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1/* Userspace key control operations
2 *
3 * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
5 *
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
8 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
10 */
11
12#include <linux/module.h>
13#include <linux/init.h>
14#include <linux/sched.h>
15#include <linux/slab.h>
16#include <linux/syscalls.h>
17#include <linux/key.h>
18#include <linux/keyctl.h>
19#include <linux/fs.h>
20#include <linux/capability.h>
21#include <linux/string.h>
22#include <linux/err.h>
23#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
24#include <linux/security.h>
25#include <linux/uio.h>
26#include <asm/uaccess.h>
27#include "internal.h"
28
29#define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096
30
31static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
32 const char __user *_type,
33 unsigned len)
34{
35 int ret;
36
37 ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, len);
38 if (ret < 0)
39 return ret;
40 if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
41 return -EINVAL;
42 if (type[0] == '.')
43 return -EPERM;
44 type[len - 1] = '\0';
45 return 0;
46}
47
48/*
49 * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
50 * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
51 *
52 * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to
53 * generate one from the payload.
54 *
55 * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
56 *
57 * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
58 * code is returned.
59 */
60SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
61 const char __user *, _description,
62 const void __user *, _payload,
63 size_t, plen,
64 key_serial_t, ringid)
65{
66 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
67 char type[32], *description;
68 void *payload;
69 long ret;
70
71 ret = -EINVAL;
72 if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
73 goto error;
74
75 /* draw all the data into kernel space */
76 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
77 if (ret < 0)
78 goto error;
79
80 description = NULL;
81 if (_description) {
82 description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
83 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
84 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
85 goto error;
86 }
87 if (!*description) {
88 kfree(description);
89 description = NULL;
90 } else if ((description[0] == '.') &&
91 (strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
92 ret = -EPERM;
93 goto error2;
94 }
95 }
96
97 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
98 payload = NULL;
99
100 if (_payload) {
101 ret = -ENOMEM;
102 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
103 if (!payload) {
104 if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
105 goto error2;
106 payload = vmalloc(plen);
107 if (!payload)
108 goto error2;
109 }
110
111 ret = -EFAULT;
112 if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
113 goto error3;
114 }
115
116 /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
117 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
118 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
119 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
120 goto error3;
121 }
122
123 /* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
124 * keyring */
125 key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
126 payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
127 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
128 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
129 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
130 key_ref_put(key_ref);
131 }
132 else {
133 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
134 }
135
136 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
137 error3:
138 kvfree(payload);
139 error2:
140 kfree(description);
141 error:
142 return ret;
143}
144
145/*
146 * Search the process keyrings and keyring trees linked from those for a
147 * matching key. Keyrings must have appropriate Search permission to be
148 * searched.
149 *
150 * If a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if there's
151 * one specified and the serial number of the key will be returned.
152 *
153 * If no key is found, /sbin/request-key will be invoked if _callout_info is
154 * non-NULL in an attempt to create a key. The _callout_info string will be
155 * passed to /sbin/request-key to aid with completing the request. If the
156 * _callout_info string is "" then it will be changed to "-".
157 */
158SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
159 const char __user *, _description,
160 const char __user *, _callout_info,
161 key_serial_t, destringid)
162{
163 struct key_type *ktype;
164 struct key *key;
165 key_ref_t dest_ref;
166 size_t callout_len;
167 char type[32], *description, *callout_info;
168 long ret;
169
170 /* pull the type into kernel space */
171 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
172 if (ret < 0)
173 goto error;
174
175 /* pull the description into kernel space */
176 description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
177 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
178 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
179 goto error;
180 }
181
182 /* pull the callout info into kernel space */
183 callout_info = NULL;
184 callout_len = 0;
185 if (_callout_info) {
186 callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE);
187 if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) {
188 ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info);
189 goto error2;
190 }
191 callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
192 }
193
194 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
195 dest_ref = NULL;
196 if (destringid) {
197 dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
198 KEY_NEED_WRITE);
199 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
200 ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
201 goto error3;
202 }
203 }
204
205 /* find the key type */
206 ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
207 if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
208 ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
209 goto error4;
210 }
211
212 /* do the search */
213 key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, callout_info,
214 callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
215 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
216 if (IS_ERR(key)) {
217 ret = PTR_ERR(key);
218 goto error5;
219 }
220
221 /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
222 ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
223 if (ret < 0)
224 goto error6;
225
226 ret = key->serial;
227
228error6:
229 key_put(key);
230error5:
231 key_type_put(ktype);
232error4:
233 key_ref_put(dest_ref);
234error3:
235 kfree(callout_info);
236error2:
237 kfree(description);
238error:
239 return ret;
240}
241
242/*
243 * Get the ID of the specified process keyring.
244 *
245 * The requested keyring must have search permission to be found.
246 *
247 * If successful, the ID of the requested keyring will be returned.
248 */
249long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
250{
251 key_ref_t key_ref;
252 unsigned long lflags;
253 long ret;
254
255 lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
256 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
257 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
258 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
259 goto error;
260 }
261
262 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
263 key_ref_put(key_ref);
264error:
265 return ret;
266}
267
268/*
269 * Join a (named) session keyring.
270 *
271 * Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session
272 * keyring, creating it if necessary. A named session keyring must have Search
273 * permission for it to be joined. Session keyrings without this permit will
274 * be skipped over.
275 *
276 * If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned.
277 */
278long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
279{
280 char *name;
281 long ret;
282
283 /* fetch the name from userspace */
284 name = NULL;
285 if (_name) {
286 name = strndup_user(_name, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
287 if (IS_ERR(name)) {
288 ret = PTR_ERR(name);
289 goto error;
290 }
291 }
292
293 /* join the session */
294 ret = join_session_keyring(name);
295 kfree(name);
296
297error:
298 return ret;
299}
300
301/*
302 * Update a key's data payload from the given data.
303 *
304 * The key must grant the caller Write permission and the key type must support
305 * updating for this to work. A negative key can be positively instantiated
306 * with this call.
307 *
308 * If successful, 0 will be returned. If the key type does not support
309 * updating, then -EOPNOTSUPP will be returned.
310 */
311long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
312 const void __user *_payload,
313 size_t plen)
314{
315 key_ref_t key_ref;
316 void *payload;
317 long ret;
318
319 ret = -EINVAL;
320 if (plen > PAGE_SIZE)
321 goto error;
322
323 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
324 payload = NULL;
325 if (_payload) {
326 ret = -ENOMEM;
327 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
328 if (!payload)
329 goto error;
330
331 ret = -EFAULT;
332 if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
333 goto error2;
334 }
335
336 /* find the target key (which must be writable) */
337 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
338 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
339 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
340 goto error2;
341 }
342
343 /* update the key */
344 ret = key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
345
346 key_ref_put(key_ref);
347error2:
348 kfree(payload);
349error:
350 return ret;
351}
352
353/*
354 * Revoke a key.
355 *
356 * The key must be grant the caller Write or Setattr permission for this to
357 * work. The key type should give up its quota claim when revoked. The key
358 * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
359 * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
360 *
361 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be revoked.
362 *
363 * If successful, 0 is returned.
364 */
365long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
366{
367 key_ref_t key_ref;
368 struct key *key;
369 long ret;
370
371 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
372 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
373 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
374 if (ret != -EACCES)
375 goto error;
376 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
377 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
378 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
379 goto error;
380 }
381 }
382
383 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
384 ret = 0;
385 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
386 ret = -EPERM;
387 else
388 key_revoke(key);
389
390 key_ref_put(key_ref);
391error:
392 return ret;
393}
394
395/*
396 * Invalidate a key.
397 *
398 * The key must be grant the caller Invalidate permission for this to work.
399 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
400 * immediately.
401 *
402 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be invalidated.
403 *
404 * If successful, 0 is returned.
405 */
406long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
407{
408 key_ref_t key_ref;
409 struct key *key;
410 long ret;
411
412 kenter("%d", id);
413
414 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
415 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
416 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
417
418 /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */
419 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
420 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0);
421 if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
422 goto error;
423 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL,
424 &key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->flags))
425 goto invalidate;
426 goto error_put;
427 }
428
429 goto error;
430 }
431
432invalidate:
433 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
434 ret = 0;
435 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
436 ret = -EPERM;
437 else
438 key_invalidate(key);
439error_put:
440 key_ref_put(key_ref);
441error:
442 kleave(" = %ld", ret);
443 return ret;
444}
445
446/*
447 * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
448 * special keyring IDs is used.
