1/*
   2   BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
   3   Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
   4
   5   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   6   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
   7   published by the Free Software Foundation;
   8
   9   THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
  10   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
  11   FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
  12   IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
  13   CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
  14   WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
  15   ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
  16   OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  17
  18   ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
  19   COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
  20   SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
  21*/
  22
  23#include <linux/debugfs.h>
  24#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 
 
 
  25#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
  26#include <crypto/hash.h>
  27#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
  28
  29#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
  30#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
  31#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
  32#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
  33
  34#include "ecc.h"
  35#include "smp.h"
  36
  37#define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
  38	((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
  39
  40/* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
  41 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
  42 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
  43 */
  44#ifdef DEBUG
  45#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
  46				 ##__VA_ARGS__)
  47#else
  48#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
  49				    ##__VA_ARGS__)
  50#endif
  51
  52#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code)	set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
  53
  54/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
  55#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
  56
  57#define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
  58
  59#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev)	(hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
  60				 0x1f : 0x07)
  61#define KEY_DIST_MASK		0x07
  62
  63/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
  64#define CMAC_MSG_MAX	80
  65
  66enum {
  67	SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
  68	SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
  69	SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
  70	SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
  71	SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
  72	SMP_FLAG_SC,
  73	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
  74	SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
  75	SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
  76	SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
  77	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
  78	SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
 
  79};
  80
  81struct smp_dev {
  82	/* Secure Connections OOB data */
 
  83	u8			local_pk[64];
  84	u8			local_sk[32];
  85	u8			local_rand[16];
  86	bool			debug_key;
  87
  88	u8			min_key_size;
  89	u8			max_key_size;
  90
  91	struct crypto_skcipher	*tfm_aes;
  92	struct crypto_shash	*tfm_cmac;
 
  93};
  94
  95struct smp_chan {
  96	struct l2cap_conn	*conn;
  97	struct delayed_work	security_timer;
  98	unsigned long           allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
  99
 100	u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
 101	u8		prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
 102	u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
 103	u8		rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
 104	u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
 105	u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
 106	u8		rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
 107	u8		lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
 108	u8		enc_key_size;
 109	u8		remote_key_dist;
 110	bdaddr_t	id_addr;
 111	u8		id_addr_type;
 112	u8		irk[16];
 113	struct smp_csrk	*csrk;
 114	struct smp_csrk	*slave_csrk;
 115	struct smp_ltk	*ltk;
 116	struct smp_ltk	*slave_ltk;
 117	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
 118	u8		*link_key;
 119	unsigned long	flags;
 120	u8		method;
 121	u8		passkey_round;
 122
 123	/* Secure Connections variables */
 124	u8			local_pk[64];
 125	u8			local_sk[32];
 126	u8			remote_pk[64];
 127	u8			dhkey[32];
 128	u8			mackey[16];
 129
 130	struct crypto_skcipher	*tfm_aes;
 131	struct crypto_shash	*tfm_cmac;
 
 132};
 133
 134/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
 135 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
 136 * private debug key.
 137 */
 138static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
 139		0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
 140		0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
 141		0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
 142		0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
 143
 144		0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
 145		0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
 146		0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
 147		0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
 148};
 149
 150static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
 151		0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
 152		0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
 153		0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
 154		0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
 155};
 156
 157static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
 158{
 159	size_t i;
 160
 161	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
 162		dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
 163}
 164
 165/* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
 166 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
 167 */
 168
 169static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
 170		    size_t len, u8 mac[16])
 171{
 172	uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
 173	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
 174	int err;
 175
 176	if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
 177		return -EFBIG;
 178
 179	if (!tfm) {
 180		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
 181		return -EINVAL;
 182	}
 183
 184	desc->tfm = tfm;
 185	desc->flags = 0;
 186
 187	/* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
 188	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
 189	swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
 190
 191	SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
 192	SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
 193
 194	err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
 195	if (err) {
 196		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
 197		return err;
 198	}
 199
 200	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
 201	shash_desc_zero(desc);
 202	if (err) {
 203		BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
 204		return err;
 205	}
 206
 207	swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
 208
 209	SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
 210
 211	return 0;
 212}
 213
 214static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
 215		  const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
 216{
 217	u8 m[65];
 218	int err;
 219
 220	SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
 221	SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
 222	SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
 223
 224	m[0] = z;
 225	memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
 226	memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
 227
 228	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
 229	if (err)
 230		return err;
 231
 232	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
 233
 234	return err;
 235}
 236
 237static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
 238		  const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
 239		  const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
 240{
 241	/* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
 242	 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
 243	 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
 244	 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
 245	 * endian format.
 246	 */
 247	const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
 248	const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
 249			      0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
 250	const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
 251	u8 m[53], t[16];
 252	int err;
 253
 254	SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
 255	SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
 256	SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
 257
 258	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
 259	if (err)
 260		return err;
 261
 262	SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
 263
 264	memcpy(m, length, 2);
 265	memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
 266	memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
 267	memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
 268	memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
 269	memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
 270
 271	m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
 272
 273	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
 274	if (err)
 275		return err;
 276
 277	SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
 278
 279	m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
 280
 281	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
 282	if (err)
 283		return err;
 284
 285	SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
 286
 287	return 0;
 288}
 289
 290static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
 291		  const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
 292		  const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
 293		  u8 res[16])
 294{
 295	u8 m[65];
 296	int err;
 297
 298	SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
 299	SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
 300	SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
 301
 302	memcpy(m, a2, 7);
 303	memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
 304	memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
 305	memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
 306	memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
 307	memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
 308
 309	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
 310	if (err)
 311		return err;
 312
 313	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
 314
 315	return err;
 316}
 317
 318static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 319		  const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
 320{
 321	u8 m[80], tmp[16];
 322	int err;
 323
 324	SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
 325	SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
 326	SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
 327
 328	memcpy(m, y, 16);
 329	memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
 330	memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
 331
 332	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
 333	if (err)
 334		return err;
 335
 336	*val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
 337	*val %= 1000000;
 338
 339	SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
 340
 341	return 0;
 342}
 343
 344static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
 345		  const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
 346{
 347	int err;
 348
 349	SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
 350
 351	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
 352	if (err)
 353		return err;
 354
 355	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
 356
 357	return err;
 358}
 359
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 360/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
 361 * s1 and ah.
 362 */
 363
 364static int smp_e(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 365{
 366	SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
 367	struct scatterlist sg;
 368	uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
 369	int err;
 370
 371	SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
 372
 373	if (!tfm) {
 374		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
 375		return -EINVAL;
 376	}
 377
 378	/* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
 379	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
 380
 381	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
 382	if (err) {
 383		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
 384		return err;
 385	}
 386
 387	/* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
 388	swap_buf(r, data, 16);
 389
 390	sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
 391
 392	skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
 393	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
 394	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 16, NULL);
 395
 396	err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
 397	skcipher_request_zero(req);
 398	if (err)
 399		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
 400
 401	/* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
 402	swap_buf(data, r, 16);
 403
 404	SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
 405
 
