1459 aa_put_label(new);
1460 aa_put_label(target);
1461 aa_put_label(label);
1462
1463 return error;
1464}