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v4.17
  1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
  2/*
  3 * Encryption policy functions for per-file encryption support.
  4 *
  5 * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
  6 * Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility.
  7 *
  8 * Written by Michael Halcrow, 2015.
  9 * Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
 
 10 */
 11
 12#include <linux/random.h>
 13#include <linux/string.h>
 14#include <linux/mount.h>
 15#include "fscrypt_private.h"
 16
 17/*
 18 * check whether an encryption policy is consistent with an encryption context
 
 
 19 */
 20static bool is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(
 21				const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
 22				const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
 23{
 24	return memcmp(ctx->master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
 25		      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
 26		(ctx->flags == policy->flags) &&
 27		(ctx->contents_encryption_mode ==
 28		 policy->contents_encryption_mode) &&
 29		(ctx->filenames_encryption_mode ==
 30		 policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31}
 32
 33static int create_encryption_context_from_policy(struct inode *inode,
 34				const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35{
 36	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37
 38	ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
 39	memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
 40					FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41
 42	if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
 43				     policy->filenames_encryption_mode))
 44		return -EINVAL;
 45
 46	if (policy->flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47		return -EINVAL;
 
 48
 49	ctx.contents_encryption_mode = policy->contents_encryption_mode;
 50	ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
 51	ctx.flags = policy->flags;
 52	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx.nonce) != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
 53	get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
 54
 55	return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx), NULL);
 56}
 57
 58int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
 59{
 60	struct fscrypt_policy policy;
 
 61	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
 
 
 62	int ret;
 63	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
 64
 65	if (copy_from_user(&policy, arg, sizeof(policy)))
 66		return -EFAULT;
 67
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
 69		return -EACCES;
 70
 71	if (policy.version != 0)
 72		return -EINVAL;
 73
 74	ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
 75	if (ret)
 76		return ret;
 77
 78	inode_lock(inode);
 79
 80	ret = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
 81	if (ret == -ENODATA) {
 82		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 83			ret = -ENOTDIR;
 
 
 84		else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
 85			ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
 86		else
 87			ret = create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode,
 88								    &policy);
 89	} else if (ret == sizeof(ctx) &&
 90		   is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(&ctx,
 91								&policy)) {
 92		/* The file already uses the same encryption policy. */
 93		ret = 0;
 94	} else if (ret >= 0 || ret == -ERANGE) {
 95		/* The file already uses a different encryption policy. */
 96		ret = -EEXIST;
 97	}
 98
 99	inode_unlock(inode);
100
101	mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
102	return ret;
103}
104EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy);
105
 
106int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
107{
108	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
109	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
110	struct fscrypt_policy policy;
111	int res;
112
113	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
114		return -ENODATA;
 