 406	return err;
 407}
 408
 409static int smp_c1(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
 410		  const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
 411		  const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
 412{
 413	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
 414	int err;
 415
 416	SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
 417	SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
 418	SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
 419
 420	memset(p1, 0, 16);
 421
 422	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
 423	p1[0] = _iat;
 424	p1[1] = _rat;
 425	memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
 426	memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
 427
 428	SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
 429
 430	/* res = r XOR p1 */
 431	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
 432
 433	/* res = e(k, res) */
 434	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
 435	if (err) {
 436		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 437		return err;
 438	}
 439
 440	/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
 441	memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
 442	memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
 443	memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
 444
 445	SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
 446
 447	/* res = res XOR p2 */
 448	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
 449
 450	/* res = e(k, res) */
 451	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
 452	if (err)
 453		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 454
 455	return err;
 456}
 457
 458static int smp_s1(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
 459		  const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
 460{
 461	int err;
 462
 463	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
 464	memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
 465	memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
 466
 467	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
 468	if (err)
 469		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 470
 471	return err;
 472}
 473
 474static int smp_ah(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
 475		  const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
 476{
 477	u8 _res[16];
 478	int err;
 479
 480	/* r' = padding || r */
 481	memcpy(_res, r, 3);
 482	memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
 483
 484	err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
 485	if (err) {
 486		BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
 487		return err;
 488	}
 489
 490	/* The output of the random address function ah is:
 491	 *	ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
 492	 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
 493	 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
 494	 * result of ah.
 495	 */
 496	memcpy(res, _res, 3);
 497
 498	return 0;
 499}
 500
 501bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
 502		     const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
 503{
 504	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
 505	struct smp_dev *smp;
 506	u8 hash[3];
 507	int err;
 508
 509	if (!chan || !chan->data)
 510		return false;
 511
 512	smp = chan->data;
 513
 514	BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
 515
 516	err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
 517	if (err)
 518		return false;
 519
 520	return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
 521}
 522
 523int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 524{
 525	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
 526	struct smp_dev *smp;
 527	int err;
 528
 529	if (!chan || !chan->data)
 530		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 531
 532	smp = chan->data;
 533
 534	get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
 535
 536	rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f;	/* Clear two most significant bits */
 537	rpa->b[5] |= 0x40;	/* Set second most significant bit */
 538
 539	err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
 540	if (err < 0)
 541		return err;
 542
 543	BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
 544
 545	return 0;
 546}
 547
 548int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
 549{
 550	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
 551	struct smp_dev *smp;
 552	int err;
 553
 554	if (!chan || !chan->data)
 555		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 556
 557	smp = chan->data;
 558
 559	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
 560		BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
 
 
 
 561		memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
 562		memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
 563		smp->debug_key = true;
 564	} else {
 565		while (true) {
 566			/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
 567			if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
 568				return -EIO;
 
 569
 570			/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
 571			 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
 572			 */
 573			if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
 574				break;
 575		}
 576		smp->debug_key = false;
 577	}
 578
 579	SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
 580	SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
 581	SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key:  %32phN", smp->local_sk);
 582
 583	get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
 584
 585	err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
 586		     smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
 587	if (err < 0)
 588		return err;
 589
 590	memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
 591
 
 
 592	return 0;
 593}
 594
 595static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 596{
 597	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 598	struct smp_chan *smp;
 599	struct kvec iv[2];
 600	struct msghdr msg;
 601
 602	if (!chan)
 603		return;
 604
 605	BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
 606
 607	iv[0].iov_base = &code;
 608	iv[0].iov_len = 1;
 609
 610	iv[1].iov_base = data;
 611	iv[1].iov_len = len;
 612
 613	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 614
 615	iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len);
 616
 617	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
 618
 619	if (!chan->data)
 620		return;
 621
 622	smp = chan->data;
 623
 624	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
 625	schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
 626}
 627
 628static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
 629{
 630	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
 631		if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
 632			return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
 633		else
 634			return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
 635	} else {
 636		return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
 637	}
 638}
 639
 640static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
 641{
 642	switch (sec_level) {
 643	case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
 644	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
 645		return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 646	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
 647		return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 648	default:
 649		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
 650	}
 651}
 652
 653static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 654			      struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
 655			      struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
 656{
 657	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 658	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 659	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 660	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 661	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
 662
 663	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
 664		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 665		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 666		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 667	} else {
 668		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 669	}
 670
 671	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
 672		remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 673
 674	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
 675		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 676
 677	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
 678	    (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
 679		struct oob_data *oob_data;
 680		u8 bdaddr_type;
 681
 682		if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
 683			local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
 684			remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
 685		}
 686
 687		if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
 688			bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
 689		else
 690			bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
 691
 692		oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
 693						    bdaddr_type);
 694		if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
 695			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
 696			oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
 697			memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
 698			memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
 699			SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
 700			SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
 701		}
 702
 703	} else {
 704		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
 705	}
 706
 707	if (rsp == NULL) {
 708		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 709		req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
 710		req->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
 711		req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
 712		req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
 713		req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
 714
 715		smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
 716		return;
 717	}
 718
 719	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 720	rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
 721	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
 722	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
 723	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
 724	rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
 725
 726	smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
 727}
 728
 729static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
 730{
 731	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 732	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 733	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 734
 735	if (max_key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
 
 
 
 
 736	    max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
 737		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 738
 739	smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
 740
 741	return 0;
 742}
 743
 744static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 745{
 746	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 747	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 748	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 749	bool complete;
 750
 751	BUG_ON(!smp);
 752
 753	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
 754
 755	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
 756	mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
 757
 758	kzfree(smp->csrk);
 759	kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
 760	kzfree(smp->link_key);
 761
 762	crypto_free_skcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
 763	crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
 
 764
 765	/* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
 766	 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
 767	 */
 768	if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
 769	    !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
 770		list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
 771		kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
 772		smp->ltk = NULL;
 773	}
 774
 775	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
 776	if (!complete) {
 777		if (smp->ltk) {
 778			list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
 779			kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
 780		}
 781
 782		if (smp->slave_ltk) {
 783			list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
 784			kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
 785		}
 786
 787		if (smp->remote_irk) {
 788			list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
 789			kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
 790		}
 791	}
 792
 793	chan->data = NULL;
 794	kzfree(smp);
 795	hci_conn_drop(hcon);
 796}
 797
 798static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
 799{
 800	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 801	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 802
 803	if (reason)
 804		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
 805			     &reason);
 806
 807	mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
 808
 809	if (chan->data)
 810		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
 811}
 812
 813#define JUST_WORKS	0x00
 814#define JUST_CFM	0x01
 815#define REQ_PASSKEY	0x02
 816#define CFM_PASSKEY	0x03
 817#define REQ_OOB		0x04
 818#define DSP_PASSKEY	0x05
 819#define OVERLAP		0xFF
 820
 821static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
 822	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
 823	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
 824	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
 825	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM    },
 826	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP     },
 827};
 828
 829static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
 830	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
 831	{ JUST_WORKS,  CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
 832	{ DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
 833	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM    },
 834	{ DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
 835};
 836
 837static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 838{
 839	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
 840	 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
 841	 */
 842	if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
 843	    remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
 844		return JUST_CFM;
 845
 846	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
 847		return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
 848
 849	return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
 850}
 851
 852static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 853						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 854{
 855	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 856	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 857	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 858	u32 passkey = 0;
 859	int ret = 0;
 860
 861	/* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
 862	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
 863	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 864
 865	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
 866
 867	/* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
 868	 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
 869	 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
 870	 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
 871	 * table.
 872	 */
 873	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
 874		smp->method = JUST_CFM;
 875	else
 876		smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
 877
 878	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
 879	if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
 880						&smp->flags))
 881		smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
 882
 883	/* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
 884	if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
 885	    hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
 886		smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
 887
 888	/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
 