449 *
450 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission and not have
451 * KEY_FLAG_KEEP set for this to work. If successful, 0 will be returned.
452 */
453long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
454{
455 key_ref_t keyring_ref;
456 struct key *keyring;
457 long ret;
458
459 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
460 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
461 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
462
463 /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
464 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
465 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0);
466 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref))
467 goto error;
468 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR,
469 &key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)->flags))
470 goto clear;
471 goto error_put;
472 }
473
474 goto error;
475 }
476
477clear:
478 keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
479 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
480 ret = -EPERM;
481 else
482 ret = keyring_clear(keyring);
483error_put:
484 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
485error:
486 return ret;
487}
488
489/*
490 * Create a link from a keyring to a key if there's no matching key in the
491 * keyring, otherwise replace the link to the matching key with a link to the
492 * new key.
493 *
494 * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the the keyring must grant
495 * the caller Write permission. Furthermore, if an additional link is created,
496 * the keyring's quota will be extended.
497 *
498 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
499 */
500long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
501{
502 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
503 long ret;
504
505 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
506 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
507 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
508 goto error;
509 }
510
511 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
512 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
513 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
514 goto error2;
515 }
516
517 ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
518
519 key_ref_put(key_ref);
520error2:
521 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
522error:
523 return ret;
524}
525
526/*
527 * Unlink a key from a keyring.
528 *
529 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work; the key
530 * itself need not grant the caller anything. If the last link to a key is
531 * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
532 *
533 * Keys or keyrings with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be unlinked.
534 *
535 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
536 */
537long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
538{
539 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
540 struct key *keyring, *key;
541 long ret;
542
543 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
544 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
545 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
546 goto error;
547 }
548
549 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0);
550 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
551 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
552 goto error2;
553 }
554
555 keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
556 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
557 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags) &&
558 test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
559 ret = -EPERM;
560 else
561 ret = key_unlink(keyring, key);
562
563 key_ref_put(key_ref);
564error2:
565 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
566error:
567 return ret;
568}
569
570/*
571 * Return a description of a key to userspace.
572 *
573 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
574 *
575 * If there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it formatted
576 * in the following way:
577 *
578 * type;uid;gid;perm;description<NUL>
579 *
580 * If successful, we return the amount of description available, irrespective
581 * of how much we may have copied into the buffer.
582 */
583long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
584 char __user *buffer,
585 size_t buflen)
586{
587 struct key *key, *instkey;
588 key_ref_t key_ref;
589 char *infobuf;
590 long ret;
591 int desclen, infolen;
592
593 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
594 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
595 /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
596 * authorisation token handy */
597 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
598 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
599 if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
600 key_put(instkey);
601 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
602 KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
603 0);
604 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
605 goto okay;
606 }
607 }
608
609 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
610 goto error;
611 }
612
613okay:
614 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
615 desclen = strlen(key->description);
616
617 /* calculate how much information we're going to return */
618 ret = -ENOMEM;
619 infobuf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL,
620 "%s;%d;%d;%08x;",
621 key->type->name,
622 from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->uid),
623 from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->gid),
624 key->perm);
625 if (!infobuf)
626 goto error2;
627 infolen = strlen(infobuf);
628 ret = infolen + desclen + 1;
629
630 /* consider returning the data */
631 if (buffer && buflen >= ret) {
632 if (copy_to_user(buffer, infobuf, infolen) != 0 ||
633 copy_to_user(buffer + infolen, key->description,
634 desclen + 1) != 0)
635 ret = -EFAULT;
636 }
637
638 kfree(infobuf);
639error2:
640 key_ref_put(key_ref);
641error:
642 return ret;
643}
644
645/*
646 * Search the specified keyring and any keyrings it links to for a matching
647 * key. Only keyrings that grant the caller Search permission will be searched
648 * (this includes the starting keyring). Only keys with Search permission can
649 * be found.
650 *
651 * If successful, the found key will be linked to the destination keyring if
652 * supplied and the key has Link permission, and the found key ID will be
653 * returned.
654 */
655long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
656 const char __user *_type,
657 const char __user *_description,
658 key_serial_t destringid)
659{
660 struct key_type *ktype;
661 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref, dest_ref;
662 char type[32], *description;
663 long ret;
664
665 /* pull the type and description into kernel space */
666 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
667 if (ret < 0)
668 goto error;
669
670 description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
671 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
672 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
673 goto error;
674 }
675
676 /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
677 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
678 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
679 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
680 goto error2;
681 }
682
683 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
684 dest_ref = NULL;
685 if (destringid) {
686 dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
687 KEY_NEED_WRITE);
688 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
689 ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
690 goto error3;
691 }
692 }
693
694 /* find the key type */
695 ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
696 if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
697 ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
698 goto error4;
699 }
700
701 /* do the search */
702 key_ref = keyring_search(keyring_ref, ktype, description);
703 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
704 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
705
706 /* treat lack or presence of a negative key the same */
707 if (ret == -EAGAIN)
708 ret = -ENOKEY;
709 goto error5;
710 }
711
712 /* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
713 if (dest_ref) {
714 ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK);
715 if (ret < 0)
716 goto error6;
717
718 ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
719 if (ret < 0)
720 goto error6;
721 }
722
723 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
724
725error6:
726 key_ref_put(key_ref);
727error5:
728 key_type_put(ktype);
729error4:
730 key_ref_put(dest_ref);
731error3:
732 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
733error2:
734 kfree(description);
735error:
736 return ret;
737}
738
739/*
740 * Read a key's payload.
741 *
742 * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the
743 * caller Search permission when searched for from the process keyrings.
744 *
745 * If successful, we place up to buflen bytes of data into the buffer, if one
746 * is provided, and return the amount of data that is available in the key,
747 * irrespective of how much we copied into the buffer.
748 */
749long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
750{
751 struct key *key;
752 key_ref_t key_ref;
753 long ret;
754
755 /* find the key first */
756 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
757 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
758 ret = -ENOKEY;
759 goto error;
760 }
761
762 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
763
764 /* see if we can read it directly */
765 ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
766 if (ret == 0)
767 goto can_read_key;
768 if (ret != -EACCES)
769 goto error;
770
771 /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
772 * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
773 * dangling off an instantiation key
774 */
775 if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) {
776 ret = -EACCES;
777 goto error2;
778 }
779
780 /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
781can_read_key:
782 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
783 if (key->type->read) {
784 /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
785 * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
786 */
787 down_read(&key->sem);
788 ret = key_validate(key);
789 if (ret == 0)
790 ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
791 up_read(&key->sem);
792 }
793
794error2:
795 key_put(key);
796error:
797 return ret;
798}
799
800/*
801 * Change the ownership of a key
802 *
803 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
804 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. For the UID to be changed, or
805 * for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the
806 * caller must have sysadmin capability. If either uid or gid is -1 then that
807 * attribute is not changed.
808 *
809 * If the UID is to be changed, the new user must have sufficient quota to
810 * accept the key. The quota deduction will be removed from the old user to
811 * the new user should the attribute be changed.
812 *
813 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
814 */
815long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
816{
817 struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
818 struct key *key;
819 key_ref_t key_ref;
820 long ret;
821 kuid_t uid;
822 kgid_t gid;
823
824 uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
825 gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
826 ret = -EINVAL;
827 if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
828 goto error;
829 if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
830 goto error;
831
832 ret = 0;
833 if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
834 goto error;
835
836 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
837 KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
838 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
839 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
840 goto error;
841 }
842
843 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
844
845 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
846 ret = -EACCES;
847 down_write(&key->sem);
848
849 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
850 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
851 if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
852 goto error_put;
853
854 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
855 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
856 if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
857 goto error_put;
858 }
859
860 /* change the UID */
861 if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
862 ret = -ENOMEM;
863 newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
864 if (!newowner)
865 goto error_put;
866
867 /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
868 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
869 unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
870 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
871 unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
872 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
873
874 spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
875 if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
876 newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
877 newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
878 newowner->qnbytes)
879 goto quota_overrun;
880
881 newowner->qnkeys++;
882 newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
883 spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
884
885 spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
886 key->user->qnkeys--;
887 key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
888 spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
889 }
890
891 atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
892 atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
893
894 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
895 atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
896 atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
897 }
898
899 zapowner = key->user;
900 key->user = newowner;
901 key->uid = uid;
902 }
903
904 /* change the GID */
905 if (group != (gid_t) -1)
906 key->gid = gid;
907
908 ret = 0;
909
910error_put:
911 up_write(&key->sem);
912 key_put(key);
913 if (zapowner)
914 key_user_put(zapowner);
915error:
916 return ret;
917
918quota_overrun:
919 spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
920 zapowner = newowner;
921 ret = -EDQUOT;
922 goto error_put;
923}
924
925/*
926 * Change the permission mask on a key.
