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1#include <linux/kernel.h>
2#include <linux/syscalls.h>
3#include <linux/fdtable.h>
4#include <linux/string.h>
5#include <linux/random.h>
6#include <linux/module.h>
7#include <linux/ptrace.h>
8#include <linux/init.h>
9#include <linux/errno.h>
10#include <linux/cache.h>
11#include <linux/bug.h>
12#include <linux/err.h>
13#include <linux/kcmp.h>
14
15#include <asm/unistd.h>
16
17/*
18 * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
19 * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
20 * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
21 *
22 * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
23 * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
24 * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
25 * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
26 * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
27 * relative prime to 2^n).
28 *
29 * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
30 * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
31 */
32static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
33
34static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
35{
36 return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
37}
38
39/*
40 * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
41 * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
42 * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
43 * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
44 */
45static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
46{
47 long ret;
48
49 ret = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type) - kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
50
51 return (ret < 0) | ((ret > 0) << 1);
52}
53
54/* The caller must have pinned the task */
55static struct file *
56get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
57{
58 struct file *file = NULL;
59
60 task_lock(task);
61 rcu_read_lock();
62
63 if (task->files)
64 file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);
65
66 rcu_read_unlock();
67 task_unlock(task);
68
69 return file;
70}
71
72static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
73{
74 if (likely(m2 != m1))
75 mutex_unlock(m2);
76 mutex_unlock(m1);
77}
78
79static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
80{
81 int err;
82
83 if (m2 > m1)
84 swap(m1, m2);
85
86 err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
87 if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
88 err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
89 if (err)
90 mutex_unlock(m1);
91 }
92
93 return err;
94}
95
96SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
97 unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
98{
99 struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
100 int ret;
101
102 rcu_read_lock();
103
104 /*
105 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
106 */
107 task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
108 task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
109 if (!task1 || !task2)
110 goto err_no_task;
111
112 get_task_struct(task1);
113 get_task_struct(task2);
114
115 rcu_read_unlock();
116
117 /*
118 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
119 */
120 ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
121 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
122 if (ret)
123 goto err;
124 if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
125 !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
126 ret = -EPERM;
127 goto err_unlock;
128 }
129
130 switch (type) {
131 case KCMP_FILE: {
132 struct file *filp1, *filp2;
133
134 filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
135 filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
136
137 if (filp1 && filp2)
138 ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
139 else
140 ret = -EBADF;
141 break;
142 }
143 case KCMP_VM:
144 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
145 break;
146 case KCMP_FILES:
147 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
148 break;
149 case KCMP_FS:
150 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
151 break;
152 case KCMP_SIGHAND:
153 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
154 break;
155 case KCMP_IO:
156 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
157 break;
158 case KCMP_SYSVSEM:
159#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
160 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
161 task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
162 KCMP_SYSVSEM);
163#else
164 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
165#endif
166 break;
167 default:
168 ret = -EINVAL;
169 break;
170 }
171
172err_unlock:
173 kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
174 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
175err:
176 put_task_struct(task1);
177 put_task_struct(task2);
178
179 return ret;
180
181err_no_task:
182 rcu_read_unlock();
183 return -ESRCH;
184}
185
186static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
187{
188 int i;
189
190 get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
191
192 for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
193 cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1);
194
195 return 0;
196}
197arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2#include <linux/kernel.h>
3#include <linux/syscalls.h>
4#include <linux/fdtable.h>
5#include <linux/string.h>
6#include <linux/random.h>
7#include <linux/module.h>
8#include <linux/ptrace.h>
9#include <linux/init.h>
10#include <linux/errno.h>
11#include <linux/cache.h>
12#include <linux/bug.h>
13#include <linux/err.h>
14#include <linux/kcmp.h>
15#include <linux/capability.h>
16#include <linux/list.h>
17#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
18#include <linux/file.h>
19
20#include <asm/unistd.h>
21
22/*
23 * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
24 * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
25 * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
26 *
27 * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
28 * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
29 * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
30 * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
31 * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
32 * relative prime to 2^n).