 889	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
 890		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 
 
 
 
 
 
 891		return 0;
 892	}
 893
 894	/* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
 895	 * can only recover the just-works case.
 896	 */
 897	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
 898		return -EINVAL;
 899
 900	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
 901	if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
 902		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
 903		if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
 904			hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
 905	}
 906
 907	/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
 908	 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
 909	 */
 910	if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
 911		if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
 912			smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
 913		else
 914			smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
 915	}
 916
 917	/* Generate random passkey. */
 918	if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
 919		memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
 920		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
 921		passkey %= 1000000;
 922		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
 923		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
 924		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 925	}
 926
 927	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
 928		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 929						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
 930	else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
 931		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 932						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
 933						passkey, 1);
 934	else
 935		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 936						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
 937						passkey, 0);
 938
 939	return ret;
 940}
 941
 942static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 943{
 944	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
 945	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
 946	int ret;
 947
 948	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 949
 950	ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 951		     conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
 952		     conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
 953		     cp.confirm_val);
 954	if (ret)
 955		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 956
 957	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
 958
 959	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 960
 961	if (conn->hcon->out)
 962		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
 963	else
 964		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
 965
 966	return 0;
 967}
 968
 969static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 970{
 971	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
 972	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 973	u8 confirm[16];
 974	int ret;
 975
 976	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
 977		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 978
 979	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 980
 981	ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 982		     hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
 983		     hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
 984	if (ret)
 985		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 986
 987	if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
 988		BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
 
 989		return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
 990	}
 991
 992	if (hcon->out) {
 993		u8 stk[16];
 994		__le64 rand = 0;
 995		__le16 ediv = 0;
 996
 997		smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
 998
 999		if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1000			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1001
1002		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
1003		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
1004		set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1005	} else {
1006		u8 stk[16], auth;
1007		__le64 rand = 0;
1008		__le16 ediv = 0;
1009
1010		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1011			     smp->prnd);
1012
1013		smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1014
1015		if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1016			auth = 1;
1017		else
1018			auth = 0;
1019
1020		/* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
1021		 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
1022		 * STK never needs to be stored).
1023		 */
1024		hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1025			    SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1026	}
1027
1028	return 0;
1029}
1030
1031static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1032{
1033	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1034	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1035	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1036	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1037	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1038	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1039	bool persistent;
1040
1041	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1042		if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1043			persistent = false;
1044		else
1045			persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1046					       &hcon->flags);
1047	} else {
1048		/* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1049		 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1050		 * authentication requests.
1051		 */
1052		persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1053				SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
1054	}
1055
1056	if (smp->remote_irk) {
1057		mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1058
1059		/* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1060		 * identity address track the connection based on it
1061		 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1062		 */
1063		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1064			bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1065			hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1066			queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
1067		}
1068	}
1069
1070	if (smp->csrk) {
1071		smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1072		bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1073		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1074	}
1075
1076	if (smp->slave_csrk) {
1077		smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1078		bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1079		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
1080	}
1081
1082	if (smp->ltk) {
1083		smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1084		bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1085		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1086	}
1087
1088	if (smp->slave_ltk) {
1089		smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1090		bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1091		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
1092	}
1093
1094	if (smp->link_key) {
1095		struct link_key *key;
1096		u8 type;
1097
1098		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1099			type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1100		else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1101			type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1102		else
1103			type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1104
1105		key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1106				       smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1107		if (key) {
1108			mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1109
1110			/* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1111			 * flag is not set.
1112			 */
1113			if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1114			    key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1115				list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1116				kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1117			}
1118		}
1119	}
1120}
1121
1122static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1123{
1124	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1125	u8 key_type, auth;
1126
1127	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1128		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1129	else
1130		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1131
1132	if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1133		auth = 1;
1134	else
1135		auth = 0;
1136
1137	smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1138			       key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1139			       0, 0);
1140}
1141
1142static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1143{
1144	/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
1145	 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'.
1146	 */
1147	const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1148	const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1149
1150	smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1151	if (!smp->link_key)
1152		return;
1153
1154	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1155		kzfree(smp->link_key);
1156		smp->link_key = NULL;
1157		return;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1158	}
1159
1160	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1161		kzfree(smp->link_key);
1162		smp->link_key = NULL;
1163		return;
1164	}
1165}
1166
1167static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1168{
1169	/* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1170	 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1171	 * them in the correct order.
1172	 */
1173	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1174		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1175	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1176		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1177	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1178		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1179}
1180
1181static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1182{
1183	/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
1184	 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp2' and 'brle'.
1185	 */
1186	const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1187	const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1188	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1189	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1190	struct link_key *key;
1191
1192	key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1193	if (!key) {
1194		BT_ERR("%s No Link Key found to generate LTK", hdev->name);
1195		return;
1196	}
1197
1198	if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1199		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1200
1201	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1202		return;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1203
1204	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1205		return;
1206
1207	sc_add_ltk(smp);
1208}
1209
1210static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1211{
1212	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1213	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1214	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1215	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1216	__u8 *keydist;
1217
1218	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1219
1220	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1221
1222	/* The responder sends its keys first */
1223	if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1224		smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1225		return;
1226	}
1227
1228	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1229
1230	if (hcon->out) {
1231		keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1232		*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1233	} else {
1234		keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1235		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1236	}
1237
1238	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1239		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1240			sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1241		if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1242			sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1243
1244		/* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1245		*keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1246	}
1247
1248	BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1249
1250	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1251		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1252		struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
1253		struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1254		u8 authenticated;
1255		__le16 ediv;
1256		__le64 rand;
1257
1258		/* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1259		 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1260		 * of the value to zeroes.
1261		 */
1262		get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1263		memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1264		       sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1265
1266		get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1267		get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1268
1269		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1270
1271		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1272		ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1273				  SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1274				  smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1275		smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
1276
1277		ident.ediv = ediv;
1278		ident.rand = rand;
1279
1280		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
1281
1282		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1283	}
1284
1285	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1286		struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1287		struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1288
1289		memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1290
1291		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1292
1293		/* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1294		 * after the connection has been established.
1295		 *
1296		 * This is true even when the connection has been
1297		 * established using a resolvable random address.
1298		 */
1299		bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1300		addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1301
1302		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1303			     &addrinfo);
1304
1305		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1306	}
1307
1308	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1309		struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1310		struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1311
1312		/* Generate a new random key */
1313		get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1314
1315		csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1316		if (csrk) {
1317			if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1318				csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1319			else
1320				csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1321			memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1322		}
1323		smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
1324
1325		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1326
1327		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1328	}
1329
1330	/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1331	if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1332		smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1333		return;
1334	}
1335
1336	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1337	smp_notify_keys(conn);
1338
1339	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1340}
1341
1342static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1343{
1344	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1345					    security_timer.work);
1346	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1347
1348	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1349
1350	hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1351}
1352
1353static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1354{
1355	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1356	struct smp_chan *smp;
1357
1358	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1359	if (!smp)
1360		return NULL;
1361
1362	smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
1363	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
1364		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
1365		kzfree(smp);
1366		return NULL;
1367	}
1368
1369	smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1370	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1371		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1372		crypto_free_skcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
1373		kzfree(smp);
1374		return NULL;
 
