Loading...
1/*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15#include <linux/security.h>
16#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
17#include <linux/mm.h>
18#include <linux/mman.h>
19#include <linux/mount.h>
20#include <linux/namei.h>
21#include <linux/ptrace.h>
22#include <linux/ctype.h>
23#include <linux/sysctl.h>
24#include <linux/audit.h>
25#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
26#include <net/sock.h>
27
28#include "include/apparmor.h"
29#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
30#include "include/audit.h"
31#include "include/capability.h"
32#include "include/context.h"
33#include "include/file.h"
34#include "include/ipc.h"
35#include "include/path.h"
36#include "include/policy.h"
37#include "include/procattr.h"
38
39/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
40int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
41
42/*
43 * LSM hook functions
44 */
45
46/*
47 * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
48 */
49static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
50{
51 aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
52 cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
53}
54
55/*
56 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
57 */
58static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
59{
60 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
61 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
62 if (!cxt)
63 return -ENOMEM;
64
65 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
66 return 0;
67}
68
69/*
70 * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
71 */
72static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
73 gfp_t gfp)
74{
75 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
76 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
77 if (!cxt)
78 return -ENOMEM;
79
80 aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
81 cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
82 return 0;
83}
84
85/*
86 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
87 */
88static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
89{
90 const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
91 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
92
93 aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
94}
95
96static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
97 unsigned int mode)
98{
99 int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
100 if (error)
101 return error;
102
103 return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
104}
105
106static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
107{
108 int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
109 if (error)
110 return error;
111
112 return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
113}
114
115/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
116static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
117 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
118{
119 struct aa_profile *profile;
120 const struct cred *cred;
121
122 rcu_read_lock();
123 cred = __task_cred(target);
124 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
125
126 *effective = cred->cap_effective;
127 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
128 *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
129
130 if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
131 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
132 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
133 }
134 rcu_read_unlock();
135
136 return 0;
137}
138
139static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
140 int cap, int audit)
141{
142 struct aa_profile *profile;
143 /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
144 int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
145 if (!error) {
146 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
147 if (!unconfined(profile))
148 error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
149 }
150 return error;
151}
152
153/**
154 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
155 * @op: operation being checked
156 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
157 * @mask: requested permissions mask
158 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
159 *
160 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
161 */
162static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
163 struct path_cond *cond)
164{
165 struct aa_profile *profile;
166 int error = 0;
167
168 profile = __aa_current_profile();
169 if (!unconfined(profile))
170 error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
171
172 return error;
173}
174
175/**
176 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
177 * @op: operation being checked
178 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
179 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
180 * @mask: requested permissions mask
181 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
182 *
183 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
184 */
185static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
186 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
187 struct path_cond *cond)
188{
189 struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
190
191 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
192}
193
194/**
195 * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
196 * @op: operation being checked
197 * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
198 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
199 * @mask: requested permissions mask
200 *
201 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
202 */
203static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
204 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
205{
206 struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
207 struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
208 dentry->d_inode->i_mode
209 };
210
211 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
212}
213
214/**
215 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
216 * @op: operation being checked
217 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
218 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
219 * @mask: requested permission mask
220 *
221 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
222 */
223static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
224 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
225{
226 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
227 struct path_cond cond = { };
228
229 if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode))
230 return 0;
231
232 cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
233 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
234
235 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
236}
237
238/**
239 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
240 * @op: operation being checked
241 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
242 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
243 * @mask: request permission mask
244 * @mode: created file mode
245 *
246 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
247 */
248static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
249 u32 mask, umode_t mode)
250{
251 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
252
253 if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode))
254 return 0;
255
256 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
257}
258
259static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
260{
261 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
262}
263
264static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
265 umode_t mode)
266{
267 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
268 S_IFDIR);
269}
270
271static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
272{
273 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
274}
275
276static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
277 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
278{
279 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
280}
281
282static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path)
283{
284 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
285 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
286 };
287
288 if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
289 return 0;
290
291 return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
292 &cond);
293}
294
295static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
296 const char *old_name)
297{
298 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
299 S_IFLNK);
300}
301
302static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
303 struct dentry *new_dentry)
304{
305 struct aa_profile *profile;
306 int error = 0;
307
308 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
309 return 0;
310
311 profile = aa_current_profile();
312 if (!unconfined(profile))
313 error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
314 return error;
315}
316
317static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
318 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
319{
320 struct aa_profile *profile;
321 int error = 0;
322
323 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
324 return 0;
325
326 profile = aa_current_profile();
327 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
328 struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
329 struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
330 struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
331 old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
332 };
333
334 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
335 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
336 AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
337 &cond);
338 if (!error)
339 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
340 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
341 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
342
343 }
344 return error;
345}
346
347static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
348{
349 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
350 return 0;
351
352 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
353}
354
355static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
356{
357 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
358 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
359 };
360
361 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
362 return 0;
363
364 return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
365}
366
367static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
368{
369 if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
370 return 0;
371
372 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry,
373 AA_MAY_META_READ);
374}
375
376static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
377{
378 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
379 struct aa_profile *profile;
380 int error = 0;
381
382 if (!mediated_filesystem(file_inode(file)))
383 return 0;
384
385 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
386 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
387 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
388 * actually execute the image.