33 *
34 * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
35 * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
36 */
37static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
38
39static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
40{
41 return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
42}
43
44/*
45 * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
46 * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
47 * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
48 * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
49 */
50static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
51{
52 long t1, t2;
53
54 t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type);
55 t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
56
57 return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1);
58}
59
60/* The caller must have pinned the task */
61static struct file *
62get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
63{
64 struct file *file = NULL;
65
66 task_lock(task);
67 rcu_read_lock();
68
69 if (task->files)
70 file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);
71
72 rcu_read_unlock();
73 task_unlock(task);
74
75 return file;
76}
77
78static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
79{
80 if (likely(m2 != m1))
81 mutex_unlock(m2);
82 mutex_unlock(m1);
83}
84
85static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
86{
87 int err;
88
89 if (m2 > m1)
90 swap(m1, m2);
91
92 err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
93 if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
94 err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
95 if (err)
96 mutex_unlock(m1);
97 }
98
99 return err;
100}
101
102#ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL
103static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
104 struct task_struct *task2,
105 unsigned long idx1,
106 struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot)
107{
108 struct file *filp, *filp_epoll, *filp_tgt;
109 struct kcmp_epoll_slot slot;
110 struct files_struct *files;
111
112 if (copy_from_user(&slot, uslot, sizeof(slot)))
113 return -EFAULT;
114
115 filp = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
116 if (!filp)
117 return -EBADF;
118
119 files = get_files_struct(task2);
120 if (!files)
121 return -EBADF;
122
123 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
124 filp_epoll = fcheck_files(files, slot.efd);
125 if (filp_epoll)
126 get_file(filp_epoll);
127 else
128 filp_tgt = ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
129 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
130 put_files_struct(files);
131
132 if (filp_epoll) {
133 filp_tgt = get_epoll_tfile_raw_ptr(filp_epoll, slot.tfd, slot.toff);
134 fput(filp_epoll);
135 }
136
137 if (IS_ERR(filp_tgt))
138 return PTR_ERR(filp_tgt);
139
140 return kcmp_ptr(filp, filp_tgt, KCMP_FILE);
141}
142#else
143static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
144 struct task_struct *task2,
145 unsigned long idx1,
146 struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot)
147{
148 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
149}
150#endif
151
152SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
153 unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
154{
155 struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
156 int ret;
157
158 rcu_read_lock();
159
160 /*
161 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
162 */
163 task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
164 task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
165 if (!task1 || !task2)
166 goto err_no_task;
167
168 get_task_struct(task1);
169 get_task_struct(task2);
170
171 rcu_read_unlock();
172
173 /*
174 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
175 */
176 ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
177 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
178 if (ret)
179 goto err;
180 if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
181 !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
182 ret = -EPERM;
183 goto err_unlock;
184 }
185
186 switch (type) {
187 case KCMP_FILE: {
188 struct file *filp1, *filp2;
189
190 filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
191 filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
192
193 if (filp1 && filp2)
194 ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
195 else
196 ret = -EBADF;
197 break;
198 }
199 case KCMP_VM:
200 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
201 break;
202 case KCMP_FILES:
203 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
204 break;
205 case KCMP_FS:
206 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
207 break;
208 case KCMP_SIGHAND:
209 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
210 break;
211 case KCMP_IO:
212 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
213 break;
214 case KCMP_SYSVSEM:
215#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
216 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
217 task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
218 KCMP_SYSVSEM);
219#else
220 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
221#endif
222 break;
223 case KCMP_EPOLL_TFD:
224 ret = kcmp_epoll_target(task1, task2, idx1, (void *)idx2);
225 break;
226 default:
227 ret = -EINVAL;
228 break;
229 }
230
231err_unlock:
232 kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
233 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
234err:
235 put_task_struct(task1);
236 put_task_struct(task2);
237
238 return ret;
239
240err_no_task:
241 rcu_read_unlock();
242 return -ESRCH;
243}
244
245static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
246{
247 int i;
248
249 get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
250
251 for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
252 cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1);
253
254 return 0;
255}
256arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);