 
 
 
1375	}
1376
1377	smp->conn = conn;
1378	chan->data = smp;
1379
1380	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1381
1382	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1383
1384	hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
1385
1386	return smp;
 
 
 
 
 
 
1387}
1388
1389static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1390{
1391	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1392	u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1393
1394	if (hcon->out) {
1395		na   = smp->prnd;
1396		nb   = smp->rrnd;
1397	} else {
1398		na   = smp->rrnd;
1399		nb   = smp->prnd;
1400	}
1401
1402	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1403	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1404	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1405	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1406
1407	return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1408}
1409
1410static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1411{
1412	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1413	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1414	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1415	u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1416
1417	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1418	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1419	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1420	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1421
1422	if (hcon->out) {
1423		local_addr = a;
1424		remote_addr = b;
1425		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1426	} else {
1427		local_addr = b;
1428		remote_addr = a;
1429		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1430	}
1431
1432	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1433
1434	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1435		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1436
1437	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1438		memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1439
1440	smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1441	       local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1442
1443	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1444}
1445
1446static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1447{
1448	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1449	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1450	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1451	u8 r;
1452
1453	r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1454	r |= 0x80;
1455
1456	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1457
1458	if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1459		   cfm.confirm_val))
1460		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1461
1462	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1463
1464	return 0;
1465}
1466
1467static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1468{
1469	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1470	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1471	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1472	u8 cfm[16], r;
1473
1474	/* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1475	if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1476		return 0;
1477
1478	switch (smp_op) {
1479	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1480		r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1481		r |= 0x80;
1482
1483		if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1484			   smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
1485			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1486
1487		if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1488			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1489
1490		smp->passkey_round++;
1491
1492		if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1493			/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1494			if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1495				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1496		}
1497
1498		/* The round is only complete when the initiator
1499		 * receives pairing random.
1500		 */
1501		if (!hcon->out) {
1502			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1503				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1504			if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1505				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1506			else
1507				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1508			return 0;
1509		}
1510
1511		/* Start the next round */
1512		if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1513			return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1514
1515		/* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1516		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1517		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1518
1519		break;
1520
1521	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1522		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1523			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1524			return 0;
1525		}
1526
1527		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1528
1529		if (hcon->out) {
1530			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1531				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1532			return 0;
1533		}
1534
1535		return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1536
1537	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1538	default:
1539		/* Initiating device starts the round */
1540		if (!hcon->out)
1541			return 0;
1542
1543		BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
1544		       smp->passkey_round + 1);
1545
1546		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1547
1548		return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1549	}
1550
1551	return 0;
1552}
1553
1554static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1555{
1556	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1557	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1558	u8 smp_op;
1559
1560	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1561
1562	switch (mgmt_op) {
1563	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1564		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1565		return 0;
1566	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1567		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1568		return 0;
1569	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1570		hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1571		smp->passkey_round = 0;
1572
1573		if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1574			smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1575		else
1576			smp_op = 0;
1577
1578		if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1579			return -EIO;
1580
1581		return 0;
1582	}
1583
1584	/* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1585	if (hcon->out) {
1586		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1587		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1588	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1589		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1590		sc_add_ltk(smp);
1591	}
1592
1593	return 0;
1594}
1595
1596int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1597{
1598	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1599	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1600	struct smp_chan *smp;
1601	u32 value;
1602	int err;
1603
1604	BT_DBG("");
1605
1606	if (!conn)
1607		return -ENOTCONN;
1608
1609	chan = conn->smp;
1610	if (!chan)
1611		return -ENOTCONN;
1612
1613	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1614	if (!chan->data) {
1615		err = -ENOTCONN;
1616		goto unlock;
1617	}
1618
1619	smp = chan->data;
1620
1621	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1622		err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1623		goto unlock;
1624	}
1625
1626	switch (mgmt_op) {
1627	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1628		value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1629		memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1630		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
1631		put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1632		/* Fall Through */
1633	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1634		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1635		break;
1636	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1637	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1638		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1639		err = 0;
1640		goto unlock;
1641	default:
1642		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1643		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
1644		goto unlock;
1645	}
1646
1647	err = 0;
1648
1649	/* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1650	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1651		u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1652		if (rsp)
1653			smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1654	}
1655
1656unlock:
1657	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1658	return err;
1659}
1660
1661static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1662				    struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1663				    struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1664{
1665	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1666	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1667	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1668
1669	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1670		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1671		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1672	}
1673
1674	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1675		remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1676
1677	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1678		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1679
1680	if (!rsp) {
1681		memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1682
 
1683		req->init_key_dist   = local_dist;
1684		req->resp_key_dist   = remote_dist;
1685		req->max_key_size    = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1686
1687		smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1688
1689		return;
1690	}
1691
1692	memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1693
 
1694	rsp->max_key_size    = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1695	rsp->init_key_dist   = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1696	rsp->resp_key_dist   = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1697
1698	smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1699}
1700
1701static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1702{
1703	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1704	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1705	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1706	struct smp_chan *smp;
1707	u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1708	int ret;
1709
1710	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1711
1712	if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1713		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1714
1715	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1716		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1717
1718	if (!chan->data)
1719		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1720	else
1721		smp = chan->data;
1722
1723	if (!smp)
1724		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1725
1726	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1727	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1728
1729	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1730	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1731		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1732
1733	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1734		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1735
1736	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1737	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1738	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1739
1740	/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1741	 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1742	 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1743	 */
1744	if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
1745		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1746
1747	/* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1748	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1749		/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1750		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1751		    !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1752			return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1753
1754		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1755
1756		build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1757
 
 
 
1758		key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1759		if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1760			return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1761
1762		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1763		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1764
1765		smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1766		memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1767		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1768
1769		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1770		return 0;
1771	}
1772
1773	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1774
1775	if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
1776		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1777
 
 
 
 
1778	if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1779		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1780	else
1781		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1782
1783	if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1784		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1785
1786	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1787	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1788		u8 method;
1789
1790		method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1791					 req->io_capability);
1792		if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1793			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1794	}
1795
1796	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1797	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1798		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1799
1800	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1801
1802	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1803	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1804
1805	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1806
1807	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1808
1809	/* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1810	 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1811	 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1812	 * positive SC enablement.
1813	 */
1814	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1815
1816	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1817		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1818		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1819		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1820		/* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1821		return 0;
1822	}
1823
1824	/* Request setup of TK */
1825	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1826	if (ret)
1827		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1828
1829	return 0;
1830}
1831
1832static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1833{
1834	struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1835
1836	BT_DBG("");
1837
1838	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1839		struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1840		struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1841
1842		if (!chan || !chan->data)
1843			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1844
1845		smp_dev = chan->data;
1846
1847		memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1848		memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32);
1849		memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1850
1851		if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1852			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1853
1854		goto done;
1855	}
1856
1857	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1858		BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
 