389 */
390 if (current->in_execve) {
391 fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
392 return 0;
393 }
394
395 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
396 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
397 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
398 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
399
400 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
401 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
402 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
403 fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
404 }
405
406 return error;
407}
408
409static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
410{
411 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
412 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
413 if (!file->f_security)
414 return -ENOMEM;
415 return 0;
416
417}
418
419static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
420{
421 struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
422
423 aa_free_file_context(cxt);
424}
425
426static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
427{
428 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
429 struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
430 int error = 0;
431
432 BUG_ON(!fprofile);
433
434 if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
435 !mediated_filesystem(file_inode(file)))
436 return 0;
437
438 profile = __aa_current_profile();
439
440 /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
441 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
442 * was granted.
443 *
444 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
445 * delegation from unconfined tasks
446 */
447 if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
448 ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
449 error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
450
451 return error;
452}
453
454static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
455{
456 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
457}
458
459static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
460{
461 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
462
463 if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
464 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
465
466 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
467}
468
469static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
470 unsigned long flags)
471{
472 int mask = 0;
473
474 if (!file || !file->f_security)
475 return 0;
476
477 if (prot & PROT_READ)
478 mask |= MAY_READ;
479 /*
480 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
481 * write back to the files
482 */
483 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
484 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
485 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
486 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
487
488 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
489}
490
491static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
492 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
493{
494 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
495}
496
497static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
498 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
499{
500 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
501 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
502}
503
504static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
505 char **value)
506{
507 int error = -ENOENT;
508 /* released below */
509 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
510 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
511 struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
512
513 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
514 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
515 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
516 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
517 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
518 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
519 else
520 error = -EINVAL;
521
522 if (profile)
523 error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
524
525 aa_put_profile(profile);
526 put_cred(cred);
527
528 return error;
529}
530
531static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
532 void *value, size_t size)
533{
534 struct common_audit_data sa;
535 struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
536 char *command, *args = value;
537 size_t arg_size;
538 int error;
539
540 if (size == 0)
541 return -EINVAL;
542 /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
543 * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
544 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
545 */
546 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
547 if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
548 return -EINVAL;
549 args[size] = '\0';
550 }
551
552 /* task can only write its own attributes */
553 if (current != task)
554 return -EACCES;
555
556 args = value;
557 args = strim(args);
558 command = strsep(&args, " ");
559 if (!args)
560 return -EINVAL;
561 args = skip_spaces(args);
562 if (!*args)
563 return -EINVAL;
564
565 arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
566 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
567 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
568 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
569 !AA_DO_TEST);
570 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
571 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
572 AA_DO_TEST);
573 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
574 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
575 !AA_DO_TEST);
576 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
577 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
578 AA_DO_TEST);
579 } else
580 goto fail;
581 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
582 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
583 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
584 !AA_DO_TEST);
585 else
586 goto fail;
587 } else
588 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
589 return -EINVAL;
590
591 if (!error)
592 error = size;
593 return error;
594
595fail:
596 sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
597 sa.aad = &aad;
598 aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
599 aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
600 aad.info = name;
601 aad.error = -EINVAL;
602 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
603 return -EINVAL;
604}
605
606static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
607 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
608{
609 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
610 int error = 0;
611
612 if (!unconfined(profile))
613 error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
614
615 return error;
616}
617
618static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
619 .name = "apparmor",
620
621 .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
622 .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
623 .capget = apparmor_capget,
624 .capable = apparmor_capable,
625
626 .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
627 .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
628 .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
629 .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
630 .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
631 .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
632 .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
633 .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
634 .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
635 .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
636 .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
637
638 .file_open = apparmor_file_open,
639 .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
640 .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
641 .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
642 .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file,
643 .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
644 .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
645 .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
646
647 .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
648 .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
649
650 .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
651 .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
652 .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
653 .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer,
654
655 .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
656 .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
657 .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
658 .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
659
660 .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
661};
662
663/*
664 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
665 */
666
667static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
668static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
669#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
670static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
671 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARG,
672 .set = param_set_aabool,
673 .get = param_get_aabool
674};
675
676static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
677static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