927 *
928 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
929 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. If the caller does not have
930 * sysadmin capability, it may only change the permission on keys that it owns.
931 */
932long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
933{
934 struct key *key;
935 key_ref_t key_ref;
936 long ret;
937
938 ret = -EINVAL;
939 if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
940 goto error;
941
942 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
943 KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
944 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
945 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
946 goto error;
947 }
948
949 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
950
951 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
952 ret = -EACCES;
953 down_write(&key->sem);
954
955 /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
956 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
957 key->perm = perm;
958 ret = 0;
959 }
960
961 up_write(&key->sem);
962 key_put(key);
963error:
964 return ret;
965}
966
967/*
968 * Get the destination keyring for instantiation and check that the caller has
969 * Write permission on it.
970 */
971static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
972 struct request_key_auth *rka,
973 struct key **_dest_keyring)
974{
975 key_ref_t dkref;
976
977 *_dest_keyring = NULL;
978
979 /* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */
980 if (ringid == 0)
981 return 0;
982
983 /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
984 if (ringid > 0) {
985 dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
986 if (IS_ERR(dkref))
987 return PTR_ERR(dkref);
988 *_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
989 return 0;
990 }
991
992 if (ringid == KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY)
993 return -EINVAL;
994
995 /* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the
996 * authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */
997 if (ringid >= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING) {
998 *_dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
999 return 0;
1000 }
1001
1002 return -ENOKEY;
1003}
1004
1005/*
1006 * Change the request_key authorisation key on the current process.
1007 */
1008static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
1009{
1010 struct cred *new;
1011
1012 new = prepare_creds();
1013 if (!new)
1014 return -ENOMEM;
1015
1016 key_put(new->request_key_auth);
1017 new->request_key_auth = key_get(key);
1018
1019 return commit_creds(new);
1020}
1021
1022/*
1023 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
1024 * destination keyring if one is given.
1025 *
1026 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1027 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1028 *
1029 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1030 */
1031long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
1032 struct iov_iter *from,
1033 key_serial_t ringid)
1034{
1035 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1036 struct request_key_auth *rka;
1037 struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
1038 size_t plen = from ? iov_iter_count(from) : 0;
1039 void *payload;
1040 long ret;
1041
1042 kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
1043
1044 if (!plen)
1045 from = NULL;
1046
1047 ret = -EINVAL;
1048 if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
1049 goto error;
1050
1051 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
1052 * assumed before calling this */
1053 ret = -EPERM;
1054 instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
1055 if (!instkey)
1056 goto error;
1057
1058 rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
1059 if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
1060 goto error;
1061
1062 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
1063 payload = NULL;
1064
1065 if (from) {
1066 ret = -ENOMEM;
1067 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
1068 if (!payload) {
1069 if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
1070 goto error;
1071 payload = vmalloc(plen);
1072 if (!payload)
1073 goto error;
1074 }
1075
1076 ret = -EFAULT;
1077 if (copy_from_iter(payload, plen, from) != plen)
1078 goto error2;
1079 }
1080
1081 /* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
1082 * requesting task */
1083 ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
1084 if (ret < 0)
1085 goto error2;
1086
1087 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1088 ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
1089 dest_keyring, instkey);
1090
1091 key_put(dest_keyring);
1092
1093 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1094 * instantiation of the key */
1095 if (ret == 0)
1096 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1097
1098error2:
1099 kvfree(payload);
1100error:
1101 return ret;
1102}
1103
1104/*
1105 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
1106 * destination keyring if one is given.
1107 *
1108 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1109 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1110 *
1111 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1112 */
1113long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
1114 const void __user *_payload,
1115 size_t plen,
1116 key_serial_t ringid)
1117{
1118 if (_payload && plen) {
1119 struct iovec iov;
1120 struct iov_iter from;
1121 int ret;
1122
1123 ret = import_single_range(WRITE, (void __user *)_payload, plen,
1124 &iov, &from);
1125 if (unlikely(ret))
1126 return ret;
1127
1128 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, &from, ringid);
1129 }
1130
1131 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, ringid);
1132}
1133
1134/*
1135 * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
1136 * the destination keyring if one is given.
1137 *
1138 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1139 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1140 *
1141 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1142 */
1143long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
1144 const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov,
1145 unsigned ioc,
1146 key_serial_t ringid)
1147{
1148 struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
1149 struct iov_iter from;
1150 long ret;
1151
1152 if (!_payload_iov)
1153 ioc = 0;
1154
1155 ret = import_iovec(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
1156 ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), &iov, &from);
1157 if (ret < 0)
1158 return ret;
1159 ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, &from, ringid);
1160 kfree(iov);
1161 return ret;
1162}
1163
1164/*
1165 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
1166 * the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1167 *
1168 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1169 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1170 *
1171 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1172 * after the timeout expires.
1173 *
1174 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1175 * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
1176 *
1177 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1178 */
1179long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
1180{
1181 return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid);
1182}
1183
1184/*
1185 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
1186 * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1187 *
1188 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1189 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1190 *
1191 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1192 * after the timeout expires.
1193 *
1194 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1195 * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
1196 *
1197 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1198 */
1199long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
1200 key_serial_t ringid)
1201{
1202 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1203 struct request_key_auth *rka;
1204 struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
1205 long ret;
1206
1207 kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid);
1208
1209 /* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
1210 if (error <= 0 ||
1211 error >= MAX_ERRNO ||
1212 error == ERESTARTSYS ||
1213 error == ERESTARTNOINTR ||
1214 error == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
1215 error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1216 return -EINVAL;
1217
1218 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
1219 * assumed before calling this */
1220 ret = -EPERM;
1221 instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
1222 if (!instkey)
1223 goto error;
1224
1225 rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
1226 if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
1227 goto error;
1228
1229 /* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
1230 * writable) */
1231 ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
1232 if (ret < 0)
1233 goto error;
1234
1235 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1236 ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
1237 dest_keyring, instkey);
1238
1239 key_put(dest_keyring);
1240
1241 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1242 * instantiation of the key */
1243 if (ret == 0)
1244 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1245
1246error:
1247 return ret;
1248}
1249
1250/*
1251 * Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
1252 * return the old setting.
1253 *
1254 * If a process keyring is specified then this will be created if it doesn't
1255 * yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
1256 */
1257long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
1258{
1259 struct cred *new;
1260 int ret, old_setting;
1261
1262 old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
1263
1264 if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
1265 return old_setting;
1266
1267 new = prepare_creds();
1268 if (!new)
1269 return -ENOMEM;
1270
1271 switch (reqkey_defl) {
1272 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
1273 ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
1274 if (ret < 0)
1275 goto error;
1276 goto set;
1277
1278 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
1279 ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
1280 if (ret < 0) {
1281 if (ret != -EEXIST)
1282 goto error;
1283 ret = 0;
1284 }
1285 goto set;
1286
1287 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
1288 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
1289 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
1290 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
1291 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
1292 goto set;
1293
1294 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
1295 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
1296 default:
1297 ret = -EINVAL;
1298 goto error;
1299 }
1300
1301set:
1302 new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
1303 commit_creds(new);
1304 return old_setting;
1305error:
1306 abort_creds(new);
1307 return ret;
1308}
1309
1310/*
1311 * Set or clear the timeout on a key.
1312 *
1313 * Either the key must grant the caller Setattr permission or else the caller
1314 * must hold an instantiation authorisation token for the key.
1315 *
1316 * The timeout is either 0 to clear the timeout, or a number of seconds from
1317 * the current time. The key and any links to the key will be automatically
1318 * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
1319 *
1320 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be timed out.