 
1859		memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1860		memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
1861		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1862	} else {
1863		while (true) {
1864			/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
1865			if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
1866				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1867
1868			/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1869			 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
1870			 */
1871			if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
1872				break;
1873		}
1874	}
1875
1876done:
1877	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1878	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1879	SMP_DBG("Local Private Key:  %32phN", smp->local_sk);
1880
1881	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1882
1883	return 0;
1884}
1885
1886static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1887{
1888	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1889	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1890	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1891	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1892	u8 key_size, auth;
1893	int ret;
1894
1895	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1896
1897	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1898		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1899
1900	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1901		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1902
1903	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1904
1905	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1906
1907	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1908	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1909		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1910
1911	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1912
1913	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1914		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1915
1916	/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1917	 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1918	 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1919	 */
1920	if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
1921		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1922
1923	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1924	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1925
1926	/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1927	 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1928	 */
1929	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1930
 
 
 
1931	/* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1932	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1933		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1934		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1935		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1936		return 0;
1937	}
1938
1939	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1940		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1941	else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1942		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1943
1944	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1945	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1946		u8 method;
1947
1948		method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
1949					 rsp->io_capability);
1950		if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1951			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1952	}
1953
1954	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1955
1956	/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1957	 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1958	 */
1959	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1960
1961	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1962		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1963		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1964		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1965		return sc_send_public_key(smp);
1966	}
1967
1968	auth |= req->auth_req;
1969
1970	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
1971	if (ret)
1972		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1973
1974	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1975
1976	/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
1977	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
1978		return smp_confirm(smp);
1979
1980	return 0;
1981}
1982
1983static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1984{
1985	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1986
1987	BT_DBG("");
1988
1989	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1990		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1991
1992	if (conn->hcon->out) {
1993		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1994			     smp->prnd);
1995		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1996	}
1997
1998	return 0;
1999}
2000
2001/* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
2002 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
2003 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
2004 */
2005static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
2006{
2007	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2008	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2009	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2010	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2011	u8 auth;
2012
2013	/* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
2014	if (hcon->out)
2015		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2016
2017	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2018		BT_ERR("Refusing SMP SC -> legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2019		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2020	}
2021
2022	BT_ERR("Trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2023
2024	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2025	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2026
2027	/* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2028	smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2029
2030	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2031
2032	if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2033		BT_ERR("Failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2034		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2035	}
2036
2037	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2038
2039	return 0;
2040}
2041
2042static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2043{
2044	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2045	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2046
2047	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
2048
2049	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2050		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2051
2052	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2053	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2054
2055	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2056		int ret;
2057
2058		/* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2059		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2060			return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2061
2062		BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2063
2064		ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2065		if (ret)
2066			return ret;
2067	}
2068
2069	if (conn->hcon->out) {
2070		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2071			     smp->prnd);
2072		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2073		return 0;
2074	}
2075
2076	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2077		return smp_confirm(smp);
2078
2079	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2080
2081	return 0;
2082}
2083
2084static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2085{
2086	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2087	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2088	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2089	u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
2090	u32 passkey;
2091	int err;
2092
2093	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2094
2095	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2096		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2097
2098	memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2099	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2100
2101	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2102		return smp_random(smp);
2103
2104	if (hcon->out) {
2105		pkax = smp->local_pk;
2106		pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2107		na   = smp->prnd;
2108		nb   = smp->rrnd;
2109	} else {
2110		pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2111		pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2112		na   = smp->rrnd;
2113		nb   = smp->prnd;
2114	}
2115
2116	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2117		if (!hcon->out)
2118			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2119				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2120		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2121		goto mackey_and_ltk;
2122	}
2123
2124	/* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2125	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2126		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2127
2128	if (hcon->out) {
2129		u8 cfm[16];
2130
2131		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2132			     smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
2133		if (err)
2134			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2135
2136		if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2137			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2138	} else {
2139		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2140			     smp->prnd);
2141		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2142	}
2143
2144mackey_and_ltk:
2145	/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2146	err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2147	if (err)
2148		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2149
2150	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2151		if (hcon->out) {
2152			sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2153			SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2154		}
2155		return 0;
2156	}
2157
2158	err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2159	if (err)
2160		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2161
 
 
 
 
 
 
2162	err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2163					hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
2164	if (err)
2165		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2166
2167	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2168
2169	return 0;
2170}
2171
2172static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2173{
2174	struct smp_ltk *key;
2175	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2176
2177	key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2178	if (!key)
2179		return false;
2180
2181	if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2182		return false;
2183
2184	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2185		return true;
2186
2187	hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2188	hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2189
2190	/* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
2191	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2192
2193	return true;
2194}
2195
2196bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2197			     enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2198{
2199	if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2200		return true;
2201
2202	/* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2203	 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2204	 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2205	 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2206	 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2207	 */
2208	if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2209	    test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2210	    hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2211		return false;
2212
2213	if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2214		return true;
2215
2216	return false;
2217}
2218
2219static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2220{
2221	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2222	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2223	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2224	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2225	struct smp_chan *smp;
2226	u8 sec_level, auth;
2227
2228	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2229
2230	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2231		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2232
2233	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2234		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2235
2236	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2237
2238	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2239		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2240
2241	if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2242		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2243	else
2244		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2245
2246	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
 
 
 
 
 
2247		return 0;
 
2248
2249	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2250		hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2251
2252	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2253		return 0;
2254
2255	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2256	if (!smp)
2257		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2258
2259	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2260	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2261		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2262
2263	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2264
2265	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2266	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2267
2268	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2269	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2270
2271	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2272	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2273
2274	return 0;
2275}
2276
2277int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2278{
2279	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2280	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2281	struct smp_chan *smp;
2282	__u8 authreq;
2283	int ret;
2284
2285	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
2286
2287	/* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2288	if (!conn)
2289		return 1;
2290
2291	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2292		return 1;
2293
2294	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2295		return 1;
2296
2297	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2298		hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2299
2300	if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2301		if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2302			return 0;
2303
2304	chan = conn->smp;
2305	if (!chan) {
2306		BT_ERR("SMP security requested but not available");
2307		return 1;
2308	}
2309
2310	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2311
2312	/* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2313	if (chan->data) {
2314		ret = 0;
2315		goto unlock;
2316	}
2317
2318	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2319	if (!smp) {
2320		ret = 1;
2321		goto unlock;
2322	}
2323
2324	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2325
2326	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
2327		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
 
 
 
2328
2329	/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2330	 * requires it.
2331	 */
2332	if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2333	    hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2334		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
 
 
 
 
 
2335
2336	if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2337		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2338
2339		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2340		smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2341		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2342
2343		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2344		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2345	} else {
2346		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2347		cp.auth_req = authreq;
2348		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2349		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2350	}
2351
2352	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2353	ret = 0;
2354
2355unlock:
2356	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2357	return ret;
2358}
2359
2360void smp_cancel_pairing(struct hci_conn *hcon)
 
2361{
2362	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
 
2363	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2364	struct smp_chan *smp;
 
 
 
 
2365
 
 
 
 
 
2366	if (!conn)
2367		return;
2368
2369	chan = conn->smp;
2370	if (!chan)
2371		return;
2372
2373	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2374
2375	smp = chan->data;
2376	if (smp) {
 
 
 
 
 
 
2377		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2378			smp_failure(conn, 0);
2379		else
2380			smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
 