678#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
679static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
680 .set = param_set_aauint,
681 .get = param_get_aauint
682};
683
684static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
685static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
686#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
687static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
688 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARG,
689 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
690 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
691};
692
693static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
694static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
695
696static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
697static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
698
699/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
700 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
701 */
702
703/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
704enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
705module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
706 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
707
708/* Debug mode */
709bool aa_g_debug;
710module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
711
712/* Audit mode */
713enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
714module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
715 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
716
717/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
718 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
719 */
720bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
721module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
722 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
723
724/* lock out loading/removal of policy
725 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
726 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
727 */
728bool aa_g_lock_policy;
729module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
730 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
731
732/* Syscall logging mode */
733bool aa_g_logsyscall;
734module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
735
736/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
737unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
738module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
739
740/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
741 * on the loaded policy is done.
742 */
743bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
744module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
745 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
746
747/* Boot time disable flag */
748static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
749module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
750
751static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
752{
753 unsigned long enabled;
754 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
755 if (!error)
756 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
757 return 1;
758}
759
760__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
761
762/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
763static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
764{
765 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
766 return -EPERM;
767 if (aa_g_lock_policy)
768 return -EACCES;
769 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
770}
771
772static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
773{
774 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
775 return -EPERM;
776 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
777}
778
779static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
780{
781 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
782 return -EPERM;
783 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
784}
785
786static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
787{
788 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
789 return -EPERM;
790 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
791}
792
793static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
794{
795 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
796 return -EPERM;
797 return param_set_uint(val, kp);
798}
799
800static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
801{
802 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
803 return -EPERM;
804 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
805}
806
807static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
808{
809 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
810 return -EPERM;
811
812 if (!apparmor_enabled)
813 return -EINVAL;
814
815 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
816}
817
818static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
819{
820 int i;
821 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
822 return -EPERM;
823
824 if (!apparmor_enabled)
825 return -EINVAL;
826
827 if (!val)
828 return -EINVAL;
829
830 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
831 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
832 aa_g_audit = i;
833 return 0;
834 }
835 }
836
837 return -EINVAL;
838}
839
840static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
841{
842 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
843 return -EPERM;
844
845 if (!apparmor_enabled)
846 return -EINVAL;
847
848 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
849}
850
851static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
852{
853 int i;
854 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
855 return -EPERM;
856
857 if (!apparmor_enabled)
858 return -EINVAL;
859
860 if (!val)
861 return -EINVAL;
862
863 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
864 if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
865 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
866 return 0;
867 }
868 }
869
870 return -EINVAL;
871}
872
873/*
874 * AppArmor init functions
875 */
876
877/**
878 * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
879 *
880 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
881 */
882static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
883{
884 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
885 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
886
887 cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
888 if (!cxt)
889 return -ENOMEM;
890
891 cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
892 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
893
894 return 0;
895}
896
897static int __init apparmor_init(void)
898{
899 int error;
900
901 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
902 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
903 apparmor_enabled = 0;
904 return 0;
905 }
906
907 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
908 if (error) {
909 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
910 goto alloc_out;
911 }
912
913 error = set_init_cxt();
914 if (error) {
915 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
916 goto register_security_out;
917 }
918
919 error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
920 if (error) {
921 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
922 aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
923 cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
924 AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
925 goto register_security_out;
926 }
927
928 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
929 apparmor_initialized = 1;
930 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
931 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
932 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
933 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
934 else
935 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
936
937 return error;
938
939register_security_out:
940 aa_free_root_ns();
941
942alloc_out:
943 aa_destroy_aafs();
944
945 apparmor_enabled = 0;
946 return error;
947}
948
949security_initcall(apparmor_init);
1/*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
16#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
17#include <linux/mm.h>
18#include <linux/mman.h>
19#include <linux/mount.h>
20#include <linux/namei.h>
21#include <linux/ptrace.h>
22#include <linux/ctype.h>
23#include <linux/sysctl.h>
24#include <linux/audit.h>
25#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
26#include <net/sock.h>
27
28#include "include/apparmor.h"
29#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
30#include "include/audit.h"
31#include "include/capability.h"
32#include "include/context.h"
33#include "include/file.h"
34#include "include/ipc.h"
35#include "include/path.h"
36#include "include/policy.h"
37#include "include/procattr.h"
38
39/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
40int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
41
42/*
43 * LSM hook functions
44 */
45
46/*
47 * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
48 */
49static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
50{
51 aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
52 cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
53}
54
55/*
56 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
57 */
58static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
59{
60 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
61 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