1321 *
1322 * If successful, 0 is returned.
1323 */
1324long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
1325{
1326 struct key *key, *instkey;
1327 key_ref_t key_ref;
1328 long ret;
1329
1330 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
1331 KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
1332 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
1333 /* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
1334 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
1335 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
1336 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
1337 if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
1338 key_put(instkey);
1339 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id,
1340 KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
1341 0);
1342 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
1343 goto okay;
1344 }
1345 }
1346
1347 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1348 goto error;
1349 }
1350
1351okay:
1352 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
1353 ret = 0;
1354 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
1355 ret = -EPERM;
1356 else
1357 key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
1358 key_put(key);
1359
1360error:
1361 return ret;
1362}
1363
1364/*
1365 * Assume (or clear) the authority to instantiate the specified key.
1366 *
1367 * This sets the authoritative token currently in force for key instantiation.
1368 * This must be done for a key to be instantiated. It has the effect of making
1369 * available all the keys from the caller of the request_key() that created a
1370 * key to request_key() calls made by the caller of this function.
1371 *
1372 * The caller must have the instantiation key in their process keyrings with a
1373 * Search permission grant available to the caller.
1374 *
1375 * If the ID given is 0, then the setting will be cleared and 0 returned.
1376 *
1377 * If the ID given has a matching an authorisation key, then that key will be
1378 * set and its ID will be returned. The authorisation key can be read to get
1379 * the callout information passed to request_key().
1380 */
1381long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
1382{
1383 struct key *authkey;
1384 long ret;
1385
1386 /* special key IDs aren't permitted */
1387 ret = -EINVAL;
1388 if (id < 0)
1389 goto error;
1390
1391 /* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
1392 if (id == 0) {
1393 ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1394 goto error;
1395 }
1396
1397 /* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we
1398 * instantiate the specified key
1399 * - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings
1400 * somewhere
1401 */
1402 authkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
1403 if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
1404 ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
1405 goto error;
1406 }
1407
1408 ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey);
1409 if (ret < 0)
1410 goto error;
1411 key_put(authkey);
1412
1413 ret = authkey->serial;
1414error:
1415 return ret;
1416}
1417
1418/*
1419 * Get a key's the LSM security label.
1420 *
1421 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
1422 *
1423 * If there's a buffer, then up to buflen bytes of data will be placed into it.
1424 *
1425 * If successful, the amount of information available will be returned,
1426 * irrespective of how much was copied (including the terminal NUL).
1427 */
1428long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
1429 char __user *buffer,
1430 size_t buflen)
1431{
1432 struct key *key, *instkey;
1433 key_ref_t key_ref;
1434 char *context;
1435 long ret;
1436
1437 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
1438 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
1439 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
1440 return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1441
1442 /* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
1443 * have the authorisation token handy */
1444 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
1445 if (IS_ERR(instkey))
1446 return PTR_ERR(instkey);
1447 key_put(instkey);
1448
1449 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0);
1450 if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
1451 return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1452 }
1453
1454 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
1455 ret = security_key_getsecurity(key, &context);
1456 if (ret == 0) {
1457 /* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
1458 * string */
1459 ret = 1;
1460 if (buffer && buflen > 0 &&
1461 copy_to_user(buffer, "", 1) != 0)
1462 ret = -EFAULT;
1463 } else if (ret > 0) {
1464 /* return as much data as there's room for */
1465 if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
1466 if (buflen > ret)
1467 buflen = ret;
1468
1469 if (copy_to_user(buffer, context, buflen) != 0)
1470 ret = -EFAULT;
1471 }
1472
1473 kfree(context);
1474 }
1475
1476 key_ref_put(key_ref);
1477 return ret;
1478}
1479
1480/*
1481 * Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
1482 * parent process.
1483 *
1484 * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the
1485 * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective
1486 * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID.
1487 *
1488 * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace.
1489 *
1490 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1491 */
1492long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
1493{
1494 struct task_struct *me, *parent;
1495 const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
1496 struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork;
1497 key_ref_t keyring_r;
1498 struct cred *cred;
1499 int ret;
1500
1501 keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
1502 if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
1503 return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
1504
1505 ret = -ENOMEM;
1506
1507 /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
1508 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
1509 * our parent */
1510 cred = cred_alloc_blank();
1511 if (!cred)
1512 goto error_keyring;
1513 newwork = &cred->rcu;
1514
1515 cred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
1516 keyring_r = NULL;
1517 init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring);
1518
1519 me = current;
1520 rcu_read_lock();
1521 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1522
1523 ret = -EPERM;
1524 oldwork = NULL;
1525 parent = me->real_parent;
1526
1527 /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
1528 if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
1529 goto unlock;
1530
1531 /* the parent must be single threaded */
1532 if (!thread_group_empty(parent))
1533 goto unlock;
1534
1535 /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
1536 * there's no point */
1537 mycred = current_cred();
1538 pcred = __task_cred(parent);
1539 if (mycred == pcred ||
1540 mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) {
1541 ret = 0;
1542 goto unlock;
1543 }
1544
1545 /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
1546 * SUID/SGID */
1547 if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, mycred->euid) ||
1548 !uid_eq(pcred->euid, mycred->euid) ||
1549 !uid_eq(pcred->suid, mycred->euid) ||
1550 !gid_eq(pcred->gid, mycred->egid) ||
1551 !gid_eq(pcred->egid, mycred->egid) ||
1552 !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, mycred->egid))
1553 goto unlock;
1554
1555 /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
1556 if ((pcred->session_keyring &&
1557 !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) ||
1558 !uid_eq(mycred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid))
1559 goto unlock;
1560
1561 /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
1562 oldwork = task_work_cancel(parent, key_change_session_keyring);
1563
1564 /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
1565 * restarting */
1566 ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, true);
1567 if (!ret)
1568 newwork = NULL;
1569unlock:
1570 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1571 rcu_read_unlock();
1572 if (oldwork)
1573 put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu));
1574 if (newwork)
1575 put_cred(cred);
1576 return ret;
1577
1578error_keyring:
1579 key_ref_put(keyring_r);
1580 return ret;
1581}
1582
1583/*
1584 * The key control system call
1585 */
1586SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
1587 unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
1588{
1589 switch (option) {
1590 case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
1591 return keyctl_get_keyring_ID((key_serial_t) arg2,
1592 (int) arg3);
1593
1594 case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING:
1595 return keyctl_join_session_keyring((const char __user *) arg2);
1596
1597 case KEYCTL_UPDATE:
1598 return keyctl_update_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1599 (const void __user *) arg3,
1600 (size_t) arg4);
1601
1602 case KEYCTL_REVOKE:
1603 return keyctl_revoke_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
1604
1605 case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE:
1606 return keyctl_describe_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1607 (char __user *) arg3,
1608 (unsigned) arg4);
1609
1610 case KEYCTL_CLEAR:
1611 return keyctl_keyring_clear((key_serial_t) arg2);
1612
1613 case KEYCTL_LINK:
1614 return keyctl_keyring_link((key_serial_t) arg2,
1615 (key_serial_t) arg3);
1616
1617 case KEYCTL_UNLINK:
1618 return keyctl_keyring_unlink((key_serial_t) arg2,
1619 (key_serial_t) arg3);
1620
1621 case KEYCTL_SEARCH:
1622 return keyctl_keyring_search((key_serial_t) arg2,
1623 (const char __user *) arg3,
1624 (const char __user *) arg4,
1625 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1626
1627 case KEYCTL_READ:
1628 return keyctl_read_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1629 (char __user *) arg3,
1630 (size_t) arg4);
1631
1632 case KEYCTL_CHOWN:
1633 return keyctl_chown_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1634 (uid_t) arg3,
1635 (gid_t) arg4);
1636
1637 case KEYCTL_SETPERM:
1638 return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1639 (key_perm_t) arg3);
1640
1641 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE:
1642 return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1643 (const void __user *) arg3,
1644 (size_t) arg4,
1645 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1646
1647 case KEYCTL_NEGATE:
1648 return keyctl_negate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1649 (unsigned) arg3,
1650 (key_serial_t) arg4);
1651
1652 case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING:
1653 return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2);
1654
1655 case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT:
1656 return keyctl_set_timeout((key_serial_t) arg2,
1657 (unsigned) arg3);
1658
1659 case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
1660 return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t) arg2);
1661
1662 case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
1663 return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
1664 (char __user *) arg3,
1665 (size_t) arg4);
1666
1667 case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
1668 return keyctl_session_to_parent();
1669
1670 case KEYCTL_REJECT:
1671 return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1672 (unsigned) arg3,
1673 (unsigned) arg4,
1674 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1675
1676 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
1677 return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
1678 (key_serial_t) arg2,
1679 (const struct iovec __user *) arg3,
1680 (unsigned) arg4,
1681 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1682
1683 case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
1684 return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
1685
1686 case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
1687 return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3);
1688
1689 default:
1690 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1691 }
1692}
1/* Userspace key control operations
2 *
3 * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
5 *
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
8 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
10 */
11
12#include <linux/module.h>
13#include <linux/init.h>
14#include <linux/sched.h>
15#include <linux/slab.h>
16#include <linux/syscalls.h>
17#include <linux/keyctl.h>
18#include <linux/fs.h>
19#include <linux/capability.h>
20#include <linux/string.h>
21#include <linux/err.h>
22#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
23#include <linux/security.h>
24#include <asm/uaccess.h>
25#include "internal.h"
26
27static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
28 const char __user *_type,
29 unsigned len)
30{
31 int ret;
32
33 ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, len);
34 if (ret < 0)
35 return ret;
36 if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
37 return -EINVAL;
38 if (type[0] == '.')