2381	}
2382
2383	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
 
 
 
2384}
2385
2386static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2387{
2388	struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2389	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2390	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2391
2392	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2393
2394	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2395		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2396
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2397	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
2398
2399	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2400
2401	memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2402
2403	return 0;
2404}
2405
2406static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2407{
2408	struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2409	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2410	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2411	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2412	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2413	struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2414	u8 authenticated;
2415
2416	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2417
2418	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2419		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2420
2421	/* Mark the information as received */
2422	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2423
2424	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2425		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2426	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2427		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2428
2429	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2430
2431	authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2432	ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2433			  authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2434			  rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2435	smp->ltk = ltk;
2436	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2437		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2438
2439	return 0;
2440}
2441
2442static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2443{
2444	struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2445	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2446	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2447
2448	BT_DBG("");
2449
2450	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2451		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2452
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2453	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2454
2455	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2456
2457	memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2458
2459	return 0;
2460}
2461
2462static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2463				   struct sk_buff *skb)
2464{
2465	struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2466	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2467	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2468	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2469	bdaddr_t rpa;
2470
2471	BT_DBG("");
2472
2473	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2474		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2475
2476	/* Mark the information as received */
2477	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2478
2479	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2480		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2481
2482	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2483
2484	/* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2485	 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2486	 * as "identity information". However, since such
2487	 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2488	 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2489	 * received an IRK for such a device.
2490	 *
2491	 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2492	 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2493	 */
2494	if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2495	    !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2496		BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address");
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2497		goto distribute;
2498	}
2499
2500	bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2501	smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2502
2503	if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2504		bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2505	else
2506		bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2507
2508	smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2509				      smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2510
2511distribute:
2512	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2513		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2514
2515	return 0;
2516}
2517
2518static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2519{
2520	struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2521	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2522	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2523	struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2524
2525	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2526
2527	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2528		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2529
2530	/* Mark the information as received */
2531	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2532
2533	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2534
2535	csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2536	if (csrk) {
2537		if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2538			csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2539		else
2540			csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2541		memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2542	}
2543	smp->csrk = csrk;
2544	smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2545
2546	return 0;
2547}
2548
2549static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2550{
2551	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2552	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2553	struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2554	u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2555
2556	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2557	    test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2558		return REQ_OOB;
2559
2560	/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2561	 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2562	 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2563	 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2564	 */
2565	if (hcon->out) {
2566		local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2567		remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2568	} else {
2569		local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2570		remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2571	}
2572
2573	local_io = local->io_capability;
2574	remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2575
2576	local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2577	remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2578
2579	/* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2580	 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2581	 */
2582	if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2583		method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2584	else
2585		method = JUST_WORKS;
2586
2587	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2588	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2589		method = JUST_WORKS;
2590
2591	return method;
2592}
2593
2594static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2595{
2596	struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2597	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2598	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2599	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2600	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 
2601	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2602	int err;
2603
2604	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2605
2606	if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2607		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2608
2609	memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2610
2611	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2612		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2613			     smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2614		if (err)
2615			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2616
2617		if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2618			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2619	}
2620
2621	/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2622	 * the key from the initiating device.
2623	 */
2624	if (!hcon->out) {
2625		err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2626		if (err)
2627			return err;
2628	}
2629
2630	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2631	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2632
2633	if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2634		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2635
2636	SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2637
2638	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2639
2640	smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2641
2642	BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
2643
2644	/* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2645	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2646		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2647	else
2648		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2649
2650	if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2651		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2652
2653	if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2654		get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2655				 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2656		hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2657		hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2658		smp->passkey_round = 0;
2659		if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2660					     hcon->dst_type,
2661					     hcon->passkey_notify,
2662					     hcon->passkey_entered))
2663			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2664		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2665		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2666	}
2667
2668	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2669		if (hcon->out)
2670			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2671				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2672
2673		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2674
2675		return 0;
2676	}
2677
2678	if (hcon->out)
2679		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2680
2681	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2682		if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2683					      hcon->dst_type))
2684			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2685		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2686		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2687		return 0;
2688	}
2689
2690	/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2691	 * send the confirm value.
2692	 */
2693	if (conn->hcon->out)
2694		return 0;
2695
2696	err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2697		     0, cfm.confirm_val);
2698	if (err)
2699		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2700
2701	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2702	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2703
2704	return 0;
2705}
2706
2707static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2708{
2709	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2710	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2711	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2712	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2713	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2714	u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2715	int err;
2716
2717	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2718
2719	if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2720		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2721
2722	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2723	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2724	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2725	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2726
2727	if (hcon->out) {
2728		local_addr = a;
2729		remote_addr = b;
2730		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2731	} else {
2732		local_addr = b;
2733		remote_addr = a;
2734		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2735	}
2736
2737	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2738
2739	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2740		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2741	else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2742		memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2743
2744	err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2745		     io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2746	if (err)
2747		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2748
2749	if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
2750		return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2751
2752	if (!hcon->out) {
2753		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2754			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2755			return 0;
2756		}
2757
2758		/* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
2759		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2760	}
2761
2762	sc_add_ltk(smp);
2763
2764	if (hcon->out) {
2765		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2766		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2767	}
2768
2769	return 0;
2770}
2771
2772static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2773				   struct sk_buff *skb)
2774{
2775	struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2776
2777	BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2778
2779	return 0;
2780}
2781
2782static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2783{
2784	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2785	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2786	struct smp_chan *smp;
2787	__u8 code, reason;
2788	int err = 0;
2789
2790	if (skb->len < 1)
2791		return -EILSEQ;
2792
2793	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2794		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2795		goto done;
2796	}
2797
2798	code = skb->data[0];
2799	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2800
2801	smp = chan->data;
2802
2803	if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2804		goto drop;
2805
2806	if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2807		goto drop;
2808
2809	/* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2810	 * pairing request and security request.
2811	 */
2812	if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2813		goto drop;
2814
2815	switch (code) {
2816	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2817		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2818		break;
2819
2820	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2821		smp_failure(conn, 0);
2822		err = -EPERM;
2823		break;
2824
2825	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2826		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
2827		break;
2828
2829	case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
2830		reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
2831		break;
2832
2833	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
2834		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
2835		break;
2836
2837	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
2838		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
2839		break;
2840
2841	case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
2842		reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
2843		break;
2844
2845	case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
2846		reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
2847		break;
2848
2849	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
2850		reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
2851		break;
2852
2853	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
2854		reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
2855		break;
2856
2857	case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
2858		reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
2859		break;
2860
2861	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
2862		reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
2863		break;
2864
2865	case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
2866		reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
2867		break;
2868
2869	case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
2870		reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
2871		break;
2872
2873	default:
2874		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
2875		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2876		goto done;
2877	}
2878
2879done:
2880	if (!err) {
2881		if (reason)
2882			smp_failure(conn, reason);
2883		kfree_skb(skb);
2884	}
2885
2886	return err;
2887
2888drop:
2889	BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name,
2890	       code, &hcon->dst);
2891	kfree_skb(skb);
2892	return 0;
2893}
2894
2895static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
2896{
2897	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2898
2899	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2900
2901	if (chan->data)
2902		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
2903
2904	conn->smp = NULL;
2905	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
2906}
2907
2908static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
2909{
2910	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2911	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2912	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2913	struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
2914	struct smp_chan *smp;
2915
2916	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2917
2918	/* Only new pairings are interesting */
2919	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
2920		return;
2921
2922	/* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
2923	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
2924		return;
2925
2926	/* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
2927	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2928		return;
2929
2930	/* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
2931	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
2932		return;
2933
2934	/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
2935	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
2936	    !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
2937		return;
2938
2939	/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
2940	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2941		return;
2942
2943	/* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
2944	if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
2945		return;
2946
2947	/* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
2948	if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
2949		return;
2950
2951	/* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
2952	if (chan->data)
2953		return;
2954
2955	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2956	if (!smp) {
2957		BT_ERR("%s unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR",
2958		       hdev->name);
2959		return;
2960	}
2961
2962	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2963
2964	BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
2965
2966	/* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
2967	build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
2968
2969	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2970	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
2971
2972	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
2973	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2974}
2975
2976static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
2977{
2978	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2979	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2980	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2981
2982	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2983
2984	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
2985		bredr_pairing(chan);
2986		return;
2987	}
2988
2989	if (!smp)
2990		return;
2991
2992	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
2993		return;
2994
2995	cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
2996
2997	smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2998}
2999
3000static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3001{
3002	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3003	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3004
3005	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3006
3007	/* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
3008	 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
3009	 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
3010	 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3011	 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3012	 */
3013	conn->smp = chan;
3014
3015	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3016		bredr_pairing(chan);
3017}
3018
3019static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3020{
3021	int err;
3022
3023	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3024
3025	err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3026	if (err) {
3027		struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3028
3029		if (smp)
3030			cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3031
3032		hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3033	}
3034
3035	return err;
3036}
3037
3038static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3039					unsigned long hdr_len,
3040					unsigned long len, int nb)
3041{
3042	struct sk_buff *skb;
3043
3044	skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3045	if (!skb)
3046		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3047
3048	skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3049	bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3050
3051	return skb;
3052}
3053
3054static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3055	.name			= "Security Manager",
3056	.ready			= smp_ready_cb,
3057	.recv			= smp_recv_cb,
3058	.alloc_skb		= smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3059	.teardown		= smp_teardown_cb,
3060	.resume			= smp_resume_cb,
3061
3062	.new_connection		= l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3063	.state_change		= l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3064	.close			= l2cap_chan_no_close,
3065	.defer			= l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3066	.suspend		= l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3067	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3068	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3069};
3070
3071static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3072{
3073	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3074
3075	BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3076
3077	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3078	if (!chan)
3079		return NULL;
3080
3081	chan->chan_type	= pchan->chan_type;
3082	chan->ops	= &smp_chan_ops;
3083	chan->scid	= pchan->scid;
3084	chan->dcid	= chan->scid;
3085	chan->imtu	= pchan->imtu;
3086	chan->omtu	= pchan->omtu;
3087	chan->mode	= pchan->mode;
3088
3089	/* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3090	 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3091	 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3092	 * warnings.
3093	 */
3094	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3095
3096	BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3097
3098	return chan;
3099}
3100
3101static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3102	.name			= "Security Manager Root",
3103	.new_connection		= smp_new_conn_cb,
3104
3105	/* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3106	.close			= l2cap_chan_no_close,
3107	.alloc_skb		= l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3108	.recv			= l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3109	.state_change		= l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3110	.teardown		= l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3111	.ready			= l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3112	.defer			= l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3113	.suspend		= l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3114	.resume			= l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3115	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3116	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3117};
3118
3119static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3120{
3121	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3122	struct smp_dev *smp;
3123	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_aes;
3124	struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
 