115
116	res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
117	if (res < 0 && res != -ERANGE)
118		return res;
119	if (res != sizeof(ctx))
120		return -EINVAL;
121	if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
122		return -EINVAL;
123
124	policy.version = 0;
125	policy.contents_encryption_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
126	policy.filenames_encryption_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
127	policy.flags = ctx.flags;
128	memcpy(policy.master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
129				FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
130
131	if (copy_to_user(arg, &policy, sizeof(policy)))
132		return -EFAULT;
133	return 0;
134}
135EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy);
136
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137/**
138 * fscrypt_has_permitted_context() - is a file's encryption policy permitted
139 *				     within its directory?
140 *
141 * @parent: inode for parent directory
142 * @child: inode for file being looked up, opened, or linked into @parent
143 *
144 * Filesystems must call this before permitting access to an inode in a
145 * situation where the parent directory is encrypted (either before allowing
146 * ->lookup() to succeed, or for a regular file before allowing it to be opened)
147 * and before any operation that involves linking an inode into an encrypted
148 * directory, including link, rename, and cross rename.  It enforces the
149 * constraint that within a given encrypted directory tree, all files use the
150 * same encryption policy.  The pre-access check is needed to detect potentially
151 * malicious offline violations of this constraint, while the link and rename
152 * checks are needed to prevent online violations of this constraint.
153 *
154 * Return: 1 if permitted, 0 if forbidden.  If forbidden, the caller must fail
155 * the filesystem operation with EPERM.
156 */
157int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
158{
159	const struct fscrypt_operations *cops = parent->i_sb->s_cop;
160	const struct fscrypt_info *parent_ci, *child_ci;
161	struct fscrypt_context parent_ctx, child_ctx;
162	int res;
163
164	/* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
165	if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
166	    !S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
167		return 1;
168
169	/* No restrictions if the parent directory is unencrypted */
170	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent))
171		return 1;
172
173	/* Encrypted directories must not contain unencrypted files */
174	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(child))
175		return 0;
176
177	/*
178	 * Both parent and child are encrypted, so verify they use the same
179	 * encryption policy.  Compare the fscrypt_info structs if the keys are
180	 * available, otherwise retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts.
181	 *
182	 * Note that the fscrypt_context retrieval will be required frequently
183	 * when accessing an encrypted directory tree without the key.
184	 * Performance-wise this is not a big deal because we already don't
185	 * really optimize for file access without the key (to the extent that
186	 * such access is even possible), given that any attempted access
187	 * already causes a fscrypt_context retrieval and keyring search.
188	 *
189	 * In any case, if an unexpected error occurs, fall back to "forbidden".
190	 */
191
192	res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
193	if (res)
194		return 0;
195	res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child);
196	if (res)
197		return 0;
198	parent_ci = parent->i_crypt_info;
199	child_ci = child->i_crypt_info;
200
201	if (parent_ci && child_ci) {
202		return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key, child_ci->ci_master_key,
203			      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
204			(parent_ci->ci_data_mode == child_ci->ci_data_mode) &&
205			(parent_ci->ci_filename_mode ==
206			 child_ci->ci_filename_mode) &&
207			(parent_ci->ci_flags == child_ci->ci_flags);
208	}
209
210	res = cops->get_context(parent, &parent_ctx, sizeof(parent_ctx));
211	if (res != sizeof(parent_ctx))
212		return 0;
213
214	res = cops->get_context(child, &child_ctx, sizeof(child_ctx));
215	if (res != sizeof(child_ctx))
216		return 0;
217
218	return memcmp(parent_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
219		      child_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
220		      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
221		(parent_ctx.contents_encryption_mode ==
222		 child_ctx.contents_encryption_mode) &&
223		(parent_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode ==
224		 child_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode) &&
225		(parent_ctx.flags == child_ctx.flags);
226}
227EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context);
228
229/**
230 * fscrypt_inherit_context() - Sets a child context from its parent
231 * @parent: Parent inode from which the context is inherited.
232 * @child:  Child inode that inherits the context from @parent.
233 * @fs_data:  private data given by FS.
234 * @preload:  preload child i_crypt_info if true
235 *
236 * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
237 */
238int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child,
239						void *fs_data, bool preload)
240{
241	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
 
242	struct fscrypt_info *ci;
243	int res;
244
245	res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
246	if (res < 0)
247		return res;
248
249	ci = parent->i_crypt_info;
250	if (ci == NULL)
251		return -ENOKEY;
252
253	ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
254	ctx.contents_encryption_mode = ci->ci_data_mode;
255	ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode;
256	ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags;
257	memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key,
258	       FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
259	get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
260	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);
261	res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx,
262						sizeof(ctx), fs_data);
263	if (res)
264		return res;
265	return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0;
266}
267EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context);
v5.4
  1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
  2/*
  3 * Encryption policy functions for per-file encryption support.
  4 *
  5 * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
  6 * Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility.
  7 *
  8 * Originally written by Michael Halcrow, 2015.
  9 * Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
 10 * Modified by Eric Biggers, 2019 for v2 policy support.
 11 */
 12
 13#include <linux/random.h>
 14#include <linux/string.h>
 15#include <linux/mount.h>
 16#include "fscrypt_private.h"
 17
 18/**
 19 * fscrypt_policies_equal - check whether two encryption policies are the same
 20 *
 21 * Return: %true if equal, else %false
 22 */
 23bool fscrypt_policies_equal(const union fscrypt_policy *policy1,
 24			    const union fscrypt_policy *policy2)
 