62 if (!cxt)
63 return -ENOMEM;
64
65 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
66 return 0;
67}
68
69/*
70 * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
71 */
72static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
73 gfp_t gfp)
74{
75 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
76 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
77 if (!cxt)
78 return -ENOMEM;
79
80 aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
81 cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
82 return 0;
83}
84
85/*
86 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
87 */
88static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
89{
90 const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
91 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
92
93 aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
94}
95
96static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
97 unsigned int mode)
98{
99 return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
100}
101
102static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
103{
104 return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
105}
106
107/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
108static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
109 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
110{
111 struct aa_profile *profile;
112 const struct cred *cred;
113
114 rcu_read_lock();
115 cred = __task_cred(target);
116 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
117
118 /*
119 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
120 * initialize effective and permitted.
121 */
122 if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
123 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
124 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
125 }
126 rcu_read_unlock();
127
128 return 0;
129}
130
131static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
132 int cap, int audit)
133{
134 struct aa_profile *profile;
135 int error = 0;
136
137 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
138 if (!unconfined(profile))
139 error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
140 return error;
141}
142
143/**
144 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
145 * @op: operation being checked
146 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
147 * @mask: requested permissions mask
148 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
149 *
150 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
151 */
152static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
153 struct path_cond *cond)
154{
155 struct aa_profile *profile;
156 int error = 0;
157
158 profile = __aa_current_profile();
159 if (!unconfined(profile))
160 error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
161
162 return error;
163}
164
165/**
166 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
167 * @op: operation being checked
168 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
169 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
170 * @mask: requested permissions mask
171 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
172 *
173 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
174 */
175static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
176 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
177 struct path_cond *cond)
178{
179 struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
180
181 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
182}
183
184/**
185 * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
186 * @op: operation being checked
187 * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
188 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
189 * @mask: requested permissions mask
190 *
191 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
192 */
193static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
194 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
195{
196 struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
197 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_uid,
198 d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_mode
199 };
200
201 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
202}
203
204/**
205 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
206 * @op: operation being checked
207 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
208 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
209 * @mask: requested permission mask
210 *
211 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
212 */
213static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
214 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
215{
216 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
217 struct path_cond cond = { };
218
219 if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dentry))
220 return 0;
221
222 cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
223 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
224
225 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
226}
227
228/**
229 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
230 * @op: operation being checked
231 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
232 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
233 * @mask: request permission mask
234 * @mode: created file mode
235 *
236 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
237 */
238static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
239 u32 mask, umode_t mode)
240{
241 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
242
243 if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry))
244 return 0;
245
246 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
247}
248
249static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
250{
251 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
252}
253
254static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
255 umode_t mode)
256{
257 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
258 S_IFDIR);
259}
260
261static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
262{
263 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
264}
265
266static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
267 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
268{
269 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
270}
271
272static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path)
273{
274 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
275 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
276 };
277
278 if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
279 return 0;
280
281 return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
282 &cond);
283}
284
285static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
286 const char *old_name)
287{
288 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
289 S_IFLNK);
290}
291
292static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
293 struct dentry *new_dentry)
294{
295 struct aa_profile *profile;
296 int error = 0;
297
298 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
299 return 0;
300
301 profile = aa_current_profile();
302 if (!unconfined(profile))
303 error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
304 return error;
305}
306
307static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
308 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
309{
310 struct aa_profile *profile;
311 int error = 0;
312
313 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
314 return 0;
315
316 profile = aa_current_profile();
317 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
318 struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
319 struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
320 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
321 d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
322 };
323
324 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
325 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
326 AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
327 &cond);
328 if (!error)
329 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
330 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
331 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
332
333 }
334 return error;
335}
336
337static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
338{
339 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
340 return 0;
341
342 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
343}
344
345static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
346{
347 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
348 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
349 };
350
351 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
352 return 0;
353
354 return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
355}
356
357static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
358{
359 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
360 return 0;
361
362 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, path->mnt, path->dentry,
363 AA_MAY_META_READ);
364}
365
366static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
367{
368 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
369 struct aa_profile *profile;
370 int error = 0;
371
372 if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
373 return 0;
374
375 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
376 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
377 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
378 * actually execute the image.