39 return -EPERM;
40 type[len - 1] = '\0';
41 return 0;
42}
43
44/*
45 * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
46 * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
47 *
48 * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
49 *
50 * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
51 * code is returned.
52 */
53SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
54 const char __user *, _description,
55 const void __user *, _payload,
56 size_t, plen,
57 key_serial_t, ringid)
58{
59 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
60 char type[32], *description;
61 void *payload;
62 long ret;
63 bool vm;
64
65 ret = -EINVAL;
66 if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
67 goto error;
68
69 /* draw all the data into kernel space */
70 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
71 if (ret < 0)
72 goto error;
73
74 description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
75 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
76 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
77 goto error;
78 }
79
80 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
81 payload = NULL;
82
83 vm = false;
84 if (_payload) {
85 ret = -ENOMEM;
86 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
87 if (!payload) {
88 if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
89 goto error2;
90 vm = true;
91 payload = vmalloc(plen);
92 if (!payload)
93 goto error2;
94 }
95
96 ret = -EFAULT;
97 if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
98 goto error3;
99 }
100
101 /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
102 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
103 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
104 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
105 goto error3;
106 }
107
108 /* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
109 * keyring */
110 key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
111 payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
112 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
113 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
114 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
115 key_ref_put(key_ref);
116 }
117 else {
118 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
119 }
120
121 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
122 error3:
123 if (!vm)
124 kfree(payload);
125 else
126 vfree(payload);
127 error2:
128 kfree(description);
129 error:
130 return ret;
131}
132
133/*
134 * Search the process keyrings and keyring trees linked from those for a
135 * matching key. Keyrings must have appropriate Search permission to be
136 * searched.
137 *
138 * If a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if there's
139 * one specified and the serial number of the key will be returned.
140 *
141 * If no key is found, /sbin/request-key will be invoked if _callout_info is
142 * non-NULL in an attempt to create a key. The _callout_info string will be
143 * passed to /sbin/request-key to aid with completing the request. If the
144 * _callout_info string is "" then it will be changed to "-".
145 */
146SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
147 const char __user *, _description,
148 const char __user *, _callout_info,
149 key_serial_t, destringid)
150{
151 struct key_type *ktype;
152 struct key *key;
153 key_ref_t dest_ref;
154 size_t callout_len;
155 char type[32], *description, *callout_info;
156 long ret;
157
158 /* pull the type into kernel space */
159 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
160 if (ret < 0)
161 goto error;
162
163 /* pull the description into kernel space */
164 description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
165 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
166 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
167 goto error;
168 }
169
170 /* pull the callout info into kernel space */
171 callout_info = NULL;
172 callout_len = 0;
173 if (_callout_info) {
174 callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE);
175 if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) {
176 ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info);
177 goto error2;
178 }
179 callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
180 }
181
182 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
183 dest_ref = NULL;
184 if (destringid) {
185 dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
186 KEY_WRITE);
187 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
188 ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
189 goto error3;
190 }
191 }
192
193 /* find the key type */
194 ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
195 if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
196 ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
197 goto error4;
198 }
199
200 /* do the search */
201 key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, callout_info,
202 callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
203 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
204 if (IS_ERR(key)) {
205 ret = PTR_ERR(key);
206 goto error5;
207 }
208
209 /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
210 ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
211 if (ret < 0)
212 goto error6;
213
214 ret = key->serial;
215
216error6:
217 key_put(key);
218error5:
219 key_type_put(ktype);
220error4:
221 key_ref_put(dest_ref);
222error3:
223 kfree(callout_info);
224error2:
225 kfree(description);
226error:
227 return ret;
228}
229
230/*
231 * Get the ID of the specified process keyring.
232 *
233 * The requested keyring must have search permission to be found.
234 *
235 * If successful, the ID of the requested keyring will be returned.
236 */
237long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
238{
239 key_ref_t key_ref;
240 unsigned long lflags;
241 long ret;
242
243 lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
244 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
245 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
246 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
247 goto error;
248 }
249
250 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
251 key_ref_put(key_ref);
252error:
253 return ret;
254}
255
256/*
257 * Join a (named) session keyring.
258 *
259 * Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session
260 * keyring, creating it if necessary. A named session keyring must have Search
261 * permission for it to be joined. Session keyrings without this permit will
262 * be skipped over.
263 *
264 * If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned.
265 */
266long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
267{
268 char *name;
269 long ret;
270
271 /* fetch the name from userspace */
272 name = NULL;
273 if (_name) {
274 name = strndup_user(_name, PAGE_SIZE);
275 if (IS_ERR(name)) {
276 ret = PTR_ERR(name);
277 goto error;
278 }
279 }
280
281 /* join the session */
282 ret = join_session_keyring(name);
283 kfree(name);
284
285error:
286 return ret;
287}
288
289/*
290 * Update a key's data payload from the given data.
291 *
292 * The key must grant the caller Write permission and the key type must support
293 * updating for this to work. A negative key can be positively instantiated
294 * with this call.
295 *
296 * If successful, 0 will be returned. If the key type does not support
297 * updating, then -EOPNOTSUPP will be returned.
298 */
299long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
300 const void __user *_payload,
301 size_t plen)
302{
303 key_ref_t key_ref;
304 void *payload;
305 long ret;
306
307 ret = -EINVAL;
308 if (plen > PAGE_SIZE)
309 goto error;
310
311 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
312 payload = NULL;
313 if (_payload) {
314 ret = -ENOMEM;
315 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
316 if (!payload)
317 goto error;
318
319 ret = -EFAULT;
320 if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
321 goto error2;
322 }
323
324 /* find the target key (which must be writable) */
325 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
326 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
327 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
328 goto error2;
329 }
330
331 /* update the key */
332 ret = key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
333
334 key_ref_put(key_ref);
335error2:
336 kfree(payload);
337error:
338 return ret;
339}
340
341/*
342 * Revoke a key.
343 *
344 * The key must be grant the caller Write or Setattr permission for this to
345 * work. The key type should give up its quota claim when revoked. The key
346 * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
347 * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
348 *
349 * If successful, 0 is returned.
350 */
351long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
352{
353 key_ref_t key_ref;
354 long ret;
355
356 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
357 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
358 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
359 if (ret != -EACCES)
360 goto error;
361 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
362 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
363 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
364 goto error;
365 }
366 }
367
368 key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
369 ret = 0;
370
371 key_ref_put(key_ref);
372error:
373 return ret;
374}
375
376/*
377 * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
378 * special keyring IDs is used.
379 *
380 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work. If
381 * successful, 0 will be returned.
382 */
383long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
384{
385 key_ref_t keyring_ref;
386 long ret;
387
388 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
389 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
390 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
391 goto error;
392 }
393
394 ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
395
396 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
397error:
398 return ret;
399}
400
401/*
402 * Create a link from a keyring to a key if there's no matching key in the
403 * keyring, otherwise replace the link to the matching key with a link to the
404 * new key.