 25{
 26	if (policy1->version != policy2->version)
 27		return false;
 28
 29	return !memcmp(policy1, policy2, fscrypt_policy_size(policy1));
 30}
 31
 32/**
 33 * fscrypt_supported_policy - check whether an encryption policy is supported
 34 *
 35 * Given an encryption policy, check whether all its encryption modes and other
 36 * settings are supported by this kernel.  (But we don't currently don't check
 37 * for crypto API support here, so attempting to use an algorithm not configured
 38 * into the crypto API will still fail later.)
 39 *
 40 * Return: %true if supported, else %false
 41 */
 42bool fscrypt_supported_policy(const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u,
 43			      const struct inode *inode)
 44{
 45	switch (policy_u->version) {
 46	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1: {
 47		const struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *policy = &policy_u->v1;
 48
 49		if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
 50					     policy->filenames_encryption_mode)) {
 51			fscrypt_warn(inode,
 52				     "Unsupported encryption modes (contents %d, filenames %d)",
 53				     policy->contents_encryption_mode,
 54				     policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
 55			return false;
 56		}
 57
 58		if (policy->flags & ~FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID) {
 59			fscrypt_warn(inode,
 60				     "Unsupported encryption flags (0x%02x)",
 61				     policy->flags);
 62			return false;
 63		}
 64
 65		return true;
 66	}
 67	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2: {
 68		const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy = &policy_u->v2;
 69
 70		if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
 71					     policy->filenames_encryption_mode)) {
 72			fscrypt_warn(inode,
 73				     "Unsupported encryption modes (contents %d, filenames %d)",
 74				     policy->contents_encryption_mode,
 75				     policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
 76			return false;
 77		}
 78
 79		if (policy->flags & ~FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID) {
 80			fscrypt_warn(inode,
 81				     "Unsupported encryption flags (0x%02x)",
 82				     policy->flags);
 83			return false;
 84		}
 85
 86		if (memchr_inv(policy->__reserved, 0,
 87			       sizeof(policy->__reserved))) {
 88			fscrypt_warn(inode,
 89				     "Reserved bits set in encryption policy");
 90			return false;
 91		}
 92
 93		return true;
 94	}
 95	}
 96	return false;
 97}
 98
 99/**
100 * fscrypt_new_context_from_policy - create a new fscrypt_context from a policy
101 *
102 * Create an fscrypt_context for an inode that is being assigned the given
103 * encryption policy.  A new nonce is randomly generated.
104 *
105 * Return: the size of the new context in bytes.
106 */
107static int fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u,
108					   const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u)
109{
110	memset(ctx_u, 0, sizeof(*ctx_u));
111
112	switch (policy_u->version) {
113	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1: {
114		const struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *policy = &policy_u->v1;
115		struct fscrypt_context_v1 *ctx = &ctx_u->v1;
116
117		ctx->version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1;
118		ctx->contents_encryption_mode =
119			policy->contents_encryption_mode;
120		ctx->filenames_encryption_mode =
121			policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
122		ctx->flags = policy->flags;
123		memcpy(ctx->master_key_descriptor,
124		       policy->master_key_descriptor,
125		       sizeof(ctx->master_key_descriptor));
126		get_random_bytes(ctx->nonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
127		return sizeof(*ctx);
128	}
129	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2: {
130		const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy = &policy_u->v2;
131		struct fscrypt_context_v2 *ctx = &ctx_u->v2;
132
133		ctx->version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2;
134		ctx->contents_encryption_mode =
135			policy->contents_encryption_mode;
136		ctx->filenames_encryption_mode =
137			policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
138		ctx->flags = policy->flags;
139		memcpy(ctx->master_key_identifier,
140		       policy->master_key_identifier,
141		       sizeof(ctx->master_key_identifier));
142		get_random_bytes(ctx->nonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
143		return sizeof(*ctx);
144	}
145	}
146	BUG();
147}
148
149/**
150 * fscrypt_policy_from_context - convert an fscrypt_context to an fscrypt_policy
151 *
152 * Given an fscrypt_context, build the corresponding fscrypt_policy.
153 *
154 * Return: 0 on success, or -EINVAL if the fscrypt_context has an unrecognized
155 * version number or size.
156 *
157 * This does *not* validate the settings within the policy itself, e.g. the
158 * modes, flags, and reserved bits.  Use fscrypt_supported_policy() for that.
159 */
160int fscrypt_policy_from_context(union fscrypt_policy *policy_u,
161				const union fscrypt_context *ctx_u,
162				int ctx_size)
163{
164	memset(policy_u, 0, sizeof(*policy_u));
165
166	if (ctx_size <= 0 || ctx_size != fscrypt_context_size(ctx_u))
 