379 */
380 if (current->in_execve) {
381 fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
382 return 0;
383 }
384
385 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
386 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
387 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
388 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
389
390 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
391 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
392 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
393 fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
394 }
395
396 return error;
397}
398
399static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
400{
401 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
402 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
403 if (!file->f_security)
404 return -ENOMEM;
405 return 0;
406
407}
408
409static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
410{
411 struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
412
413 aa_free_file_context(cxt);
414}
415
416static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
417{
418 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
419 struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
420 int error = 0;
421
422 BUG_ON(!fprofile);
423
424 if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
425 !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
426 return 0;
427
428 profile = __aa_current_profile();
429
430 /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
431 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
432 * was granted.
433 *
434 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
435 * delegation from unconfined tasks
436 */
437 if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
438 ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
439 error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
440
441 return error;
442}
443
444static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
445{
446 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
447}
448
449static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
450{
451 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
452
453 if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
454 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
455
456 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
457}
458
459static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
460 unsigned long flags)
461{
462 int mask = 0;
463
464 if (!file || !file->f_security)
465 return 0;
466
467 if (prot & PROT_READ)
468 mask |= MAY_READ;
469 /*
470 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
471 * write back to the files
472 */
473 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
474 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
475 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
476 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
477
478 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
479}
480
481static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
482 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
483{
484 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
485}
486
487static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
488 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
489{
490 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
491 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
492}
493
494static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
495 char **value)
496{
497 int error = -ENOENT;
498 /* released below */
499 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
500 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
501 struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
502
503 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
504 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
505 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
506 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
507 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
508 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
509 else
510 error = -EINVAL;
511
512 if (profile)
513 error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
514
515 aa_put_profile(profile);
516 put_cred(cred);
517
518 return error;
519}
520
521static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
522 void *value, size_t size)
523{
524 struct common_audit_data sa;
525 struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
526 char *command, *args = value;
527 size_t arg_size;
528 int error;
529
530 if (size == 0)
531 return -EINVAL;
532 /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
533 * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
534 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
535 */
536 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
537 if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
538 return -EINVAL;
539 args[size] = '\0';
540 }
541
542 /* task can only write its own attributes */
543 if (current != task)
544 return -EACCES;
545
546 args = value;
547 args = strim(args);
548 command = strsep(&args, " ");
549 if (!args)
550 return -EINVAL;
551 args = skip_spaces(args);
552 if (!*args)
553 return -EINVAL;
554
555 arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
556 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
557 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
558 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
559 !AA_DO_TEST);
560 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
561 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
562 AA_DO_TEST);
563 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
564 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
565 !AA_DO_TEST);
566 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
567 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
568 AA_DO_TEST);
569 } else
570 goto fail;
571 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
572 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
573 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
574 !AA_DO_TEST);
575 else
576 goto fail;
577 } else
578 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
579 return -EINVAL;
580
581 if (!error)
582 error = size;
583 return error;
584
585fail:
586 sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
587 sa.aad = &aad;
588 aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
589 aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
590 aad.info = name;
591 aad.error = -EINVAL;
592 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
593 return -EINVAL;
594}
595
596static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
597 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
598{
599 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
600 int error = 0;
601
602 if (!unconfined(profile))
603 error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
604
605 return error;
606}
607
608static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
610 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
612 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
613
614 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
615 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
616 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
618 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
620 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
625
626 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
628 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
630 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
631 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
632 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
633
634 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
635 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
636
637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
639 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
640 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
641
642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
645 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
646
647 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
648};
649
650/*
651 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
652 */
653