3125
3126	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3127		smp = NULL;
3128		goto create_chan;
3129	}
3130
3131	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3132	if (!smp)
3133		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3134
3135	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3136	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
3137		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
3138		kzfree(smp);
3139		return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
3140	}
3141
3142	tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3143	if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3144		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3145		crypto_free_skcipher(tfm_aes);
3146		kzfree(smp);
3147		return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3148	}
3149
3150	smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3151	smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3152	smp->min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
3153	smp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
3154
3155create_chan:
3156	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3157	if (!chan) {
3158		if (smp) {
3159			crypto_free_skcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
3160			crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3161			kzfree(smp);
 
3162		}
3163		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3164	}
3165
3166	chan->data = smp;
3167
3168	l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3169
3170	l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3171
3172	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3173		u8 bdaddr_type;
3174
3175		hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3176
3177		if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3178			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3179		else
3180			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3181	} else {
3182		bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3183		chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3184	}
3185
3186	chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3187	chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3188	chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3189	chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3190
3191	/* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3192	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3193
3194	return chan;
3195}
3196
3197static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3198{
3199	struct smp_dev *smp;
3200
3201	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3202
3203	smp = chan->data;
3204	if (smp) {
3205		chan->data = NULL;
3206		crypto_free_skcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
3207		crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3208		kzfree(smp);
 
3209	}
3210
3211	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3212}
3213
3214static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
3215				    char __user *user_buf,
3216				    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3217{
3218	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3219	char buf[3];
3220
3221	buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
3222	buf[1] = '\n';
3223	buf[2] = '\0';
3224	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
3225}
3226
3227static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
3228				     const char __user *user_buf,
3229				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3230{
3231	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3232	char buf[32];
3233	size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf)-1));
3234	bool enable;
 
3235
3236	if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3237		return -EFAULT;
3238
3239	buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3240	if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
3241		return -EINVAL;
3242
3243	if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3244		return -EALREADY;
3245
3246	if (enable) {
3247		struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3248
3249		chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3250		if (IS_ERR(chan))
3251			return PTR_ERR(chan);
3252
3253		hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3254	} else {
3255		struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3256
3257		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3258		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3259		smp_del_chan(chan);
3260	}
3261
3262	hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3263
3264	return count;
3265}
3266
3267static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
3268	.open		= simple_open,
3269	.read		= force_bredr_smp_read,
3270	.write		= force_bredr_smp_write,
3271	.llseek		= default_llseek,
3272};
3273
3274static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3275				     char __user *user_buf,
3276				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3277{
3278	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3279	char buf[4];
3280
3281	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size);
3282
3283	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3284}
3285
3286static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3287				      const char __user *user_buf,
3288				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3289{
3290	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3291	char buf[32];
3292	size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3293	u8 key_size;
3294
3295	if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3296		return -EFAULT;
3297
3298	buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3299
3300	sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3301
3302	if (key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
3303	    key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
3304		return -EINVAL;
3305
3306	SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size = key_size;
3307
3308	return count;
3309}
3310
3311static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = {
3312	.open		= simple_open,
3313	.read		= le_min_key_size_read,
3314	.write		= le_min_key_size_write,
3315	.llseek		= default_llseek,
3316};
3317
3318static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3319				     char __user *user_buf,
3320				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3321{
3322	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3323	char buf[4];
3324
3325	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size);
3326
3327	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3328}
3329
3330static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3331				      const char __user *user_buf,
3332				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3333{
3334	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3335	char buf[32];
3336	size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3337	u8 key_size;
3338
3339	if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3340		return -EFAULT;
3341
3342	buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3343
3344	sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3345
3346	if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
3347	    key_size < SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size)
3348		return -EINVAL;
3349
3350	SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size = key_size;
3351
3352	return count;
3353}
3354
3355static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = {
3356	.open		= simple_open,
3357	.read		= le_max_key_size_read,
3358	.write		= le_max_key_size_write,
3359	.llseek		= default_llseek,
3360};
3361
3362int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3363{
3364	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3365
3366	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
3367
3368	/* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3369	 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3370	 */
3371	if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3372		return 0;
3373
3374	if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3375		chan = hdev->smp_data;
3376		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3377		smp_del_chan(chan);
3378	}
3379
3380	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3381	if (IS_ERR(chan))
3382		return PTR_ERR(chan);
3383
3384	hdev->smp_data = chan;
3385
3386	debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3387			    &le_min_key_size_fops);
3388	debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3389			    &le_max_key_size_fops);
3390
3391	/* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
3392	 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
3393	 *
3394	 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
3395	 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
3396	 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
3397	 */
3398	if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3399		debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
3400				    hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
3401		return 0;
 