167		return -EINVAL;
168
169	switch (ctx_u->version) {
170	case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1: {
171		const struct fscrypt_context_v1 *ctx = &ctx_u->v1;
172		struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *policy = &policy_u->v1;
173
174		policy->version = FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1;
175		policy->contents_encryption_mode =
176			ctx->contents_encryption_mode;
177		policy->filenames_encryption_mode =
178			ctx->filenames_encryption_mode;
179		policy->flags = ctx->flags;
180		memcpy(policy->master_key_descriptor,
181		       ctx->master_key_descriptor,
182		       sizeof(policy->master_key_descriptor));
183		return 0;
184	}
185	case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2: {
186		const struct fscrypt_context_v2 *ctx = &ctx_u->v2;
187		struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy = &policy_u->v2;
188
189		policy->version = FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2;
190		policy->contents_encryption_mode =
191			ctx->contents_encryption_mode;
192		policy->filenames_encryption_mode =
193			ctx->filenames_encryption_mode;
194		policy->flags = ctx->flags;
195		memcpy(policy->__reserved, ctx->__reserved,
196		       sizeof(policy->__reserved));
197		memcpy(policy->master_key_identifier,
198		       ctx->master_key_identifier,
199		       sizeof(policy->master_key_identifier));
200		return 0;
201	}
202	}
203	/* unreachable */
204	return -EINVAL;
205}
206
207/* Retrieve an inode's encryption policy */
208static int fscrypt_get_policy(struct inode *inode, union fscrypt_policy *policy)
209{
210	const struct fscrypt_info *ci;
211	union fscrypt_context ctx;
212	int ret;
213
214	ci = READ_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info);
215	if (ci) {
216		/* key available, use the cached policy */
217		*policy = ci->ci_policy;
218		return 0;
219	}
220
221	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
222		return -ENODATA;
223
224	ret = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
225	if (ret < 0)
226		return (ret == -ERANGE) ? -EINVAL : ret;
227
228	return fscrypt_policy_from_context(policy, &ctx, ret);
229}
230
231static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode,
232				 const union fscrypt_policy *policy)
233{
234	union fscrypt_context ctx;
235	int ctxsize;
236	int err;
237
238	if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(policy, inode))
239		return -EINVAL;
240
241	switch (policy->version) {
242	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
243		/*
244		 * The original encryption policy version provided no way of
245		 * verifying that the correct master key was supplied, which was
246		 * insecure in scenarios where multiple users have access to the
247		 * same encrypted files (even just read-only access).  The new
248		 * encryption policy version fixes this and also implies use of
249		 * an improved key derivation function and allows non-root users
250		 * to securely remove keys.  So as long as compatibility with
251		 * old kernels isn't required, it is recommended to use the new
252		 * policy version for all new encrypted directories.
253		 */
254		pr_warn_once("%s (pid %d) is setting deprecated v1 encryption policy; recommend upgrading to v2.\n",
255			     current->comm, current->pid);
256		break;
257	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
258		err = fscrypt_verify_key_added(inode->i_sb,
259					       policy->v2.master_key_identifier);
260		if (err)
261			return err;
262		break;
263	default:
264		WARN_ON(1);
265		return -EINVAL;
266	}
267
268	ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, policy);
 
 
 
 
269
270	return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, ctxsize, NULL);
271}
272
273int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
274{
275	union fscrypt_policy policy;
276	union fscrypt_policy existing_policy;
277	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
278	u8 version;
279	int size;
280	int ret;
 
281
282	if (get_user(policy.version, (const u8 __user *)arg))
283		return -EFAULT;
284
285	size = fscrypt_policy_size(&policy);
286	if (size <= 0)
287		return -EINVAL;
288
289	/*
290	 * We should just copy the remaining 'size - 1' bytes here, but a
291	 * bizarre bug in gcc 7 and earlier (fixed by gcc r255731) causes gcc to
292	 * think that size can be 0 here (despite the check above!) *and* that
293	 * it's a compile-time constant.  Thus it would think copy_from_user()
294	 * is passed compile-time constant ULONG_MAX, causing the compile-time
295	 * buffer overflow check to fail, breaking the build. This only occurred
296	 * when building an i386 kernel with -Os and branch profiling enabled.
297	 *
298	 * Work around it by just copying the first byte again...
299	 */
300	version = policy.version;
301	if (copy_from_user(&policy, arg, size))
302		return -EFAULT;
303	policy.version = version;
304
305	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
306		return -EACCES;
307
 
 
 
308	ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
309	if (ret)
310		return ret;
311
312	inode_lock(inode);
313
314	ret = fscrypt_get_policy(inode, &existing_policy);
315	if (ret == -ENODATA) {
316		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
317			ret = -ENOTDIR;
318		else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
319			ret = -ENOENT;
320		else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
321			ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
322		else
323			ret = set_encryption_policy(inode, &policy);
324	} else if (ret == -EINVAL ||
325		   (ret == 0 && !fscrypt_policies_equal(&policy,
326							&existing_policy))) {
 
 
 
 
327		/* The file already uses a different encryption policy. */
328		ret = -EEXIST;
329	}
330
331	inode_unlock(inode);
332
333	mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
334	return ret;
335}
336EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy);
337
338/* Original ioctl version; can only get the original policy version */
339int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
340{
341	union fscrypt_policy policy;
342	int err;
 