405 *
406 * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the the keyring must grant
407 * the caller Write permission. Furthermore, if an additional link is created,
408 * the keyring's quota will be extended.
409 *
410 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
411 */
412long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
413{
414 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
415 long ret;
416
417 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
418 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
419 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
420 goto error;
421 }
422
423 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
424 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
425 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
426 goto error2;
427 }
428
429 ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
430
431 key_ref_put(key_ref);
432error2:
433 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
434error:
435 return ret;
436}
437
438/*
439 * Unlink a key from a keyring.
440 *
441 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work; the key
442 * itself need not grant the caller anything. If the last link to a key is
443 * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
444 *
445 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
446 */
447long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
448{
449 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
450 long ret;
451
452 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
453 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
454 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
455 goto error;
456 }
457
458 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0);
459 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
460 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
461 goto error2;
462 }
463
464 ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
465
466 key_ref_put(key_ref);
467error2:
468 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
469error:
470 return ret;
471}
472
473/*
474 * Return a description of a key to userspace.
475 *
476 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
477 *
478 * If there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it formatted
479 * in the following way:
480 *
481 * type;uid;gid;perm;description<NUL>
482 *
483 * If successful, we return the amount of description available, irrespective
484 * of how much we may have copied into the buffer.
485 */
486long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
487 char __user *buffer,
488 size_t buflen)
489{
490 struct key *key, *instkey;
491 key_ref_t key_ref;
492 char *tmpbuf;
493 long ret;
494
495 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
496 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
497 /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
498 * authorisation token handy */
499 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
500 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
501 if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
502 key_put(instkey);
503 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
504 KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
505 0);
506 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
507 goto okay;
508 }
509 }
510
511 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
512 goto error;
513 }
514
515okay:
516 /* calculate how much description we're going to return */
517 ret = -ENOMEM;
518 tmpbuf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
519 if (!tmpbuf)
520 goto error2;
521
522 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
523
524 ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1,
525 "%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s",
526 key->type->name,
527 key->uid,
528 key->gid,
529 key->perm,
530 key->description ?: "");
531
532 /* include a NUL char at the end of the data */
533 if (ret > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
534 ret = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
535 tmpbuf[ret] = 0;
536 ret++;
537
538 /* consider returning the data */
539 if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
540 if (buflen > ret)
541 buflen = ret;
542
543 if (copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, buflen) != 0)
544 ret = -EFAULT;
545 }
546
547 kfree(tmpbuf);
548error2:
549 key_ref_put(key_ref);
550error:
551 return ret;
552}
553
554/*
555 * Search the specified keyring and any keyrings it links to for a matching
556 * key. Only keyrings that grant the caller Search permission will be searched
557 * (this includes the starting keyring). Only keys with Search permission can
558 * be found.
559 *
560 * If successful, the found key will be linked to the destination keyring if
561 * supplied and the key has Link permission, and the found key ID will be
562 * returned.
563 */
564long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
565 const char __user *_type,
566 const char __user *_description,
567 key_serial_t destringid)
568{
569 struct key_type *ktype;
570 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref, dest_ref;
571 char type[32], *description;
572 long ret;
573
574 /* pull the type and description into kernel space */
575 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
576 if (ret < 0)
577 goto error;
578
579 description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
580 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
581 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
582 goto error;
583 }
584
585 /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
586 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
587 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
588 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
589 goto error2;
590 }
591
592 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
593 dest_ref = NULL;
594 if (destringid) {
595 dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
596 KEY_WRITE);
597 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
598 ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
599 goto error3;
600 }
601 }
602
603 /* find the key type */
604 ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
605 if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
606 ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
607 goto error4;
608 }
609
610 /* do the search */
611 key_ref = keyring_search(keyring_ref, ktype, description);
612 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
613 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
614
615 /* treat lack or presence of a negative key the same */
616 if (ret == -EAGAIN)
617 ret = -ENOKEY;
618 goto error5;
619 }
620
621 /* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
622 if (dest_ref) {
623 ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
624 if (ret < 0)
625 goto error6;
626
627 ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
628 if (ret < 0)
629 goto error6;
630 }
631
632 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
633
634error6:
635 key_ref_put(key_ref);
636error5:
637 key_type_put(ktype);
638error4:
639 key_ref_put(dest_ref);
640error3:
641 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
642error2:
643 kfree(description);
644error:
645 return ret;
646}
647
648/*
649 * Read a key's payload.
650 *
651 * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the
652 * caller Search permission when searched for from the process keyrings.
653 *
654 * If successful, we place up to buflen bytes of data into the buffer, if one
655 * is provided, and return the amount of data that is available in the key,
656 * irrespective of how much we copied into the buffer.
657 */
658long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
659{
660 struct key *key;
661 key_ref_t key_ref;
662 long ret;
663
664 /* find the key first */
665 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
666 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
667 ret = -ENOKEY;
668 goto error;
669 }
670
671 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
672
673 /* see if we can read it directly */
674 ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
675 if (ret == 0)
676 goto can_read_key;
677 if (ret != -EACCES)
678 goto error;
679
680 /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
681 * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
682 * dangling off an instantiation key
683 */
684 if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) {
685 ret = -EACCES;
686 goto error2;
687 }
688
689 /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
690can_read_key:
691 ret = key_validate(key);
692 if (ret == 0) {
693 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
694 if (key->type->read) {
695 /* read the data with the semaphore held (since we
696 * might sleep) */
697 down_read(&key->sem);
698 ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
699 up_read(&key->sem);
700 }
701 }
702
703error2:
704 key_put(key);
705error:
706 return ret;
707}
708
709/*
710 * Change the ownership of a key
711 *
712 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
713 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. For the UID to be changed, or
714 * for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the
715 * caller must have sysadmin capability. If either uid or gid is -1 then that
716 * attribute is not changed.
717 *
718 * If the UID is to be changed, the new user must have sufficient quota to
719 * accept the key. The quota deduction will be removed from the old user to
720 * the new user should the attribute be changed.
721 *
722 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
723 */
724long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
725{
726 struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
727 struct key *key;
728 key_ref_t key_ref;
729 long ret;
730
731 ret = 0;
732 if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
733 goto error;
734
735 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
736 KEY_SETATTR);
737 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
738 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
739 goto error;
740 }
741
742 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
743
744 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
745 ret = -EACCES;
746 down_write(&key->sem);
747
748 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
749 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
750 if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid)
751 goto error_put;
752
753 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
754 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
755 if (gid != (gid_t) -1 && gid != key->gid && !in_group_p(gid))
756 goto error_put;
757 }
758
759 /* change the UID */
760 if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) {
761 ret = -ENOMEM;
762 newowner = key_user_lookup(uid, current_user_ns());
763 if (!newowner)
764 goto error_put;
765
766 /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
767 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
768 unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ?
769 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
770 unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ?
771 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
772
773 spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
774 if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
775 newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
776 newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
777 newowner->qnbytes)
778 goto quota_overrun;
779
780 newowner->qnkeys++;
781 newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
782 spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
783
784 spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
785 key->user->qnkeys--;
786 key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
787 spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
788 }
789
790 atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
791 atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
792
793 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
794 atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
795 atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
796 }
797
798 zapowner = key->user;
799 key->user = newowner;
800 key->uid = uid;
801 }
802
803 /* change the GID */
804 if (gid != (gid_t) -1)
805 key->gid = gid;
806
807 ret = 0;
808
809error_put:
810 up_write(&key->sem);
811 key_put(key);
812 if (zapowner)
813 key_user_put(zapowner);
814error:
815 return ret;
816
817quota_overrun:
818 spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
819 zapowner = newowner;
820 ret = -EDQUOT;
821 goto error_put;
822}
823
824/*
825 * Change the permission mask on a key.
826 *
827 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
828 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. If the caller does not have
829 * sysadmin capability, it may only change the permission on keys that it owns.
830 */
831long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
832{
833 struct key *key;
834 key_ref_t key_ref;
835 long ret;
836
837 ret = -EINVAL;
838 if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
839 goto error;
840
841 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
842 KEY_SETATTR);
843 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
844 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
845 goto error;
846 }
847
848 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
849
850 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
851 ret = -EACCES;
852 down_write(&key->sem);
853
854 /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
855 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
856 key->perm = perm;
857 ret = 0;
858 }
859
860 up_write(&key->sem);
861 key_put(key);
862error:
863 return ret;
864}
865
866/*
867 * Get the destination keyring for instantiation and check that the caller has
868 * Write permission on it.