654static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
655static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
656#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
657static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
658 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
659 .set = param_set_aabool,
660 .get = param_get_aabool
661};
662
663static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
664static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
665#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
666static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
667 .set = param_set_aauint,
668 .get = param_get_aauint
669};
670
671static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
672static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
673#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
674static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
675 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
676 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
677 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
678};
679
680static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
681static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
682
683static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
684static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
685
686/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
687 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
688 */
689
690/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
691enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
692module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
693 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
694
695/* Debug mode */
696bool aa_g_debug;
697module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
698
699/* Audit mode */
700enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
701module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
702 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
703
704/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
705 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
706 */
707bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
708module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
709 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
710
711/* lock out loading/removal of policy
712 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
713 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
714 */
715bool aa_g_lock_policy;
716module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
717 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
718
719/* Syscall logging mode */
720bool aa_g_logsyscall;
721module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
722
723/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
724unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
725module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
726
727/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
728 * on the loaded policy is done.
729 */
730bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
731module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
732 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
733
734/* Boot time disable flag */
735static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
736module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
737
738static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
739{
740 unsigned long enabled;
741 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
742 if (!error)
743 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
744 return 1;
745}
746
747__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
748
749/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
750static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
751{
752 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
753 return -EPERM;
754 if (aa_g_lock_policy)
755 return -EACCES;
756 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
757}
758
759static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
760{
761 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
762 return -EPERM;
763 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
764}
765
766static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
767{
768 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
769 return -EPERM;
770 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
771}
772
773static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
774{
775 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
776 return -EPERM;
777 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
778}
779
780static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
781{
782 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
783 return -EPERM;
784 return param_set_uint(val, kp);
785}
786
787static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
788{
789 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
790 return -EPERM;
791 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
792}
793
794static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
795{
796 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
797 return -EPERM;
798
799 if (!apparmor_enabled)
800 return -EINVAL;
801
802 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
803}
804
805static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
806{
807 int i;
808 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
809 return -EPERM;
810
811 if (!apparmor_enabled)
812 return -EINVAL;
813
814 if (!val)
815 return -EINVAL;
816
817 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
818 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
819 aa_g_audit = i;
820 return 0;
821 }
822 }
823
824 return -EINVAL;
825}
826
827static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
828{
829 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
830 return -EPERM;
831
832 if (!apparmor_enabled)
833 return -EINVAL;
834
835 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
836}
837
838static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
839{
840 int i;
841 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
842 return -EPERM;
843
844 if (!apparmor_enabled)
845 return -EINVAL;
846
847 if (!val)
848 return -EINVAL;
849
850 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
851 if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
852 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
853 return 0;
854 }
855 }
856
857 return -EINVAL;
858}
859
860/*
861 * AppArmor init functions
862 */
863
864/**
865 * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
866 *
867 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
868 */
869static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
870{
871 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
872 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
873
874 cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
875 if (!cxt)
876 return -ENOMEM;
877
878 cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
879 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
880
881 return 0;
882}
883
884static int __init apparmor_init(void)
885{
886 int error;
887
888 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
889 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
890 apparmor_enabled = 0;
891 return 0;
892 }
893
894 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
895 if (error) {
896 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
897 goto alloc_out;
898 }
899
900 error = set_init_cxt();
901 if (error) {
902 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
903 aa_free_root_ns();
904 goto alloc_out;
905 }
906 security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
907
908 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
909 apparmor_initialized = 1;
910 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
911 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
912 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
913 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
914 else
915 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
916
917 return error;
918
919alloc_out:
920 aa_destroy_aafs();
921
922 apparmor_enabled = 0;
923 return error;
924}
925
926security_initcall(apparmor_init);