 
343
344	err = fscrypt_get_policy(file_inode(filp), &policy);
345	if (err)
346		return err;
347
348	if (policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)
 
 
 
 
 
349		return -EINVAL;
350
351	if (copy_to_user(arg, &policy, sizeof(policy.v1)))
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
352		return -EFAULT;
353	return 0;
354}
355EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy);
356
357/* Extended ioctl version; can get policies of any version */
358int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
359{
360	struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg arg;
361	union fscrypt_policy *policy = (union fscrypt_policy *)&arg.policy;
362	size_t policy_size;
363	int err;
364
365	/* arg is policy_size, then policy */
366	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(typeof(arg), policy_size) != 0);
367	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(typeof(arg), policy_size) !=
368		     offsetof(typeof(arg), policy));
369	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(arg.policy) != sizeof(*policy));
370
371	err = fscrypt_get_policy(file_inode(filp), policy);
372	if (err)
373		return err;
374	policy_size = fscrypt_policy_size(policy);
375
376	if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg.policy_size)))
377		return -EFAULT;
378
379	if (policy_size > arg.policy_size)
380		return -EOVERFLOW;
381	arg.policy_size = policy_size;
382
383	if (copy_to_user(uarg, &arg, sizeof(arg.policy_size) + policy_size))
384		return -EFAULT;
385	return 0;
386}
387EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex);
388
389/**
390 * fscrypt_has_permitted_context() - is a file's encryption policy permitted
391 *				     within its directory?
392 *
393 * @parent: inode for parent directory
394 * @child: inode for file being looked up, opened, or linked into @parent
395 *
396 * Filesystems must call this before permitting access to an inode in a
397 * situation where the parent directory is encrypted (either before allowing
398 * ->lookup() to succeed, or for a regular file before allowing it to be opened)
399 * and before any operation that involves linking an inode into an encrypted
400 * directory, including link, rename, and cross rename.  It enforces the
401 * constraint that within a given encrypted directory tree, all files use the
402 * same encryption policy.  The pre-access check is needed to detect potentially
403 * malicious offline violations of this constraint, while the link and rename
404 * checks are needed to prevent online violations of this constraint.
405 *
406 * Return: 1 if permitted, 0 if forbidden.
 
407 */
408int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
409{
410	union fscrypt_policy parent_policy, child_policy;
411	int err;
 
 
412
413	/* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
414	if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
415	    !S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
416		return 1;
417
418	/* No restrictions if the parent directory is unencrypted */
419	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent))
420		return 1;
421
422	/* Encrypted directories must not contain unencrypted files */
423	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(child))
424		return 0;
425
426	/*
427	 * Both parent and child are encrypted, so verify they use the same
428	 * encryption policy.  Compare the fscrypt_info structs if the keys are
429	 * available, otherwise retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts.
430	 *
431	 * Note that the fscrypt_context retrieval will be required frequently
432	 * when accessing an encrypted directory tree without the key.
433	 * Performance-wise this is not a big deal because we already don't
434	 * really optimize for file access without the key (to the extent that
435	 * such access is even possible), given that any attempted access
436	 * already causes a fscrypt_context retrieval and keyring search.
437	 *
438	 * In any case, if an unexpected error occurs, fall back to "forbidden".
439	 */
440
441	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
442	if (err)
443		return 0;
444	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child);
445	if (err)
446		return 0;
 
 
447
448	err = fscrypt_get_policy(parent, &parent_policy);
449	if (err)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
450		return 0;
451
452	err = fscrypt_get_policy(child, &child_policy);
453	if (err)
454		return 0;
455
456	return fscrypt_policies_equal(&parent_policy, &child_policy);
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
457}
458EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context);
459
460/**
461 * fscrypt_inherit_context() - Sets a child context from its parent
462 * @parent: Parent inode from which the context is inherited.
463 * @child:  Child inode that inherits the context from @parent.
464 * @fs_data:  private data given by FS.
465 * @preload:  preload child i_crypt_info if true
466 *
467 * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
468 */
469int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child,
470						void *fs_data, bool preload)
471{
472	union fscrypt_context ctx;
473	int ctxsize;
474	struct fscrypt_info *ci;
475	int res;
476
477	res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
478	if (res < 0)
479		return res;
480
481	ci = READ_ONCE(parent->i_crypt_info);
482	if (ci == NULL)
483		return -ENOKEY;
484
485	ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, &ci->ci_policy);
486
 
 
 
 
 
487	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);
488	res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx, ctxsize, fs_data);
 
489	if (res)
490		return res;
491	return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0;
492}
493EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context);