869 */
870static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
871 struct request_key_auth *rka,
872 struct key **_dest_keyring)
873{
874 key_ref_t dkref;
875
876 *_dest_keyring = NULL;
877
878 /* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */
879 if (ringid == 0)
880 return 0;
881
882 /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
883 if (ringid > 0) {
884 dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
885 if (IS_ERR(dkref))
886 return PTR_ERR(dkref);
887 *_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
888 return 0;
889 }
890
891 if (ringid == KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY)
892 return -EINVAL;
893
894 /* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the
895 * authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */
896 if (ringid >= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING) {
897 *_dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
898 return 0;
899 }
900
901 return -ENOKEY;
902}
903
904/*
905 * Change the request_key authorisation key on the current process.
906 */
907static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
908{
909 struct cred *new;
910
911 new = prepare_creds();
912 if (!new)
913 return -ENOMEM;
914
915 key_put(new->request_key_auth);
916 new->request_key_auth = key_get(key);
917
918 return commit_creds(new);
919}
920
921/*
922 * Copy the iovec data from userspace
923 */
924static long copy_from_user_iovec(void *buffer, const struct iovec *iov,
925 unsigned ioc)
926{
927 for (; ioc > 0; ioc--) {
928 if (copy_from_user(buffer, iov->iov_base, iov->iov_len) != 0)
929 return -EFAULT;
930 buffer += iov->iov_len;
931 iov++;
932 }
933 return 0;
934}
935
936/*
937 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
938 * destination keyring if one is given.
939 *
940 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
941 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
942 *
943 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
944 */
945long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
946 const struct iovec *payload_iov,
947 unsigned ioc,
948 size_t plen,
949 key_serial_t ringid)
950{
951 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
952 struct request_key_auth *rka;
953 struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
954 void *payload;
955 long ret;
956 bool vm = false;
957
958 kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
959
960 ret = -EINVAL;
961 if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
962 goto error;
963
964 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
965 * assumed before calling this */
966 ret = -EPERM;
967 instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
968 if (!instkey)
969 goto error;
970
971 rka = instkey->payload.data;
972 if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
973 goto error;
974
975 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
976 payload = NULL;
977
978 if (payload_iov) {
979 ret = -ENOMEM;
980 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
981 if (!payload) {
982 if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
983 goto error;
984 vm = true;
985 payload = vmalloc(plen);
986 if (!payload)
987 goto error;
988 }
989
990 ret = copy_from_user_iovec(payload, payload_iov, ioc);
991 if (ret < 0)
992 goto error2;
993 }
994
995 /* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
996 * requesting task */
997 ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
998 if (ret < 0)
999 goto error2;
1000
1001 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1002 ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
1003 dest_keyring, instkey);
1004
1005 key_put(dest_keyring);
1006
1007 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1008 * instantiation of the key */
1009 if (ret == 0)
1010 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1011
1012error2:
1013 if (!vm)
1014 kfree(payload);
1015 else
1016 vfree(payload);
1017error:
1018 return ret;
1019}
1020
1021/*
1022 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
1023 * destination keyring if one is given.
1024 *
1025 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1026 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1027 *
1028 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1029 */
1030long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
1031 const void __user *_payload,
1032 size_t plen,
1033 key_serial_t ringid)
1034{
1035 if (_payload && plen) {
1036 struct iovec iov[1] = {
1037 [0].iov_base = (void __user *)_payload,
1038 [0].iov_len = plen
1039 };
1040
1041 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, 1, plen, ringid);
1042 }
1043
1044 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
1045}
1046
1047/*
1048 * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
1049 * the destination keyring if one is given.
1050 *
1051 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1052 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1053 *
1054 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1055 */
1056long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
1057 const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov,
1058 unsigned ioc,
1059 key_serial_t ringid)
1060{
1061 struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
1062 long ret;
1063
1064 if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
1065 goto no_payload;
1066
1067 ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
1068 ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
1069 if (ret < 0)
1070 return ret;
1071 if (ret == 0)
1072 goto no_payload_free;
1073
1074 ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
1075
1076 if (iov != iovstack)
1077 kfree(iov);
1078 return ret;
1079
1080no_payload_free:
1081 if (iov != iovstack)
1082 kfree(iov);
1083no_payload:
1084 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
1085}
1086
1087/*
1088 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
1089 * the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1090 *
1091 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1092 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1093 *
1094 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1095 * after the timeout expires.
1096 *
1097 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1098 * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
1099 *
1100 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1101 */
1102long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
1103{
1104 return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid);
1105}
1106
1107/*
1108 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
1109 * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1110 *
1111 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1112 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1113 *
1114 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1115 * after the timeout expires.
1116 *
1117 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1118 * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
1119 *
1120 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1121 */
1122long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
1123 key_serial_t ringid)
1124{
1125 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1126 struct request_key_auth *rka;
1127 struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
1128 long ret;
1129
1130 kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid);
1131
1132 /* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
1133 if (error <= 0 ||
1134 error >= MAX_ERRNO ||
1135 error == ERESTARTSYS ||
1136 error == ERESTARTNOINTR ||
1137 error == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
1138 error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1139 return -EINVAL;
1140
1141 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
1142 * assumed before calling this */
1143 ret = -EPERM;
1144 instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
1145 if (!instkey)
1146 goto error;
1147
1148 rka = instkey->payload.data;
1149 if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
1150 goto error;
1151
1152 /* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
1153 * writable) */
1154 ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
1155 if (ret < 0)
1156 goto error;
1157
1158 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1159 ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
1160 dest_keyring, instkey);
1161
1162 key_put(dest_keyring);
1163
1164 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1165 * instantiation of the key */
1166 if (ret == 0)
1167 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1168
1169error:
1170 return ret;
1171}
1172
1173/*
1174 * Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
1175 * return the old setting.
1176 *
1177 * If a process keyring is specified then this will be created if it doesn't
1178 * yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
1179 */
1180long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
1181{
1182 struct cred *new;
1183 int ret, old_setting;
1184
1185 old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
1186
1187 if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
1188 return old_setting;
1189
1190 new = prepare_creds();
1191 if (!new)
1192 return -ENOMEM;
1193
1194 switch (reqkey_defl) {
1195 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
1196 ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
1197 if (ret < 0)
1198 goto error;
1199 goto set;
1200
1201 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
1202 ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
1203 if (ret < 0) {
1204 if (ret != -EEXIST)
1205 goto error;
1206 ret = 0;
1207 }
1208 goto set;
1209
1210 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
1211 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
1212 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
1213 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
1214 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
1215 goto set;
1216
1217 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
1218 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
1219 default:
1220 ret = -EINVAL;
1221 goto error;
1222 }
1223
1224set:
1225 new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
1226 commit_creds(new);
1227 return old_setting;
1228error:
1229 abort_creds(new);
1230 return ret;
1231}
1232
1233/*
1234 * Set or clear the timeout on a key.
1235 *
1236 * Either the key must grant the caller Setattr permission or else the caller
1237 * must hold an instantiation authorisation token for the key.
1238 *
1239 * The timeout is either 0 to clear the timeout, or a number of seconds from
1240 * the current time. The key and any links to the key will be automatically
1241 * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
1242 *
1243 * If successful, 0 is returned.
1244 */
1245long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
1246{
1247 struct timespec now;
1248 struct key *key, *instkey;
1249 key_ref_t key_ref;
1250 time_t expiry;
1251 long ret;
1252
1253 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
1254 KEY_SETATTR);
1255 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
1256 /* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
1257 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
1258 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
1259 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
1260 if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
1261 key_put(instkey);
1262 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id,
1263 KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
1264 0);
1265 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
1266 goto okay;
1267 }
1268 }
1269
1270 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1271 goto error;
1272 }
1273
1274okay:
1275 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
1276
1277 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */
1278 down_write(&key->sem);
1279
1280 expiry = 0;
1281 if (timeout > 0) {
1282 now = current_kernel_time();
1283 expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
1284 }
1285
1286 key->expiry = expiry;
1287 key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
1288
1289 up_write(&key->sem);
1290 key_put(key);
1291
1292 ret = 0;
1293error:
1294 return ret;
1295}
1296
1297/*
1298 * Assume (or clear) the authority to instantiate the specified key.