 
 
3402	}
3403
3404	if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3405		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3406		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3407		smp_del_chan(chan);
3408	}
3409
3410	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3411	if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
3412		int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3413		chan = hdev->smp_data;
3414		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3415		smp_del_chan(chan);
3416		return err;
3417	}
3418
3419	hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3420
3421	return 0;
3422}
3423
3424void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3425{
3426	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3427
3428	if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3429		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3430		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3431		smp_del_chan(chan);
3432	}
3433
3434	if (hdev->smp_data) {
3435		chan = hdev->smp_data;
3436		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3437		smp_del_chan(chan);
3438	}
3439}
3440
3441#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3442
3443static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_aes)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3444{
3445	const u8 irk[16] = {
3446			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3447			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3448	const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3449	const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3450	u8 res[3];
3451	int err;
3452
3453	err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
3454	if (err)
3455		return err;
3456
3457	if (memcmp(res, exp, 3))
3458		return -EINVAL;
3459
3460	return 0;
3461}
3462
3463static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_aes)
3464{
3465	const u8 k[16] = {
3466			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3467			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3468	const u8 r[16] = {
3469			0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3470			0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3471	const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3472	const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3473	const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3474	const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3475	const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3476	const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3477	const u8 exp[16] = {
3478			0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3479			0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3480	u8 res[16];
3481	int err;
3482
3483	err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3484	if (err)
3485		return err;
3486
3487	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3488		return -EINVAL;
3489
3490	return 0;
3491}
3492
3493static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_aes)
3494{
3495	const u8 k[16] = {
3496			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3497			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3498	const u8 r1[16] = {
3499			0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3500	const u8 r2[16] = {
3501			0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3502	const u8 exp[16] = {
3503			0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3504			0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3505	u8 res[16];
3506	int err;
3507
3508	err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
3509	if (err)
3510		return err;
3511
3512	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3513		return -EINVAL;
3514
3515	return 0;
3516}
3517
3518static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3519{
3520	const u8 u[32] = {
3521			0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3522			0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3523			0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3524			0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3525	const u8 v[32] = {
3526			0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3527			0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3528			0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3529			0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3530	const u8 x[16] = {
3531			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3532			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3533	const u8 z = 0x00;
3534	const u8 exp[16] = {
3535			0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3536			0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3537	u8 res[16];
3538	int err;
3539
3540	err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3541	if (err)
3542		return err;
3543
3544	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3545		return -EINVAL;
3546
3547	return 0;
3548}
3549
3550static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3551{
3552	const u8 w[32] = {
3553			0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3554			0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3555			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3556			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3557	const u8 n1[16] = {
3558			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3559			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3560	const u8 n2[16] = {
3561			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3562			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3563	const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3564	const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3565	const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3566			0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3567			0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3568	const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3569			0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3570			0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3571	u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3572	int err;
3573
3574	err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3575	if (err)
3576		return err;
3577
3578	if (memcmp(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3579		return -EINVAL;
3580
3581	if (memcmp(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3582		return -EINVAL;
3583
3584	return 0;
3585}
3586
3587static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3588{
3589	const u8 w[16] = {
3590			0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3591			0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3592	const u8 n1[16] = {
3593			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3594			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3595	const u8 n2[16] = {
3596			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3597			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3598	const u8 r[16] = {
3599			0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3600			0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3601	const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3602	const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3603	const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3604	const u8 exp[16] = {
3605			0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3606			0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3607	u8 res[16];
3608	int err;
3609
3610	err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3611	if (err)
3612		return err;
3613
3614	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3615		return -EINVAL;
3616
3617	return 0;
3618}
3619
3620static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3621{
3622	const u8 u[32] = {
3623			0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3624			0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3625			0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3626			0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3627	const u8 v[32] = {
3628			0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3629			0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3630			0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3631			0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3632	const u8 x[16] = {
3633			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3634			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3635	const u8 y[16] = {
3636			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3637			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3638	const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3639	u32 val;
3640	int err;
3641
3642	err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3643	if (err)
3644		return err;
3645
3646	if (val != exp_val)
3647		return -EINVAL;
3648
3649	return 0;
3650}
3651
3652static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3653{
3654	const u8 w[16] = {
3655			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3656			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3657	const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3658	const u8 exp[16] = {
3659			0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3660			0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3661	u8 res[16];
3662	int err;
3663
3664	err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3665	if (err)
3666		return err;
3667
3668	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3669		return -EINVAL;
3670
3671	return 0;
3672}
3673
3674static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3675
3676static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3677			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3678{
3679	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3680				       strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3681}
3682
3683static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3684	.open		= simple_open,
3685	.read		= test_smp_read,
3686	.llseek		= default_llseek,
3687};
3688
3689static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_aes,
3690				struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3691{
3692	ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3693	unsigned long long duration;
3694	int err;
3695
3696	calltime = ktime_get();
3697
3698	err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
 
 
 
 
 
 
3699	if (err) {
3700		BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3701		goto done;
3702	}
3703
3704	err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
3705	if (err) {
3706		BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3707		goto done;
3708	}
3709
3710	err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
3711	if (err) {
3712		BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3713		goto done;
3714	}
3715
3716	err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3717	if (err) {
3718		BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3719		goto done;
3720	}
3721
3722	err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3723	if (err) {
3724		BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3725		goto done;
3726	}
3727
3728	err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3729	if (err) {
3730		BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3731		goto done;
3732	}
3733
3734	err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3735	if (err) {
3736		BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3737		goto done;
3738	}
3739
3740	err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3741	if (err) {
3742		BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3743		goto done;
3744	}
3745
3746	rettime = ktime_get();
3747	delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3748	duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3749
3750	BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3751
3752done:
3753	if (!err)
3754		snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3755			 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3756	else
3757		snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3758
3759	debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3760			    &test_smp_fops);
3761
3762	return err;
3763}
3764
3765int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3766{
3767	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_aes;
3768	struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
 
3769	int err;
3770
3771	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3772	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
3773		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
3774		return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
3775	}
3776
3777	tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3778	if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3779		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3780		crypto_free_skcipher(tfm_aes);
3781		return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3782	}
3783
3784	err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac);
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3785
3786	crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3787	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm_aes);
3788
3789	return err;
3790}
3791
3792#endif