1299 *
1300 * This sets the authoritative token currently in force for key instantiation.
1301 * This must be done for a key to be instantiated. It has the effect of making
1302 * available all the keys from the caller of the request_key() that created a
1303 * key to request_key() calls made by the caller of this function.
1304 *
1305 * The caller must have the instantiation key in their process keyrings with a
1306 * Search permission grant available to the caller.
1307 *
1308 * If the ID given is 0, then the setting will be cleared and 0 returned.
1309 *
1310 * If the ID given has a matching an authorisation key, then that key will be
1311 * set and its ID will be returned. The authorisation key can be read to get
1312 * the callout information passed to request_key().
1313 */
1314long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
1315{
1316 struct key *authkey;
1317 long ret;
1318
1319 /* special key IDs aren't permitted */
1320 ret = -EINVAL;
1321 if (id < 0)
1322 goto error;
1323
1324 /* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
1325 if (id == 0) {
1326 ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1327 goto error;
1328 }
1329
1330 /* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we
1331 * instantiate the specified key
1332 * - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings
1333 * somewhere
1334 */
1335 authkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
1336 if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
1337 ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
1338 goto error;
1339 }
1340
1341 ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey);
1342 if (ret < 0)
1343 goto error;
1344 key_put(authkey);
1345
1346 ret = authkey->serial;
1347error:
1348 return ret;
1349}
1350
1351/*
1352 * Get a key's the LSM security label.
1353 *
1354 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
1355 *
1356 * If there's a buffer, then up to buflen bytes of data will be placed into it.
1357 *
1358 * If successful, the amount of information available will be returned,
1359 * irrespective of how much was copied (including the terminal NUL).
1360 */
1361long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
1362 char __user *buffer,
1363 size_t buflen)
1364{
1365 struct key *key, *instkey;
1366 key_ref_t key_ref;
1367 char *context;
1368 long ret;
1369
1370 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
1371 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
1372 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
1373 return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1374
1375 /* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
1376 * have the authorisation token handy */
1377 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
1378 if (IS_ERR(instkey))
1379 return PTR_ERR(instkey);
1380 key_put(instkey);
1381
1382 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0);
1383 if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
1384 return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1385 }
1386
1387 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
1388 ret = security_key_getsecurity(key, &context);
1389 if (ret == 0) {
1390 /* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
1391 * string */
1392 ret = 1;
1393 if (buffer && buflen > 0 &&
1394 copy_to_user(buffer, "", 1) != 0)
1395 ret = -EFAULT;
1396 } else if (ret > 0) {
1397 /* return as much data as there's room for */
1398 if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
1399 if (buflen > ret)
1400 buflen = ret;
1401
1402 if (copy_to_user(buffer, context, buflen) != 0)
1403 ret = -EFAULT;
1404 }
1405
1406 kfree(context);
1407 }
1408
1409 key_ref_put(key_ref);
1410 return ret;
1411}
1412
1413/*
1414 * Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
1415 * parent process.
1416 *
1417 * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the
1418 * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective
1419 * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID.
1420 *
1421 * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace.
1422 *
1423 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1424 */
1425long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
1426{
1427#ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
1428 struct task_struct *me, *parent;
1429 const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
1430 struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
1431 key_ref_t keyring_r;
1432 int ret;
1433
1434 keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
1435 if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
1436 return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
1437
1438 /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
1439 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
1440 * our parent */
1441 ret = -ENOMEM;
1442 cred = cred_alloc_blank();
1443 if (!cred)
1444 goto error_keyring;
1445
1446 cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
1447 keyring_r = NULL;
1448
1449 me = current;
1450 rcu_read_lock();
1451 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1452
1453 parent = me->real_parent;
1454 ret = -EPERM;
1455
1456 /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
1457 if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
1458 goto not_permitted;
1459
1460 /* the parent must be single threaded */
1461 if (!thread_group_empty(parent))
1462 goto not_permitted;
1463
1464 /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
1465 * there's no point */
1466 mycred = current_cred();
1467 pcred = __task_cred(parent);
1468 if (mycred == pcred ||
1469 mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
1470 goto already_same;
1471
1472 /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
1473 * SUID/SGID */
1474 if (pcred->uid != mycred->euid ||
1475 pcred->euid != mycred->euid ||
1476 pcred->suid != mycred->euid ||
1477 pcred->gid != mycred->egid ||
1478 pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
1479 pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
1480 goto not_permitted;
1481
1482 /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
1483 if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
1484 pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) ||
1485 mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
1486 goto not_permitted;
1487
1488 /* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
1489 * that */
1490 oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
1491
1492 /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
1493 * restarting */
1494 parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
1495 cred = NULL;
1496 set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
1497
1498 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1499 rcu_read_unlock();
1500 if (oldcred)
1501 put_cred(oldcred);
1502 return 0;
1503
1504already_same:
1505 ret = 0;
1506not_permitted:
1507 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1508 rcu_read_unlock();
1509 put_cred(cred);
1510 return ret;
1511
1512error_keyring:
1513 key_ref_put(keyring_r);
1514 return ret;
1515
1516#else /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
1517 /*
1518 * To be removed when TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME has been implemented on
1519 * m68k/xtensa
1520 */
1521#warning TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME not implemented
1522 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1523#endif /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
1524}
1525
1526/*
1527 * The key control system call
1528 */
1529SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
1530 unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
1531{
1532 switch (option) {
1533 case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
1534 return keyctl_get_keyring_ID((key_serial_t) arg2,
1535 (int) arg3);
1536
1537 case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING:
1538 return keyctl_join_session_keyring((const char __user *) arg2);
1539
1540 case KEYCTL_UPDATE:
1541 return keyctl_update_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1542 (const void __user *) arg3,
1543 (size_t) arg4);
1544
1545 case KEYCTL_REVOKE:
1546 return keyctl_revoke_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
1547
1548 case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE:
1549 return keyctl_describe_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1550 (char __user *) arg3,
1551 (unsigned) arg4);
1552
1553 case KEYCTL_CLEAR:
1554 return keyctl_keyring_clear((key_serial_t) arg2);
1555
1556 case KEYCTL_LINK:
1557 return keyctl_keyring_link((key_serial_t) arg2,
1558 (key_serial_t) arg3);
1559
1560 case KEYCTL_UNLINK:
1561 return keyctl_keyring_unlink((key_serial_t) arg2,
1562 (key_serial_t) arg3);
1563
1564 case KEYCTL_SEARCH:
1565 return keyctl_keyring_search((key_serial_t) arg2,
1566 (const char __user *) arg3,
1567 (const char __user *) arg4,
1568 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1569
1570 case KEYCTL_READ:
1571 return keyctl_read_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1572 (char __user *) arg3,
1573 (size_t) arg4);
1574
1575 case KEYCTL_CHOWN:
1576 return keyctl_chown_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1577 (uid_t) arg3,
1578 (gid_t) arg4);
1579
1580 case KEYCTL_SETPERM:
1581 return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1582 (key_perm_t) arg3);
1583
1584 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE:
1585 return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1586 (const void __user *) arg3,
1587 (size_t) arg4,
1588 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1589
1590 case KEYCTL_NEGATE:
1591 return keyctl_negate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1592 (unsigned) arg3,
1593 (key_serial_t) arg4);
1594
1595 case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING:
1596 return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2);
1597
1598 case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT:
1599 return keyctl_set_timeout((key_serial_t) arg2,
1600 (unsigned) arg3);
1601
1602 case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
1603 return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t) arg2);
1604
1605 case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
1606 return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
1607 (char __user *) arg3,
1608 (size_t) arg4);
1609
1610 case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
1611 return keyctl_session_to_parent();
1612
1613 case KEYCTL_REJECT:
1614 return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1615 (unsigned) arg3,
1616 (unsigned) arg4,
1617 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1618
1619 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
1620 return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
1621 (key_serial_t) arg2,
1622 (const struct iovec __user *) arg3,
1623 (unsigned) arg4,
1624 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1625
1626 default:
1627 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1628 }
1629}